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* Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit MAR 211991 LR-N97184 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 272/97-004-00 SALEM GENERATING STATION -UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 Gentlemen:
t"}7 PS~G                    *
This Licensee Event Report (LER) entitled "Inadequate Surveillance Testing of Molded Case Circuit Breakers" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.73(a)
* Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit MAR 211991 LR-N97184 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 272/97-004-00 SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 Gentlemen:
(2) (i) (B). Attachment DVH C Distribution LER File _3. 7 9703280229 970321 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR Sincerely, David F.-
This Licensee Event Report (LER) entitled "Inadequate Surveillance Testing of Molded Case Circuit Breakers" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (i) (B).
General Manager Salem Operations I If llll /11/11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 St 1
Sincerely,
* ii & 3 I St
                                                ~O r-:QqJ!.c~oJ David F.-  ~~chow General Manager Salem Operations Attachment DVH C           Distribution LER File _3. 7 9703280229 970321 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S                         PDR IIfllll /11/11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 St     1
* 95-2168 REV. 6/94
* ii   &     ~  3     I   St
--NRC fORM 366 U.S. NUCL AR REGULATORY COMMISSION AP OVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 . ("'r95) EXPIRES 04/30/98 . ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.
* 95-2168 REV. 6/94
FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION (See reverse for required number of AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC. 20555-0001, AND TO digits/characters for each block) THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503. FACILITY NAllE (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3) SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 1 of 3 TITLE (4)' Inadequate Surveillance Testing of Molded Case Circuit Breakers.
 
EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) YEAR I FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR SEQUENTIAL I REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Salem, Unit 2 05000311 02 21 97 97 004 00 03 97 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER --OPERATING NA THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11) MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) x 50. 73(a)(2)(i)
NRC fORM 366                         U.S. NUCL AR REGULATORY COMMISSION                                                 AP     OVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104
: 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)
. ("'r95)                                                                                                                             EXPIRES 04/30/98 .
POWER 000 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
: 50. 73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                                              LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.               FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR (See reverse for required number of                                                  REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC. 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF digits/characters for each block)                                                  MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
FACILITY NAllE (1)                                                                                             DOCKET NUMBER (2)                                   PAGE (3)
: 50. 73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4)
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1                                                                               05000272                                         1 of 3 TITLE (4)'
: 50. 73(a)(2)(iv)
Inadequate Surveillance Testing of Molded Case Circuit Breakers.
OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1)
EVENT DATE (5)                 LER NUMBER (6)               REPORT DATE (7)                                         OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
: 50. 73(a)(2)(v)
MONTH         DAY     YEAR    YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION NUMBER MONTH         DAY                   YEAR FACILITY NAME Salem, Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 05000311 FACILITY NAME                            DOCKET NUMBER 02         21       97     97   -    004       -    00       03                                   97 OPERATING             NA     THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)
Abstract below or in C Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2)
MODE (9)                     20.2201(b)                     20.2203(a)(2)(v)                                 x 50. 73(a)(2)(i)                         50. 73(a)(2)(viii)
: 50. 73(a)(2)(vii)
POWER             000       20.2203(a)(1)                   20.2203(a)(3)(i)                                     50. 73(a)(2)(ii)                     50.73(a)(2)(x)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) Brian J. Thomas, Licensing Engineer 609-339-2022 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE I CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS TONPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR 'YES xlNO SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). DATE (15) ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spac;:ed typewritten lines) (16) During NRC inspection activities, an inadequate performance of a surveillance requirement was identified.
LEVEL (10)                   20.2203(a)(2)(i)               20.2203(a)(3)(ii)                                     50. 73(a)(2)(iii)                     73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)               20.2203(a)(4)                                         50. 73(a)(2)(iv)                     OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)             50.36(c)(1)                                           50. 73(a)(2)(v)                 Spec~in Abstract below or in     C Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)               50.36(c)(2)                                           50. 73(a)(2)(vii)
Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
: 4. 8. 3. 1. a .*2 requires that ten percent of each type of all required containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices (e.g., circuit breakers) required to provide thermal protection of a penetration be verified operable every 18 months. In addition, TS 4.8.3.1.b requires.each required overcurrent protection device be inspected and have the manufacturer's preventative maintenance performed once per 60 months. Contrary to these requirements an adequate verification of the required overcurrent protection devices was not performed.
NAME                                                                                                               TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Certain elements of the. protective devices were not verified, because an acceptance criterion was not specified in the procedure.
Brian J. Thomas, Licensing Engineer                                                                                 609-339-2022 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE         SYSTEM     COMPONENT   MANUFACTURER     REPORTABLE                                   CAUSE       SYSTEM     COMPONENT     MANUFACTURER         REPORTABLE TO NPRDS                                                                                               TONPRDS
      'YES SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
I::::::::::::::::::::::::~:~:~
xlNO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
MONTH          DAY        YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spac;:ed typewritten lines) (16)
During NRC inspection activities, an inadequate performance of a surveillance requirement was identified.                             Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 4. 8. 3. 1. a .*2 requires that ten percent of each type of all required containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices (e.g., circuit breakers) required to provide thermal protection of a penetration be verified operable every 18 months.                             In addition, TS 4.8.3.1.b requires.each required overcurrent protection device be inspected and have the manufacturer's preventative maintenance performed once per 60 months.                                                                         Contrary to these requirements an adequate verification of the required overcurrent protection devices was not performed.                             Certain elements of the. protective devices were not verified, because an acceptance criterion was not specified in the procedure.
The protection devices were adequately tested, and the test procedures were clarified to better define the TS requirements.
The protection devices were adequately tested, and the test procedures were clarified to better define the TS requirements.
This event is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 73 (2),(i) (B)' any operation or condition prohibited by TS. NRC FORM 366 (4-95)
This event is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 73 (2),(i) (B)' any operation or condition prohibited by TS.
,, NRC FORM 366A (4-95) U. . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 2 97 -004 -00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) PLANT AND SYSTEM ID.ENTIFICATION Westinghouse  
NRC FORM 366 (4-95)
-
 
Water Reactor 460V/230V/120V Breakers {-/BKR}
NRC FORM 366A                                                                       U. . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)
* Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CC} CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE OF 3 At the time of identification, Salem Unit 1 was defueled and Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 5. DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE During NRC inspection activities, an inadequate performance of a surveillance requirement was identified.
,,                                              LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
Specifically, Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 4.8.3.1.a.2 requires that ten* percent of each type of all required containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices (e.g., circuit breakers {-/BKR}) required to provide thermal protection of containment penetrations  
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)                           DOCKET NUMBER (2)     LER NUMBER (6)               PAGE (3) 05000272     YEAR I   SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER   2   OF    3 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 97   -   004     -     00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
*be verified operable every 18 months. In addition, TS 4.8.3.1.b states each required overcurrent protection device be inspected and have the manufacturer's preventative maintenance performed once per 60 months. Contrary to these requirements verification of the required overcurrent protection devices was not performed.
PLANT AND SYSTEM ID.ENTIFICATION Westinghouse -           Pressuriz~d          Water Reactor 460V/230V/120V Breakers {-/BKR}
Three distinct types of molded case circuit breakers are used at Salem Generating Station to provide thermal protection for The first type of molded case circuit breaker has a thermal element and an adjustable instantaneous trip function.
* Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CC}
The second type of molded case circuit. breakers has a thermal element and a fixed instantaneous trip funcition.
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE At the time of identification, Salem Unit 1 was defueled and Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 5.
The third type of molded case circuit breaker has only an adjustable .instantaneous trip function (i.e., no thermal element in the circuit breaker.)
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE During NRC inspection activities, an inadequate performance of a surveillance requirement was identified. Specifically, Technical Specification (TS)
The instantaneous trip function in the third type of molded case circuit breaker was tested during surveillance testing. The thermal element of the first and second type of molded case circuit breaker was tested during surveillance testing; however, the fixed instantaneous and adjustable instantaneous trip functions for the first and second type of *molded case circuit breakers was not by the. surveillance test. CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The station procedures accurately identified that the thermal element and the instantaneous element required testing; however, the instantaneous element was not tested, because an acceptance criterion for the instantaneous function was not accurately specified in the NRC FORM 366A (4-95))
Surveillance Requirement 4.8.3.1.a.2 requires that ten* percent of each type of all required containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices (e.g., circuit breakers {-/BKR}) required to provide thermal protection of containment penetrations *be verified operable every 18 months.                                         In addition, TS 4.8.3.1.b states each required overcurrent protection device be inspected and have the manufacturer's preventative maintenance performed once per 60 months.
NRC FORM 366A (4-95) U. . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 2 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 97 -004 -00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES PAGE (3) 3 OF 3 A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2 issued in the last two years identified ten LERs (272/95-019, 272/96-004, 272/96-006, 272/96-008, 272/96-016, 008, 311/96-003, 311/96-007, 311/96-010 and 311/96-011) where surveillance requirements were not performed because of procedure problems.
Contrary to these requirements ad~quate verification of the required overcurrent protection devices was not performed.
The identification of this programmatic issue, along with other related issues, resulted in the initiation of the Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Program (TSSIP) described in LER Jll/95-008.
Three distinct types of molded case circuit breakers are used at Salem Generating Station to provide thermal protection for con~ainment pe~etrations.
The TSSIP should ensure that Technical Specification surveillance requirements are adequately implemented.
The first type of molded case circuit breaker has a thermal element and an adjustable instantaneous trip function. The second type of molded case circuit.
breakers has a thermal element and a fixed instantaneous trip funcition.                                               The third type of molded case circuit breaker has only an adjustable .instantaneous trip function (i.e., no thermal element in the circuit breaker.)
The instantaneous trip function in the third type of molded case circuit breaker was tested during surveillance testing. The thermal element of the first and second type of molded case circuit breaker was tested during surveillance testing; however, the fixed instantaneous and adjustable instantaneous trip functions for the first and second type of *molded case circuit breakers was not
    ~ested by the. surveillance test.
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The station procedures accurately identified that the thermal element and the instantaneous element required testing; however, the instantaneous element was not tested, because an acceptance criterion for the instantaneous function was not accurately specified in the procedu~e.
NRC FORM 366A (4-95))
 
NRC FORM 366A                                                                         U. . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)                            DOCKET NUMBER (2)       LER NUMBER (6)             PAGE (3)
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1                                       05 0 0 0 2 7 2 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER   3  OF    3 97 -     004     -     00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2 issued in the last two years identified ten LERs (272/95-019, 272/96-004, 272/96-006, 272/96-008, 272/96-016, 311/95~
008, 311/96-003, 311/96-007, 311/96-010 and 311/96-011) where surveillance requirements were not performed adequ~tely because of procedure problems. The identification of this programmatic issue, along with other related issues, resulted in the initiation of the Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Program (TSSIP) described in LER Jll/95-008.                                   The TSSIP should ensure that Technical Specification surveillance requirements are adequately implemented.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS There were no safety consequences as a result of this event because the containment penetrations remained operable.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS There were no safety consequences as a result of this event because the containment penetrations remained operable.
Redundant protection devices (e.g. fuses, circuit breakers) are installed on these circuits.
Redundant protection devices (e.g. fuses, circuit breakers) are installed on these circuits.             These redundant protection devices are reliable, therefore, a fault would likely have caused a l~ast one of the piotection devices to tiip.
These redundant protection devices are reliable, therefore, a fault would likely have caused a one of the piotection devices to tiip. This is supported by the testing that was performed on the devices after this event was discovered.
This is supported by the testing that was performed on the devices after this event was discovered.                 The testing demonstrated that the tested circuit breaker instantaneous elements would have cleared the fault prior to exceeding the thermal capability of the penetration.
The testing demonstrated that the tested circuit breaker instantaneous elements would have cleared the fault prior to exceeding the thermal capability of the penetration.
Further, the thermal element for both the fixed instantaneous trip                                           and adjustable instantaneous trip circuit breakers were verified to be                                           operable in accordance with the TS.                   The thermal element provides a measure of                         fault protection such that it is unlikely that a fault would have caused                                           thermal damage to the ~lectrical penetration.
Further, the thermal element for both the fixed instantaneous trip and adjustable instantaneous trip circuit breakers were verified to be operable in accordance with the TS. The thermal element provides a measure of fault protection such that it is unlikely that a fault would have caused thermal damage to the penetration.
The health and safety of the public was not affected.
The health and safety of the public was not affected.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1. For Salem Unit 2, the protection devices were adequately tested. 2. For Salem Unit 1, the protection devices will be tested prior to entry into Mode 4. 3. The common test procedure was revised to better clarify the TS requirements.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
: 4. The Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Program (TSSIP) has been initiated for Salem Units 1 and 2. The scope and content of the TSSIP program was previously described in LER The TSSIP review is expected to be completed by December 31, 1997. NRC FORM 366A (4-95))}}
: 1.     For Salem Unit 2, the protection devices were adequately tested.
: 2.     For Salem Unit 1, the protection devices will be tested prior to entry into Mode 4.
: 3.     The common test procedure was revised to better clarify the TS requirements.
: 4.     The Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Program (TSSIP) has been initiated for Salem Units 1 and 2. The scope and content of the TSSIP program was previously described in LER 311/95~008-00.                                        The TSSIP review is expected to be completed by December 31, 1997.
NRC FORM 366A (4-95))}}

Latest revision as of 05:19, 3 February 2020

LER 97-004-00:on 970221,inadequate Surveillance Testing of Molded Case Circuit Breakers Were Identified.Caused by Instantaneous Function Not Accurately Specified in Procedure.Tssip Has Been initiated.W/970321 Ltr
ML18102A938
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 03/21/1997
From: Garchow D, Bernard Thomas
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-97-004-01, LER-97-4-1, LR-N97184, NUDOCS 9703280229
Download: ML18102A938 (4)


Text

"\

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t"}7 PS~G *

  • Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit MAR 211991 LR-N97184 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 272/97-004-00 SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 Gentlemen:

This Licensee Event Report (LER) entitled "Inadequate Surveillance Testing of Molded Case Circuit Breakers" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (i) (B).

Sincerely,

~O r-:QqJ!.c~oJ David F.- ~~chow General Manager Salem Operations Attachment DVH C Distribution LER File _3. 7 9703280229 970321 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR IIfllll /11/11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 St 1

  • ii & ~ 3 I St
  • 95-2168 REV. 6/94

NRC fORM 366 U.S. NUCL AR REGULATORY COMMISSION AP OVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104

. ("'r95) EXPIRES 04/30/98 .

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR (See reverse for required number of REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC. 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAllE (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 1 of 3 TITLE (4)'

Inadequate Surveillance Testing of Molded Case Circuit Breakers.

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME Salem, Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 05000311 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 02 21 97 97 - 004 - 00 03 97 OPERATING NA THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) x 50. 73(a)(2)(i) 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER 000 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50. 73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50. 73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50. 73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50. 73(a)(2)(v) Spec~in Abstract below or in C Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50. 73(a)(2)(vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Brian J. Thomas, Licensing Engineer 609-339-2022 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS TONPRDS

'YES SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

I::::::::::::::::::::::::~:~:~

xlNO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spac;:ed typewritten lines) (16)

During NRC inspection activities, an inadequate performance of a surveillance requirement was identified. Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 4. 8. 3. 1. a .*2 requires that ten percent of each type of all required containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices (e.g., circuit breakers) required to provide thermal protection of a penetration be verified operable every 18 months. In addition, TS 4.8.3.1.b requires.each required overcurrent protection device be inspected and have the manufacturer's preventative maintenance performed once per 60 months. Contrary to these requirements an adequate verification of the required overcurrent protection devices was not performed. Certain elements of the. protective devices were not verified, because an acceptance criterion was not specified in the procedure.

The protection devices were adequately tested, and the test procedures were clarified to better define the TS requirements.

This event is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 73 (2),(i) (B)' any operation or condition prohibited by TS.

NRC FORM 366 (4-95)

NRC FORM 366A U. . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)

,, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER 2 OF 3 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 97 - 004 - 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM ID.ENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressuriz~d Water Reactor 460V/230V/120V Breakers {-/BKR}

  • Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CC}

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE At the time of identification, Salem Unit 1 was defueled and Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 5.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE During NRC inspection activities, an inadequate performance of a surveillance requirement was identified. Specifically, Technical Specification (TS)

Surveillance Requirement 4.8.3.1.a.2 requires that ten* percent of each type of all required containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices (e.g., circuit breakers {-/BKR}) required to provide thermal protection of containment penetrations *be verified operable every 18 months. In addition, TS 4.8.3.1.b states each required overcurrent protection device be inspected and have the manufacturer's preventative maintenance performed once per 60 months.

Contrary to these requirements ad~quate verification of the required overcurrent protection devices was not performed.

Three distinct types of molded case circuit breakers are used at Salem Generating Station to provide thermal protection for con~ainment pe~etrations.

The first type of molded case circuit breaker has a thermal element and an adjustable instantaneous trip function. The second type of molded case circuit.

breakers has a thermal element and a fixed instantaneous trip funcition. The third type of molded case circuit breaker has only an adjustable .instantaneous trip function (i.e., no thermal element in the circuit breaker.)

The instantaneous trip function in the third type of molded case circuit breaker was tested during surveillance testing. The thermal element of the first and second type of molded case circuit breaker was tested during surveillance testing; however, the fixed instantaneous and adjustable instantaneous trip functions for the first and second type of *molded case circuit breakers was not

~ested by the. surveillance test.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The station procedures accurately identified that the thermal element and the instantaneous element required testing; however, the instantaneous element was not tested, because an acceptance criterion for the instantaneous function was not accurately specified in the procedu~e.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95))

NRC FORM 366A U. . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05 0 0 0 2 7 2 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER 3 OF 3 97 - 004 - 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2 issued in the last two years identified ten LERs (272/95-019, 272/96-004, 272/96-006, 272/96-008, 272/96-016, 311/95~

008, 311/96-003, 311/96-007, 311/96-010 and 311/96-011) where surveillance requirements were not performed adequ~tely because of procedure problems. The identification of this programmatic issue, along with other related issues, resulted in the initiation of the Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Program (TSSIP) described in LER Jll/95-008. The TSSIP should ensure that Technical Specification surveillance requirements are adequately implemented.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS There were no safety consequences as a result of this event because the containment penetrations remained operable.

Redundant protection devices (e.g. fuses, circuit breakers) are installed on these circuits. These redundant protection devices are reliable, therefore, a fault would likely have caused a l~ast one of the piotection devices to tiip.

This is supported by the testing that was performed on the devices after this event was discovered. The testing demonstrated that the tested circuit breaker instantaneous elements would have cleared the fault prior to exceeding the thermal capability of the penetration.

Further, the thermal element for both the fixed instantaneous trip and adjustable instantaneous trip circuit breakers were verified to be operable in accordance with the TS. The thermal element provides a measure of fault protection such that it is unlikely that a fault would have caused thermal damage to the ~lectrical penetration.

The health and safety of the public was not affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. For Salem Unit 2, the protection devices were adequately tested.
2. For Salem Unit 1, the protection devices will be tested prior to entry into Mode 4.
3. The common test procedure was revised to better clarify the TS requirements.
4. The Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Program (TSSIP) has been initiated for Salem Units 1 and 2. The scope and content of the TSSIP program was previously described in LER 311/95~008-00. The TSSIP review is expected to be completed by December 31, 1997.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95))