Information Notice 1986-57, Operating Problems with Solenoid Operated Valves at Nuclear Power Plants: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:11$S ORIGINAL SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-57 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:11$S ORIGINAL                                 SSINS No.:
                                                              IN 86-57   6835 UNITED STATES


COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


OFFICE OF INSPECTION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT


===AND ENFORCEMENT===
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 11, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-57:  OPERATING PROBLEMS WITH SOLENOID OPERATED
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 11, 1986 IE INFORMATION


NOTICE NO. 86-57: OPERATING
VALVES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
 
PROBLEMS WITH SOLENOID OPERATED VALVES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:
:
All nuclear power reactor facilities
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license or a
 
holding an operating
 
license or a construction


permit.
construction permit.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
: This notice is to advise recipients
:
This notice is to advise recipients of a series of valve failures that have


of a series of valve failures that have occurred recently at several nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipi-ents will review the events discussed
occurred recently at several nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipi- ents will review the events discussed below for applicability to their facili- ties and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar valve failures


below for applicability
occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice


to their facili-ties and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar valve failures occurring
do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written


at their facilities.
response is required.


However, suggestions
==Description of Circumstances==
 
:
contained
The NRC has received reports from licensees of operating nuclear power plants
 
in this notice do not constitute
 
NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
 
of Circumstances:
The NRC has received reports from licensees
 
of operating
 
nuclear power plants involving
 
failures of certain valves that are actuated by solenoid operated valves (SOVs) to operate properly.
 
These failures have adversely
 
affected the intended functions
 
of the main steam isolation
 
system, pressure relief and fluid control systems. Attachment
 
1 to this information
 
notice describes
 
the failure events and the corrective
 
actions taken.Discussion:
In most of the cases described
 
in Attachment
 
1, the cause for triggering


the event was attributed
involving failures of certain valves that are actuated by solenoid operated


to a malfunctioning
valves (SOVs) to operate properly. These failures have adversely affected the


SOV that served as a pilot valve. This in turn resulted in the malfunction
intended functions of the main steam isolation system, pressure relief and


of the associated
fluid control systems. Attachment 1 to this information notice describes the


main valve. The failures of the SOVs can be traced to the following
failure events and the corrective actions taken.


different
Discussion:
In most of the cases described in Attachment 1, the cause for triggering the


causes: (1) potentially
event was attributed to a malfunctioning SOV that served as a pilot valve. This


high-temperature
in turn resulted in the malfunction of the associated main valve. The failures


ambient conditions
of the SOVs can be traced to the following different causes: (1) potentially


are not being continuously
high-temperature ambient conditions are not being continuously monitored in areas


monitored
where SOVs are installed and operating in an energized state, (2) hydrocarbon


in areas where SOVs are installed
contaminants, probably because backup air systems (e.g., plant service or shop


and operating
air systems) are being used periodically and are not designed to "oil-free"
 
  specifications as required for Class IE service, (3) chloride contaminants
in an energized
 
state, (2) hydrocarbon
 
contaminants, probably because backup air systems (e.g., plant service or shop air systems) are being used periodically
 
and are not designed to "oil-free" specifications
 
as required for Class IE service, (3) chloride contaminants


causing open circuits in coils of the SOVs, possibly as a result of questionable
causing open circuits in coils of the SOVs, possibly as a result of questionable


handling, packaging, and storage procedures, (4) an active replacement
handling, packaging, and storage procedures, (4) an active replacement parts
 
parts program associated
 
with the elastomers
 
and other short-lived
 
subcomponents
 
used in SOVs has not been adequately
 
maintained, and (5) lubricants
 
have been used excessively
 
during maintenance.
 
ASCO provides installation
 
and maintenance
 
8607090425 Attachment
 
1 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 b. Viton has superior high-temperature
 
performance
 
when compared to EP and is impervious
 
to hydrocarbons.
 
Its major disadvantage
 
is that it is less resistant
 
to radiation
 
than EP by a factor of ten. ASCO recommends
 
Viton for applications
 
that are not oil-free and where radiation
 
levels do not exceed 20 megarads.On the basis of a licensee review of the Brunswick
 
===Station maintenance===
history, which showed the performance
 
of Viton to be satisfactory
 
in ASCO valves, and the available
 
literature
 
and industry experience, the licensee replaced all Unit 2 dual solenoid valves with valves having Viton seats and seals. Because Viton has a 20-megarad
 
limit, the licensee plans to replace these elastomers
 
every 3.3 years to meet environmental
 
qualifica- tion requirements
 
for the MSIV application.
 
After replacing
 
the faulty valves with valves having Viton disc and seal material, the licensee experienced
 
several SOV failures resulting
 
from open circuits of the dc coils on Unit 2. (Brunswick
 
Station employs ASCO NP8323A36V
 
valves that use one ac coil and one dc coil in applications
 
using the subject dual solenoid valve.)On October 5, 1985, the dc coils of two MSIVs failed during the perfor-mance of post-maintenance
 
testing of the MSIVs. Investigation
 
into the failures indicated
 
an open circuit in the dc coils. The coils were replaced and the valves subsequently
 
retested satisfactorily.


On October 15, 1985, an unplanned
program associated with the elastomers and other short-lived subcomponents used


closure of an MSIV occurred while Unit 2 was operating
in SOVs has not been adequately maintained, and (5) lubricants have been used


at 99 percent full power. Closure of the MSIV occurred when the ac solenoid coil portion of the MSIV associated
excessively during maintenance. ASCO provides installation and maintenance


SOV was de-energized
8607090425


in accordance
Attachment 1 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 b.    Viton has superior high-temperature performance when compared to EP


with a periodic test procedure.
and is impervious to hydrocarbons. Its major disadvantage is that it


It was not known then that there was an open circuit in the associated
is less resistant to radiation than EP by a factor of ten. ASCO


dc solenoid coil portion of the dual SOV. Consequently, when the ac coil was de-energized, closure of the MSIV resulted.
recommends Viton for applications that are not oil-free and where


The failed dc coil was replaced and then retested satisfactorily.
radiation levels do not exceed 20 megarads.


Investigation
On the basis of a licensee review of the Brunswick Station maintenance


into the failures of the dc coil by the licensee determined
history, which showed the performance of Viton to be satisfactory in ASCO


that the failures appeared to be separation
valves, and the available literature and industry experience, the licensee


of the very fine coil wire at the junction point where it connects to the much larger field lead. This connection
replaced all Unit 2 dual solenoid valves with valves having Viton seats


point is a soldered connection
and seals. Because Viton has a 20-megarad limit, the licensee plans to


that is then taped and lacquered.
replace these elastomers every 3.3 years to meet environmental qualifica- tion requirements for the MSIV application.


Further analysis of the coils (two failed dc coils plus five spares from storage) by the CP&L Research Center indicated
After replacing the faulty valves with valves having Viton disc and seal


the separation
material, the licensee experienced several SOV failures resulting from


might be corrosion
open circuits of the dc coils on Unit 2. (Brunswick Station employs ASCO


induced by chloride contaminants.
NP8323A36V valves that use one ac coil and one dc coil in applications


To date, the licensee and ASCO are unable to determine
using the subject dual solenoid valve.)
On October 5, 1985, the dc coils of two MSIVs failed during the perfor- mance of post-maintenance testing of the MSIVs. Investigation into the


the source of the chloride.
failures indicated an open circuit in the dc coils. The coils were


However, followup investigation
replaced and the valves subsequently retested satisfactorily.


by the NRC revealed that ASCO had previously
On October 15, 1985, an unplanned closure of an MSIV occurred while Unit 2 was operating at 99 percent full power. Closure of the MSIV occurred when


experienced
the ac solenoid coil portion of the MSIV associated SOV was de-energized


similar dc coil open circuit anomalies
in accordance with a periodic test procedure. It was not known then that


after a surface ship-ment of SOVs overseas to Japan. At that time, ASCO believed that the salt water ambient conditions
there was an open circuit in the associated dc solenoid coil portion of


during shipping may have been the source of the chlorine-induced
the dual SOV. Consequently, when the ac coil was de-energized, closure of


failures.
the MSIV resulted. The failed dc coil was replaced and then retested


ASCO recommends
satisfactorily.


specific handling, packaging, and storage conditions
Investigation into the failures of the dc coil by the licensee determined


for spare parts and valves at facilities.
that the failures appeared to be separation of the very fine coil wire at


Attachment
the junction point where it connects to the much larger field lead. This


1 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 The licensee initiated
connection point is a soldered connection that is then taped and


a temporary
lacquered.


surveillance
Further analysis of the coils (two failed dc coils plus five spares from


program to monitor opera-bility of the solenoid coils on October 16, 1985. A modification
storage) by the CP&L Research Center indicated the separation might be


was performed
corrosion induced by chloride contaminants. To date, the licensee and


to install a voltage dropping resistor in the individual
ASCO are unable to determine the source of the chloride. However, followup investigation by the NRC revealed that ASCO had previously


coil circuits so that they can be monitored
experienced similar dc coil open circuit anomalies after a surface ship- ment of SOVs overseas to Japan. At that time, ASCO believed that the salt


directly from cabinets in the control room. This allows continuity
water ambient conditions during shipping may have been the source of the


of the coil circuitry
chlorine-induced failures. ASCO recommends specific handling, packaging, and storage conditions for spare parts and valves at facilities.


to be verified by measuring
Attachment 1 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 The licensee initiated a temporary surveillance program to monitor opera- bility of the solenoid coils on October 16, 1985. A modification was


a voltage drop across the resistor.
performed to install a voltage dropping resistor in the individual coil


According
circuits so that they can be monitored directly from cabinets in the


to the licensee, until the cause for failure can be determined, plans are to check the coil circuitry
control room. This allows continuity of the coil circuitry to be verified


for continuity
by measuring a voltage drop across the resistor. According to the


on a daily basis.2. Scram Discharge
licensee, until the cause for failure can be determined, plans are to


Solenoid Valve Failure In November 1985, Carolina Power and Light's Brunswick
check the coil circuitry for continuity on a daily basis.


facility experi-enced problems with several scram discharge
2.  Scram Discharge Solenoid Valve Failure


SOVs. The problems were identified
In November 1985, Carolina Power and Light's Brunswick facility experi- enced problems with several scram discharge SOVs. The problems were


during periodic surveillance
identified during periodic surveillance testing to determine the single


testing to determine
rod insertion times and resulted in several rods with slow insertion


the single rod insertion
times. Initial troubleshooting isolated the problem to the SOVs in the


times and resulted in several rods with slow insertion times. Initial troubleshooting
scram discharge line for two of the control rods, which were subsequently
 
isolated the problem to the SOVs in the scram discharge
 
line for two of the control rods, which were subsequently


replaced and tested satisfactorily.
replaced and tested satisfactorily.


The licensee disassembled
The licensee disassembled the failed SOVs, which were manufactured by ASCO
 
the failed SOVs, which were manufactured
 
by ASCO (Model HV-90-405-2A), for failure analysis.
 
When the valves were disas-sembled, it was noted that copious amounts of silicone lubricant
 
had been applied by the licensee to all gaskets, seals, and diaphragms
 
internal to the valves during previous routine maintenance..
 
The licensee believes that the excessive
 
amount of lubricant
 
may have blocked some of the valves' internal passages or caused sticking of the diaphragms, thereby contributing
 
to the slow insertion
 
times. The technical
 
manual for the subject valves states that body passage gaskets should be lubricated
 
with moderate amounts of Dow Corning's
 
Valve Seal Silicone Lubricant
 
or an equivalent
 
high-grade
 
silicone grease.The licensee conducted
 
successful
 
scram tests on all other rods. A periodic retest of 10 percent of the control rods every 120 days as required by the Technical
 
Specifications
 
provides sufficient
 
assurance that this problem does not exist in other SOVs. In addition, the licensee stated that maintenance
 
procedures
 
and practices


would be reviewed and modified, as required, to prevent the application
(Model HV-90-405-2A), for failure analysis. When the valves were disas- sembled, it was noted that copious amounts of silicone lubricant had been


of excessive
applied by the licensee to all gaskets, seals, and diaphragms internal to


amounts of lubricant
the valves during previous routine maintenance.. The licensee believes


during repair or overhaul of components.
that the excessive amount of lubricant may have blocked some of the


Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant On September
valves' internal passages or caused sticking of the diaphragms, thereby


10, 1985, the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant was operating
contributing to the slow insertion times. The technical manual for the


at 100 percent power when one of the six SOVs in the auxiliary
subject valves states that body passage gaskets should be lubricated with


feedwater
moderate amounts of Dow Corning's Valve Seal Silicone Lubricant or an


system (AFW)failed to change state when de-energized.
equivalent high-grade silicone grease.


This failure was detected during the performance
The licensee conducted successful scram tests on all other rods. A


of a preventive
periodic retest of 10 percent of the control rods every 120 days as


maintenance
required by the Technical Specifications provides sufficient assurance


procedure
that this problem does not exist in other SOVs. In addition, the licensee


developed
stated that maintenance procedures and practices would be reviewed and


to periodically
modified, as required, to prevent the application of excessive amounts of


cycle each of the six SOVs to prevent a sticking problem similar to SOV fail-ures previously
lubricant during repair or overhaul of components.


experienced
===Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant===
On September 10, 1985, the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant was operating at 100
percent power when one of the six SOVs in the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW)
failed to change state when de-energized. This failure was detected during the


on November 2, 1984. In that earlier event, two feedwater
performance of a preventive maintenance procedure developed to periodically


bypass valves failed to open automatically
cycle each of the six SOVs to prevent a sticking problem similar to SOV fail- ures previously experienced on November 2, 1984. In that earlier event, two


and the cause was deter-mined to be sticking SOVs. The faulty SOV was ASCO Model NP8320A-185E
feedwater bypass valves failed to open automatically and the cause was deter- mined to be sticking SOVs. The faulty SOV was ASCO Model NP8320A-185E and the


and the licensee has been unable to determine
licensee has been unable to determine the cause of the malfunction. The


the cause of the malfunction.
Attachment 2 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED


The
IE INFORMATION NOTICES


Attachment
Information                                  Date of


2 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION
Notice No.    Subject                        Issue    Issued to


NOTICES Information
86-56          Reliability Of Main Steam      7/10/86 All PWR facilities


Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 86-56 Reliability
Safety Valves                          holding an OL or CP


Of Main Steam Safety Valves 7/10/86 All PWR facilities
86-55          Delayed Access To Safety-      7/10/86 All power reactor


holding an OL or CP 86-55 86-54 Delayed Access To Safety-Related Areas And Equipment During Plant Emergencies
Related Areas And Equipment           facilities holding


Criminal Prosecution
During Plant Emergencies              an OL or CP


Of A Former Radiation
86-54          Criminal Prosecution Of A     6/27/86 All holders of by- Former Radiation Safety                product, source, or


===Safety Officer Who Willfully Directed An Unqualified===
Officer Who Willfully                 special nuclear
Individual


===To Perform Radiography===
Directed An Unqualified                material
Improper Use Of Heat Shrink-able Tubing 7/10/86 6/27/86 6/26/86 86-53 86-52 Conductor


Insulation
Individual To Perform


Degrada- 6/26/86 tion On Foxboro Model E Controllers
Radiography


Excessive
86-53          Improper Use Of Heat Shrink-  6/26/86 All power reactor


Pneumatic
able Tubing                            facilities holding


Leakage 6/18/86 In The Automatic
an OL or CP


Depressuriza- tion System All power reactor facilities
86-52          Conductor Insulation Degrada- 6/26/86  All power reactor


holding an OL or CP All holders of by-product, source, or special nuclear material All power reactor facilities
tion On Foxboro Model E                facilities holding


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
Controllers                            an OL or CP


holding an OL or CP All BWR facilities
86-51          Excessive Pneumatic Leakage 6/18/86    All BWR facilities


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
In The Automatic Depressuriza-        holding an OL or CP


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
tion System


holding an OL or CP All BWR facilities
86-50          Inadequate Testing To Detect  6/18/86 All power reactor


holding an OL or CP 86-51 86-50 86-49 Inadequate
Failures Of Safety-Related            facilities holding


Testing To Detect Failures Of Safety-Related
Pneumatic Components Or                an OL or CP


Pneumatic
Systems


Components
86-49          Age/Environment Induced        6/16/86 All power reactor


Or Systems Age/Environment
Electrical Cable Failues              facilities holding


Induced Electrical
an OL or CP


Cable Failues Inadequate
86-48          Inadequate Testing Of Boron 6/13/86    All BWR facilities


Testing Of Boron Solution Concentration
Solution Concentration In The          holding an OL or CP


In The Standby Liquid Control System 6/18/86 6/16/86 6/13/86 86-48 OL = Operating
Standby Liquid Control System


License CP = Construction
OL = Operating License


Permit}}
CP = Construction Permit}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 03:03, 24 November 2019

Operating Problems with Solenoid Operated Valves at Nuclear Power Plants
ML031220718
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill
Issue date: 07/11/1986
From:
NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-86-057, NUDOCS 8607090425
Download: ML031220718 (4)


11$S ORIGINAL SSINS No.:

IN 86-57 6835 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 11, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-57: OPERATING PROBLEMS WITH SOLENOID OPERATED

VALVES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license or a

construction permit.

Purpose

This notice is to advise recipients of a series of valve failures that have

occurred recently at several nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipi- ents will review the events discussed below for applicability to their facili- ties and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar valve failures

occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice

do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written

response is required.

Description of Circumstances

The NRC has received reports from licensees of operating nuclear power plants

involving failures of certain valves that are actuated by solenoid operated

valves (SOVs) to operate properly. These failures have adversely affected the

intended functions of the main steam isolation system, pressure relief and

fluid control systems. Attachment 1 to this information notice describes the

failure events and the corrective actions taken.

Discussion:

In most of the cases described in Attachment 1, the cause for triggering the

event was attributed to a malfunctioning SOV that served as a pilot valve. This

in turn resulted in the malfunction of the associated main valve. The failures

of the SOVs can be traced to the following different causes: (1) potentially

high-temperature ambient conditions are not being continuously monitored in areas

where SOVs are installed and operating in an energized state, (2) hydrocarbon

contaminants, probably because backup air systems (e.g., plant service or shop

air systems) are being used periodically and are not designed to "oil-free"

specifications as required for Class IE service, (3) chloride contaminants

causing open circuits in coils of the SOVs, possibly as a result of questionable

handling, packaging, and storage procedures, (4) an active replacement parts

program associated with the elastomers and other short-lived subcomponents used

in SOVs has not been adequately maintained, and (5) lubricants have been used

excessively during maintenance. ASCO provides installation and maintenance

8607090425

Attachment 1 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 b. Viton has superior high-temperature performance when compared to EP

and is impervious to hydrocarbons. Its major disadvantage is that it

is less resistant to radiation than EP by a factor of ten. ASCO

recommends Viton for applications that are not oil-free and where

radiation levels do not exceed 20 megarads.

On the basis of a licensee review of the Brunswick Station maintenance

history, which showed the performance of Viton to be satisfactory in ASCO

valves, and the available literature and industry experience, the licensee

replaced all Unit 2 dual solenoid valves with valves having Viton seats

and seals. Because Viton has a 20-megarad limit, the licensee plans to

replace these elastomers every 3.3 years to meet environmental qualifica- tion requirements for the MSIV application.

After replacing the faulty valves with valves having Viton disc and seal

material, the licensee experienced several SOV failures resulting from

open circuits of the dc coils on Unit 2. (Brunswick Station employs ASCO

NP8323A36V valves that use one ac coil and one dc coil in applications

using the subject dual solenoid valve.)

On October 5, 1985, the dc coils of two MSIVs failed during the perfor- mance of post-maintenance testing of the MSIVs. Investigation into the

failures indicated an open circuit in the dc coils. The coils were

replaced and the valves subsequently retested satisfactorily.

On October 15, 1985, an unplanned closure of an MSIV occurred while Unit 2 was operating at 99 percent full power. Closure of the MSIV occurred when

the ac solenoid coil portion of the MSIV associated SOV was de-energized

in accordance with a periodic test procedure. It was not known then that

there was an open circuit in the associated dc solenoid coil portion of

the dual SOV. Consequently, when the ac coil was de-energized, closure of

the MSIV resulted. The failed dc coil was replaced and then retested

satisfactorily.

Investigation into the failures of the dc coil by the licensee determined

that the failures appeared to be separation of the very fine coil wire at

the junction point where it connects to the much larger field lead. This

connection point is a soldered connection that is then taped and

lacquered.

Further analysis of the coils (two failed dc coils plus five spares from

storage) by the CP&L Research Center indicated the separation might be

corrosion induced by chloride contaminants. To date, the licensee and

ASCO are unable to determine the source of the chloride. However, followup investigation by the NRC revealed that ASCO had previously

experienced similar dc coil open circuit anomalies after a surface ship- ment of SOVs overseas to Japan. At that time, ASCO believed that the salt

water ambient conditions during shipping may have been the source of the

chlorine-induced failures. ASCO recommends specific handling, packaging, and storage conditions for spare parts and valves at facilities.

Attachment 1 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 The licensee initiated a temporary surveillance program to monitor opera- bility of the solenoid coils on October 16, 1985. A modification was

performed to install a voltage dropping resistor in the individual coil

circuits so that they can be monitored directly from cabinets in the

control room. This allows continuity of the coil circuitry to be verified

by measuring a voltage drop across the resistor. According to the

licensee, until the cause for failure can be determined, plans are to

check the coil circuitry for continuity on a daily basis.

2. Scram Discharge Solenoid Valve Failure

In November 1985, Carolina Power and Light's Brunswick facility experi- enced problems with several scram discharge SOVs. The problems were

identified during periodic surveillance testing to determine the single

rod insertion times and resulted in several rods with slow insertion

times. Initial troubleshooting isolated the problem to the SOVs in the

scram discharge line for two of the control rods, which were subsequently

replaced and tested satisfactorily.

The licensee disassembled the failed SOVs, which were manufactured by ASCO

(Model HV-90-405-2A), for failure analysis. When the valves were disas- sembled, it was noted that copious amounts of silicone lubricant had been

applied by the licensee to all gaskets, seals, and diaphragms internal to

the valves during previous routine maintenance.. The licensee believes

that the excessive amount of lubricant may have blocked some of the

valves' internal passages or caused sticking of the diaphragms, thereby

contributing to the slow insertion times. The technical manual for the

subject valves states that body passage gaskets should be lubricated with

moderate amounts of Dow Corning's Valve Seal Silicone Lubricant or an

equivalent high-grade silicone grease.

The licensee conducted successful scram tests on all other rods. A

periodic retest of 10 percent of the control rods every 120 days as

required by the Technical Specifications provides sufficient assurance

that this problem does not exist in other SOVs. In addition, the licensee

stated that maintenance procedures and practices would be reviewed and

modified, as required, to prevent the application of excessive amounts of

lubricant during repair or overhaul of components.

Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant

On September 10, 1985, the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant was operating at 100

percent power when one of the six SOVs in the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW)

failed to change state when de-energized. This failure was detected during the

performance of a preventive maintenance procedure developed to periodically

cycle each of the six SOVs to prevent a sticking problem similar to SOV fail- ures previously experienced on November 2, 1984. In that earlier event, two

feedwater bypass valves failed to open automatically and the cause was deter- mined to be sticking SOVs. The faulty SOV was ASCO Model NP8320A-185E and the

licensee has been unable to determine the cause of the malfunction. The

Attachment 2 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to

86-56 Reliability Of Main Steam 7/10/86 All PWR facilities

Safety Valves holding an OL or CP

86-55 Delayed Access To Safety- 7/10/86 All power reactor

Related Areas And Equipment facilities holding

During Plant Emergencies an OL or CP

86-54 Criminal Prosecution Of A 6/27/86 All holders of by- Former Radiation Safety product, source, or

Officer Who Willfully special nuclear

Directed An Unqualified material

Individual To Perform

Radiography

86-53 Improper Use Of Heat Shrink- 6/26/86 All power reactor

able Tubing facilities holding

an OL or CP

86-52 Conductor Insulation Degrada- 6/26/86 All power reactor

tion On Foxboro Model E facilities holding

Controllers an OL or CP

86-51 Excessive Pneumatic Leakage 6/18/86 All BWR facilities

In The Automatic Depressuriza- holding an OL or CP

tion System

86-50 Inadequate Testing To Detect 6/18/86 All power reactor

Failures Of Safety-Related facilities holding

Pneumatic Components Or an OL or CP

Systems

86-49 Age/Environment Induced 6/16/86 All power reactor

Electrical Cable Failues facilities holding

an OL or CP

86-48 Inadequate Testing Of Boron 6/13/86 All BWR facilities

Solution Concentration In The holding an OL or CP

Standby Liquid Control System

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit