ML18093A529

LER 87-017-00:on 871113,six Leakage Paths Discovered from Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Compartment.Caused by Control of Design Requirements.Leakage Paths Sealed Prior to Restart. Maint of Protective Encl Integrity verified.W/871211 Ltr

ML18093A529
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	12/11/1987
From:	Mel Gray, Zupko J Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-87-017-01, LER-87-17-1, NUDOCS 8712170063
Download: ML18093A529 (5)

Text

U.S. NUCLEAR llEOULATOllY C~llllON NAC For111 -

19.aJI 4"'ROVEO OMI NO. 31!!0-0111' EXP'IAES 1/31196 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

I FACILIT'I' NAME 111 DOCKET NUM9Ell 121 l r-u* 131 Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 o 1s 1 o 1o Io I 21 71? I , loF n 1'1 TITLE 141 Discovered Leakage Paths From 13(23) AFW Pump Comoartment - Control of Desicrn R 0 ~*ts.

EVENT DATE Ill LEA NUMllER 181 llEP'ORT DATE 171 OTHEll FACILITIES INVOLVED Ill MONTH llAY YEAR YEAR <> SE~~~~~~"~ I:::::: ~~~":.~ MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY PWAMES DOCKET NUMBERISI Salem TTnit- ? O I5 IO I O I O I 3 11 I 1 1 1I ii 3 s 7 s I7 - oI1 h - o lo i I2 i Ii s h 01S1010101 I I THll llEP'ORT II IUSMITTED P'UlllUANT TO THE REOUlllEMENTI OF 10 CFll §: (Ch<<:k o,,. or of rM folloWJnf} 1111

--

m0'9

-

Of'ERATINO lllOOE Ill 6 20.-lcl I0.*1*1111 -

.2£...

I0.73tall2111YI I0.7:11tall2lM 73.711bl 73.71(ol

-- -- -

~

DO.*loll2l D0.731all2Jl*Ml OTHER IS/l<</fy in Ab1rrocr Nlow utd in T*xt. NRC Form ll0.73111121111 I0.731all2H*lllllAI 366A}

- I0.7311H2lllil D0.7Jlall2llllil LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEA 1121

- I0.731all2llwlllllll I0.731111211*1 NAME TELEPHCj>NE NUMBER AREA CODE I*

M. K. Gray - Licensing Engineer 6, I 0 I 9 3 I 31 9 1- I 4 I 3 17 I 0 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DEICRllED IN THIS llEP'ORT 1131 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC-TURER REPORTABLE -::<S??: ::}::_::,::}_}

TO NPRDS :::*'.::<: :*-:* -'*. **::::::::;-

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC*

TURER i/:::::::: **:- :;: .*.::***.* :-:*

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1* I I I I I I I I I IU""LEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (141 MONTH DAY Y~A" EXPECTED n YES Ill yn. complort EXPECTED SUIJMISSION DATE! kl NO SUBMISSION DATE 1151 I I I On 11/13/87 an NRC 1nGpec~or identified leakage paths from Lhe No. 13 Auxiliary Fecdw2ter (AFW) Turbine Driven Pump compartment {BAI S~bseqUEil~ in~estig~~~~~ ~2Vealed SiX (6) leakage pathways from the UniL l pump und one pathway from the Unit 2 pump. The comparcme~t enclosEs the steam teed piping to the AFW Turbine Driven Pump su~h thut a pcstulatcd pipe break would not damage adjacent vital electrical equipment located outside the compartment. The root cause of the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment deficiencies is control of design requi~ements. The leakage paths identified on the Salem Units 1 & 2 Steax Driven AFW Pu~p enclosures will be sealed prier to the res~art of either Unit, respectively. Unit 1 is currently in a refuEling outage and Uni~ 2 is curren~ly in a maintenance outage.

Also, other procecc~ve pipe rupture enclosures will be reviewed to verify their integrity has been maintained. To ensute that adequate attent~on is given ~o the maintenance of these structures in the futurE, the Program Analysis Group (PAG) will issue a Field Directive identifying che areas that ar2 designed to accommodate th2 effects of a pipe rupture. The Field Directive will also stress the importance of maincaining p=o~ective struc~ures in a condition that meets their desig~ reqcirements.

• 8712170063 871211 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S DCD NllC foml -

19.a31

LICEl~SEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU"A'I'ION Salem GELe~ating DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit: 1- 5000272 ____ _§]_-:_QJ 7 -q_o____________~ __gL__~L ___ _

Westinghouse - Pressurized Wa~er Reactor Energy Industry IdeLtification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as i xx l IDENTIFICATICN OF OCCURRENCE:

Disccvere~ L2akag~ Paths From 13(23) Aux Feedwater Pump Compartme3t -

Contra~ of Desi~n Requirements This repcr~ was initiated by Incident Report No.87-449.

COlIDI'I'I!JNS PRIOR T:J OCCURREIKE;

• -------*

Rea~tcr Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe On :_/~3/S~ an NRC inspector ideritified leakage paths from the Ne.

Acxllia~y f(cdwater (AFW) Turbin2 Driven Pump compartmenL {BAI.

Subs2q~2n~ i~~~s~igation revealed six (6) leakage pathways from Lhe erti~ ~ ~u~~ co~partm~nt and one pathway from the Unit 2 pump cc~par~2eL~. The ccmpartment encloses the steam feed piping to the AFW Turbin2 Driven Pump such chat a postulated pipe bre~k woul6 not damage adjace~t. vical electrical equipment located oucsidc the comp a::- trr,en t..

The Unit l pump comparcmen~ pathways consist of four (4) pipe peLecrations where excessive annulus areas exist between the pipe and ti12 compa:ct:ment wall, one (1) hole cut to accommodate a protr*.lding bole, and one {l} small hole cut through the steel compartment wall fo~ nc known reason. The Unit 2 pump compartment pathway is a pipe pen.st:ca ti on with an excessive an"-1.ulus area between the pipE. an::l wal:L.

APPARE.N'I' CA.USE. OF OCCURRENCE:-

The root cause of the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment deficiencies is control of design requirements. "Notes" on the AFW Fumv E:nclos-c1rr.::

concrolled drawings (both Unitsi state that the compartment struct~re is designed fo= an internal pressure of 50 pounds per square foot (psi:}. Also, the drawing "Not:es" indicate that gaps and cracks in the structure should be minimized during erection and plugged as required to ensure a reasonable degree of watertightness.

It canno~ be conclusively determined what activities took place that resulted in these leakage paths whether from the original d2sign configurat:ion or as the result of design modifications.

---

_,,____ _ _ _ ___..,~------

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

---*-----------*----

Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1

---

*--*-----

~_5_0_00272 ______ 87-0:1, 7-0_Q______J_ of__!_ __

The Salerc Unit 1 AFW Pump compartment was analyzed since significantly more leakage can occur than from the Unit 2 AFW Pump enclosure. The AFW Pump enclosure is designed to contain the steam release from a postulated steam pipe rupture such that adjacent vital electrical equipment is not damaged. The total unsealed area for the Unit 1 co~partment was approximately 20 square inches. In the event of a postulated pump steam supply line rupture (high energy line break) within the compartmerit, the compartment temperature and pressure would rise to 0.33 psi and 300°F respectively. At 0.33 psi, a backdraft damper will open to vent steam into the pipe alley. Due to the leakage pachs, it was calculated that steam would be released from the compartmen: at u rate of 1.4 lbs./sec. Since it is assumed it would take app~oxirnacely 30 minutes for an Operator to isolate the break, the po~en~ial exists to release 2520 pounds of steam into the area adjaceLt to the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment.

TL.:.:... <::.6_j<;;.c2n-c area contains the 11 (21) and 12 (22) Motor Driven AFW Fu:rr:ps, v;:;ricus AFW valves, Main Steam System valves {Unit 2 only}, th<::

1(2)A and 1(2)C West 230 V Vital Motor Control Centers (MCCs), and various electrical panels, including the Alternate Shutdown Panel (Panel 213}. The 230 V MCCs provide power and control to a variety of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) valves, including 0L2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Minimum Flow Valve (11RH29) {BPl, the Safety Injectio~ Puilip Minimum Flow Valves {SJ67 & 68), an RHR Loop Crosstie Valve (11RH19), one suction valve from the Reactor Water Storage Tank to the Charging Pumps (1SJ1), a Containment Sump Isolation Valve (l1SJ44), and Component Cooling Water discharge valve from the RHR EE at Exchanger (11CC15).

Since an ECCS ac~ua~ion is not expected to occur as a result of the postulated break, these ECCS valves would not be required to operate.

Also, since a fire is not postulated coincident with a pipf~ b:*e,:;_}; I U1,--

Alternate Shutdown Panel would not be required. However, in the event cf a break in the steam supply line to the AFW Turbine Drivan Pump, the Motor Driven AFW Pumps and valves would be required to operate during normal plant cooldown to remove heat from the core until the RHR System could be placed in operation.

An estimated 2520 pounds of steam would be released from the postulated pipe break into the adjacent area to the Turbine Driven AFW Pump compartment. This room is an area open to the hallway and bounded by three w~lls. Therefore, the Motor Operated AFW Pumps and valves would most likely be able to operate to bring the Unit to a safe shutdown condition. However, since their qualification to operate in such an environment has not been established, they must be assumed to be inoperable in the event of a pipe break.

In summary, the equipment adjacent to the Steam Driven AFW Pump are necessary to normal plan~ operation as well as mitigation of design base acciden~s. They are required to be protected against the dynamic effects of a postulated pipe rupture. It could not be conclusively

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

---*----------*-------------------

Salem Ger.erating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE

---

1 Unit -----* *----*- 5000272

---

*--------"--"--"-'~----

87-017-0.~0_ _ _ _ 4 of 4 shown thaL adequate protection was provided by the Salem Unit 1 Turbine Driven AFW Pump enclosure. Therefore, the discovery of the impaired Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment is reportable in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10CFR 50.73(a) (2) (v).

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

---

----

The leakage paths identified on the Salem Units 1 & 2 Steam Driven AFW Pump enclosures will be sealed prior to the restart of either Unit, respectively. Unit 1 is currently in a refueling outage and ULit 2 is currently in a maintenance outage. Also, other protective pipe rupture enclosures *will be reviewed to verify their integrity has been maint2ined.

To ensure that adequate attention is given to the maintenance of LhEse structures in the future, the Program Analysis Group (PAG) will issue a Field Direcc:ive identifying the areas that are designed to accorr~modac.e c:hs effects of a pipe rupture. The Field Din~ctive will also stress c:he importance of maintaining protective structures in a condi"CioL thac: meets their design requirements.

General Manager -

Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mt;;. 87--110

/"

e e PS~G

.(

• Put:*iic Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station December 11, 1987 TJ .. S- l'Jt.:..c~l22.:;_ }::~2g*ulat:o::::}** Co:n.m.issioil Doclirnen~ Conc~ol Desk

\~~~~1_ir1*..x-con r ~:JC 20555

C1::.2r Si.!.-:

S~~EH GENER~TING STATION LICENSE NO. DP~-70 DOCKE: NG. 50-272

• 1 Ul*~ I'I' h 0 .. J_

LICENSEE E~ENl ~EPCRT 87-017-00 Tt.i.~ L~cc11sc:c E\:rc1:::. Repcr-c is beir.:_g s~Ll.brnit-ced pt1::cs*:..iar~t t:o t-.11e i*2qLi~cc.~r~2:ct.s c.:£ lDCFF. SO_ 73 {;::) {2) (TJ') .. This report is re~uired wi~h~n Lhi~cy (JO) days of discovery.

Since::::ely yours, yv1i~k,/ ftv J. M. Zupko, J~.

Gen2ral Manage:r-Salem Operations MJP:pc Distr*ibt:!. tio..:-:;.

& ")."--

~¥ ,\,

~i:-.?-.s~* 1*. r ivl1 ~~-;:;.: