|
|
Line 16: |
Line 16: |
|
| |
|
| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:,..,_ r -'. -. e Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 | | {{#Wiki_filter:,..,_ |
| | e PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station Octo,ber 24, 1991 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 |
|
| |
|
| ==Dear Sir:== | | ==Dear Sir:== |
| SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. l Octo,ber 24, 1991 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 91-003-01; SUPPLEMENT This Supplemental Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to 16CFR50.73.
| |
| This supplement enhances the analysis bf as requested by NRC Inspection Report 272/91-05.
| |
| MJP:pc Distribution The Enerav People 9111050073 911024 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR Sincerely
| |
| : yours, C. A. Vondra General Manager -Salem Operations 95-2189 (10M) 12-89 NRC Fu'tlM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOI 16-89) APPROVED OMB NO. 3150*0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP*530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.
| |
| WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13150-0104).
| |
| OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. WASHINGTON, DC 20503. FACILITY NAME 111 I DOCKET NUMBE_R (2) PAGE (3) Salem Generating Station -Unit 1 o 1s1oIo1o12 17 I 2 1 loF 014 *TITLE, 141 Tech. Spec. 3.0.3 Entry; 2 Stm Flow Channels for 1 Steamline Inop. Due To Personnel Error EVENT DATE 151 *LER NUMBER 161 REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (81 MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR
| |
| ?? SEQUENTIAL NUMBER HI REVISION MONTH NUMBER DAY YEAR FACI LlTY NAMES DOCKET NUMBERISJ 0 I 5 IO I 01 o, I I ' 12 0 19 911 -o lo 13 -ol i ii 21 911 0 9 1 0 4 0 I 5 Io Io I o, I I OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE OF 10 C_FR §:(Chock one or more of rho following)
| |
| (11) MODE (8) 1 20.402(b) 20.405(cl 50.73(a) (2)(ivl 73.71(b) I -,_ ,__ POWER 20.406l*ll1llil 60.381cll1 I 50.73lall2llvl 73.71(c) LEVEL ..._ --,__ (101 0, 1 ,s 20.406(a)(1
| |
| )(iii 60.36(cll21 50.73(a)(2)(viil OTHER in Abmacr --,__ balow *nd in Text. NRC Form I 20.406(*1"(1
| |
| )(iii) x 60.731all21 Iii 60,73(a)(2)(vili)(A) 366AJ ,__ -,...._ 20.406 (all1 I (Iv) 60.73(all2lllil 50.73(al 121 (viii) (BJ ---20.406(aJl1 llvl 50.731*1121 (iii) 60.73lall2llxl LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE M. J. Pollack -LER Coordinator.
| |
| 61 0 19 313 19 I -12 10 1212 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 113) MANUFAC* REPORTABLE I:<: .... ,.*.*.-.*.*.
| |
| .:.:.*.-. }{{ MANUFAC* !REPORTABLE .i:!i*ii*l:i,:.::11:::::::::1::1:*::=*:*:=:-::::**:*
| |
| CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT
| |
| :-::-:*:*:*:*:*
| |
| *:*::*:* CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TUR ER TO NPRDS 1.:.-.:*.*.
| |
| .........
| |
| *.: :.: .. :.* ::::::*:,..:
| |
| .. TUR ER TO NPRDS ,.,., .. ..... ,. *.*:*.-.-.*.
| |
| .... :-:-: :-:-:-:.:-:-:
| |
| I:*:*:*: :-:-:-:* :-:*:*:*:
| |
| :-:*:-:*:*:*:*:
| |
| ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
| |
| ,,.,.,.,._
| |
| ... .........
| |
| ..........
| |
| *=*=*=*=*
| |
| I I I I I I I It: < .:.-.:.:*
| |
| *:*:*:=::::::::*:*
| |
| I I I
| |
| *.*.-:*.*
| |
| *:*.<::::;:::::::
| |
| I I I I ..............
| |
| *:*.:-:: ()) '.:ii::::::::::jJl:1:.:*11::::=::=::'1:*:'*i**:'.j.
| |
| *:-::*:*:*:*:-:-:
| |
| .........
| |
| I I I I I I I *.* . .-...... .,.,. *:-:-:-:*
| |
| ::::::-:,:-:-:
| |
| I I I I I I I :-:--:*:* , ..... , ... ;-:-:*:-:
| |
| SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (141 MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED rn SUBMISSION n YES (If v*s, comp!*<* EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) DATE 1151 I I I NO ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spsc6s, i.e .. approximntely fifte6n single-space typewrirren Jines) 116) On 2/9/91, during reactor shutdown (in support of the upcoming ninth refueling outage) , a No. 14 Steam Generator (S/G) steamline flow channel I transmitter sensing line was isolated during investigation of a 14 SIG steamline flow channel II erroneous reading. Subsequently, Action Statement 3.0.3 was entered since the Action Statements for Tech. Specs. 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.3.1 do not address required actions with more than one inoperable steamline flow channel for any one S/G. The root cause of this event is personnel error as attributed to inappropriate supervisory direction.
| |
| The supervisor involved acted upon an invalid assumption.
| |
| When the tran-smi t ter sensing line would not stop venting (after the root valve was closed) the supervisor incorrectly assumed either the schematic was not read correctly, the valves were mislabled or the schematic was incorrect.
| |
| The supervisor did not consider that the correct transmitter sensing line root valve was closed but was leaking by (due to it not being closed tight enough) . Contributing to this event was that the schematic drawing, which details component alignment, (for the transmitter sensing lines) was not taken to the job site. Upon notification of the isolation of the Channel I sensing line, the supervisor reopened the wrong root valve and successfully closed the correct root valve (i.e. I the first one closed) and vented the subject sensing line. This event has been reviewed by Maintenance management.
| |
| Corrective disciplinary action was taken with the supervisor involved.
| |
| This event has been reviewed with applicable Maintenance personnel.
| |
| NRC Form 366 (6-89)
| |
| -----LICENSEE EVENT REPORT. (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:
| |
| W_estinghouse
| |
| -Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [xx} IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
| |
| Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entry; Two Steam Flow Channels for One Main Steamline Inoperable Due To Personnel Error Event Date: 2/9/91 Report Date: 10/24/91 This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos. 91-088 and 91-087. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
| |
| Mode 1 Reactor Power 18% -Unit Load 145 MWe Unit in the process of shutting down in support of the upcoming 9th refueling outage DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
| |
| On February 8, 1990, at 1955 hours, during reactor shutdown (in support of the upcoming ninth refueling outage), Operations shift personnel observed that No. 14 Steam Generator (S/G) steamline steam flow channel II was greater than 10% above its corresponding feed flow. The channel was declar_ed inoperable and Technical 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.3.1 Action Statements 14 and 7 were entered. In accordance with the Action Statement, channel bistables were tripped. Maintenance-I&C was issued a work *order to investigate (and correct) the cause of invalid reading. On February 9, 1991 at 0845 hours, during reactor shutdown, a transmitter,sensing line, for No. 14 S/G stearnline flow channel I, was isolated during the.channel II investigations.
| |
| Subsequently, Technical Specification Action Statement 3.0.3 was entered since the Action Statements for Technical Specifications 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.3.1.do not address required actions with more than one inoperable channel per steamline.
| |
| Technical Specification Action Statement
| |
|
| |
|
| ====3.0.3 states====
| | SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 91-003-01; SUPPLEMENT This Supplemental Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to 16CFR50.73. This supplement enhances the analysis bf ~he e~ent as requested by NRC Inspection Report 272/91-05. |
| "When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met except as provided in the ACTION requirements, within one hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which the specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in: 1. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, 2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and 3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours.
| | Sincerely yours, |
| | <J/~4jA} |
| | C. A. Vondra ~~ |
| | General Manager - |
| | Salem Operations MJP:pc Distribution 4ri\~ |
| | /~\ |
| | The Enerav People r - 9111050073 911024 |
| | '. - . |
| | PDR ADOCK 05000272 95-2189 (10M) 12-89 S PDR |
|
| |
|
| LICE1\fSEE EVENT REPORT ( LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 , pESCRIPTION OF LER NUMBER 91-003-01 PAGE 3 of 4 Where c6rrective measures are completed that permit *operation urider the ACTION requirements, the ACTION may be taken in accordance with the specified time limits as measured from the time of failure to meet the Condition of Operation.
| | NRC Fu'tlM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOI 16-89) APPROVED OMB NO. 3150*0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP*530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13150-0104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. WASHINGTON, DC 20503. |
| Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the specifications." APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
| | FACILITY NAME 111 I DOCKET NUMBE_R (2) PAGE (3) |
| The root cause of this event is personnel error as attributed to inappropriate supervisory direction.
| | Salem Generating Station |
| The supervisor involved acted upon an invalid assumption without. fully assessing an situation.
| | *TITLE, 141 |
| To support troubleshooting No. 14 S/G steamline steam flow channel II, the transmitter sensing lines were to be isolated.
| | - Unit 1 o 1s1oIo1o12 17 I 2 1 loF 014 Tech. Spec. 3.0.3 Entry; 2 Stm Flow Channels for 1 Steamline Inop. Due To Personnel Error EVENT DATE 151 *LER NUMBER 161 REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (81 MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR |
| The high side sensing line was isolated £irst by closing its root valve. The line was then vented; no' difficulties were When the low side sensing line root valve (14MS5) was closed (see schematic below), the line would not stop venting. The supervisor, thinking that he had closed the wrong valve, reopined the 14MS5 root valve and closed a. different root valve (14MS4). When this occurred, the Control Room received indication of the Channel I high failure. The 14MS4 valve isolates a Channel I sensing lirte. Upon notification (from the Operations Shift) of the isolation of the Channel I sensing line, the supervisor had the 14MS4 valve reopened and the 14MS5 valve reclosed.
| | ?? SEQUENTIAL NUMBER HI REVISION NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR FACI LlTY NAMES DOCKET NUMBERISJ 0 I 5 IO I 01 o, I I |
| The Channel II sensing line was then successfully vepted. It should be noted that, prior to closing the low side. sensing line valve, the supervisor did have a technician review the schematic to determine which valves were to be closed. This information was relayed (via telecon) to the supervisor..
| | ' |
| The correct valves were identified; however, when the low side sensing line would not stop venting, the supervisor incorrectly assumed that either the schematic was not read correctly, the valves were mislabled or the schematic was Flow Transmitter Channel I 14MS4 14MS2 ) ( 14MSS 14MS3 No. 14 S/G Flow Transmitter Channel II
| | 0 12 0 19 9 1 911 |
| ., ..... LICENSEE EVENT*REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating* | | - olo 13 |
| S.tation DOCKET-NUMBER LER NUMBER ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
| | - ol i ii 0 21 4 911 0 I 5 Io Io I o, I I |
| PAGE 4 of 4 incorrect.
| | THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE R~QUIREMENTS OF 10 C_FR §:(Chock one or more of rho following) (11) |
| The supervisor did not consider that the correct valve was closed but leaking by (due to it not being closed tight enough) . Main Steam steamline flow inputs t6 S/G Feed Pump speed and water
| | OPERATING MODE (8) 1 20.402(b) 20.405(cl |
| * level control. In addition, .steamline flow signals are used as input to steamline isolation, safety. injection (SI), and steam flow mismatch. | | ,_ 50.73(a) (2)(ivl |
| Steam flow/feed flow mismatch when coupled with "Low S/G Level" will initiate a reactor t-rip signal. When the No. 14 Steam Geneiator (S/G) steamline steam flow channel II failed, its bistables were placed in the tripped condition in accordance with Technical Action requirements*.
| | ,__ 73.71(b) |
| This action placed the plant in a conservative condition with regard to applicable Reactor Trip/ESF Solid State System (SSPS) actuating signals. To initiate an SSPS actuating signal, only one (1) of two (2) steam flow channels in a loop must respond to an abnormal condition.
| | - |
| With the No. 14 loop Channel II bistable in the tripped position, an SSPS actuating signal would have initiated despite the No. 14 ioop Channel I being made inoperable by closure of its root valve. Therefore, this event did not affect the health or safety of the public. However, since Technical Specification Action Statement 3.0.3 entered this event* is reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in accordance with Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B). Technical Specification Action Statement 3.0.3 was exited approximately one (1) minute after entry upon restoration of sensing line flow. CORRECTIVE ACTION: This event. has been reviewed by Maintenance Department management.
| | I -- |
| Appropriate corrective disciplinary action was taken with the supervisor involved in this event. The need to fully assess (i.e., understand) and discuss unusual situations prior to taking action and to not manipulate plant components without appropriate documentation review was discussed with the supervisor involved.
| | POWER 20.406l*ll1llil 60.381cll1 I 50.73lall2llvl 73.71(c) |
| event has been reviewed with appiicable Maintenance Department personnel.
| | ..._ |
| The need to communicate unusual situations (as they arise) with other appropriate personnel, prior to manipulating components, was stressed.
| | LEVEL - ,__ |
| General Manager -{,/ -Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mtg. 91-108}}
| | (101 0, 1 ,s 20.406(a)(1 )(iii |
| | -x 60.36(cll21 50.73(a)(2)(viil ,__ OTHER IS~cify in Abmacr |
| | -- |
| | balow *nd in Text. NRC Form |
| | ~tl,~1111'.lllllflfI- |
| | ,__ 20.406(*1"(1 )(iii) 60.731all21 Iii |
| | ,...._ 60,73(a)(2)(vili)(A) 366AJ 20.406 (all1 I (Iv) 20.406(aJl1 llvl 60.73(all2lllil 50.731*1121 (iii) |
| | LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) |
| | - 50.73(al 121 (viii) (BJ 60.73lall2llxl NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE M. J. Pollack - LER Coordinator. 61 0 19 313 19 I -12 10 1212 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 113) |
| | .... ,.*.*.-.*.*. .:.:.*.- .}{{ |
| | CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC* |
| | TUR ER REPORTABLE I:<: :-::-:*:*:*:*:* *:*::*:* |
| | TO NPRDS 1.:.-.:*.*. ......... *.: :.: :.* ::::::*:,..:. CAUSE |
| | .. SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC* |
| | TUR ER |
| | !REPORTABLE TO NPRDS .i:!i*ii*l:i,:.::11:::::::::1::1:*::=*:*:=:-::::**:* |
| | ,.,.,.. .....,. *.*:*.-.-.*. .... :-:-: :-:-:-:.:-:-: |
| | I:*:*:*: :-:-:-:* :-:*:*:*::-:*:-:*:*:*:*: |
| | ,,.,.,.,._ ... ......... .......... :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: |
| | ~~~~~~l~I~l~~l~f ~~~~l!~\~lI~~~~~I/W |
| | .:.-.:.:* *=*=*=*=* |
| | I I I I I I I It: < *.*.-:*.* *:*:*:=::::::::*:* |
| | *:*.<::::;::::::: I I I I I I I |
| | .............. |
| | *:-::*:*:*:*:-:-: ......... ()) |
| | *:*.:-:: |
| | *.*. .- ...... .,.,. *:-:-:-:* ::::::-:,:-:-: '.:ii::::::::::jJl:1:.:*11::::=::=::'1:*:'*i**:'.j. |
| | I I I I I I I :-:--:*:* ,..... ,...;-:-:*:-: I I I I I I I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (141 MONTH DAY YEAR rn EXPECTED n YES (If v*s, comp!*<* EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO SUBMISSION DATE 1151 I I I ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spsc6s, i.e .. approximntely fifte6n single-space typewrirren Jines) 116) |
| | On 2/9/91, during reactor shutdown (in support of the upcoming ninth refueling outage) , a No. 14 Steam Generator (S/G) steamline flow channel I transmitter sensing line was isolated during investigation of a 14 SIG steamline flow channel I I erroneous reading. Subsequently, Action Statement 3.0.3 was entered since the Action Statements for Tech. Specs. 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.3.1 do not address required actions with more than one inoperable steamline flow channel for any one S/G. The root cause of this event is personnel error as attributed to inappropriate supervisory direction. The supervisor involved acted upon an invalid assumption. When the tran-smi t ter sensing line would not stop venting (after the root valve was closed) the supervisor incorrectly assumed either the schematic was not read correctly, the valves were mislabled or the schematic was incorrect. The supervisor did not consider that the correct transmitter sensing line root valve was closed but was leaking by (due to it not being closed tight enough) . Contributing to this event was that the schematic drawing, which details component alignment, (for the transmitter sensing lines) was not taken to the job site. Upon notification of the isolation of the Channel I sensing line, the supervisor reopened the wrong root valve and successfully closed the correct root valve (i.e. I the first one closed) and vented the subject sensing line. This event has been reviewed by Maintenance management. Corrective disciplinary action was taken with the supervisor involved. This event has been reviewed with applicable Maintenance personnel. |
| | NRC Form 366 (6-89) |
| | |
| | ----- |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT. (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1 5000272~~~~~91-003-0_1~~~-*-2~o_f~4~- |
| | PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION: |
| | W_estinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [xx} |
| | IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: |
| | Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entry; Two Steam Flow Channels for One Main Steamline Inoperable Due To Personnel Error Event Date: 2/9/91 Report Date: 10/24/91 This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos. 91-088 and 91-087. |
| | CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE: |
| | Mode 1 Reactor Power 18% - Unit Load 145 MWe Unit in the process of shutting down in support of the upcoming 9th refueling outage DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: |
| | On February 8, 1990, at 1955 hours, during reactor shutdown (in support of the upcoming ninth refueling outage), Operations shift personnel observed that No. 14 Steam Generator (S/G) steamline steam flow channel II was greater than 10% above its corresponding feed flow. The channel was declar_ed inoperable and Technical Speci~ications 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.3.1 Action Statements 14 and 7 (r~specti~ely) were entered. In accordance with the Action Statement, |
| | ~the channel bistables were tripped. Maintenance-I&C was issued a work |
| | *order to investigate (and correct) the cause of th~ invalid reading. |
| | On February 9, 1991 at 0845 hours, during reactor shutdown, a transmitter,sensing line, for No. 14 S/G stearnline flow channel I, was isolated during the.channel II investigations. Subsequently, Technical Specification Action Statement 3.0.3 was entered since the Action Statements for Technical Specifications 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.3.1.do not address required actions with more than one inoperable channel per steamline. |
| | Technical Specification Action Statement 3.0.3 states: |
| | "When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met except as provided in the a~sociated ACTION requirements, within one hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which the specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in: |
| | : 1. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, |
| | : 2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and |
| | : 3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours. |
| | |
| | --*-~-. |
| | LICE1\fSEE EVENT REPORT ( LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1 5000272 91-003-01 3 of 4 |
| | , pESCRIPTION OF OCCURREN~C~E~:~----'-(c_ont'd) |
| | Where c6rrective measures are completed that permit *operation urider the ACTION requirements, the ACTION may be taken in accordance with the specified time limits as measured from the time of failure to meet the ~imiting Condition of Operation. |
| | Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual-specifications." |
| | APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: |
| | The root cause of this event is personnel error as attributed to inappropriate supervisory direction. The supervisor involved acted upon an invalid assumption without. fully assessing an u~usual situation. |
| | To support troubleshooting No. 14 S/G steamline steam flow channel II, the transmitter sensing lines were to be isolated. The high side sensing line was isolated £irst by closing its root valve. The line was then vented; no' difficulties were ~ncountered. When the low side sensing line root valve (14MS5) was closed (see schematic below), the line would not stop venting. The supervisor, thinking that he had closed the wrong valve, reopined the 14MS5 root valve and closed a. |
| | different root valve (14MS4). When this occurred, the Control Room received indication of the Channel I high failure. The 14MS4 valve isolates a Channel I trans~itter sensing lirte. |
| | Upon notification (from the Operations Shift) of the isolation of the Channel I sensing line, the supervisor had the 14MS4 valve reopened and the 14MS5 valve reclosed. The Channel II sensing line was then successfully vepted. |
| | It should be noted that, prior to closing the low side. sensing line valve, the supervisor did have a technician review the schematic to determine which valves were to be closed. This information was relayed (via telecon) to the supervisor.. The correct valves were identified; however, when the low side sensing line would not stop venting, the supervisor incorrectly assumed that either the schematic was not read correctly, the valves were mislabled or the schematic was 14MS4 14MSS Flow Flow Transmitter Channel I )( Transmitter Channel II 14MS2 14MS3 No. 14 S/G |
| | |
| | ......, |
| | LICENSEE EVENT*REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating* S.tation DOCKET- NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE |
| | _U_n~i~t'----"1~*~~~~~--~~~~~~~-5000_27~2~~~~~9_1_-003-01 4 of 4 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: |
| | incorrect. The supervisor did not consider that the correct valve was closed but ~as leaking by (due to it not being closed tight enough) . |
| | Main Steam steamline flow inputs t6 S/G Feed Pump speed and water |
| | * level control. In addition, .steamline flow signals are used as input to steamline isolation, safety. injection (SI), and steam flow/f~ed flow mismatch. Steam flow/feed flow mismatch when coupled with "Low S/G Level" will initiate a reactor t-rip signal. |
| | When the No. 14 Steam Geneiator (S/G) steamline steam flow channel II failed, its associate~ bistables were placed in the tripped condition in accordance with Technical Spec~fication Action S~atement requirements*. This action placed the plant in a conservative condition with regard to applicable Reactor Trip/ESF Solid State Pro~ection System (SSPS) actuating signals. To initiate an SSPS actuating signal, only one (1) of two (2) steam flow channels in a loop must respond to an abnormal condition. With the No. 14 loop Channel II bistable in the tripped position, an SSPS actuating signal would have initiated despite the No. 14 ioop Channel I being made inoperable by closure of its root valve. Therefore, this event did not affect the health or safety of the public. However, since Technical Specification Action Statement 3.0.3 ~as entered this event* |
| | is reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in accordance with Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B). |
| | Technical Specification Action Statement 3.0.3 was exited approximately one (1) minute after entry upon restoration of sensing line flow. |
| | CORRECTIVE ACTION: |
| | This event. has been reviewed by Maintenance Department management. |
| | Appropriate corrective disciplinary action was taken with the supervisor involved in this event. The need to fully assess (i.e., |
| | understand) and discuss unusual situations prior to taking action and to not manipulate plant components without appropriate documentation review was discussed with the supervisor involved. |
| | Th~s event has been reviewed with appiicable Maintenance Department personnel. The need to communicate unusual situations (as they arise) with other appropriate personnel, prior to manipulating components, was stressed. |
| | rot?~-* -fYr~~ |
| | General Manager -{,/ - |
| | Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mtg. 91-108}} |
Similar Documents at Salem |
---|
Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998 LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998 LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998 LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998 LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998 Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998 Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998 LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998 LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998 LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998 LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998 Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998 Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML18107A5581999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5571999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5301999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990913 Ltr ML18107A5311999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990913 ML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A5201999-08-12012 August 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#9) Second Interval,Second Period, First Outage (96RF). ML18107A4811999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4821999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A5211999-07-0101 July 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#10) Second Interval,Second Period,Second Outage (99RF). ML18107A4351999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990713 Ltr ML18107A4341999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990713 Ltr ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3441999-06-0101 June 1999 Interim Part 21 Rept Re Premature Over Voltage Protection Actuation in Circuit Specific Application in Dc Power Supply.Testing & Evaluation Activities Will Be Completed on 990716 ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A3681999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A3721999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A3711999-04-30030 April 1999 Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1 ML18107A3151999-04-30030 April 1999 Submittal-Only Screening Review of Salem Generating Station Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion), Rev 1 ML18107A2991999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2971999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18107A2881999-04-0707 April 1999 Rev 0 to NFS-0174, COLR for Salem Unit 2 Cycle 11. ML18107A1821999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990414 Ltr ML18107A1831999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990414 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B1021999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B1011999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B0931999-02-25025 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack Due to Improper Location of Heated Bar.Only One Part Out of 7396 Pieces in Forging Lot Was Found to Be Cracked.Affected Util,Notified ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0551999-02-0101 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Matl Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Defect Is Crack in Center of Forging.Analysis of Part Is Continuing & Further Details Will Be Provided IAW Ncr Timetables.Drawing of Part,Encl ML18106B0561999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990212 Ltr ML18106B0571999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990212 Ltr ML20205P1671999-01-31031 January 1999 a POST-PLUME Phase, Federal Participation Exercise ML18106B0441999-01-29029 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack in Center of Forging. Continuing Analysis of Part & Will Provide Details in Acoordance with NRC Timetables ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0251998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Salem Unit 2.With 990115 Ltr 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:,..,_
e PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station Octo,ber 24, 1991 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir:
SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 91-003-01; SUPPLEMENT This Supplemental Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to 16CFR50.73. This supplement enhances the analysis bf ~he e~ent as requested by NRC Inspection Report 272/91-05.
Sincerely yours,
<J/~4jA}
C. A. Vondra ~~
General Manager -
Salem Operations MJP:pc Distribution 4ri\~
/~\
The Enerav People r - 9111050073 911024
'. - .
PDR ADOCK 05000272 95-2189 (10M) 12-89 S PDR
NRC Fu'tlM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOI 16-89) APPROVED OMB NO. 3150*0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP*530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13150-0104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME 111 I DOCKET NUMBE_R (2) PAGE (3)
Salem Generating Station
- Unit 1 o 1s1oIo1o12 17 I 2 1 loF 014 Tech. Spec. 3.0.3 Entry; 2 Stm Flow Channels for 1 Steamline Inop. Due To Personnel Error EVENT DATE 151 *LER NUMBER 161 REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (81 MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR
?? SEQUENTIAL NUMBER HI REVISION NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR FACI LlTY NAMES DOCKET NUMBERISJ 0 I 5 IO I 01 o, I I
'
0 12 0 19 9 1 911
- olo 13
- ol i ii 0 21 4 911 0 I 5 Io Io I o, I I
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE R~QUIREMENTS OF 10 C_FR §:(Chock one or more of rho following) (11)
OPERATING MODE (8) 1 20.402(b) 20.405(cl
,_ 50.73(a) (2)(ivl
,__ 73.71(b)
-
I --
POWER 20.406l*ll1llil 60.381cll1 I 50.73lall2llvl 73.71(c)
..._
LEVEL - ,__
(101 0, 1 ,s 20.406(a)(1 )(iii
-x 60.36(cll21 50.73(a)(2)(viil ,__ OTHER IS~cify in Abmacr
--
balow *nd in Text. NRC Form
~tl,~1111'.lllllflfI-
,__ 20.406(*1"(1 )(iii) 60.731all21 Iii
,...._ 60,73(a)(2)(vili)(A) 366AJ 20.406 (all1 I (Iv) 20.406(aJl1 llvl 60.73(all2lllil 50.731*1121 (iii)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
- 50.73(al 121 (viii) (BJ 60.73lall2llxl NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE M. J. Pollack - LER Coordinator. 61 0 19 313 19 I -12 10 1212 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 113)
.... ,.*.*.-.*.*. .:.:.*.- .}{{
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC*
TUR ER REPORTABLE I:<: :-::-:*:*:*:*:* *:*::*:*
TO NPRDS 1.:.-.:*.*. ......... *.: :.: :.* ::::::*:,..:. CAUSE
.. SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC*
TUR ER
!REPORTABLE TO NPRDS .i:!i*ii*l:i,:.::11:::::::::1::1:*::=*:*:=:-::::**:*
,.,.,.. .....,. *.*:*.-.-.*. .... :-:-: :-:-:-:.:-:-:
I:*:*:*: :-:-:-:* :-:*:*:*::-:*:-:*:*:*:*:
,,.,.,.,._ ... ......... .......... ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
~~~~~~l~I~l~~l~f ~~~~l!~\~lI~~~~~I/W
.:.-.:.:* *=*=*=*=*
I I I I I I I It: < *.*.-:*.* *:*:*:=::::::::*:*
*:*.<::::;::::::: I I I I I I I
..............
*:-::*:*:*:*:-:-: ......... ())
*:*.:-::
*.*. .- ...... .,.,. *:-:-:-:* ::::::-:,:-:-: '.:ii::::::::::jJl:1:.:*11::::=::=::'1:*:'*i**:'.j.
I I I I I I I :-:--:*:* ,..... ,...;-:-:*:-: I I I I I I I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (141 MONTH DAY YEAR rn EXPECTED n YES (If v*s, comp!*<* EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO SUBMISSION DATE 1151 I I I ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spsc6s, i.e .. approximntely fifte6n single-space typewrirren Jines) 116)
On 2/9/91, during reactor shutdown (in support of the upcoming ninth refueling outage) , a No. 14 Steam Generator (S/G) steamline flow channel I transmitter sensing line was isolated during investigation of a 14 SIG steamline flow channel I I erroneous reading. Subsequently, Action Statement 3.0.3 was entered since the Action Statements for Tech. Specs. 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.3.1 do not address required actions with more than one inoperable steamline flow channel for any one S/G. The root cause of this event is personnel error as attributed to inappropriate supervisory direction. The supervisor involved acted upon an invalid assumption. When the tran-smi t ter sensing line would not stop venting (after the root valve was closed) the supervisor incorrectly assumed either the schematic was not read correctly, the valves were mislabled or the schematic was incorrect. The supervisor did not consider that the correct transmitter sensing line root valve was closed but was leaking by (due to it not being closed tight enough) . Contributing to this event was that the schematic drawing, which details component alignment, (for the transmitter sensing lines) was not taken to the job site. Upon notification of the isolation of the Channel I sensing line, the supervisor reopened the wrong root valve and successfully closed the correct root valve (i.e. I the first one closed) and vented the subject sensing line. This event has been reviewed by Maintenance management. Corrective disciplinary action was taken with the supervisor involved. This event has been reviewed with applicable Maintenance personnel.
NRC Form 366 (6-89)
-----
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT. (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1 5000272~~~~~91-003-0_1~~~-*-2~o_f~4~-
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:
W_estinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [xx}
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entry; Two Steam Flow Channels for One Main Steamline Inoperable Due To Personnel Error Event Date: 2/9/91 Report Date: 10/24/91 This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos. 91-088 and 91-087.
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
Mode 1 Reactor Power 18% - Unit Load 145 MWe Unit in the process of shutting down in support of the upcoming 9th refueling outage DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
On February 8, 1990, at 1955 hours, during reactor shutdown (in support of the upcoming ninth refueling outage), Operations shift personnel observed that No. 14 Steam Generator (S/G) steamline steam flow channel II was greater than 10% above its corresponding feed flow. The channel was declar_ed inoperable and Technical Speci~ications 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.3.1 Action Statements 14 and 7 (r~specti~ely) were entered. In accordance with the Action Statement,
~the channel bistables were tripped. Maintenance-I&C was issued a work
*order to investigate (and correct) the cause of th~ invalid reading.
On February 9, 1991 at 0845 hours, during reactor shutdown, a transmitter,sensing line, for No. 14 S/G stearnline flow channel I, was isolated during the.channel II investigations. Subsequently, Technical Specification Action Statement 3.0.3 was entered since the Action Statements for Technical Specifications 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.3.1.do not address required actions with more than one inoperable channel per steamline.
Technical Specification Action Statement 3.0.3 states:
"When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met except as provided in the a~sociated ACTION requirements, within one hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which the specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in:
- 1. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours,
- 2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and
- 3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours.
--*-~-.
LICE1\fSEE EVENT REPORT ( LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1 5000272 91-003-01 3 of 4
, pESCRIPTION OF OCCURREN~C~E~:~----'-(c_ont'd)
Where c6rrective measures are completed that permit *operation urider the ACTION requirements, the ACTION may be taken in accordance with the specified time limits as measured from the time of failure to meet the ~imiting Condition of Operation.
Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual-specifications."
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
The root cause of this event is personnel error as attributed to inappropriate supervisory direction. The supervisor involved acted upon an invalid assumption without. fully assessing an u~usual situation.
To support troubleshooting No. 14 S/G steamline steam flow channel II, the transmitter sensing lines were to be isolated. The high side sensing line was isolated £irst by closing its root valve. The line was then vented; no' difficulties were ~ncountered. When the low side sensing line root valve (14MS5) was closed (see schematic below), the line would not stop venting. The supervisor, thinking that he had closed the wrong valve, reopined the 14MS5 root valve and closed a.
different root valve (14MS4). When this occurred, the Control Room received indication of the Channel I high failure. The 14MS4 valve isolates a Channel I trans~itter sensing lirte.
Upon notification (from the Operations Shift) of the isolation of the Channel I sensing line, the supervisor had the 14MS4 valve reopened and the 14MS5 valve reclosed. The Channel II sensing line was then successfully vepted.
It should be noted that, prior to closing the low side. sensing line valve, the supervisor did have a technician review the schematic to determine which valves were to be closed. This information was relayed (via telecon) to the supervisor.. The correct valves were identified; however, when the low side sensing line would not stop venting, the supervisor incorrectly assumed that either the schematic was not read correctly, the valves were mislabled or the schematic was 14MS4 14MSS Flow Flow Transmitter Channel I )( Transmitter Channel II 14MS2 14MS3 No. 14 S/G
......,
LICENSEE EVENT*REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating* S.tation DOCKET- NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE
_U_n~i~t'----"1~*~~~~~--~~~~~~~-5000_27~2~~~~~9_1_-003-01 4 of 4 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
incorrect. The supervisor did not consider that the correct valve was closed but ~as leaking by (due to it not being closed tight enough) .
Main Steam steamline flow inputs t6 S/G Feed Pump speed and water
- level control. In addition, .steamline flow signals are used as input to steamline isolation, safety. injection (SI), and steam flow/f~ed flow mismatch. Steam flow/feed flow mismatch when coupled with "Low S/G Level" will initiate a reactor t-rip signal.
When the No. 14 Steam Geneiator (S/G) steamline steam flow channel II failed, its associate~ bistables were placed in the tripped condition in accordance with Technical Spec~fication Action S~atement requirements*. This action placed the plant in a conservative condition with regard to applicable Reactor Trip/ESF Solid State Pro~ection System (SSPS) actuating signals. To initiate an SSPS actuating signal, only one (1) of two (2) steam flow channels in a loop must respond to an abnormal condition. With the No. 14 loop Channel II bistable in the tripped position, an SSPS actuating signal would have initiated despite the No. 14 ioop Channel I being made inoperable by closure of its root valve. Therefore, this event did not affect the health or safety of the public. However, since Technical Specification Action Statement 3.0.3 ~as entered this event*
is reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in accordance with Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B).
Technical Specification Action Statement 3.0.3 was exited approximately one (1) minute after entry upon restoration of sensing line flow.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
This event. has been reviewed by Maintenance Department management.
Appropriate corrective disciplinary action was taken with the supervisor involved in this event. The need to fully assess (i.e.,
understand) and discuss unusual situations prior to taking action and to not manipulate plant components without appropriate documentation review was discussed with the supervisor involved.
Th~s event has been reviewed with appiicable Maintenance Department personnel. The need to communicate unusual situations (as they arise) with other appropriate personnel, prior to manipulating components, was stressed.
rot?~-* -fYr~~
General Manager -{,/ -
Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mtg. 91-108}}