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| issue date = 12/01/2015 | | issue date = 12/01/2015 | ||
| title = Response Regarding Phase 2 Staffing Submittals Associated with the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Power Plant Accident | | title = Response Regarding Phase 2 Staffing Submittals Associated with the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Power Plant Accident | ||
| author name = Halter M | | author name = Halter M | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR/JLD | | author affiliation = NRC/NRR/JLD | ||
| addressee name = Davison | | addressee name = Davison K | ||
| addressee affiliation = Northern States Power Co | | addressee affiliation = Northern States Power Co | ||
| docket = 05000282, 05000306 | | docket = 05000282, 05000306 | ||
| Line 14: | Line 14: | ||
| page count = 4 | | page count = 4 | ||
| project = TAC:MF6321, TAC:MF6322 | | project = TAC:MF6321, TAC:MF6322 | ||
| stage = | | stage = Other | ||
}} | }} | ||
=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter: | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 December 1, 2015 Mr. Kevin K. Davison Site Vice President Northern States Power Company - Minnesota Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant 1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089-9642 | ||
==SUBJECT:== | ==SUBJECT:== | ||
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -RESPONSE REGARDING PHASE 2 STAFFING SUBMITTALS ASSOCIATED WITH NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION | PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - | ||
RESPONSE REGARDING PHASE 2 STAFFING SUBMITTALS ASSOCIATED WITH NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 9.3 RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAl-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT (TAC NOS. MF6321 AND MF6322) | |||
== | ==Dear Mr. Davison:== | ||
By letter dated March 12, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No ML12053A340), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 O CFR) Part 50, Section 50.54(f) (hereafter referred to as the 50.54(f) letter), regarding Recommendations 2.1 (seismic and flooding evaluations), 2.3 {seismic and flooding walkdowns), and 9.3 (emergency preparedness communication and staffing) of the Near-Terrn Task Force (NTTF) review of insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. With respect to Recommendation 9.3, Enclosure 5 to the NRC's letter requested licensees and holders of construction permits to assess their means to power communications equipment onsite and offsite during a prolonged station blackout (SBO) event and to perform a staffing assessment to determine the staff required to fill all necessary positions in response to a multi-unit event. | |||
By letter dated March 12, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No | The 50.54(f) letter, in part, requested licensee responses pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f) pertaining to onsite and augmented staff availability to implement the strategies discussed in the emergency plan and plant operating procedures including new staff or functions resulting from the assessment, identified collateral duties, an implementation schedule to perform the assessments, identified modifications, and any changes that have been made or will be made to the emergency plan regarding 011-shift or augmented staffing. In addition, NTTF Recommendation 9.3 has a dependency on the implementation of NTTF Recommendation 4.2 (mitigating strategies). As a result of this dependency, licensees responded to the 50.54(f) letter in phases. The Phase 1 staffing assessment requested licensees to evaluate their ability to respond to a multi-unit extended loss of alternating current (ac) power (ELAP) event utilizing existing processes and procedures. The licensee responses to the 50.54(f) letter for Phase 1 staffing assessments for multi-unit sites were received and evaluated by the NRC staff. The NRC staff issued acknowle?gement letters to all licensees | ||
With respect to Recommendation 9.3, Enclosure 5 to the NRC's letter requested licensees and holders of construction permits to assess their means to power communications equipment onsite and offsite during a prolonged station blackout (SBO) event and to perform a staffing assessment to determine the staff required to fill all necessary positions in response to a multi-unit event. The 50.54(f) letter, in part, requested licensee responses pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f) pertaining to onsite and augmented staff availability to implement the strategies discussed in the emergency plan and plant operating procedures including new staff or functions resulting from the assessment, identified collateral duties, an implementation schedule to perform the assessments, identified modifications, and any changes that have been made or will be made to the emergency plan regarding 011-shift or augmented staffing. | |||
In addition, NTTF Recommendation 9.3 has a dependency on the implementation of NTTF Recommendation 4.2 (mitigating strategies). | K. Davison with multi-unit sites, with the exception of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, by April 28, 2014. | ||
As a result of this dependency, licensees responded to the 50.54(f) letter in phases. The Phase 1 staffing assessment requested licensees to evaluate their ability to respond to a multi-unit extended loss of alternating current (ac) power (ELAP) event utilizing existing processes and procedures. | Licensees were also requested to submit for NRG staff review a Phase 2 staffing assessment, which provides an assessment of the staffing necessary to perform the functions related to the strategies developed in response to NTTF Recommendation 4.2 and the resulting NRG Order EA-12-049, "Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events [BDBEE]" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A736). | ||
The licensee responses to the 50.54(f) letter for Phase 1 staffing assessments for multi-unit sites were received and evaluated by the NRC staff. The NRC staff issued acknowle?gement letters to all licensees K. Davison with multi-unit sites, with the exception of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, by April 28, 2014. Licensees were also requested to submit for NRG staff review a Phase 2 staffing assessment, which provides an assessment of the staffing necessary to perform the functions related to the strategies developed in response to NTTF Recommendation 4.2 and the resulting NRG Order EA-12-049, "Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events [BDBEE]" (ADAMS Accession No. | Licensees were requested to provide their Phase 2 Staffing Assessments to the NRC no later than four months prior to the beginning of their second refueling outage (as used in the context of NRG Order EA-12-049). By letter dated May 28, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15154A564), Northern States Power Company - Minnesota (the licensee) submitted its Phase 2 staffing assessment for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 to the NRG in response to the 50.54(f) letter. | ||
Licensees were requested to provide their Phase 2 Staffing Assessments to the NRC no later than four months prior to the beginning of their second refueling outage (as used in the context of NRG Order EA-12-049). | The NRG staff reviewed your Phase 2 staffing assessment in accordance with the assumptions and guidelines of Sections 2.2, 2.3, and 3 of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance document NEI 12-01, "Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12125A412), which was endorsed by the NRG staff by letter dated May 15, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12131A043). The NRC staff noted that you assessed your current onsite minimum staffing levels to identify any enhancements needed to respond following a beyond-design-basis large- scale natural event, and to ensure that the strategies contained in the existing emergency plan and plant operating procedures, such as those used in response to a SBO, can be performed by the site staff. Your assessment assumed that a large-scale natural event causes: | ||
By letter dated May 28, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. | (1) an ELAP, (2) all units on the site to be affected, and (3) access to the site to be impeded for a minimum of six hours. You also assessed your capability to perform the site specific functions related to the strategies developed in response to Order EA-12-049. You conducted independent reviews and concluded, based on your staffing assessment, that the existing on-shift minimum staff is sufficient to implement the loss of all ac power, multi-unit event response strategies, including those strategies developed to support the requirements of Order EA-12-049, while supporting performance of the required emergency planning duties without unacceptable collateral duties. | ||
The NRC staff noted that you assessed your current onsite minimum staffing levels to identify any enhancements needed to respond following a beyond-design-basis large-scale natural event, and to ensure that the strategies contained in the existing emergency plan and plant operating procedures, such as those used in response to a SBO, can be performed by the site staff. Your assessment assumed that a large-scale natural event causes: (1) an ELAP, (2) all units on the site to be affected, and (3) access to the site to be impeded for a minimum of six hours. You also assessed your capability to perform the site specific functions related to the strategies developed in response to Order EA-12-049. | The NRC staff reviewed your Phase 2 staffing submittal and confirmed that your existing emergency response resources, as described in your emergency plan, are sufficient to perform the required plant actions and emergency plan functions, and implement the multi-unit event response strategies that were developed in response to Order EA-12-049 without the assignment of collateral duties that would impact the performance of assigned emergency plan functions. | ||
You conducted independent reviews and concluded, based on your staffing assessment, that the existing on-shift minimum staff is sufficient to implement the loss of all ac power, multi-unit event response strategies, including those strategies developed to support the requirements of Order EA-12-049, while supporting performance of the required emergency planning duties without unacceptable collateral duties. The NRC staff reviewed your Phase 2 staffing submittal and confirmed that your existing emergency response resources, as described in your emergency plan, are sufficient to perform the required plant actions and emergency plan functions, and implement the multi-unit event response strategies that were developed in response to Order EA-12-049 without the assignment of collateral duties that would impact the performance of assigned emergency plan functions. | |||
As a result, the NRG staff concludes that your Phase 2 staffing submittal adequately addresses the response strategies needed to respond to a BDBEE using your procedures and guidelines. | As a result, the NRG staff concludes that your Phase 2 staffing submittal adequately addresses the response strategies needed to respond to a BDBEE using your procedures and guidelines. | ||
The NRG staff will verify the implementation of your staffing capabilities through the inspection program. | The NRG staff will verify the implementation of your staffing capabilities through the inspection program. | ||
K. Davison If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Stephen Philpott at (301) 415-2365 or via email at Stephen.Philpott@nrc.gov. | |||
K. Davison If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Stephen Philpott at (301) 415-2365 or via email at Stephen.Philpott@nrc.gov. | |||
Mandy K. Halter, Acting Branch Chief Orders Management Branch Japan Lessons-Learned Division Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | Sincerely, mff(/&/6;_ | ||
Docket Nos. 50-282 and 50-306 cc: Distribution via Listserv | Mandy K. Halter, Acting Branch Chief Orders Management Branch Japan Lessons-Learned Division Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-282 and 50-306 cc: Distribution via Listserv | ||
ML15320A465 *via email OFFICE NRR/JLD/JOMB/PM NRR/JLD/LA NSIR/DPR/NRLB/BC* NRR/JLD/JOMB/BC(A) | |||
MHalter 12/1/2015 | NAME SPhilpott Slent ARivera MHalter DATE 11/18/2015 11/17/2015 11/20/2015 12/1/2015}} | ||
Latest revision as of 07:31, 5 February 2020
| ML15320A465 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 12/01/2015 |
| From: | Halter M Japan Lessons-Learned Division |
| To: | Davison K Northern States Power Co |
| Philpott, Stephen, NRR/JLD 415-2365 | |
| References | |
| EA-12-049, TAC MF6321, TAC MF6322 | |
| Download: ML15320A465 (4) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 December 1, 2015 Mr. Kevin K. Davison Site Vice President Northern States Power Company - Minnesota Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant 1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089-9642
SUBJECT:
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -
RESPONSE REGARDING PHASE 2 STAFFING SUBMITTALS ASSOCIATED WITH NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 9.3 RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAl-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT (TAC NOS. MF6321 AND MF6322)
Dear Mr. Davison:
By letter dated March 12, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No ML12053A340), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 O CFR) Part 50, Section 50.54(f) (hereafter referred to as the 50.54(f) letter), regarding Recommendations 2.1 (seismic and flooding evaluations), 2.3 {seismic and flooding walkdowns), and 9.3 (emergency preparedness communication and staffing) of the Near-Terrn Task Force (NTTF) review of insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. With respect to Recommendation 9.3, Enclosure 5 to the NRC's letter requested licensees and holders of construction permits to assess their means to power communications equipment onsite and offsite during a prolonged station blackout (SBO) event and to perform a staffing assessment to determine the staff required to fill all necessary positions in response to a multi-unit event.
The 50.54(f) letter, in part, requested licensee responses pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f) pertaining to onsite and augmented staff availability to implement the strategies discussed in the emergency plan and plant operating procedures including new staff or functions resulting from the assessment, identified collateral duties, an implementation schedule to perform the assessments, identified modifications, and any changes that have been made or will be made to the emergency plan regarding 011-shift or augmented staffing. In addition, NTTF Recommendation 9.3 has a dependency on the implementation of NTTF Recommendation 4.2 (mitigating strategies). As a result of this dependency, licensees responded to the 50.54(f) letter in phases. The Phase 1 staffing assessment requested licensees to evaluate their ability to respond to a multi-unit extended loss of alternating current (ac) power (ELAP) event utilizing existing processes and procedures. The licensee responses to the 50.54(f) letter for Phase 1 staffing assessments for multi-unit sites were received and evaluated by the NRC staff. The NRC staff issued acknowle?gement letters to all licensees
K. Davison with multi-unit sites, with the exception of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, by April 28, 2014.
Licensees were also requested to submit for NRG staff review a Phase 2 staffing assessment, which provides an assessment of the staffing necessary to perform the functions related to the strategies developed in response to NTTF Recommendation 4.2 and the resulting NRG Order EA-12-049, "Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events [BDBEE]" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A736).
Licensees were requested to provide their Phase 2 Staffing Assessments to the NRC no later than four months prior to the beginning of their second refueling outage (as used in the context of NRG Order EA-12-049). By letter dated May 28, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15154A564), Northern States Power Company - Minnesota (the licensee) submitted its Phase 2 staffing assessment for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 to the NRG in response to the 50.54(f) letter.
The NRG staff reviewed your Phase 2 staffing assessment in accordance with the assumptions and guidelines of Sections 2.2, 2.3, and 3 of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance document NEI 12-01, "Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12125A412), which was endorsed by the NRG staff by letter dated May 15, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12131A043). The NRC staff noted that you assessed your current onsite minimum staffing levels to identify any enhancements needed to respond following a beyond-design-basis large- scale natural event, and to ensure that the strategies contained in the existing emergency plan and plant operating procedures, such as those used in response to a SBO, can be performed by the site staff. Your assessment assumed that a large-scale natural event causes:
(1) an ELAP, (2) all units on the site to be affected, and (3) access to the site to be impeded for a minimum of six hours. You also assessed your capability to perform the site specific functions related to the strategies developed in response to Order EA-12-049. You conducted independent reviews and concluded, based on your staffing assessment, that the existing on-shift minimum staff is sufficient to implement the loss of all ac power, multi-unit event response strategies, including those strategies developed to support the requirements of Order EA-12-049, while supporting performance of the required emergency planning duties without unacceptable collateral duties.
The NRC staff reviewed your Phase 2 staffing submittal and confirmed that your existing emergency response resources, as described in your emergency plan, are sufficient to perform the required plant actions and emergency plan functions, and implement the multi-unit event response strategies that were developed in response to Order EA-12-049 without the assignment of collateral duties that would impact the performance of assigned emergency plan functions.
As a result, the NRG staff concludes that your Phase 2 staffing submittal adequately addresses the response strategies needed to respond to a BDBEE using your procedures and guidelines.
The NRG staff will verify the implementation of your staffing capabilities through the inspection program.
K. Davison If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Stephen Philpott at (301) 415-2365 or via email at Stephen.Philpott@nrc.gov.
Sincerely, mff(/&/6;_
Mandy K. Halter, Acting Branch Chief Orders Management Branch Japan Lessons-Learned Division Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-282 and 50-306 cc: Distribution via Listserv
ML15320A465 *via email OFFICE NRR/JLD/JOMB/PM NRR/JLD/LA NSIR/DPR/NRLB/BC* NRR/JLD/JOMB/BC(A)
NAME SPhilpott Slent ARivera MHalter DATE 11/18/2015 11/17/2015 11/20/2015 12/1/2015