05000456/FIN-2010005-02: Difference between revisions
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| significance = Severity level IV | | significance = Severity level IV | ||
| cornerstone = Mitigating Systems | | cornerstone = Mitigating Systems | ||
| violation of = | | violation of = None | ||
| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71152 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71152 | ||
| Inspector = E Duncan, J Robbinsm, | | Inspector = E Duncan, J Robbinsm, Holmbergm Perry, M Thorpe Kavanaugh, N Feliz Adomo, R Jicklin, R Ng, T Go, B Metrow, B Palagi, D Betancourt, D Jones, E Duncan, J Benjamin, J Dalzell, J Robbins | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = A Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) was identified by the inspectors when licensee personnel failed to report known conditions that could have prevented the fulfillment of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system to perform its designed emergency core cooling safety function while operating in the shutdown cooling mode of operation, within 60 days of discovery. Specifically, upon receipt of Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL) 0904, Presence of Vapor in Emergency Core Cooling System/Residual Heat Removal System in Modes 3 or 4 Loss-of-Coolant Accident Conditions, the licensee determined that a loss of RHR system safety function occurred when both trains of the RHR system were placed into the shutdown cooling mode of operation above 200 degrees Fahrenheit (F). The station identified four instances in which both trains of RHR were operated in the shutdown cooling mode of operation above 200F over the previous 3 year period. The licensee, however, failed to report to the NRC within 60 days that the RHR safety function had been lost. The station entered this issue into the CAP as IR 1155372. Corrective actions included the issuance of Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000456/457/2010-007-00 on January 18, 2010. The inspectors determined that the failure to report this LER in accordance with NRC regulations was a performance deficiency since this issue had the potential to impact the regulatory process. Therefore, this violation was dispositioned through the traditional enforcement process. The inspectors determined that this issue was a Severity Level IV violation based on a similar example referenced in NRC Enforcement Policy Supplement I, Example D.4. The inspectors evaluated this issue under the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) and did not identify a performance deficiency that could be assessed under the SDP. (Section 4OA2.2) | | description = A Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) was identified by the inspectors when licensee personnel failed to report known conditions that could have prevented the fulfillment of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system to perform its designed emergency core cooling safety function while operating in the shutdown cooling mode of operation, within 60 days of discovery. Specifically, upon receipt of Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL) 0904, Presence of Vapor in Emergency Core Cooling System/Residual Heat Removal System in Modes 3 or 4 Loss-of-Coolant Accident Conditions, the licensee determined that a loss of RHR system safety function occurred when both trains of the RHR system were placed into the shutdown cooling mode of operation above 200 degrees Fahrenheit (F). The station identified four instances in which both trains of RHR were operated in the shutdown cooling mode of operation above 200F over the previous 3 year period. The licensee, however, failed to report to the NRC within 60 days that the RHR safety function had been lost. The station entered this issue into the CAP as IR 1155372. Corrective actions included the issuance of Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000456/457/2010-007-00 on January 18, 2010. The inspectors determined that the failure to report this LER in accordance with NRC regulations was a performance deficiency since this issue had the potential to impact the regulatory process. Therefore, this violation was dispositioned through the traditional enforcement process. The inspectors determined that this issue was a Severity Level IV violation based on a similar example referenced in NRC Enforcement Policy Supplement I, Example D.4. The inspectors evaluated this issue under the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) and did not identify a performance deficiency that could be assessed under the SDP. (Section 4OA2.2) | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:40, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Braidwood  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000456/2010005 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
| Type: | TEV: Severity level IV |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | E Duncan J Robbinsm Holmbergm Perry M Thorpe Kavanaugh N Feliz Adomo R Jicklin R Ng T Go B Metrow B Palagi D Betancourt D Jones E Duncan J Benjamin J Dalzell J Robbins |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |