IR 05000354/2025010: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
← Older edit
VisualWikitext
StriderTol Bot change
StriderTol Bot change
 
(One intermediate revision by the same user not shown)
Line 85: Line 85:
Division of Operating Reactor Safety  
Division of Operating Reactor Safety  


SUMMARY  
=SUMMARY=
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Hope Creek Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.


The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees
===List of Findings and Violations===
performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Hope
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Creek Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor
Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial
nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more
information.  


List of Findings and Violations
===Additional Tracking Items===
None.


No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
=INSPECTION SCOPES=


Additional Tracking Items
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.


None.  
==OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE==
===71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)===
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71152|count=1}}
: (1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees problem identification and resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety-conscious work environment.
* Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees problem identification and resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a five-year review of the Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system. The corrective actions for the following non-cited violations (NCVs) and findings were evaluated as part of the assessment: NCV 05000354/2023003-02, 05000354/2023402-01, 05000354/2024003-02, 05000354/2024003-01, and 05000354/2024010-02.
* Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience.
* Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.
* Safety-Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.


INSPECTION SCOPES
==INSPECTION RESULTS==
Assessment 71152B Problem Identification and Resolution Program Effectiveness:


Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
The inspectors determined that PSEGs problem identification and resolution program for Hope Creek was generally effective and adequately supported nuclear safety and security.
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met
consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection
Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,
observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance
with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.  


OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
Identification: The team reviewed a sample of issues that have been processed through PSEGs problem identification and resolution program since the last biennial team inspection, including NCVs of regulatory requirements and other documented findings. The team determined that, based on the samples selected, PSEG identified issues and entered them into the corrective action program.


71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution
Prioritization and Evaluation: Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined PSEG was generally effective at prioritizing and evaluating issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. Inspectors observed that at station corrective action program meetings, issues were generally screened and prioritized at the appropriate level and that corrective actions were assigned to address the issues. However, the inspectors identified a minor performance deficiency when PSEG failed to comply with a self-imposed standard regarding procedure use and adherence. Additionally, the inspectors identified two observations related to timely corrective actions and documentation of various issues with HPCI system parameters. Both the minor performance deficiency and two observations are documented below.


Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
Corrective Action: The team reviewed a sample of corrective actions and concluded that PSEG was marginally effective in developing corrective actions that were focused on correcting the identified problems.


(1)
Assessment 71152B Operating Experience:  
The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees
problem identification and resolution program, use of operating experience, self-
assessments and audits, and safety-conscious work environment.
* Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed
the effectiveness of the licensees problem identification and resolution
program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The
inspectors also conducted a five-year review of the Unit 1 high pressure
coolant injection (HPCI) system. The corrective actions for the following non-
cited violations (NCVs) and findings were evaluated as part of the
assessment: NCV 05000354/2023003-02, 05000354/2023402-01,
05000354/2024003-02, 05000354/2024003-01, and 05000354/2024010-02.
* Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the
licensees processes for use of operating experience.
* Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of
the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through
audits and self-assessments.
* Safety-Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the
effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-
conscious work environment.


INSPECTION RESULTS
The inspectors reviewed a sample of operating experience captured in the corrective action program and sampled operating experience from NRC, industry, vendors, and third-party groups. Overall, for the samples selected, PSEG was generally performing the appropriate assessments for station applicability.


Assessment
Assessment 71152B Self-Assessments and Audits:  
71152B
Problem Identification and Resolution Program Effectiveness:  
 
The inspectors determined that PSEGs problem identification and resolution program for
Hope Creek was generally effective and adequately supported nuclear safety and security.


Identification: The team reviewed a sample of issues that have been processed through
The inspectors determined that PSEG was adequately performing self-assessments and audits in accordance with licensee procedures and implementing corrective actions as needed.
PSEGs problem identification and resolution program since the last biennial team inspection,
including NCVs of regulatory requirements and other documented findings. The team
determined that, based on the samples selected, PSEG identified issues and entered them
into the corrective action program.  


Prioritization and Evaluation: Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined PSEG
Assessment 71152B Safety-Conscious Work Environment:  
was generally effective at prioritizing and evaluating issues commensurate with the safety
significance of the identified problem. Inspectors observed that at station corrective action
program meetings, issues were generally screened and prioritized at the appropriate level
and that corrective actions were assigned to address the issues. However, the inspectors
identified a minor performance deficiency when PSEG failed to comply with a self-imposed
standard regarding procedure use and adherence. Additionally, the inspectors identified two
observations related to timely corrective actions and documentation of various issues with
HPCI system parameters. Both the minor performance deficiency and two observations are
documented below.


Corrective Action: The team reviewed a sample of corrective actions and concluded that
The team interviewed a total of 33 individuals in informal one-on-one discussions. The purpose of these interviews was
PSEG was marginally effective in developing corrective actions that were focused on
: (1) to evaluate the willingness of PSEG staff to raise nuclear safety issues,
correcting the identified problems.  
: (2) to evaluate the perceived effectiveness of the corrective action program at resolving identified problems, and
: (3) to evaluate PSEG's safety-conscious work environment. The personnel interviewed were randomly selected by the inspectors from Engineering, Maintenance, Operations, Radiation Protection, Chemistry, Emergency Preparedness, and Security. To supplement these discussions, the team interviewed the Employee Concern Program (ECP) Coordinator to assess their perception of the site employees' willingness to raise nuclear safety concerns and reviewed the ECP case log and select case files.


Assessment
All individuals interviewed indicated that they would raise safety concerns. Individuals felt that their management was receptive to receiving safety concerns and generally addressed them promptly, commensurate with the significance of the concern. Interviewees indicated that they were adequately trained and proficient on initiating condition reports. Most interviewees were aware of the licensee's ECP, and all stated they would use the program if necessary and expressed confidence that their confidentiality would be maintained if they brought issues to the ECP. When asked whether there have been any instances where individuals experienced retaliation or other negative reactions for raising safety concerns, all individuals interviewed stated that they had neither experienced nor heard of an instance of retaliation at the site.
71152B
Operating Experience:


The inspectors reviewed a sample of operating experience captured in the corrective action
The team determined that the processes in place to mitigate potential safety culture issues were adequately implemented.
program and sampled operating experience from NRC, industry, vendors, and third-party
groups. Overall, for the samples selected, PSEG was generally performing the appropriate
assessments for station applicability.  


Assessment
Minor Performance Deficiency 71152B Minor Performance Deficiency
71152B
Self-Assessments and Audits:


The inspectors determined that PSEG was adequately performing self-assessments and
Minor Performance Deficiency: PSEG created a preventative maintenance (PM) deferral request (PDR), PDR-24-000254, to make a one-time 18-month extension of the 12-year HPCI turbine internal inspection PM and determined that the PM deferral was high risk. ER-AA-210-1005, Preventative Maintenance (PM) Change Processing, requires that high risk PM deferrals have an approved and implemented mitigation strategy. The PDRs approved implementation mitigation strategy required additional parameters to be collected during the quarterly HPCI inservice test (IST) runs, such as: the degradation of a known oil leak, quantification of known pump seal leakage, turbine thrust bearing oil pressure, hydraulic reset supply oil pressure, overspeed trip supply oil pressure, barometric condenser pressure, thermal imaging of the turbine and pump, trending of pump discharge and turbine steam discharge pressures, and valve stroke times. However, after June 2024, PSEG failed to record the implementation mitigation strategy values during the quarterly HPCI IST pump runs.
audits in accordance with licensee procedures and implementing corrective actions as
needed.  


Assessment
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The inspectors evaluated the performance deficiency in accordance with the guidance in IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, and determined the issue was of minor significance because it did not adversely impact the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Although additional parameters were not collected as required by the PDRs mitigation strategy, the HPCI system remained available and operable during the impacted period except for planned maintenance and surveillance testing.
71152B
Safety-Conscious Work Environment:  


The team interviewed a total of 33 individuals in informal one-on-one discussions. The
Observation: Timeliness of corrective actions 71152B Examples of licensee staff failing to schedule corrective action assignments in a timely manner include:
purpose of these interviews was (1) to evaluate the willingness of PSEG staff to raise nuclear
safety issues, (2) to evaluate the perceived effectiveness of the corrective action program at


resolving identified problems, and (3) to evaluate PSEG's safety-conscious work
===1. Notification 20919997 for the 1A service water pump motor space heater drawing===
environment. The personnel interviewed were randomly selected by the inspectors from
current less than expected was documented on November 4, 2022. On August 6, 2025, the inspectors identified that the motor was at ambient temperature with the motor secured. The motor space heaters are designed to be energized with the motor secured to maintain the motor windings warm and dry such that condensation will not collect and adversely affect the motor windings. As of August 6, 2025, PSEG had failed to schedule repair of the 1A service water pump motor space heater to ensure its continued long-term reliability in a humid environment. New notification 20999330 was initiated on August 6, 2025, to document the concern and a repair was scheduled to occur during the next 1A service water pump outage.
Engineering, Maintenance, Operations, Radiation Protection, Chemistry, Emergency
Preparedness, and Security. To supplement these discussions, the team interviewed the
Employee Concern Program (ECP) Coordinator to assess their perception of the site
employees' willingness to raise nuclear safety concerns and reviewed the ECP case log and
select case files.  


All individuals interviewed indicated that they would raise safety concerns. Individuals felt that
===2. Notification 20705507 for H1KJ-1KJV-249, emergency diesel generator (EDG) oil===
their management was receptive to receiving safety concerns and generally addressed them
check valve, was documented on October 15, 2015. NRC inspectors identified an oil leak from the check valve and a nearby pipe rub with deck grating. PSEG walked down the concern but believed the oil leak was associated with the D EDG and coming from H1KJ-1D-S-404. A pipe rub was not similarly identified by the PSEG staff. During a walkdown on February 26, 2020, PSEG staff subsequently identified that the NRC inspectors original concern was with the B EDG and not the D EDG. On August 19, 2025, the inspectors requested the status of the D EDG check valve oil leak and pipe rub and learned that no repair had been scheduled. On August 20, 2025, PSEG returned notification 20705507 to the Station Ownership Committee (SOC) to reconsider the condition and to schedule repairs.
promptly, commensurate with the significance of the concern. Interviewees indicated that they
were adequately trained and proficient on initiating condition reports. Most interviewees were
aware of the licensee's ECP, and all stated they would use the program if necessary and
expressed confidence that their confidentiality would be maintained if they brought issues to
the ECP. When asked whether there have been any instances where individuals experienced
retaliation or other negative reactions for raising safety concerns, all individuals interviewed
stated that they had neither experienced nor heard of an instance of retaliation at the site.
The team determined that the processes in place to mitigate potential safety culture issues
were adequately implemented.  


Minor Performance Deficiency
===3. Notification 20686303 was initiated on April 22, 2015, for an undervoltage (UV) time===
71152B
delay relay (TDR) associated with a 1B EDG breaker auto-close permissive being out of tolerance. The 1B EDG was evaluated as operable, and the UV TDR repair was scheduled for repair during refueling outage 19 in April 2015. On July 7, 2015, the scheduled work was scoped out of refueling outage 19 and rescheduled for refueling outage 20 in fall 2016. At the time of this inspection, the notification was not updated, and the repair was not completed. On August 20, 2025, PSEG returned notification 20686303 to the SOC to reconsider the condition and to schedule repairs.
Minor Performance Deficiency


Minor Performance Deficiency: PSEG created a preventative maintenance (PM) deferral
===4. On August 7, 2025, the NRC inspection team identified significant external corrosion===
request (PDR), PDR-24-000254, to make a one-time 18-month extension of the 12-year
on a fire water header in the basement of the B/D bay of the service water intake structure. The corrosion was previously identified by an NRC inspector on March 12, 2024, pictures were taken and notification 20959367 was initiated. Based on the pictures, the corrosion had worsened, and pipe material loss was evident. PSEG rescheduled the pipe refurbishment, but it is now scheduled for repair 100 weeks after the original intended date.
HPCI turbine internal inspection PM and determined that the PM deferral was high risk. ER-
AA-210-1005, Preventative Maintenance (PM) Change Processing, requires that high risk
PM deferrals have an approved and implemented mitigation strategy. The PDRs approved
implementation mitigation strategy required additional parameters to be collected during the
quarterly HPCI inservice test (IST) runs, such as: the degradation of a known oil leak,
quantification of known pump seal leakage, turbine thrust bearing oil pressure, hydraulic reset
supply oil pressure, overspeed trip supply oil pressure, barometric condenser pressure,
thermal imaging of the turbine and pump, trending of pump discharge and turbine steam
discharge pressures, and valve stroke times. However, after June 2024, PSEG failed to
record the implementation mitigation strategy values during the quarterly HPCI IST pump
runs.  


Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The inspectors
Observation: Prior to notifications updated for new adverse condition 71152B The inspectors observed two examples of notifications that were originally written for HPCI system parameters that were low out of band and were later updated for the parameters being high out of band instead of a new notification being written for the new condition as directed by procedure LS-AA-120, Issue Identification and Screening Process, Step 4.2.2.
evaluated the performance deficiency in accordance with the guidance in IMC 0612,
Appendix B, Issue Screening, and determined the issue was of minor significance because
it did not adversely impact the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Although additional
parameters were not collected as required by the PDRs mitigation strategy, the HPCI system
remained available and operable during the impacted period except for planned maintenance
and surveillance testing.  


Observation: Timeliness of corrective actions
===1. Notification 20840058 was written for HPCI turbine bearing oil pressure being low out===
71152B
of band in November 2019. The notification was later updated for the oil pressure being high out of band in December 2022, June and September 2023, and June 2025.
Examples of licensee staff failing to schedule corrective action assignments in a timely
manner include:


1. Notification 20919997 for the 1A service water pump motor space heater drawing
===2. Notification 20938749 was written for HPCI aux oil pump filter inlet pressure being low===
current less than expected was documented on November 4, 2022. On August 6,
out of band in June 2023. The notification was updated in June 2025 for the inlet pressure being high out of band and an operability screening for the new condition was not performed until August 2025 when questioned by the inspectors.
2025, the inspectors identified that the motor was at ambient temperature with the
motor secured. The motor space heaters are designed to be energized with the motor
secured to maintain the motor windings warm and dry such that condensation will not
collect and adversely affect the motor windings. As of August 6, 2025, PSEG had
failed to schedule repair of the 1A service water pump motor space heater to ensure
its continued long-term reliability in a humid environment. New notification 20999330
was initiated on August 6, 2025, to document the concern and a repair was scheduled
to occur during the next 1A service water pump outage.
2. Notification 20705507 for H1KJ-1KJV-249, emergency diesel generator (EDG) oil
check valve, was documented on October 15, 2015. NRC inspectors identified an oil
leak from the check valve and a nearby pipe rub with deck grating. PSEG walked
down the concern but believed the oil leak was associated with the D EDG and
coming from H1KJ-1D-S-404. A pipe rub was not similarly identified by the PSEG
staff. During a walkdown on February 26, 2020, PSEG staff subsequently identified
that the NRC inspectors original concern was with the B EDG and not the D
EDG. On August 19, 2025, the inspectors requested the status of the D EDG check
valve oil leak and pipe rub and learned that no repair had been scheduled. On
August 20, 2025, PSEG returned notification 20705507 to the Station Ownership
Committee (SOC) to reconsider the condition and to schedule repairs.
3. Notification 20686303 was initiated on April 22, 2015, for an undervoltage (UV) time
delay relay (TDR) associated with a 1B EDG breaker auto-close permissive being out
of tolerance. The 1B EDG was evaluated as operable, and the UV TDR repair was
scheduled for repair during refueling outage 19 in April 2015. On July 7, 2015, the
scheduled work was scoped out of refueling outage 19 and rescheduled for refueling
outage 20 in fall 2016. At the time of this inspection, the notification was not updated,
and the repair was not completed. On August 20, 2025, PSEG returned notification
20686303 to the SOC to reconsider the condition and to schedule repairs.
4. On August 7, 2025, the NRC inspection team identified significant external corrosion
on a fire water header in the basement of the B/D bay of the service water intake
structure. The corrosion was previously identified by an NRC inspector on March 12,
2024, pictures were taken and notification 20959367 was initiated. Based on the
pictures, the corrosion had worsened, and pipe material loss was evident. PSEG
rescheduled the pipe refurbishment, but it is now scheduled for repair 100 weeks after
the original intended date.  


Observation: Prior to notifications updated for new adverse condition
==EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS==
71152B
The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
The inspectors observed two examples of notifications that were originally written for HPCI
* On August 22, 2025, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Michael Maiuro, Principal Compliance Specialist, and other members of the licensee staff.
system parameters that were low out of band and were later updated for the parameters
being high out of band instead of a new notification being written for the new condition as
directed by procedure LS-AA-120, Issue Identification and Screening Process, Step 4.2.2.  


1. Notification 20840058 was written for HPCI turbine bearing oil pressure being low out
=DOCUMENTS REVIEWED=
of band in November 2019. The notification was later updated for the oil pressure
being high out of band in December 2022, June and September 2023, and June
2025.
 
2. Notification 20938749 was written for HPCI aux oil pump filter inlet pressure being low
out of band in June 2023. The notification was updated in June 2025 for the inlet
pressure being high out of band and an operability screening for the new condition
was not performed until August 2025 when questioned by the inspectors.
 
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
 
The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained or documented in this
report.
* On August 22, 2025, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and
resolution inspection results to Michael Maiuro, Principal Compliance Specialist, and
other members of the licensee staff.
 
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED  


Inspection
Inspection
Line 357: Line 217:
Procedures
Procedures
LS-AA-120
LS-AA-120
ISSUE IDENTIFICATION AND SCREENING PROCESS  
ISSUE IDENTIFICATION AND SCREENING PROCESS
 
LS-AA-125
LS-AA-125
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM  
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM
 
LS-AA-125-1001
LS-AA-125-1001
CAUSE ANALYSIS  
CAUSE ANALYSIS
 
NO-AA-10
NO-AA-10
QUALITY ASSURANCE TOPICAL REPORT (QATR)  
QUALITY ASSURANCE TOPICAL REPORT (QATR)  
Line 376: Line 233:
Date
Date
Self-Assessments 70233173
Self-Assessments 70233173
70230410
230410
70233173
233173
70235479
235479
70231369
231369
70236734
236734
70230115
230115
70198049
70198049
70209513
209513
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 22:51, 22 February 2026

Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000354/2025010
ML25352A002
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek 
Issue date: 12/18/2025
From: Jason Schussler
Division of Operating Reactors
To: Mcfeaters C
Public Service Enterprise Group
References
IR 2025010
Download: ML25352A002 (0)
v • d • e


Text

December 18, 2025

SUBJECT:

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000354/2025010

Dear Charles McFeaters:

On August 22, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Hope Creek Generating Station and discussed the results of this inspection with Michael Maiuro, Principal Compliance Specialist, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Due to the temporary cessation of government operations, which commenced on October 1, 2025, the NRC began operating under its Office of Management and Budget-approved plan for operations during a lapse in appropriations. Consistent with that plan, the NRC operated at reduced staffing levels throughout the duration of the shutdown. However, the NRC continued to perform critical health and safety functions and make progress on other high-priority activities associated with the ADVANCE Act and Executive Order 14300. On November 13, 2025, following the passage of a continuing resolution, the NRC resumed normal operations. As a result, the issuance of this inspection report is delayed beyond the timeliness criteria specified in Inspection Manual Chapter 0611, Power Reactor Inspection Reports.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations problem identification and resolution program to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your program complies with NRC regulations and applicable industry standards such that the Reactor Oversight Process can continue to be implemented.

The team also evaluated the stations effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, and its use of industry and NRC operating experience information. The results of these evaluations are in the enclosure.

Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews, the team found no evidence of challenges to your organization's safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Jason E. Schussler, Team Leader Technical Support and Administrative Team Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Docket No. 05000354 License No. NPF-57

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number:

05000354

License Number:

NPF-57

Report Number:

05000354/2025010

Enterprise Identifier: I-2025-010-0006

Licensee:

PSEG Nuclear, LLC

Facility:

Hope Creek Generating Station

Location:

Hancock's Bridge, NJ

Inspection Dates:

August 4, 2025 to August 22, 2025

Inspectors:

D. Beacon, Senior Project Engineer

J. Bresson, Project Engineer

J. Edwards, Physical Security Inspector

M. Henrion, Senior Project Engineer

D. Orr, Senior Project Engineer

Approved By:

Jason E. Schussler, Team Lead

Technical Support and Administrative Team

Division of Operating Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Hope Creek Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

Main article: IP 71152
(1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees problem identification and resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety-conscious work environment.
  • Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience.
  • Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.
  • Safety-Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Assessment 71152B Problem Identification and Resolution Program Effectiveness:

The inspectors determined that PSEGs problem identification and resolution program for Hope Creek was generally effective and adequately supported nuclear safety and security.

Identification: The team reviewed a sample of issues that have been processed through PSEGs problem identification and resolution program since the last biennial team inspection, including NCVs of regulatory requirements and other documented findings. The team determined that, based on the samples selected, PSEG identified issues and entered them into the corrective action program.

Prioritization and Evaluation: Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined PSEG was generally effective at prioritizing and evaluating issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. Inspectors observed that at station corrective action program meetings, issues were generally screened and prioritized at the appropriate level and that corrective actions were assigned to address the issues. However, the inspectors identified a minor performance deficiency when PSEG failed to comply with a self-imposed standard regarding procedure use and adherence. Additionally, the inspectors identified two observations related to timely corrective actions and documentation of various issues with HPCI system parameters. Both the minor performance deficiency and two observations are documented below.

Corrective Action: The team reviewed a sample of corrective actions and concluded that PSEG was marginally effective in developing corrective actions that were focused on correcting the identified problems.

Assessment 71152B Operating Experience:

The inspectors reviewed a sample of operating experience captured in the corrective action program and sampled operating experience from NRC, industry, vendors, and third-party groups. Overall, for the samples selected, PSEG was generally performing the appropriate assessments for station applicability.

Assessment 71152B Self-Assessments and Audits:

The inspectors determined that PSEG was adequately performing self-assessments and audits in accordance with licensee procedures and implementing corrective actions as needed.

Assessment 71152B Safety-Conscious Work Environment:

The team interviewed a total of 33 individuals in informal one-on-one discussions. The purpose of these interviews was

(1) to evaluate the willingness of PSEG staff to raise nuclear safety issues,
(2) to evaluate the perceived effectiveness of the corrective action program at resolving identified problems, and
(3) to evaluate PSEG's safety-conscious work environment. The personnel interviewed were randomly selected by the inspectors from Engineering, Maintenance, Operations, Radiation Protection, Chemistry, Emergency Preparedness, and Security. To supplement these discussions, the team interviewed the Employee Concern Program (ECP) Coordinator to assess their perception of the site employees' willingness to raise nuclear safety concerns and reviewed the ECP case log and select case files.

All individuals interviewed indicated that they would raise safety concerns. Individuals felt that their management was receptive to receiving safety concerns and generally addressed them promptly, commensurate with the significance of the concern. Interviewees indicated that they were adequately trained and proficient on initiating condition reports. Most interviewees were aware of the licensee's ECP, and all stated they would use the program if necessary and expressed confidence that their confidentiality would be maintained if they brought issues to the ECP. When asked whether there have been any instances where individuals experienced retaliation or other negative reactions for raising safety concerns, all individuals interviewed stated that they had neither experienced nor heard of an instance of retaliation at the site.

The team determined that the processes in place to mitigate potential safety culture issues were adequately implemented.

Minor Performance Deficiency 71152B Minor Performance Deficiency

Minor Performance Deficiency: PSEG created a preventative maintenance (PM) deferral request (PDR), PDR-24-000254, to make a one-time 18-month extension of the 12-year HPCI turbine internal inspection PM and determined that the PM deferral was high risk. ER-AA-210-1005, Preventative Maintenance (PM) Change Processing, requires that high risk PM deferrals have an approved and implemented mitigation strategy. The PDRs approved implementation mitigation strategy required additional parameters to be collected during the quarterly HPCI inservice test (IST) runs, such as: the degradation of a known oil leak, quantification of known pump seal leakage, turbine thrust bearing oil pressure, hydraulic reset supply oil pressure, overspeed trip supply oil pressure, barometric condenser pressure, thermal imaging of the turbine and pump, trending of pump discharge and turbine steam discharge pressures, and valve stroke times. However, after June 2024, PSEG failed to record the implementation mitigation strategy values during the quarterly HPCI IST pump runs.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The inspectors evaluated the performance deficiency in accordance with the guidance in IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, and determined the issue was of minor significance because it did not adversely impact the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Although additional parameters were not collected as required by the PDRs mitigation strategy, the HPCI system remained available and operable during the impacted period except for planned maintenance and surveillance testing.

Observation: Timeliness of corrective actions 71152B Examples of licensee staff failing to schedule corrective action assignments in a timely manner include:

1. Notification 20919997 for the 1A service water pump motor space heater drawing

current less than expected was documented on November 4, 2022. On August 6, 2025, the inspectors identified that the motor was at ambient temperature with the motor secured. The motor space heaters are designed to be energized with the motor secured to maintain the motor windings warm and dry such that condensation will not collect and adversely affect the motor windings. As of August 6, 2025, PSEG had failed to schedule repair of the 1A service water pump motor space heater to ensure its continued long-term reliability in a humid environment. New notification 20999330 was initiated on August 6, 2025, to document the concern and a repair was scheduled to occur during the next 1A service water pump outage.

2. Notification 20705507 for H1KJ-1KJV-249, emergency diesel generator (EDG) oil

check valve, was documented on October 15, 2015. NRC inspectors identified an oil leak from the check valve and a nearby pipe rub with deck grating. PSEG walked down the concern but believed the oil leak was associated with the D EDG and coming from H1KJ-1D-S-404. A pipe rub was not similarly identified by the PSEG staff. During a walkdown on February 26, 2020, PSEG staff subsequently identified that the NRC inspectors original concern was with the B EDG and not the D EDG. On August 19, 2025, the inspectors requested the status of the D EDG check valve oil leak and pipe rub and learned that no repair had been scheduled. On August 20, 2025, PSEG returned notification 20705507 to the Station Ownership Committee (SOC) to reconsider the condition and to schedule repairs.

3. Notification 20686303 was initiated on April 22, 2015, for an undervoltage (UV) time

delay relay (TDR) associated with a 1B EDG breaker auto-close permissive being out of tolerance. The 1B EDG was evaluated as operable, and the UV TDR repair was scheduled for repair during refueling outage 19 in April 2015. On July 7, 2015, the scheduled work was scoped out of refueling outage 19 and rescheduled for refueling outage 20 in fall 2016. At the time of this inspection, the notification was not updated, and the repair was not completed. On August 20, 2025, PSEG returned notification 20686303 to the SOC to reconsider the condition and to schedule repairs.

4. On August 7, 2025, the NRC inspection team identified significant external corrosion

on a fire water header in the basement of the B/D bay of the service water intake structure. The corrosion was previously identified by an NRC inspector on March 12, 2024, pictures were taken and notification 20959367 was initiated. Based on the pictures, the corrosion had worsened, and pipe material loss was evident. PSEG rescheduled the pipe refurbishment, but it is now scheduled for repair 100 weeks after the original intended date.

Observation: Prior to notifications updated for new adverse condition 71152B The inspectors observed two examples of notifications that were originally written for HPCI system parameters that were low out of band and were later updated for the parameters being high out of band instead of a new notification being written for the new condition as directed by procedure LS-AA-120, Issue Identification and Screening Process, Step 4.2.2.

1. Notification 20840058 was written for HPCI turbine bearing oil pressure being low out

of band in November 2019. The notification was later updated for the oil pressure being high out of band in December 2022, June and September 2023, and June 2025.

2. Notification 20938749 was written for HPCI aux oil pump filter inlet pressure being low

out of band in June 2023. The notification was updated in June 2025 for the inlet pressure being high out of band and an operability screening for the new condition was not performed until August 2025 when questioned by the inspectors.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On August 22, 2025, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Michael Maiuro, Principal Compliance Specialist, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71152B

Corrective Action

Documents

20999540

20840058

20938749

20919997

20999330

20705507

20686303

20959367

20983620

20936320

80135162

20999254

20995321

20995364

20999061

20938749

20840058

20892804

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

20999041

20999042

20999043

20999045

20999048

20999049

20999061

20999284

20999330

20999426

Procedures

LS-AA-120

ISSUE IDENTIFICATION AND SCREENING PROCESS

LS-AA-125

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM

LS-AA-125-1001

CAUSE ANALYSIS

NO-AA-10

QUALITY ASSURANCE TOPICAL REPORT (QATR)

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Self-Assessments 70233173

230410

233173

235479

231369

236734

230115

70198049

209513

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=IR_05000354/2025010&oldid=5576498"