ML19209D171: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMMISSloN
{{#Wiki_filter:U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMMISSloN
'RC FORM 3G,G .
'RC FORM 3G,G .
7-7 H LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: l lllll1h (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATIONI 1 6l0 lH D lB S l 1 l@l 0 l 0]- l 0 l 0 lN l P lF l- l013 @l 4 1lll1l1l@l ll@, 23 2ti LICENSE TYPE JJ bl GAT $d:o 1 8 9 LICE ?.SE. CODE 14 15 LICEN5E NUYaER
7-7 H LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: l 1
[c'3"j l L j@l 0 ] 5 l 0 l- l 0 l 3 l 4 l 6 l@l 0 7 l2 [5 [7 l9 l@l0 l8 l2 l1 l7 l9 @
l    l    l    l  l 6
CON'T 14 b REPORT DATE 80'O 1 68 63 EVENT DATE cJ 61 COCK ET NUYSER 8 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROB ABLE CONSEQUENCES h it was j 1400 hours on 7 /25/79 while performing routine preventative maintenance, 10 2 l At train (S33-2) of the Control Room Emergency Ventilatioq to 3 l found that #2 concensing unit System (EVS) would not start.
1h                (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATIONI l    l@                      ,
This placed the unit in the Action Statement of T.S.
:o          1 8 9 l0 lH D lB LICE ?.SE. CODE S l 1 l@l 0 l 0]- LICEN5E 14    15 l 0 lNUYaER 0 lN l P lF l- l013LICENSE 23    2ti        @l 4TYPE1lll1l1l@l JJ   bl GAT $d CON'T
j o 4lThere was no danger to the health and saf ety of the public or station per-lo 5 1 3.7.6.1.lTrain 1 of the Control Room EVS was available for use if an event recuiring 0 6l sonnel.0 7 l EVS operation had ocegered.
'O          1             [c'3"j l L j@l 0 ] 5 l 0 l- l 0 l 3 l 4 l 6 68l@l 630                              7EVENT l2 DATE
Each EVS train is designed for full capacity.
[5 [7 l9 l@l0   14      b l8REPORT l2 l1     l7 l980@
lI[_@P-33-79-99) 60 O a COYP.VALVE SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE CODE COOE SUBOODE CO*AFCNENT CODE S'J SCO C E SUSCODE Ol9]lSlClh l El@ l B lh Ml Ol Tl 0l Rl Xlh Wh W h 7 8 9 10 11 12 fJ 13 19 10 REVISION SEQUENTI AL OCCUR R E NCE REPORT_EVENTYEAR REPORT NO.
DATE 8                      cJ           61             COCK ET NUYSER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROB ABLE CONSEQUENCES h                                                                                                           it was         j 10          2 l At 1400 hours on 7 /25/79 while performing routine preventative maintenance, to          3 l found that #2 concensing unit train (S33-2) of the Control Room Emergency Ventilatioq j
CODE TYPE N O.@ .ggr! 71 91 1-1 10 8l6ll-l 10l31lL I l-1 11lLER RO_ 21 22 23 24 2 ti 27 23 29 JJ 31 32 TAK AC T C 0 L NT C HOURS S 9 iT E FO UB.5 PLIE'J A FACT RCR Jgl34 Xl@l Zl@@l 0] 0l 0l 01 Yl@[N[@l Al@lT 2 l 6 l 5.j@ , 31 40 41 42 43 44 47 J3 35 ao CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h
o        4            System (EVS) would not start. This placed the unit in the Action Statement of T.S.
-failure; one of three thermistors in the com-l l This occurrence was caused by component i O]i li ) { pressor motor winding had failed opening the circuit thus preventing it f rom s tarting .I The f aulty thermistor was bypassed and the system was successfully tested and declareq i 7 ll3) [ operable removing the unit from the Action Statement.
l lo          5      1    3.7.6.1.            There was no danger to the health and saf ety of the public or station per-l 0        6       l sonnel.             Train 1 of the Control Room EVS was available for use if an event recuiring 0         7 l EVS operation had ocegered.                                         Each EVS train is designed for full capacity.                                                           l I
FCR 77-291 will be implemented 1 i_ [ ]l to bypass the " overload trip" function.
60 O        a      [_@P-33-79-99)                                                                                                         COYP.           VALVE SYSTEM             CAUSE           CAUSE                                                   S'J SCO C E        SUSCODE CODE               COOE       SUBOODE                 CO*AFCNENT CODE Ol9]                                 lSlClh l El@ l B lh                     12            fJ Ml Ol Tl 0l Rl Xlh Wh W h13            19              10 8                       9           10         11                                                                                                       REVISION 7
_l 1 , 80 8 9 STA 3% PC/.E R GTHER STATUS b1SCO RY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION NAlB j@l Preventative maintenance lEl@ l1l0l0l@l i 5 ACTIVITY CC NTENT loc ATION OF RELE ASE RELEASEO OF RELE ASE A'JOUNT CF ACTIVITY W @ lZ i @ l NA l[NA i G 80 44 45 7 8 9 10 11 PERSONNEL E XPOSURES
OCCUR R E NCE           REPORT SEQUENTI AL                                                TYPE                           N O.
-NUVSER TYDE DESCRIPTION l 0 l 0 l 0 j@l Z l@l NA i 7 PERSONNEL INJUR ES i fg j NUYSER DESCRtDTION lb !NA I 4{(/go 7 8 9 11 12 ,,, " I O { g Q
REPORT NO.                            CODE
''L O35 CF OR D AY AGE TO FACILITY
                      @ .ggr LER RO _EVENTYEAR 1-1             10 8l6l                l-l         10l31                    lL I           l-1             11l
.l'TY'E C E SCRIP TION y @@lNA 7 8 9 10 NRC USE ONLY
                                            ! 71 91                23             24           2 ti     27           23       29             JJ             31             32
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_ 21            22 UB. 5 PLIE               'J A     FACT RCR HOURS            S 9 iT E        FO lT 2 l 6 l 5.j@ ,
IS ,L E DE CAIPTry; h NA 2 o 08 69 83 g 7 8 9 to 419-259-5000 Ext. 299{Jam s P. M o @
TAK        AC T C            0      L NT            C l35 Zl@               @           l 0] 0l 0l 0140            Yl@             [N[@             l43Al@
PHONE.DVR 79-120 33.,.yogpggggggg  
Jgl34 J3 Xl@                               ao                31                       41                 42                                 44                 47
.TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BLSSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLF21 ENTAL INFOR'tATION FOR LER NP-33-70-99 c DATE OF EVENT: July 25, 1979 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
                                                                                                                                                                                                          -
Train 2 of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System inoperable Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MUT) = 2772, and Load (Gross MWE) = 910 Description of Occurrence: At 1400 hours on July 25, 1979, a maintenance repairman found that the No. 2 Condensing Unit Train (S33-2) of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) would not start.
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h l This occurrence was caused by component failure; one of three thermistors in the com-l i       O
This was detected while performing Pre-ventative Maintenance Work Order 79-1911 on the Control Room EVS.
    ]i li ) { pressor motor winding had failed opening the circuit thus preventing it f rom s tarting .I The f aulty thermistor was bypassed and the system was successfully tested and declareq i       7 l FCR 77-291 will be implemented 1    l3) [ operable removing the unit from the Action Statement.
l 1       i_ [ ]l to bypass the " overload trip" function.                               ,
_
80 8 9 b1SCO    RY                            DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION STA 3               % PC/.E R                   GTHER STATUS B j@l Preventative maintenance i        5 lEl@ l1l0l0l@l                                 NA                        l ACTIVITY CC NTENT                                                                                                     loc ATION OF RELE ASE RELEASEO OF RELE ASE                         A'JOUNT CF ACTIVITY i      G W @ lZ10i @ l NA                                                       44 l         [
45 NA 80 7             8 9                             11 PERSONNEL E XPOSURES                             -
NUVSER             TYDE         DESCRIPTION i      7      l 0 l 0 l 0 j@l Z l@l NA PERSONNEL INJUR ES                                                                                                     i NUYSER              DESCRtDTION                                                                                                              fg                       j I      4            lb !               NA
{       (       /       go 7             8 9                   11     12                                                                                                                       ''
L O35 CF OR D AY AGE TO FACILITY TY'E       C E SCRIP TION
                                                                      .
                                                                                                                                                  ,,,
                                                                                                                                                  ' "IO{gQ                                          l y @@l        8 9             10 NA 7                                                                                                                                                                NRC USE ONLY                   ,
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08 69                                   83 g Jam s P. M o @                                                PHONE.
419-259-5000                 Ext. 299
{
DVR 79-120                         33.,.yogpggggggg
 
  .
TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BLSSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLF21 ENTAL INFOR'tATION FOR LER NP-33-70-99 c
DATE OF EVENT: July 25, 1979 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:     Train 2 of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System inoperable Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MUT) = 2772, and Load (Gross MWE) = 910 Description of Occurrence: At 1400 hours on July 25, 1979, a maintenance repairman found that the No. 2 Condensing Unit Train (S33-2) of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) would not start.       This was detected while performing Pre-ventative Maintenance Work Order 79-1911 on the Control Room EVS.
Technical Specification 3.7.6.1 requires both EVS trains to be operable in Modes 1-4.
Technical Specification 3.7.6.1 requires both EVS trains to be operable in Modes 1-4.
This f ailure put the station in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.6.1 which requires the system be restored to operable status within seven days or the unit be in at least hot standby within the next six hours and cold shutdown within the following thirty hours.
This f ailure put the station in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.6.1 which requires the system be restored to operable status within seven days or the unit be in at least hot standby within the next six hours and cold shutdown within the following thirty hours.
.~Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence is component
                                                                                              .
~failure. One out of the three thernistors in the windings of the compressor was faulty.
                                                                                                  ~
Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence is component     ~
failure. One out of the three thernistors in the windings of the compressor was faulty.
This simulated a high temperature condition in the windings which opened the comp *essor motor control circuit and prevented it f rom starting.
This simulated a high temperature condition in the windings which opened the comp *essor motor control circuit and prevented it f rom starting.
Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. Train 1 of the Control Room EVS was available for use if EVS operation had been required.
Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. Train 1 of the Control Room EVS was available for use if EVS operation had been required. Each EVS train is designed for full capacity.
Each EVS train is designed for full capacity.
Corrective Action: The compressor was repaired per Maintenance Work Order 79-2571 by jumpering with a resistor across the f aulty thermistor terminal. The two remaining thermistors were rested and proven operable. A new compressor will be installed during the next maintenance outage.
Corrective Action: The compressor was repaired per Maintenance Work Order 79-2571 by jumpering with a resistor across the f aulty thermistor terminal. The two remaining thermistors were rested and proven operable. A new compressor will be installed during the next maintenance outage.
The system was successfully tested and declared operable per ST 5076.01, " Control Room EVS Monthly" and Maintenance Work Order 79-1911, " Control Room EVS Quarterly Preventa-tive Maintenance" on July 30, 1979. This removed the unit from the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.6.1.
The system was successfully tested and declared operable per ST 5076.01, " Control Room EVS Monthly" and Maintenance Work Order 79-1911, " Control Room EVS Quarterly Preventa-tive Maintenance" on July 30, 1979. This removed the unit from the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.6.1.
Per Maintenance Work Order 79-2962, the resistor was removed on September 8, 1979, and the thermistor terminals were jumpered out as directed by Power Engineering. This 1 action taken is part of FCR 77-291, which will bypass the " overload trip" function.
Per Maintenance Work Order 79-2962, the resistor was removed on September 8, 1979, and the thermistor terminals were jumpered out as directed by Power Engineering. This 1   action taken is part of FCR 77-291, which will bypass the " overload trip" function.
1174 065 Failure Data:
1174 065 Failure Data:   There have been no previously reported similar occurrences.
There have been no previously reported similar occurrences.
LER #79-086}}
LER #79-086}}

Revision as of 13:27, 19 October 2019

LER 79-086/03L-1:on 790725,train 2 of Control Room Emergency Ventilation Sys Was Inoperable.Cause by One of Three Thermistors in Compressor Motor Winding Failing to Open Circuit.Compressor Repaired & New One Will Be Installed
ML19209D171
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 08/21/1979
From: Rudolph J
TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML19209D152 List:
References
LER-79-086-03L, LER-79-86-3L, NUDOCS 7910190489
Download: ML19209D171 (2)


Text

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMMISSloN

'RC FORM 3G,G .

7-7 H LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: l 1

l l l l l 6

1h (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATIONI l l@ ,

o 1 8 9 l0 lH D lB LICE ?.SE. CODE S l 1 l@l 0 l 0]- LICEN5E 14 15 l 0 lNUYaER 0 lN l P lF l- l013LICENSE 23 2ti @l 4TYPE1lll1l1l@l JJ bl GAT $d CON'T

'O 1 [c'3"j l L j@l 0 ] 5 l 0 l- l 0 l 3 l 4 l 6 68l@l 630 7EVENT l2 DATE

[5 [7 l9 l@l0 14 b l8REPORT l2 l1 l7 l980@

DATE 8 cJ 61 COCK ET NUYSER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROB ABLE CONSEQUENCES h it was j 10 2 l At 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> on 7 /25/79 while performing routine preventative maintenance, to 3 l found that #2 concensing unit train (S33-2) of the Control Room Emergency Ventilatioq j

o 4 System (EVS) would not start. This placed the unit in the Action Statement of T.S.

l lo 5 1 3.7.6.1. There was no danger to the health and saf ety of the public or station per-l 0 6 l sonnel. Train 1 of the Control Room EVS was available for use if an event recuiring 0 7 l EVS operation had ocegered. Each EVS train is designed for full capacity. l I

60 O a [_@P-33-79-99) COYP. VALVE SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE S'J SCO C E SUSCODE CODE COOE SUBOODE CO*AFCNENT CODE Ol9] lSlClh l El@ l B lh 12 fJ Ml Ol Tl 0l Rl Xlh Wh W h13 19 10 8 9 10 11 REVISION 7

OCCUR R E NCE REPORT SEQUENTI AL TYPE N O.

REPORT NO. CODE

@ .ggr LER RO _EVENTYEAR 1-1 10 8l6l l-l 10l31 lL I l-1 11l

! 71 91 23 24 2 ti 27 23 29 JJ 31 32

_ 21 22 UB. 5 PLIE 'J A FACT RCR HOURS S 9 iT E FO lT 2 l 6 l 5.j@ ,

TAK AC T C 0 L NT C l35 Zl@ @ l 0] 0l 0l 0140 Yl@ [N[@ l43Al@

Jgl34 J3 Xl@ ao 31 41 42 44 47

-

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h l This occurrence was caused by component failure; one of three thermistors in the com-l i O

]i li ) { pressor motor winding had failed opening the circuit thus preventing it f rom s tarting .I The f aulty thermistor was bypassed and the system was successfully tested and declareq i 7 l FCR 77-291 will be implemented 1 l3) [ operable removing the unit from the Action Statement.

l 1 i_ [ ]l to bypass the " overload trip" function. ,

_

80 8 9 b1SCO RY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION STA 3  % PC/.E R GTHER STATUS B j@l Preventative maintenance i 5 lEl@ l1l0l0l@l NA l ACTIVITY CC NTENT loc ATION OF RELE ASE RELEASEO OF RELE ASE A'JOUNT CF ACTIVITY i G W @ lZ10i @ l NA 44 l [

45 NA 80 7 8 9 11 PERSONNEL E XPOSURES -

NUVSER TYDE DESCRIPTION i 7 l 0 l 0 l 0 j@l Z l@l NA PERSONNEL INJUR ES i NUYSER DESCRtDTION fg j I 4 lb ! NA

{ ( / go 7 8 9 11 12

L O35 CF OR D AY AGE TO FACILITY TY'E C E SCRIP TION

.

,,,

' "IO{gQ l y @@l 8 9 10 NA 7 NRC USE ONLY ,

DE CAIPTry; IS ,L E l lllllllllll}

7 2 o 8 9 h to NA l

08 69 83 g Jam s P. M o @ PHONE.

419-259-5000 Ext. 299

{

DVR 79-120 33.,.yogpggggggg

.

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BLSSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLF21 ENTAL INFOR'tATION FOR LER NP-33-70-99 c

DATE OF EVENT: July 25, 1979 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Train 2 of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System inoperable Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MUT) = 2772, and Load (Gross MWE) = 910 Description of Occurrence: At 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> on July 25, 1979, a maintenance repairman found that the No. 2 Condensing Unit Train (S33-2) of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) would not start. This was detected while performing Pre-ventative Maintenance Work Order 79-1911 on the Control Room EVS.

Technical Specification 3.7.6.1 requires both EVS trains to be operable in Modes 1-4.

This f ailure put the station in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.6.1 which requires the system be restored to operable status within seven days or the unit be in at least hot standby within the next six hours and cold shutdown within the following thirty hours.

.

~

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence is component ~

failure. One out of the three thernistors in the windings of the compressor was faulty.

This simulated a high temperature condition in the windings which opened the comp *essor motor control circuit and prevented it f rom starting.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. Train 1 of the Control Room EVS was available for use if EVS operation had been required. Each EVS train is designed for full capacity.

Corrective Action: The compressor was repaired per Maintenance Work Order 79-2571 by jumpering with a resistor across the f aulty thermistor terminal. The two remaining thermistors were rested and proven operable. A new compressor will be installed during the next maintenance outage.

The system was successfully tested and declared operable per ST 5076.01, " Control Room EVS Monthly" and Maintenance Work Order 79-1911, " Control Room EVS Quarterly Preventa-tive Maintenance" on July 30, 1979. This removed the unit from the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.6.1.

Per Maintenance Work Order 79-2962, the resistor was removed on September 8, 1979, and the thermistor terminals were jumpered out as directed by Power Engineering. This 1 action taken is part of FCR 77-291, which will bypass the " overload trip" function.

1174 065 Failure Data: There have been no previously reported similar occurrences.

LER #79-086