05000293/FIN-2016011-06: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 95003 | | Inspection procedure = IP 95003 | ||
| Inspector = D Jackson, C Bickett, F Arner, R Clagg, J Bream, D Dodson, A Nguyen, E Duncan, G Pick, R Ruiz, A Sanchez, D Silk, J Josey, J Brand, G Eatmon, K Miller, S Elkhiamy, J Schoppy, M Keefe, L Micewski, C Norton, D Sieracki, N Staples, R Lorsona, | | Inspector = D Jackson, C Bickett, F Arner, R Clagg, J Bream, D Dodson, A Nguyen, E Duncan, G Pick, R Ruiz, A Sanchez, D Silk, J Josey, J Brand, G Eatmon, K Miller, S Elkhiamy, J Schoppy, M Keefe, L Micewski, C Norton, D Sieracki, N Staples, R Lorsona, Nguyena Sanchez, C Bickett, C Norton, D Dodson, D Jackson, D Silk, E Duncan, F Arner, G Eatmon, G Pick, J Brand, J Bream, J Josey, J Schoppy, K Miller, L Micewski, M Keefe, N Staples, R Clagg, R Lorson, R Ruiz, S Elkhiamy, D Sieracki | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The NRC team identified a preliminary greater than Green finding and apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, associated with Entergys failure to ensure that design changes were subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design and were approved by the designated responsible organization. Specifically, Entergy received a new style right angle drive for the A emergency diesel generator radiator blower fan from a vendor but failed to adequately review the differences in the design of the drives to identify potential new failure mechanisms for the part or the need for related preventive measures. Entergy entered this issue into the corrective action program as CR-PNP-2016-07443. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, the team screened the finding for safety significance and determined that a detailed risk evaluation was required based on the A emergency diesel generator being inoperable for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time. Region I senior reactor analysts performed a detailed risk evaluation. The finding was preliminarily determined to be of greater than very low safety significance (greater than Green). The risk important sequences were dominated by external fire risk. Specifically, a postulated fire in the B 4 kilovolt (KV) switchgear room with a consequential loss of the unit auxiliary generator power supply, non-recoverable loss of off-site power (LOOP) to both safety buses A5 and A6, loss of the B emergency diesel generator with the conditional failure of the A emergency diesel generator, along with the loss of bus A8 feed (from the shutdown transformer or station blackout (SBO) diesel generator) to safety buses A5 and A6. The internal event risk was dominated by weather related LOOPs, failure of the A emergency diesel generator, with failure of the B emergency diesel generator and SBO diesel generator to run, along with failure to recover offsite power or the emergency diesel generators. See Attachment 1, A Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling Water System Degradation Detailed Risk Evaluation, for a detailed review of the quantitative criteria considered in the preliminary risk determination. The NRC team did not assign a cross-cutting aspect to this finding because the performance deficiency occurred in May 2000. Entergys program has undergone changes since May 2000, and the NRC team did not identify any recent examples of this performance deficiency. Other aspects of Entergys performance related to this issue are further discussed in Sections 5.10.3 and 6.3.4. | | description = The NRC team identified a preliminary greater than Green finding and apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, associated with Entergys failure to ensure that design changes were subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design and were approved by the designated responsible organization. Specifically, Entergy received a new style right angle drive for the A emergency diesel generator radiator blower fan from a vendor but failed to adequately review the differences in the design of the drives to identify potential new failure mechanisms for the part or the need for related preventive measures. Entergy entered this issue into the corrective action program as CR-PNP-2016-07443. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, the team screened the finding for safety significance and determined that a detailed risk evaluation was required based on the A emergency diesel generator being inoperable for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time. Region I senior reactor analysts performed a detailed risk evaluation. The finding was preliminarily determined to be of greater than very low safety significance (greater than Green). The risk important sequences were dominated by external fire risk. Specifically, a postulated fire in the B 4 kilovolt (KV) switchgear room with a consequential loss of the unit auxiliary generator power supply, non-recoverable loss of off-site power (LOOP) to both safety buses A5 and A6, loss of the B emergency diesel generator with the conditional failure of the A emergency diesel generator, along with the loss of bus A8 feed (from the shutdown transformer or station blackout (SBO) diesel generator) to safety buses A5 and A6. The internal event risk was dominated by weather related LOOPs, failure of the A emergency diesel generator, with failure of the B emergency diesel generator and SBO diesel generator to run, along with failure to recover offsite power or the emergency diesel generators. See Attachment 1, A Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling Water System Degradation Detailed Risk Evaluation, for a detailed review of the quantitative criteria considered in the preliminary risk determination. The NRC team did not assign a cross-cutting aspect to this finding because the performance deficiency occurred in May 2000. Entergys program has undergone changes since May 2000, and the NRC team did not identify any recent examples of this performance deficiency. Other aspects of Entergys performance related to this issue are further discussed in Sections 5.10.3 and 6.3.4. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:56, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Pilgrim |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000293/2016011 Section 4OA4 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2017 (2017Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 95003 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Jackson C Bickett F Arner R Clagg J Bream D Dodson A Nguyen E Duncan G Pick R Ruiz A Sanchez D Silk J Josey J Brand G Eatmon K Miller S Elkhiamy J Schoppy M Keefe L Micewski C Norton D Sieracki N Staples R Lorsona Nguyena Sanchez C Bickett C Norton D Dodson D Jackson D Silk E Duncan F Arner G Eatmon G Pick J Brand J Bream J Josey J Schoppy K Miller L Micewski M Keefe N Staples R Clagg R Lorson R Ruiz S Elkhiamy D Sieracki |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |