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| | issue date = 12/11/1987 | | | issue date = 12/11/1987 |
| | title = LER 87-017-00:on 871113,six Leakage Paths Discovered from Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Compartment.Caused by Control of Design Requirements.Leakage Paths Sealed Prior to Restart. Maint of Protective Encl Integrity verified.W/871211 Ltr | | | title = LER 87-017-00:on 871113,six Leakage Paths Discovered from Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Compartment.Caused by Control of Design Requirements.Leakage Paths Sealed Prior to Restart. Maint of Protective Encl Integrity verified.W/871211 Ltr |
| | author name = GRAY M K, ZUPKO J M | | | author name = Gray M, Zupko J |
| | author affiliation = PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO. OF NEW JERSEY | | | author affiliation = PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO. OF NEW JERSEY |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = |
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| {{#Wiki_filter:NAC For111 -19.aJI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR llEOULATOllY 4"'ROVEO OMI NO. 31!!0-0111' EXP'IAES 1/31196 FACILIT'I' NAME 111 Salem Generating Station -Unit 1 I DOCKET NUM9Ell 121 l r-u* 131 o 1 s 1 o 1 o Io I 21 71? I , loF n 1'1 TITLE 141 Discovered Leakage Paths From 13(23) AFW Pump Comoartment | | {{#Wiki_filter:U.S. NUCLEAR llEOULATOllY C~llllON NAC For111 - |
| -Control of Desicrn EVENT DATE Ill LEA NUMllER 181 llEP'ORT DATE 171 OTHEll FACILITIES INVOLVED Ill MONTH llAY YEAR YEAR <> | | 19.aJI 4"'ROVEO OMI NO. 31!!0-0111' EXP'IAES 1/31196 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| I:::::: | | I FACILIT'I' NAME 111 DOCKET NUM9Ell 121 l r-u* 131 Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 o 1s 1 o 1o Io I 21 71? I , loF n 1'1 TITLE 141 Discovered Leakage Paths From 13(23) AFW Pump Comoartment - Control of Desicrn R 0 ~*ts. |
| MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY PWAMES DOCKET NUMBERISI Salem TTnit-? O I 5 I O I O I O I 3 11 I 1 1 I 1 ii 3 s 7 s I 7 -o I 1 h -o lo i I 2 i I i s h 01S1010101 I I Of'ERATINO lllOOE Ill THll llEP'ORT II IUSMITTED P'UlllUANT TO THE REOUlllEMENTI OF 10 CFll §: (Ch<<:k o,,. or m0'9 of rM folloWJnf} | | EVENT DATE Ill LEA NUMllER 181 llEP'ORT DATE 171 OTHEll FACILITIES INVOLVED Ill MONTH llAY YEAR YEAR <> SE~~~~~~"~ I:::::: ~~~":.~ MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY PWAMES DOCKET NUMBERISI Salem TTnit- ? O I5 IO I O I O I 3 11 I 1 1 1I ii 3 s 7 s I7 - oI1 h - o lo i I2 i Ii s h 01S1010101 I I THll llEP'ORT II IUSMITTED P'UlllUANT TO THE REOUlllEMENTI OF 10 CFll §: (Ch<<:k o,,. or of rM folloWJnf} 1111 m0'9 Of'ERATINO lllOOE Ill 6 20.-lcl I0.*1*1111 - |
| 1111 6 20.-lcl --I0.*1*1111 | | .2£... |
| .2£... DO.*loll2l | | I0.73tall2111YI I0.7:11tall2lM 73.711bl 73.71(ol |
| --ll0.73111121111
| | ~ |
| --I0.7311H2lllil
| | DO.*loll2l D0.731all2Jl*Ml OTHER IS/l<</fy in Ab1rrocr Nlow utd in T*xt. NRC Form ll0.73111121111 I0.731all2H*lllllAI 366A} |
| --D0.7Jlall2llllil LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEA 1121 I0.73tall2111YI I0.7:11tall2lM D0.731all2Jl*Ml I0.731all2H*lllllAI I0.731all2llwlllllll I0.731111211*1
| | - I0.7311H2lllil D0.7Jlall2llllil LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEA 1121 |
| ---73.711bl 73.71(ol OTHER IS/l<</fy in Ab1rrocr Nlow utd in T*xt. NRC Form 366A} NAME TELEPHCj>NE NUMBER AREA CODE I* M. K. Gray -Licensing Engineer 6, I 0 I 9 3 I 31 9 1-I 4 I 3 17 I 0 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DEICRllED IN THIS llEP'ORT 1131 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC-REPORTABLE
| | - I0.731all2llwlllllll I0.731111211*1 NAME TELEPHCj>NE NUMBER AREA CODE I* |
| -::<S??: ::}::_::,::}_} | | M. K. Gray - Licensing Engineer 6, I 0 I 9 3 I 31 9 1- I 4 I 3 17 I 0 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DEICRllED IN THIS llEP'ORT 1131 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC-TURER REPORTABLE -::<S??: ::}::_::,::}_} |
| CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC* TURER TO NPRDS :::*'.::<:
| | TO NPRDS :::*'.::<: :*-:* -'*. **::::::::;- |
| :*-:* -'*. **::::::::;- | | CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC* |
| TURER i/:::::::: | | TURER i/:::::::: **:- :;: .*.::***.* :-:* |
| **:-:;: .*.::***.* | | I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1* I I I I I I I I I IU""LEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (141 MONTH DAY Y~A" EXPECTED n YES Ill yn. complort EXPECTED SUIJMISSION DATE! kl NO SUBMISSION DATE 1151 I I I On 11/13/87 an NRC 1nGpec~or identified leakage paths from Lhe No. 13 Auxiliary Fecdw2ter (AFW) Turbine Driven Pump compartment {BAI S~bseqUEil~ in~estig~~~~~ ~2Vealed SiX (6) leakage pathways from the UniL l pump und one pathway from the Unit 2 pump. The comparcme~t enclosEs the steam teed piping to the AFW Turbine Driven Pump su~h thut a pcstulatcd pipe break would not damage adjacent vital electrical equipment located outside the compartment. The root cause of the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment deficiencies is control of design requi~ements. The leakage paths identified on the Salem Units 1 & 2 Steax Driven AFW Pu~p enclosures will be sealed prier to the res~art of either Unit, respectively. Unit 1 is currently in a refuEling outage and Uni~ 2 is curren~ly in a maintenance outage. |
| :-:* I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1* I I I I I I I I I IU""LEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (141 n YES Ill yn. complort EXPECTED SUIJMISSION DATE! kl NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE 1151 MONTH DAY I I I On 11/13/87 an NRC identified leakage paths from Lhe No. 13 Auxiliary Fecdw2ter (AFW) Turbine Driven Pump compartment | | Also, other procecc~ve pipe rupture enclosures will be reviewed to verify their integrity has been maintained. To ensute that adequate attent~on is given ~o the maintenance of these structures in the futurE, the Program Analysis Group (PAG) will issue a Field Directive identifying che areas that ar2 designed to accommodate th2 effects of a pipe rupture. The Field Directive will also stress the importance of maincaining p=o~ective struc~ures in a condition that meets their desig~ reqcirements. |
| {BAI SiX (6) leakage pathways from the UniL l pump und one pathway from the Unit 2 pump. The enclosEs the steam teed piping to the AFW Turbine Driven Pump thut a pcstulatcd pipe break would not damage adjacent vital electrical equipment located outside the compartment. | | *8712170063 871211 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S DCD NllC foml - |
| The root cause of the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment deficiencies is control of design The leakage paths identified on the Salem Units 1 & 2 Steax Driven AFW enclosures will be sealed prier to the of either Unit, respectively. | | 19.a31 |
| Unit 1 is currently in a refuEling outage and 2 is in a maintenance outage. Also, other pipe rupture enclosures will be reviewed to verify their integrity has been maintained. | |
| To ensute that adequate is given the maintenance of these structures in the futurE, the Program Analysis Group (PAG) will issue a Field Directive identifying che areas that ar2 designed to accommodate th2 effects of a pipe rupture. The Field Directive will also stress the importance of maincaining in a condition that meets their reqcirements. | |
| *8712170063 871211 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S DCD NllC foml -19.a31 | |
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| EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU"A'I'ION DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Salem Unit: 1-5000272 ____ _§]_-:_QJ 7 -q_ o ____________ __ | | LICEl~SEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU"A'I'ION Salem GELe~ating DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit: 1- 5000272 ____ _§]_-:_QJ 7 -q_o____________~ __gL__~L ___ _ |
| ___ _ Westinghouse | | Westinghouse - Pressurized Wa~er Reactor Energy Industry IdeLtification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as i xx l IDENTIFICATICN OF OCCURRENCE: |
| -Pressurized Reactor Energy Industry IdeLtification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as i xx l IDENTIFICATICN OF OCCURRENCE: | | Disccvere~ L2akag~ Paths From 13(23) Aux Feedwater Pump Compartme3t - |
| Paths From 13(23) Aux Feedwater Pump Compartme3t | | Contra~ of Desi~n Requirements This repcr~ was initiated by Incident Report No. 87-449. |
| - | | COlIDI'I'I!JNS PRIOR T:J OCCURREIKE; Rea~tcr Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe On :_/~3/S~ an NRC inspector ideritified leakage paths from the Ne. |
| of Requirements This was initiated by Incident Report No. 87-449. COlIDI'I'I!JNS PRIOR T:J OCCURREIKE; | | Acxllia~y f(cdwater (AFW) Turbin2 Driven Pump compartmenL {BAI. |
| *-------*
| | Subs2q~2n~ i~~~s~igation revealed six (6) leakage pathways from Lhe erti~ ~ ~u~~ co~partm~nt and one pathway from the Unit 2 pump cc~par~2eL~. The ccmpartment encloses the steam feed piping to the AFW Turbin2 Driven Pump such chat a postulated pipe bre~k woul6 not damage adjace~t. vical electrical equipment located oucsidc the comp a::- trr,en t.. |
| Power 0% -Unit Load 0 MWe On an NRC inspector ideritified leakage paths from the Ne. | | The Unit l pump comparcmen~ pathways consist of four (4) pipe peLecrations where excessive annulus areas exist between the pipe and ti12 compa:ct:ment wall, one (1) hole cut to accommodate a protr*.lding bole, and one {l} small hole cut through the steel compartment wall fo~ nc known reason. The Unit 2 pump compartment pathway is a pipe pen.st:ca ti on with an excessive an"-1.ulus area between the pipE. an::l wal:L. |
| f(cdwater (AFW) Turbin2 Driven Pump compartmenL | | APPARE.N'I' CA.USE. OF OCCURRENCE:- |
| {BAI. | | The root cause of the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment deficiencies is control of design requirements. "Notes" on the AFW Fumv E:nclos-c1rr.:: |
| revealed six (6) leakage pathways from Lhe and one pathway from the Unit 2 pump The ccmpartment encloses the steam feed piping to the AFW Turbin2 Driven Pump such chat a postulated pipe woul6 not damage vical electrical equipment located oucsidc the comp a::-trr,en t.. The Unit l pump pathways consist of four (4) pipe peLecrations where excessive annulus areas exist between the pipe and ti12 compa:ct:ment wall, one (1) hole cut to accommodate a protr*.lding bole, and one {l} small hole cut through the steel compartment wall nc known reason. The Unit 2 pump compartment pathway is a pipe pen.st:ca ti on with an excessive an"-1.ulus area between the pipE. an::l wal:L. APPARE.N'I' CA.USE OF OCCURRENCE: . -The root cause of the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment deficiencies is control of design requirements. "Notes" on the AFW Fumv E:nclos-c1rr.:: | | concrolled drawings (both Unitsi state that the compartment struct~re is designed fo= an internal pressure of 50 pounds per square foot (psi:}. Also, the drawing "Not:es" indicate that gaps and cracks in the structure should be minimized during erection and plugged as required to ensure a reasonable degree of watertightness. |
| concrolled drawings (both Unitsi state that the compartment is designed fo= an internal pressure of 50 pounds per square foot (psi:}. Also, the drawing "Not:es" indicate that gaps and cracks in the structure should be minimized during erection and plugged as required to ensure a reasonable degree of watertightness. | | It canno~ be conclusively determined what activities took place that resulted in these leakage paths whether from the original d2sign configurat:ion or as the result of design modifications. |
| It be conclusively determined what activities took place that resulted in these leakage paths whether from the original d2sign configurat:ion or as the result of design modifications. | | |
| ---------_,,___ _____ | | --------- _,,____ _ _ _ ___..,~------ |
| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1 |
| ---*-----------*---- | | ~_5_0_00272 ______ 87-0:1, 7-0_Q______J_ of__!_ __ |
| Salem Generating Station Unit 1 -------------*--*-----
| | The Salerc Unit 1 AFW Pump compartment was analyzed since significantly more leakage can occur than from the Unit 2 AFW Pump enclosure. The AFW Pump enclosure is designed to contain the steam release from a postulated steam pipe rupture such that adjacent vital electrical equipment is not damaged. The total unsealed area for the Unit 1 co~partment was approximately 20 square inches. In the event of a postulated pump steam supply line rupture (high energy line break) within the compartmerit, the compartment temperature and pressure would rise to 0.33 psi and 300°F respectively. At 0.33 psi, a backdraft damper will open to vent steam into the pipe alley. Due to the leakage pachs, it was calculated that steam would be released from the compartmen: at u rate of 1.4 lbs./sec. Since it is assumed it would take app~oxirnacely 30 minutes for an Operator to isolate the break, the po~en~ial exists to release 2520 pounds of steam into the area adjaceLt to the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment. |
| DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE
| | TL.:.:... <::.6_j<;;.c2n-c area contains the 11 (21) and 12 (22) Motor Driven AFW Fu:rr:ps, v;:;ricus AFW valves, Main Steam System valves {Unit 2 only}, th<:: |
| ______ 87-0:1, 7-0_Q_ ____ _J_ of _ _!_ __ The Salerc Unit 1 AFW Pump compartment was analyzed since significantly more leakage can occur than from the Unit 2 AFW Pump enclosure.
| | 1(2)A and 1(2)C West 230 V Vital Motor Control Centers (MCCs), and various electrical panels, including the Alternate Shutdown Panel (Panel 213}. The 230 V MCCs provide power and control to a variety of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) valves, including 0L2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Minimum Flow Valve (11RH29) {BPl, the Safety Injectio~ Puilip Minimum Flow Valves {SJ67 & 68), an RHR Loop Crosstie Valve (11RH19), one suction valve from the Reactor Water Storage Tank to the Charging Pumps (1SJ1), a Containment Sump Isolation Valve (l1SJ44), and Component Cooling Water discharge valve from the RHR EE at Exchanger (11CC15). |
| The AFW Pump enclosure is designed to contain the steam release from a postulated steam pipe rupture such that adjacent vital electrical equipment is not damaged. The total unsealed area for the Unit 1 was approximately 20 square inches. In the event of a postulated pump steam supply line rupture (high energy line break) within the compartmerit, the compartment temperature and pressure would rise to 0.33 psi and 300°F respectively.
| | Since an ECCS ac~ua~ion is not expected to occur as a result of the postulated break, these ECCS valves would not be required to operate. |
| At 0.33 psi, a backdraft damper will open to vent steam into the pipe alley. Due to the leakage pachs, it was calculated that steam would be released from the compartmen:
| | Also, since a fire is not postulated coincident with a pipf~ b:*e,:;_}; I U1,-- |
| at u rate of 1.4 lbs./sec.
| | Alternate Shutdown Panel would not be required. However, in the event cf a break in the steam supply line to the AFW Turbine Drivan Pump, the Motor Driven AFW Pumps and valves would be required to operate during normal plant cooldown to remove heat from the core until the RHR System could be placed in operation. |
| Since it is assumed it would take 30 minutes for an Operator to isolate the break, the exists to release 2520 pounds of steam into the area adjaceLt to the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment.
| | An estimated 2520 pounds of steam would be released from the postulated pipe break into the adjacent area to the Turbine Driven AFW Pump compartment. This room is an area open to the hallway and bounded by three w~lls. Therefore, the Motor Operated AFW Pumps and valves would most likely be able to operate to bring the Unit to a safe shutdown condition. However, since their qualification to operate in such an environment has not been established, they must be assumed to be inoperable in the event of a pipe break. |
| TL.:.:...
| | In summary, the equipment adjacent to the Steam Driven AFW Pump are necessary to normal plan~ operation as well as mitigation of design base acciden~s. They are required to be protected against the dynamic effects of a postulated pipe rupture. It could not be conclusively |
| <::.6_j<;;.c2n-c area contains the 11 (21) and 12 (22) Motor Driven AFW Fu:rr:ps, v;:;ricus AFW valves, Main Steam System valves {Unit 2 only}, th<:: 1(2)A and 1(2)C West 230 V Vital Motor Control Centers (MCCs), and various electrical panels, including the Alternate Shutdown Panel (Panel 213}. The 230 V MCCs provide power and control to a variety of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) valves, including 0L2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Minimum Flow Valve (11RH29) {BPl, the Safety Puilip Minimum Flow Valves {SJ67 & 68), an RHR Loop Crosstie Valve (11RH19), one suction valve from the Reactor Water Storage Tank to the Charging Pumps (1SJ1), a Containment Sump Isolation Valve (l1SJ44), and Component Cooling Water discharge valve from the RHR EE at Exchanger (11CC15). | | |
| Since an ECCS is not expected to occur as a result of the postulated break, these ECCS valves would not be required to operate. Also, since a fire is not postulated coincident with a b:*e,:;_}; | | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Ger.erating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE |
| I Alternate Shutdown Panel would not be required.
| | -----1 Unit -----* *----*- 5000272 |
| However, in the event cf a break in the steam supply line to the AFW Turbine Drivan Pump, the Motor Driven AFW Pumps and valves would be required to operate during normal plant cooldown to remove heat from the core until the RHR System could be placed in operation. | | ----*--------"--"--"-'~---- |
| An estimated 2520 pounds of steam would be released from the postulated pipe break into the adjacent area to the Turbine Driven AFW Pump compartment. | | 87-017-0.~0_ _ _ _ 4 of 4 shown thaL adequate protection was provided by the Salem Unit 1 Turbine Driven AFW Pump enclosure. Therefore, the discovery of the impaired Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment is reportable in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10CFR 50.73(a) (2) (v). |
| This room is an area open to the hallway and bounded by three Therefore, the Motor Operated AFW Pumps and valves would most likely be able to operate to bring the Unit to a safe shutdown condition. | | CORRECTIVE ACTION: |
| However, since their qualification to operate in such an environment has not been established, they must be assumed to be inoperable in the event of a pipe break. In summary, the equipment adjacent to the Steam Driven AFW Pump are necessary to normal operation as well as mitigation of design base They are required to be protected against the dynamic effects of a postulated pipe rupture. It could not be conclusively LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION | | The leakage paths identified on the Salem Units 1 & 2 Steam Driven AFW Pump enclosures will be sealed prior to the restart of either Unit, respectively. Unit 1 is currently in a refueling outage and ULit 2 is currently in a maintenance outage. Also, other protective pipe rupture enclosures *will be reviewed to verify their integrity has been maint2ined. |
| ---*----------*-------------------
| | To ensure that adequate attention is given to the maintenance of LhEse structures in the future, the Program Analysis Group (PAG) will issue a Field Direcc:ive identifying the areas that are designed to accorr~modac.e c:hs effects of a pipe rupture. The Field Din~ctive will also stress c:he importance of maintaining protective structures in a condi"CioL thac: meets their design requirements. |
| Salem Ger.erating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1 5000272 ----------*
| | General Manager - |
| *----*-
| | Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mt;;. 87--110 |
| ____ 4 of 4 shown thaL adequate protection was provided by the Salem Unit 1 Turbine Driven AFW Pump enclosure.
| | |
| Therefore, the discovery of the impaired Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment is reportable in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission lOCFR 50.73(a) (2) (v). CORRECTIVE ACTION: ------------The leakage paths identified on the Salem Units 1 & 2 Steam Driven AFW Pump enclosures will be sealed prior to the restart of either Unit, respectively. | | /" |
| Unit 1 is currently in a refueling outage and ULit 2 is currently in a maintenance outage. Also, other protective pipe rupture enclosures | | e e PS~G |
| *will be reviewed to verify their integrity has been maint2ined. | | .( |
| To ensure that adequate attention is given to the maintenance of LhEse structures in the future, the Program Analysis Group (PAG) will issue a Field Direcc:ive identifying the areas that are designed to c:hs effects of a pipe rupture. The Field will also stress c:he importance of maintaining protective structures in a condi"CioL thac: meets their design requirements. | | Put:*iic Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station December 11, 1987 TJ .. S- l'Jt.:..c~l22.:;_ }::~2g*ulat:o::::}** Co:n.m.issioil Doclirnen~ Conc~ol Desk |
| MJP:pc SORC Mt;;. 87--110 General Manager -Salem Operations | | \~~~~1_ir1*..x-con r ~:JC 20555 |
| * /" .( e e Put:*iic Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station TJ .. S -
| | :C1::.2r Si.!.-: |
| Co:n.m.issioil Desk . .x-con r 20555 :C1::.2r Si.!.-:
| | S~~EH GENER~TING STATION LICENSE NO. DP~-70 DOCKE: NG. 50-272 |
| STATION LICENSE NO. | | *1 Ul*~ I'I' h 0 .. J_ |
| DOCKE: NG. 50-272 I'I' h 0 .. *1 J_ LICENSEE 87-017-00 December 11, 1987 E\:rc1:::. | | LICENSEE E~ENl ~EPCRT 87-017-00 Tt.i.~ L~cc11sc:c E\:rc1:::. Repcr-c is beir.:_g s~Ll.brnit-ced pt1::cs*:..iar~t t:o t-.11e i*2qLi~cc.~r~2:ct.s c.:£ lDCFF. SO_ 73 {;::) {2) (TJ') .. This report is re~uired wi~h~n Lhi~cy (JO) days of discovery. |
| Repcr-c is beir.:_g t:o t-.11e c.:£ lDCFF .. SO_ 73 {;::) {2) (TJ') .. (JO) days of discovery. | | Since::::ely yours, yv1i~k,/ ftv J. M. Zupko, J~. |
| MJP:pc Distr*ibt:!.
| | Gen2ral Manage:r-Salem Operations MJP:pc Distr*ibt:!. tio..:-:;. |
| tio..:-:;.
| | & ")."-- |
| This report is Since::::ely
| | ~¥ ,\, |
| : yours, ftv J. M. Zupko, Gen2ral Salem Operations
| | ~i:-.?-.s~* 1*. r ivl1 ~~-;:;.:}} |
| & ")."--,\, | |
| 1*. r ivl1}} | |
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ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr
ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr
ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr
ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999
LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr
ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999
LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr
ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999
LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr
ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998
LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr
ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998
LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr
ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998
LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr
ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998
LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr
ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998
LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr
ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr
ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr
ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998
LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr
ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr
ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998
LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr
ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr
ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr
ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr
ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr
ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr
ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr
ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr
ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged
ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr
ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr
ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998
LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr
ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr
ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr
ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected
ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998
Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences
ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr
ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr
ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr
ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998
Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs
ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr
ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr
1999-08-26
[Table view]
Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr
ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999
LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr
ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr
ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr
ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr
ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr
ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr
ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr
ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr
ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr
ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr
ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr
ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr
ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr
ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr
ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr
ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999
LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr
ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999
LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr
ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999
LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr
ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998
LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr
ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998
LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr
ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998
LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr
ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998
LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr
ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998
LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr
ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr
ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr
ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998
LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr
ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr
ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998
LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr
ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr
ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr
ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr
ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr
ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr
ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr
ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr
ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged
ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr
ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr
ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998
LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr
ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr
ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr
ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected
ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998
Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences
ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr
ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr
ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr
ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998
Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs
ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr
ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr
1999-08-26
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999
NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data
ML18107A5581999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 991014 Ltr
ML18107A5571999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 991014 Ltr
ML18107A5301999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990913 Ltr
ML18107A5311999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990913
ML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr
ML18107A5201999-08-12012 August 1999
Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#9) Second Interval,Second Period, First Outage (96RF).
ML18107A4811999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990813 Ltr
ML18107A4821999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990813 Ltr
ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999
LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr
ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr
ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr
ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr
ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr
ML18107A5211999-07-0101 July 1999
Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#10) Second Interval,Second Period,Second Outage (99RF).
ML18107A4351999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990713 Ltr
ML18107A4341999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990713 Ltr
ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999
NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept
ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr
ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr
ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr
ML18107A3441999-06-0101 June 1999
Interim Part 21 Rept Re Premature Over Voltage Protection Actuation in Circuit Specific Application in Dc Power Supply.Testing & Evaluation Activities Will Be Completed on 990716
ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr
ML18107A3681999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990611 Ltr
ML18107A3721999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990611 Ltr
ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr
ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr
ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr
ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr
ML18107A3711999-04-30030 April 1999
Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1
ML18107A3151999-04-30030 April 1999
Submittal-Only Screening Review of Salem Generating Station Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion), Rev 1
ML18107A2991999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990514 Ltr
ML18107A2971999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990514 Ltr
ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr
ML18107A2881999-04-0707 April 1999
Rev 0 to NFS-0174, COLR for Salem Unit 2 Cycle 11.
ML18107A1821999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990414 Ltr
ML18107A1831999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990414 Ltr
ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr
ML18106B1021999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990315 Ltr
ML18106B1011999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990315 Ltr
ML18106B0931999-02-25025 February 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack Due to Improper Location of Heated Bar.Only One Part Out of 7396 Pieces in Forging Lot Was Found to Be Cracked.Affected Util,Notified
ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999
LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr
ML18106B0551999-02-0101 February 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Possible Matl Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Defect Is Crack in Center of Forging.Analysis of Part Is Continuing & Further Details Will Be Provided IAW Ncr Timetables.Drawing of Part,Encl
ML18106B0561999-01-31031 January 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990212 Ltr
ML18106B0571999-01-31031 January 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990212 Ltr
ML20205P1671999-01-31031 January 1999
a POST-PLUME Phase, Federal Participation Exercise
ML18106B0441999-01-29029 January 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack in Center of Forging. Continuing Analysis of Part & Will Provide Details in Acoordance with NRC Timetables
ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999
LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr
ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999
LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr
ML18106B0251998-12-31031 December 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Salem Unit 2.With 990115 Ltr
1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR llEOULATOllY C~llllON NAC For111 -
19.aJI 4"'ROVEO OMI NO. 31!!0-0111' EXP'IAES 1/31196 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
I FACILIT'I' NAME 111 DOCKET NUM9Ell 121 l r-u* 131 Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 o 1s 1 o 1o Io I 21 71? I , loF n 1'1 TITLE 141 Discovered Leakage Paths From 13(23) AFW Pump Comoartment - Control of Desicrn R 0 ~*ts.
EVENT DATE Ill LEA NUMllER 181 llEP'ORT DATE 171 OTHEll FACILITIES INVOLVED Ill MONTH llAY YEAR YEAR <> SE~~~~~~"~ I:::::: ~~~":.~ MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY PWAMES DOCKET NUMBERISI Salem TTnit- ? O I5 IO I O I O I 3 11 I 1 1 1I ii 3 s 7 s I7 - oI1 h - o lo i I2 i Ii s h 01S1010101 I I THll llEP'ORT II IUSMITTED P'UlllUANT TO THE REOUlllEMENTI OF 10 CFll §: (Ch<<:k o,,. or of rM folloWJnf} 1111 m0'9 Of'ERATINO lllOOE Ill 6 20.-lcl I0.*1*1111 -
.2£...
I0.73tall2111YI I0.7:11tall2lM 73.711bl 73.71(ol
~
DO.*loll2l D0.731all2Jl*Ml OTHER IS/l<</fy in Ab1rrocr Nlow utd in T*xt. NRC Form ll0.73111121111 I0.731all2H*lllllAI 366A}
- I0.7311H2lllil D0.7Jlall2llllil LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEA 1121
- I0.731all2llwlllllll I0.731111211*1 NAME TELEPHCj>NE NUMBER AREA CODE I*
M. K. Gray - Licensing Engineer 6, I 0 I 9 3 I 31 9 1- I 4 I 3 17 I 0 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DEICRllED IN THIS llEP'ORT 1131 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC-TURER REPORTABLE -::<S??: ::}::_::,::}_}
TO NPRDS :::*'.::<: :*-:* -'*. **::::::::;-
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC*
TURER i/:::::::: **:- :;: .*.::***.* :-:*
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1* I I I I I I I I I IU""LEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (141 MONTH DAY Y~A" EXPECTED n YES Ill yn. complort EXPECTED SUIJMISSION DATE! kl NO SUBMISSION DATE 1151 I I I On 11/13/87 an NRC 1nGpec~or identified leakage paths from Lhe No. 13 Auxiliary Fecdw2ter (AFW) Turbine Driven Pump compartment {BAI S~bseqUEil~ in~estig~~~~~ ~2Vealed SiX (6) leakage pathways from the UniL l pump und one pathway from the Unit 2 pump. The comparcme~t enclosEs the steam teed piping to the AFW Turbine Driven Pump su~h thut a pcstulatcd pipe break would not damage adjacent vital electrical equipment located outside the compartment. The root cause of the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment deficiencies is control of design requi~ements. The leakage paths identified on the Salem Units 1 & 2 Steax Driven AFW Pu~p enclosures will be sealed prier to the res~art of either Unit, respectively. Unit 1 is currently in a refuEling outage and Uni~ 2 is curren~ly in a maintenance outage.
Also, other procecc~ve pipe rupture enclosures will be reviewed to verify their integrity has been maintained. To ensute that adequate attent~on is given ~o the maintenance of these structures in the futurE, the Program Analysis Group (PAG) will issue a Field Directive identifying che areas that ar2 designed to accommodate th2 effects of a pipe rupture. The Field Directive will also stress the importance of maincaining p=o~ective struc~ures in a condition that meets their desig~ reqcirements.
- 8712170063 871211 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S DCD NllC foml -
19.a31
LICEl~SEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU"A'I'ION Salem GELe~ating DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit: 1- 5000272 ____ _§]_-:_QJ 7 -q_o____________~ __gL__~L ___ _
Westinghouse - Pressurized Wa~er Reactor Energy Industry IdeLtification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as i xx l IDENTIFICATICN OF OCCURRENCE:
Disccvere~ L2akag~ Paths From 13(23) Aux Feedwater Pump Compartme3t -
Contra~ of Desi~n Requirements This repcr~ was initiated by Incident Report No.87-449.
COlIDI'I'I!JNS PRIOR T:J OCCURREIKE; Rea~tcr Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe On :_/~3/S~ an NRC inspector ideritified leakage paths from the Ne.
Acxllia~y f(cdwater (AFW) Turbin2 Driven Pump compartmenL {BAI.
Subs2q~2n~ i~~~s~igation revealed six (6) leakage pathways from Lhe erti~ ~ ~u~~ co~partm~nt and one pathway from the Unit 2 pump cc~par~2eL~. The ccmpartment encloses the steam feed piping to the AFW Turbin2 Driven Pump such chat a postulated pipe bre~k woul6 not damage adjace~t. vical electrical equipment located oucsidc the comp a::- trr,en t..
The Unit l pump comparcmen~ pathways consist of four (4) pipe peLecrations where excessive annulus areas exist between the pipe and ti12 compa:ct:ment wall, one (1) hole cut to accommodate a protr*.lding bole, and one {l} small hole cut through the steel compartment wall fo~ nc known reason. The Unit 2 pump compartment pathway is a pipe pen.st:ca ti on with an excessive an"-1.ulus area between the pipE. an::l wal:L.
APPARE.N'I' CA.USE. OF OCCURRENCE:-
The root cause of the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment deficiencies is control of design requirements. "Notes" on the AFW Fumv E:nclos-c1rr.::
concrolled drawings (both Unitsi state that the compartment struct~re is designed fo= an internal pressure of 50 pounds per square foot (psi:}. Also, the drawing "Not:es" indicate that gaps and cracks in the structure should be minimized during erection and plugged as required to ensure a reasonable degree of watertightness.
It canno~ be conclusively determined what activities took place that resulted in these leakage paths whether from the original d2sign configurat:ion or as the result of design modifications.
_,,____ _ _ _ ___..,~------
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1
~_5_0_00272 ______ 87-0:1, 7-0_Q______J_ of__!_ __
The Salerc Unit 1 AFW Pump compartment was analyzed since significantly more leakage can occur than from the Unit 2 AFW Pump enclosure. The AFW Pump enclosure is designed to contain the steam release from a postulated steam pipe rupture such that adjacent vital electrical equipment is not damaged. The total unsealed area for the Unit 1 co~partment was approximately 20 square inches. In the event of a postulated pump steam supply line rupture (high energy line break) within the compartmerit, the compartment temperature and pressure would rise to 0.33 psi and 300°F respectively. At 0.33 psi, a backdraft damper will open to vent steam into the pipe alley. Due to the leakage pachs, it was calculated that steam would be released from the compartmen: at u rate of 1.4 lbs./sec. Since it is assumed it would take app~oxirnacely 30 minutes for an Operator to isolate the break, the po~en~ial exists to release 2520 pounds of steam into the area adjaceLt to the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment.
TL.:.:... <::.6_j<;;.c2n-c area contains the 11 (21) and 12 (22) Motor Driven AFW Fu:rr:ps, v;:;ricus AFW valves, Main Steam System valves {Unit 2 only}, th<::
1(2)A and 1(2)C West 230 V Vital Motor Control Centers (MCCs), and various electrical panels, including the Alternate Shutdown Panel (Panel 213}. The 230 V MCCs provide power and control to a variety of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) valves, including 0L2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Minimum Flow Valve (11RH29) {BPl, the Safety Injectio~ Puilip Minimum Flow Valves {SJ67 & 68), an RHR Loop Crosstie Valve (11RH19), one suction valve from the Reactor Water Storage Tank to the Charging Pumps (1SJ1), a Containment Sump Isolation Valve (l1SJ44), and Component Cooling Water discharge valve from the RHR EE at Exchanger (11CC15).
Since an ECCS ac~ua~ion is not expected to occur as a result of the postulated break, these ECCS valves would not be required to operate.
Also, since a fire is not postulated coincident with a pipf~ b:*e,:;_}; I U1,--
Alternate Shutdown Panel would not be required. However, in the event cf a break in the steam supply line to the AFW Turbine Drivan Pump, the Motor Driven AFW Pumps and valves would be required to operate during normal plant cooldown to remove heat from the core until the RHR System could be placed in operation.
An estimated 2520 pounds of steam would be released from the postulated pipe break into the adjacent area to the Turbine Driven AFW Pump compartment. This room is an area open to the hallway and bounded by three w~lls. Therefore, the Motor Operated AFW Pumps and valves would most likely be able to operate to bring the Unit to a safe shutdown condition. However, since their qualification to operate in such an environment has not been established, they must be assumed to be inoperable in the event of a pipe break.
In summary, the equipment adjacent to the Steam Driven AFW Pump are necessary to normal plan~ operation as well as mitigation of design base acciden~s. They are required to be protected against the dynamic effects of a postulated pipe rupture. It could not be conclusively
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Ger.erating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE
1 Unit -----* *----*- 5000272
*--------"--"--"-'~----
87-017-0.~0_ _ _ _ 4 of 4 shown thaL adequate protection was provided by the Salem Unit 1 Turbine Driven AFW Pump enclosure. Therefore, the discovery of the impaired Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment is reportable in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10CFR 50.73(a) (2) (v).
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
The leakage paths identified on the Salem Units 1 & 2 Steam Driven AFW Pump enclosures will be sealed prior to the restart of either Unit, respectively. Unit 1 is currently in a refueling outage and ULit 2 is currently in a maintenance outage. Also, other protective pipe rupture enclosures *will be reviewed to verify their integrity has been maint2ined.
To ensure that adequate attention is given to the maintenance of LhEse structures in the future, the Program Analysis Group (PAG) will issue a Field Direcc:ive identifying the areas that are designed to accorr~modac.e c:hs effects of a pipe rupture. The Field Din~ctive will also stress c:he importance of maintaining protective structures in a condi"CioL thac: meets their design requirements.
General Manager -
Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mt;;. 87--110
/"
e e PS~G
.(
Put:*iic Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station December 11, 1987 TJ .. S- l'Jt.:..c~l22.:;_ }::~2g*ulat:o::::}** Co:n.m.issioil Doclirnen~ Conc~ol Desk
\~~~~1_ir1*..x-con r ~:JC 20555
- C1::.2r Si.!.-:
S~~EH GENER~TING STATION LICENSE NO. DP~-70 DOCKE: NG. 50-272
LICENSEE E~ENl ~EPCRT 87-017-00 Tt.i.~ L~cc11sc:c E\:rc1:::. Repcr-c is beir.:_g s~Ll.brnit-ced pt1::cs*:..iar~t t:o t-.11e i*2qLi~cc.~r~2:ct.s c.:£ lDCFF. SO_ 73 {;::) {2) (TJ') .. This report is re~uired wi~h~n Lhi~cy (JO) days of discovery.
Since::::ely yours, yv1i~k,/ ftv J. M. Zupko, J~.
Gen2ral Manage:r-Salem Operations MJP:pc Distr*ibt:!. tio..:-:;.
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