ML19208B216: Difference between revisions

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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:..REPORT DATE:
{{#Wiki_filter:. .
September 13, 1979 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 79-35 ISSUE O OCCURRENCE DATE:
REPORT DATE:         September 13, 1979             REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 79-35 ISSUE O OCCURRENCE DATE:     Auguse 31, 1979               Page 1 of 3
Auguse 31, 1979 Page 1 of 3 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
      -                  FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO P. O. BOX 361 PLATTEVILLE, COLORADO 80651 REPORT NO. 50-267/79-35/01-T-0 Preliminary IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
-PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO P. O. BOX 361 PLATTEVILLE, COLORADO 80651 REPORT NO. 50-267/79-35/01-T-0 Preliminary IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
An engineering field audit and preliminary analysis of a random sample of safety related system piping and associated hangers has found inconsistencies that may Jeopardize the operability of systems In the event of a design basis earthquake.
An engineering field audit and preliminary analysis of a random sample of safety related system piping and associated hangers has found inconsistencies that may Jeopardize the operability of systems In the event of a design basis earthquake.
Due to these inconsistencies, Public Service Company has elected to suspend operation of the Fort St. Vrain Unit No. 1, as of 1800 hours on Septe=ber 1, 1979.9 An investigation of these inconsistencies is continuing.
Due to these inconsistencies, Public Service Company has elected to suspend operation of the Fort St. Vrain Unit No. 1, as of 1800 hours on Septe=ber 1, 1979.
9 An investigation of these inconsistencies is continuing.
This appears to be reportable per Fort St. Vrain Technical Specification AC 7.5.2(a)9.
This appears to be reportable per Fort St. Vrain Technical Specification AC 7.5.2(a)9.
EVENT DESCRIPTION:
EVENT DESCRIPTION:
Line 29: Line 29:
On the remaining eight isometric drawings and 30 hanger drawings, inconsisten-cies judged to be potentially significant were identified between the field installation and the reference documentation.
On the remaining eight isometric drawings and 30 hanger drawings, inconsisten-cies judged to be potentially significant were identified between the field installation and the reference documentation.
An analytical evaluation of the noted isometric drawing inconst. "cies indi-cates that they would not result in invalidation of the seismic qu .ification of the piping depicted on the subject iso =e.tric drawing.
An analytical evaluation of the noted isometric drawing inconst. "cies indi-cates that they would not result in invalidation of the seismic qu .ification of the piping depicted on the subject iso =e.tric drawing.
-, Q'3 i->96!7 909190 3NGt)
                                                                                          -,
                                                                                    ->
Q'3 i 96!
7 909190 3NGt)
 
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 79-35 ISSUE O Page 2 of 3
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 79-35 ISSUE O Page 2 of 3
.EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued):
.
EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued):
An analytical analysis of the inconsistencies identified in the hangers indi-cates that 18 of the hangers of concern fulfill Class I design requirements.
An analytical analysis of the inconsistencies identified in the hangers indi-cates that 18 of the hangers of concern fulfill Class I design requirements.
The retaining 12 hangers have inconsistencies that may jeopardize the opera-bility of the associated systems in the event of a design basis earthquake.
The retaining 12 hangers have inconsistencies that may jeopardize the opera-bility of the associated systems in the event of a design basis earthquake.
Line 40: Line 45:
CAUSE DESCRIPTION:
CAUSE DESCRIPTION:
The inconsistencies between the design and installation of the various hangers required re-analysis of the piping / hanger systems. The time involved did not allow a final resolution of the problem before a report was submitted. There-fore the plant was shutdown pending outcome of the investigation.
The inconsistencies between the design and installation of the various hangers required re-analysis of the piping / hanger systems. The time involved did not allow a final resolution of the problem before a report was submitted. There-fore the plant was shutdown pending outcome of the investigation.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: The re=aining hangers are being analyzed and the outcone of these analyses along with the corrective actions necessary, will be submitted in a future supplemental repo r t.0',,t , to REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 79-35 ISSLT 0 Page 3 of 3
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
.Prepared by:
The re=aining hangers are being analyzed and the outcone of these analyses along with the corrective actions necessary, will be submitted in a future supplemental repo r t.
/jZ.Asa B. Reed Technical Services Technician Reviewed by:
                                                                        ,,t ,   0' to
 
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 79-35 ISSLT 0 Page 3 of 3
.
Prepared by:       /jZ.
Asa B. Reed Technical Services Technician Reviewed by:
g.W.Miali=
g.W.Miali=
(/ Technical Services Supervisor Reviewed by:
(/ Technical Services Supervisor Reviewed by:               b Frank 11. Mathie Operations !!anager Approved by:         %  YM Don Warenbourg         9
b Frank 11. Mathie Operations !!anager Approved by:
                                !!anager, Nuclear Production
YM%Don Warenbourg 9!!anager, Nuclear Production
                                                                            .     (b 4 ,t
.(b 4 ,t" (7 77)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
                                                                                  "
-.CONTROL BLOCK: l lllllh (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) o li iCI0IFlSl vill @l0l0l-l010 01010- (010 l@l4 Il 1 (2 l 0 l@l i l@7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUM8ER 25 26 LICENSE TYPL Jo 57 CAT $8 CON'Tl L l@ 0 l 5 l 0 l 0 l 0 l 2 l 6 l 7 @l 0 l 8 l 3 l1 l 7 ] 9 l@l0 19 l1 l 3 l 7 l 9 l@
 
REPORT o i 3c 9 60 61 COCKET NUMSER 68 69 EV ENT D ATE 74 75 REPCRT DATE So?a*EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES h y field audit and preliminary engineering analysis of a random sample of as-built 1 Io 2 i safety related piping drawings showed that several hangers have inconsistencies that I o al cay jeopardize the operability of the associated systems in the event of a design j o 4 c 5 I basis earthquake.
(7 77)
Because of these inconsistencies the Fort St. Vrain unit was shut- l o e! down on September 1,1979. This appears to be reportable per Fort St. Vrain Techni-ol7 Ical Specification AC 7.5.2(a)9.
        -              .                                                            LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: l                   l    l      l    l    l h                  (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) o li           iCI0IFlSl vill @l0l0l-l010                                                       01010 - (010 25l@l4                 26 IlLICENSE1 (2TYPL  l 0Jol@l57 CAT  i
There was no affect on public health or safety.
                                                                                                                                                                                        $8 l@
[l ota l 80 7 8 9 SYSTEY CAUSE CAUSE COYP.VALVE CCCE COOE SUSCCOE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUSCOCE o19lZlZlh h l A lh {lU lP lO lR lT lh A@Zjh 7 8 9 to 11 12 13 -18 19 20 ,_S EQUE NTI A L QCCU A RENCE REPORT A EVISION gga a0 EVENT YE AR REPORT NO.
7           8 9             LICENSEE CODE               14     15                         LICENSE NUM8ER CON'T REPORT
CODE WPE NO.@ aE a;l 7l 9ll_ll 01 3l 5l l/l 0 l1 llTll-ll0 l_;1 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 JJ 31 32 AK N AC ON ON PLANT Y M HQURS S8 i FO t 8.SL PPLI E MAN FAC RER 0 l7 l4 ]4 __l lYl@N l@l XlhlX l9 l9 l9 lh l Z l@l Fl@
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lAl@l A lhl1 33 34 35 36 3 40 41 42 43 44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h 1 0 lThe cause of this nroblem is dasim /f,R *C l otion fernnRis*encies which could ieonar-l1 i Idize the svstems involved.
o      i a
The exact extent of the nrokler is not ver cer*
3c 9
4, ,, a o, I i; l investigation is continuinc. When the exact cause is detedned the corrective action t-3l will be decided and a revised Licensee Event Recort s ubmi t t ed .
* l60L l@ 0 l 5 lCOCKET 61 0 l 0NUMSER l 0 l 2 l 668 l 769@l 0               l 8 l 3 l1 l 7 ] 9 l@l0 EV ENT D ATE            74        75      REPCRT  19DATEl1 l 3 So l 7 l 9 l@
I 1 4 I I 80 7 8 9 ST S% POWER OTHER STATUS h1500 RY D'SCOVERY DESCRIPTION l E l@0 l 3 l 5 l@l N/A ll C l@l Hanger Audit t s'1 o a 45 4a 80 7 8 A8TiviTv CONTENT AMOUNT OF ACTivtTY LOCATION CF RELE ASE RELE ASE@D OF RELE ASEl Zl@l N/A l N/AlZ 1 6'""*PERSONNEL ExPOSUEES 0**0'* *TYPE @l DESCRIPTION ooblNuvseRl 0] 0 l 0 l@lZ lN/A i 7*ERSONsE L iNau'dlES
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES h Io        2        y field audit and preliminary engineering analysis of a random sample of as-built                                                                                                 1 o    a        i safety related piping drawings showed that several hangers have inconsistencies that                                                                                           I l cay jeopardize the operability of the associated systems in the event of a design                                                                                               j o     4 c     5       I basis earthquake.                         Because of these inconsistencies the Fort St. Vrain unit was shut- l o     e       ! down on September 1,1979. This appears to be reportable per Fort St. Vrain Techni-ol7 Ical Specification AC 7.5.2(a)9. There was no affect on public health or safety.                                                                                                             [
~''** 'i-l 0 l 0 l 0 l@l N/A. (l l (3l_1 m[NUVSER DESCRIPTICN
l ota l                                                                                                                                                                                         80 7             8 9 SYSTEY             CAUSE             CAUSE                                                           COYP.           VALVE CCCE               COOE         SUSCCOE                     COMPONENT CODE                     SUBCODE           SUSCOCE o19                                  lZlZlh                          h l A lh {lU lP lO lR lT lh                                                 A@               Zjh 7             8                         9         to           11               12               13 -                           18             19               20 S EQUE NTI A L                     QCCU A RENCE           REPORT                         A EVISION
$r_3 , 80 7 8 9 11 12'~7 (T () ()U LOSS OF CA OAVAGE TO FACILITY Q f i l~) /-U TYDE DESCRI' TION U ,l Zl@l N/A lt 9 7 8 9 to 30 e ISSUEf@l DESCRIPTION lN N/Alll llllll ltlt]j
                                      ,_
: o , ,, , 7 8 9 to//g 68 69 90 &w J. W. Gahm (30 3) 785-2253 e NAYE OF PAEPARER PwCNE: "o p y}}
gga a0       EVENT YE AR                                   REPORT NO.                             CODE                 WPE                             NO.
                    @ aE a;                 l 7l 9l              l_l                l 01 3l 5l               l/l           0 l1 l                  lTl              l-l          l0 l
_;1             22         23               24               26       27           28       29             JJ               31           32 AK N AC ON                 ON PLANT             Y     M                       HQURS           S8 i             FO t       8.     SL PPLI E             MAN FAC RER l33Z l@l34 Fl@                  lAl@
35 l36A lh            3l10 l7 l4 ]4 __l   40 lYl@
41                42 N l@           l Xlh lX l9 l9 l9 lh 43               44               47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h 1     0       lThe cause of this nroblem is dasim /f,R *C l otion fernnRis*encies which could ieonar-                                                                                           l 4,    ,, a o, 1      i     Idize the svstems involved.                                     The exact extent of the nrokler is not ver cer*                                                                   I i     ; l investigation is continuinc. When the exact cause is detedned the corrective action t-       3      l will be decided and a revised Licensee Event Recort s ubmi t t ed .                                                                                                             I 4                                                                                                                                                                                         I 1            I 80 7             8 9 ST     S           % POWER                         OTHER STATUS                     h1500 RY                               D'SCOVERY DESCRIPTION t    s l E l@           0 l 3 l 5 l@lo N/A                                             l    l C l@l Hanger Audit 7            8                  '                 1                                             a     45         4a                                                                           80 A8TiviTv CONTENT AMOUNT OF ACTivtTY                                                             LOCATION CF RELE ASE 1    6 RELE ASE@D Z
                                  '
OF RELE ASEl"                            Zl@l lN/A  "
N/A
* l
  '           *
* PERSONNEL ExPOSUEES NuvseR 0**0 i      7 l 0] 0 l 0 l@lZ           TYPE l          N/A DESCRIPTION
                                                              @l                                                                        ~
oob                                                    l
  *            * '                  ''
                        *ERSONsE L iNau'dlES r
NUVSER                DESCRIPTICN                                                                            $
i     -
l 0 l 0 l 0 l@l N/A                                                                                         , . (l l       (3l    _    1 m[           _3 80 7           8 9                 11       12
                                                                                                                                                                          '~7             -
LOSS OF CA OAVAGE TO FACILITY Q TYDE        DESCRI' TION                    U                                                                                                  f i l~) /
                                                                                                                                                                      ,              (T () ()U U
l 7
t      9 8 9 l Zl@l N/A to                                                                                                                                                                 30 e
:      o      lN ISSUEf@l           N/ADESCRIPTION                                  ,    ,, ,                                                              l      ll llllll ltlt]j 7           8 9             to
                                                                            //             g                                                               68 69                                 90 &
w                                         J. W. Gahm             PwCNE:
(30 3) 785-2253                             e NAYE OF PAEPARER                                                                                                                                                       "o p             y}}

Revision as of 14:19, 19 October 2019

LER 79-035/01T-0:on 790831,field Audit Analysis Indicated Inconsistencies in Hangers of as-built safety-related Piping.Caused by Design & Installation Inconsistencies. Remaining Hangers Being Analyzed
ML19208B216
Person / Time
Site: Fort Saint Vrain Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/13/1979
From: Gahm J
PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
Shared Package
ML19208B217 List:
References
LER-79-035-01T, LER-79-35-1T, NUDOCS 7909190360
Download: ML19208B216 (4)
v • d • e


Text

. .

REPORT DATE: September 13, 1979 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 79-35 ISSUE O OCCURRENCE DATE: Auguse 31, 1979 Page 1 of 3

- FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO P. O. BOX 361 PLATTEVILLE, COLORADO 80651 REPORT NO. 50-267/79-35/01-T-0 Preliminary IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

An engineering field audit and preliminary analysis of a random sample of safety related system piping and associated hangers has found inconsistencies that may Jeopardize the operability of systems In the event of a design basis earthquake.

Due to these inconsistencies, Public Service Company has elected to suspend operation of the Fort St. Vrain Unit No. 1, as of 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br /> on Septe=ber 1, 1979.

9 An investigation of these inconsistencies is continuing.

This appears to be reportable per Fort St. Vrain Technical Specification AC 7.5.2(a)9.

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Public Service Co=pany of Colorado has completed the field audit and a prelim-inary engineering analysis of a random sample of as-built safety related piping isometric and associated hanger drawings as committed to in Public Service Con-pany letter P-79161.

The audit included a field verification of the as-built installation of the piping shown on 26 Class I piping isometric drawings and the 94 associated hanger drawings. The general validity of the seismic design inputs documenta-tion on 18 of the isometric drawings and 64 of the hanger drawings was confirmed.

On the remaining eight isometric drawings and 30 hanger drawings, inconsisten-cies judged to be potentially significant were identified between the field installation and the reference documentation.

An analytical evaluation of the noted isometric drawing inconst. "cies indi-cates that they would not result in invalidation of the seismic qu .ification of the piping depicted on the subject iso =e.tric drawing.

-,

->

Q'3 i 96!

7 909190 3NGt)

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 79-35 ISSUE O Page 2 of 3

.

EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued):

An analytical analysis of the inconsistencies identified in the hangers indi-cates that 18 of the hangers of concern fulfill Class I design requirements.

The retaining 12 hangers have inconsistencies that may jeopardize the opera-bility of the associated systems in the event of a design basis earthquake.

Because the sacpling of isometric drawings and associated hangers was made on a rando= basis, no conclusions can be drawn as to the continued operability of those systems or portions of systems required to re=ain operable during and after a design basis earthquake.

On the basis of the results of the audit, Public Service Co=pany of Colorado has determined that the piping systen seistic hanger / support systen for the Class I piping uay not be installed per the design requirements defined in the Final Safety Analysis Report and cay require corrective modifications to bring the "as-built" systems into agreement with the design intent.

Because of the inconsistencies noted, the Public Service Company of Colorado has temporarily suspended operation of the Fort St. Vrain unit as of approxi-cately 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br /> on September 1,1979.

After further analysis, using more sophisticated analytical methods, it has been deter =ined that none of the systems examined to date are impaired per the Final Safety Analysis Report since the individual hangers are acceptable or, the asso-ciated piping and its remaining hangers would re=ain operable during the de-sign basis earthquake.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION:

The inconsistencies between the design and installation of the various hangers required re-analysis of the piping / hanger systems. The time involved did not allow a final resolution of the problem before a report was submitted. There-fore the plant was shutdown pending outcome of the investigation.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The re=aining hangers are being analyzed and the outcone of these analyses along with the corrective actions necessary, will be submitted in a future supplemental repo r t.

,,t , 0' to

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 79-35 ISSLT 0 Page 3 of 3

.

Prepared by: /jZ.

Asa B. Reed Technical Services Technician Reviewed by:

g.W.Miali=

(/ Technical Services Supervisor Reviewed by: b Frank 11. Mathie Operations !!anager Approved by:  % YM Don Warenbourg 9

!!anager, Nuclear Production

. (b 4 ,t

"

(7 77)

- . LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: l l l l l l h (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) o li iCI0IFlSl vill @l0l0l-l010 01010 - (010 25l@l4 26 IlLICENSE1 (2TYPL l 0Jol@l57 CAT i

$8 l@

7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUM8ER CON'T REPORT

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o i a

3c 9

  • l60L l@ 0 l 5 lCOCKET 61 0 l 0NUMSER l 0 l 2 l 668 l 769@l 0 l 8 l 3 l1 l 7 ] 9 l@l0 EV ENT D ATE 74 75 REPCRT 19DATEl1 l 3 So l 7 l 9 l@

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES h Io 2 y field audit and preliminary engineering analysis of a random sample of as-built 1 o a i safety related piping drawings showed that several hangers have inconsistencies that I l cay jeopardize the operability of the associated systems in the event of a design j o 4 c 5 I basis earthquake. Because of these inconsistencies the Fort St. Vrain unit was shut- l o e  ! down on September 1,1979. This appears to be reportable per Fort St. Vrain Techni-ol7 Ical Specification AC 7.5.2(a)9. There was no affect on public health or safety. [

l ota l 80 7 8 9 SYSTEY CAUSE CAUSE COYP. VALVE CCCE COOE SUSCCOE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUSCOCE o19 lZlZlh h l A lh {lU lP lO lR lT lh A@ Zjh 7 8 9 to 11 12 13 - 18 19 20 S EQUE NTI A L QCCU A RENCE REPORT A EVISION

,_

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35 l36A lh 3l10 l7 l4 ]4 __l 40 lYl@

41 42 N l@ l Xlh lX l9 l9 l9 lh 43 44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h 1 0 lThe cause of this nroblem is dasim /f,R *C l otion fernnRis*encies which could ieonar- l 4, ,, a o, 1 i Idize the svstems involved. The exact extent of the nrokler is not ver cer* I i  ; l investigation is continuinc. When the exact cause is detedned the corrective action t- 3 l will be decided and a revised Licensee Event Recort s ubmi t t ed . I 4 I 1 I 80 7 8 9 ST S  % POWER OTHER STATUS h1500 RY D'SCOVERY DESCRIPTION t s l E l@ 0 l 3 l 5 l@lo N/A l l C l@l Hanger Audit 7 8 ' 1 a 45 4a 80 A8TiviTv CONTENT AMOUNT OF ACTivtTY LOCATION CF RELE ASE 1 6 RELE ASE@D Z

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