ML18110A676: Difference between revisions
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{{#Wiki_filter:NRC FORM 195 | {{#Wiki_filter:NRC FORM 195 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKET NUMBER I2-70) 50-335 FILE NUMBER NRC D'ISTRIBUTION FDR Pa T 50 DOCKET MATERIAL INCIDENT REPORT I | ||
PROP INPUT FORM NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED" 30 ENCLOSURE Reportable Occurrence k'6-1 Licensee Event Report on 3-3-76 Concerning the water level in the refueliyj cavity being below the top of the fuel transfer tube....... | F ioM: Flordia Power 8I Light Co. DATE OF DOCUMENT N.C. Moseley 4-2-76 Miami, Floddia A.D. Schmidt DATE RECEIVED 4-15-76 OI.ETTE R ONOTORIZED PROP INPUT FORM NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED OORIGINAL SUNCLASSIFIED " | ||
~ | @COPY 30 DESCRIPTION ENCLOSURE Reportable Occurrence k'6-1 Licensee Event Ltr. trans th'e following....... Report on 3-3-76 Concerning the water level in the refueliyj cavity being below the top of the fuel transfer tube....... | ||
y~~c&E Mr.Norman C.Moseley, Director, Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission 230 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 818 Atlanta,"Georgia 30303 | " | ||
~ | |||
(30 Cys. ReceivedI'No Original) | |||
ACKNOW/LEDGED DO NOT REMOVE PLANT NAME ~ St Luci e III ] NOTE: XF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS XNVOLVED SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J COLLINS SAFETY FOR ACTION/INFORMATION ENVIRO BRANCH CHIEF.: Ziemann W 3 CYS FOR ACTION LXC. ASST: DiaaS W/ CYS ACRS CYS ENT TO LA INTERNAL 0 IST R I BUTION NRC PDR 6cE 2 SCjIROEDER/IPPOLITO NOVAK CHECK | |||
.R IIES &N E TEDESCO MACCA BARR SHAO VOLLMER BUNG KRE E OL N EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION CONTROL NUMBER LPDR'XC 1 cep NSXC 3821 NRC FORM 10d (2-70I | |||
II I II 1 | |||
1 | |||
~ s ~ 'L | |||
~ 1~ | |||
I N | |||
P.O. BOX 3100 MIAMI, FLOIIIOA 33101 | |||
~ grill@ | |||
FLORIDA POWER 5 LIGHT COMPANY gHk ' | |||
p ll Aprj.l 2, 1976 g>sXS > | |||
PRN-LI-76-68 34egufatO~ ALIIS, I3 II,>> ~a~ | |||
y~~ c&E Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director, Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 230 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 818 Atlanta,"Georgia 30303 '5(S8,'~I~glA | |||
==Dear Mr Moseley:== | ==Dear Mr Moseley:== | ||
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-76-1 ST LUCIE UNIT 1 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: | gaS CO~~ ~(A REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-76-1 ST LUCIE UNIT 1 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: MARCH 3, 1976 BREACH OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted in ac-cordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30-day notification of the subject: occurrence. | ||
MARCH 3, 1976 BREACH OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY | Very truly yours, | ||
Very truly yours, ,~g.gd~~A.D.Schmidt Vice President Power, Resources MRS/jn Attachment cc: Jack R.Newman, Esctuire Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30)Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3)I LPIN<G BUILD FLORIDA 3 rP A'7 Jl'~C CONTROL BLOCK: 1 UCENSEE NAME[pg~]F L S L S 1 | , ~g.gd~ | ||
~ A. D. Schmidt Vice President Power, Resources MRS/jn Attachment cc: Jack R. Newman, Esctuire Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30) | |||
[op/The exact cause of the occurrence has not been determined. | Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3) | ||
However, | I LPIN<G BUILD FLORIDA | ||
~s~oo o~z 7 8 9 11 | |||
~4 Loaoo J 7 8 9, 11 12 | 3 rP A'7 Jl'~ | ||
7 8 9 7 89 M.A.Schopoman PHONE 305/552-3779 | C | ||
The immediate corrective action was to suspend core loading'nd restore the water level in the refueling cavity.Additional: | |||
corrective action was to establish more frequent surveillance of the water level in the refueling cavity.This was the first occurrence of this type (335-76-1) | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: (P E PAINT ALL REQUIRED INFDAIVIATION) 1 6 UCENSEE LCENSE EVENT NAME TYPE TYPE | ||
[pg~] F L S L S 1 4 1 1 1 1 ~03 | |||
Second, an'ncorrect valve lineup may have caused a'gradual decrease in water level.However, since it was necessary to change the | ~ | ||
7 89 14 15 25 26 30 31 32 REPORT REPORT REPORT OATE CATEGORY .TYPE SOURCE OOCICET NUMBER EVENT OATE L 0 5 0 0 3 3 5 0 3 0 3 7 6 0 4 0 2 7 6 | |||
[001] coN'T ~L 7 8 57 58 59 60 61 68 69 74 75 80 EVENT OESCRIPTION Qo 2 During initial core loading, the water level in the refueling cavity was 7 8 9 ' 80 | |||
[Jpg~] | |||
found to be approximately ~ | |||
2 inches | |||
~ | |||
below the top of the fuel transfer 7 89 80 tube. This was in conflict with the intent of Technical Specification 7 8 9 80 Qp5 3. 9. 4 which requires that, during refueling operations, there be no 7 89;* 80 fgg~] direct access from containment to the outside atmosphere which is 7 8 9 PRME 80 a'0 SYSTEM CAUSE COMPONENT COMPONENT s | |||
* COOE COOE COMPONENT COOS SUPPLER MANUFACTURER VQtATION Qpjp ~FC ~F Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z 9 9 9 N 7 8 9 10 11 12 17 43 44 47 48 CAUSE OESCRIPTION | |||
[op/ The exact cause of the occurrence has not been determined. However, 7 8,9 80 Qos the water lost from the refueling cavity was traced to tanks in the 7 8 9 80 Qs o] E ui ment and Chemical Drain System and further investigation identified 7 89 80 | |||
'2 FA CIVVY METHOD OF STATUS 36 POWER OTHER STATUS OISCOVERY OISCOVERY OESCRIPTION s ~oo o NA o erator 7 8 9 10 13 44 45 46 FORM OF ACTIVffY COATENT | |||
...RELEASEO OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTNITY LOCATION OF RELEASE NA | |||
$8 7 | |||
12 9 | |||
Z - | |||
~Z 10 '11 | |||
. NA 44 45 80 PERSONNFL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE - | |||
OESCRIPTION | |||
~s ~oo o | |||
'2~z NA 80 7 8 9 11 13 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER OESCILPTION | |||
~4 Loaoo J NA 80 7 8 9 , 11 12 PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES NA 7 8 9 80 LOSS OR OAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE OESCRIPTION t116 Z NA 7 89 10 80 PUBLICITY NA 7 8 9 ~ 80 AOOITIONAL FACTORS Q1 g See a e two for continuation of Event and Cause descriptions. | |||
7 8 9 7 89 80 M. A. Schopoman PHONE 305/552-3779 QPO CSI i CCT | |||
Occurrence 335-76-1 V'eportable Licensee Event Report Page Two Event Descri tion (continued) incapable of automatic isolation. The immediate corrective action was to suspend core loading'nd restore the water level in the refueling cavity. Additional: corrective action was to establish more frequent surveillance of the water level in the refueling cavity. This was the first occurrence of this type (335-76-1) . | |||
Cause Descri tion (continued) two probable causes of the water transfer. First, the refueling cavity water level may have been lowered during, electrical checkout of the refueling canal sump pump motor. The sump pump was being tested concurrent with core loading and too much water may have been pumped from the refueling cavity to the Equipment and Chemical Drain System. Followup action was to place a clearance tag on the sump pump which prohibited use of the pump unless authorized by the Nuclear Plant Supervisor. Second, an | |||
'ncorrect valve lineup may have caused a 'gradual decrease in water level. However, since position of certain valves in it was necessary to change the order to restore the refueling cavity water level, .it was not possible the'occurrence. | |||
to verify that a valve Followup action after lineup error had caused restoring water level was to confirm that all valve lineups which could affect refueling cavity water level were correct for the operating condition then in effect. | |||
k}} |
Revision as of 07:20, 21 October 2019
ML18110A676 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Saint Lucie |
Issue date: | 04/02/1976 |
From: | Schmidt A Florida Power & Light Co |
To: | Moseley N NRC/IE, NRC/RGN-II |
References | |
PRN-LI-76-68 LER 1976-001-00 | |
Download: ML18110A676 (6) | |
Text
NRC FORM 195 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKET NUMBER I2-70) 50-335 FILE NUMBER NRC D'ISTRIBUTION FDR Pa T 50 DOCKET MATERIAL INCIDENT REPORT I
F ioM: Flordia Power 8I Light Co. DATE OF DOCUMENT N.C. Moseley 4-2-76 Miami, Floddia A.D. Schmidt DATE RECEIVED 4-15-76 OI.ETTE R ONOTORIZED PROP INPUT FORM NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED OORIGINAL SUNCLASSIFIED "
@COPY 30 DESCRIPTION ENCLOSURE Reportable Occurrence k'6-1 Licensee Event Ltr. trans th'e following....... Report on 3-3-76 Concerning the water level in the refueliyj cavity being below the top of the fuel transfer tube.......
"
~
(30 Cys. ReceivedI'No Original)
ACKNOW/LEDGED DO NOT REMOVE PLANT NAME ~ St Luci e III ] NOTE: XF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS XNVOLVED SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J COLLINS SAFETY FOR ACTION/INFORMATION ENVIRO BRANCH CHIEF.: Ziemann W 3 CYS FOR ACTION LXC. ASST: DiaaS W/ CYS ACRS CYS ENT TO LA INTERNAL 0 IST R I BUTION NRC PDR 6cE 2 SCjIROEDER/IPPOLITO NOVAK CHECK
.R IIES &N E TEDESCO MACCA BARR SHAO VOLLMER BUNG KRE E OL N EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION CONTROL NUMBER LPDR'XC 1 cep NSXC 3821 NRC FORM 10d (2-70I
II I II 1
1
~ s ~ 'L
~ 1~
I N
P.O. BOX 3100 MIAMI, FLOIIIOA 33101
~ grill@
FLORIDA POWER 5 LIGHT COMPANY gHk '
p ll Aprj.l 2, 1976 g>sXS >
PRN-LI-76-68 34egufatO~ ALIIS, I3 II,>> ~a~
y~~ c&E Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director, Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 230 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 818 Atlanta,"Georgia 30303 '5(S8,'~I~glA
Dear Mr Moseley:
gaS CO~~ ~(A REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-76-1 ST LUCIE UNIT 1 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: MARCH 3, 1976 BREACH OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted in ac-cordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30-day notification of the subject: occurrence.
Very truly yours,
, ~g.gd~
~ A. D. Schmidt Vice President Power, Resources MRS/jn Attachment cc: Jack R. Newman, Esctuire Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30)
Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3)
I LPIN<G BUILD FLORIDA
3 rP A'7 Jl'~
C
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: (P E PAINT ALL REQUIRED INFDAIVIATION) 1 6 UCENSEE LCENSE EVENT NAME TYPE TYPE
[pg~] F L S L S 1 4 1 1 1 1 ~03
~
7 89 14 15 25 26 30 31 32 REPORT REPORT REPORT OATE CATEGORY .TYPE SOURCE OOCICET NUMBER EVENT OATE L 0 5 0 0 3 3 5 0 3 0 3 7 6 0 4 0 2 7 6
[001] coN'T ~L 7 8 57 58 59 60 61 68 69 74 75 80 EVENT OESCRIPTION Qo 2 During initial core loading, the water level in the refueling cavity was 7 8 9 ' 80
[Jpg~]
found to be approximately ~
2 inches
~
below the top of the fuel transfer 7 89 80 tube. This was in conflict with the intent of Technical Specification 7 8 9 80 Qp5 3. 9. 4 which requires that, during refueling operations, there be no 7 89;* 80 fgg~] direct access from containment to the outside atmosphere which is 7 8 9 PRME 80 a'0 SYSTEM CAUSE COMPONENT COMPONENT s
- COOE COOE COMPONENT COOS SUPPLER MANUFACTURER VQtATION Qpjp ~FC ~F Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z 9 9 9 N 7 8 9 10 11 12 17 43 44 47 48 CAUSE OESCRIPTION
[op/ The exact cause of the occurrence has not been determined. However, 7 8,9 80 Qos the water lost from the refueling cavity was traced to tanks in the 7 8 9 80 Qs o] E ui ment and Chemical Drain System and further investigation identified 7 89 80
'2 FA CIVVY METHOD OF STATUS 36 POWER OTHER STATUS OISCOVERY OISCOVERY OESCRIPTION s ~oo o NA o erator 7 8 9 10 13 44 45 46 FORM OF ACTIVffY COATENT
...RELEASEO OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTNITY LOCATION OF RELEASE NA
$8 7
12 9
Z -
~Z 10 '11
. NA 44 45 80 PERSONNFL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE -
OESCRIPTION
~s ~oo o
'2~z NA 80 7 8 9 11 13 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER OESCILPTION
~4 Loaoo J NA 80 7 8 9 , 11 12 PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES NA 7 8 9 80 LOSS OR OAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE OESCRIPTION t116 Z NA 7 89 10 80 PUBLICITY NA 7 8 9 ~ 80 AOOITIONAL FACTORS Q1 g See a e two for continuation of Event and Cause descriptions.
7 8 9 7 89 80 M. A. Schopoman PHONE 305/552-3779 QPO CSI i CCT
Occurrence 335-76-1 V'eportable Licensee Event Report Page Two Event Descri tion (continued) incapable of automatic isolation. The immediate corrective action was to suspend core loading'nd restore the water level in the refueling cavity. Additional: corrective action was to establish more frequent surveillance of the water level in the refueling cavity. This was the first occurrence of this type (335-76-1) .
Cause Descri tion (continued) two probable causes of the water transfer. First, the refueling cavity water level may have been lowered during, electrical checkout of the refueling canal sump pump motor. The sump pump was being tested concurrent with core loading and too much water may have been pumped from the refueling cavity to the Equipment and Chemical Drain System. Followup action was to place a clearance tag on the sump pump which prohibited use of the pump unless authorized by the Nuclear Plant Supervisor. Second, an
'ncorrect valve lineup may have caused a 'gradual decrease in water level. However, since position of certain valves in it was necessary to change the order to restore the refueling cavity water level, .it was not possible the'occurrence.
to verify that a valve Followup action after lineup error had caused restoring water level was to confirm that all valve lineups which could affect refueling cavity water level were correct for the operating condition then in effect.
k