CP-201300546, Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Response to Request for Additional Information for License Amendment Request (LAR) 12-007, Revision to Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, for Two, 14-Day Completion Times for Offsit

Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Response to Request for Additional Information for License Amendment Request (LAR)12-007, Revision to Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, for Two, 14-Day Completion Times for Offsite Ci

ML13149A257
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	05/16/2013
From:	Mays R B Luminant Generation Co, Luminant Power
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CP-201300546, TXX-13082
Download: ML13149A257 (40)

Text

a Luminant Rafael Flores Senior Vice President& Chief Nuclear Officer Rafael.Flores@Luminant.com Luminant Power P 0 Box 1002 6322 North FM 56 Glen Rose, TX 76043 T 254 897 5550 C 817 559 0403 F 254 897 6652 Ref. # 10CFR50.90 CP-201300546 Log # TXX-13082 May 16, 2013 ATTN: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST (LAR)12-007, REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, "AC SOURCES -OPERATING," FOR TWO, 14-DAY COMPLETION TIMES FOR OFFSITE CIRCUITS," (TAC NOS. MF0405 AND MF0406)

REFERENCES:

1. Luminant Power letter, logged TXX-12198, from Rafael Flores to the NRC titled"Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, License Amendment Request (LAR)12-007, Revision to Technical Specification 3.8.1,'AC Sources -Operating,'

for Two, 14-Day Completion Times for Offsite Circuits," dated December 19,2012 (ADAMS Number ML13028A237)

2. Request for Additional information from Balwant K. Singal, NRR via email dated April 18, 2013 (ADAMS Number ML13108A153)

Dear Sir or Madam:

Reference 1 was License Amendment Request (LAR)12-007 for two, one-time, 14-day Technical Specification (TS) Completion Times (CTs) to complete a plant modification by March 31, 2014. Reference 2 provided a request from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for additional information needed to review the amendment request. Attached is the Luminant Power response to the request for additional information.

This communication contains no new commitment regarding Comanche Peak Units 1 and 2.Should you have any questions, please contact Ms. Tamera Ervin-Walker at (254) 897-6902.A member of the STARS Alliance Callaway ' Comanche Peak -Diablo Canyon

• Palo Verde

• San Onofre

• South Texas Project

• Wolf Creek U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission TXX-13082 Page 2 of 2 05/16/2013 Sincerely, Luminant Generation Company LLC Rafael Flores By: _ _ __ _R. B.Mas Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Support Attachment 1 -Response to Request for Additional Information Attachment 2 -Response to RAI 1 Attachment 3 -Response to RAI 3 Attachment 4 -Response to RAI 7 Attachment 5 -Response to RAI 9 c -A. T. Howell III, Region IV Balwant K. Singal, NRR Resident Inspectors, Comanche Peak Alice Hamilton Rogers, P.E.Inspection Unit Manager Texas Department of State Health Services.Mail Code 1986 P. 0. Box 149347 Austin TX 78714-9347 ATTACHMENT 1 TO TXX-13082 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Attachment I to TXX-1 3082 Page 1 of 5 NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI) 1: In the LAR Attachment 1, Section 2.0, Page 3, the following is stated: The proposed changes in Chapters 8 and 9 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)(Reference 8.1) (Attachment

6) reflect ST [startup transformer]

XST1, new alternate ST XST1A, new 138 kV [kilo volt] tower disconnect switches, firewall, and the installation of new cable buses and transfer panels. The FSAR Table and Figures not shown in the Attachment, but which will also be updated, are Table 8.3-3 and Figures 1.2-1, 8.2-1, 8.2-4, 8.2-7, 8.2-9, and 8.2-11.Please provide the following documents: (a) Markup/update of the FSAR Figures 1.2-1, 8.2-1, 8.2-4, 8.2-7, 8.2-9, 8.2-11, and 8.3-1 (Drawing No.El-0001) (or a relevant portion of the figures/drawings) showing the modifications.(b) Markup of the FSAR Table 8.3-3.Luminant Power's Response to RAI 1: The markup of the FSAR Figures 1.2-1, 8.2-1, 8.2-4, 8.2-7, 8.2-9, 8.2-11, and 8.3-1 (Drawing No. E1-0001)showing the modifications and markup of FSAR Table 8.3-3 are contained in Attachment 2.NRC RAI 2: In the LAR Attachment 1, Section 4.1, Page 15, the licensee stated that the plant procedure SOP-614A/B"Alternative Power Generator Operations" requires the Alternate Power Diesel Generator (APDG) fuel be replenished every two hours.Please describe how the APDG fuel will be replenished every two hours, if needed, throughout any of two 14-day Completion Times (CTs).Luminant Power's Response to RAI 2: SOP-614A/B, "Alternate Power Generator Operation" directs Operators to contact the appropriate APDG Refueling Contact (RC) to utilize "Engineering Work Book -Loss of Off-Site Power Supplement" for replenishing diesel fuel to the APDGs every two hours.The Engineering Work Book contains instructions for filling the APDG during loss of offsite power conditions where the normal method of refueling truck replenishment is not available.

Operations will contact the appropriate APDG RC to gather the pre-staged materials and equipment.

If power exists to the fuel island, the normal method of refueling truck (RT) filling is used. The electric powered refueling transfer pump can fill the 2000 gallon RT (normal capacity is 1,800 gallons or less), and the 500 gallon RT if needed, such that the fuel to the affected APDGs will be replenished every two hours inside the protected area. The fuel island storage tank has an 8,000 gallon capacity tank normally filled to 5,000 to 8,000 gallons.However, if power does not exist to the fuel island, the Engineering Work Book contains instructions on replenishing the APDGs every two hours. Inside the protected area is the 2000 gallon RT, a 5.5 horse-powered (HP) gasoline powered pump that can pump approximately 200 gallons per minute, and four emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil storage tanks (FOSTs) each typically filled to greater than 86,000 gallons. The APDG RC will retrieve the materials identified in the Material List and contact the Control Room (CR). The CR will designate a FOST to use to fill the RT. The 2000 gallon RT will be positioned next to the FOST and grounded to the metal cover of the FOST. Two hoses will be connected Attachment I to TXX-1 3082 Page 2 of 5 to the gas powered pump. The gas powered pump suction hose will be connected to a rigid suction pipe then inserted into the sampling opening on the cover of the FOST. The pump will be started for a short duration such that the initial flushing of fuel oil will remove any pump or pipe debris to a 55-gallon drum or suitable container.

The pump discharge will then be directed to the top of the RT and started. Once the RT is at the desired level, the pump will be stopped and grounding device removed. The RT can then be repositioned to fill the APDGs. This process will be repeated except for the flushing and connection steps and thus the APDGs can be refueled every two hours.If the gas powered pump becomes unavailable, an alternate method is described in the Engineering Work Book to fill the APDGs RT using an air pressure powered pump and an air compressor.

Normally, two air compressors are available for use and are rated at 185 cubic-foot-per-minute (cfm) and 130 cfm respectively, and both operate at 100 pounds-per-square-inch (psi). Also available is a 100 gallon per minute (gpm) rated air pump that can be powered by an air compressor such that the air powered pump can refuel the RT in approximately 20 minutes.NRC RAI 3: Please provide the following drawings related to the APDG sets: (a) Drawing(s) showing layout of major enclosures/components of the APDG sets, and describe the cable routing from the APDG sets to the plant Class 1E 6.9kV buses.(b) A single line diagram showing connections of the APDG sets to the plant 6.9 kV Class 1E buses.Luminant Power's Response to RAI 3: See Attachment 3 for the drawing(s) showing layout of major enclosures/components of the APDG sets and a single-line diagram showing connections of the APDG sets to the plant 6.9kV Class 1E buses. The description of the cable routing is described below.The connection from each generator to transformer is provided by five conductors per-phase (5 -1/c)#4/0 American Wire Gauge (AWG), 600-volt cables per-phase.

These cables are laid in a 24-inch cable tray. Thus, a total of 15 -1/c #4/0 AWG cables per-phase provide connection from the APDGs to the transformer.

The secondary of the transformer is connected to the transfer switch by 1 -1/c 500 thousand circular mills (MCM) 8kV cable per-phase.

For Unit 1, the cable is installed in a tray. For Unit 2, the cable is installed in a conduit.The transfer switch allows APDG power to be connected to either Train A or Train B Class 1E safety related bus at a time. A 1/C 500 MCM cable per-phase, routed in conduit and tray, connect transfer switch to breaker in the safety related bus.NRC RAI 4: Please describe whether any dedicated operator will be assigned to ensure proper operation of the APDGs, during the proposed two 14-day CTs.Luminant Power's Response to RAI 4: A Nuclear Equipment Operator (NEO) will be assigned to ensure proper operation of the APDGs, during the proposed two 14-day CTs.

Attachment 1 to TXX-13082 Page 3 of 5 NRC RAI 5: In the LAR Attachment 1, Section 4.1, Page 15, the licensee stated that each APDG set consist of three diesel generators operating in parallel at 480 volts (V), 3 phase and 60 hertz (Hz). Each APDG is rated at 1140 kilowatts (kW) with output connected in parallel for a total capacity of 3420 kW and is connected to the Class 1E 6.9 kV bus through a 480 V/6.9 kV transformer.

The loading of APDG set will be limited by the transformer capacity of 3450 kVA. The total of the unit-specific loads required to be fed from APDGs as shown in Page 16, Table 4, is 3010.29 kW.Please provide total unit-specific load in kVA [kilovolt-ampere] (considering power factor of loads) to verify that the loading will remain within the connected transformer rating of 3450 kVA. Also, please provide a discussion if any common load may be necessary to be powered from the unit APDG set for safe shutdown and long term cooling of the unit.Luminant Power's Response to RAI 5: Table 1 lists the power factor (PF) and kVA demand for each load. Total kVA load, including a 2% margin for losses, is 3416kVA, thus the loading will remain within the transformer rating of 3450kVA. The loads identified below represent the Unit-specific (i.e., non-common) loads. The loads in Table 1 are similar for both Units 1 and 2.Table 1. Load Description and Load in kW, PF, and kVA LOAD LOAD LOAD 6.9KV LOAD DESCRIPTION (kW) PF (kVA)Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) 526.03 0.914 575.53 Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump 789.42 0.910 867.49 Station Service Water (SSW) Pump 643.1 0.873 736.66 LOAD LOAD LOAD 480V LOAD DESCRIPTION (KW) PF (KVA)Containment Recirculating Fan 93.25 0.85 109.71 Safety Chillers 99.9 0.85 117.53 Safety Chiller Recirculation Pump 18.24 0.85 21.46 Emergency Lighting 132.69 0.85 156.11 Control Rod Drive Mechanism Ventilation (CDRM) Fan 92.44 0.85 108.75 Instrument Air 183.28 0.85 215.62 Pressurizer Heater Control Group A 141.4 0.85 166.35 Battery Chargers and Inverters 110.94 0.84 132.07 Reactor Makeup Water Pump 4.54 0.85 5.34 Miscellaneous 480V Loads (Fans, Pumps, Transformers, and Heaters) 116.03 0.85 136.51 SUBTOTAL 2951.26 3349.12 Plus 2% Losses 59.03 66.98 TOTAL 3010.29 3416.11 Attachment 1 to TXX-13082 Page 4 of 5 Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) compliance with the Station Blackout Rule, 10CFR50.63, has been performed in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155 and NUMARC 87-00. In accordance with those RGs, CPNPP is not required under 10 CFR50.63 to consider simultaneous loss of both offsite power (LOOP) sources and both EDGs to both Units. CPNPP compliance is based on simultaneous LOOP at both Units, the non-mechanistic unavailability of both EDGs in one Unit, (i.e., the blackout Unit) and the availability of one of two EDGs in the other, "non-blackout" Unit. All common loads will be fed by the operable EDG and APDG will not be required to power the common loads.NRC RAI 6: Please describe whether each APDG set consisting of 3 DGs, each rated 1140 kW, will be provided with load sharing mechanism so that the kW and kVAR [kilovolt-ampere-reactive]

loading is shared equally among the 3 DGs.Luminant Power's Response to RAI 6: Each generator set contains a multi-function protection and control device "GEMPAC" with the capability to actively share real (kW) and reactive (kVAR) power with other generators.

There is an instrumentation cable with three individual insulated conductors "triad" that is daisy-chained between each GEMPAC. The three conductors of the triad cable are a real power wire, a reactive power wire, and a common wire. There is a +/-5VDC (volts direct current) analog signal transmitted between the real wire and the common wire, and another +/-5 VDC analog signal transmitted between the reactive wire and the common wire. Real power and kVAR load share signals are generated by each GEMPAC based on the rating of the generator controlled by the GEMPAC. Zero percent of the rated load provides a 0-Volt signal and one-hundred percent of the rated load provides a 5-Volt signal. Each GEMPAC is working to equalize the load share signal voltages between all three generator sets thus assuring equal sharing, proportional to the rating of the generator, of real and reactive power. As needed, each GEMPAC will send a fuel bias "increase/decrease" signal to the engine governor, and an excitation bias"increase/

decrease" signal to the voltage regulator in order to increase or decrease real power or reactive power, respectively.

GEMPAC monitors, real and reactive power output from the generator sets, compares it to what it "should" be for equal load sharing by looking at load share signal voltages, and compensates if necessary by sending bias signals to the engine governor and voltage regulator.

The three generators of each APDG have same kW and kVAR rating; therefore, they will equally share the real and reactive power load.NRC RAI 7: In the LAR Attachment 1, Section 4.1, Page 27, the licensee stated: CPNPP's [Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant's] Operations Department will contact the Transmission Operator (Transmission Grid Controller) once per day during a 14-day Completion Time to ensure no problems exist in the transmission lines feeding CPNPP or their associated switchyards that would cause post trip switchyard voltages to exceed the voltages required by STA-629.Please provide relevant portion of the STA-629 document which provides the required post trip switchyard voltages.Luminant Power's Response to RAI 7: CPNPP offsite power system required voltages at the Switchyards are listed in STA-629 Attachment 8.H, section 1.0 Table 1. Section 1.3 of Attachment 8.H describes the requirement of system studies and contingencies to be considered.

Post contingency voltages are required to meet the voltage limits defined in Table 1. The relevant pages of STA-629 are provided in Attachment

4.

Attachment 1 to TXX-13082 Page 5 of 5 NRC RAI 8: In the LAR Attachment 1, Section 4.2, Page 30, the licensee stated In the two weeks prior to the start of the CT, a thermographic survey will be conducted on the two fixed sources in the safeguards switchgear room to verify no abnormalities exist. This is to reduce the likelihood of a fire ignition.Please provide a description of two fixed sources in the safeguards switchgear room.Luminant Power's Response to RAI 8: The two fixed sources in the Unit 1 safeguards switchgear room that were identified for thermographic surveys are the motor control center (MCC) CP1-EPMCEB-01 (1EB1-1) and 6.9kV to 480V transformer CP1-EPTRET-02 (TIEB3). The two fixed sources were identified as potential impacts to XST2 during the 14 day CTs by plant walkdowns and information contained in the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) fire assessment.

The walkdowns were performed to verify the cable routings for both XST2 and XST1, and to confirm that the information contained in the IPEEE remained valid. As only XST2 would be in-service during the extended CTs, a fire in either of these two sources could result in a loss of power from the in-service transformer and thus warranted additional preventative actions prior to entering the extended CT. The two sources identified and the preventative actions are the same for both 14-day XST1 CTs (138kV and 6.9kV work windows, respectively).

NRC RAI 9: Please describe the precautions which will be taken to prevent any fire-hazards due to any diesel fuel oil leakage/spillage associated with the APDG sets.Luminant Power's Response to RAI 9: The following design features and administrative controls are established to ensure that any diesel fuel leak or spill does not become a fire hazard: The Aggreko APDG sets are designed with built-in leak detection and spill containment.

Aggreko User Manual M020319, Revision C, Paragraph 5.4, the base frame has 120% capacity of the fuel tank to prevent fuel leaking out of the generator set in the event of a fuel leakage inside the generator.

A level switch is fitted inside the bund for spillage indication.

This will shut down the engine when activated.

The APDG fuel tank fill point is external, which prevents diesel fuel from refueling activities from potentially coming in contact with running and hot DG components.

Additionally, the exhaust system consists of the exhaust ducting, exhaust silencer complete with spark arrestor and rain cap assembly.CPNPP procedure SOP-614A, "Alternate Power Generator Operation," is established for the operation of the APDGs and requires the APDG fuel be replenished every two hours. SOP-614A/B references"Engineering Work Book -Loss of Offsite Power" for APDG refueling.

This work book contains steps to ensure that the refueling truck is grounded during refueling operations.

In the event that a diesel fuel spill would occur outside of the APDG sets, CPNPP procedure STA-726,"Nonradioactive Spill Response," would be invoked as a mechanism for initial response to the spill.Attachment 5 to this letter is a spill response flow diagram which is included as Attachment 5 of STA-726.

ATTACHMENT 2 TO TXX-13082 RESPONSE TO RAI 1 Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 1 of 19 CPE..0 ................

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-EAT. .s__ lE7 A loxe I -XSTZ 5 6 6 I I I I OSRALMAMA C-ST~l 3C 04IW( 0%1I-12-0007301-0 B C 0 E I F=FINAL IHHINI ) H 3-L.;, A E1-0DO1 a C D 0 < FINAL IPRINT > it Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 10 of 19 POPS to Unit 2 safety buses through CPX-EPTSST-04Y CPNPP/FSAR and CPX-EPTSST-05Y and AOPS to Unit 1 safety buses TABLE 8.3-3 through CPX-EPTSST-04X FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS FOR AUXILIARY AC POWER SYSTEM and CPX-EPTSST-05X transmission linel (Sheet 1 of 18) F pACI Caues of Effects of F ure n Fu ion Failure Mode\ Failur Failure D6/ectic Can also realign to startup transformer XST1A (XST1)Effects on System ItemIDescr&

TS-]l &l I # l I *1 2 3 3A 1 38-kV ofite sup ies power to startup fails to provide \transmiss'¶Qp line power sou e trans ormer XST1 (XSTIA) electrical power \ails; oppas sod to XST1 (XST1A) 4, circuit breakers ol~ns".45-kV offsite suppli power to startup fails to provide trarnission line ower source transfo er XST2 (XST2A) electrical power fails, circuit breakers to XST2 (XST2A) tartup supplies , 6I- fails to deliver internal fault;nsformer XST1 to buase 2EA! and 2EA2 power component failure;SUIJ 2 ., , ....overheating; fire supplies A .......15-kV cable power from short circuit; mechanical damage;XST to buoez 1 EA4 8d open circuit fire WA2.loss of el ctri al power p otec ve relays;to transfcrm r XST1 nnu ciation in (XSTIA) ont I room loss of ec cal po er pr ective relays;to trans r er XS a unciation in (XST c ntrol room loss of t rotective relays;buses EAl d 2 annunciation in and lo s of control room Ifor buses EA' an 1 E For o en circ .Lo s protective relays;of t annunciation in buse 1 EA1 and 1 control room For ort circuit: oss of- PweB to buse 2EA1, 2EA2, a loss of altermae pewer soame for buses lEA1 and 1EA2.None: offsite ower source (Item 2) or di sel generators are availabl N4one: off te power source Item 1) o diesel generators re availble.one: ffsite power source Item or diesel generators ea ilable.N e: Offsite power source (I m 2) or diesel generators e available.

transfer panels CPX-EPTSST-04X and CPX-EPTSST-O5X Amendment No. 1.04 Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 11 of 19 CPNPP/FSAR TABLE 8.3-3 ECT ANALYSIS FOR AUXILIARY AC POWER (Sheet 2 of 18) Causes of c Failure Failure Can also realign to startup transformer XST1A (XST1)Eaects on S /stem Failure Detection Item Description Failure Mode 3B 15-kV cable I(Note 5)For o Loss protective relays;of ' to bu es annunciation in ,1A. ad 2 fko:. control room For slu c~fcuit: Loss of buses 2EA1, , and loss of ate pow F-eewee for buses 1 EA1 and 1EA2. [1111 loss of per protective relays;buses lEA1, and lEA2 annunciation in and loss of attemate control room p:ewj~ou~ce for bu s 2EA1 and 2EA2 nAfP done: offsite power source (jtem 2) or diesel generators e available.

None: offsite power source (Item 1) or diesel generators are available.

Can also realign to spare startup transformer XTS2A (116M.4c .4 startup transformer XST2 fails to deliver internal fault;component failure;overheating; fire I Amendment No. +94 Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 12 of 19 CPNPP/FSAR TABLE 8.3-3 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS FOR AUXILIARY AC POWER SYSTEM 11-9I (Sheet 3 of 18)Causes of Effects of Failure Failure Failure Detection Effects on System Item Description 4A short circuit;open circuit Pr an co 4B 15-KV cable Trnsik power from short transfer panel CPX- open X EPTSST-O2X/;n, XeT-2 I 2 I and CPX-EPTSST-03X circuit; mechanical circuit fire For open ir "t: Lossýf U5= 2'-'- to ses2 1and 2EA2 For't circuit: Loss of to buses 1EA EA2 and loss of a w-for buses 2EA1 and 2EA2.pr an co otective relays; None: offsite power source nunciation in (Item 1) or diesel generators ntrol room are available.

Can also realign to spare startup transformer XTS2A 7XST2 otection relays; None: offsit power source nunciation in (Item 1) or iesel generators ntrol room are avail le.Can als realign to spare startu ansformer XTS2A otective relays; None; offiste power source nunciation in the (Item 1) or diesel generator ntrol room available.

Can also realign to startup transformer XST2 (Item 4).4C Spare Startup Supplies power to 6.9kV Fails to deliver Interr transformer XST2A to buses 1 EA1 and 1 EA2 power comp of Unit 1 through CPX- oveh EPTSST-032Y; and is an alternate power source for buses 2EA1 and 2EA2 of Unit 2 through CPX-EPTSST-032X ial fault;onent failure;eating; fire Loss of power to buses lEA1 and 1EA2 and loss of alternate power source for buses 2EA1 and 2EA2.Pr an co Amendment No. +04 Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 13 of 19 CPNPP/FSAR TABLE 8.3-3 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS FOR AUXILIARY AC POWER SYSTEM 19 (Sheet 4 of 18)f Item Description Causes of Failure Mode Failure Effects of Failure Failure Detection Effects on System Function.1 4D 15-KV Cable 4E 15-KV Cable Transmits power to transfer panel CPX-EPTSST-03Y from XST2A Transmits power to transfer panel CPX-EPTSST-032X from XST2A Short circuit; Mechanical damage;open circuit fire Short circuit; Mechanical damage;open circuit fire For open circuit: Loss of power to buses 1EA1 and 1 EA2 from XST2A. For short circuit: Loss of power to buses lEA1, 1EA2 and loss of altemate power source for buses 2EA1 and 2EA2.For open circuit: Loss of power to alternate buses 2EA1 and 2EA2 from XST2A. For short circuit: Loss of power to buses 1EA1, 1EA2 and loss of alternate power source for buses 2EA1 and 2EA2.Protective relays;annunciation in the control room Protective relays;annunciation in teh control room None; offsite power source (Item 1) or diesel generators are available.

Can also realign to startup transformer XST2 (Item 4).None; offiste power source (Item 1) or diesel generators are available.

Can also realign to startup transformer XST2 (Item 4).4OF 15-KV Transfer Panel CPX-EPTSST-02X*8e-3 1 ?T;ene"me pewe"3to buses Short circuit;2 1 and 2EA2-f open circuit[Supplies AOPS from XST2 (XST2A)Mechanical damage; For open circuit: Loss Protective relays;fire of 0ACM-POWe.C annunciation in the ee.mFe-to buses 2EA1 control room and 2EA2. For short circuit: Loss of P@WeF AOPS to buses lEA1, 1EA2, and loss of altefea pewereemree for buses 2EA1 and 2EA2.None; offsite power sources (Item 1) or diesel generators are available.

A-Amendment No. 404.

Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 14 of 19 CPNPP/FSAR TABLE 8.3-3 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS FOR AUXILIARY AC POWER SYSTEM (Sheet 5 of 18)ISupplies POPS from XST2 (XST2A)Item Description FunctiýCauses of Failure Effects of Failure Failure Detection Effects on System Failure Mode 1:.4D6 15-KV Transfer TsRamit. pow Panel CPX- 1EA1 and 1 EA EPTSST-02Y

.,.T' CPX-EPvSTOY Fto buses (eT2A Short circuit;open circuit Mechanical damage;fire (Note 7)ISupes POPS For open circuit: Loss Protective relays; None; offsite power source of fewef to buses annunciation in the (Item 1) or diesel generatorsand 1 EA2. For contol room are available.

4hort circuit; Loss of powe to buses lEA1, r1EA2 and loss of for buses 2EA1 and 2EA2.I \ open circuit: Loss c relays; None; offsite power source of'e to buses /annunciation inthe (Item 1) or diesel generators lEA1 and I EA2. For control room are available 4hort circuit: Loss of to buses 1 EA1 1EA2 and loss of Y for buses 2EA1 and 2EA2.4E+- 15-KV Cable 4 supplies AOP 4F'I- 15-KV CablE A T, l pvwfrom transfer panel CPX-EPTSST-02Y and 03)buses 1EA1 and ýA'Short circuit; Mechanical open circuit fire.to e Short circuit;open circuit transfer panel CPF_4 EPTSST-02X and'03Xýbuses 2EA1 and 2EA2 Mechanical damage; For open circuit: Loss Protective rela fire of a8061late pone annunciation ir sguFG to buses 2EA1 control room-- -- and 2EA2. For short Acircuit:

Loss of-jewefL to buses 1EA1, 1EA2 and loss of tem.vate ,ýI<powe;osewee for buses 2EA1 and 2EA2.ys;n the None; offsite power source (Item 1) or diesel generators are available.

Amendment No. 4G4 Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 15 of 19 CPNPP/FSAR TABLE 8.3-3 FAll IIRF MODEF AND FFFFCT ANALYSIS FOR AUXILIARY AC POWER SYSTEM (Sheet 6 of 18)F(XS-TIA-)I Failure Effects Detec Systen Causes of Failure Mode Failure Effects of Failure on Item Description Function 5 6.9-ky circuit breaker 1EA1-2 6 6.9-kV circuit breaker 1EA1-1 7 6.9-kV circuit breaker 1 EA2-2 protects bus 1 EA1 protects bus 1 EA1 protects bus 1 EA2 fails to open; mechanical failure;fails to close stuck contacts; relay failure; control power fails; fire; loss of ventilation

1. Failure to open An nciation could cause loss of 2. Friodic testing 1 EA1 & XFMR XST1 f operational

2. Fails to close: : eadiness power cannot be supplied from XST1 fails to open;fails to close mechanical failure; 1. Failure to open 1. Annunciation stuck contacts; relay could cause loss of 2. Periodic testing failure; control power 1 EA1 & XFMRG XST erational fails; fire; loss of .afi T readines ventilation

2. Fails to close: bus power cannot be loss of bus (XsT2A) supplied from power mechanical failure; 1. Failure to n 1. Annunciation stuck contacts; relay could cause A2 & 2. Periodic testing failure; control power XFMR XST1 for operational fails; fire; loss of 2. Fails to clse: readiness ventilation power can r~t be supplied fr m XST1 None: 1. Redundant equipment is provided on bus 1EA2.2. Power can be supplied from offsite power source (Item 2)or diesel generator 1 EG1.None: 1. Redundant equipment is provided on bus 1 EA2.2. Power can be supplied from offsite power source (Item 1)or diesel generator 1 EG1.None: (1. Redundant equipment is provided on bus 1 EA1.2. Power can be suppliec.#_

from offsite power source (Item 2) or diesel generator 1 EG2.fails to open;fails to close power source Amendment No. Q4 Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 16 of 19 CPNPPIFSAR TABLE 8.3-3 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS FOR AUXILIARY AC POWER SYSTEM (Sheet 7 of 18)Causes of Failure Effects of Failure Failure Detection Effects on System Item Description Function Failure Mode 8 6.9-kV circuit breaker 1EA2-1 protects bus 1 EA2 fails to open; mechanical failure;fails to close stuck contacts; relay failure; control power fails; fire; loss of ventilation

1. Failure to open could cause loss of bus 1EA2 & XFMR&XST2 (XST2A)-&4-I-

2. Fails to close: power cannot be supplied from power source XST2 (XST2A)loss of Train A safety load group 1. Annunciation

2. Periodic testing for operational readiness 9 Bus lEA1 10 Bus 1EA2 11 6.9-kV circuit breaker distributes electrical power to Train A loads distributes electrical power to Train B loads protects Unit Substation transformer Ti EB1 fails to deliver power fails to deliver power short circuit;overload; fire; loss of ventilation short circuit overload; loss of Train B safety fire; loss of ventilation load group fails to open; mechanical failure;fails to close stuck contacts; relay failure; control power fails; fire; loss of ventilation

1. Fails to open: back up breaker opens and loss of 1 EA1 Bus 2. Fails to close: loss of power to 1EB1 1. protective relays 2. Annunciation in Control Room 1. protective relays 2. Annunciation in Control Room 1. protective relays 2. Annunciation redundant load group in Control Room 1. protective relays 2. Annunication in Control Room None: 1. Redundant equipment is provided on bus 1 EA1.2. Power can be supplied from offsite power source (Item 1)or diesel generator 1 EG2.None: Redundant Train B from bus lEA2 available None: redundant Train A from from bus 1 EA1 available None: Load supplied by redundant load group provided from bus 1EA2 None: load supplied by redundant load group provided from bus 1 EA2 11A 8-kV cable connects circuit breaker and transformer T1 EB1 short circuit;open circuit Mechanical damage; loss of power to fire bus 1EB1 Amendment No. 40+

Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 17 of 19 CPNPPIFSAR TABLE 8.3-3 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS FOR AUXILIARY AC POWER SYSTEM (Sheet 11 of 18)Causes of Failure Effects of Failure Failure Detection Effects on System Item Description Function Failure Mode 17 I tap box No. 1 tap box No. 3 tap box No. 6 tap box No. 2 supplies offsite power to 6.9-kV buses 2EA1 and 2EA2 supplies offsite power to 6.9-kV buses 2EA1 and 2EA2 supplies offsite power to 6.9-KV buses 2EA1 and 2EA2 supplies offsite power to 6.9-kV buses 1 EA1 and 1 EA2 supplies offsite power to 6.9-kV buses lEA1 and 1 EA2 short circuit;open circuit short circuit;open circuit short circuit;open circuit short circuit;open circuit short circuit;open circuit mechanical damage mechanical damage mechanical damage mechanical damage mechanical damage loss of alternate source to 2EA1 and 2EA2 loss of preferred source to 2EA1 and 2EA2 loss of preferred source to 2EA1 and 2EA2 loss of preferred source to 1 EA1 and 1 EA2 loss of preferred source to 1 EA1 and 1EA2 protective relays;annunciation in control room protective relays;annunciation in control room protective relays;annunciation in control room protective relays;annunciation in control room protective relays;annunciation in control room None: bus 2LA1 and 2LA2 can be supplied by offsite power source (Item 1) or by diesel generator 2EGI, 2EG2.None: bus 2EA1 and 2EA2 can be supplied by offsite power source (Item 2) or by diesel generator 2EG1, 2EG2.None: buses 2EA1 and 2EA2 can be supplied by offsite power source (Item 2) or diesel generators 2EG1, 2EG2.None: buses IEA1 and IEA2 can be supplied by offsite power source (Item 1) or diesel generators 1 EG1, 1 EG2 None: buses lEA1 and IEA2 can be supplied by offsite power source (Item 1) or diesel generators lEG1, 1EG2 17D"I tap box No. 5ýz Amendment No. 4-9*

Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 18 of 19 CPNPP/FSAR TABLE 8.3-3 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS FOR AUXILIARY AC POWER SYSTEM (Sheet 18 of 18)Causes of Failure Effects of Failure Failure Detection Effects on System Item Description Function Failure Mode 44 Unit 1 Train A MCCs supplied by Train A switchgears 45 Common Train A MCCs supplied by Train A unit I or 2 switchgears 46 Unit 1 Train B MCCs supplied by Train B switchgears 47 Common Train B MCCs supplied by Train B unit 1 or 2 switchgears distributes 480-V power distributes 480-V power distributes 480-V power fails to deliver power fails to deliver power fails to deliver power fails to deliver power mechanical failure;short circuit; over-load; fire; loss of ventilation mechanical failure;short circuit; over-load; fire; loss of ventilation mechanical failure;short circuit; over-load; fire; loss of ventilation mechanical failure;short circuit; over-load; fire; loss of ventilation loss of MCC loss of MCC loss of MCC Annunciation in control room Annunciation in control room Annunciation in control room Annunciation in Control Room None: Item redundant equipment on unit 1 MCCs supplied by Train B switchgears None: redundant equipment on common MCCs supplied by Train B switchgears None: redundant equipment on unit I MCCs supplied by Train A switchgears.

None: redundant equipment on common MCCs supplied by Train A switchgears.

distributes 480-V power loss of MCC Notes: 1. The items listed in this Table are shown on the plant one-line diagram, Figure 8.3-1.2. The analysis listed is for Unit 1; Unit 2 is similar, except for equipment identification numbers.3. Analysis of the dc system is given in Table 8.3-7.4. Flooding considerations for the previously mentioned equipment are discussed in Section 8.3.1.1.14.

Abbreviations:

P8.=1, iS:zhar. .(P.D).1. POPS -Preferred Offsite Power Source AOPS -Alternate Offsite Power Source 3. PD -Partial Discharge 5. The cables from XST1 Y-winding to manual transfer switches CPX-EPTSST-04Y and CPX-EPTSST-05Y is routed through tap box 3 and tap box 6.6. The removable link boxes CPX-EPTSST-02X and CPX-EPTSST-03X and Eaton bus bar connection of these boxes constitute the manual transfer switch for the X-winding of XST2 and XST2A.7. The removable link boxes CPX-EPTSST-02Y and CPX-EPTSST-03Y and Eaton bus bar connection of these boxes constitute the manual transfer switch for the Y-winding of XST2 and XST2A.8. The cables from the Y-winding manual transfer switch to Unit 1 safety buses is routed through tap box 2 and tap box S.9. The cables from the X-winding manual transfer switch to Unit 2 safety buses is routed through tap box I and tap box 7.Amendment No. UA4 Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 19 of 19 INSERTS INSERT A 3C 15-kV transfer panel CPX-EPTSST-04X and CPX-EPTSST-05X.supplies AOPS from XST1 (XST1A) to buses lEA1 and 1EA2 short circuit;open circuit mechanical damage;fire For open circuit: Loss of AOPS to buses lEA1 and 1EA2, For short circuit: Loss of POPS to buses 2EA1, 2EA2, and loss of AOPS for buses lEA1 and 1EA2.protective relays;annunciation in control room 3D 15-kV transfer supplies POPS from short ciruit;panel XST1 (XST1A) to buses open circuit CPX-EPTSST-04Y 2EA1 and 2EA2 and CPX-EPTSST-05Y.3E .15-kV cable supplies AOPS from i short circuit;I transfer panel CPX- I open circuit EPTSST-04X (CPX-EPTSST-05X) to bus 1EAI(1EA2) mechanical damage; For open circuit: Loss protective relays;fire of POPS to buses 2EA1 annunciation in and 2EA2 control room For short circuit: Loss of POPS to buses 2EA1, 2EA2, and loss of AOPS for buses lEA1 and 1EA2.None: offsite power source (Item 2) or diesel generators are available.

None: offsite power source I (Item 2) or diesel generators are available.

None: offsite power source (Item 2) or diesel generators are available.

None: offsite power source (Item 2) or diesel generators are available.

mechanical damage;fire For open circuit: Loss of AOPS to bus 1EAI(1EA2).

For short circuit: Loss of POPS to buses 2EA1, 2EA2, and loss of AOPS for buses lEA1 and 1EA2.protective relays;annunciation in control room I 15-kV cable supplies POPS from transfer panel CPX-EPTSST-04Y (CPX-EPTSST-05Y ) to bus 2EA1(2EA2) short circuit;open circuit mechanical damage;fire For open circuit: Loss of POPS to bus 2EA1(2EA2).

For short circuit: Loss of POPS to buses 2EA1, 2EA2, and loss of AOPS for buses lEA1 and 1EA2.protective relays;annunciation in control room ATTACHMENT 3 TO TXX-13082 RESPONSE TO RAI 3 Attachment 3 to TXX-13082 Page 1 of 4 NORTH CONTAINMENT UNIT 1 MCM PER PHASE CP1 -EPDSNA-O1 60OA DISC SWITCH (OFFLOAD TYPE)RWST Ul 5-1/C-#4/0 AWG CU CABLES PER PHASE 3-24" TRAYS---" APDG SET-P 1140 kW GEN UNI T I TOR LAYOUT GENERA dsOOOlki.dgn DS-GENERATORS dsOOOlki.dgn DS-GENERATORS Attachment 3 to TXX-13082 Page 2 of 4 NORTH -o 4')VALVE HOUSE 3-21' TRAYS [F-1C-4/ AWG CUD CALEEERPHS 2-5UNI 2ODUT L 600A DISFSWTC/I A T\ IA5I ! I OADI TWITH 5-1/C-#4/0 AWG CU CABLES PER PHASE UNI T 2 oo0 r'UNUD A TOD I A Vrl IT Ia Attachment 3 to TXX-13082 Page 3 of 4 N*m A I a f C D 0 N-I --.-.- ...----.----.--.----.-.--..-.-..

---

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I A9WA7 FSRFIGURE 8.3-6 o -n- t -m I -i 0.--.I. .* CMý T et.=. Ar -,'n-w. a". in.Mra .a 3-2.. -........

L F.. I OEM"=-LL 0- I Ci L .P-----V 1 10..... _71. h -, 't ratI -4 fl 46- -- .-,.. 45 -- -* .-M i n- I ---, I " I , t --2EStO CMS am ~CEO SO t r1 Al

,,,,r 'r ,i' , , ..TRAIN A CLASS I GLEN ROAL-LLT Writs!SU 5 8 a I IS l e I 0 ( FINAL IPRINT ) N Attachment 3 to TXX-13082 Page 4 of 4 Is. A a N A 0 I 11 I3 CEMM---- -- ------- ---- --em-m1-es-aun Ti in.v. sSiee -oit0 UStSbe in*-Oo 010 -*O0i To 1 O M 05Mm 5mev. b '55K~ IiTSlB -1in100 OC¢T gal CI T UTr e SoTM U m 15 O[ .UT M iS TIt T Sem Coi t A-ilF W I T LWOUl2OT KYT.l 1200A. ton t[ o TSF-#- I Le IsS i"U- 5i"tssnnn ean iea"s a I 1i] I .-IT.is L T t o Tio ,, C.CI L a o -m ists,, I C, r.r no lI SO 0 .*eo I~l'lllm RStOU [A IT IFJT

• 0 S -Let, j ., .5 ., , 1.05,. ,,It.. ,z,. .I M NOfls ICY MSOt LWaa ulI" tDS MA.1)-W-f U ~ US -U! M CO E CONTAMA3rT POFNET RSDA EAT (SPIT LT1IM CENTRIUGA~L STM o(ATION SINIP TRAN~SFORER TB hE!tr Tm-WM 5-A 21 21. CeW 2is mO2ie ts~e cuSPRAT PUMP 23~uT je t~ ttWATsNt.~LOA TO a UT El.-Kt~iSi O- einSm Ilc wbe rr r-r. OSCO l ,,-,)- TKi ev as ,',, tii a-te-OSASm noonz * -os.mo j m-.sT C ~ MSP'CLASO eS. soe I t.KEsSL 4 0 I __S I a I I 5Ss-S~s.~

a ( FIN ol. PRIN I I ýTKW"-Occw I o ( F!NAL WPM]N > ,

ATTACHMENT 4 TO TXX-13082 RESPONSE TO RAI 7 Attachment 4 to TXX-13082 Page 1 of 4 CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.STATION ADMINISTRATION MANUAL STA-629 SWITCHYARD CONTROL AND REVISION NO. 7 PAGE 56 OF 65 TRANSMISSION GRID INTERFACE INFORMATION USE ATTACHMENT 8.1-PAGE 1 OF 7 CPNPP OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS

[C]1.0 System Voltage CPNPP offsite power system required voltages at the Switchyards are listed in Table 1 below.TABLE 1 CPNPP Switchyards Voltage Limits System Maximum kV Minimum kV 138kV System 144 135 345kV System 361 340 1.1 The preferred source of power, for CPNPP safety related buses, is offsite power supplied from the TO transmission system. Therefore, the availability of Switchyard voltages within the limits defined in Table 1 should be assured with high reliability considering the transmission grid network contingencies discussed below. For purposes of this provision, voltages will be measured at the Points of Interconnection, as defined in the Generation Interconnection Agreement.

The actions of both TO and ERCOT may be required to assure that the Switchyard voltages will remain within the limits of Table 1.This Procedure does not address actions required by ERCOT.The offsite sources of power for CPNPP are as follows: A. Unit 1 a. Preferred

-Start Up Transformer XST2 345kV interconnection with TO 345kV Switchyard

b. Alternate

-Start Up Transformer XST1 138kV interconnection with TO 138kV Switchyard B. Unit 2 a. Preferred

-Start Up Transformer XST1 138kV interconnection with TO 138kV Switchyard

b. Alternate

-Start Up Transformer XST2 345kV interconnection with TO 345kV Switchyard

1.2 Voltage

Reliability Transmission Planning shall, on an annual basis, assess the probability of an event, involving multiple individual transmission facility outages that could result in Switchyard voltages being outside the limits defined in Table 1. Transmission Planning shall notify the Generator if the probability of such event exceeds 1.OE-5.

Attachment 4 to TXX-13082 Page 2 of 4 CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.STATION ADMINISTRATION MANUAL STA-629 SWITCHYARD CONTROL AND REVISION NO. 7 PAGE 57 OF 65 TRANSMISSION GRID INTERFACE INFORMATION USE ATTACHMENT 8.H PAGE 2 OF 7 CPNPP OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS System Voltage (continued)

1.3 System

Studies 1.3.1 Transmission Planning shall perform annual steady state studies in accordance with ERCOT Requirements to evaluate Switchyard voltages and shall take actions as described below to address the voltage requirements of CPNPP shown in Table 1.1.3.2 The following system conditions will be considered in evaluating the system voltages at the Switchyards:

A. Maximum expected system demand and minimum expected system demand.B. CPNPP load modeled as described in Section 1.3.4 below.1.3.3 The following contingencies shall be evaluated:

1.3.3.1 Transmission Planning shall perform annual studies to evaluate the CPNPP Switchyard voltages for the CPNPP defined contingencies below: A. The trip of a CPNPP unit. The tripping of a CPNPP unit shall be considered even when the other CPNPP unit is in outage or otherwise off line.B. Simultaneous loss of a CPNPP unit and a most critical transmission line to CPNPP.The tripping of a CPNPP unit shall be considered even when the other CPNPP unit is in outage or otherwise off line.C. Simultaneous loss of a CPNPP unit and a most critical generator to CPNPP. The tripping of a CPNPP unit shall be considered even when the other CPNPP unit is in outage or otherwise off line.1.3.3.2 Transmission Planning shall also perform annual studies to evaluate the CPNPP Switchyard voltages for normal required contingencies defined by the ERCOT Requirements.

Attachment 4 to TXX-13082 Page 3 of 4 CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.STATION ADMINISTRATION MANUAL STA-629 SWITCHYARD CONTROL AND REVISION NO. 7 PAGE 58 OF 65 TRANSMISSION GRID INTERFACE INFORMATION USE ATTACHMENT 8.H PAGE 3 OF 7 CPNPP OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS System Voltage (continued) 1.3.4 The studies, addressed in this Section 1.3, to determine the minimum voltages at the Switchyards shall model CPNPP loads, at 0.85 PF, as follows: 138 kV 345 kV 345 kV 345 kV 138 kV Total 138 Total 345 Scenario kV kV MVA MVA MVA MVA MVAMA MV MVVA MVA XST1 XST2 1ST 2ST 25 kV Transformer Transformer Transformer Transformer Transformers A 14 14 45 45 10 24 104 B 0 28 45 45 10 10 118 C 28 0 45 45 10 38 90 Scenario A -138 kV and 345 kV normal loading scenario.Scenario B -345 kV maximum loading scenario.Scenario C -138 kV maximum loading scenario.Generator will provide loads for conditions not addressed above, when requested.

1.3.5 The results of all system voltage studies including the assumptions made to perform these studies performed pursuant to Section 1.3 shall be communicated to Generator in accordance with attachment 8.F and ERCOT in accordance with ERCOT Requirements.

1.3.5.1 Under each of the contingencies identified in section 1.3.3.1, both of the offsite sources should remain immediately available within the voltage ranges of Table 1 ("Voltage Performance A"). If the studies required by 1.3.3.1 reveal that Voltage Performance A is not expected to be met, then the TO shall: A. Identify actions it believes are appropriate to implement such that, after such implementation, the Voltage Performance Ais expected to be met.B. Inform Generator about the condition, minimum expected voltage, and the identified actions in accordance with Attachment 8.F, and C Initiate implementation of such actions, to the extent it has the responsibility and authority to do so, in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, tariffs, and ERCOT Requirements.

Such actions may include short-term (temporary or permanent) actions, as well as long-term (permanent) actions.

Attachment 4 to TXX-13082 Page 4 of 4 CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.STATION ADMINISTRATION MANUAL STA-629 SWITCHYARD CONTROL AND REVISION NO. 7 PAGE 59 OF 65 TRANSMISSION GRID INTERFACE INFORMATION USE ATTACHMENT 8.H PAGE 4 OF 7 CPNPP OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS System Voltage (continued) 1.3.5.2 Under each of the contingencies referenced in section 1.3.3.2, one of the offsite sources should remain immediately available within the voltage ranges of Table 1 ("Voltage Performance B"). If the studies required by 1.3.3.2 reveal that Voltage Performance B is not expected to be met, then the TO shall: A. Identify actions it believes are appropriate to implement such that, after such implementation, the Voltage Performance B is expected to be met.B. Inform Generator about the condition, minimum expected voltage, and the identified actions in accordance with Attachment 8.F, and C. Initiate implementation of such actions, to the extent it has the responsibility and authority to do so, in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, tariffs, and ERCOT Requirements.

Such actions may include short-term (temporary or permanent) actions, as well as long-term (permanent) actions.1.4 Normal Operating Voltage Ranges TO will take operating actions on its system, which it has the responsibility and authority to implement in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, tariffs, and ERCOT Requirements, to maintain the Switchyard voltages within the ranges shown below under normal system conditions (no maintenance outages or contingencies).

For purposes of this provision, voltages will be measured at the Points of Interconnection, as defined in the Generation Interconnection Agreement.

TO may change the Normal Operating Voltage Ranges depending upon various operating conditions.

This Procedure will be amended to reflect such change.138 kV Switchyard 138 to 143 kV 345 kV Switchyard 342 to 358 kV 1.5 State Estimator/Real Time Contingency Analyzer TGO state estimator/real time contingency analyzer based analyses and studies shall provide warning when the voltage at either Switchyard is projected to be outside the limits defined in Table 1 under any of the contingencies defined in Section 1.3.3. Such analyses are normally run every fifteen (15)minutes. Upon confirmation of the results of a scenario referenced in this Section 1.5, TO shall immediately notify the CPNPP Shift Manager, in accordance with Attachment 8.F.

ATTACHMENT 5 TO TXX-13082 RESPONSE TO RAI 9 Attachment 5 to TXX-1 3082 Page 1 of 1/]1 SPILL/ RELES 612 16.1.3 f6.1.4 f6.1.5 1 6.1.7 1--------------

NOTE NOTIFY RP & MAKE IMMEDATE CONTACT SPILL REVIEW EP21INITIATE CR TO CONTACT FR SM PLANT ANNOUNCEMENT ACTION REQUIRED COORDINATOR EVALUATE LEADER TO ADVISE IF TOXIC SPILL COULD CHARCOAL IF SPILL OF SPILL/ RELEASE.AFFECT BREATHING AIR IN SFGDs, AB, ECB FB RESPOND AS A ORCTMT RESOURCE SPILL