ML18038A721

Petition for Emergency Enforcement Action Against Facility, Which Is Operating in Violation of NRC & Federal Requirements for Availability of ECCS High Pressure Core Injection & Request for Public Hearing

ML18038A721
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	10/28/1992
From:	RIDING B L AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	NRC
Shared Package
ML18038A720	List: ML18038A719 ML18038A721
References
NUDOCS 9211160402
Download: ML18038A721 (148)

Text

UNITEDSTATEDOFAMERICABEFORETHENUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION PETITIONFOREMERGENCY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONANDREQUESTFORPUBLICHEARINGI.INTRODUCTION I,BENL.RIDINGS(hereinafter "Petitioner"

)herebypetitiontheCommissioners oftheNuclearRegulatory Commission

("NRC"or"Commission"

)foremergency enforcement actionagainstNiagraMohawk'sNineMile(UnitOne)Nuclearpower"plant, whichisoperatinq inviolation ofboththeNRCandFederalrequirements foravailability ofEmergency CoreCooling(ECCS)highpressurecoreinjection.

AsanECCSsystem,theNineMileplantalsofailstoprovidethemandatory emergency backuppowertothehighpressurecoreinjection (HPCI)system.OverthetwentyyearstheNineMileOneplanthasbeenallowedtooperate,nosafetyrelatedpumpshaveeverbeenavailable toinjectwaterintothevesselatreactorpressure.

Atthesametimethisplantwasallowedtooperateatfullpower,therearemanypostulated accidents assumedintheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(thatarecapableofdrainingthereactorvessel)andspecifically relyontheECCSHPCIPumpsto'aintain reactorwaterlevel.Thesepumpshaveneverbeeninstalled andthecurrentadministrative controlsallowedthisplanttooperateoutsidetheminimumfederalrequirement.

Thisspecifictypeofplantoperation outsidetheknownminimumfederalrequirements greatlyendangers healthandpropertyrisktothepublic.Asdiscussed indetailbelow,theresponsible utility,itsQualityAssurance groupandtheNRChaveroutinely failedintheirresponsibility toensuretheoperation ofnuclearpowerplantswithinthelicenseagreement.

Evenwhenproblemsareidentified,.

documented andbroughttotheattention oftheresponsible parties,varioussafetyconcernsareroutinely dismissed, ignoredor9211160402 921027*PDRADOCK05000220PDR

~~~M'h' administratively eliminated.

Evenissueswhichobviously endangerpublicsafetyhavebeenroutinely dismissed, notonlybytheutilitybutsuchactionsauthorized andapprovedbytheindependent qualityassurance groupsandbytheNRC.Anyandalloftheseorganizations havetheauthority tostoptheop'eration ofplantsoutsidetheminimumsafetyrequirements, andnotonehavecomeforwardtofulfillitsdutyandprotectthepublic.Instead,eachorganization hasreviewedtheenclosedsafetyconcernsandcontrarytoanypractical justification, haveremainedsilentandallowedthismannerofplantoperation totakeplacewiththeirapproval, givingevidencethatthesegroupshavealsofailedtoremainindependent ofeachother.Independent reviewbynotonlythegovernment agencybutthequalityassurance reviewgroupsisthebasicpremisewhichallowedcongresstograntoperation ofcommercial nuclearpowerplantswithlimitedliability fordamages.Thecurrentadministrative controlsusedtodayfailedtoensuretheplantoperatewithintheminimumfederalguidelines.

ItisCongress's dutytoprotectpublicsafetyanditscurrentadministrative controlshavefailed.BecausetheNineNilePointUnitOneReactorviolatesbothfederallawandtheCommissions's requirements forHIGHPRESSURECOREINJECTION, theCommission canmakenofindingthatthereisresonable assurance ofnounduerisktopublichealthandsafety.Petitioner therefore requestthattheCommission issueimmediately aneffective orderdirecting thelicenseetoceasepoweroperation andplacethereactorinacoldshutdowncondition.

Theplantshouldnotbepermitted tocontinueorresumeoperation unlessanduntilsubsequent testsandinspections areshowntoprovidetherequisite reasonable assurance ofnounduerisktopublichealthandsafety.Moreover, Petitioners seekapublichearingbeforetheplantisallowedtooperateagain.

II.DESCRIPTION OFPETITIINERI,BenL.Ridings,'amatechnical consultant forcommercial nuclearpowerplants.Overaspanofsomefifteenyears,whileworkingatsometwentyfoursites,Ihavespecialized inreviewing oflicensing agreement (FSAR,Technical Specifications,FederalCodesandRegulations, ASMECodes,etc.),establishing administrative controlstomeettheserequirements andtestprogramstoensurecompliance atalltimes.Nytestprogramsandadministrat vecontrolsestablished whileundercontracttovariousutilities arestillinusetodayatmanyfacilities.

III~THECOMNISSIOM SHOULDEXERCISEITSSUPERVISORY JURISDICTION OVERTHISPETITIONA.TheCommission hasanInherentSupervisory Jurisdiction overtheSafetyofOperation oftheNiagraNohawkNineNilePlant.ThispetitionisbroughtbeforetheCommission pursuanttotheauthority grantedtoitin42USC2233(d),2236(a),2237 and10CFR2.204,2.206(c)(1),

50.54,50.57,50.100and50.109.Itinvokestheinherentsupervisory authority oftheCommission tooverseeallaspectsoftheregulatory andlicensing processandits"overriding responsibility forassuringpublichealthandsafetyintheoperation ofnuclearpowerfacilities."

Consolidated EdisonCoo.ofN.Y.Inc.(IndianPoint,Units1,2and3).CLI-75-8, 2NRC173(1975)~AstheCommission haspreviously

observed, itssupervisory powersincludethepowertoorderimmediate shutdownofafacility"ifthepublichealthorsafetysorequires."

tPetitionforEmerencandRemedialAction,CLI786g7NRC400'05(1978)gciting5USC558(c),42USC2236(b)~10CFR2202(f)g2204.

t~U

~rs~i~fTheCommission hasexeicised itsinherentauthority onanumberofoccasions.

Inadditiontotheceasescitedabove,seePetitionforResearchandDevelomentAdministration (ClinchRiverBreederReactorProject)p CLI761374NRC6777576(1976)I Consumers PowerCo.(MidlandUnits1and2),CLI-73-38, 6AEC1084(1973);PublicServiceCo.ofNewN~aeshire(Seahroot NuclearPowerStation,Unitsiand2),CL1-77-8, SNPC503,515-517(1977).

B.ExerciseoftheCommissions's Independent Jurisdiction is,Appropriate inThisCase.NRCregulations at10CFR2.206 providethatunderordinarycircumstances, enforcement petitions aretobelodgedwiththeNRCStaff,andthattheCommission maytakediscretionary reviewofStaffdenialsofsuchpetitions.

However,theCommissions's reviewing power"doesnotlimitinanyway"its"supervisory powerover.delegated Staffactions",

10CFR2.206(c)(1).Itisappropriate forthecommission toexerciseitssupervisory powersandtakejurisdiction inthiscasebecausetheNPCStaffhasacquiesced toNiagraMohawks'iolations formorethantwoyears.InJan1990,NiagraMohawkCompliance Supervisor wasgivenwrittennoticeofHPCIsandotherinadequacies whicheffectpublicsafety.Afternoapparentaction,theNineMileQualityFirstTeamwasalsogivennotice.Petitioner waslaternotifiedbytheQualityFirstTeamthattheNRChadbeencontacted andmadeawareoftheproblemaswell.Petitioner waslatercontacted bytheQualityFirstTeamandtoldthattheNRChadexemptedtheplantfromtheHPCIrequirement anditsneedforbackuppowerintheeventoflossofpower.Petitioner hasyettoheardirectlyfromtheNRConthismatter.

II IV.GROUNDSFORACTIONA.FederalRequirements forhavingradioactive fuelsonsiteInaccordance with10CFR50.10, theutilityNiagraMohawkenteredintocontractual agreement withthefederalgovernment undertheprovisions ofpublicdocument50-220,onfilewiththefederalregister.

NowundertheJurisdiction of10CFR50,App.A(GeneralDesignCriteria),

establish theminimumrequirements fortheprincipal designforwatercoolednuclearpowerplant.Criterion 33and35(Attachment 2)specifytheminimumneedthatasystemtoprovideabundantemergency corecoolingshallbeprovided.

Thesystemsafetyfunctionshallbetotransferheatfromthe.reactor coreandmusthavesuitableredundancy incomponents andonsiteelectricpowersystem(assuming offsitepowerisnotavailable) whichwillenablethesafetyfunctiontobeaccomplished.

Also(Criterion 33),asystemtosupplyreactorcoolantmakeupforprotection againstsmallbreaksinthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshallbeprovided.

Criterion 37providesc)bu"gthetestingrequirements oftheemergency corecoolingsystem.10CFK70detailstheutilityandNRCresponsibility fortestingandinspection ofthesesystemsand10CFR50App.B(QualityAssurance Criteria) detailstheQualityAssurance Programandtheadministrative requirements forInspections, TestControl,Operating Status,Corrective ActionandRecords.B.AStudyofContractual Agreement (docket50-220)In,accordance with10CFR50.34, thetechnical specificationshallperformanevaluation ofthesafetyeffectiveness ofproviding forseparation ofhighpressurecoolantinJection(HPCI)andreactorcoreisolation cooling(RCIC).Thisinvestigation foundtheNileNilePointTechnical Specification incompliance with'hisrequirement.

Technical Specification 4.1~8(Attachment 3)givespositiveproofthattheECCS iC:.

~gl~requirement fortheHPCIsystemwasanticipated bythedesigners.

Secondly, thecorresponding LimitingCondition forOperation (LCO)3.i.8.c(Attachment 3)viewthissystemassocriticalthatif"theutilityfailstoverifyHPCIoperability itwilldemandanorderlyshutdownbeinitiated withinonehour.WhenonlyoneHPCIcomponent becomesinoperable itsredundant component shallbedemonstrated tobeoperableimmediately anddailythereafter (asopposedtomonthlydemonstration)."

Inaccordance withtheBasesforTechnical Specification 3.1.8,theHPCIsystemisprovidedtoensureadequatecorecoolingintheunlikelyeventofareactorcoolantlinebreak(alsoafederalrequirement-design criterion 33).TheHPCIsystemisrequiredforlinebreakswhichexceedthecapability oftheControlRodDrivepumpsandwhicharenotlargeenoughtoallowfastenoughdepressurization forcorespraytobeeffective (corespray350psiasopposedtoHPCI22QQpsi).Inaccordance withtheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR),ChapterVII(Attachment 4),theDesignBasesforHPCIisdiscussed.

Althoughseveralrevisionhavebeenimplemented bytheutility'in ordertofabricate theexistence ofaECCSsystemtosatisfytheHPCIfederalrequirement, itsprimarysafetyfunctionislisted;(1)provide adequatecoolingofthereactorcoreunderabnormalandaccidentconditions, (2)remove theheatfromradioactive decayandresidualheatfromthereactorcoreatsucharatethatfuelcladmeltingwouldbeprevented, (3)provide forcontinuity ofcorecoolingoverthecompleterangeofpostulated breaksizesintheprimarysystemprocessbarrier.Once.thesafetyfunctions areunderstood itbecomesobviousastowhythissystemisaminimumrequirement ofthefederalguidelines.

~g4 Thefollowing paragraph ofFSARChapterVIIgivesthereaderanindication ofthelackofproperreviewthatexists.AtNineNilePoint,unlikeeveryothernuclearfacility, "MPCIisnotanengineered safeguards systemandisnotconsidered inanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalysis."

AsstatedintheFSAR(inlaymanterms)thisfeedwater systemdoesnotpretendtomeettheIOCFR50AppendixA(Criterion 33,35,36,37)requirements oftheminimumfederalrequirements.

Infact,NineNilePointhasnosystemmeetingtheseminimumfederalrequirements.

Next,reviewing theDesignEvaluation portionofFSARChapterVII,(Attachment 4)aparadoxoccursindesignphilosophy.

"Duringaloss-of-coolantaccidentwithinthedrywel1,highdrywel1pressureduetoalinebreakwillcauseareactorscram.Theautomatic'cram willcauseaturbinetripafterafive-second delay.Inordertoreventcladdinterneraturefromexceedintheirmaximumlimitfortheentire.spectrumofbreaks,the3800gpm(fromonetrainoftheHPCIpumps)wouldhavetobeavailable Obviously, theHPCIsystemisabsolutely necessary toensurecriticalheatflux(CHF)isnotexceeded.

Withoutthecoolantwatertotransfertheheatfromthefueltothecoolant,thefuelrodwouldthenheatuprapidlyandfuelcladdingwouldtakeplaceandcause'possiblemeltdownunlessthereactorwereshutdownquickly.Further,oncethecriticalheatfluxwasexceeded, thedeparture fromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)wouldexceedits1~25limit.TheselimitsareTechnical Specificationrequirements aswellbutitgivesanindication oftheinterdependence oftheECCSsystems.Tomakeastatement inalicensethat"HPCIhasnotbeenconsidered inanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalyses" isaanotherindication ofthelackofp~opcireviewthatexistsatNineNilePoint.Everysafetylimitassumed jl'I

~~,'jestattheNineMilePointplantisjeopardized withouttheassurance thatthefuelwillremaincoveredatalltimes.TheNRChasapprovedthenon-safety relatedfeedwater systemasanappropriate substitute foranECCSHPCIfederalrequirement.

Whatatfirstseemslikeaquibbleaboutasinglepumpisinactuality avalidargumentthateverybasesassumedbythislicenseisnullandvoid.AtNineMilePoint,standardbasicthermalreactordesignhasbeensignificantly alteredinseveralECCSsystems.TherearenoHPCIorRCICsystemtotransferheatfromthereactorcore.Thereisnowayoftakingsteamawayfromthereactorandusingthisenergytodriveahighpressurepump.NormallytheHPCIpumpsreturnthecondensed steam(water)backintothevesseltomaintainwaterlevel.AtNineMilePoint,thereisnoHPCIorRCICsystems.AtNineMilePoint,unlikenormalreactordesign,electrically driven,non-quality

~-relatedfeedwater pumpsareconsidered.

Thesenon-quality relatedfeedwater pumpssupposedly fulfilltheHPCIsafetyfunctionandyetdonotmeettheelectrical backuprequirements.

Itmustbenotedthatthesizeoftheseelectrical pumpsmakeitimpossible tohaveon-sitepoweravailable intheeventoflossofoff-sitepower.On-sitepoweravailability isassumedinthebasesoftheFSAR.Itistherefore impossible forthisplanttofulfilltheminimumsafetyobligation asdictatedbyfederalstatuteoftheknownpostulated accidents.

Thissamefeedwater system(beingnon-quality related)waspurchased asanon-quality relatedsystem.Inthissamesystem;piping,valvesfinstrumentation, wiring,electrical components andcontrolsystemswereallpurchased andinstalled undernon-quality relatedcontractual provisions.

HPCIautomatically initiates onaLossCoolantAccident(LOCA)signalfromtheNSSSlogic.TheNSSSlogicperformstheECCSsafeguard functions and E

alwaysinstalled understrictcontractual

mandates, whichincludetraining, qualityassurance reviews,certified skilledcraftsmen, etc.Secondly, thepipingsystem,welding,hangerrestraints andmaintenance considerations wereinstalled andmaintained undernon-quality relatedprovisions aswell.Again,ECCSsafeguard systemsarepurchased, constructed andmaintained undermuchstricterguidelines.

Thefeedwater systemwasneverdesigned, purchased, built,maintained norcapableoffulfillingtheHPCIrequirements ofthefederalguidelines.-

AtNineNilePointtheHPCIsystemsimplydoesnotexist.Theadministrative controlswhichallowedacceptance ofsuchanon-quality relatedsystemtofulfillthismandatory ECCSfederalrequirement isnotacceptable.

C.Knowledge ofExistingConcernsTheneedforanoperableECCSHPCISystemismandatory asevidenced fromthegroundsforreliefinthisreport.AtNineNilePointy'theUtility,QualityAssurance personnel andtheNPCwerewellawareofthisrequirement.

F'rwhateverreason,thisplantwaslicensedbytheNRCandallowedtooperatewithoutthismandatory requirement installed.

Attemptsbythesesamepartiestosubstitute non-quality relatedfeedwater equipment tofulfillthismandatory safeguard functionsupportsthefacttheneedforrequirement wasunderstood.

Evenifnon-quality relatedequipment was.acceptable tosupportECCSfunctions (anditsnot),thereisnoonsiteelectricpowersystemthatwillsupportthesafetyfunctionofafeedwater/HPCI system.Thiselec.ricsystemisanothermandatory minimumrequirement (Attachment 2-Criterion 35).Toprovethecollaboration betweenallpartiesmentioned, thelicenseeattemptstotakecreditforronsitepoweravailability fromtheBentonDam,some100milesaway.Obviously thereviewers areawareofthesemandatory requirements butthere I

'Igg~'I"resolution tothesafetyconcernsisnotacceptable.

Thepossibility ofatornadodestroying theswitchyard isaknownpostulated accidentthatcanoccur.Withoutthispoweravailability, theHPCIfunctioncannotpossiblybeassumed,asstatedintheFSARChapterVII(Attachment 4).Everytimethefeedwater procedures wererevisedthisissuewouldhavetobereviewed.

Everytime theFSAR(ChapterVII)wasrevised,theTechnical Specifications revisedorcontainment integrity wasquestioned thisissuehadtobereviewedinaccordance withadministrative requirements setoutbythefederalguidelines.

Everytime theQualityAssurance groupsandNRCperformed theirindependent auditsandinspections thisissuehadtobereviewed.

Everytime thisplantwasoperatedatmodes1or2,theresponsible SeniorReactorOperator(SRO),whoisspecifically trained(10CFR50AppE)ontheseissueswouldhavetoquestionthevalidityofthecurrentHPCIsystem.EverytimetheHPCIsurveillance (monthly) wasperformed toensureoperability, theresponsible SPOwouldhavetoquestionthevalidityofanonqualityrelatedfeedwater systemfulfilling theHPCIsystem.Takingcreditfornon-quality relatedequipment tofulfilltherequirements ofaECCSsafetyfunctionisnotacceptable anditwouldbetheSPO'sresponsibility toquestionthefeedwater abilitytoperformthisHPCIsafetyfunction.

Ofcourse,thatistheanotherproblemtoconsider, itwouldbetheSRO'sjob.Althoughpreviously awareoftheproblem,onJan18,1990,theUtilitywasservednoticeoftheseandothersafetyconcern.Ifthenon-quality relatedfeedwater systemwastosupposedly fulfilltheHPCIsafetyfunction, itfailedtomettheonsiteelectrical requirements andmanyof

'I'I themainflowpathvalveshadneverbeenincludedintheInservice TestProgram(10CFR50.

55).Some44outof47valveswerecurrently notidentifiedintheInservice TestProgram(ECCS Surveillance violation).

Withsuchknowledge, theUtility,QualityAssurance groupandtheNRCallowed'theplanttostartupandcontinueintofulloperating (mode1)condition.

Nopumps,novalvesyetTechnical Specification4.1.8(Attachment

.3)demandsifonevalveisnotdemonstrated operableadailysurveillance isrequiredtobeperformed.

Thisisjustanotherlackofadministrative controlinwhichthereviewgroupshavefailedtoauditorreviewproperly.

Unfortunately, thisdilemmaisnotuniquetoNineNilePoint,Otherplantswerealsosomehowlicensedwithoutthismandatory HPCIcapability.

Thatisanotherindicator ofthetypeofreviewthathastakenplaceatotherfacilities aswellbuteventually theseplantsinstalled themandatory system.Themoststunningfactofthisinvestigation showsthatafterliterally thousands oftechnical reviewsperformed byhundredsof"qualified personnel" workingindifferent shifts,separatedepartments, sitesorregions,haveallfailedtostopthisfacilityfromoperating outsidetheminimumfederalguidelines.

Everymonthduringfullpoweroperation, theHPCIsystemisverifiedoperablebya"qualified" SeniorPeactorOperatorandaswornaffidavit submitted eachmonthbytheUtilitytotheNPCattesting thatallrequirements havebeenfulfilled.

Obviously, thecurrentsystemofchecksandbalancescannotstopthisplantfromoperating outsidethesemandatory federalguidelines, anassumption falselymadebycongress.

11

~I D.Pesponsibi 1ities10CFR50App.Bdetailstheadministrative requirements forTestControl,Inspections, Operating Status,Corrective Action,Pecordsand-independent Audits.Theserequirements areaddressed inboththeTechnical Specifications andFSAR;Sitespecificadministrative procedures detailutilityandqualityassurance staffpositionresponsibilities.

10CFR50.70 detailtheNRCinspections whileIOCFRS0.72 detailreportnotification responsibilities forallparties.TheNRChavetheirownadministrative procedures whichdetailstaffresponsibilities.

NUREG-0800 detailstheUSNRCtandardreviewplanforinservice testingofpumpsandvalves.Allpartiesmentioned wererequiredtohaveknowledge oftheHPCIrequirements atthelevelofreviewforwhicheachindividual wasinvolved.

Thesereviewsrequiremandatory action.Despiteallmentioned reviewsthisrequirement wasnotmet.OnJan18,1990theNiagraMohawk,NineMilePointNuclearRegulatory Compliance Groupwereservednoticeofthisandmanyotherknownsafetyconcerns.

OnJuly31,1990theNiagraMohawkQualityFirstTeamwereservedwrittennotice.TheNPCwasnotifiedandonandtheQualityFirstTeamnotifiedpetitioner thattheNRCexemptedtheutility'fromtherequirement.

V.STATEMENT OFTHELA'W1.Thereisaminimumrequirement foraHighPressureCoreInje'ction ECCSSafeguard SystemattheNineMilePointUnitOnefacility.

Thisrequirement comesfromthefederalguidelines, Technical Specifications andFSARminimummandates.

2.'oHighPressureCoreInjection Systemmeetingthesafeguard federalguidelines existsatNineMilePoint,UnitOne.

E~

3.Ifthenon-quality relatedfeedwater systemwastosupposedly fulfilltheHPCIsafetyfunction, itfailedtomettheonsiteelectrical requirements andmanyofthemainflowpathvalveshadneverbeenincludedintheInservice TestProgram.4.IftheHPCISystemisnotasafeguard systemandisnotconsidered inanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalysesasstatedintheFSARChapterVII,thennoassumption canbemadethatthefuelwillremaincoveredbythemoderator andrelatedsafetylimitssetinthecurrentlicensearenullandvoid.Obviously unreviewed safetyquestions exist.5.Congressmadeanassumption ofthecurrentchecksandbalancesthatwouldneverallowaplanttooperateoutsidetheminimumsafetyrequirements setoutinfederalguidelines.

Onthisassumption, unlikeanyotherindustry, thenuclearindustryhasbeenallowedtooperateunderlimitedliability.

Theutility,QualityAssurance Groups,NRCandChiefExecutive Officerhavereceivedwrittennoticeoftheirfailuretocomplywiththeminimumfederalguidelines andhaveadministratively failedtocomplywiththisissue.Asdiscussed above,theNineMileUnitOnePlantfailstocomplywithboththeminimumfederalandNRC'srequirements forHPCIECCSSystem.Thishasbeenacknowledged bytheNRCStaffandisdemonstrated unequivocally bytheevidenceinthepublicrecord.Moreover, theStaffhasperformed novalidanalysisthatmeetstheCommission's narrowcriteriaforcontinuing tooperateintheabsenceofcompliance.

Compliance withbothFederalandNPCsafetyregulations isaprerequisite tosafeoperation ofanuclearpowerplant.Infact,astheNRC'sAppealBoardhasobserved, regulatory 0r~

~~andsafety."MaineYankeeAtomicPowerComanALAB-161, 6AEC1003,1009(1973).

Compliance maynotbeavoidedbyarguingthat,althoughanapplicable regulation isnotme,thepublichealthandsafetywillstillbeprotected.

for,oncearegulation isadopted,thestandards itembodiesrepresent theCommission's definition ofwhatisrequiredtoprotectthepublichealthandsafety.VermontYankeeNuclearPowerCor.ALAB-138, 6AEC520,528(1973)(emphasis added).TheCommission's essential safetystandards mustbemet,withoutregardtothecostorinconvenience ofachieving compliance.

10CF'R50.

109SeealsoUnionofConcerned Scientists vNRC,824f.2d108(DCCir1987).VI~REQUESTFORRELIEFtF'rthereasonsenumerated above,petitioner statesthatthefollowing reliefisrequired:A.Immediate ShutdownPendingDemonstration ofRegulatoryCompliance.

Asdiscussed above,theNineMilePointnuclearplantfailstocomplywithanarrayoffundamental requirements forHPCIECCSmandatory requirements.

Noexemptions tothisrequirement canpossiblybejustified withoutundueriskstopublicsafety.Consistent withtherequirements oftheAtomicEnergyAct,F'ederalmandatory requirements andNPCregulations, Petitioner therefore seeksimmediate shutdownoftheNineMilePointunitonereactorpendingfullcompliance withtheregulations.

Inseekingthisrelief,Petitioner notesthatmaintaining ECCSsystemsnecessary tometigatelossofcoolantaccidents isaregulatory goalthatwarrantsthemostimmediate andstringent enforcemenC action.NineMilePoint'snoncompliance withChefederalminimumdesigncriteriaandthe"coverup"activities ofallresponsible parCieswhichposesasafetyrisk

~~

tt'fcommensurate, ifnotgraver,dimension thanthesuspicion ofECCSpipecrackingthatcausedthecommission toorder23plantshutdowns inl975.SeePetitionforEmerencandremedialActioniCLI78Sg7NRC400'05(i978).

LiketheECCSpipecracking, thisplantdoesn'tevenhavethepipes,valvesorpumpsnecessary tometigateaknownpostulated accidentthateffectsknownsafetylimitsoftheFSAR.Thissystemisnecessary forthecoolingofthecoreduringanaccidentandthissystem(whichdoesnotexist)istfleonlymeanstopreventameltdown.

Again,unlikenormalECCSsystemswhichhaveredundant components andcantherefore withstand

~asinglefailure,thissystemdoesnotexistandcannotbecompensated forbyanyothersystem.Simplyput,asmallbreakdescribed intheFSARbasesasapostulated accidentwillinalllikelihood meltdownthereactorforlackofcooling.Becausethecontainment isnotdesignedtowithstand ameltdown, such'neventwouldprobablyleadtoanuncontained releaseofradioactivity tothepublicenvironment.

Thisutilityisnotinsuredforsuchanaccident.

B.PublicHearingT.';eissuesraisedbytheNineMilePoint'snoncompliance withfederalrequirements raisesgravesafetyquestions oftremendous publicimportance.

Petitioner therefore requestthatbeforeallowingtheNineMilePointplanttocontinueoperating, theCommission provideforpublichearing,withrightsofdiscovery andcrossexamination, todetermine whetherNineMilePointisinfullcompliance withallfederalminimumrequirements revelanttoHPCIandpublicsafety.Secondly, congressbenotifiedthattheadministrative controlsreliedupontograntthenuclearindustrytheimmunityofliability havefailedtoensurepublicsafety.Afterliterally thousands ofreviewsby"qualified

personnel" fromdifferentdisciplines, departments, sitesandregionscompleted theirreview,notonecameforwardanddemandthisplantoperatewithinthelawaslaidoutbyactofcongress.

Shouldnoncompliance befound,manyofthesereviewsdemandmandatory actiononthepartofthereviewer.

Thepetitioner hasnotifiedallresponsible partiesandaftertwoyearsNineMilePointUnitOnecontinues tooperateoutsidethefederalguidelinesatatremendous risktopublicsafety.Acongressionalinvestigation ofthismatterbeinitiatedimmediately.

Thepetitioner's serviceswerecontracted byNiagraMohawktoreviewandensureadministrative compliance toTechnical SpecificationpriortoStart-Up.

Aqualified groupoftenbeganalaborious reviewandwhenenormousproblemsbegantoimmerge.Thisgroupwasdisbanded immediately.

InJan1990,theNiagraMohawk'sNuclearPegulatory Compliance Staffwasgivenadetailedmemo(Attachment 5)givingevidencethat45%ofthecontainment isolation valveshadadministrative deficiencies.

Twoweekslaterthereviewgroupwasdisbanded priortocompletion oftheirreview.AlongwithHPCIconcerns, containment isolation valvesasfoundintheFSARTableVI-3haddeficiencies withcorresponding Technical Specification Tables3.3.4h3.2.7.Thisplanthadoperatedfortwentyyearsandyetthelicensefailedtoevencorrespond toitself,letaloneactualplantconditions.

Thesevalvesarerequiredbyfederalguidelines toprotectthepublicyetalmosthalfhaddeficiencies.

Petitioner allegesthatwhenconcernsareidentified, theconcernsareroutinely "coveredup",dismissed oradministratively exempted.

AproperreviewoftheNineMilePointUnitOneTechnical Specification

4.0. 5requirements

andthecomliance ofthe lr ttestprogramswillshowthattheutilitysimplyhiredanotherreviewgroupthat(forwhateverreason)failedtodocumentthedeficiencies thattrulyexist.NineNilePointUnitOneresumedfullpoweroperations evenafterthesafetyconcernswereidentified anddocumented.

Thistypeofcoverupisnotuniquetothisplantandacongressional investigation ofthismatterbeinitiated immediately.

~IMSUNDRYTherecanbenojustification fortheoperation ofnuclearpowerplantsoutsidetheminimumrequirements specified byactofcongress.

Thesearetheminimumrequirements deemednecessary byactofcongresstogranttheimmunityofliability currently assumedbytheutility.WhenpublicsafetyisJeopardized byknownpostulated accidents, therecanbenojustificationforthelackofactionbytheresponsible partiesinthisinstance.

Simplyput,thisutilityisnotinsuredtooperateinthismanner.Respectfullysubmitted, BenL.RidingsP.O.Box1101Kingston, TN37763 P'

BIBLIOGRAPHY NODERNPOWERPLANTENGINEERING, WeismanhEckart,1985Prentice-Hall Inc.20V~4~10CFPSO.10,"Requirement ofLicense."10CFR50.46,"Acceptance criteriaforemergency corecoolingsystemsforlightwaternuclearpowerreactors."

10CFR50.55a, "CodesandStandards."

1OCFP50.59, "Changes, testsandexperiments."

6.10CFRS0.70, "Inspection, Notifications."

Pecords,Reports,7.10CFRSO,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion 33,"Peactorcoolantmakeup."8.10CFP50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion 35,"Emergency corecooing."9.10CFP50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion 36,"Inspection ofemergency corecooingsystem."10..10CFR50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion 37,"TestingofEmergency CoreCoolingsystems."11.10CFR50,AppendixB,II."QualityAssurance Program"12.10CFR50,AppendixB,III."Design'Control."

13.10CFR50,AppendixB,VI."Document Control."

14.10CFR50,AppendixB,X."Inspections."

1S.10CFR50,AppendixB,XI."TestControl."

16.10CFP50,AppendixB,XIV."Inspection, TestandOperatingStatus."17.10CFR50,AppendixB,XVI."Corrective Action."18.10CFR50,AppendixB,XVII."QualityAssurance Records."

19.10CFR50,AppendixE,F."Training."

20.FederalRegister, PublicDocket:50-220,NiagraNohawk,UnitOne,NineNilePointThermalNuclearReactor.-18"

UNITEDSTATEDOFAMERICABEFOPETHENUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION AFFIDAVIT OFBENL.RIDINGSI,BenL.Ridingsdomakeoathandsay:1.MynameisBenL.Ridings.Iamatechnical consultant forcommercial nuclearpowerplants.Overaspanofsomefifteenyears,whileworkingatsometwentyfoursites,Ihavespecialized inreviewing oflicensing agreement (FSAR,Technical Specifications, FederalCodesandRegulations, ASMECodes,etc.),establishing administrative controlstomeettheserequirements andtestprogramstoensurecompliance atalltimes.Mytestprogramsandadministrative controlsestablished whileundercontracttovariousutilities arestillinusetodayatmanyfacilities.

2.Ihavereviewedalloftherelevantpubliclyavailable correspondence betweentheNucIearRegulatoryCommissionandNiagraMohawkduringtherelvanttimespan.IamfamilarwithNRCregulations andregulatory guidancegoverning HighPressureCoreInjection.

3.Thefactualstatement madeintheattachedPetitionforEmergency ActionandRequestforpublicHearingaretrueandcorrecttothebestofmyknowlegeandbelief.BenL.RidingsSubscribed andsworntobeforemethis~l~dayofQf~,1992.

Mycommision expires:

l'C PartSO,App.ACtffcr(oa 2y~oscbfscct rcacffo(fy cosftofsysfctssCapabQ(fy.

Theteactlvlty controlsystemsshaBbedesignedtohaveacorn.binedcapabUlty.

InconiuncUon withpoisonaddIUonbytheemergency corecooUngsystem.ofreOablyconttoOIng reactivity changestoassurethatunderpostulated ac-cidentconditions andwithappropriate marginforstudcrodsthecapabOIty tocool'hecorelsmaintained.

CHfcrfoa3d-Reac(fv(fy I(scffa.Thereac-Uvitycontrolsystemsshallbedesignedwith~pptoprlate OmitsonthcpotentISI amount~ndrateofteactlvlty IncreasetoassurethatthccffcctsofPos'LUlatcd tcscUvI(y accidents canneither(1)resultlndamagetoLhereac-torcoolantpressureboundarygreaterthanUmltedlocalyieldingnor(2)suffidently dis-'CUtbChcco~ltssupportsttUCLUfcs orotherreactorpressurevesselInternals toImpairslgnlflcanUy thecayabOlty tocoolthecore.Thesepostuiated reacUvlty acci-dentsshaBIndudeconsideration ofrodefecUon(unlessprevented bypositivemeans),roddropout,stcamUnerupture.changesinreactorcoolanttemperature andpressure, andcoldwateraddIUon.Crffctfoa 29-Aefccffoa apafastastfcfpa(cdopcraffosaf occsttcscea Theprotec-tionandreactivity controlsystemsshaBbedesignedtoassureanexttcmdyhighproba-blUtyolaccomplishing theirsafetyfunc-tionsIntheeventolantldpated operational IV.ilsMSystemsCrffcrfoa 3P-Qsalffy ofrcacforcoolastprcssurebousdary.

Components whicharepattofthereactorcoolantpressurebounda-ryshaBbedesigned.

fabricated, erecLed,andtestedtothehighestquaUtystandards ptac-tlcaLMeansshaBbeprovidedfordeLectlng

'and.toCheextentpracUcaLIdenUfylng thelocationofthesourceofreactorcoolantleakage.Crffcr(oa 31-Ftacfstc pretpcsffoa ofreacforcooiaafprcssurebousdary.

ThereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshaBbedesigned<<lthsufiIdentmargintoassurethatwhensttc55cdunderopclaUng.

maintenance.

tc5L-inC,andpostulated acddentconditions (1)theboundarybehaveslnanonbrfttiemannersnd(2)U1cytobabOIL7 offapidlypropagating ftsctutcisminI111IzccL ThcdesignshaBreflectconsideration ofservicetemPeratures andotherconditions oftheboundarymatetMunderoperaUnc, mainte-nance,testing,andpostulated acddentcon-ditionsandtheuncertainties Indetermining (I)1nstctial ptopcttics, (2)UlccffcctsofIt~,radlaUononmaterialproperties.

(2)residu-al,steadystateandCranslent

stresses, and(4)SIseofQawLCrffet(oa 32-laspccffoa qfreacforcoo(-Oatyrcsssreboesdary.

Components whkharepartofthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshaBbedcslgncdCopermit(1)54610CFRCh.1(11~Ed.II)periodicInspection andtesUngofImportant ateassndfcaLutestoassesstheirstructural andleaktight Integrity, and(2)anSpytoprI.atematerialsutveOlance programforthereactorprcssutcvesseLCrffcrfos 33-Rcacfor coo(Oaftsakcup,hsystemtoSUPPlyreactorcoolantmakeupforprotection againsCsmallbreaksInthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshallbeprovidecL ThesystemsafetyfuncUonshallbetoassurethatspecified acceptable fueldesignOmitsarenoLexceededasaresultofreactorcoolantlossduetoleakagefromthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryandrup-tureofsmaUpipingorothersmaUcompo.ncntswhichatcpartoftheboundary.

Thesystemshallbedesignedtoassurethatfotonslteelectrkpowersystemoperation (as-sumingoffslicpowerlstloCsvsOsblc) sndforoffslteelectricPowersystemopetatlon (assuming onsltepowerIsnotavaOable)

LhesystemsafetyfuncUoncanbeaccomplished U5lngU1cplyingipumps,sndvsivc5115cdtomaintaincoolantInventory duringnorma)reactoroperation.

Crffcr(os 34-Rcsfdaal heafmnooaf.hsystemCotcmoveresidualheatshaBbepro.videcLThesystemsafetyfunctionSMlbctotransferfhsionproductdecayheatandothertesldualheatfromthereactotcoreatarateaudithatspedfledacceptable fueldesignOmitsandthedesignconditions ofthereactorcoolantptcmuteboundaryarenotexceedecL Suitableredundancy Incomponents andfeatures, andsuitableIntetconnecUons, leakdetecUon.

andISOISUoncayabOltles shaBbeprovidedtoassureChatforonslteelectricpowersystemoperaUon(assuming offsltepower15noLsvsOablc) andfoFoffslicclcctricpowersystemoperaUon(amumlngonsltepowerlsnotavaOable) thesystemsafetyfuncUoncanbeaccompUshccL assum-IngasinglefaOure.Crffer(oa 39-Esccrpescy corecooifsp.hsystemtoprovideabundantemercency corecooOngshaBbeptovideLThesystemsafetyfunctionshallbeCotransferheatfromthereactorcorefoUowinganylossofreactorcoolantatiratesuchthat(1)fuelandcladdamagethaLcouldInterfere withcontfriued effective coteceoUng15prevented and(2)dsdmeta)-water rcactkaIshltedLonegU-glbleamounts.Suitabletcdundaney lncomponents andfeatures.

andsuitableInterconnections.

leakdetection.

ISOISUon.

andcontainment eapa-bOitlesshallbeprovidedtoassurethatforonsiicelectrkpowersystemoperation (as~sumingoffsltepowerhnotavaOable) andforoffslteelectricpowersystemoperaUon(assUnllng on5ltcpowct!5notavaOablc)

ChcsystemsafeLyfuncUoncanbeaccompUshed.

assursfng asingkfaOure.Crffcrfoa 3g-fsspccffos Ofesacrpescy corecooffspsysfcts.Theemergency cotegudcotRegulat1s~gUngsystemshappropriate pctlotantcomponents.

~totptcssUfcvdes.Sndpiping.tCpabOItyofthe5-Ct(ktios3t-2'spsys(cpsT~Lcmshallbcdc.Stcperiodicprem'Losmutc(I)thc5'Legtityofitscolnl1andperformance

.Ofthesystem,ansystemas~whol;dosetodesignas.Of,U1cfUllopera>thi.systeminto~UonofappUca'ILionsystem,th>>indemergency p;ationofthe~.",.Cr(kt(os 39-(,hsystemtorett.containment shs-'afetyfunctionconststent with1sodatedsystems'andtemperature

intacddentaniablylowlevels..'

1Sultable redu.'features, andsuI'detection, IsolatibQltlesshaBbec.iinslteelectricI,sumlngoffslte.foroffsiteelect~(assuming onsit.SystemMetyf1assumingasing~Crifcr(oa 39-'eatrc1sooaf5)removalsystemi~ayproprlatc petantcomponen'.spray'nozzles, c'.tegrltyandcapCr(ter(oa gp-tcmooafsysfnrmovalsystem~yproprlate pe~1testingto~leaktlght Inte>theoperabOlt

~ctlvecompontheoperablUt:

andunderconaspractical toperational saIntooperation cableportionstransferbetwpowersourcessodatedcooUrCt(tv{osckasup.Syst

~p~>

)1-l-88Edition)aineofbnportanL sstheirstructura) 4(2)anappropri-programfortheoolanlmakcu)LAcoolantmakeupsallbreaksIntheboundaryshallbeetyfunctionshaDacceptable fuelcdedasaresultof>leakagefromthe,boundaryandcup.thersmaDcompo.heboundary.

Thetoassurethatforwmoperation (as-notavailable) andsystemoperation

noLavailable) the,nbeaccomplhhed andvalvesusedto)ryduringnormal'ealremoval.AIheatshallbeyro-~functionshaDbeetdecayheatandthereactorcoreatcdacceptable fueleslgnconditions ofsureboundaryarennantsandarcs.ectlons,leak.mpabIDUes shaDbeforonslteelectric>(assumine offsiteendforoffslCeelec-eraUon(assuming st)able)thesystemxompllshed.

assum-icycorecoo(lap.Aantemergency coreLThesystemsafetyssferheatfromthe~nyIosso!reactorsat(l)fuelandcladferewithcontinued rprevented and(2)nhlimitedtoncgll-tncomponents and.terconnectlons, leakIcontabunent capa-dLoassurethaLfotistemoperation (as-snotavailable) andersystemoperation hnotavailable) thecanbeaccomplished.

.((onofcmcrpency theemergency core4lgNuciaarRegulatory Commission coolingsystemshallbedesignedtopermitappropr(ate PeriodicInspecUon oftantcomponent@,

suchassprayringsInthereactorpressurevessel,waterIniectlon nas-zles.andpiping.toassuretheIntegrity andcapability ofthesystem.Cr((cr(on 2F-Tcrtfnp ofemerpency corecool(opsystem.Theemergency corecoollnesystemshaDbedesignedtopermitapproprl-ateperiodicPressureandfuncUonal testingtoassure(l)thestructural andleaktight In-tegrityofitscomponents.

(2)theoperablllty andperformance oftheactivecomponents ofthesystem.and(3)theoperablllty ofthesystemasawholeand.undercondfUons asdosetodesbcnaspractical, theperformance ofthefuDoperational sequencethatbringsthesystemIntooperation.

Including oper.ationofapplicable portionsoftheyrotec-Uonsystem.LhetransferbeCweennormalandemergency powersources,andtheoper-ationoftheasscclated coolingwatersystem.Cry(sr(on 4d-Con(a(nmcn(

healremoval.AsysLemtoremoveheatfromthereactorcontainment shallbeprov(ded.

Thcsystemsafetylunctlonshallbetoreducerapidly.conshtent withthelunctlonlne ofotheras.sodatedsystems.thecontalrunent pressureandtemyeraLure following an)rl~fwool.antacddentandmaintainthematacceptablylowleveh.Suitableredundancy lncomponents andfeatures.

andsuitableInterconnections.

leakdetection.

Isolation.

andcontainment caya-bllltlesshallbeyrovidedtoassurethaCforonsiteelectricPowersystemoperaUon(as-sumingof!sitepowerhnotavailable) indforof!siteelectr@powersystemoperation (assuming onsltepowerIsnotavailable) thesystemsafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplhhed, assumingaslnelc!allure.Crffcr(on 39-fnspcc((oa qfconte(amen(

heatremeltsystem.Thecontainment heatremoralsystemshaDbedesignedtapermit~ppiopr(ate periodicInspection ofImportantcomponents.

suchasthetorus,sumps,spraynuules.andplplnetaassurethein-.tegrityandcapability ofthesystem.Cr((cr(oa 40-Tcsfln po/con(a(nmca(

healremovalsys(cm.Thecontainment heatre-movalsystemshallbedesignedtopermitapprayrhCc perlodlcpressureandfunction-sltestingtoassure(l)thestrucLural andleaktlght Integrity ofItscomponents.

(2)theoperability andpecformance oftheactivecomponents ofChesystem.and(3).theoperablllty ofthesystemasawhole.andunderconditions ascloseLothedesign~spractical theperformance o!Chefulloperational sequencethatbringsCh'esystemIntooperatio'n.

IndudlngoperaUonofappli-cableportionsoftheprotection system.thetransferbeLweennormalandemergency powersources.andthe.operation oftheas,:'odatedcooDn'gwatersystem.CH(erfonef-Con(a(nmcal a(mosphcre deans~Systemstocontrolfhsionprod-Part50,AppAuctshydrogenoxygenandothersub-stanceswhichmaybereleasedintothereac-torcontainment shaDbeprovidedasneces-sarytoreduce.conshtent withthefunctlon-Ingofotherassociated systems.theconcen-'trationandqualityo!fhsionproductsre-leasedtothcenvironment following postu-latedaccidents, andtocontroltheconcen-trationofhydrogenoraxygenandothersubstances Inthecontainment atmosphere followlne postulated accidents toassurethatcontainment lnteerILy hmaintained.

EachsystemshaDhavesuitableredundan.

cyIncomponents andfeatures, andsuitableInterconnections.

leakdetection, Isolation, andconLalnmenL capabilities taassureChat(oronslteelectricpo~ersystemoperaUon(assuming of!sitepowerhnatavailable) andforof!sitedcctricyowersystemoperaLlon (assumtne onsltepowerhnotavailable)

ILssafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplhhed.

assum;Ingasingle!allure.Cr((er(oa 42-laspcc((on ofcon(a(nmca(

a(morphcre cleanupsyslcms.Thecontaln-mentatmosphere cleanupsystemsshaDbedesignedtopermitapprapHate yeriodh'In-spectlonofbnyortant components.

suchasfilterfcames.ducts,andpipingCoassuretheIntegrity andcapablDty o!thesystema,Cr(ter(on 43-Tcstfnp ofconfafnment a!-maryheredeanupsysfemaThecontainment atmosphere deanupsystemsshaDbede-signedtopermitappropriate periodicpres.sureandfunctional testingtoassure(1)thestructural andleakUghtlntegrlLy olItscom-ponents.(2)theoperability andperfonn-anceofthe'ctlre components ofthesys-temssuchasfans.filters,dampecs.pumps.~ndralvesand(3)theoperabOIty ofthesys-temsasawholeand.undercondIUons asclosetodesignaspracUca).

theperfonnance ofthefulloperational sequencethatbringsthesystemsIntaoperation.

Indudlngoperationofapplicable yorUonsaftheyroteo.tlonsystem.thetransferbetweennormalandemergency powersources.andtheoper-ationofassodated systems.Cr(fer(oa 4S-Cool(np roofer.Asystemtotransferheatfromstructures, systems,andcomponents bnportant tasafety,toanulti-mateheaCsinkshaDbeprovided.

ThesystemsafetyfunctionshaDbetatransfer\hecombinedheaLloadofthesestcuctures.

systems.andcomponents undernormalop-eratingandacddentconditiona, Suitableredundancy lncomponents andfeatures.

andsuitableInterconnecUons.

leakdetection.

andholatloncapabilities shallbeprovidedtaassurethatforonslteelectricpowersystemoperation (assuming offsitepowerhnot'available) andforof!siteelec.tricpowersystemoyeraUon(assuming onsltepowerhnotavaDable) thesystemsafety!uncUoncanbeaccomplhhed.

assum-Ingasingle!allure.

\

LIHITINGCONDITION FOROPERATIOH SURVEILLANCE AE(UIAEHLHT

~A3.1.8IIIQIPRESSURECOOLANTIJECTIOHAicabiit;Appliestotheoperational statusofthehighpressurecoolantinjection syst~a.;O~bectiva:

Toassurethecapability ofthehighpressurecoolantinjection systemtocoolreactorfuelintheeventofa1oss-of-coolantaccident.~liii)ggxf~~~e1a.Ouringthepoweroperating con-ditionwheneverthereactorcoolantpressureisgreaterthan110psigandthereactorcoolanttemperature greaterthansaturation temperature, thehighpressurecoolantinjection systemshallbeoperableexceptasspecified inSpecification "b"below.b.Ifaredundant component ofthehighpressurecoolantinjection systembecomesinoperable thehighpressurecoolantinjection shallbeconsidered operableprovl~led thatthecomponent isreturnedtoanoperableco>>dition wltl>>n15daysandtheadditional sur-vei1lancerequiredIsperformed.

4.1.8lllGIIPAESSUAECOOLANTINJECTION A~ilAppliestotheperiodictesti>>grequire>>iunts forthehighpressurecoola>>ti>>juctiu>>

systume~0bective:Toverifytheoperability ofthehighpressurecoolantinjection system.~Sec(fication:Thehighpressurecoolantinjection sur-veillance shallbeperformed asindicated below:a.At1eastEnny1'.-ae~aBIIQ".-cycie=.g

~Ail~<AA)AAAe~~)LM Automatic start-upofthehii)hpressurecoolantinjectio>>

systemshallbudemon-strated.A.APumpoperability shallbodutermI>>ud.

71 JIJ' S~UAfJLAt{C~f(}lJJJEML'N'I c.lfSpecification "a"and"b"arenotmet,anormalorderlyshutdownshallbeinitiated M>thinonehourandreactorcoolantpressureandtemp-eratureshallbereducedtolessthan110psigandsaturation temperature within24hours.c.Surveillance withI~noarableCo>>>l>>>aunt Whenacomponent becomesl>>operabio itsredundant compo>>ant shallbudeulonstrdtud tobeoperablei>>mediately anddailjthereafter.

XJ~7 BASESFOR3.1.8AKD4.).8HTGH'PRESSURE COOLAKTIKJB.i)OK IHighPressureCoolantIn5ection System(HPCl)isprovidedtoqnsureadequatecorecoolingintheunlike)yeventofa))reactorcoolant))hebreak.TheHPClSystem.is required.

forlinebreakswhichexceedthecapability ofthentrolRodDrivepumpsandwhicharenotlargeenoughtoallo~'fast'enough depressurization forcorespraytobefective.esetofhighpressurecoolantin)ection pumpsconsistsofacondensate pump,afeedwater boosterpumpandamotorivenfeedwater pump.Onesetofpumpsiscapableofdeliver)ng 3,000gpmtothereactorvesselatreactoressure.Theperformance capability ofHPCIaloneandincon]unction withothersystemstoprovideadequatecore~olingforaspectrumoflinebreaksisdiscussed intheFifthSupplement oftheFSAR.idetermining theoperability ofth~HPClSystem,therequiredperformance capability ofvariouscomponents shallbe>ns)dered.

~TheHPClSystemshal'lbecapableofmeetingitspumpheadversusflowcurve.Themotordrivenfeedwater pumpshallbecapableofautomatic initiation uponreceiptofeitheranautomatic turbinetripsignalorreactor)ow-water-)eve) signal..~TheCondenser hotwe)l~eve)shallnotbelessthan57inches(75,000gallons).

e~)'heCondensate storagetanksinventory shallnotbelessthan105,000gallons.-

Themotor-driven feedwater pumpwillautomatlcal)y tripifreactorhigh~aterleve)issustained fortensecondsandtheassociated pumpdownstream flowcontrolvalveand)owf)owcontrolvalvearenotclosed.ir)ngreactorstart-up, operation andshutdown, thecondensate andfeedwater boosterpumpsareinoperation.

At.actorpressures upto450psig,thesepumpsarecapableofsupplying therequired3,800gpm.Above450pslga)tor-dr)yen-feedwater pumpisnecessary tuprovidetherequiredf)owrate.secapability ofthecondensate, feedwa'ooster andmotordrivenfeedwater pumpswillbedemonstrated bytheirterat)onaspartofthefeedwater supplyduringnormalstationoperation.

Stand-bypumpswillbep)acedinservicetleastquarterly tosupplyfeedwater duringstationoperation.

Anautomatic systeminitiation testwil)beerformedatleastonceperoperating cycle.Thiswl)linvolveautomatic startingofthemotordrivenfeedwater pumps~dflowtothereactorvessel.RevisedOctober1,190673 IJl l~)))yI.HIGH-PRESSURE COOLANTINJECTION 1.0DesinBasesThehigh-pressure coolantinjection (HPCI)systemisanoperating'ode ofthefeedwater systemavailable intheeventofasmallreactorcoolantlinebreakwhiche'xceedsthecapability ofthecontrolroddrivepumps(0.003ft2).HPCIalongwithoneemergency coolingsystemhasthecapability ofkeepingtheswollenreactorcoolantlevelabovethetopofactivefuelforsmallreactorcoolantboundarybreaksupto0.07ft2foratleast1000seconds.TheHPCIsystemwithoneofthetwoemergency coolingsystemsandtwocorespraysystems,willprovidecorecoolingforthecompletespectrumofbreaksizesuptothemaximumdesignbasisrecirculation discharge linebreak(5.446ft2).Itsprimarypurposeisto:a.provideadequatecoolingofthereactorcoreunderabnormalandaccidentconditions.

Rev.72.0b.removetheheatfromradioactive decayandresidualheatfromthereactorcoreatsucharatethatfuelcladmeltingwouldbeprevented.

c.provide,forcontinuity ofcorecoolingoverthecompleterangeofpostulated"break sizesintheprimarysystemprocessbarrier.HPCIisnotanengineered safeguards systemandisnotconsidered inanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalyses.

Itisdiscussed inthissectionbecauseofitscapability toprovidemakeupwateratreactoroper'ating pressure.

~t.tTheHPCIsystemutilizesthetwocondensate storagetanks,.the maincondenser hotwell,twocondensate pumps,condensate demineralizers, twofeedwater boosterpumps,feedwater heaters,twomotor-driven feedwater pumps,anintegrated controlsystemandallassociated pipingandvalves.Thesystemiscapableofdelivering 7600gpmintothereactorvesselatreactorpressurewhenusingtwotrainsoffeedwater pumps.Thecondensate andfeedwater boosterpumpsarecapableofsupplying therequired3,800gpmatapproximately reactorpressures upto270psig.Above270psigamotor-driven feedwater pumpisnecessary toprovidetherequiredflowrate.Rev.7Rev.7Rev.7 F

VII-61aThefeedwater systempumpshaverecirculation lineswithairoperatedflowcontrolvalvestopreventthepumpsfromoperating againstaclosedsystem.Intheeventoflossofairpressure, thesevalvesopenrecycling partoftheHPCIflowtothehotwell.HPCIflowwouldbereducedtoapproximately 3,000gpmatareactorpressureof1,150psigand3,800gpmatareactorpressureof940psig.Condensate inventory ismaintained atanavailable minimumvolumeof180,000gallons.Rev.7'.0OesinEvaluation Duringaloss-of-coolant accidentwithinthedrywell,highdrywellpressureduetoalinebreakwillcauseareactorscram.Thisautomatic scramwillcauseaturbinetripafte-afive-second delay.Inordertopreventcladdingtemperatures fromexceeding theirmaximumlimitfortheentirespectrumofbreaks,the3800gpm<fromonetrainofHPCI/feedwater pumps)wouldhavetobeavailable immediately.

Feedwater flowwouldbeavailable forconsiderable timefromtheshaft-driven feedwater pump.Theshaft-driven feedwater pumpshouldcoastdownawhiletheelectricmotor-driven condensate pumpsandfeedwater boosterpumpswouldcontinuetooperate.Thecoastdowntimetoreach3,800gpmdeliverytothecoreisapproximately 3;2minutes(FigureVII-17),sinceboththecondensate andfeedwater boosterpumpswillcontinuetooperateonoff-sitepower.Theturbinetripwillsignalthemotor-driven feedwater pumptostart.Thesignalwillbesimultaneous withthestartoftheshaftpumpcoastdown.Themotor-driven feedwater pumpwillbeupto'peedandcapableofsupplying 3,800gpminabouttenseconds.Asabackup,lowreactorwaterlevelwillalsosignalthemotor-driven pumptostart.Theinitiati'on signaltransfers controlfromthenormalfeedwater totheHPCIinstrumentation andcontroller whichhasbeencontinuously trackingthenormalfeedwater controlsignal.Thustherewillbeacontinuous supplyoffeedwater tothereactor.TheHPCIsingleelementcontrolsystemwillattempttomaintainreactorvesselwaterlevelat65inchesor72inches(depending uponwhichpump,11or12respectively, isinservice)withamaximumfeedwater flowlimitof3800gpm.Rev.7 P't VII-62Asustained highreactorwaterlevelreactorprotection systemsignalcoincident withanopenfeedwater flowcontrolvalvewillselectively triptheassociated feedwater pump.Theclutchoftheshaft-driven pumpwillalsobedisengaged immediately uponhighreactorwaterlevel.Shouldthereactorwaterlevelreachthelo'wlevelscramsetpointthemotordrivenpumpthattrippedonhighreactorwaterlevelwi11restart.Hecessary feedwater pumprecirculation isprovidedtoallowforcontinued pumpoperation withtheflowcontrolvalveclosed.Asfeedwater ispumpedoutofthecondenser hotwell,through'he selectedequipment ofthecondensate andfeedwater systemsandintothereactor,thecondenser hotwe'lllevelwillfall.Sincecondensed steamfromtheturbinenolongerreplenishes thecondenser hotwell,condensate willbetransferred fromthecondensate storagetankstothehotwellformakeup.Thefeedwater systempumpsoperateon4160v.Hhentheplant.isinoperation, thepowerissuppliedfromthemaingenerator throughthestationservicetransformer whenthegenerator ison-lineandconnected tothegrid.Hhenthemaingenerator isoff-line, thefeedwater pumpsaresuppliedwithnormaloff-sitepowerfromthe115KVsystemthroughthereservetransformers.

IfaHPCIinitiation signalshould,occur,allHPCI/feedwater systempumpswouldstartimmediately withtwofeedwater pumptrainsavailable forHPCIinjection usingthesingleelementfeedwater controlsystemforreactorvessellevelcontrol.Ifamajorpo~erdisturbance weretooccurthatresultedinlossofthe115KVpowersupplytotheNineHilePoint115KVbus,powerwouldberestoredfromagenerator locatedattheBennettsBridgeHydroStation.Thisgenerator wouldhavethecapacityofsupplying approximately 6,000KVAwhichissufficient tooperateonetrainofHPCI/feedwater.

systempumps.IfHPCIinitiation weretooccur,thepreferred feedwater trainpumps(feedwater pump12,feedwater boosterpump13,condensate pump13)wouldstart.Thenon-preferred trainpumps,wouldbelockedoutonlossofoff-sitepowerandnotstartuntiltheoperatormanuallyresetthelockout.Ifapreferred trainpumphadbeenlockedoutpriortothelossofoff-sitepower,itwouldremainlockedoutandthenon-preferred trainbackuppumpwouldautomatically startonHPCIinitiation.

Ifboththepreferred andbackuppumpsarerunning,thepreferred pumpwouldremaininserviceandthebackuppumpwilltrip.TheRev.7 4A~tg VII-62auseofaBennettsBridgehydrogenerator, whilenotequivalent toanon-siteemergency powersource,providesahighlyreliablealternate off-sitepowersupplyfortheHPCIfunctionofthefeedwater system.4.0TestsandInsectionsev7Testsandinspections ofthevariouscomponents aredescribed inSectionXI-SteamtoPowerConversion.

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DearSirs:

EnclosedforfilingPETITIONFOREMERGENCY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONANDREQUESTFORPUBLICHEARING.Respectfully submitted, BenL.RidingsCg

UNITEDSTATEDOFAMERICABEFORETHENUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION PETITIONFOREMERGENCY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONANDREQUESTFORPUBLICHEARINGI.INTRODUCTION I,BENL.RIDINGS(hereinafter "Petitioner"

)herebypetitiontheCommissioners oftheNuclearRegulatory Commission

("NRC"or"Commission"

)foremergency enforcement actionagainstNiagraMohawk'sNineMile(UnitOne)Nuclearpowerplant,whichisoperating inviolation ofboththeNRCandFederalrequirements foravailability ofEmergency CoreCooling(ECCS)highpressurecoreinjection.

AsanECCSsystem,theNineMileplantalsofailstoprovidethemandatory emergency backuppowertothehighpressurecoreinjection (HPCI)system.OverthetwentyyearstheNineMileOneplanthasbeenallowedtooperate,nosafetyrelatedpumpshaveeverbeenavailable toinjectwaterintothevesselatreactorpressure.

Atthesametimethisplantwasallowedtooperateatfullpower,therearemanypostulated accidents assumedintheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(thatarecapableofdrainingthereactorvessel)andspecifically relyontheECCSHPCIPumpstomaintainreactorwaterlevel.Thesepumpshaveneverbeeninstalled andthecurrentadministrative controlsallowedthisplanttooperateoutsidetheminimumfederalrequirement.

Thisspecifictypeofplantoperation outsidetheknownminimumfederalrequirements greatlyendangers healthandpropertyrisktothepublic.Asdiscussed indetailbelow,theresponsible utility,itsQualityAssurance groupandtheNRChaveroutinely failedintheirresponsibility toensuretheoperation ofnuclearpowerplantswithinthelicenseagreements Evenwhenproblemsareidentified, documented andbroughttotheattention oftheresponsible parties,varioussafetyconcernsareroutinely dismissed, ignoredor

'f'f7 administratively eliminated.

Evenissueswhichobviously endangerpublicsafetyhavebeenroutinely dismissed, notonlybytheutilitybutsuchactionsauthorized andapprovedbytheindependent qualityassurance groupsandbytheNRC.Anyandalloftheseorganizations havetheauthority tostoptheoperation ofplantsoutsidetheminimumsafetyrequirements, andnotonehavecomeforwardtofulfillitsduty,andprotectthepublic.Instead,eachorganization hasreviewedtheenclosedsafetyconcernsandcontrarytoanypractical justification, haveremainedsilentandallowedthismannerofplantoperation totakeplacewiththeirapproval, givinqevidencethatthesegroupshavealsofailedtoremainindependent ofeachother.Independent reviewbynotonlythegovernment agencybutthequalityassurance reviewgroupsisthebasicpremisewhichallowedcongresstograntoperation ofcommercial nuclearpowerplantswithlimitedliability fordamages.Thecurrentadministrative controlsusedtodayfailedtoensuretheplantoperatewithintheminimumfederalguidelines.

ItisCongress's dutytoprotectpublicsafetyanditscurrentadministrative controlshavefailed.BecausetheNineNilePointUnitOneReactorviolatesbothfederallawandtheCommissions's requirements forHIGHPRESSURECOREINJECTION, theCommission canmakenofindingthatthereisresonable assurance ofnounduerisktopublichealthandsafety.Petitioner therefore requestthattheCommission issueimmediately aneffective orderdirecting thelicenseetoceasepoweroperation andplacethereactorinacoldshutdowncondition.

Theplantshouldnotbepermitted tocontinueorresumeoperation unlessanduntilsubsequent testsandinspections areshowntoprovidetherequisite reasonable assurance ofnounduerisktopublichealthandsafety.Moreover, Petitioners seekapublichearingbeforetheplantisallowedtooperateagain.

II.DESCRIPTION OFPETITIONER I,BenL.Ridings,amatechnical consultant forcommercial nuclearpowerplants.Overaspanofsomefifteenyears,whileworkingatsometwentyfoursites,Ihavespecialized inreviewing oflicensing agreement (FSAR,Technical Specifications, FederalCodesandRegulations, ASMECodes,etc.),establishing administrative controlstomeettheserequirements andtestprogramstoensurecompliance atalltimes.Mytestprogramsandadministrative controlsestablished whileundercontracttovariousutilities arestillinusetodayatmanyfacilities.

III.THECOMMISSION SHOULDEXERCISEITSSUPERVISORY JURISDICTION OVERTHISPETITIONA.TheCommission hasanInherentSupervisory Jurisdiction overtheSafetyofOperation oftheNiagraMohawkNineMilePlant.ThispetitionisbroughtbeforetheCommission pursuanttotheauthority grantedtoitin42USC2233(d),2236(a),2237 and10CFR2.204,2.206(c)(1),

50.54,50.57,50.100and50.109.Itinvokestheinherentsupervisory authority oftheCommission tooverseeallaspectsoftheregulatory andlicensing processandits"overriding responsibility forassuringpublichealthandsafetyintheoperation ofnuclearpowerfacilities."

Consolidated EdisonCoo.ofN.Y.Inc.(IndianPoint,Units1,2and3).CLI-75-8, 2NRC173(1975).AstheCommission haspreviously

observed, itssupervisory powersincludethepowertoorderimmediate shutdownofafacility"ifthepublichealthorsafetysorequires.

"PetitionforEmerencandRemedialAction,CLI-78-6, 7NRC400,405(1978),citing5USC558(c),42USC2236(b),10CFR2.202(f),

2.204.

"4iq(,)'

TheCommission hasexercised itsinherentauthority onanumberofoccasions.

Inadditiontotheceasescitedabove,seePetitionforResearchandDevelomentAdministration (ClinchRiverBreederReactorProject),

CLI-76-i3, 4NRC67,75-76(i976);

Consumers PowerCo.(NidlandUnitsiand2),CLI-73-38, 6AECi084(i973);PublicServiceCo.ofNewH~amshire(Seabrook NuclearPoserStation,Units1and2),CLI-77-S, 5NRC503,5i5-5i7(i977).

B.ExerciseoftheCommissions's Independent Jurisdiction isAppropriate inThisCase.NRCregulations atiOCFR2.206 providethatunderordinarycircumstances, enforcement petitions aretobelodgedwiththeNRCStaff,andthattheCommission maytakediscretionary reviewofStaffdenialsofsuchpetitions.

However,theCommissions's reviewing power"doesnotlimitinanyway"its"supervisory poweroverdelegated Staffactions",

iOCFR2.206(c)(i)

~Itisappropriate forthecommission toexerciseitssupervisory powersandtakejurisdiction inthiscasebecausetheNRCStaffhasacquiesced toNiagraMohawks'iolations formorethantwoyears.InJani990,NiagraMohawkCompliance Supervisor wasgivenwrittennoticeofHPCIandotherinadequacies whicheffectpublicsafety.Afternoapparentaction,theNineNileQualityFirstTeamwasalsogivennotice.Petitioner waslaternotifiedbytheQualityFirstTeamthattheNRChadbeencontacted andmadeawareoftheproblemaswell.Petitioner waslatercontacted bytheQualityFirstTeamandtoldthattheNRChadexemptedtheplantfromtheHPCIrequirement anditsneedforbackuppowerintheeventoflossofpower.Petitioner hasyettoheardirectlyfromtheNRConthismatter.

IV.GROUNDSFORENFORCEMENT ACTIONA.FederalRequirements forhavingradioactive fuelsons'iteInaccordance with10CFR50.10,theutilityNiagraMohawkenteredintocontractual agreement withthefederalgovernment undertheprovisions ofpublicdocument50-220,onfilewiththefederalregister.

Nowunderthejurisdiction of10CFR50,App.A(GeneralDesignCriteria),

establish theminimumrequirements fortheprincipal designforwatercoolednuclearpowerplant.Criterion 33and35(Attachment 2)specifytheminimumneedthatasystemtoprovideabundantemergency corecoolingshallbeprovided.

Thesystemsafetyfunctionshallbetotransferheatfromthereactorcoreandmusthavesuitableredundancy incomponents andonsiteelectricpowersystem(assuming offsitepowerisnotavailable) whichwillenablethesafetyfunctiontobeaccomplished.

Also(Criterion 33),asystemtosupplyreactorcoolantmakeupforprotection againstsmallbreaksinthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshallbeprovided.

Criterion 37providesthetestingrequirements oftheemergency corecoolingsystem.10CFR70detailstheutilityandNRCresponsibility fortestingandinspection ofthesesystemsand10CFR50App.B(QualityAssurance Criteria) detailstheQualityAssurance Programandtheadministrative requirements forInspections, TestControl,Operating Status,Corrective ActionandRecords.B.AStudyofContractual Agreement (docket50-220)Inaccordance with10CFR50.34, thetechnical specification shallperformanevaluation ofthesafetyeffectiveness ofproviding forseparation ofhighpressurecoolantinjection (HPCI)andreactorcoreisolation cooling(RCIC).Thisinvestigation foundtheNileMilePointTechnical Specification incompliance withthisrequirement.

Technical Specification 4.1.8(Attachment 3)givespositiveproofthattheECCS

requirement fortheHPCIsystemwasanticipated bythedesigners.

Secondly, thecorresponding LimitingCondition forOperation (LCO)3.1.8.c(Attachment 3)viewthissystemassocriticalthatif"theutilityfailstoverifyHPCIoperability itwilldemandanorderlyshutdownbeinitiated withinonehour.WhenonlyoneHPCIcomponent becomesinoperable itsredundant component shallbedemonstrated tobeoperableimmediately anddailythereafter (asopposedtomonthlydemonstration)."

Inaccordance withtheBasesforTechnical Specification 3.1.8,theHPCIsystemisprovidedtoensureadequatecorecoolingintheunlikelyeventofareactorcoolantlinebreak(alsoafederalrequirement-design criterion 33).TheHPCIsystemisrequiredforlinebreakswhichexceedthecapability oftheControlRodDrivepumpsandwhicharenotlargeenoughtoallowfastenoughdepressurization forcorespraytobeeffective (corespray350psiasopposedtoHPCI2200psi)~Inaccordance withtheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR),ChapterVII(Attachment 4),theDesignBasesforHPCIisdiscussed.

Althoughseveralrevisionhavebeenimplemented bytheutilityinordertofabricate theexistence ofaECCSsystemtosatisfytheHPCIfederalrequirement, itsprimarysafetyfunctionislisted;(1)provide adequatecoolingofthereactorcoreunderabnormalandaccident'onditions, (2)remove theheatfromradioactive decayandresidualheatfromthereactorcoreatsucharatethatfuelcladmeltingwouldbeprevented, (3)provide forcontinuity ofcorecoolingoverthecompleterangeofpostulated breaksizesintheprimarysystemprocessbarrier.Oncethesafetyfunctions areunderstood itbecomesobviousastowhythissystemisaminimumrequirement ofthefederalguidelines.

Thefollowing paragraph ofFSARChapterVIIgivesthereaderanindication ofthelackofproperreviewthatexists.AtNineMilePoint,unlikeeveryothernuclearfacility, "HPCIisnotanengineered safeguards systemandisnotconsidered inanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalysis."

AsstatedintheFSAR(inlaymanterms)thisfeedwater systemdoesnotpretendtomeetthe10CFR50AppendixA(Criterion 33,35,36,37)requirements oftheminimumfederalrequirements.

Infact,NineMilePointhasnosystemmeetingtheseminimumfederalrequirements.

Next,reviewing theDesignEvaluation portionofFSARChapterVII,(Attachment 4)aparadoxoccursindesignphilosophy.

"Duringaloss-of-coolantaccidentwithinthedrywell,highdrywellpressureduetoalinebreakwillcauseareactorscram.Theautomatic scramwillcauseaturbinetripafterafive-second delay.Inordertoreventcladdinterneraturefromexceedintheirmaximumlimitfortheentirespectrumofbreaks,the3800gpm(fromonetrainoftheHPCIpumps)wouldhavetobeavailable Obviously, theHPCIsystemisabsolutely necessary toensurecriticalheatflux(CHF)isnotexceeded.

Withoutthecoolantwatertotransfertheheatfromthefueltothecoolant,thefuelrodwouldthenheatuprapidlyandfuelcladdingwouldtakeplaceandcauseapossiblemeltdownunlessthereactorwereshutdownquickly.Further,oncethecriticalheatfluxwasexceeded, thedeparture fromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)wouldexceedits1.25limit.TheselimitsareTechnical Specification requirements aswellbutitgivesanindication oftheinterdependence oftheECCSsystems.Tomakeastatement inalicensethat"HPCIhasnotbeenconsidered inanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalyses" isaanotherindication ofthelackofprope:reviewthatexistsatNineMilePoint.Everysafetylimitassumed

attheNineMilePointplantisjeopardized withouttheassurance thatthefuelwillremaincoveredatalltimes.TheNRChasapprovedthenon-safety relatedfeedwater systemasanappropriate substitute foranECCBHPCIfederalrequirement.

Whatatfirstseemslikeaquibbleaboutasinglepumpisinactuality avalidargumentthateverybasesassumedbythislicenseisnullandvoid.AtNineMilePoint,standardbasicthermalreactordesignhasbeensignificantly alteredinseveralECCSsystems.TherearenoHPCIorRCICsystemtotransferheatfromthereactorcore.Thereisnowayoftakingsteamawayfromthereactorandusingthisenergytodriveahighpressurepump.NormallytheHPCIpumpsreturnthecondensed steam(water)backintothevesseltomaintainwaterlevel.AtNineMilePoint,thereisnoHPCIorRCICsystems.AtNineMilePoint,unlikenormalreactordesign,electrically driven,non-quality relatedfeedwater pumpsareconsidered.

Thesenon-quality relatedfeedwater pumpssupposedly fulfilltheHPCIsafetyfunctionandyetdonotmeettheelectrical backuprequirements.

Itmustbenotedthatthesizeoftheseelectrical pumpsmakeitimpossible tohaveon-sitepoweravailable intheeventoflossofoff-sitepower.On-sitepoweravailability isassumedinthebasesoftheFSAR.Itistherefore impossible forthisplanttofulfilltheminimumsafetyobligation asdictatedbyfederalstatuteoftheknownpostulated accidents.

Thissamefeedwater system(beingnon-quality related)waspurchased asanon-quality relatedsystem.Inthissamesystem;pipingfvalves,instrumentation, wiring,electrical components andcontrolsystemswereallpurchased andinstalled undernon-quality relatedcontractual provisions.

HPCIautomatically initiates onaLossCoolantAccident(LOCA)signalfromtheNSSSlogic.TheNBBSlogicperformstheECCBsafeguard functions and

alwaysinstalled understrictcontractual

mandates, whichincludetraining, qualityassurance reviews,certified skilledcraftsmen, etc.Secondly, thepipingsystem,welding,hangerrestraints andmaintenance considerations wereinstalled andmaintained undernon-quality relatedprovisions aswell~Again,ECCSsafeguard systemsarepurchased, constructed andmaintained undermuchstricterguidelines.

Thefeedwater systemwasneverdesigned, purchased, built,maintained norcapableoffulfilling theMPCIrequirements ofthefederalguidelines.

AtNineNilePointtheHPCIsystemsimplydoesnotexistedTheadministrative controlswhichallowedacceptance ofsuchanon-quality relatedsystemtofulfillthismandatory ECCSfederalrequirement isnotacceptable.

C.Knowledge ofExistingConcernsTheneedforanoperableECCSHPCISystemismandatory asevidenced fromthegroundsforreliefinthisreport.AtNineNilePoint,theUtility,QualityAssurance personnel andtheNRCwerewellawareofthisrequirements Forwhateverreason,thisplantwaslicensedbytheNRCandallowedtooperatewithoutthismandatory requirement installed.

Attemptsbythesesamepartiestosubstitute non-quality relatedfeedwater equipment tofulfillthismandatory safeguard functionsupportsthefacttheneedforrequirement wasunderstood.

Evenifnon-quality relatedequipment wasacceptable tosupportECCSfunctions (anditsnot),thereisnoonsiteelectricpowersystemthatwillsupportthesafetyfunctionofafeedwater/HPCI system.Thiselectricsystemisanothermandatory minimumrequirement (Attachment 2-Criterion 35)~Toprovethecollaboration betweenallpartiesmentioned, thelicenseeattemptstotakecreditforonsitepoweravailability fromtheBentonDam,some100milesaway.Obviously thereviewers areawareofthesemandatory requirements butthere

0resolution tothesafetyconcernsisnotacceptable.

Thepossibility ofatornadodestroying theswitchyard isaknownpostulated accidentthatcanoccursWithoutthispoweravailability, theHPCIfunctioncannotpossiblybeassumed,asstatedintheFSARChapterVII(Attachment 4)~Everytimethefeedwater procedures wererevisedthisissuewouldhavetobereviewed.

Everytime theFSAR(ChapterVII)wasrevised,theTechnical Specifications revisedorcontainment integrity wasquestioned thisissuehadtobereviewedinaccordance withadministrative requirements setoutbythefederalguidelines.

Everytime theQualityAssurance groupsandNRCperformed theirindependent auditsandinspections thisissuehadtobereviewed.

Everytime thisplantwasoperatedatmodesior2,theresponsible SeniorReactorOperator(SRO),whoisspecifically trained(10CFR50AppE)ontheseissueswouldhavetoquestionthevalidityofthecurrentHPCIsystem.EverytimetheHPCIsurveillance (monthly) wasperformed toensureoperability, theresponsible SROwouldhavetoquestionthevalidityofanonqualityrelatedfeedwater systemfulfilling theHPCIsystem.Takingcreditfornon-quality relatedequipment tofulfilltherequirements ofaECCSsafetyfunctionisnotacceptable anditwouldbetheSRO'sresponsibility toquestionthefeedwater abilitytoperformthisHPCIsafetyfunction.

Ofcourse,thatistheanotherproblemtoconsider, itwouldbetheSRO'sjob.Althoughpreviously awareoftheproblem,onJan18,1990,theUtilitywasservednoticeoftheseandothersafetyconcern.Ifthenon-quality relatedfeedwater systemwastosupposedly fulfilltheHPCIsafetyfunction, itfailedtomettheonsiteelectrical requirements andmanyof

themainflowpathvalveshadneverbeenincludedintheInserviceTestProgram(iOCFR50.55)

~Some44outof47valveswerecurrently notidentifiedintheInservice TestProgram(ECCS Surveillance violation).

Withsuchknowledge, theUtility,QualityAssurance groupandtheNRCallowedtheplanttostartupandcontinueintofulloperating (modei)condition.Nopumps,novalvesyetTechnical Specification4.i.8(Attachment 3)demandsifonevalveisnotdemonstrated operableadailysurveillance isrequiredtobeperformed.

Thisisjustanotherlackofadministrative controlinwhichthereviewgroupshavefailedtoauditorreviewproperly.

Unfortunately, thisdilemmaisnotuniquetoNineNilePoint.Otherplantswerealsosomehowlicensedwithoutthismandatory HPCIcapability.

Thatisanotherindicator ofthetypeofreviewthathastakenplaceatotherfacilities aswellbuteventually theseplantsinstalled themandatory system.Themoststunningfactofthisinvestigation showsthatafterliterally thousands oftechnical reviewsperformed byhundredsof"qualifiedpersonnel" workingindifferent shifts,separatedepartments, sitesorregions,haveallfailedtostopthisfacilityfromoperating outsidetheminimumfederalguidelines.

Everymonthduringfullpoweroperation, theHPCIsystemisverifiedoperablebya"qualified" SeniorReactorOperatorandaswornaffidavit submitted eachmonthbytheUtilitytotheNRCattesting thatallrequirements havebeenfulfilled.

Obviously, thecurrentsystemofchecksandbalancescannotstopthisplantfromoperating outsidethesemandatory federalguidelines, anassumption falselymadebycongress.

D.Responsibilities 10CFR50App.Bdetailstheadministrative requirements forTestControl,Inspections, Operating Status,Corrective Action,Recordsandindependent Audits.Theserequirements areaddressed inboththeTechnical Specifications andFSAR.Sitespecificadministrative procedures detailutilityandqualityassurance staffpositionresponsibilities.

10CFR50.70 detailtheNRCinspections while10CFR50.72 detailreportnotification responsibilities forallparties.TheNRChavetheirownadministrative procedures whichdetailstaffresponsibilities.

NUREG-0800 detailstheUBNRCstandardreviewplanforinservice testingofpumpsandvalves.Allpartiesmentioned wererequiredtohaveknowledge oftheHPCIrequirements atthelevelofreviewforwhicheachindividual wasinvolved.

Thesereviewsrequiremandatory action.Despiteallmentioned reviewsthisrequirement wasnotmet.OnJan18,1990theNiagraNohawk,NineNilePointNuclearRegulatory Compliance Groupwereservednoticeofthisandmanyotherknownsafetyconcerns.

OnJuly31,1990theNiagraMohawkQualityFirstTeamwereservedwrittennotice.TheNRCwasnotifiedandonandtheQualityFirstTeamnotifiedpetitioner thattheNRCexemptedtheutilityfromtherequirement.V.BTATENENT OFTHELAWi.Thereisaminimumrequirement foraHighPressureCoreInjection ECCSSafeguard SystemattheNineNilePointUnitOnefacility.

Thisrequirement comesfromthefederalguidelines, Technical Specifications andFSARminimummandates.

2.NoHighPressureCoreInjection Systemmeetingthesafeguard federalguidelines existsatNineNilePoint,UnitOne.

IA,yA<<-n>mwq1='I 3.Ifthenon-quality relatedfeedwater systemwastosupposedly fulfilltheHPCIsafetyfunction, itfailedtomettheonsiteelectrical requirements andmanyofthemainflowpathvalveshadneverbeenincludedintheInservice TestProgram.4.IftheHPCISystemisnotasafeguard systemandisnotconsidered inanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalysesasstatedintheFSARChapterVII,thennoassumption canbemadethatthefuelwillremaincoveredbythemoderator andrelatedsafetylimitssetinthecurrentlicensearenullandvoid.Obviously unreviewed safetyquestions exist.5.Congressmadeanassumption ofthecurrentchecksandbalancesthatwouldneverallowaplanttooperateoutsidetheminimumsafetyrequirements setoutinfederalguidelines.

Onthisassumption, unlikeanyotherindustry, thenuclearindustryhasbeenallowedtooperateunderlimitedliability.

Theutility,QualityAssurance Groups,NRCandChiefExecutive Officerhavereceivedwrittennoticeoftheirfailuretocomplywiththeminimumfederalguidelines andhaveadministratively failedtocomplywiththisissue.Asdiscussed above,theNineMileUnitOnePlantfailstocomplywithboththeminimumfederalandNRC'requirements forHPCIECCSSystem.Thishasbeenacknowledged bytheNRCStaffandisdemonstrated unequivocally bytheevidenceinthepublicrecord.Moreover, theStaffhasperformed novalidanalysisthatmeetstheCommission's narrowcriteriaforcontinuing tooperateintheabsenceofcompliance.

Compliance withbothFederalandNRCsafetyregulations isaprerequisite tosafeoperation ofanuclearpowerplant.Infact,astheNRC'sAppealBoardhasobserved, regulatory

andsafety."NaineYankeeAtomicPowerComanALAB-161, 6AEC1003,1009(19?3).

Compliance maynotbeavoidedbyarguingthat,althoughanapplicable regulation isnotme,thepublichealthandsafetywillstillbeprotected.

For,oncearegulation isadopted,thestandards itembodiesrepresent theCommission's definition ofwhatisrequiredtoprotectthepublichealthandsafety.VermontYankeeNuclearPowerCor.ALAB-138, 6AEC520,528(1973)(emphasis added).TheCommission's essential safetystandards mustbemet,withoutregardtothecostorinconvenience ofachieving compliance.

10CFR50.109SeealsoUnionofConcerned Scientists vNRC,824F.2d108(DCCir1987)~VI.REQUESTFORRELIEFForthereasonsenumerated above,petitioner statesthatthefollowing reliefisrequired:

A.Immediate ShutdownPendingDemonstration ofRegulatory Compliance.

Asdiscussed above,theNineNilePointnuclearplantfailstocomplywithanarrayoffundamental requirements forHPCIECCSmandatory requirements.

Noexemptions tothisrequirement canpossiblybejustified withoutundueriskstopublicsafety.Consistent withtherequirements oftheAtomicEnergyAct,Federalmandatory requirements andNRCregulations, Petitioner therefore seeksimmediate shutdownoftheNineNilePointunitonereactorpendingfullcompliance withtheregulations.

Inseekingthisrelief,Petitioner notesthatmaintaining ECCSsystemsnecessary tometigatelossofcoolantaccidents isaregulatory goalthatwarrantsthemostimmediate andstrinqent enforcement action.NineNilePoint'snoncompliance withthefederalminimumdesigncriteriaandthe"coverup"activities ofallresponsible partieswhichposesasafetyrisk I

ofcommensurate, ifnotgraver,dimension thanthesuspicion ofECCSpipecrackingthatcausedthecommission toorder23plantshutdowns in1975.SeePetitionforEmerencandremedialAction,CLI-78-6, 7NRC400,405(1978).

LiketheECCSpipecracking, thisplantdoesn'tevenhavethepipes,valvesorpumpsnecessary tometigateaknownpostulated accidentthateffectsknownsafetylimitsoftheFSAR.Thissystemisnecessary forthecoolingofthecoreduringanaccidentandthissystem(whichdoesnotexist)istheonlymeanstopreventameltdown.

Again,unlikenormalECCSsystemswhichhaveredundant components andcantherefore withstand asinglefailure,thissystemdoesnotexistandcannotbecompensated forbyanyothersystem.Simplyput,asmallbreakdescribed intheFSARbasesasapostulated accidentwillinalllikelihood meltdownthereactorforlackofcooling.Becausethecontainment isnotdesignedtowithstand ameltdown, suchaneventwouldprobablyleadtoanuncontained releaseofradioactivity tothepublicenvironment.

Thisutilityisnotinsuredforsuchanaccident.

B.PublicHearingTheissuesraisedbytheNineMilePoint'snoncompliance withfederalrequirements raisesgravesafetyquestions oftremendous publicimportance.

Petitioner therefore requestthatbeforeallowingtheNineMilePointplanttocontinueoperating, theCommission provideforpublichearing,withrightsofdiscovery andcrossexamination, todetermine whetherNineMilePointisinfullcompliance withallfederalminimumrequirements revelanttoHPCIandpublicsafety.Secondly, congressbenotifiedthattheadministrative controlsreliedupontograntthenuclearindustrytheimmunityofliability havefailedtoensurepublicsafety.Afterliterally thousands ofreviewsby"qualified mz personnel" fromdifferentdisciplines, departments, sitesandregionscompleted theirreview,notonecameforwardanddemandthisplantoperatewithinthelawaslaidoutbyactofcongress.

Shouldnoncompliance befound,manyofthesereviewsdemandmandatory actiononthepartofthereviewer.

Thepetitioner hasnotifiedallresponsible partiesandaftertwoyearsNineMilePointUnitOnecontinues tooperateoutsidethefederalguidelines atatremendous risktopublicsafety.Acongressional investigation ofthismatterbeinitiated immediately.

Thepetitioner's serviceswerecontracted byNiagraMohawktoreviewandensureadministrative compliance toTechnical Specification priortoStart-Up.

Aqualified groupoftenbeganalaborious reviewandwhenenormousproblemsbegantoimmerge.Thisgroupwasdisbanded immediately.

InJanl990,theNiagraMohawk'sNuclearRegulatory Compliance Staffwasgivenadetailedmemo(Attachment 5)givingevidencethat45/ofthecontainment isolation valveshadadministrative deficiencies.

Twoweekslaterthereviewgroupwasdisbanded priortocompletion oftheirreview.AlongwithHPCIconcerns, containment isolation valvesasfoundintheFSARTableVI-3haddeficiencies withcorresponding Technical Specification Tables3.3.48<3.2.7.Thisplanthadoperatedfortwentyyearsandyetthelicensefailedtoevencorrespond toitself,letaloneactualplantconditions.

Thesevalvesarerequiredbyfederalguidelines toprotectthepublicyetalmosthalfhaddeficiencies.

Petitioner allegesthatwhenconcernsareidentified, theconcernsareroutinely "coveredup",dismissed oradministratively exempted.

AproperreviewoftheNineMilePointUnitOneTechnical Specification

4.0. 5requirements

andthecomliance ofthe

testprogramswillshowthattheutilitysimplyhiredanotherreviewgroupthat(forwhateverreason)failedtodocumentthedeficiencies thattrulyexist.NineNilePointUnitOneresumedfullpoweroperations evenafterthesafetyconcernswereidentified anddocumented.

Thistypeofcoverupisnotuniquetothisplantandacongressional investigation ofthismatterbeinitiated immediately.

INSUGARYTherecanbenojustification fortheoperation ofnuclearpowerplantsoutsidetheminimumrequirements specified byactofcongress.

Thesearetheminimumrequirements deemednecessary byactofcongresstogranttheimmunityofliability currently assumedbytheutility.Whenpublicsafetyisjeopardized byknownpostulated accidents, therecanbenojustification forthelackofactionbytheresponsible partiesinthisinstance.

Simplyput,thisutilityisnotinsuredtooperateinthismanner.Respectfully submitted, BenL.RidingsP.O.Boxii01Kingston, TN37763 4C<t~A<"llL.1>a-t BIBLIOGRAPHY 1.NODERNPOWERPLANTENGINEERING, Weisman5Eckart,1985Prentice-Hall Inc.2.10CFR50.10,"Requirement ofLicense."

3.10CFR50.46, "Acceptance criteriaforemergency corecoolingsystemsforlightwaternuclearpowerreactors."

4.10CFRS0.55a, "CodesandStandards."

5.10CFR50.59, "Changes, testsandexperiments."

6.10CFR50.70, "Inspection, Records,Reports,Notifications."

7.10CFR50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion 33,"Reactorcoolantmakeup."8~10CFR50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion 35,"Emergency corecooing."9.10CFR50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion36,"Inspection ofemergency corecooingsystem."10.10CFR50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion37,"TestingofEmerqency CoreCoolingsystems."11.10CFRSO,AppendixB,II'QualityAssurance Program"12.10CFR50,AppendixB,III."DesignControl."

13.10CFR50,AppendixB,VI."Document Control,"

14.10CFR50,AppendixB,X."Inspections."

15.10CFR50,AppendixB,XI'TestControl."

16.10CFR50,AppendixB,XIV."Inspection,-

TestandOperating Status."17.10CFR50,AppendixB,XVI."Corrective Action."18.10CFR50,AppendixB,XVII."QualityAssurance Records."

19.10CFR50;AppendixE,F."Training."

20.FederalRegister, PublicDocket:50-220,Niagramohawk,UnitOne,NineNilePointThermalNuclearReactor.

UNITEDSTATEDOFAMERICABEFORETHENUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION AFFIDAVIT OFBENL~RIDINGSI,BenL.Ridingsdomakeoathandsay:1.MynameisBenL.Ridings.Iamatechnical consultant forcommercial nuclearpowerplants.Overaspanofsomefifteenyears,whileworkingatsometwentyfoursites,Ihavespecialized inreviewing oflicensing agreement (FSAR,Technical Specifications, FederalCodesandRegulations, ASMECodes,etc.),establishing administrative controlstomeettheserequirements andtestprogramstoensurecompliance atal)times.Mytestprogramsandadministrative controlsestablished whileundercontracttovariousutilities arestillinusetodayatmanyfacilities.

2.Ihavereviewedalloftherelevantpubliclyavailable correspondence betweentheNuclearRegulatory Commission andNiagraMohawkduringtherelvanttimespan.IamfamilarwithNRCregulations andregulatory guidancegoverning HighPressureCoreInjections 3.Thefactualstatement madeintheattachedPetitionforEmergency ActionandRequestforpublicHearingaretrueandcorrecttothebestofmyknowlegeandbelief.BenL.RidingsSubscribed andsworntobeforemethis~~dayofQ~,1992.Mycommision expires:((<'IIg"gy((~If,f,".,ecC'P~g,<cg<t'c"/p>>f)~~lA>>,

Cpr,f'b Part50,App.A'riterion 27-Combfrrcd reactivity controlsystnnscapability.

Thereactivity controlsystemsshallbcdesignedtohaveacorn.blnedcapability, Inconiunctlon withpoisonadditionbytheemergency corecoolingsystem,ofreliablycontrolling reactivity changestoassurethatunderpostulated ac-cidentconditions andwithappropriate marginforstuckrodsthecapability tocoolthccorelsmaintained.

Criterion 28-Reactfvffy limits.Thereac-tivitycontrolsystemsshallbedesignedwlLhappropriate limitsonthcpotential amountandrateofreactivity increasetoassurethattheeffectsofpostulated reactivity accidents canneither(1)resultIndamagetothcreac-torcoolantpressureboundarygreaterthanlimitedlocalyieldingnor(2)sufficiently dis-turbthecore.Itssupportstructures orotherreactorpressurevesselinternals toImpairsignificantly thecapability tocoolthecore.Thesepostulated reactivity acci-dentsshallIncludeconsideration ofrodelection(unlessprevented bypositivemeans),roddropout,steamlinerupture,changeslnreactorcoolanttemperature andpressure, andcoldwateraddition.

Criterion 29-Prefect(orr agafrrstanticf-patcdopcratfonal occurrences.

Theprotec-tionandreactivity controlsystemsshallbedesignedtoassureanextremely highproba-bilityofaccomplishing theirsafetyfunc-tionsIntheeventofanticipated operational occurrences.

IV.FluidSysfnrrsCrffcrion 30-Quality ofreactorcoolantpressureb'oundary.

Components whicharepartofthereactorcoolantpressurebounda-ryshallbedesigned, fabricated, erected.andtestedtothehighestqualitystandards prac-tical.Meansshallbeprovidedfordetecting and,totheextentpractical, Identifying thelocationofthesourceofreactorcoolantleakage.Crftcr(on 3I-Fracture prevent(on ofreac-torcoolantprcssureboundary.

Thereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshallbedesignedwithsufficient margintoassurethatwhenstressedunderoperating, maintenance, test-ing,andpostulated accidentconditions (1)theboundarybehavesInanonbrlttle mannerand(2)theprobability o!rapidlypropagating fractureIsminimized.

Thcdesignshallreflectconsideration ofservicetemperatures andotherconditions oftheboundarymaterialunderoperating, mainte-nance,testing,andpostulated accidentcon.dltlonsandtheuncertainties Indetermining (I)materialproperties, (2)theeffectsofIr-radiation onmaterialproperties, (3)residu-al,steadystateandtransient stresses.

and<<')smofnaws.Crffcrion 32-Irrspccfforr ofreactorcool-antpressureboundary.

Components whicharepartofthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryshallbedesignedtopermit(1)loCFRChI(11~8Edltlon)546periodicinsPcctlon andtestingofImportanL areasandfeaturestoassesstheirstructural andlcaktlght integrity, and(2)anapproprl.

atematerialsurveillance programforthereactorpressurevessel.Crifcrfon 33-Reactor coolantmakeup.Asystemtosupplyreactorcoolantmakeupforprotection againstsmallbreaksInthcreactorcoolantpressureboundaryshallbcprovided.

Thesystemsafetyfunctionshallbetoassurethatspecified acceptable fueldesignlimitsarenotexceededasaresultofreactorcoolantlossduetoleakagefromthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryandrup-tureofsmallpipingorothersmallcompo.nentswhicharepartoftheboundary.

Thesystemshallbedesignedtoassurethatforonslteelectricpowersystemoperation (as.sumlngoffsltepowertsnotavailable) andfor'ffslte electricpowersystemoperation (assuming onsltepowertsnotavailable) thesystemsafetyfunctioncanbeaccompltshcd usingtheplplnlr.Dumps,andvalvesusedtomaintaincoolantInventory duringnormalreactoroperation.

Criterion 36-Residual heatrcmovaLAsystemtoremoveresidualheatshallbepro.vlded.Thesystemsafetyfunctionshallbetotransferfissionproductdecayheatandotherresidualheatfromthereactorcoreataratesuchthatspecified acceptable fueldesignIlrnltsandthedesignconditions ofthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryarenotexceeded.

Suitableredundancy Incomponents andfeatures, andsuitableInterconnections, leakdetection, andIsolation capabilities shallbeprovidedtoassurethatforonsltcelectricpowersystemoperation (assuming offsltepowerlsnotavailable) andforoffslteelec-'ricpowersystemoperation (assuming onsltepowerhnotavailable) thesystemsafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplished.

assum-Ingasinglefailure.Crffcrforr 35-Emergnrcy corecooHng.Asystemtoprovideabundantemergency corecoolingshallbeprovided.

Thesystemsafetyfunctionshallbetotransferheatfromthereactorcorefollowing anylossofreactorcoolantataratesuchthat(1)fuelandcladdamagethaLcouldInterfere withcontinued effective corecoolingIsprevented and(2)cladmetal-water reactionIslimitedtonegli-gibleamounts.Suitableredundancy Incomponents andfeatures, andsuitableInterconnections, leakdetection.

Isolation, andcontainment capa-bilitiesshallbeprovidedtoassurethatforons!Leelectricpowersystemoperation (as-sumingoffsltepowerIsnotavailable) andforoffslteelectricPowersystemoperation (assuming onsltepowerIsnotavallablc) thesystemsafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplished.

assumingasinglefailure.Crfter(on36-Irrspccliorr ofcmcrgnrcy corecoolirrpsystem.Theemergency corevcr'iNuclearReSuiator

-4~"-'ingsystemshallappropriate perlodt'ant components.

sutorpressurevesaeandpipingLor>Pabtiity oithesys'-.Crftcriorr 37-TcsIfnpsysicm.'Thes~temshallbedesb-.'ateperiodicpress<<>~;passure(1) thestr'cgrityofILscomPo>r(andperformance or,ofthesystem,and('systemasawholer.dosetodesignaspr:of.thefulloperatlo,the,systemintoot,ationofapplicable

,tlonsystem,theL~"andemergency poa.;,ationoftheassocla~.~.."<Cr(tcrion 38-Co:'.hsystemtorcmov~,".containment shallsafetyfunctionshconsistent withthrsoclatedsystems,t-andtemperature f,antaccidentandr~rablyIowlevels.'W-;:jSultable redund:'features andsulta'r',detection, Isolatlor

~bllltlesshallbepr~<lonslte electricpov<sumlngoffsltepo':foroffslteelectric(assuming onslteg;systemsafetyfun(.'ssuming asingle:~Criterion 39-Ir.;$heatremovalsystr,,removalsystemslappropriate perte"tantcomponents,

.:.spray'nozzles, anr,'S,c,'.tegrltyandcapablCritcrion40-Tcremovalsystem.'ovalsystemsh:appropriate perio~,,'ltestingtoassrleaktlght Intcgrlrtheoperability activecomponcn'he operablllLy candundercondltaspractical theoperational scourIntooperation, Ir.=cableportionsoftransferbetweer':f-powersources,arsoclatcdcoolings4";,'riterion 4I-cleanup.SystemQ(('I

.'1-1-88Edition)>tingofImportant ssLhclrstrucLural id(2)anapproprl-programforthevolantmakeup.A'oolantrnakcup>allbreakslntheboundaryshallbectyfunctionshall>dscccptablc fuelcdedasaresultof>leakagefromthe>oundaryandrup-thersmallcompo-.heboundary.

Thetoassurethatforwmoperation (as-notavailable) and'ystemoperation

notavailable) theabcaccomplished andvalvesusedto>ryduringnormal;healremoval.AIheatshallbepro->functionshallbe<ctdecayheatandthereactorcoreat.edacceptable fuelcslgnconditions ofsureboundaryarennentsand>cree.cctlons,leak>apabllltlcs shallbeforonslteelectric>(assuming offslteu>dforoffslteelec->eration(assuming

>liable)thcsystemxompilshed, assurn->cycorecoolfnp.Asntemergency coreLThesystemsafeLy>sferheatfromtheanylossofreactor>ai,(1)fuelandcladferewlChcontinued

>prevented and(2)nIslimitedtonegll-Incomponents and>terconnectlons.

leakIcontainment capa-dtoassurethatforrstemoperation (as->notavailable) sndersystemoperation Isnotavailable) thecanbeaccompltshed.

e;lionofcmcrpency fheemergency coreJ~tNuclearRegulatory Commission coolingsystemshallbedesignedtopermitappropriate periodicInspection ofImpor-tantcomponenLs, suchassprayringsInthcreactorpressurevessel,waterInfection noz-stcs.sndpiping.toassuretheIntegrity sndcapability ofthesystem.Crifcrion 37-Tcsf(np ofemergency corecoolinpsystem.Theemergency corecoolingsystemshallbedesignedtopermitspproprl.

ateperiodicpressureandfunctional testingtoassure(1)thestructural sndleaktlght In-tegrityofItscomponents, (2)theoperabglty andperformance ofLheactivecomponents ofthesystem,and(3)theoperability ofthcsystemasawholeand,underconditions ssclosetodesignaspractical, theperformance ofthefulloperational sequencethatbringsthesystemIntooperation, Including oper-ationofspp)lcsble portionsoftheprotec-tionsystem,thetransferbetweennormalsndemergency powersources,andtheoper-ationoftheassociated coolingwatersystem.Crifcrion 38-Confainmen(

heatremoval.AsystemtoremovehestfromLhereactorcontslrunent shallbeprovided.

Thesystemsafetyfunctionshallbctoreducerapidly,consistent withthefunctioning ofotheras.soclatedsystems,thecontainment pressureandtemperature following anytoss.ofwool-antaccidentandmaintainthemataccept-ablylowlevels.Sultab)eredundancy Incomponents andfeatures.

andsuitableInterconnections, leakdetection.

Isolation, andcontainment caps.bllltlesshallbeprovidedtoassurethatforonslteelectricpowersystemoperation (as-sumingoffsitepowerIsnotavailable) andforoffslteelectricpowersystemoperation (assuming onsitepowerIsnotavailable) thesystemsafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplished, assumingasinglefailure.Criferion 39-lnspcctfo>>

ofconlainmcnl healremovalsysfcm.Thecontalnmcnt heatremovalsystemshallbedesignedtopermitappropriate periodicInspection ofimpor-tantcomponents, suchasthetorus,sumps.spraynozzles,andpipingtoassuretheIn-tegrityandcapability ofthesystem.Criterion 40-Tcsfinp ofconfafnmcn(

healremovalsystem.Thecontainment heaCre-movalsystemshallbedesignedtopermitappropriate periodicpressureandfunction-altestingtoassure(1)thestructural andleaktlght Integrity ofItscomponents.

(2)theopcrablllty andperformance oftheactivecomponents ofthesystem.and(3)theoperability ofthesystemasawhole,andunderconditions asclosetothedesignaspractica) theperformance ofthefulloperational sequencethatbringsthcsystemIntooperaLlon, Including operation ofsppll-csblcportionsoftheprotection system,thetransferbetweennormalandemergency powersources.andCheoperation oftheas-sociatedcoolingwatersystem.Criteria>>

41-Confainment almosphcrc cleanup.Systemstocontrolfissionprod-Port50,App.Aucts,hydrogen, oxygen,andothersub-stanceswhichmaybereleasedIntothereac-torcontslnmenC shallbeprovidedasneces-sarytoreduce,consistent withthefunction-ingofotherassociated systems,thcconcen.tratlonandqualityoffissionproductsre-leasedLotheenvironment following postu.latedaccidents, andtoconLroltheconcen.tratlonofhydrogenoroxygenandothersubstances lnthecontainment atmosphcrc following postulated accidents toassurethsCcontainment lnLegrlty Ismaintained.

Eachsystemshallhavesuitableredundan-cyIncomponents andfeatures.

sndsuitableInterconnections, leakdetection, isolation.

andcontainment capabilities toassurethat,foronsltcelectricpowersystemopcratlon (assuming oifsltepowerIsnotavailable) andforoffsiteelectricpowersystemoperaC!on (assuming onsltepowerLsnotavailable) lissafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplished, sssum.Ingssinglefailure.Criterion 42-lnspec(ion ofconfainmenl almosphcrc cleanupsysfcms.Thecontain-mcnLatmosphere cleanupsystemsshallbedesignedLopermlLappropr'late periodic'In-spectionofImportant components.

suchasfilterframes.ducts,andpipingtoassuretheIntegrity andcspsblHty ofthesystems.Crfferia>>43-Tcrffnp ofconfafnmcnl at.mosphcrccleanupsysfcms.Thecontainment atmosphere cleanupsystemsshallbede-signedtopermitappropriate periodicpres-sureandfunctional testingtoassure(1)thcstructural andleaktlght Integrity ofItscorn.ponents,(2)theoperability andperform.anceoftheactivecomponents ofthesys.ternssuchasIsns,filters,dsmpers.pumps,andvalvesand(3)theoperability ofthesys-temsasawholeand,underconditions ssclosetodesignaspractical.

thcperformance ofthefulloperational sequencethatbringsthcsystemsintooperation, Including oper-ationofapplicable portionsoftheprotec.Lionsystem,thetransferbetweennormalandernergcncy powersources,andtheoper-ationofassociated systems.Cr(ferion 44-Coohnp u>afer.Asystemtotransferheatfromstructures, systems,andcomponents important tosafety,toanulti-mateheatsinkshallbeprovided.

ThesystemsafetyfunctionshallbetotrsnslerChecombinedhestloadofthesestructures, systems,andcomponents undernormalop.cratingandaccidentconditions.

Suitableredundancy Incomponents andfeatures, andsuitableInterconnections, leakdetection, andIsolation capabilities shallbeprovidedtoassurethatforonslteelectricpowersystemoperation (assuming offsltepowerIsnoLavailable) andforoffslteelec-tricpowersystemoperation (assuming onsltepowerIsnol,available) thesystemsafetyfunctioncanbeaccomplished, sssum-Ingasinglefailure.54'7 rr LIHITING,CONDITION FOROPERATIOH SURVEILLAHCE AEJUIR)'.HLHT 3.1.8Illa)PRESSuRECOOLANTIHJECTION AJJ11Appliestotheoperational statusofthehighpressurecoolantinjection syste<n.O~b<.ctive:Toassurethecapability ofthehighpressurecoolantinjection systemtocoolreactorfuelintheeventofaloss-of-coolant accident.

4.1.8lllGIIPRESSURECOOLANTINJECTION Appliestotheperiodictesti>>grequirum<.nts forthehighpressurecoolanti>>juctiu>>

cyst<.<ll.

~Obective:Toverifytheoperability ofthehigh)iressuru coolantinjection system.h111<<1)a.Duringthepoweroperating con-"dition,wheneverthereactorcoolantpressureisgreaterthan110psigandthereactorcoolanttemperature greaterthansaturation temperature, thehighpressurecoolantinjection systen>shallbeoperableexceptasspecified inSpecification"b"below.b.Ifaredundant component ofthehinhpressurecoolantinjection systembecomesinoperable thehighpressurecoolantinjection shallbeconsidered operableprovidedthatthecomponent isreturnedt.oanoperablecondition within15daysandtheadditional sur-veillance rec)uired isperformed.

~Sectficat<on:

Thehighpressurecoolanti>>jectio>>

sur-veillance shallbeperformed asindicated below:a.At1east&nayel8er'at)'hgŽcycle.

Auto<natlc start-upofthelii<)hp)essur<~coolantinjection systemshallbedemon-strated.Pumpoperabili tyshallbedeter<)i>>ud, 71 r

LierCS~UAVfLLAHCEA~F.IJIAI'.HLH'I'.=-

IfSpecification "a"and"b"arenotmet,anormalorderlyshutdownshallbeinitiated w>thinonehourandreactorcoolantpressureandtemp-eratureshallbereducedtolessthan110psigandsaturation temperature within24hours.c.Surveillance withI~nocrableCoiigionvnt Whenacomponent becomesI>>operable itsredundant component shallhudemonstrated tobeoperableiiuiedlately anddailythereafter.

'12 ll BASESFOR3.1.8AND4.1.8HIGH'PRESSURE COOLANTIHJEL))OM aHighPressureCoolantInjection System(KPCI)is.providedtoensureadequate'corecoolingintheunlikelyeventofntrolRodDrivepumpsandwhicharenotlargeenoughtoallo~'fastenoughdepressur)zat onxl)reactorcooan'nerea..e1tli"'kThHPCISystem.is required.

forlinebreakswh')chexceedthecapab)lityoftheforcoresratobepyfeetive.eseogpressrtfhihurecoolantinjection pumpsconsistsofacondensate pump,afeedwater boosterpumpandamotorivenfeedwater pump.Onesetofpumps)scapableofdel)ver.ing 3,800gpmtothercreactorvesselatreactoressure.Theperformance capability ofHPCIaloneandinconjunction withothersystemstoprov)deadequatecoreso))ngforaspectrumof1)nebreaks)sdiscussed

)ntheFifthSupplement oftheFSAR.tdeterm)ning theoperability oftheHPCISystem,therequiredperformance capab)l)ty ofvariouscomponents shallbe>ns)dered.

~TheKPCISystemshallbecapableofmeetingitspumpheadversusflowcurve.gT.hemotordrivenfeeduater pumpshallbecapableofautomatic initiation uponreceiptofeitheranautomatic turbinetripsignalorreactorlow-water-level signal.e.'heCondenser hotwell~eve)shallnotbelessthan57)nches(75,000gallons).

TheCondensate storagetanksinventory shallnotbelessthan105,000gallons.-

Themotor-driven feedwater pumpwillautomatically tr)p)freactorh)ghwaterlevelissusta)ned fortensecondsandtheassociated pumpdownstream flowcontrolvalveandlowflowcontrolvalvearenotclosed.rr)ngreactorstart-up, operat)on andshutdown, thecondensate andfeedwater boosterpumpsareinoperation.

Ateactorpressures upto450pslg,thesepumpsarecapableofsupply)ng therequired3,800gpm.Above450ps)gavtor-driven-feedwater pumpisnecessary toprovidetherequiredflowrate.hbilitofthecondensate, feedwa-'boosterandmotordr)venfeedwater pumpsw)1)bedemonstrated bytheirperationaspartofthefeedwater supplyduringnormalstationoperation.

Stand-bypumpsw)l1epecapayow)11belacedinservicetleastquarterly tosupp)yfeedwater duringstationoperation.

Anautomatic systeminitiation testwillbeerformedatleastonceperoperating cycle.Th)sw)llinvolveautomatic startingofthemotordr)venfeedwater pumpsndflowtothereactorvessel.RevisedOctober1,198673 r

I.HIGH-PRESSURE COOLANTINJECTION 1.0DesinSasesThehigh-pressure coolantinjection (HPCI)systemisanoperating modeofthefeedwater systemavailable intheeventofasmallreactorcoolantlinebreakwhichexceedsthecapability ofthecontrolroddrivepumps(0.003ft2).HPCIalongwithoneemergency coolingsystemhasthecapability ofkeepingtheswollenreactorcoolantlevelabovethetopofactivefuelforsmallreactorcoolantboundarybreaksupto0.07ft2foratleast1000seconds.TheHPCIsystemwithoneofthetwoemergency coolingsystemsandtwocorespraysystems,willprovidecorecoolingforthecompletespectrumofbreaksizesuptothemaximumdesignbasisrecirculation discharge linebreak(5.446ft2).Itsprimarypurposeisto:a.provideadequatecoolingofthereactorcoreunderabnormalandaccidentconditions.

b.removetheheatfromradioactive decayandresidualheatfromthereactorcoreatsucharatethatfuelcladmeltingwouldbeprevented.

c.provideforcontinuity ofcorecoolingoverthecompleterangeofpostulated"break sizesintheprimarysystemprocessbarrier.HPCIisnotanengineered safeguards systemandisnotconsidered inanyLossofCoolantAccidentAnalyses.

Itisdiscussed inthissectionbecauseofitscapability toprovidemakeupwateratreactoroperating pressure.

2.0SstemDesinTheHPCIsystemutilizesthetwocondensate storagetanks,themaincondenser hotwell,twocondensate pumps,condensate demineralizers, twofeedwater boosterpumps,feedwater heaters,twomotor-driven feedwater pumps,anintegrated controlsystemandallassociated pipingandvalves.Thesystemiscapableofdelivering 7600gpmintothereactorvesselatreactorpressurewhenusingtwotrainsoffeedwater pumps.Thecondensate andfeedwater boosterpumpsarecapableofsupplying therequired3,800gpmatapproximately reactorpressures upto270psig.Above270psigamotor-driven feedwater pumpisnecessary toprovidetherequiredflowrate.

VII-6laThefeedwater systempumpshaverecirculation lineswithairoperatedflowcontrolvalvestopreventthepumpsfromoperating againstaclosedsystem.Intheeventoflossofairpressure, thesevalvesopenrecycling partoftheHPCIflowtothehotwell.HPCIflowwouldbereducedtoapproximately 3,000gpmatareactorpressureof1,150psigand3,800gpmatareactorpressureof940psig.Rev.7Condensate inventory ismaintained atanavailable minimumvolumeof180,000gallons.3.0DesinEvaluation Duringaloss-of-'coolant accidentwithinthedrywell,highdrywellpressureduetoalinebreakwillcauseareactorscram.Thisautomatic scramwillcauseaturbinetripafte"afive-second delay.Inordertopreventcladdingtemperatures fromexceeding theirmaximumlimitfortheentirespectrumofbreaks,the3800gpm(fromonetrainofHPCI/feedwater pumps).wouldhavetobeavailable immediately.

Feedwater flowwouldbeavailable forconsiderable timefromtheshaft-driven feedwater pump.Theshaft-driven feedwater pumpwouldcoastdownwhiletheelectricmotor-driven condensate pumpsandfeedwater boosterpumpswouldcontinuetooperate.Thecoastdowntimetoreach3,800gpmdeliverytothecoreisapproximately 3.2minutes(FigureVII-17),sinceboththecondensate andfeedwater boosterpumpswillcontinuetooperateonoff-sitepower.Theturbinetripwillsigna1themotor-driven feedwater pumptostart.Thesignalwillbesimultaneous withthestartoftheshaftpumpcoastdown.Themotor-driven feedwater pumpwillbeuptospeedandcapableofsupplying 3,800gpminabout:tenseconds.Asabackup,lowreactorwaterlevelwi11alsosignalthemotor-driven pumptostart.Theinitiation signaltransfers controlfromthenormalfeedwater totheHPCIinstrumentation andcontroller whichhasbeencontinuously trackingthenormalfeedwater controlsignal.Thustherewillbeacontinuous supplyoffeedwater tothereactor.TheHPCIsingleelementcontrolsystemwillattempttomaintainreactorvesselwaterlevelat65inchesor72inches(depending uponwhichpump,llor12respectively, isinservice)withamaximumfeedwater flowlimitof3800gpm.Rev.7 r

VII-62Asustained highreactorwaterlevelreactorprotection systemsignalcoincident withanopenfeedwater flowcontrolvalvewillselectively triptheassociated feedwater pump.Theclutchoftheshaft-driven pumpwillalsobedisengaged immediately uponhighreactorwaterlevel.Shouldthereactorwaterlevelreachthelowlevelscramsetpointthemotordrivenpumpthattrippedonhighreactorwaterlevelwillrestart.Necessary feedwater pumprecirculation isprovidedtoallowforcontinued pumpoperation withtheflowcontrolvalveclosed.Asfeedwater ispumpedoutofthecondenser hotwell,throughtheselectedequipment ofthecondensate andfeedwater systemsandintothereactor,thecondenser hotwelllevelwillfall.Sincecondensed steamfromtheturbinenolongerreplenishes thecondenser hotwell,condensate willbetransferred fromthecondensate storagetankstothehotwellformakeup.Thefeedwater systempumpsoperateon4160v.Whentheplantisinoperation, thepowerissuppliedfromthemaingenerator throughthestationservicetransformer whenthegenerator ison-lineandconnected tothegrid.Whenthemaingenerator isoff-line, thefeedwater pumpsaresuppliedwithnormaloff-sitepowerfromthe115KVsystemthroughthereservetransformers.

IfaHPCIinitiation signalshouldoccur,allHPCI/feedwater systempumpswouldstartimmediately withtwofeedwater pumptrainsavailable forHPCIinjection usingthesingleelementfeedwater controlsystemforreactorvessellevelcontrol.Ifamajorpowerdisturbance weretooccurthatresultedinlossofthe115KVpowersupplytotheNineNilePoint115KVbus,powerwouldberestoredfromagenerator locatedattheBennettsBridgeHydroStation.Thisgenerator wouldhavethecapacityofsupplying approximately 6,000KVAwhichissufficient tooperateonetrainofHPCI/feedwater systempumps.IfHPCIinitiation weretooccur,thepreferred feedwater trainpumps(feedwater pump12,feedwater boosterpump13,condensate pump13)'would start.Thenon-preferred tra'inpumpswouldbelockedoutonlossofoff-sitepowerandnotstartuntiltheoperatormanuallyresetthelockout.Ifapreferred trainpumphadbeenlockedoutpriortothelossofoff-sitepower,itwouldremainlockedoutandthenon-preferred trainbackuppumpwouldautomatically startonHPCIinitiation.

Ifboththepreferred andbackuppumpsarerunning,thepreferred pumpwouldremaininserviceandthebackuppumpwilltrip.TheRev.7 0r VII-62auseofaBennettsBridgehydrogenerator, whilenotequivalent toanon-siteemergency powersource,providesahighlyreliablealternate off-sitepowersupplyfortheHPCIfunctionofthefeedwater system.ev.74.0TestsandInsections"Testsandinspections ofthevariouscomponents aredescribed inSectionXI-SteamtoPowerConversion.

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