ML18110A676: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Line 3: Line 3:
| issue date = 04/02/1976
| issue date = 04/02/1976
| title = LER 1976-001-00 for St. Lucie Unit 1, a Breach of Containment Integrity
| title = LER 1976-001-00 for St. Lucie Unit 1, a Breach of Containment Integrity
| author name = Schmidt A D
| author name = Schmidt A
| author affiliation = Florida Power & Light Co
| author affiliation = Florida Power & Light Co
| addressee name = Moseley N C
| addressee name = Moseley N
| addressee affiliation = NRC/IE, NRC/RGN-II
| addressee affiliation = NRC/IE, NRC/RGN-II
| docket = 05000335
| docket = 05000335

Revision as of 09:47, 17 June 2019

LER 1976-001-00 for St. Lucie Unit 1, a Breach of Containment Integrity
ML18110A676
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/02/1976
From: Schmidt A
Florida Power & Light Co
To: Moseley N
NRC/IE, NRC/RGN-II
References
PRN-LI-76-68 LER 1976-001-00
Download: ML18110A676 (6)


Text

NRC FORM 195 I2-70)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC D'ISTRIBUTION FDR Pa T 50 DOCKET MATERIAL DOCKET NUMBER 50-335 FILE NUMBER INCIDENT REPORT I N.C.Moseley F ioM: Flordia Power 8I Light Co.Miami, Floddia A.D.Schmidt DATE OF DOCUMENT 4-2-76 DATE RECEIVED 4-15-76 OI.ETTE R OORIGINAL@COPY DESCRIPTION ONOTORIZED SUNCLASSIFIED Ltr.trans th'e following.......

PROP INPUT FORM NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED" 30 ENCLOSURE Reportable Occurrence k'6-1 Licensee Event Report on 3-3-76 Concerning the water level in the refueliyj cavity being below the top of the fuel transfer tube.......

~" (30 Cys.ReceivedI'No Original)ACKNOW/LEDGED DO NOT REMOVE PLANT NAME~St Luci e III]NOTE: XF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS XNVOLVED SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J COLLINS SAFETY BRANCH CHIEF.: W 3 CYS FOR ACTION LXC.ASST: W/CYS ACRS CYS FOR ACTION/INFORMATION Ziemann DiaaS ENT TO LA ENVIRO INTERNAL 0 R I BUTION IST NRC PDR 6cE 2 SCjIROEDER/IPPOLITO NOVAK CHECK.R IIES&N E TEDESCO MACCA BARR SHAO VOLLMER BUNG KRE E OL N LPDR'XC NSXC 1 cep EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION CONTROL NUMBER 3821 NRC FORM 10d (2-70I II I II 1~s~1'L~1~I N Aprj.l 2, 1976 PRN-LI-76-68 P.O.BOX 3100 MIAMI, FLOIIIOA 33101 ALIIS, I3~grill@FLORIDA POWER 5 LIGHT COMPANY p gHk'll g>sXS>II,>>~a~34egufatO~

y~~c&E Mr.Norman C.Moseley, Director, Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission 230 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 818 Atlanta,"Georgia 30303

Dear Mr Moseley:

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-76-1 ST LUCIE UNIT 1 DATE OF OCCURRENCE:

MARCH 3, 1976 BREACH OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY'5(S8,'~I~glA gaS CO~~~(A The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted in ac-cordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30-day notification of the subject: occurrence.

Very truly yours, ,~g.gd~~A.D.Schmidt Vice President Power, Resources MRS/jn Attachment cc: Jack R.Newman, Esctuire Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30)Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3)I LPIN<G BUILD FLORIDA 3 rP A'7 Jl'~C CONTROL BLOCK: 1 UCENSEE NAME[pg~]F L S L S 1 7 89 14 15 LICENSEE EVENT 6 REPORT (P E PAINT ALL REQUIRED INFDAIVIATION)

LCENSE EVENT TYPE TYPE 4 1 1 1 1~03 25 26 30 31 32 REPORT REPORT CATEGORY.TYPE SOURCE[001]coN'T~~L L 7 8 57 58 59 60 EVENT OESCRIPTION Qo 2 During initial core OOCICET NUMBER EVENT OATE REPORT OATE 0 5 0 0 3 3 5 0 3 0 3 7 6 0 4 0 2 7 6 61 68 69 74 75 80 loading, the water level in the refueling cavity was 7 8 9~~'80[Jpg~]found to be approximately 2 inches below the top of the fuel transfer 7 89 tube.This was in conflict with the intent of Technical Specification 7 8 9 Qp5 3.9.4 which requires that, during refueling operations, there be no 7 89;*fgg~]direct access from containment to the outside atmosphere which is 80 80 80 COMPONENT s*MANUFACTURER N 47 7 8 9 PRME SYSTEM CAUSE COMPONENT COOE COOE COMPONENT COOS SUPPLER VQtATION Qpjp~FC~F Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z 9 9 9 7 8 9 10 11 12 17 43 44 48 CAUSE OESCRIPTION

[op/The exact cause of the occurrence has not been determined.

However, 80 7 8,9 Qos the water lost from the refueling cavity was traced to tanks in the 80 80 7 89 FA CIVVY STATUS 36 POWER s~oo o 7 8 9 10'2 13 FORM OF ACTIVffY COATENT...RELEASEO OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTNITY$12 Z-~Z.NA 7 8 9 10'11 PERSONNFL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE-OESCRIPTION

~s~oo o~z 7 8 9 11'2 13 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER OESCILPTION

~4 Loaoo J 7 8 9, 11 12 METHOD OF OISCOVERY OISCOVERY OESCRIPTION o erator OTHER STATUS NA a'0 44 45 46 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 80 44 45 NA 80 NA 80 PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 7 8 9 80 Qs o]E ui ment and Chemical Drain System and further investigation identified 7 8 9 LOSS OR OAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE OESCRIPTION t116 Z 7 89 10 PUBLICITY 7 8 9 NA NA NA 80 80~80 AOOITIONAL FACTORS Q1 g See a e two for continuation of Event and Cause descriptions.

7 8 9 7 89 M.A.Schopoman PHONE 305/552-3779 80 QPO CSI i CCT V'eportable Occurrence 335-76-1 Licensee Event Report Page Two Event Descri tion (continued) incapable of automatic isolation.

The immediate corrective action was to suspend core loading'nd restore the water level in the refueling cavity.Additional:

corrective action was to establish more frequent surveillance of the water level in the refueling cavity.This was the first occurrence of this type (335-76-1)

.Cause Descri tion (continued) two probable causes of the water transfer.First, the refueling cavity water level may have been lowered during, electrical checkout of the refueling canal sump pump motor.The sump pump was being tested concurrent with core loading and too much water may have been pumped from the refueling cavity to the Equipment and Chemical Drain System.Followup action was to place a clearance tag on the sump pump which prohibited use of the pump unless authorized by the Nuclear Plant Supervisor.

Second, an'ncorrect valve lineup may have caused a'gradual decrease in water level.However, since it was necessary to change the position of certain valves in order to restore the refueling cavity water level,.it was not possible to verify that a valve lineup error had caused the'occurrence.

Followup action after restoring water level was to confirm that all valve lineups which could affect refueling cavity water level were correct for the operating condition then in effect.k