Information Notice 1996-71, Licensee Response to Indications of Tampering, Vandalism, or Malicious Mischief

Licensee Response to Indications of Tampering, Vandalism, or Malicious Mischief

ML031050461
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	12/27/1996
From:	Martin T T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-96-071, NUDOCS 9612300051
Download: ML031050461 (8)

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION-

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 December 27, 1996 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE NO. 96-71: LICENSEE RESPONSE TO INDICATIONS

OF TAMPERING, VANDALISM, OR MALICIOUS MISCHIEF

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses or construction

permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

This information

notice is being issued to alert licensees

to the benefits of planning a response to indications

of tampering, vandalism, or malicious

mischief.

It is expected that recipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description

of Circumstances

Recent events at operating

reactors indicate that some licensee personnel

may not recognize

the potential

significance

of early indications

of potential

tampering, vandalism, or malicious

mischief.

As a result, licensee response may be untimely and of limited scope and depth. Failure to promptly question, resolve the significance

and implement

an appropriate

strategy to mitigate the consequence

of a potential

tampering, vandalism, or malicious

mischief situation, could leave the plant in a vulnerable

state for a significant

period of time. Lack of detailed planning, procedures, and training frequently

plays a role in the quality of response to these events. Brief accounts of two events illustrate

the issue: Improperly

Positioned

Valve at Beaver Valley During the conduct of a quarterly

surveillance

on Friday, July 14, 1995, to verify the position of certain safety-related

locked valves; the licensee determined

that the service water cross-connect

valve at the discharge

of the recirculation

spray heat exchanger

was in the incorrect

position (shut in lieu of open), that the chain used to secure the valve in the proper position had been cut, and that the lock appeared to have been placed back on the chain in a manner that made it difficult

to detect the condition.

The licensee's

staff initially

assumed the valve had been inadvertently

mispositioned

during earlier operational

evolutions, but subsequent

interviews

and analysis were unable to confirm this assumption.

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IN 96-71 December 27, 1996 Licensee management

first learned of the event on Tuesday, July 18, 1995. Consequ-ently, licensee management

was not able to oversee the licensee evaluation

of the event until considerable

time had elapsed. The licensee's

determination

that potential

tampering could not be ruled out was not made until six days after the incorrect

valve position was identified.

Thorough valve lineup checks and locked valve surveillances

were not completed

for both Beaver Valley units until after the plant staff made an emergency notification

system (ENS) call on Thursday evening, July 20, 1995. The similarity

of this event to an event in the early 1 980s heightened

the concern of both licensee and NRC personnel

who knew of the previous events.Misadjusted

Valves and Disabled Locks at St. Lucie In May 1996, St. Lucie personnel

identified

two pressure-relief

valves which, when tested, were found to have pressure setpoints

55 percent and 9 percent above their design values.These valves also had broken wire seals. The root cause could not be determined.

Although tampering

could not be ruled out, it was concluded

that the more likely cause for the misadjusted

valves was poor maintenance.

Licensee management

decided to alert the Security force; however, site Security was not notified.

The failure to follow through on alerting site Security precluded

coordinated

actions of Operations

and Security staffs to enhance awareness

to other possible tampering

events.On July 26, 1996, St. Lucie staff identified

nine padlocks and two door locks in vital areas that were intentionally

damaged to inhibit opening the locks. These locks controlled

personnel

access to various pieces of plant equipment.

The licensee did not identify keylock switches as needing to be checked; consequently, these switches were not checked until August 1996. Although the tampering

of components

within a vital area indicated

the need to be alert to additional

tampering, other than alerting Security, the licensee failed to consider additional

measures to detect tampering.

On August 14, 1996, St. Lucie staff identified

three additional

examples of tampering

in vital areas that inhibited the opening of locks associated

with safety-related

equipment.

Discussion

The following

factors may have contributed

to these events: (1) The licensees'

contingency

plans required by 10 CFR 73.55(h)(1)

and the implementing

procedures

required by Appendix C to Part 73 did not adequately

address tampering, vandalism, and malicious

mischief.

Other licensee procedures

touched some aspects of these situations;

however, no plan or process was used to evaluate the potential

malevolent

event and determine

its importance.

Factors such as safety significance, overtness, intent, sophistication

of method, and the history of similar incidents

were not considered.

Information

Notice 83-27, "Operational

Response to Events Concerning

Deliberate

Acts Directed Against Plant Equipment," described

events in which licensees

were not prepared to assess the situation

and take necessary

steps to ensure the operability

of systems important

to safety or make decisions

concerning

continued

operation.

The information

notice indicated that guidelines

or procedures

prepared by the licensee outlining

a process of

i IN 96-71 December 27, 1996 following

up on both deliberate

and inadvertent

acts with respect to plant operation should be available.

(2) The licensees'

actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing the events.(3) The licensees'

Operations

staff were not sensitive

to abnormalities

identified

earlier and apparently

assumed no malice. Since the Operations

staff may be the first to encounter

signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious

mischief during its tours and surveillance

activities, sensitivity

to precursors

plays a key role in timely response to events of this nature. Therefore, licensees

may wish to periodically

refresh their Operations

staff's sensitivity

to and awareness

of the evaluation

process to ensure effective

response to these acts.(4) The licensee's

Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the sequence of events at St. Lucie. Security's

ability to identify the perpetrators

and institute

other protective

measures diminishes

severely as time elapses.Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to the NRC Operations

Center within one hour of discovery.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

project manager.Thomas T. Martin, Director Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts:

Loren Bush, NRR (301) 415-2944 E-mail: llb(nrc.gov

David Skeen, NRR (301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices AM -chrobL~A

4?f-r S

W-Attachment

IN 96-71 December 27, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION

NOTICES Information

Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 96-70 96-69 96-68 96-67 Year 2000 Effect on Computer System Software Operator Actions Affecting Reactivity

Incorrect

Effective

Diaphragm Area Values in Vendor Manual Result in Potential

Failure of Pneumatic

Diaphragm Actuators Vulnerability

of Emergency Diesel Generators

to Fuel Oil/Lubricating

Oil Incom-patibility

Recent Misadministrations

Caused by Incorrect

Cali-brations of Strontium-90

Eye Applicators

Undetected

Accumulation

of Gas in Reactor Coolant System and Inaccurate

Reactor Water Level Indication

During Shutdown 12/24/96 12/20/96 12/19/96 12/19/96 12/13/96 12/11/96 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

licensees, certificate

holders, and registrants

All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Medical Use Licensees authorized

to use strontium-90 (Sr-90)eye applicators

All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors 96-66 96-65 OL = Operating

License CP = Construction

Permit

IN 96-71 December 27, 1996 following

up on both deliberate

and inadvertent

acts with respect to plant operation should be available.

t (2) The licensees'

actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing the events.(3) The licensees'

Operations

staff were not sensitive

to abnormalities

identified

earlier and apparently

assumed no malice. Since the Operations

staff may be the first to encounter

signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious

mischief during its tours and surveillance

activities, sensitivity

to precursors

plays a key role in timely response to events of this nature. Therefore, licensees

may wish to periodically

refresh their Operations

staff's sensitivity

to and awareness

of the evaluation

process to ensure effective

response to these acts.(4) The licensee's

Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the sequence of events at St. Lucie. Security's

ability to identify the perpetrator(s)

and institute

other protective

measures diminishes

severely as time elapses.Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to the NRC Operations

Center within one hour of discovery.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

project manager.original signed by D.B. Matthews Thomas T. Martin, Director Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts:

Loren Bush, NRR David Skeen, NRR (301) 415-2944 (301) 415-1174 E-mail: llb@nrc.gov

E-mail: dls@nrc.gov

Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred

on 9/27/96 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices DOCUMENT NAME: 96-71.IN To receive a copy of this document.

hIdlcate I the box: 'C' -Copy w/o attachmentlenclosure

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TMart DSkeen* L ' I DATE 10/31/96 11/01/96 12 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

• IN 96-December , 1996 following

up on both deliberate

and inadvertent

acts with respect to plant operation should be available.

(2) The licensees'

actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing the events.(3) The licensees'

Operations

staff were not sensitive

to abnormalities

identified

earlier and apparently

assumed no malice. Since the Operations

staff may be the first to encounter

signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious

mischief during its tours and surveillance

activities, sensitivity

to precursors

plays a key role in timely response to events of this nature. Therefore, licensees

may wish to periodically

refresh their Operations

staff's sensitivity

to and awareness

of the evaluation

process to ensure effective

response to these acts.(4) The licensee's

Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the sequence of events at St. Lucie. Security's

ability to identify the perpetrators

and institute

other protective

measures diminishes

severely as time elapses.Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to the NRC Operations

Center within one hour of discovery.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

project manager.Thomas T. Martin, Director Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts:

Loren Bush, NRR David Skeen, NRR (301) 415-2944 (301) 415-1174 E-mail: llb@nrc.gov

E-mail: dls@nrc.gov

Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred

on 9/27/96 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DLS\96-XXX

To receive a copy of this document.

indicate In the box: 'C -Copy w/o attachment/enclosure

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Toard n DSkeen1 A a e haW DATE 10/31/96 11/01/96 12/zo /96 Al. -r ... -.A In-n n/I U11l.IWAL

KLLUKU HUrY 4 t

• IN 96-XX November xx, 1996 available.

Furthermore, the licensee contingency

plans requiredby

10 CFR 73.55(h)(1)

and the implementing

procedures

required by Appendix C to Part 73 did not adequately

address tampering, vandalism, and malicious

mischief.(2) The licensee actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing the events.(3) The Operations

staff was not sensitive

to abnormalities

identified

earlier and apparently

assumed no malice. Since the Operations

staff may be the first to encounter

signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious

mischief during its tours and surveillance

activities, sensitivity

to precursors

plays a key role in timely response to events of this nature. Therefore, licensees

may wish to periodically

refresh their Operations

staffs sensitivity

to and awareness

of the evaluation

process to ensure effective

response to these acts.(4) The licensee's

Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the sequence of events. Security's

ability to identify the perpetrator(s)

and institute

other protective

measures diminishes

severely as time elapses.Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to the NRC Operations

Center within one hour of discovery.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Thomas T. Martin, Director Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contact: Loren Bush, NRR (301) 415-2944 E-mail: llb@nrc.gov

David Skeen, NRR (301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices DOCUMENT NAME: G:MDLS\IN96-XX.TPR

To receive a copy of this document.

hIdicate hI the box: 'C' -Copy w/o attachmenVenclosure

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IC PSGB:DRPM

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LBush* LCunninghamnM

AChaffeeCifv-'

TMartin DATE 10/3//96 10/xv/96 10/ /96 1l// /96 3y9 10/ /96-i OFFICIAL RECORD COPY*- pervias 44 1i I

K.IN 96-XX October xx, 1996 available.

Furthermore, the licensee contingency

plans requiredby

10 CFR 73.55(h)(1)

and the implementing

procedures

required by Appendix C to Part 73 did not adequately

address tampering, vandalism, and malicious

mischief.(2) The licensee actions were limited in scope and depth, at least initially, in pursuing the events.(3) The Operations

staff was not sensitive

to abnormalities

identified

earlier and apparently

assumed no malice. Since the Operations

staff may be the first to encounter

signs of tampering, vandalism, or malicious

mischief during its tours and surveillance

activities, sensitivity

to precursors

plays a key role in timely response to events of this nature. Therefore, licensees

may wish to periodically

refresh their Operations

staffs sensitivity

to and awareness

of the evaluation

process to ensure effective

response to these acts.(4) The licensee's

Security staff was not told about these problems until well into the sequence of events. Security's

ability to identify the perpetrator(s)

and institute

other protective

measures diminishes

severely as time elapses.Events of this nature are required by Appendix G to Part 73 of 10 CFR to be reported to the NRC Operations

Center within one hour of discovery.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Thomas T. Martin, Director Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contact: Loren Bush, NRR (301) 415-2944 E-mail: llbenrc.gov

David Skeen, NRR (301) 415-1174 E-mail: dIs@nrc.gov

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices DOCUMENT NAME: G:IDLSIN96-XX.TPR

To receive a copy of this document,.

Indicate i the box: 'C' -Copy w/o attachment/enclosure

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V AChaffee TMartin DATE 10/6/4/96

10t796 10 9E -910/ /96 10/ /96 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY