ML110050116: Difference between revisions
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| issue date = 08/26/2010 | | issue date = 08/26/2010 | ||
| title = 2010 Fermi Initial License Examination - Operating Test Review Comments | | title = 2010 Fermi Initial License Examination - Operating Test Review Comments | ||
| author name = Reeser D | | author name = Reeser D | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OB | | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OB | ||
| addressee name = | | addressee name = | ||
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: 3. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-02 | : 3. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-02 | ||
: a. Revised to allow use of IPCS including addition of appropriate cues | : a. Revised to allow use of IPCS including addition of appropriate cues | ||
: b. Revised to include data tables (information to be provided when requested); allows performance in classroom setting rather than in Simulator | : b. Revised to include data tables (information to be provided when requested); | ||
allows performance in classroom setting rather than in Simulator | |||
: 4. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-03S | : 4. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-03S | ||
: a. Changed task from | : a. Changed task from Assess Shutdown Risk to Evaluate a Temporary Change Notice since procedure guidance for assessing risk was too generic to support a JPM. | ||
: b. Replacement JPM from bank | : b. Replacement JPM from bank | ||
: 5. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-04R | : 5. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-04R | ||
Line 55: | Line 56: | ||
: 12. JPM No. 2010-301-IP-03 | : 12. JPM No. 2010-301-IP-03 | ||
: a. Added clarifying information for evaluator | : a. Added clarifying information for evaluator | ||
: b. Added missed step | : b. Added missed step SCENARIO COMMENTS | ||
SCENARIO COMMENTS | |||
: 1. Scenario 1 | : 1. Scenario 1 | ||
: a. Eliminated reactivity manipulation to shorten scenario run time | : a. Eliminated reactivity manipulation to shorten scenario run time | ||
: b. Increased delay time for sticking IRM to provide a more noticeable indication of failure. c. Included additional role play messages for communicator | : b. Increased delay time for sticking IRM to provide a more noticeable indication of failure. | ||
: c. Included additional role play messages for communicator | |||
: d. Added clarification that applicants may isolate RCIC before auto isolation signal is actuated | : d. Added clarification that applicants may isolate RCIC before auto isolation signal is actuated | ||
: e. Added clarifying note for CRD Flow transmitter failure | : e. Added clarifying note for CRD Flow transmitter failure | ||
Line 73: | Line 73: | ||
: f. Revised response actions for Feed Pump suction strainer clogging to include possibility that applicants may trip pump rather than perform a controlled shutdown of pump (power already low enough to support single pump operation due to RR pump trip response) | : f. Revised response actions for Feed Pump suction strainer clogging to include possibility that applicants may trip pump rather than perform a controlled shutdown of pump (power already low enough to support single pump operation due to RR pump trip response) | ||
: 3. Scenario 3 | : 3. Scenario 3 | ||
: a. Changed CW system rupture event | : a. Changed CW system rupture event type from Major to Component failure. | ||
: b. Revised severity of SBFW Injection valve failure to permit some injection to ensure that response to small break LOCA is driven by containment parameters | : b. Revised severity of SBFW Injection valve failure to permit some injection to ensure that response to small break LOCA is driven by containment parameters and not RPV parameters | ||
and not RPV parameters | |||
: c. Eliminated RCIC malfunction and changed HPCI failure from a credited malfunction to recognition of failure. | : c. Eliminated RCIC malfunction and changed HPCI failure from a credited malfunction to recognition of failure. | ||
: d. Added Role-Play communications | : d. Added Role-Play communications | ||
: e. Changed stator water cooling malfunction from TCV failure to HX fouling | : e. Changed stator water cooling malfunction from TCV failure to HX fouling | ||
: f. Added clarifying information where needed.}} | : f. Added clarifying information where needed.}} |
Latest revision as of 05:50, 13 November 2019
ML110050116 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Fermi ![]() |
Issue date: | 08/26/2010 |
From: | David Reeser Operations Branch III |
To: | Detroit Edison |
References | |
50-341/10-301 | |
Download: ML110050116 (2) | |
Text
OPERATING TEST COMMENTS JPM COMMENTS
- 1. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-01R - Unable to setup simulator to support performance of MODE 5 Shiftly/Daily Surveillance
- a. Changed from a MODE 5 to MODE 4 surveillance
- b. Changed K/A from 2.1.44 to 2.1.18
- c. Changed task elements due to changes in MODE to include:
- i. Recording of Torus Water Level ii. Recording of RPV Flange Temperature iii. Identification abnormal indication for annunciator 3D57 iv. Identification of abnormal RHR configuration
- v. Identification of abnormal SRM indication
- 2. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-01S
- b. Changed SRM verification step
- i. From 1 SRM below 3 cps to 2 SRMs below 3 cps ii. Included completed SRM signal to noise verification packages to be evaluated
- c. Included Secondary Containment Differential Pressure Correction Tables as required material
- 3. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-02
- a. Revised to allow use of IPCS including addition of appropriate cues
- b. Revised to include data tables (information to be provided when requested);
allows performance in classroom setting rather than in Simulator
- 4. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-03S
- a. Changed task from Assess Shutdown Risk to Evaluate a Temporary Change Notice since procedure guidance for assessing risk was too generic to support a JPM.
- b. Replacement JPM from bank
- 5. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-04R
- a. Changed to RO only
- b. Revised required materials to include Mock Up RWP and Survey Map
- 6. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-04S
- b. Replacement JPM from bank
- 7. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-05S
- a. Updated to reflect changes in procedure.
- 8. JPM No. 2010-301-CR-04
- a. Included a recommended IC for setup
- b. Added clarifying information to evaluator prompt and note
- 9. JPM No. 2010-301-CR-05
- a. Added step to setup to ensure that injection path is isolated
- b. Added step to un-isolate injection path
- c. Included preferred level band in evaluator notes.
- 10. JPM No. 2010-301-CR-07
- a. Added guidance for simulator operator to act as RO responsible for maintaining reactor period and ranging of IRMs
- 11. JPM No. 2010-301-IP-02
- a. Changed valve number and fuse location to simplify access to panel
- 12. JPM No. 2010-301-IP-03
- a. Added clarifying information for evaluator
- b. Added missed step SCENARIO COMMENTS
- 1. Scenario 1
- a. Eliminated reactivity manipulation to shorten scenario run time
- b. Increased delay time for sticking IRM to provide a more noticeable indication of failure.
- c. Included additional role play messages for communicator
- d. Added clarification that applicants may isolate RCIC before auto isolation signal is actuated
- e. Added clarifying note for CRD Flow transmitter failure
- g. Changed mechanical vacuum pump failure from a credited component failure to simply an observation of failure
- 2. Scenario 2
- a. Changed RR Pump trip event type from Reactivity Manipulation to Component malfunction due to insufficient time between initiation of malfunction and automatic trip of pump.
- b. Added Role-Play communications
- c. Revised Bypass Valve Test expected actions to include both procedurally allowed methods for reclosing valve.
- d. Revised expected TS actions for failed accumulator to provide more detail
- e. Added expectation for insertion of CRAM array in response to RR Pump Trip
- f. Revised response actions for Feed Pump suction strainer clogging to include possibility that applicants may trip pump rather than perform a controlled shutdown of pump (power already low enough to support single pump operation due to RR pump trip response)
- 3. Scenario 3
- a. Changed CW system rupture event type from Major to Component failure.
- b. Revised severity of SBFW Injection valve failure to permit some injection to ensure that response to small break LOCA is driven by containment parameters and not RPV parameters
- c. Eliminated RCIC malfunction and changed HPCI failure from a credited malfunction to recognition of failure.
- d. Added Role-Play communications
- e. Changed stator water cooling malfunction from TCV failure to HX fouling
- f. Added clarifying information where needed.