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| Public*Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit AUG 18 1996 LR-N96246 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen: | | * Public*Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit AUG 18 1996 LR-N96246 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen: |
| LER 272/96-016-00 SALEM GENERATING STATION -UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 This Licensee Event Report entitled "Missed Surveillance for RHR Pump Dynamic Head Prior To Entering Mode 4" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50. 73 (a) (2) (i) (B) . Attachment SORC Mtg. 96-109 JMO/tcp C Distribution LER File 3.7 9608260103 960818 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR Th: pc!\\ er is in \DUr hands. | | LER 272/96-016-00 SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 This Licensee Event Report entitled "Missed Surveillance for RHR Pump Dynamic Head Prior To Entering Mode 4" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50. 73 (a) (2) (i) (B) . |
| David F. Garchow General Manager -Salem Operations
| | ([QlF~~ |
| _/_-£* ,,.,,,..7 1/ --/.a<. I 95-2168 REV. 6/94 | | David F. Garchow General Manager - |
| * Document Control Desk LR-N96246 Attachment A The following represents the commitments that Public Service Electric & Gas (PSE&G) made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) relative to this LER (272/96-016-00). | | Salem Operations Attachment SORC Mtg. 96-109 JMO/tcp C Distribution LER File 3.7 9608260103 960818 PDR ADOCK 05000272 _/_-£* , ., ,. 7 1/ |
| The commitments are as follows: 1. A review will be conducted to evaluate the generic implications of this event for past reportability. | | - - /.a<. I S PDR Th: pc!\\ er is in \DUr hands. |
| This review will be completed prior to restart of Unit 2. 2. Mode transition procedural controls will be evaluated and improved as necessary to ensure that the higher Mode acceptance criteria are used to verify the acceptability of making a Mode transition. | | 95-2168 REV. 6/94 |
| The review will be completed prior to Mode 4. Any necessary procedure changes will be completed prior to the respective Mode transition. | | * Document Control Desk LR-N96246 Attachment A The following represents the commitments that Public Service Electric |
| | & Gas (PSE&G) made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) relative to this LER (272/96-016-00). The commitments are as follows: |
| | : 1. A review will be conducted to evaluate the generic implications of this event for past reportability. This review will be completed prior to restart of Unit 2. |
| | : 2. Mode transition procedural controls will be evaluated and improved as necessary to ensure that the higher Mode acceptance criteria are used to verify the acceptability of making a Mode transition. The review will be completed prior to Mode 4. Any necessary procedure changes will be completed prior to the respective Mode transition. |
| : 3. A Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Project (TSSIP) has been initiated for Salem Units 1 and 2. The scope and content of the TSSIP program was described previously in LER 311/95-008-00. | | : 3. A Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Project (TSSIP) has been initiated for Salem Units 1 and 2. The scope and content of the TSSIP program was described previously in LER 311/95-008-00. |
| The TSSIP review is expected to be completed December 31, 1997. | | The TSSIP review is expected to be completed December 31, 1997. |
| NRC FORM 366 (4*95) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 04/30/98 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TD CDMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTD THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. | | |
| FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TD THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH lT*6 F33J, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTDN, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150*0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTDN. | | NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (4*95) EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TD CDMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTD THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) BURDEN ESTIMATE TD THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH lT*6 F33J, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTDN, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150*0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, (See reverse for required number of WASHINGTDN. DC 20503. |
| DC 20503. FACILITY IAME (11 (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) DOCKET IUMBER (2) PAGE 131 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 1 OF 3 TITLE (41 Missed Surveillance for RHR Pump Dynamic Head Prior To Entering Mode 4 EVENT DA TE (5) MONTH DAY YEAR 07 19 96 OPERATING N MODE(9) POWER 000 LEVEL (10) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I NUMBER 96 016 REVISION NUMBER 00 MOITH 08 FACILITY NAME DAY YEAR Salem, Unit 2 18 96 FACILITY NAME THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
| | digits/characters for each block) |
| X 50.73(a)(2)fl) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | FACILITY IAME (11 DOCKET IUMBER (2) PAGE 131 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 1 OF 3 TITLE (41 Missed Surveillance for RHR Pump Dynamic Head Prior To Entering Mode 4 EVENT DA TE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) |
| DOCKET NUMBER 05000311 DOCKET IUMBER 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71 below or in LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) NAME TELEPHOIE NUMBER (lnclud1 Ar11 Codi) Dennis V. Hassler, LER Coordinator 609-339-1989 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (131 lf---CA-U-SE--+--S-YS-T-EM--+--C-DM-P-Dl-EIT---t--MA-1-U-FA-CT-UR_E_ft SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) 'YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATEJ. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (151 MONTH DAY YEAR On July 19, 1996, while reviewing RHR pump testing acceptance criteria, a procedure writer noted that the surveillance procedure wording did not ensure that total dynamic head requirements were met when transitioning from Mode 5 to Mode 4. A root cause investigation confirmed that Units 1 and 2 had transitioned from Mode 5 to Mode 4 without verifying that the pump total dynamic head requirement of Technical Specification 4.5.2.f.3 had been met, as required by Technical Specification 4.0.4. Since 1990, Salem Units 1 and 2 have made numerous Mode changes from Mode 5 to Mode 4. The cause of this occurrence was determined to be inadequate procedural controls for verification of Mode change requirements.
| | MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER MOITH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME Salem, Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 05000311 FACILITY NAME DOCKET IUMBER 07 19 96 96 016 00 08 18 96 OPERATING N THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11) |
| | MODE(9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) X 50.73(a)(2)fl) 50.73(a)(2)(viii) |
| | POWER 000 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) |
| | LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 114 1 |
| | -:11----1-~--:....,:~"'~"'::,..,.::.,..::..,..~:--::~--::-----+----t-:-::-~:-~-::-!:----------t--+-:-~:--~~--::....,::=~:,.,.::..,..::-1 --------t;-.,~,....~~~c~*~~;;~X8ct below or in LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) |
| | NAME TELEPHOIE NUMBER (lnclud1 Ar11 Codi) |
| | Dennis V. Hassler, LER Coordinator 609-339-1989 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (131 lf---CA-U-SE--+--S-YS-T-EM--+--C-DM-P-Dl-EIT---t--MA-1-U-FA-CT-UR_E_ft-+-R-i~_O.-R:_:~-~E---f:lof---CA-US-E--+--SY-ST_E_M-+--C-OMP-0-IE-IT-+--MA-IU-FA-C-TU-RE-R-t---R-i~-DN-R:_:~-~E--ll SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATEJ. DATE (151 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) |
| | ' |
| | On July 19, 1996, while reviewing RHR pump testing acceptance criteria, a procedure writer noted that the surveillance procedure wording did not ensure that total dynamic head requirements were met when transitioning from Mode 5 to Mode 4. A root cause investigation confirmed that Units 1 and 2 had transitioned from Mode 5 to Mode 4 without verifying that the pump total dynamic head requirement of Technical Specification 4.5.2.f.3 had been met, as required by Technical Specification 4.0.4. Since 1990, Salem Units 1 and 2 have made numerous Mode changes from Mode 5 to Mode 4. |
| | The cause of this occurrence was determined to be inadequate procedural controls for verification of Mode change requirements. |
| This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. | | This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. |
| NRC FORM 366 (4*95) | | NRC FORM 366 (4*95) |
| * NRC FORM J&&A (4*95) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (JJ SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 YEAR I SEOUEITIAL l REVISIOI IUMBEI llUllllEll 2 96 -016 -00 TEXT Pf more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form J&&AJ ( 17 J PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse
| | |
| -Pressurized Water Reactor Residual Heat Removal Pump {BP/P}* | | NRC FORM J&&A (4*95) |
| * Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC} CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE OF At the time of identification, Salem Units 1 and 2 were shutdown and defueled. | | * LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE 3 On July 19, 1996, while reviewing RHR pump testing acceptance criteria, a procedure writer noted that the surveillance procedure wording did not ensure that total dynamic head requirements were met when from Mode 5 to Mode 4. A root cause investigation confirmed that Units 1 and 2 had transitioned from Mode 5 to Mode 4 without verifying that the pump total dynamic head requirement of Technical Specification 4.5.2.f.3 had been met, as required by Technical Specification 4.0.4. Since 1990, Salem Units 1 and 2 have made numerous Mode changes from Mode 5 to Mode 4. The Residual Heat Removal pump in-service surveillance test procedures were written to capture test data for Modes 1 through 4 or Modes 5 and 6. In Modes 5 and 6, full flow test data was collected, but total dynamic head was not evaluated against the Technical Specification requirement since the requirement was not applicable in Modes 5 and 6. The integrated operating procedure (IOP) for transition from Mode 5 to Mode 4 required satisfactory completion of the RHR surveillance test, but did not specify the use of Mode 4 acceptance criteria. | | TEXT CONTINUATION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (JJ 05000272 YEAR I SEOUEITIAL IUMBEI l REVISIOI llUllllEll 2 OF 3 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 96 - 016 - 00 TEXT Pf more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form J&&AJ (17 J PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Residual Heat Removal Pump {BP/P}* |
| Consequently, the completion of the test using Mode 5 and 6 criteria inappropriately satisfied the IOP requirements. | | * Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC} |
| In keeping with the 92 day test interval, subsequent RHR pump surveillances were run that demonstrated acceptability of total dynamic head. CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of this occurrence was determined tc be inadequate procedural controls for verification of Mode change requirements. | | CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE At the time of identification, Salem Units 1 and 2 were shutdown and defueled. |
| | DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On July 19, 1996, while reviewing RHR pump testing acceptance criteria, a procedure writer noted that the surveillance procedure wording did not ensure that total dynamic head requirements were met when transitionin~ from Mode 5 to Mode 4. A root cause investigation confirmed that Units 1 and 2 had transitioned from Mode 5 to Mode 4 without verifying that the pump total dynamic head requirement of Technical Specification 4.5.2.f.3 had been met, as required by Technical Specification 4.0.4. Since 1990, Salem Units 1 and 2 have made numerous Mode changes from Mode 5 to Mode 4. |
| | The Residual Heat Removal pump in-service surveillance test procedures were written to capture test data for Modes 1 through 4 or Modes 5 and 6. In Modes 5 and 6, full flow test data was collected, but total dynamic head was not evaluated against the Technical Specification requirement since the requirement was not applicable in Modes 5 and 6. The integrated operating procedure (IOP) for transition from Mode 5 to Mode 4 required satisfactory completion of the RHR surveillance test, but did not specify the use of Mode 4 acceptance criteria. |
| | Consequently, the completion of the test using Mode 5 and 6 criteria inappropriately satisfied the IOP requirements. In keeping with the 92 day test interval, subsequent RHR pump surveillances were run that demonstrated acceptability of total dynamic head. |
| | CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of this occurrence was determined tc be inadequate procedural controls for verification of Mode change requirements. |
| NRC FORM 366A (4-95) | | NRC FORM 366A (4-95) |
| * NRC f,ORM 366A (4*95) FACILITY NAME (1) | | * NRC f,ORM 366A (4*95) |
| * LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LEH) TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER (21 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC form 366AI (17) PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LER NUMBER 161 PAGE (3) YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUl\tlER 3 OF 3 96 -016 -00 A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2 over the last two years identified six LERs (272/94-008, 272/95-004, 272/95-019, 272/95-028, 311/95-006, and 311/95-008) that were a result of missed surveillances due to inadequate implementation of Technical Specification requirements. | | * LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LEH) |
| The corrective actions were specific to the missed surveillance issues addressed in each LER. The identification of these programmatic issues resulted in the initiation of the Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Program (TSSIP) described in LER 311/95-008. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE | | TEXT CONTINUATION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (21 LER NUMBER 161 PAGE (3) 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUl\tlER 3 OF 3 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 96 - 016 - 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC form 366AI (17) |
| & IMPLICATIONS The testing that was performed in 5 and 6, prior to transition to Mode 4, was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program, at full flow conditions, and provided reasonable assurance that the RHR pumps were operable. | | PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2 over the last two years identified six LERs (272/94-008, 272/95-004, 272/95-019, 272/95-028, 311/95-006, and 311/95-008) that were a result of missed surveillances due to inadequate implementation of Technical Specification requirements. The corrective actions were specific to the missed surveillance issues addressed in each LER. The identification of these programmatic issues resulted in the initiation of the Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Program (TSSIP) described in LER 311/95-008. |
| The RHR pumps were subsequently tested on a quarterly basis as required by the Mode 1 through 4 requirements. | | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE & IMPLICATIONS The testing that was performed in Mode~ 5 and 6, prior to transition to Mode 4, was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program, at full flow conditions, and provided reasonable assurance that the RHR pumps were operable. The RHR pumps were subsequently tested on a quarterly basis as required by the Mode 1 through 4 requirements. A selected search of historical records did not identify any instances where a pump tested in Modes 5 or 6 subsequently failed a test in Modes 1 through 4. Thus, there was no safety significance to the missed surveillance and the health and safety of the public remained unaffected. |
| A selected search of historical records did not identify any instances where a pump tested in Modes 5 or 6 subsequently failed a test in Modes 1 through 4. Thus, there was no safety significance to the missed surveillance and the health and safety of the public remained unaffected. | | CORRECTIVE ACTION |
| CORRECTIVE ACTION 1. A review will be conducted to ev:'.luate the generic implications of this event for past reportability. | | : 1. A review will be conducted to ev:'.luate the generic implications of this event for past reportability. This review will be completed prior to restart of Unit 2. |
| This review will be completed prior to restart of Unit 2. 2. Mode transition procedural controls will be evaluated and improved as necessary to ensure that the higher Mode acceptance criteria are used to verify the acceptability of making a Mode transition. | | : 2. Mode transition procedural controls will be evaluated and improved as necessary to ensure that the higher Mode acceptance criteria are used to verify the acceptability of making a Mode transition. The review will be completed prior to Mode 6. Any necessary procedure changes will be completed prior to the respective Mode transition. |
| The review will be completed prior to Mode 6. Any necessary procedure changes will be completed prior to the respective Mode transition. | | : 3. A Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Project (TSSIP) has been initiated for Salem Units 1 and 2. The scope and content of the TSSIP program was described previously in LER 311/95-008-00. The TSSIP review is expected to be completed December 31, 1997. |
| : 3. A Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Project (TSSIP) has been initiated for Salem Units 1 and 2. The scope and content of the TSSIP program was described previously in LER 311/95-008-00. | | NRC FORM 366A (4-95)}} |
| The TSSIP review is expected to be completed December 31, 1997. NRC FORM 366A (4-95)}} | |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
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Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998 LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998 LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998 LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998 LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998 Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998 Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998 LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998 LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998 LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998 LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998 Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998 Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML18107A5581999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5571999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5301999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990913 Ltr ML18107A5311999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990913 ML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A5201999-08-12012 August 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#9) Second Interval,Second Period, First Outage (96RF). ML18107A4811999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4821999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A5211999-07-0101 July 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#10) Second Interval,Second Period,Second Outage (99RF). ML18107A4351999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990713 Ltr ML18107A4341999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990713 Ltr ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3441999-06-0101 June 1999 Interim Part 21 Rept Re Premature Over Voltage Protection Actuation in Circuit Specific Application in Dc Power Supply.Testing & Evaluation Activities Will Be Completed on 990716 ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A3681999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A3721999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A3711999-04-30030 April 1999 Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1 ML18107A3151999-04-30030 April 1999 Submittal-Only Screening Review of Salem Generating Station Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion), Rev 1 ML18107A2991999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2971999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18107A2881999-04-0707 April 1999 Rev 0 to NFS-0174, COLR for Salem Unit 2 Cycle 11. ML18107A1821999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990414 Ltr ML18107A1831999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990414 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B1021999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B1011999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B0931999-02-25025 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack Due to Improper Location of Heated Bar.Only One Part Out of 7396 Pieces in Forging Lot Was Found to Be Cracked.Affected Util,Notified ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0551999-02-0101 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Matl Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Defect Is Crack in Center of Forging.Analysis of Part Is Continuing & Further Details Will Be Provided IAW Ncr Timetables.Drawing of Part,Encl ML18106B0561999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990212 Ltr ML18106B0571999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990212 Ltr ML20205P1671999-01-31031 January 1999 a POST-PLUME Phase, Federal Participation Exercise ML18106B0441999-01-29029 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack in Center of Forging. Continuing Analysis of Part & Will Provide Details in Acoordance with NRC Timetables ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0251998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Salem Unit 2.With 990115 Ltr 1999-09-30
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Text
OPS~G
- Public*Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit AUG 18 1996 LR-N96246 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
LER 272/96-016-00 SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 This Licensee Event Report entitled "Missed Surveillance for RHR Pump Dynamic Head Prior To Entering Mode 4" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50. 73 (a) (2) (i) (B) .
([QlF~~
David F. Garchow General Manager -
Salem Operations Attachment SORC Mtg.96-109 JMO/tcp C Distribution LER File 3.7 9608260103 960818 PDR ADOCK 05000272 _/_-£* , ., ,. 7 1/
- - /.a<. I S PDR Th: pc!\\ er is in \DUr hands.
95-2168 REV. 6/94
- Document Control Desk LR-N96246 Attachment A The following represents the commitments that Public Service Electric
& Gas (PSE&G) made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) relative to this LER (272/96-016-00). The commitments are as follows:
- 1. A review will be conducted to evaluate the generic implications of this event for past reportability. This review will be completed prior to restart of Unit 2.
- 2. Mode transition procedural controls will be evaluated and improved as necessary to ensure that the higher Mode acceptance criteria are used to verify the acceptability of making a Mode transition. The review will be completed prior to Mode 4. Any necessary procedure changes will be completed prior to the respective Mode transition.
- 3. A Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Project (TSSIP) has been initiated for Salem Units 1 and 2. The scope and content of the TSSIP program was described previously in LER 311/95-008-00.
The TSSIP review is expected to be completed December 31, 1997.
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (4*95) EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TD CDMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTD THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) BURDEN ESTIMATE TD THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH lT*6 F33J, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTDN, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150*0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, (See reverse for required number of WASHINGTDN. DC 20503.
digits/characters for each block)
FACILITY IAME (11 DOCKET IUMBER (2) PAGE 131 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 1 OF 3 TITLE (41 Missed Surveillance for RHR Pump Dynamic Head Prior To Entering Mode 4 EVENT DA TE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER MOITH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME Salem, Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 05000311 FACILITY NAME DOCKET IUMBER 07 19 96 96 016 00 08 18 96 OPERATING N THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)
MODE(9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) X 50.73(a)(2)fl) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER 000 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 114 1
-:11----1-~--:....,:~"'~"'::,..,.::.,..::..,..~:--::~--::-----+----t-:-::-~:-~-::-!:----------t--+-:-~:--~~--::....,::=~:,.,.::..,..::-1 --------t;-.,~,....~~~c~*~~;;~X8ct below or in LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHOIE NUMBER (lnclud1 Ar11 Codi)
Dennis V. Hassler, LER Coordinator 609-339-1989 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (131 lf---CA-U-SE--+--S-YS-T-EM--+--C-DM-P-Dl-EIT---t--MA-1-U-FA-CT-UR_E_ft-+-R-i~_O.-R:_:~-~E---f:lof---CA-US-E--+--SY-ST_E_M-+--C-OMP-0-IE-IT-+--MA-IU-FA-C-TU-RE-R-t---R-i~-DN-R:_:~-~E--ll SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATEJ. DATE (151 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
'
On July 19, 1996, while reviewing RHR pump testing acceptance criteria, a procedure writer noted that the surveillance procedure wording did not ensure that total dynamic head requirements were met when transitioning from Mode 5 to Mode 4. A root cause investigation confirmed that Units 1 and 2 had transitioned from Mode 5 to Mode 4 without verifying that the pump total dynamic head requirement of Technical Specification 4.5.2.f.3 had been met, as required by Technical Specification 4.0.4. Since 1990, Salem Units 1 and 2 have made numerous Mode changes from Mode 5 to Mode 4.
The cause of this occurrence was determined to be inadequate procedural controls for verification of Mode change requirements.
This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
NRC FORM 366 (4*95)
NRC FORM J&&A (4*95)
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (JJ 05000272 YEAR I SEOUEITIAL IUMBEI l REVISIOI llUllllEll 2 OF 3 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 96 - 016 - 00 TEXT Pf more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form J&&AJ (17 J PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Residual Heat Removal Pump {BP/P}*
- Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC}
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE At the time of identification, Salem Units 1 and 2 were shutdown and defueled.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On July 19, 1996, while reviewing RHR pump testing acceptance criteria, a procedure writer noted that the surveillance procedure wording did not ensure that total dynamic head requirements were met when transitionin~ from Mode 5 to Mode 4. A root cause investigation confirmed that Units 1 and 2 had transitioned from Mode 5 to Mode 4 without verifying that the pump total dynamic head requirement of Technical Specification 4.5.2.f.3 had been met, as required by Technical Specification 4.0.4. Since 1990, Salem Units 1 and 2 have made numerous Mode changes from Mode 5 to Mode 4.
The Residual Heat Removal pump in-service surveillance test procedures were written to capture test data for Modes 1 through 4 or Modes 5 and 6. In Modes 5 and 6, full flow test data was collected, but total dynamic head was not evaluated against the Technical Specification requirement since the requirement was not applicable in Modes 5 and 6. The integrated operating procedure (IOP) for transition from Mode 5 to Mode 4 required satisfactory completion of the RHR surveillance test, but did not specify the use of Mode 4 acceptance criteria.
Consequently, the completion of the test using Mode 5 and 6 criteria inappropriately satisfied the IOP requirements. In keeping with the 92 day test interval, subsequent RHR pump surveillances were run that demonstrated acceptability of total dynamic head.
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of this occurrence was determined tc be inadequate procedural controls for verification of Mode change requirements.
NRC FORM 366A (4-95)
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LEH)
TEXT CONTINUATION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (21 LER NUMBER 161 PAGE (3) 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUl\tlER 3 OF 3 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 96 - 016 - 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC form 366AI (17)
PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2 over the last two years identified six LERs (272/94-008, 272/95-004, 272/95-019, 272/95-028, 311/95-006, and 311/95-008) that were a result of missed surveillances due to inadequate implementation of Technical Specification requirements. The corrective actions were specific to the missed surveillance issues addressed in each LER. The identification of these programmatic issues resulted in the initiation of the Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Program (TSSIP) described in LER 311/95-008.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE & IMPLICATIONS The testing that was performed in Mode~ 5 and 6, prior to transition to Mode 4, was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program, at full flow conditions, and provided reasonable assurance that the RHR pumps were operable. The RHR pumps were subsequently tested on a quarterly basis as required by the Mode 1 through 4 requirements. A selected search of historical records did not identify any instances where a pump tested in Modes 5 or 6 subsequently failed a test in Modes 1 through 4. Thus, there was no safety significance to the missed surveillance and the health and safety of the public remained unaffected.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
- 1. A review will be conducted to ev:'.luate the generic implications of this event for past reportability. This review will be completed prior to restart of Unit 2.
- 2. Mode transition procedural controls will be evaluated and improved as necessary to ensure that the higher Mode acceptance criteria are used to verify the acceptability of making a Mode transition. The review will be completed prior to Mode 6. Any necessary procedure changes will be completed prior to the respective Mode transition.
- 3. A Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Project (TSSIP) has been initiated for Salem Units 1 and 2. The scope and content of the TSSIP program was described previously in LER 311/95-008-00. The TSSIP review is expected to be completed December 31, 1997.
NRC FORM 366A (4-95)