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| {{#Wiki_filter:11$S ORIGINAL SSINS No.: 6835IN 86-57UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENTWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555July 11, 1986IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-57: OPERATING PROBLEMS WITH SOLENOID OPERATEDVALVES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS | | {{#Wiki_filter:11$S ORIGINAL SSINS No.: |
| | IN 86-57 6835 UNITED STATES |
| | |
| | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION |
| | |
| | OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT |
| | |
| | WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 11, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-57: OPERATING PROBLEMS WITH SOLENOID OPERATED |
| | |
| | VALVES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS |
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| ==Addressees== | | ==Addressees== |
| :All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license or aconstruction permit. | | : |
| | All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license or a |
| | |
| | construction permit. |
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| |
|
| ==Purpose== | | ==Purpose== |
| :This notice is to advise recipients of a series of valve failures that haveoccurred recently at several nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipi-ents will review the events discussed below for applicability to their facili-ties and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar valve failuresoccurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this noticedo not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or writtenresponse is required. | | : |
| | This notice is to advise recipients of a series of valve failures that have |
| | |
| | occurred recently at several nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipi- ents will review the events discussed below for applicability to their facili- ties and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar valve failures |
| | |
| | occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice |
| | |
| | do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written |
| | |
| | response is required. |
|
| |
|
| ==Description of Circumstances== | | ==Description of Circumstances== |
| :The NRC has received reports from licensees of operating nuclear power plantsinvolving failures of certain valves that are actuated by solenoid operatedvalves (SOVs) to operate properly. These failures have adversely affected theintended functions of the main steam isolation system, pressure relief andfluid control systems. Attachment 1 to this information notice describes thefailure events and the corrective actions taken.Discussion:In most of the cases described in Attachment 1, the cause for triggering theevent was attributed to a malfunctioning SOV that served as a pilot valve. Thisin turn resulted in the malfunction of the associated main valve. The failuresof the SOVs can be traced to the following different causes: (1) potentiallyhigh-temperature ambient conditions are not being continuously monitored in areaswhere SOVs are installed and operating in an energized state, (2) hydrocarboncontaminants, probably because backup air systems (e.g., plant service or shopair systems) are being used periodically and are not designed to "oil-free"specifications as required for Class IE service, (3) chloride contaminantscausing open circuits in coils of the SOVs, possibly as a result of questionablehandling, packaging, and storage procedures, (4) an active replacement partsprogram associated with the elastomers and other short-lived subcomponents usedin SOVs has not been adequately maintained, and (5) lubricants have been usedexcessively during maintenance. ASCO provides installation and maintenance8607090425 Attachment 1IN 86-57July 11, 1986 b. Viton has superior high-temperature performance when compared to EPand is impervious to hydrocarbons. Its major disadvantage is that itis less resistant to radiation than EP by a factor of ten. ASCOrecommends Viton for applications that are not oil-free and whereradiation levels do not exceed 20 megarads.On the basis of a licensee review of the Brunswick Station maintenancehistory, which showed the performance of Viton to be satisfactory in ASCOvalves, and the available literature and industry experience, the licenseereplaced all Unit 2 dual solenoid valves with valves having Viton seatsand seals. Because Viton has a 20-megarad limit, the licensee plans toreplace these elastomers every 3.3 years to meet environmental qualifica-tion requirements for the MSIV application.After replacing the faulty valves with valves having Viton disc and sealmaterial, the licensee experienced several SOV failures resulting fromopen circuits of the dc coils on Unit 2. (Brunswick Station employs ASCONP8323A36V valves that use one ac coil and one dc coil in applicationsusing the subject dual solenoid valve.)On October 5, 1985, the dc coils of two MSIVs failed during the perfor-mance of post-maintenance testing of the MSIVs. Investigation into thefailures indicated an open circuit in the dc coils. The coils werereplaced and the valves subsequently retested satisfactorily.On October 15, 1985, an unplanned closure of an MSIV occurred while Unit 2was operating at 99 percent full power. Closure of the MSIV occurred whenthe ac solenoid coil portion of the MSIV associated SOV was de-energizedin accordance with a periodic test procedure. It was not known then thatthere was an open circuit in the associated dc solenoid coil portion ofthe dual SOV. Consequently, when the ac coil was de-energized, closure ofthe MSIV resulted. The failed dc coil was replaced and then retestedsatisfactorily.Investigation into the failures of the dc coil by the licensee determinedthat the failures appeared to be separation of the very fine coil wire atthe junction point where it connects to the much larger field lead. Thisconnection point is a soldered connection that is then taped andlacquered.Further analysis of the coils (two failed dc coils plus five spares fromstorage) by the CP&L Research Center indicated the separation might becorrosion induced by chloride contaminants. To date, the licensee andASCO are unable to determine the source of the chloride. However,followup investigation by the NRC revealed that ASCO had previouslyexperienced similar dc coil open circuit anomalies after a surface ship-ment of SOVs overseas to Japan. At that time, ASCO believed that the saltwater ambient conditions during shipping may have been the source of thechlorine-induced failures. ASCO recommends specific handling, packaging,and storage conditions for spare parts and valves at facilitie Attachment 1IN 86-57July 11, 1986 The licensee initiated a temporary surveillance program to monitor opera-bility of the solenoid coils on October 16, 1985. A modification wasperformed to install a voltage dropping resistor in the individual coilcircuits so that they can be monitored directly from cabinets in thecontrol room. This allows continuity of the coil circuitry to be verifiedby measuring a voltage drop across the resistor. According to thelicensee, until the cause for failure can be determined, plans are tocheck the coil circuitry for continuity on a daily basis.2. Scram Discharge Solenoid Valve FailureIn November 1985, Carolina Power and Light's Brunswick facility experi-enced problems with several scram discharge SOVs. The problems wereidentified during periodic surveillance testing to determine the singlerod insertion times and resulted in several rods with slow insertiontimes. Initial troubleshooting isolated the problem to the SOVs in thescram discharge line for two of the control rods, which were subsequentlyreplaced and tested satisfactorily.The licensee disassembled the failed SOVs, which were manufactured by ASCO(Model HV-90-405-2A), for failure analysis. When the valves were disas-sembled, it was noted that copious amounts of silicone lubricant had beenapplied by the licensee to all gaskets, seals, and diaphragms internal tothe valves during previous routine maintenance.. The licensee believesthat the excessive amount of lubricant may have blocked some of thevalves' internal passages or caused sticking of the diaphragms, therebycontributing to the slow insertion times. The technical manual for thesubject valves states that body passage gaskets should be lubricated withmoderate amounts of Dow Corning's Valve Seal Silicone Lubricant or anequivalent high-grade silicone grease.The licensee conducted successful scram tests on all other rods. Aperiodic retest of 10 percent of the control rods every 120 days asrequired by the Technical Specifications provides sufficient assurancethat this problem does not exist in other SOVs. In addition, the licenseestated that maintenance procedures and practices would be reviewed andmodified, as required, to prevent the application of excessive amounts oflubricant during repair or overhaul of components.Haddam Neck Nuclear Power PlantOn September 10, 1985, the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant was operating at 100percent power when one of the six SOVs in the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW)failed to change state when de-energized. This failure was detected during theperformance of a preventive maintenance procedure developed to periodicallycycle each of the six SOVs to prevent a sticking problem similar to SOV fail-ures previously experienced on November 2, 1984. In that earlier event, twofeedwater bypass valves failed to open automatically and the cause was deter-mined to be sticking SOVs. The faulty SOV was ASCO Model NP8320A-185E and thelicensee has been unable to determine the cause of the malfunction. The Attachment 2IN 86-57July 11, 1986LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDIE INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issue Issued to86-56Reliability Of Main SteamSafety Valves7/10/86All PWR facilitiesholding an OL or CP86-5586-54Delayed Access To Safety-Related Areas And EquipmentDuring Plant EmergenciesCriminal Prosecution Of AFormer Radiation SafetyOfficer Who WillfullyDirected An UnqualifiedIndividual To PerformRadiographyImproper Use Of Heat Shrink-able Tubing7/10/866/27/866/26/8686-5386-52Conductor Insulation Degrada- 6/26/86tion On Foxboro Model EControllersExcessive Pneumatic Leakage 6/18/86In The Automatic Depressuriza-tion SystemAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll holders of by-product, source, orspecial nuclearmaterialAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll BWR facilitiesholding an OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll BWR facilitiesholding an OL or CP86-5186-5086-49Inadequate Testing To DetectFailures Of Safety-RelatedPneumatic Components OrSystemsAge/Environment InducedElectrical Cable FailuesInadequate Testing Of BoronSolution Concentration In TheStandby Liquid Control System6/18/866/16/866/13/8686-48OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit}} | | : |
| | The NRC has received reports from licensees of operating nuclear power plants |
| | |
| | involving failures of certain valves that are actuated by solenoid operated |
| | |
| | valves (SOVs) to operate properly. These failures have adversely affected the |
| | |
| | intended functions of the main steam isolation system, pressure relief and |
| | |
| | fluid control systems. Attachment 1 to this information notice describes the |
| | |
| | failure events and the corrective actions taken. |
| | |
| | Discussion: |
| | In most of the cases described in Attachment 1, the cause for triggering the |
| | |
| | event was attributed to a malfunctioning SOV that served as a pilot valve. This |
| | |
| | in turn resulted in the malfunction of the associated main valve. The failures |
| | |
| | of the SOVs can be traced to the following different causes: (1) potentially |
| | |
| | high-temperature ambient conditions are not being continuously monitored in areas |
| | |
| | where SOVs are installed and operating in an energized state, (2) hydrocarbon |
| | |
| | contaminants, probably because backup air systems (e.g., plant service or shop |
| | |
| | air systems) are being used periodically and are not designed to "oil-free" |
| | specifications as required for Class IE service, (3) chloride contaminants |
| | |
| | causing open circuits in coils of the SOVs, possibly as a result of questionable |
| | |
| | handling, packaging, and storage procedures, (4) an active replacement parts |
| | |
| | program associated with the elastomers and other short-lived subcomponents used |
| | |
| | in SOVs has not been adequately maintained, and (5) lubricants have been used |
| | |
| | excessively during maintenance. ASCO provides installation and maintenance |
| | |
| | 8607090425 |
| | |
| | Attachment 1 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 b. Viton has superior high-temperature performance when compared to EP |
| | |
| | and is impervious to hydrocarbons. Its major disadvantage is that it |
| | |
| | is less resistant to radiation than EP by a factor of ten. ASCO |
| | |
| | recommends Viton for applications that are not oil-free and where |
| | |
| | radiation levels do not exceed 20 megarads. |
| | |
| | On the basis of a licensee review of the Brunswick Station maintenance |
| | |
| | history, which showed the performance of Viton to be satisfactory in ASCO |
| | |
| | valves, and the available literature and industry experience, the licensee |
| | |
| | replaced all Unit 2 dual solenoid valves with valves having Viton seats |
| | |
| | and seals. Because Viton has a 20-megarad limit, the licensee plans to |
| | |
| | replace these elastomers every 3.3 years to meet environmental qualifica- tion requirements for the MSIV application. |
| | |
| | After replacing the faulty valves with valves having Viton disc and seal |
| | |
| | material, the licensee experienced several SOV failures resulting from |
| | |
| | open circuits of the dc coils on Unit 2. (Brunswick Station employs ASCO |
| | |
| | NP8323A36V valves that use one ac coil and one dc coil in applications |
| | |
| | using the subject dual solenoid valve.) |
| | On October 5, 1985, the dc coils of two MSIVs failed during the perfor- mance of post-maintenance testing of the MSIVs. Investigation into the |
| | |
| | failures indicated an open circuit in the dc coils. The coils were |
| | |
| | replaced and the valves subsequently retested satisfactorily. |
| | |
| | On October 15, 1985, an unplanned closure of an MSIV occurred while Unit 2 was operating at 99 percent full power. Closure of the MSIV occurred when |
| | |
| | the ac solenoid coil portion of the MSIV associated SOV was de-energized |
| | |
| | in accordance with a periodic test procedure. It was not known then that |
| | |
| | there was an open circuit in the associated dc solenoid coil portion of |
| | |
| | the dual SOV. Consequently, when the ac coil was de-energized, closure of |
| | |
| | the MSIV resulted. The failed dc coil was replaced and then retested |
| | |
| | satisfactorily. |
| | |
| | Investigation into the failures of the dc coil by the licensee determined |
| | |
| | that the failures appeared to be separation of the very fine coil wire at |
| | |
| | the junction point where it connects to the much larger field lead. This |
| | |
| | connection point is a soldered connection that is then taped and |
| | |
| | lacquered. |
| | |
| | Further analysis of the coils (two failed dc coils plus five spares from |
| | |
| | storage) by the CP&L Research Center indicated the separation might be |
| | |
| | corrosion induced by chloride contaminants. To date, the licensee and |
| | |
| | ASCO are unable to determine the source of the chloride. However, followup investigation by the NRC revealed that ASCO had previously |
| | |
| | experienced similar dc coil open circuit anomalies after a surface ship- ment of SOVs overseas to Japan. At that time, ASCO believed that the salt |
| | |
| | water ambient conditions during shipping may have been the source of the |
| | |
| | chlorine-induced failures. ASCO recommends specific handling, packaging, and storage conditions for spare parts and valves at facilities. |
| | |
| | Attachment 1 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 The licensee initiated a temporary surveillance program to monitor opera- bility of the solenoid coils on October 16, 1985. A modification was |
| | |
| | performed to install a voltage dropping resistor in the individual coil |
| | |
| | circuits so that they can be monitored directly from cabinets in the |
| | |
| | control room. This allows continuity of the coil circuitry to be verified |
| | |
| | by measuring a voltage drop across the resistor. According to the |
| | |
| | licensee, until the cause for failure can be determined, plans are to |
| | |
| | check the coil circuitry for continuity on a daily basis. |
| | |
| | 2. Scram Discharge Solenoid Valve Failure |
| | |
| | In November 1985, Carolina Power and Light's Brunswick facility experi- enced problems with several scram discharge SOVs. The problems were |
| | |
| | identified during periodic surveillance testing to determine the single |
| | |
| | rod insertion times and resulted in several rods with slow insertion |
| | |
| | times. Initial troubleshooting isolated the problem to the SOVs in the |
| | |
| | scram discharge line for two of the control rods, which were subsequently |
| | |
| | replaced and tested satisfactorily. |
| | |
| | The licensee disassembled the failed SOVs, which were manufactured by ASCO |
| | |
| | (Model HV-90-405-2A), for failure analysis. When the valves were disas- sembled, it was noted that copious amounts of silicone lubricant had been |
| | |
| | applied by the licensee to all gaskets, seals, and diaphragms internal to |
| | |
| | the valves during previous routine maintenance.. The licensee believes |
| | |
| | that the excessive amount of lubricant may have blocked some of the |
| | |
| | valves' internal passages or caused sticking of the diaphragms, thereby |
| | |
| | contributing to the slow insertion times. The technical manual for the |
| | |
| | subject valves states that body passage gaskets should be lubricated with |
| | |
| | moderate amounts of Dow Corning's Valve Seal Silicone Lubricant or an |
| | |
| | equivalent high-grade silicone grease. |
| | |
| | The licensee conducted successful scram tests on all other rods. A |
| | |
| | periodic retest of 10 percent of the control rods every 120 days as |
| | |
| | required by the Technical Specifications provides sufficient assurance |
| | |
| | that this problem does not exist in other SOVs. In addition, the licensee |
| | |
| | stated that maintenance procedures and practices would be reviewed and |
| | |
| | modified, as required, to prevent the application of excessive amounts of |
| | |
| | lubricant during repair or overhaul of components. |
| | |
| | ===Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant=== |
| | On September 10, 1985, the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant was operating at 100 |
| | percent power when one of the six SOVs in the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) |
| | failed to change state when de-energized. This failure was detected during the |
| | |
| | performance of a preventive maintenance procedure developed to periodically |
| | |
| | cycle each of the six SOVs to prevent a sticking problem similar to SOV fail- ures previously experienced on November 2, 1984. In that earlier event, two |
| | |
| | feedwater bypass valves failed to open automatically and the cause was deter- mined to be sticking SOVs. The faulty SOV was ASCO Model NP8320A-185E and the |
| | |
| | licensee has been unable to determine the cause of the malfunction. The |
| | |
| | Attachment 2 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED |
| | |
| | IE INFORMATION NOTICES |
| | |
| | Information Date of |
| | |
| | Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to |
| | |
| | 86-56 Reliability Of Main Steam 7/10/86 All PWR facilities |
| | |
| | Safety Valves holding an OL or CP |
| | |
| | 86-55 Delayed Access To Safety- 7/10/86 All power reactor |
| | |
| | Related Areas And Equipment facilities holding |
| | |
| | During Plant Emergencies an OL or CP |
| | |
| | 86-54 Criminal Prosecution Of A 6/27/86 All holders of by- Former Radiation Safety product, source, or |
| | |
| | Officer Who Willfully special nuclear |
| | |
| | Directed An Unqualified material |
| | |
| | Individual To Perform |
| | |
| | Radiography |
| | |
| | 86-53 Improper Use Of Heat Shrink- 6/26/86 All power reactor |
| | |
| | able Tubing facilities holding |
| | |
| | an OL or CP |
| | |
| | 86-52 Conductor Insulation Degrada- 6/26/86 All power reactor |
| | |
| | tion On Foxboro Model E facilities holding |
| | |
| | Controllers an OL or CP |
| | |
| | 86-51 Excessive Pneumatic Leakage 6/18/86 All BWR facilities |
| | |
| | In The Automatic Depressuriza- holding an OL or CP |
| | |
| | tion System |
| | |
| | 86-50 Inadequate Testing To Detect 6/18/86 All power reactor |
| | |
| | Failures Of Safety-Related facilities holding |
| | |
| | Pneumatic Components Or an OL or CP |
| | |
| | Systems |
| | |
| | 86-49 Age/Environment Induced 6/16/86 All power reactor |
| | |
| | Electrical Cable Failues facilities holding |
| | |
| | an OL or CP |
| | |
| | 86-48 Inadequate Testing Of Boron 6/13/86 All BWR facilities |
| | |
| | Solution Concentration In The holding an OL or CP |
| | |
| | Standby Liquid Control System |
| | |
| | OL = Operating License |
| | |
| | CP = Construction Permit}} |
|
| |
|
| {{Information notice-Nav}} | | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Operating Problems with Solenoid Operated Valves at Nuclear Power PlantsML031220718 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill |
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Issue date: |
07/11/1986 |
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From: |
NRC/IE |
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To: |
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References |
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IN-86-057, NUDOCS 8607090425 |
Download: ML031220718 (4) |
|
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Category:NRC Information Notice
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Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Contain2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Con2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notic2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-11, Age Related Capacitor Degradation2012-07-23023 July 2012 Age Related Capacitor Degradation ML12031A0132012-02-0606 February 2012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Investigation Report No. 2-2010-058, Cpn International, Inc Information Notice 2011-19, Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components2011-09-26026 September 2011 Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components Information Notice 2011-15, Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues2011-08-0101 August 2011 Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues Information Notice 2011-17, Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping2011-07-26026 July 2011 Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-04, IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-262010-12-21021 December 2010 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 ML13066A1872009-12-16016 December 2009 Draft NRC Information Notice 2009-xx - Underestimate of Dam Failure Frequency Used in Probabilistic Risk Assessments ML1007804482009-11-23023 November 2009 Email from Peter Bamford, NRR to Pamela Cowan, Exelon on TMI Contamination Control Event Information Notice 2009-11, NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-112009-07-0707 July 2009 NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-11 Information Notice 2009-10, Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10)2009-07-0707 July 2009 Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10) Information Notice 2009-09, Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify2009-06-19019 June 2009 Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify Information Notice 2008-12, Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation2008-07-0707 July 2008 Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation Information Notice 2008-11, Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 12008-06-18018 June 2008 Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 1 Information Notice 2008-04, Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants2008-04-0707 April 2008 Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants Information Notice 1991-09, Counterfeiting of Crane Valves2007-09-25025 September 2007 Counterfeiting of Crane Valves Information Notice 2007-28, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls2007-09-19019 September 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls Information Notice 2007-29, Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment2007-09-17017 September 2007 Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment Information Notice 2007-14, Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station2007-03-30030 March 2007 Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station Information Notice 2007-06, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems2007-02-0909 February 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Information Notice 2007-05, Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures2007-02-0909 February 2007 Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures Information Notice 2006-31, Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers2006-12-26026 December 2006 Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-13, E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination2006-07-13013 July 2006 E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] OR [[:Skagit]] OR [[:Marble Hill]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] OR [[:Skagit]] OR [[:Marble Hill]] </code>. |
11$S ORIGINAL SSINS No.:
IN 86-57 6835 UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 11, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-57: OPERATING PROBLEMS WITH SOLENOID OPERATED
VALVES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
Addressees
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license or a
construction permit.
Purpose
This notice is to advise recipients of a series of valve failures that have
occurred recently at several nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipi- ents will review the events discussed below for applicability to their facili- ties and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar valve failures
occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice
do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written
response is required.
Description of Circumstances
The NRC has received reports from licensees of operating nuclear power plants
involving failures of certain valves that are actuated by solenoid operated
valves (SOVs) to operate properly. These failures have adversely affected the
intended functions of the main steam isolation system, pressure relief and
fluid control systems. Attachment 1 to this information notice describes the
failure events and the corrective actions taken.
Discussion:
In most of the cases described in Attachment 1, the cause for triggering the
event was attributed to a malfunctioning SOV that served as a pilot valve. This
in turn resulted in the malfunction of the associated main valve. The failures
of the SOVs can be traced to the following different causes: (1) potentially
high-temperature ambient conditions are not being continuously monitored in areas
where SOVs are installed and operating in an energized state, (2) hydrocarbon
contaminants, probably because backup air systems (e.g., plant service or shop
air systems) are being used periodically and are not designed to "oil-free"
specifications as required for Class IE service, (3) chloride contaminants
causing open circuits in coils of the SOVs, possibly as a result of questionable
handling, packaging, and storage procedures, (4) an active replacement parts
program associated with the elastomers and other short-lived subcomponents used
in SOVs has not been adequately maintained, and (5) lubricants have been used
excessively during maintenance. ASCO provides installation and maintenance
8607090425
Attachment 1 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 b. Viton has superior high-temperature performance when compared to EP
and is impervious to hydrocarbons. Its major disadvantage is that it
is less resistant to radiation than EP by a factor of ten. ASCO
recommends Viton for applications that are not oil-free and where
radiation levels do not exceed 20 megarads.
On the basis of a licensee review of the Brunswick Station maintenance
history, which showed the performance of Viton to be satisfactory in ASCO
valves, and the available literature and industry experience, the licensee
replaced all Unit 2 dual solenoid valves with valves having Viton seats
and seals. Because Viton has a 20-megarad limit, the licensee plans to
replace these elastomers every 3.3 years to meet environmental qualifica- tion requirements for the MSIV application.
After replacing the faulty valves with valves having Viton disc and seal
material, the licensee experienced several SOV failures resulting from
open circuits of the dc coils on Unit 2. (Brunswick Station employs ASCO
NP8323A36V valves that use one ac coil and one dc coil in applications
using the subject dual solenoid valve.)
On October 5, 1985, the dc coils of two MSIVs failed during the perfor- mance of post-maintenance testing of the MSIVs. Investigation into the
failures indicated an open circuit in the dc coils. The coils were
replaced and the valves subsequently retested satisfactorily.
On October 15, 1985, an unplanned closure of an MSIV occurred while Unit 2 was operating at 99 percent full power. Closure of the MSIV occurred when
the ac solenoid coil portion of the MSIV associated SOV was de-energized
in accordance with a periodic test procedure. It was not known then that
there was an open circuit in the associated dc solenoid coil portion of
the dual SOV. Consequently, when the ac coil was de-energized, closure of
the MSIV resulted. The failed dc coil was replaced and then retested
satisfactorily.
Investigation into the failures of the dc coil by the licensee determined
that the failures appeared to be separation of the very fine coil wire at
the junction point where it connects to the much larger field lead. This
connection point is a soldered connection that is then taped and
lacquered.
Further analysis of the coils (two failed dc coils plus five spares from
storage) by the CP&L Research Center indicated the separation might be
corrosion induced by chloride contaminants. To date, the licensee and
ASCO are unable to determine the source of the chloride. However, followup investigation by the NRC revealed that ASCO had previously
experienced similar dc coil open circuit anomalies after a surface ship- ment of SOVs overseas to Japan. At that time, ASCO believed that the salt
water ambient conditions during shipping may have been the source of the
chlorine-induced failures. ASCO recommends specific handling, packaging, and storage conditions for spare parts and valves at facilities.
Attachment 1 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 The licensee initiated a temporary surveillance program to monitor opera- bility of the solenoid coils on October 16, 1985. A modification was
performed to install a voltage dropping resistor in the individual coil
circuits so that they can be monitored directly from cabinets in the
control room. This allows continuity of the coil circuitry to be verified
by measuring a voltage drop across the resistor. According to the
licensee, until the cause for failure can be determined, plans are to
check the coil circuitry for continuity on a daily basis.
2. Scram Discharge Solenoid Valve Failure
In November 1985, Carolina Power and Light's Brunswick facility experi- enced problems with several scram discharge SOVs. The problems were
identified during periodic surveillance testing to determine the single
rod insertion times and resulted in several rods with slow insertion
times. Initial troubleshooting isolated the problem to the SOVs in the
scram discharge line for two of the control rods, which were subsequently
replaced and tested satisfactorily.
The licensee disassembled the failed SOVs, which were manufactured by ASCO
(Model HV-90-405-2A), for failure analysis. When the valves were disas- sembled, it was noted that copious amounts of silicone lubricant had been
applied by the licensee to all gaskets, seals, and diaphragms internal to
the valves during previous routine maintenance.. The licensee believes
that the excessive amount of lubricant may have blocked some of the
valves' internal passages or caused sticking of the diaphragms, thereby
contributing to the slow insertion times. The technical manual for the
subject valves states that body passage gaskets should be lubricated with
moderate amounts of Dow Corning's Valve Seal Silicone Lubricant or an
equivalent high-grade silicone grease.
The licensee conducted successful scram tests on all other rods. A
periodic retest of 10 percent of the control rods every 120 days as
required by the Technical Specifications provides sufficient assurance
that this problem does not exist in other SOVs. In addition, the licensee
stated that maintenance procedures and practices would be reviewed and
modified, as required, to prevent the application of excessive amounts of
lubricant during repair or overhaul of components.
Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant
On September 10, 1985, the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant was operating at 100
percent power when one of the six SOVs in the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW)
failed to change state when de-energized. This failure was detected during the
performance of a preventive maintenance procedure developed to periodically
cycle each of the six SOVs to prevent a sticking problem similar to SOV fail- ures previously experienced on November 2, 1984. In that earlier event, two
feedwater bypass valves failed to open automatically and the cause was deter- mined to be sticking SOVs. The faulty SOV was ASCO Model NP8320A-185E and the
licensee has been unable to determine the cause of the malfunction. The
Attachment 2 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to
86-56 Reliability Of Main Steam 7/10/86 All PWR facilities
Safety Valves holding an OL or CP
86-55 Delayed Access To Safety- 7/10/86 All power reactor
Related Areas And Equipment facilities holding
During Plant Emergencies an OL or CP
86-54 Criminal Prosecution Of A 6/27/86 All holders of by- Former Radiation Safety product, source, or
Officer Who Willfully special nuclear
Directed An Unqualified material
Individual To Perform
Radiography
86-53 Improper Use Of Heat Shrink- 6/26/86 All power reactor
able Tubing facilities holding
an OL or CP
86-52 Conductor Insulation Degrada- 6/26/86 All power reactor
tion On Foxboro Model E facilities holding
Controllers an OL or CP
86-51 Excessive Pneumatic Leakage 6/18/86 All BWR facilities
In The Automatic Depressuriza- holding an OL or CP
tion System
86-50 Inadequate Testing To Detect 6/18/86 All power reactor
Failures Of Safety-Related facilities holding
Pneumatic Components Or an OL or CP
Systems
86-49 Age/Environment Induced 6/16/86 All power reactor
Electrical Cable Failues facilities holding
an OL or CP
86-48 Inadequate Testing Of Boron 6/13/86 All BWR facilities
Solution Concentration In The holding an OL or CP
Standby Liquid Control System
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
|
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list | - Information Notice 1986-01, Failure of Main Feedwater Check Valves Causes Loss of Feedwater System Integrity and Water-Hammer Damage (6 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-02, Failure of Valve Operator Motor During Environmental Qualification Testing (6 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-03, Potential Deficiencies in Enviromental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring (14 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-04, Transient Due to Loss of Power to Intergrated Control System at a Pressurized Water Reactor Designed by Babcock & Wilcox (31 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-05, Main Steam Safety Valve Test Failures and Ring Setting Adjustments (31 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-06, Failure of Lifting Rig Attachment, While Lifting Upper Guide Structure at St. Lucie Unit 1 (3 February 1986, Topic: Control of Heavy Loads)
- Information Notice 1986-06, Failure of Lifting Rig Attachment, while Lifting Upper Guide Structure at St. Lucie Unit 1 (3 February 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-07, Lack of Detailed Instruction & Inadequate Observance of Precautions During Maintenance & Testing of Diesel Generator Woodward Governors (3 February 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-08, Licensee Event Report (LER) Format Modification (3 February 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-09, Failure of Check & Stop Check Valves Subjected to Low Flow Conditions (3 February 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-10, Degradation of Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Resulting From Boric Acid Corrosion. (5 January 1995, Topic: Boric Acid)
- Information Notice 1986-10, Feedwater Line Break (10 November 1988, Topic: Coatings, Anchor Darling)
- Information Notice 1986-10, Degradation of Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Resulting from Boric Acid Corrosion. (5 January 1995, Topic: Boric Acid)
- Information Notice 1986-11, Anomalous Behavior of Recirculation Loop Flow in Jet Pump BWR Plants (31 December 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-13, Standby Liquid Control System Squib Valves Failure to Fire (21 February 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-13, Standby Liquid Control Squib Valves Failure to Fire (5 August 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-14, Overspeed Trips of AFW, HPCI & RCIC Turbines (26 August 1991, Topic: Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1986-14, Overspeed Trips of Afw, HPCI & RCIC Turbines (26 August 1991)
- Information Notice 1986-15, Loss of Offsite Power Caused by Problems in Fiber Optics Systems (10 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-16, Failures to Identify Containment Leakage Due to Inadequate Local Testing of BWR Vacuum Relief System Valves (11 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-17, Update of Failure of Automatic Sprinkler System Valves to Operate (24 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-18, NRC On-Scene Response During a Major Emergency (26 March 1986, Topic: Squib, Backfit)
- Information Notice 1986-19, Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Failure at Crystal River (21 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-20, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Scaling Factors, 10 CFR Part 61 (28 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-21, Recognition of American Society of Mechanical Engineers Accreditation Program for N Stamp Holders (31 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-22, Underresponse of Radiation Survey Instrument to High Radiation Fields (31 March 1986, Topic: High Radiation Area, Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-23, Excessive Skin Exposures Due to Contamination with Hot Particles (9 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-23, Excessive Skin Exposures due to Contamination with Hot Particles (9 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-24, Respirator Users Notice: Increased Inspection Frequency for Certain Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Air Cylinders (11 April 1986, Topic: Hydrostatic)
- Information Notice 1986-25, Traceability and Material Control of Material and Equipment, Particularly Fasteners (11 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-26, Potential Problems in Generators Manufactured by Electrical Products Incorporated (17 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-27, Access Control at Nuclear Facilities (21 April 1986, Topic: Contraband)
- Information Notice 1986-28, Telephone Numbers to the NRC Operations Center and Regional Offices (24 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-29, Effects of Changing Valve Moter-Operator Switch Settings (25 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-30, Design Limitations of Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Systems (29 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-31, Unauthorized Transfer and Loss of Control of Industrial Nuclear Gauges (14 July 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-32, Request for Collection of Licensee Radioactivity Measurements Attributed to Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident (2 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-33, Information for Licensee Regarding the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident (6 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-34, Improper Assembly, Material Selection, & Test of Valves & Their Actuators (13 May 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-34, Improper Assembly, Material Selection, & Test of Valves & their Actuators (13 May 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-35, Fire in Compressible Material at Dresden Unit 3 (15 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-36, Change in NRC Practice Regarding Issuance of Confirming Letters to Principal Contractors (16 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-37, Degradation of Station Batteries (16 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-38, Deficient Operator Actions Following Dual Function Valve Failures (20 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-39, Failures of RHR Pump Motors and Pump Internals (20 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-40, Degraded Ability to Isolate the Reactor Coolant System from Low-Pressure Coolant Systems in Bwrs (5 June 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-40, Degraded Ability to Isolate the Reactor Coolant System from Low-Pressure Coolant Systems in BWRs (5 June 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-41, Evaluation of Questionable Exposure Readings of Licensee Personnel Dosimeters (9 June 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-42, Improper Maintenance of Radiation Monitoring Systems (9 June 1986, Topic: Temporary Modification, Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-43, Problems with Silver Zeolite Sampling of Airborne Radioiodine (10 June 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
... further results |
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