05000282/FIN-2013004-02: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.12 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.12 | ||
| Inspector = K Riemer, D Szwarc, B Palagi, M Phalen, R Baker, K Stoedter, M Speck, K Barclay, P Laflamme, E Sanchez | | Inspector = K Riemer, D Szwarc, B Palagi, M Phalen, R Baker, K Stoedter, M Speck, K Barclay, P Laflamme, E Sanchez-Santiago, J Beavers, M Ziolkowski, T Daun | ||
| CCA = H.5 | | CCA = H.5 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.1 | | INPO aspect = WP.1 | ||
| description = A self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings was identified on July 24, 2013, for the failure to have documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances when performing maintenance on the 2R-49 Unit 2 Containment High Range Area Monitor power supply. Specifically, the #13 reactor protection instrument inverter was rendered inoperable when two terminals were shorted during the power supply replacement. Corrective actions for this issue included returning the #13 instrument inverter to an operable status and providing additional supervisory involvement to ensure all maintenance personnel were made aware of expectations for ensuring that energized leads were appropriately identified, that adequate barriers were established to prevent inadvertent contact with energized leads, and ensuring that access to leads to be lifted were adequate for safe manipulation. This issue was more than minor because it was associated with the design control, configuration control and procedure quality attributes of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors determined that this issue was of very low safety significance because each question provided in IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, was answered no. This issue was cross cutting in the Human Performance, Work Control area because the licensee failed to appropriately plan work activities by incorporating job site conditions which may impact human performance; plant structures, systems, and components; human- system interface; or include the need for planned compensatory actions (H.3(a)). | | description = A self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings was identified on July 24, 2013, for the failure to have documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances when performing maintenance on the 2R-49 Unit 2 Containment High Range Area Monitor power supply. Specifically, the #13 reactor protection instrument inverter was rendered inoperable when two terminals were shorted during the power supply replacement. Corrective actions for this issue included returning the #13 instrument inverter to an operable status and providing additional supervisory involvement to ensure all maintenance personnel were made aware of expectations for ensuring that energized leads were appropriately identified, that adequate barriers were established to prevent inadvertent contact with energized leads, and ensuring that access to leads to be lifted were adequate for safe manipulation. This issue was more than minor because it was associated with the design control, configuration control and procedure quality attributes of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors determined that this issue was of very low safety significance because each question provided in IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, was answered no. This issue was cross cutting in the Human Performance, Work Control area because the licensee failed to appropriately plan work activities by incorporating job site conditions which may impact human performance; plant structures, systems, and components; human- system interface; or include the need for planned compensatory actions (H.3(a)). | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:49, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000282/2013004 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | K Riemer D Szwarc B Palagi M Phalen R Baker K Stoedter M Speck K Barclay P Laflamme E Sanchez-Santiago J Beavers M Ziolkowski T Daun |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
| ' | |