ML20140A904

Insp Repts 50-498/97-15 & 50-499-97-15 on 970505-09. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Routine,Announced Insp Focused Upon Specific Areas of Licensee Physical Security Program

ML20140A904
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	06/03/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20140A879	List: ML20140A874 ML20140A889 ML20140A904
References
50-498-97-15, 50-499-97-15, NUDOCS 9706050083
Download: ML20140A904 (11)

See also: IR 05000498/1997015

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ENCLOSURE 2  !

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

REGION IV

Docket Nos.: 50-498

50-499

License Nos.: NPF-76

NPF-80

Report No.: 50-498/97-15

50-499/97-15

Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company

Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth

Wadsworth, Texas

Dates: May 5-9,1997

Inspector: Thomas W. Dexter, Senior Physical Security Specialist j

Plant Support Branch  !

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Approved: Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

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ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information

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9/06050083 970603

PDR ADOCK 05000498

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l EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

South Texas Project Electric Gererating Station, Units 1 and 2 ,

NRC Inspection Report 50-498/97-15;50-499/97-15

This routine, announced inspection focused upon specific areas of the licensee's physical

security program. These areas included review of records and reports, testing and

maintenance, detection aids - protected area, compensatory measures, access control of

personnel and packages, management support, and review of previous inspection findings.

Plant Sucoort

• Two violations were identified involving (1) the failure to secure a vital area door

and (2) failure to revoke a badge following the failure of a fitness-for-duty test. The

security staff was correctly reporting security events. A very good records and

reports program was in place (Section S1.1).

Security personnel had an excellent knowledge of testing procedures concerning the

access control equipment. All access control equipment functioned as required

(Section S2.1).

• Very good progress had been accomplished in completing the installation of their

new perimeter intrusion detection system (Section S2.2).

• The compensatory measure program was effectively implemented. Security

personnel were well trained on the prograrn requirements (Section S4.1).

• A very good prograrn for searching personnel and vehicles was maintained

(Section S4.2)

• An effective security training program had been implemented. Medical

examinations for security officers were thorough and well documented. Facilities

and firing range were excellent (Section 5.1).

• Senior managernent support for the security organization was strong. The security

program was implemented by a well trained and highly qualified staff. The morale

of the security officers was very good (Section 6.1).

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Report Details

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IV. Plant Support i

S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities l

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Sl.1 Records and Reports (81700-02.01) .

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a. Inspection Scope

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The inspector reviewed safeguards event logs and security program condition i

reports to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21(b) and (c), ,

10 CFR 26.73, and the physical security plan, j

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b. Observations and Findinas j

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The inspector reviewed the security event logs and security program condition )

reports from October 1,1996, through April 30,1997. The records were available ]

for review and maintained for the time required by regulations. The i. spector  :

determined that the licensee conformed to the regulatory requirements regarding the l

reporting of security events. The logs and condition reports were organizeri in j

numerical sequence and easy to audit. The following two events were specifically l

reviewed in detail, j

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• Uncompensated Vital Area Door in Access Mode l

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Licensee Condition Repo'rt 97-6585 identified that on April 2,1997, at

approximately 6:44 a.m. an alarm station operator d;scovered that a vital

area door had been left in the access mode (the lock alarm and the balance

magnetic switch alarm were taken out-of service) without being controlled

by the security system or by an armed security officer referencing an access

authorization list. The door alarm had been inactivated at 7:06 a.m. on

April 1,1997, so it could be blocked open for painting work in the vital area.

A compensatory officer was posted at the door. At 5:08 p.m. the workers

left the area. The compensatory officer secured the door and called the

central alarm station operator to reactivate the alarm on the door. The

officer claims he receised an acknowledgement from the station operator, .

carded out from the area and waited to ensure there were no alarms on the

door. When he did not hear a call for an alarm on the door he departed the

area. However, it appears that the alarm station operator did not place the

vital area door back in the alarm mode.

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The licensee's immediate compensatory actions were io search the vital area  ;

for any fore;gn materials or objects and then test and secure the door alarm.

However, the licensee had not developed long-term corrective actions.

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South Texas Project Physical Security Plan, Revision 7A, dated January 14,

1997, Chapter 4, paragraph 4.4, " Vital Area Access - Personnel," states, in

part, " Access to Vital Areas shall be controlled by the security system or by

an armed security officer referencing an access authorization list. Personnel ,

entry / exit is documented for all vital area access except the control room." +

The licensee's failure to control a vital area door in the access mode, between the i

afternoon of April 1,1997, and the morning of April 2,1997, is a violation of its I

security plan (50-498;-499/9715-01).

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• Failure to inactivate Badae - Fitness-For-Duty Failure  !

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Licensee Condition Report 97-0165 identified that on February 5,1997, i

while a licensee fitness-for-duty department employee was imputing drug l

test results into a computer data when the individual noted that a contract ,

employee, who had failed a for-cause alcohol test on February 3,1997, had I

not had his badge revoked. The department employee completed a condition l

report and notified security to revoke the badge in the security computer.  !

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The licensee's investigation determined that the employee's supervisor had

maintained control of the empicyee's security badge and that the employee

had not entered the protected area. j

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The licensee's corrective action involved the project engineering supervisor i

discussing the importance of the line of communication and the procedure

requirements for badge transactions. However, the inspector determined ,

that the following licensee's security plan and procedures were not l

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implemented:

South Texas Project Physical Security Plan, Revision 7A, dated January 14,

1997, Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2, states, in part, "If a person is terminated ,

for-cause, that individual's access is revoked and his/her assigned badge is j

deactivated through the security computer system prior to or simultaneously i

with notification of termination." l

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South Texas Project Procedure OPGP09-ZA-0002, " Fitness For Duty

Program," Revision 7, dated October 24,1996, paragraph 6.11, " Confirmed

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Positive Test Results," states, in part, "A ' Confirmed Positive' notification l

l letter (Form 2) is delivered to the department manager, or designee, notifying )

l them the individual is denied site access. The HL&P employee will be  !

terminated . . . Notification of the above positive test results shall be made l

using the guidelines contained in OPGP03-ZX-0002, Condition Reporting i

Process."

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South Texas Project Procedure OPGP03-ZX-0002, " Condition Reporting

Process," Revision 13, dated September 12,1996, paragraph 4.1,

" Condition identification," states, in part, "For conditions where security

concerns are obvious or perceived, contact Plant Protection immediately and

deliver the CR form to Plant Protection, or if database. entry was made,

promptly in form the Security Force Supervisor of the Condition Report

number."

The failure to initiate a proper condition report and a Form 2 is a violation of the

security plan and implementing procedures (50-498;-499/9715-02).

c. Conclusions

Two violations were identified concerning (1) the failure to secure a vital area door

and (2) failure to revoke a badge following the failure of a fitness-for-duty test. The

security staff was correctly reporting security events. A very good records and

reports program was in place.

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S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment

S2.1 Testina and Maintenance (81700-02.07)

a. insoection Scooe

The inspe tor reviewed the testing program for the access control equipment,

b. Observations and Findinas

The inspector observed the licensee conducted testing of the explosive and metal

detectors and the x-ray machines at the east and west protected area access  ;

facilities. A security person working at each facility tested the equipment. Both j

personnel were knowledgeable of the testing procedures and both conducted the  ;

tests in a similar rnanner. All equipment tested satisfactorily. ,

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c .' Conclusions

Security personnel had an excellent knowledge of testing procedures concerning the  ;

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access control equipment. All access control equipment functioned as required. )

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S2.2 Detection Aids - Protected Area (81700-02.04)

a. Inspection Scoce

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The inspector reviewed the protected area detection aid system.

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b. Observations and Findinos l

The licensee was in the process of replacing the entire protected area detection aid l

system. The detection systems' capabilities, zoning of the alarm systems, detection  !

system security, and types of detection aids have been changed signific'antly.

The inspector discussed with members of the security system engineering and  !

' installation group the estimated completion time for the perimeter microwave l

. system. The licensee expects to have the system tested and turned over to i

security before the end of June 1997. The inspector observed portions of the  ;

installed system on May 7,1997. The detection systems appeared to be well f

designed and should detect an intruder attempting to enter the protected area.

c. Conclusions

The licensee was making very good progress toward the completion of the

installation of their new perimeter intrusion detection aids.

S4 Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance

S4.1 Compensatorv Measures (81700-02.07)

a. Inspection Scope *s

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The inspector reviewed the licensee's compensatory rneasures program. The areas

inspected included deployment of compensatory measures and the effectiveness of

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b. Observations and Findinas

The inspector confirmed through a review of condition reports and security event

logs.that the licensee deployed compensatory measures in a manner consistent with

the requirements in the security plan. The inspector determined through interviews j

of security personnel that the security personnel available for assignment to

compensatory security posts were properly trained for those duties. The inspector

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also observed security personnel posted on several compensatory posts around the

perimeter of the protected area. Personnel appeared to be observant and those that

the inspectors interviewed were knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities,

c. Conclusions

The compensatory measures program was effectively implemented. The observed

compensatory measures met the requirements in the security plan. Security

personnel were well trained on the program requirements.

S4.2 Access Control of Personnel and Vehicles (81700-02.05)

a. Insoection Scone

The access control program for personnel and vehicles was inspected.

b. Observations and Findinas

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Access control activities were observed at the both security building entrances and

at the vehicle positive se feral times during the inspection. Tha licensee properly

controlled personnel access to the protected area. The protected area access

control equipment was inspected and found to be functionai and well maintained,

c. Conclusions

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A very good program for narching personnel and vehicles was maintained. l

S5 Security and Safeguards StaH Training and Qualification

SS.1 Personnel Trainina and Qualification (81700-02.08)

a. ]_nspection

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The inspector reviewed the licensee's security training and qualification program.

b. Observations and Findinas

The security organization conducted all required training in accordance with its

approved security, training, and contingency plans. The inspector confirmed, by a

review n' .he composite security training records, that the required training was 1

conducted every 12 months.

The inspector observed security officers during the performance of their duties. All

security officers displayed excellent conduct and knowledge of the procedural l

requirements.

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• Medical Examinations

Medical examination records for 10 armed security officers were reviewed.

The medical records were complete and indicated that the required annual

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medical examinations were thorough and conducted in a timely manner. The

results of the medical examinations were properly documented.

• Trainina Records

Training records for 10 armed security officers were reviewed. The records

were complete and all required training was current and conducted within

every 12-month period.

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• Trainina Aids and Facilities

The inspector verified that the security contractor was providing training

videos covering numerous security subjects. The training facility was

excellent it was located in a permanent type building adjacent to tha

protected area and convenient for personnel to use. The licensee's rebuilt

firing range was excellent.

c. Conclusions

An effective security training program had been implemented. Medical

examinations for security officers were thorough and well documented. Facilities

and firing range were excellent.

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S6 Security Organization and Administration

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S6.1 Manaaement Suocort (81700-02.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The effectiveness and adequacy of management support was inspected to

determine the degree of management support for the physical security program.

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b. Observations and Findinas

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The inspector determined by discussions with security force personnel that the j

security program received strong support from senior management. The inspector

determined that the security program was imp lemented by a well trained and highly

qualified security staff. All members of the security organization had a clear ,

understanding of their duties and responsibilities and the morale of the secunty  ;

officers was very good. j

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c. Conclusions  ;

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Senior management support for the security organization was strong. The security  !

program was implemented by a well trained and highly qualified staff. The morale

of the security officers was very good.

S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues (92904)  ;

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S8.1 (Closed) Unresolved item 498:499/9616-01: Failure to Verifv Criminal History of i

Foreian Nationals

During the access authorization inspection the inspectors identified two individuals

who appeared not to have had their criminal histories checked in their countries of

origin. Guidance received from the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Regulation was i

that it was expected that licensees would conduct criminal history checks with

foreign countries. During this inspection the inspector, with the licensee determined

that one of the individuals, although born in Mexico was a United States citizen. 1

The second individual was a citizen of Mexico and was in the United States on a

visa. During the background check the validity of the visa was not checked.

Subsequent investigation by the licensee determined that the individual has been in

the United States for 20 years and learned through the Department of Immigration

and Naturalization Services that the visa was valid and current. The licensee had

cumpleted all other background screening including a FBI criminal history check

prior to granting unescorted access to the individual. This unresolved item is

considered closed.

V. Manaaement Meetinas

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management

at the conclusion of the inspection on May 9,1997. The licensee acknowledged

the findings presented.

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ATTACHMENT

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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION [

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED l

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l Licensee

W. Cottle, Executive Vice President and General Manager, Nuclear  ;

i J. Groth, Vice President, Nuclear Operation

P. Arrington, Assistant Licensing Specialist

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J. Drymiller, Supervisor, Security  !

l M. Hall, Senior Operations Coordinator, Security j

l S. Head, Licensing Supervisor

J. Hinson, Manager, Employee Relations

A. Keating, Electrical / Instrumentation and Controls Manager

T. Koser, Licensing Engineer

L. Martin, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance and Licensing  ;

M. McBurnett, Licensing Director

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J. Northrop, Security System Engineer ,

R. Piggott, Senior Quality Assurance Specialist l

A. Rodriguez, Senior Coordinator, Security l

C. Sanders, Lead Training instructor  :

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D. Sheesley, Security Systems Supervisor

J. Sheppard, Assistant to Executive Vice President l

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M. Smith, Administrator, Plant Support Quality

Fi Timmons, Manager Plant Protection Department

P. Travis, System Engineer Supervisor

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 81700 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors

IP 92904 Followup - Plant Support

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

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50-498;499/9715-01 NOV Failure to Properly Secure Vital Area Door

50-498:499/9715-02 NOV Failure to inactivate Badge For Fitness-For-Duty Failure i

Closed

50-498:499/9616-01 URI Failure to Verify Criminal History of Foreign National

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LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

South Texas Project Physical Security Plan, Revision 7A, January 14,1997 l

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j Security event logs from October 1,1996, through April 30,1997 condition reports for the I

i same period.

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South Texas Project Procedure OPGP09-ZA-0002, Fitness For Duty Prcgram, Revision 7, I

dated October 24,1996

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South Texas Project Procedure OPGP03-ZX-0002, Condition Reporting Process,

4 Revision 13, dated September 12,1996

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Security Officer Training Records (composite listing)

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Background invest;gation (file) records for two individuals granted unescorted access

authorization to the protected area

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Medical Records for ten members of the security organization

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31-Day Access Review Records for January and February 1997 3

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