CP-201300546, Response to Request for Additional Information for License Amendment Request (LAR) 12-007, Revision to Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, for Two, 14-Day Completion Times for Offsite Circuits
| ML13149A257 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 05/16/2013 |
| From: | Mays R Luminant Generation Co, Luminant Power |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CP-201300546, TXX-13082 | |
| Download: ML13149A257 (40) | |
Text
Rafael Flores Luminant Power a Senior Vice President
& Chief Nuclear Officer Rafael.Flores@Luminant.com P 0 Box 1002 6322 North FM 56 Glen Rose, TX 76043 Luminant T 254 897 5550 C 817 559 0403 F 254 897 6652 CP-201300546 Ref. # 10CFR50.90 Log # TXX-13082 May 16, 2013 ATTN: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST (LAR)12-007, REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, "AC SOURCES - OPERATING," FOR TWO, 14-DAY COMPLETION TIMES FOR OFFSITE CIRCUITS," (TAC NOS. MF0405 AND MF0406)
REFERENCES:
- 1. Luminant Power letter, logged TXX-12198, from Rafael Flores to the NRC titled "Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, License Amendment Request (LAR)12-007, Revision to Technical Specification 3.8.1,
'AC Sources - Operating,' for Two, 14-Day Completion Times for Offsite Circuits,"
dated December 19,2012 (ADAMS Number ML13028A237)
- 2. Request for Additional information from Balwant K. Singal, NRR via email dated April 18, 2013 (ADAMS Number ML13108A153)
Dear Sir or Madam:
Reference 1 was License Amendment Request (LAR)12-007 for two, one-time, 14-day Technical Specification (TS) Completion Times (CTs) to complete a plant modification by March 31, 2014. Reference 2 provided a request from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for additional information needed to review the amendment request. Attached is the Luminant Power response to the request for additional information.
This communication contains no new commitment regarding Comanche Peak Units 1 and 2.
Should you have any questions, please contact Ms. Tamera Ervin-Walker at (254) 897-6902.
A member of the STARS Alliance Callaway ' Comanche Peak - Diablo Canyon
- Palo Verde
- San Onofre
- South Texas Project
- Wolf Creek
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission TXX-13082 Page 2 of 2 05/16/2013 Sincerely, Luminant Generation Company LLC Rafael Flores By: _ _ __ _
R. B.Mas Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Support - Response to Request for Additional Information - Response to RAI 1 - Response to RAI 3 - Response to RAI 7 - Response to RAI 9 c- A. T. Howell III, Region IV Balwant K. Singal, NRR Resident Inspectors, Comanche Peak Alice Hamilton Rogers, P.E.
Inspection Unit Manager Texas Department of State Health Services
.Mail Code 1986 P. 0. Box 149347 Austin TX 78714-9347
ATTACHMENT 1 TO TXX-13082 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Attachment I to TXX-1 3082 Page 1 of 5 NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI) 1:
In the LAR Attachment 1, Section 2.0, Page 3, the following is stated:
The proposed changes in Chapters 8 and 9 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
(Reference 8.1) (Attachment 6) reflect ST [startup transformer] XST1, new alternate ST XST1A, new 138 kV [kilo volt] tower disconnect switches, firewall, and the installation of new cable buses and transfer panels. The FSAR Table and Figures not shown in the Attachment, but which will also be updated, are Table 8.3-3 and Figures 1.2-1, 8.2-1, 8.2-4, 8.2-7, 8.2-9, and 8.2-11.
Please provide the following documents:
(a) Markup/update of the FSAR Figures 1.2-1, 8.2-1, 8.2-4, 8.2-7, 8.2-9, 8.2-11, and 8.3-1 (Drawing No.
El-0001) (or a relevant portion of the figures/drawings) showing the modifications.
(b) Markup of the FSAR Table 8.3-3.
Luminant Power's Response to RAI 1:
The markup of the FSAR Figures 1.2-1, 8.2-1, 8.2-4, 8.2-7, 8.2-9, 8.2-11, and 8.3-1 (Drawing No. E1-0001) showing the modifications and markup of FSAR Table 8.3-3 are contained in Attachment 2.
NRC RAI 2:
In the LAR Attachment 1, Section 4.1, Page 15, the licensee stated that the plant procedure SOP-614A/B "Alternative Power Generator Operations" requires the Alternate Power Diesel Generator (APDG) fuel be replenished every two hours.
Please describe how the APDG fuel will be replenished every two hours, if needed, throughout any of two 14-day Completion Times (CTs).
Luminant Power's Response to RAI 2:
SOP-614A/B, "Alternate Power Generator Operation" directs Operators to contact the appropriate APDG Refueling Contact (RC) to utilize "Engineering Work Book - Loss of Off-Site Power Supplement" for replenishing diesel fuel to the APDGs every two hours.
The Engineering Work Book contains instructions for filling the APDG during loss of offsite power conditions where the normal method of refueling truck replenishment is not available. Operations will contact the appropriate APDG RC to gather the pre-staged materials and equipment.
If power exists to the fuel island, the normal method of refueling truck (RT) filling is used. The electric powered refueling transfer pump can fill the 2000 gallon RT (normal capacity is 1,800 gallons or less), and the 500 gallon RT if needed, such that the fuel to the affected APDGs will be replenished every two hours inside the protected area. The fuel island storage tank has an 8,000 gallon capacity tank normally filled to 5,000 to 8,000 gallons.
However, if power does not exist to the fuel island, the Engineering Work Book contains instructions on replenishing the APDGs every two hours. Inside the protected area is the 2000 gallon RT, a 5.5 horse-powered (HP) gasoline powered pump that can pump approximately 200 gallons per minute, and four emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil storage tanks (FOSTs) each typically filled to greater than 86,000 gallons. The APDG RC will retrieve the materials identified in the Material List and contact the Control Room (CR). The CR will designate a FOST to use to fill the RT. The 2000 gallon RT will be positioned next to the FOST and grounded to the metal cover of the FOST. Two hoses will be connected
Attachment I to TXX-1 3082 Page 2 of 5 to the gas powered pump. The gas powered pump suction hose will be connected to a rigid suction pipe then inserted into the sampling opening on the cover of the FOST. The pump will be started for a short duration such that the initial flushing of fuel oil will remove any pump or pipe debris to a 55-gallon drum or suitable container. The pump discharge will then be directed to the top of the RT and started. Once the RT is at the desired level, the pump will be stopped and grounding device removed. The RT can then be repositioned to fill the APDGs. This process will be repeated except for the flushing and connection steps and thus the APDGs can be refueled every two hours.
If the gas powered pump becomes unavailable, an alternate method is described in the Engineering Work Book to fill the APDGs RT using an air pressure powered pump and an air compressor. Normally, two air compressors are available for use and are rated at 185 cubic-foot-per-minute (cfm) and 130 cfm respectively, and both operate at 100 pounds-per-square-inch (psi). Also available is a 100 gallon per minute (gpm) rated air pump that can be powered by an air compressor such that the air powered pump can refuel the RT in approximately 20 minutes.
NRC RAI 3:
Please provide the following drawings related to the APDG sets:
(a) Drawing(s) showing layout of major enclosures/components of the APDG sets, and describe the cable routing from the APDG sets to the plant Class 1E 6.9kV buses.
(b) A single line diagram showing connections of the APDG sets to the plant 6.9 kV Class 1E buses.
Luminant Power's Response to RAI 3:
See Attachment 3 for the drawing(s) showing layout of major enclosures/components of the APDG sets and a single-line diagram showing connections of the APDG sets to the plant 6.9kV Class 1E buses. The description of the cable routing is described below.
The connection from each generator to transformer is provided by five conductors per-phase (5 - 1/c)
- 4/0 American Wire Gauge (AWG), 600-volt cables per-phase. These cables are laid in a 24-inch cable tray. Thus, a total of 15 - 1/c #4/0 AWG cables per-phase provide connection from the APDGs to the transformer.
The secondary of the transformer is connected to the transfer switch by 1 - 1/c 500 thousand circular mills (MCM) 8kV cable per-phase. For Unit 1, the cable is installed in a tray. For Unit 2, the cable is installed in a conduit.
The transfer switch allows APDG power to be connected to either Train A or Train B Class 1E safety related bus at a time. A 1/C 500 MCM cable per-phase, routed in conduit and tray, connect transfer switch to breaker in the safety related bus.
NRC RAI 4:
Please describe whether any dedicated operator will be assigned to ensure proper operation of the APDGs, during the proposed two 14-day CTs.
Luminant Power's Response to RAI 4:
A Nuclear Equipment Operator (NEO) will be assigned to ensure proper operation of the APDGs, during the proposed two 14-day CTs.
to TXX-13082 Page 3 of 5 NRC RAI 5:
In the LAR Attachment 1, Section 4.1, Page 15, the licensee stated that each APDG set consist of three diesel generators operating in parallel at 480 volts (V), 3 phase and 60 hertz (Hz). Each APDG is rated at 1140 kilowatts (kW) with output connected in parallel for a total capacity of 3420 kW and is connected to the Class 1E 6.9 kV bus through a 480 V/6.9 kV transformer. The loading of APDG set will be limited by the transformer capacity of 3450 kVA. The total of the unit-specific loads required to be fed from APDGs as shown in Page 16, Table 4, is 3010.29 kW.
Please provide total unit-specific load in kVA [kilovolt-ampere] (considering power factor of loads) to verify that the loading will remain within the connected transformer rating of 3450 kVA. Also, please provide a discussion if any common load may be necessary to be powered from the unit APDG set for safe shutdown and long term cooling of the unit.
Luminant Power's Response to RAI 5:
Table 1 lists the power factor (PF) and kVA demand for each load. Total kVA load, including a 2% margin for losses, is 3416kVA, thus the loading will remain within the transformer rating of 3450kVA. The loads identified below represent the Unit-specific (i.e., non-common) loads. The loads in Table 1 are similar for both Units 1 and 2.
Table 1. Load Description and Load in kW, PF, and kVA LOAD LOAD LOAD 6.9KV LOAD DESCRIPTION (kW) PF (kVA)
Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) 526.03 0.914 575.53 Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump 789.42 0.910 867.49 Station Service Water (SSW) Pump 643.1 0.873 736.66 LOAD LOAD LOAD 480V LOAD DESCRIPTION (KW) PF (KVA)
Containment Recirculating Fan 93.25 0.85 109.71 Safety Chillers 99.9 0.85 117.53 Safety Chiller Recirculation Pump 18.24 0.85 21.46 Emergency Lighting 132.69 0.85 156.11 Control Rod Drive Mechanism Ventilation (CDRM) Fan 92.44 0.85 108.75 Instrument Air 183.28 0.85 215.62 Pressurizer Heater Control Group A 141.4 0.85 166.35 Battery Chargers and Inverters 110.94 0.84 132.07 Reactor Makeup Water Pump 4.54 0.85 5.34 Miscellaneous 480V Loads (Fans, Pumps, Transformers, and Heaters) 116.03 0.85 136.51 SUBTOTAL 2951.26 3349.12 Plus 2% Losses 59.03 66.98 TOTAL 3010.29 3416.11 to TXX-13082 Page 4 of 5 Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) compliance with the Station Blackout Rule, 10CFR50.63, has been performed in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155 and NUMARC 87-00. In accordance with those RGs, CPNPP is not required under 10 CFR50.63 to consider simultaneous loss of both offsite power (LOOP) sources and both EDGs to both Units. CPNPP compliance is based on simultaneous LOOP at both Units, the non-mechanistic unavailability of both EDGs in one Unit, (i.e., the blackout Unit) and the availability of one of two EDGs in the other, "non-blackout" Unit. All common loads will be fed by the operable EDG and APDG will not be required to power the common loads.
NRC RAI 6:
Please describe whether each APDG set consisting of 3 DGs, each rated 1140 kW, will be provided with load sharing mechanism so that the kW and kVAR [kilovolt-ampere-reactive] loading is shared equally among the 3 DGs.
Luminant Power's Response to RAI 6:
Each generator set contains a multi-function protection and control device "GEMPAC" with the capability to actively share real (kW) and reactive (kVAR) power with other generators. There is an instrumentation cable with three individual insulated conductors "triad" that is daisy-chained between each GEMPAC. The three conductors of the triad cable are a real power wire, a reactive power wire, and a common wire. There is a +/-5VDC (volts direct current) analog signal transmitted between the real wire and the common wire, and another +/-5 VDC analog signal transmitted between the reactive wire and the common wire. Real power and kVAR load share signals are generated by each GEMPAC based on the rating of the generator controlled by the GEMPAC. Zero percent of the rated load provides a 0-Volt signal and one-hundred percent of the rated load provides a 5-Volt signal. Each GEMPAC is working to equalize the load share signal voltages between all three generator sets thus assuring equal sharing, proportional to the rating of the generator, of real and reactive power. As needed, each GEMPAC will send a fuel bias "increase/decrease" signal to the engine governor, and an excitation bias "increase/ decrease" signal to the voltage regulator in order to increase or decrease real power or reactive power, respectively. GEMPAC monitors, real and reactive power output from the generator sets, compares it to what it "should" be for equal load sharing by looking at load share signal voltages, and compensates if necessary by sending bias signals to the engine governor and voltage regulator. The three generators of each APDG have same kW and kVAR rating; therefore, they will equally share the real and reactive power load.
NRC RAI 7:
In the LAR Attachment 1, Section 4.1, Page 27, the licensee stated:
CPNPP's [Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant's] Operations Department will contact the Transmission Operator (Transmission Grid Controller) once per day during a 14-day Completion Time to ensure no problems exist in the transmission lines feeding CPNPP or their associated switchyards that would cause post trip switchyard voltages to exceed the voltages required by STA-629.
Please provide relevant portion of the STA-629 document which provides the required post trip switchyard voltages.
Luminant Power's Response to RAI 7:
CPNPP offsite power system required voltages at the Switchyards are listed in STA-629 Attachment 8.H, section 1.0 Table 1. Section 1.3 of Attachment 8.H describes the requirement of system studies and contingencies to be considered. Post contingency voltages are required to meet the voltage limits defined in Table 1. The relevant pages of STA-629 are provided in Attachment 4.
to TXX-13082 Page 5 of 5 NRC RAI 8:
In the LAR Attachment 1, Section 4.2, Page 30, the licensee stated In the two weeks prior to the start of the CT, a thermographic survey will be conducted on the two fixed sources in the safeguards switchgear room to verify no abnormalities exist. This is to reduce the likelihood of a fire ignition.
Please provide a description of two fixed sources in the safeguards switchgear room.
Luminant Power's Response to RAI 8:
The two fixed sources in the Unit 1 safeguards switchgear room that were identified for thermographic surveys are the motor control center (MCC) CP1-EPMCEB-01 (1EB1-1) and 6.9kV to 480V transformer CP1-EPTRET-02 (TIEB3). The two fixed sources were identified as potential impacts to XST2 during the 14 day CTs by plant walkdowns and information contained in the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) fire assessment. The walkdowns were performed to verify the cable routings for both XST2 and XST1, and to confirm that the information contained in the IPEEE remained valid. As only XST2 would be in-service during the extended CTs, a fire in either of these two sources could result in a loss of power from the in-service transformer and thus warranted additional preventative actions prior to entering the extended CT. The two sources identified and the preventative actions are the same for both 14-day XST1 CTs (138kV and 6.9kV work windows, respectively).
NRC RAI 9:
Please describe the precautions which will be taken to prevent any fire-hazards due to any diesel fuel oil leakage/spillage associated with the APDG sets.
Luminant Power's Response to RAI 9:
The following design features and administrative controls are established to ensure that any diesel fuel leak or spill does not become a fire hazard:
The Aggreko APDG sets are designed with built-in leak detection and spill containment. Aggreko User Manual M020319, Revision C, Paragraph 5.4, the base frame has 120% capacity of the fuel tank to prevent fuel leaking out of the generator set in the event of a fuel leakage inside the generator. A level switch is fitted inside the bund for spillage indication. This will shut down the engine when activated.
The APDG fuel tank fill point is external, which prevents diesel fuel from refueling activities from potentially coming in contact with running and hot DG components. Additionally, the exhaust system consists of the exhaust ducting, exhaust silencer complete with spark arrestor and rain cap assembly.
CPNPP procedure SOP-614A, "Alternate Power Generator Operation," is established for the operation of the APDGs and requires the APDG fuel be replenished every two hours. SOP-614A/B references "Engineering Work Book - Loss of Offsite Power" for APDG refueling. This work book contains steps to ensure that the refueling truck is grounded during refueling operations.
In the event that a diesel fuel spill would occur outside of the APDG sets, CPNPP procedure STA-726, "Nonradioactive Spill Response," would be invoked as a mechanism for initial response to the spill. to this letter is a spill response flow diagram which is included as Attachment 5 of STA-726.
ATTACHMENT 2 TO TXX-13082 RESPONSE TO RAI 1
Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 1 of 19 CPE
. .0 : . ..................
.. .. . .... . . .. NLY IS ...
..................... RE ..........
[ ... . ......* .,... ... ... . .. . . ......
....... 1,2 ...
- rOOOO~-------------1
A B C O 6 E F G H A B C0 6 £F CG Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 2 of 19 H
L I4W~
IT 34W(V sF t FENCE
- - - A- ..... M...~.2G -l' M.L..i. 1 --
4, A~iii "EaGPMEN CATE I? 4 1.
~¶SS 1 2A m~cN.2O A
N 2
4, ---- -
345K P2 AER 2 RAIISVISSIONCRLV A
P-7 CONNDIRGE PEAl 4 ThM6OISS2ONCIGCIET TTJ
.1 I a, 34MV TRANSF 51004 34=V 20.07 A~
4 TAM
- 1 .I-4, a
ti 34590.00K064SWITCH TRANSSISSION 02037 iIw-~I CIWP RELAYRMaao 345K0EYEIANN TRANSMISSION CIRC30 I l
0-L 2
--- ~1-~
A 345KVWOLF TRASISSION HMLOS CIRCIST B NO 34SKIOECORDOVA THANSNISS*IClOUT 11 A I
I FENCE~ lb iGATE AA -- *I .. . .. 'J FINA zRA Al
~ CTOV
/1&3 ii 2V-T 2312-0 ii COMANCHEPEAK N.P.P.
SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
.~.-.-. UNITS I and 2
- .- 5~5 PLANT SWITCHYARNS 6' -- AND SSON LINE CONNECTIONS A
FIGURE 11.2-1 AG00
& M.g*
02.2-1 C O t E F G N 4COC#4 A IC 0-0-OO II It CI ANS"IS
D 4 £ C H A aB D 4 E F G H Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 3 of 19 EVERMAN SW JOHNSONSW OCCORDOVA S.E.S.- 138KY DECORDOVA S.E.S.- 345 KY WOLFHCLLOW SW 345 KY 345 KY 345 KY STEPHENVILLE - 138 KV COMANCHESW - 345 KY PARKER SWITCHINGSTATION - 345 KV I
2 PS5KYCOSOWOW LI0 345 KYSOYF a*LOE
{
TOTEWEK'O 3
W KVMCXN=VA
-4 J¢¥ ý s.
,TE... 2 TOp ECLIVERY I STBU
-5 - - 2 - - -- *tI -
1 I I I I US OK ~ I 80 I ET I I I
-L I I F~Ft III' I
I I I I
I II IT I I I ITETETI 4
PLN T O I--, K, Ills!
I I
I I
I L~i I I
I EM I I
I CT I TOW II I I IL
-,$I I-c-a --- I :-- i 6 .-
. ------------------ iJ M"a-COMANCHE PEAK NPP -138 KV -
COMANCHE 4jpp - 34E PEAKKV Itt 5
PLUT ERPT
-T3 SYSTMTEN STAT.L I £ - ITSTYL ZOO?
LIT~ ~ va001O T.1 CM013T TOUSER[Tý`M T TIGM 't~CRI-E E
MO 7 (- i-AEWOES01(
Trta 03-
'E MS72A ~
T T T~
TT-AICJSESBUE IOT 0*-2 T~
- r. COMANCHEPEAK S.E.S. 6 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT UNITS I andI 2 ELECTRICAL NETWORK INTERCONNECTIONS FIGURE 8.2-4 C H Jm TETO-WTTOOOOT, fýBM20.dý A OS-TO-ZOO BB CC 0
- 0) 9 f E F G H A ý-24u 1
C 0 A I F C II A
A B B C 0 E IF G N A a C 0 4 Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 N Page 4 of 19 I
2 3
4 4
5 6 COMANCHEPEAK N.P.P. a PLAN FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT UNITS I n 2 138 KV SWITCHYARD PLAN ELEVATIONS, AND SECTIONS FIGUME8.2-7 SH I OF 2 A O4-2S-ZOI~ I B C 0 t E F 0 N i A .- n-m I a C 0 t E F 0 N
D C H A B H 0 E F O H A B D 4 Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 5 of 19
.A -c /4sf, 'A 5 -
I vS I I Lira L...... W._ V.- 0. -_L A SECTION B-B 2 2 3 3 4 4 IWKVLý TO STCJENLE 5 5 A0 6 COMANCHEPEAK N.P.P. 6 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT LINTS I ad 2 SECTION C-C SECTION E-E 138 KV SSITCHYARO PLAN ELEVATIONS. AND SECTIONS FIGURE 8.2-7 SH 2 OF 2 C 0 0 1I -ý FSARhvOatOcO S A 04-23000
ý-2.. I 1 aB C D t £ F O
- mic -s.
615T XS7 SECIO A-At . L' i*-......
T EINA SECTION B-B
Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 7 of 19 1% a C 0 # IT 0 aI I
A-START-UP 7FTV LEGEND
- TSTIA' iI L 1I (RE FCUR TRANSFIER UARUJALL SWITCH ERDOCABLETAP BOX I
I SI NOTES.
1 9 ?9 LREFEROENC FIGURTE52-11A,FORTRANSFER SWITCHES
-05X. -04Y. AND -05Y TIE TO CPX-EPTSST-OdX.
-r Cp-PR{IS>-
ART-I, TRANSF TRAWW" w
WS j Y TRANSFORMIER 2.FOR WIEWS OsTIIA A-A ANDfl-f SEEFIGURE 8.2-00.
CIX. 111041 zK4V KVW CONTIA"MT II UNIT LTli 6.9~I I OS-UTSSTRS 3
CABLETRENC 4- ST Y5u STAIONSRG KT
~L. JT L _---
A I I
--.- 0 Q . &' ----------------...---- 4--r
-.-- 0)
CONTINMENT UNIT2 I
- L - PX-EPTSST-04T SWIOUHGARj 4 I
- 4 .~. ---- x--J
-~TMW 9 " M LAR
- I-M.. I!
- 8--. If WCE 6 66 ii.
COMANOC PEAK NP.P.
FINAL. SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT LMTS Ion 2 6
START-UPi/STATION S.RVIC1/LIT AUX TRANSFORUER CABLE BUS CONIECTION TO 6.9 KV SmITO.IG.EAR Fni . .2-i1 ET~0,~20I3I I C 0 8 fIROO0OR.dOn A DDOO*LOM A 05-09-2013 1 a ! C D 4 9 F a I IS
A B C D E F C H
- I A B C D 4 E C H I -
Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 8 of 19 LTrIENOTC OOJV "O-nTo TRNO[CSWIMr S CY-P.ETSSY.O.TMT. .- T. MO-OT TIETO I CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT UNIT 2 I UNIT I 2 2 vc
,) 0 (a 9 0 (9( ............................................................................
--- ------ ------- -----17
. .0. . . . ........ ..-- ...--------------
t 4-----------
I
----- AC NO(AE-ENO \CABLETATY FT*O" ASTI 3 ESTI 3 TAT CABE fl ST /1ABE Nl T1AY I1 ! ..
........................ ---------......... OT.OTSTOTA wT I
..... ....- I.......... -.
. I-
.......... . 1 ...... - -- .-.. .. VIEW B-B TTO EL-*S r e - - t V.4K a~ A' lWET
\ ý .,
ý VIEW A-A I T TOELOM"? MT1.I . I m'OS i I
. -- j
! t
I .--
I I
it---- . . . .-. .. .. .t ...
..-------- I .. ... ... ...... ... .I. . . . . . .t-.-.! .. .. .. .. .. .. tI- . . . . . . . ..-! . . . . . . . . .
I!
4
--- -- - --- -- - - L ------ L --- -i ---- - - - -------------
L" ..........-..---.--- L.---.....----..........-..............t......... -...
'x, -i II 2i M 0
5 5 PARTIAL PLAN VIEW B PEAX N.P.P. 6 FINA. COMANCHE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT UNTS I and 2 SPARE START-UP TRANSFORMERXSTIA CABLE BUS CONNECTIONTO 6.9 KV SWmTCHGEAR FIGUR1E8.2-t1A B C 0 E F 0 H YWOOAOT.LNAY ATR~TRB B C 0 t B 0 H
4 S 5-, . 1~
IcP[
cOW A A B C 0 0 $ F C N iW A 8UES IT,ISIAPAI" 110 -. 1Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 S ASSOA VE WARE
-AVE, 7T A NY~TR Page 9of 19 TF -EVADIT m OSTOSTASFRMR M.-T A ITR O I
I FSAR FIGURE 8.3-
-n- - UTZ 1T0TRRCfLT ,..T,.,
RESteW.A-EAT
-- y., - 514400C SAIMS A< 4~ =IOAR
. TlWAITRO.-
Il-C. IT jEI
-_ SSATI ES R STR, IEtESOWE 5*4001 R USISTOm I.ItVIM SEAE OWOASES, 1-2 O
.11A-6A mu-m SilAR
, STARRWSPSSAS L** -- i Sl iM, 4 R SA1. XFER59 .1p, ST A X Ml1 I. LRO MRm.* SO R 05SO O M A OA 2
IT 2 IlT - -l(qE- 11AA STEIC IN I. ISO -1 .I*
AW AAOOW E.T/O.-l-C MRS1.
l - EIo REV1 A IS .N TA TI- S.
- 11 IT OWE CAO MR3AIr0IIO IIIO AS
..... ..... T OW I a 3 lOES A.AT S - 1 .1055 I+*. I-LIVEu*u~CISSEAo IA V ALA.T.-l 5-* 3
~O-RoT - So REASlTORRUA MAA T ia .. 1i*s -Am*s * .u1-I +.1 TROM TAWT T-1 TOS T-.
TOO TEAM TSO 1~OWJ TE1 TI -R Al E= 1,- EST= Ass ." .u1m-IAE* 2EA i2 :E2SA A 2U TE _ AEOW ITA - 0w ~A .. ,TRRRMS f A, -
E A 11"010- ,l~
AS- Y *c 43CC A-Os~e~im SA- u x*-eME .e ml*A OtISU OSTE-4 A. 1ISEVA.. ASES.AMR K T -~A -
OWRSMA T-TS 4T.T*1SBTI[B3 A_ SM U1
~S o SITE--*m L memTS E=ST N AS
-P2--COW- CPEM C.
CP- C2 P- C2 S P- TCP2EP-C-OPETOT-4 PT-004 EPREi0 ETN-l EPTORNT-03 EPTRET-T-0 2 EPTOENT-T-040P05T--SI PRET-0T-J 1E__ CPSAP E_ E RO SEES.
R R T I" 0.. S SFT SIR-All A SEEI, MC 5
JIB2) IIB4 TSA-MT5.5 4( 713.0 T0TT 4
)007B 0OT8 220OI 21 t TEl 0 -AXSSOTO 0-A RI EB B ClA0 TO7 0-AS)TO0-S 00 -S TOTEB 0-M10B ASK D-OUXE.l res TREROR ENDE EAST R- M 1 MBA-SPTRET 0i 03 WT71Ml At 0 R21MA4 REAM STOEOIOWCAEA MT IOBO 2MM-i flI-: - IMM0T R-OS 00-AM-UT ART-S RN E P AE.I.,.so m~llm* ~,mm l 6 6 I I I I OSRALMAMA C-ST~l 04IW(
3C 0%1I-12-0007301-0 E I H C
< FINAL IPRINT )>
<* FINAL IHHINI B 0 F=
3-L.;, A E1-0DO1 a C D 0 it
Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 10 of 19 POPS to Unit 2 safety buses through CPX-EPTSST-04Y CPNPP/FSAR Can also realign to and CPX-EPTSST-05Y and startup transformer AOPS to Unit 1 safety buses TABLE 8.3-3 XST1A (XST1) through CPX-EPTSST-04X FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS FOR AUXILIARY AC POWER SYSTEM and CPX-EPTSST-05X transmission linel (Sheet 1 of 18) F pACI TS-]
Caues of Effects of F ure Effects on ItemIDescr& n Fu ion Failure Mode\ Failur Failure D6/ectic System l I # l I
- l &
1 138-kV ofite sup ies power to startup fails to provide \transmiss'¶Qp line loss of el ctri al power p otec ve relays; None: offsite ower source power sou e trans ormer XST1 (XSTIA) electrical power \ails; oppas sod to transfcrm r XST1 nnu ciation in (Item 2) or di sel generators to XST1 (XST1A) 4, circuit breakers (XSTIA) ont I room are availabl ol~ns".
2 45-kV offsite suppli power to startup fails to provide trarnission line loss of ec cal po er pr ective relays; N4one: off te power source ower source transfo er XST2 (XST2A) electrical power fails, circuit breakers to trans r er XS a unciation in Item 1) o diesel generators to XST2 (XST2A) in,*,*ithyd*;opern. (XST c ntrol room re availble.
3 tartup supplies , 6I- fails to deliver internal fault; loss of t rotective relays; one: ffsite power source nsformer XST1 to buase 2EA! and 2EA2 power component failure; buses EAl d 2 annunciation in Item or diesel generators SUIJ 2 ., , .... overheating; fire and lo s of control room ea ilable.
supplies A ....... Ifor buses EA' an 1 E 3A 15-kV cable power from short circuit; mechanical damage; For o en circ . Lo s protective relays; N e: Offsite power source XST to buoez 1EA4 8d open circuit fire of t annunciation in (I m 2) or diesel generators WA2. buse 1EA1 and 1 control room e available.
For ort circuit: oss of-PweB to buse 2EA1, 2EA2, a loss transfer panels CPX- of altermae pewer EPTSST-04X and soame for buses lEA1 CPX-EPTSST-O5X and 1EA2.
Amendment No. 1.04
Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 11 of 19 CPNPP/FSAR TABLE 8.3-3 Can also realign to ECT ANALYSIS FOR AUXILIARY AC POWER startup transformer (Sheet 2 of 18) F*] XST1A (XST1)
Causes of c Failure Eaects on Failure Failure Detection S /stem Item Description Failure Mode 3B 15-kV cable For o l*/circuit- Loss protective relays; done: offsite power source of ' to bu es annunciation in (jtem 2) or diesel generators I(Note 5) ,1A.ad 2 fko:. control room e available.
For slu c~fcuit: Loss of *pwet buses 2EA1, , and loss of ate pow F
-eewee for buses 1EA1 and 1EA2. [1111 4 startup fails to deliver internal fault; loss of per protective relays; None: offsite power source transformer XST2 component failure; buses lEA1, and lEA2 annunciation in (Item 1) or diesel generators overheating; fire and loss of attemate control room are available.
p:ewj~ou~ce for Can also realign to spare bu s 2EA1 and 2EA2 startup transformer XTS2A nAfP (116M.4c .
I Amendment No. +94
Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 12 of 19 CPNPP/FSAR 11-9I TABLE 8.3-3 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS FOR AUXILIARY AC POWER SYSTEM (Sheet 3 of 18)
Causes of Effects of Failure Effects on Item Description Failure Failure Detection System 4A short circuit; Pr otective relays; None: offsite power source open circuit an nunciation in (Item 1) or diesel generators co ntrol room are available.
Can also realign to spare startup transformer XTS2A 7XST2 4B 15-KV cable Trnsik power from short circuit; mechanical For open ir "t: Loss pr otection relays; None: offsit power source transfer panel CPX- open circuit fire ýf U5= 2'-'- to an nunciation in 1) or le.iesel generators (Itemavail are X EPTSST-O2X/;n, XeT-2 ses2 1and 2EA2 co ntrol room For't circuit: Loss Can als realign to spare I 2 Iand CPX-EPTSST-03X startu ansformer XTS2A of to buses 1EA EA2 and loss of a w
- for buses 2EA1 and 2EA2.
4C Spare Startup Supplies power to 6.9kV Fails to deliver Interr ial fault; Loss of power to buses Pr otective relays; None; offiste power source transformer XST2A to buses 1EA1 and 1EA2 power comp onent failure; lEA1 and 1EA2 and an nunciation in the (Item 1) or diesel generator of Unit 1 through CPX- oveh eating; fire loss of alternate power co ntrol room available.
EPTSST-032Y; and is an source for buses 2EA1 Can also realign to startup alternate power source and 2EA2. transformer XST2 (Item 4).
for buses 2EA1 and 2EA2 of Unit 2 through CPX-EPTSST-032X Amendment No. +04
Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 13 of 19 CPNPP/FSAR 19 TABLE 8.3-3 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS FOR AUXILIARY AC POWER SYSTEM (Sheet 4 of 18)
Causes of Effects of Failure Effects on f Item Description Function Failure Mode Failure Failure Detection System
.1 4D 15-KV Cable Transmits power to Short circuit; Mechanical damage; For open circuit: Loss Protective relays; None; offsite power source transfer panel CPX- open circuit fire of power to buses annunciation inthe (Item 1) or diesel generators EPTSST-03Y from 1EA1 and 1EA2 from control room are available.
XST2A XST2A. For short Can also realign to startup circuit: Loss of power transformer XST2 (Item 4).
to buses lEA1, 1EA2 and loss of altemate power source for buses 2EA1 and 2EA2.
4E 15-KV Cable Transmits power to Short circuit; Mechanical damage; For open circuit: Loss Protective relays; None; offiste power source transfer panel CPX- open circuit fire of power to alternate annunciation in teh (Item 1) or diesel generators EPTSST-032X from buses 2EA1 and 2EA2 control room are available.
XST2A from XST2A. For short Can also realign to startup circuit: Loss of power transformer XST2 (Item 4).
to buses 1EA1, 1EA2 and loss of alternate power source for buses 2EA1 and 2EA2.
4OF 15-KV Transfer T;ene"me pewe"3to buses Short circuit; Mechanical damage; For open circuit: Loss Protective relays; None; offsite power sources 1 ?
Panel CPX-EPTSST-02X*8e-3 2 1 and 2EA2-f W*it-2 open circuit fire AOPS of 0ACM-POWe.C ee.mFe-to buses 2EA1 and 2EA2. For short circuit: Loss of P@WeF to buses lEA1, 1EA2, annunciation inthe control room (Item 1) or diesel generators are available.
[Supplies AOPS from XST2 (XST2A) and loss of altefea pewereemree for buses 2EA1 and 2EA2.
A-Amendment No. 404.
Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 14 of 19 CPNPP/FSAR TABLE 8.3-3 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS FOR AUXILIARY AC POWER SYSTEM (Sheet 5 of 18)
ISupplies POPS from XST2 (XST2A)
Causes of Effects of Failure Effects on Item Description Functiý Failure Mode Failure Failure Detection System 1:.
4D6 15-KV Transfer TsRamit. pow Fto buses Short circuit; Mechanical damage; For open circuit: Loss Protective relays; None; offsite power source Panel CPX- 1EA1 and 1EA*2 e*i open circuit fire of fewef to buses annunciation in the (Item 1) or diesel generators EPTSST-02Y (eT2A I*A and 1 EA2. For contol room are available.
'* ' *l~and .,.T CPX-EPvSTOY 4hort circuit; Loss of powe to buses lEA1, r1EA2 and loss of (Note 7)
ISupes POPS for buses 2EA1 and 2EA2.
4E+- 15-KV Cable T, l pvwfrom Short circuit; Mechanical I \ open circuit: Loss c relays; None; offsite power source transfer panel CPX- open circuit fire of'e to buses /annunciation inthe (Item 1) or diesel generators EPTSST-02Y and 03) .to lEA1 and I EA2. For control room are available buses 1EA1 and ýA' 4hort circuit: Loss of to buses 1EA1 1EA2 and loss of Y 4supplies AOP for buses 2EA1 and 2EA2.
4F'I- 15-KV CablEe A transfer panel CPF_4 EPTSST-02X and'03Xý Short circuit; open circuit Mechanical damage; fire For open circuit: Loss of a8061late pone Protective rela ys; annunciation irnthe sguFG to buses 2EA1 control room None; offsite power source (Item 1) or diesel generators are available.
buses 2EA1 and 2EA2 -- -- and 2EA2. For short Acircuit: Loss of-jewefL to buses 1EA1, 1EA2 and loss of tem.vate
,ýI<powe;osewee for buses 2EA1 and 2EA2.
Amendment No. 4G4
Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 15 of 19 CPNPP/FSAR TABLE 8.3-3 FAll IIRF MODEF AND FFFFCT ANALYSIS FOR AUXILIARY AC POWER SYSTEM F(XS-TIA-)I (Sheet 6 of 18)
Causes of Effects of Failure Effects on Item Description Function Failure Mode Failure Failure Detec Systen 5 6.9-ky circuit protects bus 1 EA1 fails to open; mechanical failure; 1. Failure to open An nciation None:
breaker 1EA1-2 fails to close stuck contacts; relay could cause loss of bil* 2. Friodic testing 1. Redundant equipment is failure; control power 1 EA1 & XFMR XST1 f operational provided on bus 1EA2.
fails; fire; loss of 2. Fails to close: : eadiness 2. Power can be supplied from ventilation power cannot be offsite power source (Item 2) supplied from XST1 or diesel generator 1EG1.
6 6.9-kV circuit protects bus 1EA1 fails to open; mechanical failure; 1. Failure to open 1. Annunciation None:
breaker 1EA1-1 fails to close stuck contacts; relay could cause loss of 2. Periodic testing 1. Redundant equipment is failure; control power 1EA1 & XFMRG XST erational provided on bus 1 EA2.
fails; fire; loss of .afi T readines 2. Power can be supplied from ventilation 2. Fails to close: bus offsite power source (Item 1) power cannot be loss of bus or diesel generator 1EG1.
(XsT2A) supplied from power 7 6.9-kV circuit protects bus 1EA2 fails to open; mechanical failure; 1. Failure to n 1. Annunciation None: (
breaker 1EA2-2 fails to close stuck contacts; relay could cause A2 & 2. Periodic testing 1. Redundant equipment is failure; control power XFMR XST1 for operational provided on bus 1EA1.
fails; fire; loss of 2. Fails to clse: readiness 2. Power can be suppliec.#_
ventilation power can r~t be from offsite power source supplied fr m XST1 (Item 2) or diesel generator 1 EG2.
power source Amendment No. Q4
Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 16 of 19 CPNPPIFSAR TABLE 8.3-3 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS FOR AUXILIARY AC POWER SYSTEM (Sheet 7 of 18)
Causes of Effects of Failure Effects on Item Description Function Failure Mode Failure Failure Detection System 8 6.9-kV circuit protects bus 1EA2 fails to open; mechanical failure; 1. Failure to open 1. Annunciation None:
breaker 1EA2-1 fails to close stuck contacts; relay could cause loss of bus 2. Periodic testing 1. Redundant equipment is failure; control power 1EA2 & XFMR&XST2 for operational provided on bus 1EA1.
fails; fire; loss of (XST2A)-&4-I- readiness 2. Power can be supplied from ventilation 2. Fails to close: offsite power source (Item 1) power cannot be or diesel generator 1EG2.
supplied from power source XST2 (XST2A) 9 Bus lEA1 distributes electrical fails to deliver short circuit; loss of Train A safety 1. protective relays None: Redundant Train B power to Train A loads power overload; fire; loss of load group 2. Annunciation in from bus lEA2 available ventilation Control Room 10 Bus 1EA2 distributes electrical fails to deliver short circuit overload; loss of Train B safety 1. protective relays None: redundant Train A from power to Train B loads power fire; loss of load group 2. Annunciation in from bus 1EA1 available ventilation Control Room 11 6.9-kV circuit protects Unit Substation fails to open; mechanical failure; 1. Fails to open: back 1. protective relays None: Load supplied by breaker transformer Ti EB1 fails to close stuck contacts; relay up breaker opens and 2. Annunciation redundant load group provided failure; control power loss of 1EA1 Bus redundant load from bus 1EA2 fails; fire; loss of 2. Fails to close: loss group in Control ventilation of power to 1EB1 Room 11A 8-kV cable connects circuit breaker short circuit; Mechanical damage; loss of power to 1. protective relays None: load supplied by and transformer T1 EB1 open circuit fire bus 1EB1 2. Annunication in redundant load group provided Control Room from bus 1EA2 Amendment No. 40+
Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 17 of 19 CPNPPIFSAR TABLE 8.3-3 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS FOR AUXILIARY AC POWER SYSTEM (Sheet 11 of 18)
Causes of Effects of Failure Effects on Item Description Function Failure Mode Failure Failure Detection System 17 I tap box No. 1 supplies offsite power to short circuit; mechanical damage loss of alternate source protective relays; None: bus 2LA1 and 2LA2 6.9-kV buses 2EA1 and open circuit to 2EA1 and 2EA2 annunciation in can be supplied by offsite 2EA2 control room power source (Item 1) or by diesel generator 2EGI, 2EG2.
tap box No. 3 supplies offsite power to short circuit; mechanical damage loss of preferred protective relays; None: bus 2EA1 and 2EA2 6.9-kV buses 2EA1 and open circuit source to 2EA1 and annunciation in can be supplied by offsite 2EA2 2EA2 control room power source (Item 2) or by diesel generator 2EG1, 2EG2.
tap box No. 6 supplies offsite power to short circuit; mechanical damage loss of preferred protective relays; None: buses 2EA1 and 2EA2 6.9-KV buses 2EA1 and open circuit source to 2EA1 and annunciation in can be supplied by offsite 2EA2 2EA2 control room power source (Item 2) or diesel generators 2EG1, 2EG2.
tap box No. 2 supplies offsite power to short circuit; mechanical damage loss of preferred protective relays; None: buses IEA1 and IEA2 6.9-kV buses 1EA1 and open circuit source to 1EA1 and annunciation in can be supplied by offsite 1EA2 1EA2 control room power source (Item 1) or diesel generators 1EG1, 1EG2 17D"I tap box No. 5 supplies offsite power to short circuit; mechanical damage loss of preferred protective relays; None: buses lEA1 and IEA2 6.9-kV buses lEA1 and open circuit source to 1EA1 and annunciation in can be supplied by offsite 1EA2 1EA2 control room power source (Item 1) or diesel generators lEG1, 1EG2
ýz Amendment No. 4-9*
Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 18 of 19 CPNPP/FSAR TABLE 8.3-3 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS FOR AUXILIARY AC POWER SYSTEM (Sheet 18 of 18)
Causes of Effects of Failure Effects on Item Description Function Failure Mode Failure Failure Detection System 44 Unit 1 Train A distributes 480-V power fails to deliver mechanical failure; loss of MCC Annunciation in None: Item redundant MCCs supplied by power short circuit; over- control room equipment on unit 1 MCCs Train A switchgears load; fire; loss of supplied by Train B ventilation switchgears 45 Common Train A distributes 480-V power fails to deliver mechanical failure; loss of MCC Annunciation in None: redundant equipment MCCs supplied by power short circuit; over- control room on common MCCs supplied by Train A unit I or 2 load; fire; loss of Train B switchgears switchgears ventilation 46 Unit 1 Train B distributes 480-V power fails to deliver mechanical failure; loss of MCC Annunciation in None: redundant equipment MCCs supplied by power short circuit; over- control room on unit I MCCs supplied by Train B switchgears load; fire; loss of Train A switchgears.
ventilation 47 Common Train B distributes 480-V power fails to deliver mechanical failure; loss of MCC Annunciation in None: redundant equipment MCCs supplied by power short circuit; over- Control Room on common MCCs supplied by Train B unit 1 or 2 load; fire; loss of Train A switchgears.
switchgears ventilation
- 5. The cables from XST1 Y-winding to manual transfer switches CPX-EPTSST-04Y and CPX-EPTSST-05Y is routed through tap box 3 and tap box 6.
- 6. The removable link boxes CPX-EPTSST-02X and CPX-EPTSST-03X and Eaton bus bar connection of these boxes constitute the manual transfer switch for the X-Notes:
winding of XST2 and XST2A.
- 7. The removable link boxes CPX-EPTSST-02Y and CPX-EPTSST-03Y and Eaton bus
- 1. The items listed in this Table are shown on the plant one-line diagram, Figure 8.3-1.
bar connection of these boxes constitute the manual transfer switch for the Y-
- 2. The analysis listed is for Unit 1; Unit 2 is similar, except for equipment identification numbers. winding of XST2 and XST2A.
- 8. The cables from the Y-winding manual transfer switch to Unit 1 safety buses is
- 3. Analysis of the dc system is given in Table 8.3-7. routed through tap box 2 and tap box S.
- 9. The cables from the X-winding manual transfer switch to Unit 2 safety buses is
- 4. Flooding considerations for the previously mentioned equipment are discussed in Section 8.3.1.1.14. routed through tap box I and tap box 7.
Abbreviations: P8.=1, iS:zhar. . (P.D).
- 1. POPS - Preferred Offsite Power Source Amendment No. UA4 AOPS - Alternate Offsite Power Source
- 3. PD - Partial Discharge
Attachment 2 to TXX-13082 Page 19 of 19 INSERTS INSERT A 3C 15-kV transfer supplies AOPS from short circuit; mechanical damage; For open circuit: Loss protective relays; None: offsite power source panel XST1 (XST1A) to buses open circuit fire of AOPS to buses annunciation in (Item 2) or diesel generators CPX-EPTSST-04X lEA1 and 1EA2 lEA1 and 1EA2, control room are available.
and CPX-EPTSST- For short circuit: Loss 05X. of POPS to buses 2EA1, 2EA2, and loss of AOPS for buses lEA1 and 1EA2.
3D 15-kV transfer supplies POPS from short ciruit; mechanical damage; For open circuit: Loss protective relays; None: offsite power source I panel XST1 (XST1A) to buses open circuit fire of POPS to buses 2EA1 annunciation in (Item 2) or diesel generators CPX-EPTSST-04Y 2EA1 and 2EA2 and 2EA2 control room are available.
and CPX-EPTSST- For short circuit: Loss 05Y. of POPS to buses 2EA1, 2EA2, and loss of AOPS for buses lEA1 and 1EA2.
3E . 15-kV cable supplies AOPS from i short circuit; mechanical damage; For open circuit: Loss protective relays; None: offsite power source I transfer panel CPX- I open circuit fire of AOPS to bus annunciation in (Item 2) or diesel generators EPTSST-04X (CPX- 1EAI(1EA2). control room are available.
EPTSST-05X) to bus For short circuit: Loss 1EAI(1EA2) of POPS to buses 2EA1, 2EA2, and loss of AOPS for buses lEA1 and 1EA2.
I 15-kV cable supplies POPS from short circuit; mechanical damage; For open circuit: Loss protective relays; None: offsite power source transfer panel CPX- open circuit fire of POPS to bus annunciation in (Item 2) or diesel generators EPTSST-04Y (CPX- 2EA1(2EA2). control room are available.
EPTSST-05Y ) to bus For short circuit: Loss 2EA1(2EA2) of POPS to buses 2EA1, 2EA2, and loss of AOPS for buses lEA1 and 1EA2.
ATTACHMENT 3 TO TXX-13082 RESPONSE TO RAI 3 to TXX-13082 Page 1 of 4 NORTH CONTAINMENT UNIT 1 MCM PER PHASE CP1 -EPDSNA-O1 60OA DISC SWITCH (OFFLOAD TYPE) 5-1/C-#4/0 AWG RWST CU CABLES PER PHASE Ul 3-24" TRAYS---"
APDG SET-P 1140 kW GEN UNI T I GENERA TOR LAYOUT dsOOOlki.dgn DS-GENERATORS dsOOOlki.dgn DS-GENERATORS to TXX-13082 Page 2 of 4 NORTH -
4')
o VALVE HOUSE 3-21' TRAYS [
L 600A DISFSWTC F-1C-4/
AWG CUDCALEEERPHS 2-5UNI 2ODUT
/I A T\ IA5I ! I OADI TWITH 5-1/C-#4/0 AWG CU CABLES PER PHASE -*-
UNI T 2 oo0 r'UNUD A TOD I A Vrl IT Ia
Attachment 3 to TXX-13082 Page 3 of 4
- m A I a f C D 0 N N
-I --.-.- ...----.----.--.----.-.--..-.-.. ----..---...--.
I FSRFIGURE 8.3-6 A9WA7 o- n-t- m I -i a 0.--
.I.* . CMý T et.
-2.. L F..I OEM"=-
-........ =. Ar -,'n-3 LL I 0- w. a".in.Mra .
Ci L .P-
/* 71. ---- *-- V 1
- ,*
- h *,- _ 10.....
-, 't -*- ratI ,*
- 4 -- fl 46- . - ,.. 45 * -- M - . - 5 i n- I - - -, I "
t I , - - TRAINA CLASS I 8
a ~CEO Writs CMS am 2EStO SO t GLENROAL-r1 Al,* LLT I /,*,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
IS
,i',,,,r 'r , , .. *,,-
0 ( FINAL IPRINT )
e
!SU Il N
Attachment 3 to TXX-13082 Page 4 of 4 Is. A a N A 0 CEMM To O0055*I[IT 05Mm 5mev.* M Ci** b '55K~IiTSlB- 5*L"IJ 1in100 OC¢T gal CI T UTr U 15 O[ .UTM iS e SoTM m T TIt SemCoi t
-- - 010
- -*O0i
- - --- - - -- - - 1 em-m1-es-aun Ti in.v. sSiee -oit0 UStSbe in*-Oo A-ilF W I T LWOUl2OT KYT.l 1200A. ton t[ o I
O- einSm Ilc wbe rr El.-Kt~iSi LT t o Tio 1i] I IT.is .-
I TSF-#-
I Le IsS i"U- 5i"tssnnn ean iea"s a 11
,,C.CI a o - m L ists,, I C, r-r. 05**OSCO l I3
,,-,)- TKiev as * ,',,
I M no lI SO I~l'lllm 0 .*eo RStOU [A IT 0 IFJT T*~s
- S - Let
.* * , j . .* , 5. io*., ., , 1.05,. ,,It.. ,z,. .
4 r.r tii a-te-OSASm noonz noel.*s KEsSL
-os.mo j m-.sT ~C a* MSP' NOfls ICY ulI" MSOt MA.1)-W LWaa tDS 0
I __ eS.
CLASO soe
- f U ~ - M US U!CO E I t.
S a
I CONTAMA3rT RSDA POFNET EAT (SPIT LT1IM CENTRIUGA~L o(ATION STM SINIP TRAN~SFORER TB hE!tr Tm cuSPRATPUMP 23~uT -WM je 21 21.
t~ 5-A 2is ttWATsNt.~LOA CeW TO mO2ie ts~e UT a
PRIN ol. I I ýTKW"-Occw I o ( F!NAL WPM]N > ,
ATTACHMENT 4 TO TXX-13082 RESPONSE TO RAI 7
Attachment 4 to TXX-13082 Page 1 of 4 CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.
STATION ADMINISTRATION MANUAL STA-629 SWITCHYARD CONTROL AND REVISION NO. 7 TRANSMISSION GRID INTERFACE INFORMATION USE PAGE 56 OF 65 ATTACHMENT 8.1-PAGE 1 OF 7 CPNPP OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
[C]
1.0 System Voltage CPNPP offsite power system required voltages at the Switchyards are listed in Table 1 below.
TABLE 1 CPNPP Switchyards Voltage Limits System Maximum kV Minimum kV 138kV System 144 135 345kV System 361 340 1.1 The preferred source of power, for CPNPP safety related buses, is offsite power supplied from the TO transmission system. Therefore, the availability of Switchyard voltages within the limits defined in Table 1 should be assured with high reliability considering the transmission grid network contingencies discussed below. For purposes of this provision, voltages will be measured at the Points of Interconnection, as defined in the Generation Interconnection Agreement. The actions of both TO and ERCOT may be required to assure that the Switchyard voltages will remain within the limits of Table 1.
This Procedure does not address actions required by ERCOT.
The offsite sources of power for CPNPP are as follows:
A. Unit 1
- a. Preferred - Start Up Transformer XST2 345kV interconnection with TO 345kV Switchyard
- b. Alternate - Start Up Transformer XST1 138kV interconnection with TO 138kV Switchyard B. Unit 2
- a. Preferred - Start Up Transformer XST1 138kV interconnection with TO 138kV Switchyard
- b. Alternate - Start Up Transformer XST2 345kV interconnection with TO 345kV Switchyard 1.2 Voltage Reliability Transmission Planning shall, on an annual basis, assess the probability of an event, involving multiple individual transmission facility outages that could result in Switchyard voltages being outside the limits defined in Table 1. Transmission Planning shall notify the Generator if the probability of such event exceeds 1.OE-5.
Attachment 4 to TXX-13082 Page 2 of 4 CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.
STATION ADMINISTRATION MANUAL STA-629 SWITCHYARD CONTROL AND REVISION NO. 7 PAGE 57 OF 65 TRANSMISSION GRID INTERFACE INFORMATION USE ATTACHMENT 8.H PAGE 2 OF 7 CPNPP OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS System Voltage (continued) 1.3 System Studies 1.3.1 Transmission Planning shall perform annual steady state studies in accordance with ERCOT Requirements to evaluate Switchyard voltages and shall take actions as described below to address the voltage requirements of CPNPP shown in Table 1.
1.3.2 The following system conditions will be considered in evaluating the system voltages at the Switchyards:
A. Maximum expected system demand and minimum expected system demand.
B. CPNPP load modeled as described in Section 1.3.4 below.
1.3.3 The following contingencies shall be evaluated:
1.3.3.1 Transmission Planning shall perform annual studies to evaluate the CPNPP Switchyard voltages for the CPNPP defined contingencies below:
A. The trip of a CPNPP unit. The tripping of a CPNPP unit shall be considered even when the other CPNPP unit is in outage or otherwise off line.
B. Simultaneous loss of a CPNPP unit and a most critical transmission line to CPNPP.
The tripping of a CPNPP unit shall be considered even when the other CPNPP unit is in outage or otherwise off line.
C. Simultaneous loss of a CPNPP unit and a most critical generator to CPNPP. The tripping of a CPNPP unit shall be considered even when the other CPNPP unit is in outage or otherwise off line.
1.3.3.2 Transmission Planning shall also perform annual studies to evaluate the CPNPP Switchyard voltages for normal required contingencies defined by the ERCOT Requirements.
Attachment 4 to TXX-13082 Page 3 of 4 CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.
STATION ADMINISTRATION MANUAL STA-629 SWITCHYARD CONTROL AND REVISION NO. 7 PAGE 58 OF 65 TRANSMISSION GRID INTERFACE INFORMATION USE ATTACHMENT 8.H PAGE 3 OF 7 CPNPP OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS System Voltage (continued) 1.3.4 The studies, addressed in this Section 1.3, to determine the minimum voltages at the Switchyards shall model CPNPP loads, at 0.85 PF, as follows:
138 kV 345 kV 345 kV 345 kV 138 kV Total 138 Total 345 Scenario MVA MVA MVA MVA MVAMA kV MVkV MVVA MVA XST1 XST2 1ST 2ST 25 kV Transformer Transformer Transformer Transformer Transformers A 14 14 45 45 10 24 104 B 0 28 45 45 10 10 118 C 28 0 45 45 10 38 90 Scenario A - 138 kV and 345 kV normal loading scenario.
Scenario B - 345 kV maximum loading scenario.
Scenario C - 138 kV maximum loading scenario.
Generator will provide loads for conditions not addressed above, when requested.
1.3.5 The results of all system voltage studies including the assumptions made to perform these studies performed pursuant to Section 1.3 shall be communicated to Generator in accordance with attachment 8.F and ERCOT in accordance with ERCOT Requirements.
1.3.5.1 Under each of the contingencies identified in section 1.3.3.1, both of the offsite sources should remain immediately available within the voltage ranges of Table 1 ("Voltage Performance A"). If the studies required by 1.3.3.1 reveal that Voltage Performance A is not expected to be met, then the TO shall:
A. Identify actions it believes are appropriate to implement such that, after such implementation, the Voltage Performance Ais expected to be met.
B. Inform Generator about the condition, minimum expected voltage, and the identified actions in accordance with Attachment 8.F, and C Initiate implementation of such actions, to the extent it has the responsibility and authority to do so, in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, tariffs, and ERCOT Requirements. Such actions may include short-term (temporary or permanent) actions, as well as long-term (permanent) actions.
Attachment 4 to TXX-13082 Page 4 of 4 CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.
STATION ADMINISTRATION MANUAL STA-629 SWITCHYARD CONTROL AND REVISION NO. 7 PAGE 59 OF 65 TRANSMISSION GRID INTERFACE INFORMATION USE ATTACHMENT 8.H PAGE 4 OF 7 CPNPP OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS System Voltage (continued) 1.3.5.2 Under each of the contingencies referenced in section 1.3.3.2, one of the offsite sources should remain immediately available within the voltage ranges of Table 1
("Voltage Performance B"). If the studies required by 1.3.3.2 reveal that Voltage Performance B is not expected to be met, then the TO shall:
A. Identify actions it believes are appropriate to implement such that, after such implementation, the Voltage Performance B is expected to be met.
B. Inform Generator about the condition, minimum expected voltage, and the identified actions in accordance with Attachment 8.F, and C. Initiate implementation of such actions, to the extent it has the responsibility and authority to do so, in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, tariffs, and ERCOT Requirements. Such actions may include short-term (temporary or permanent) actions, as well as long-term (permanent) actions.
1.4 Normal Operating Voltage Ranges TO will take operating actions on its system, which it has the responsibility and authority to implement in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, tariffs, and ERCOT Requirements, to maintain the Switchyard voltages within the ranges shown below under normal system conditions (no maintenance outages or contingencies). For purposes of this provision, voltages will be measured at the Points of Interconnection, as defined in the Generation Interconnection Agreement. TO may change the Normal Operating Voltage Ranges depending upon various operating conditions. This Procedure will be amended to reflect such change.
138 kV Switchyard 138 to 143 kV 345 kV Switchyard 342 to 358 kV 1.5 State Estimator/Real Time Contingency Analyzer TGO state estimator/real time contingency analyzer based analyses and studies shall provide warning when the voltage at either Switchyard is projected to be outside the limits defined in Table 1 under any of the contingencies defined in Section 1.3.3. Such analyses are normally run every fifteen (15) minutes. Upon confirmation of the results of a scenario referenced in this Section 1.5, TO shall immediately notify the CPNPP Shift Manager, in accordance with Attachment 8.F.
ATTACHMENT 5 TO TXX-13082 RESPONSE TO RAI 9
Attachment 5 to TXX-1 3082 Page 1 of 1/]
1 SPILL/ RELES 612 16.1.3 f6.1.4 f6.1.5 1 6.1.7 1-------------- NOTE NOTIFY RP & MAKE IMMEDATE CONTACT SPILL REVIEW EP21INITIATE CR TO CONTACT FR SM PLANT ANNOUNCEMENT ACTION REQUIRED COORDINATOR EVALUATE LEADER TO ADVISE IFTOXIC SPILL COULD CHARCOAL IFSPILL OF SPILL/ RELEASE.
AFFECT BREATHING AIR IN SFGDs, AB, ECB FB RESPOND AS A ORCTMT RESOURCE SPILL