Information Notice 2002-14, Ensuring a Capability to Evacuate Individuals, Including Members of the Public, from the Owner-Controlled Area

Ensuring a Capability to Evacuate Individuals, Including Members of the Public, from the Owner-Controlled Area

ML020980006
Person / Time
Issue date:	04/08/2002
From:	Beckner W NRC/NRR/DRIP/RORP
To:
Robert Benedict, 415-1157
References
IN-02-014
Download: ML020980006 (11)

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555

APRIL 8, 2002

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-14:

ENSURING A CAPABILITY TO EVACUATE

INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE

PUBLIC, FROM THE OWNER-CONTROLLED

AREA

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, including those who have ceased

operations but have fuel on site.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to inform

addressees of inspection findings concerning a licensees capability to evacuate individuals, including members of the public, from the owner-controlled area in the event of an emergency.

The NRC expects recipients to review the information for applicability to their facilities and

consider taking actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, the suggestions

contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements and, therefore, no

specific action or written response is required.

Background

Title 10, Section 100.3 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 100.3) defines an

exclusion area for power reactors and §100.11(a)(1) prescribes how to determine the

boundary of the exclusion area. Specifically, §100.3 states that residents shall be subject to

ready removal in case of necessity. Activities unrelated to operations of the reactor may be

permitted in an exclusion area under appropriate limitations, provided that no significant

hazards to the public health and safety will result. Exposure to more than routinely permitted

concentrations of radioactive material could result in a significant hazard to the health and

safety of the public.

Section 20.1003 defines several terms applicable to this discussion:

A member of the public is any individual, except when he or she is receiving an

occupational dose.

Occupational dose is the dose received by an individual in the course of employment in

which the individuals assigned duties involve exposure to radiation or radioactive

material from licensed and/or unlicensed sources of radiation, whether in the possession

of the licensee or another person. Occupational dose does not include the dose

received from background radiation, from any medical administration the individual has

received, from exposure to individuals who have been administered radioactive material

and released in accordance with §35.75 [10 CFR 35.75], from voluntary participation in

medical research programs, or as a member of the public.

Public dose is the dose received by a member of the public from exposure to radiation

or radioactive material released by a licensee, or any other source of radiation under the

control of a licensee. Public dose does not include occupational dose or the dose

received from background radiation, from any medical administration the individual has

received, from exposure to individuals who have been administered radioactive material

and released in accordance with §35.75, or from voluntary participation in medical

research programs.

The owner-controlled area is an area outside of a restricted area, but inside the site

boundary, to which the licensee can limit access for any reason.

10 CFR 50.47(b)(7) states that Information is made available to the public on a periodic basis

on how they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency (e.g.,

listening to a local broadcast station and remaining indoors), the principal points of contact with

the news media for dissemination of information during an emergency (including the physical

location or locations) are established in advance, and procedures for coordinated dissemination

of information to the public are established.

The planning standard, §50.47(b)(10), states that A range of protective actions has been

developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ [emergency planning zone] for emergency

workers and the public. In developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to

evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic use of potassium iodide

(KI), as appropriate. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the

ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.

The importance of protecting individuals, including members of the public, in the owner- controlled area is reflected in the emergency preparedness cornerstone of the NRCs reactor

oversight process (ROP). The ROP identifies the planning standard as a risk-significant

planning standard (RSPS).

The following section describes one licensees failure to adequately meet the requirements of

the planning standard defined by §50.47(b)(10). That failure prevented the licensee from

ensuring protection of the public in the owner-controlled area.

Description

The facility owned by a certain licensee has two partially completed nuclear power reactors

within the exclusion area of an operating reactor. Construction of these units has been

suspended and they have been in a maintenance regime for several years. No nuclear fuel or

other significant radioactive sources are stored at the inactive sites. The staff at the operating reactor did not exercise oversight responsibility for the incomplete

plants. This responsibility had been transferred to a separate business unit in the licensees

corporate organization after construction was suspended. The business unit maintains an

office in the area. The business unit has been leasing space in otherwise unused buildings

(primarily vacant offices and warehouses originally constructed to support the inactive plants)

to various general businesses without the direct involvement of staff at the operating reactor.

As reported in Inspection Report 50/397/01-008 (Accession Number ML 012880417), the NRC

inspected this site in July 2001. The inspection revealed weaknesses in the licensees ability to

notify and evacuate members of the public (lessee employees) from the exclusion area, to

monitor the evacuating people for radioactive contamination, and to decontaminate them as

necessary. The NRC determined that these weaknesses constituted a violation of §50.54(q),

which requires, in part, that a licensee authorized to possess and operate a nuclear power

reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in

§50.47(b), and a violation of the planning standard, §50.47(b)(10), which requires that a range

of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure pathway emergency

planning zone for emergency workers and the public. The violation was determined to be

safety-significant because members of the public could be exposed to radiation and/or

radioactive material in the event of an emergency if appropriate protective actions were not

taken.

The licensee stated that lessees would be notified of an exclusion area evacuation by external

audible sirens and security sweeps; additional methods were available to notify licensee and

licensee contractor personnel. One of the sirens was under the direct control of the staff at the

operating reactor; others would have to be locally activated at the inactive sites. Signs along

the plant access roads would inform people how to respond to the sirens. The licensee also

expected that the business unit representative would contact each lessee by telephone when

notified of an evacuation decision. General procedures were in place to establish security

roadblocks along plant access roads during an exclusion area evacuation and to perform

limited sweeps of the exclusion and owner-controlled areas.

The licensee had established a pre-designated assembly and decontamination center at a

company location outside the EPZ for use by licensee and licensee contractor personnel

following an evacuation. Licensee and licensee contractor personnel received initial and

refresher training on expected actions for evacuation, offsite assembly, radiological monitoring, and personnel decontamination. However, the licensee did not provide similar training and

information to the members of the public within the owner-controlled area.

The NRC and the licensee agreed that (1) lessee operations were permitted under §100.3,

(2) lessee employees in the exclusion area were members of the public, (3) the licensee was

responsible for promptly evacuating lessee employees as necessary, (4) the licensee was

required to have the capability to effectively notify lessees of an exclusion area evacuation

within about 15 minutes of the evacuation decision, and (5) the licensee was responsible for

providing radiological monitoring to lessee employees and decontaminating them as required.

The NRC identified the following weaknesses in the licensees ability to effectively notify, evacuate, monitor, and decontaminate lessee personnel: *

Licensee test data indicated that the external sirens could not be heard inside some

lessee buildings, and the primary siren was out of service for 13 consecutive months.

The licensee had not prepared written procedures for activating the business unit call- tree, and the process relied on someone to answer a specific telephone in the lessees

office.

The licensee had no detailed written procedures for security sweeps, had not identified

the locations of occupied spaces, had given security officers little or no training on the

exclusion area evacuation process (including performing sweeps), and had not tested

the effectiveness of sweeps by drills or other means.

Although the licensee gave lessees a copy of an emergency plan specific to the

incomplete reactor units, the plan mainly covered industrial accidents and pertained only

to licensee and licensee contractor operations. The plan did not address radiological

monitoring or decontamination. Specifically, the licensee did not give lessees

information on the evacuation route and the assembly area. The NRC interviewed

employees at several lessee sites and found that only half knew about the proper

response to an emergency siren.

The licensee did not ensure that lessee employees received training on emergency plan

requirements, the expected response to a notification siren, evacuation routes, the

offsite assembly area, or radiological monitoring and decontamination.

Some members of the emergency response organization at the operating reactor were

not aware of the presence of lessees (members of the public) within the exclusion area

boundary. As a result, key decision makers may have been unaware of the need to

protect the lessees and their employees.

The licensee stated that it would establish a security roadblock along the access road to

the inactive construction sites to inform lessee employees of the emergency and direct

them to the offsite assembly area for radiological monitoring. However, the licensee

acknowledged that there might be circumstances in which the single roadblock would be

delayed or not established, thereby delaying evacuation of the exclusion area.

The licensee had not evaluated or exercised the capability to evacuate members of the

public from the owner-controlled area as part of the licensees drill program.

Discussion

The evaluation criteria for the planning standard §50.47(b)(10) are based, in part, on

NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response

Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,Section II.J.1.: Each licensee shall establish the means and time required to warn or advise

onsite individuals and individuals who may be in areas controlled by the operator, including:

a.

Employees not having emergency assignments;

b.

Visitors;

c.

Contractor and construction personnel; and

d.

Other persons who may be in the public access areas on or passing through the

site or within the owner controlled area.

The term owner-controlled area, as used in NUREG-0654, encompasses all areas contiguous

to the reactor site property that is owned or leased by the licensee (or by any of its associated

business units) over which the licensee exercises control. The owner-controlled area is usually

larger than, and encompasses, the exclusion area.

The planning standard and the evaluation criteria in NUREG-0654 provide a basis for licensee

actions that are necessary to protect the health and safety of members of the public who are in

the owner-controlled area. The range of actions may include, but is not limited to, evacuation, sheltering, decontamination, and the use of potassium iodide (KI) for those licensees in States

that have adopted its use for members of the public.

Situations that could have individuals, including members of the public, in a licensees owner- controlled area include the following examples:

visitors at the visitor center or media center

employee and family recreational facilities or areas

visitors in physical fitness center

lessee employees in leased buildings

hunters or fishermen

individuals using biking or walking trails

individuals making deliveries or providing services (catering, filling drink machines, etc).

This list is not intended to be all-inclusive but to indicate the potential scope of situations that

require adequate planning. Inclusion of these situations in the licensees emergency

preparedness drill and exercise program can provide valuable insights regarding the quality and

capability of the planning effort.

Furthermore, the planning standard, §50.47(b)(7), requires licensees to provide members of the

public, in the owner-controlled area and beyond the site boundary, with information on how they

will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency. Section II.G of

NUREG-0654 establishes the related evaluation criteria. Effective integration of licensees onsite plans with State and local plans can ensure that

essentially all members of the public will be notified of protective actions to be taken and that

the actions can be implemented in a timely manner.

This information notice does not require any specific action or written response. If you have

any questions about this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or the

appropriate project manager in the NRCs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR).

/RA/

William D. Beckner, Program Director

Operating Reactor Improvements Program

Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts:

Thomas B. Blount, NRR

Gail M. Good or Paul Elkmann, RIV

301-415-1501

817-860-8215 or 817-276-6539 Email: txb1@nrc.gov

E-mail: gmg@nrc.gov or pje@nrc.gov

Attachment

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\REXB\\RAB1\\IN-EVAC8.WPD

• See previous concurrence

OFFICE

RSE:OES:DRIP

Tech Editor

IOLB:DIPM

RIV

(A)SC:OES:DRIP PD:RORP:DRIP

NAME

RABenedict*

PAG*

GMTracy*

GMGood*

TKoshy*

WDBeckner*

DATE

03/28/2002

03/25/2002

04/03/2002

03/28/2002

04/05/2002

04/08/2002

______________________________________________________________________________________

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

Attachment 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Information

Date of

Notice No.

Subject

Issuance

Issued to

_____________________________________________________________________________________

2002-13

Possible Indicators of Ongoing

Reactor Pressure Vessel Head

Degradation

04/04/2002

All holders of operating licenses

for pressurized water nuclear

power reactors, except those who

have permanently ceased

operations and certified that fuel

has been permanently removed

from the reactor.

99-28, Supp 1

Recall of Star Brand Fire

Protection Sprinkler Heads

03/22/2002

All holders of licenses for nuclear

power, research, and test

reactors and fuel cycle facilities.

2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related

Electrical Cables

03/21/2002

All holders of operating licenses

or construction permits for

nuclear power reactors

2002-11

Recent Experience with

Degradation of Reactor

Pressure Vessel Head

03/12/2002

All holders of operating licenses

for pressurized-water reactors

(PWRs), except those who have

permanently ceased operations

and have certified that fuel has

been permanently removed from

the reactor.

2002-10

Nonconservative Water Level

Setpoints on Steam

Generators

03/07/2002

All holders of operating licenses

for nuclear power reactors, except those who have

permanently ceased operations

and have certified that fuel has

been permanently removed from

the reactor.

2002-09

Potential for Top Nozzle

Separation and Dropping of

Certain Type of Westinghouse

Fuel Assembly

02/13/2002

All holders of operating licenses

for nuclear power reactors, and

non-power reactors and holders

of licenses for permanently

shutdown facilities with fuel

onsite.