ML20127J898

Affidavit of Bl Ridings in Support of Petition for Emergency Action & Request for Public Hearing

ML20127J898
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	10/28/1992
From:	Ridings B RIDINGS, B.L.
To:
Shared Package
ML17056C147	List: ML17056C146 ML17056C148 ML20127J898
References
NUDOCS 9211200028
Download: ML20127J898 (18)

Text

79 A

UNITED STATED OF AMERICA EEFDPE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMdlSSION 4

Arr1 DAVIT OF BEN L, P!D:NGS I. Ben L. Rad:ngs do make oath and say:

1.

My name is Ben L. Ridings.

I am a technical consultant for commercial nuclear power plants.

Over a span of some fi f teen year s, while working at some twenty four sites, I have speciali:ed in reviewing of licensing agreement (FSAR, Technical Speci fic at i ons, Federal Ccdes and Regulations, ASME Codes, etc.),

establishing administrative c ont r ol s to meet these requirements and test programs to enzure compliance at al1 times.

My test programs and administrative cont rols est ablished while under c.:.nt r ac t to arious utilities are still in use today at many facilities.

2.

I have reciewed all of the relevant puLlicly available correspondence between the Nuclear Pegulatory Commission and Niagra Mohawk during the r el vant time span.

I am f amilar with NRC regulations and regulatory guidance governing High Pressure Core Injection.

"^c f actual si,atement made in the attached Petition for Emergency Action and Request for public Hearing are true and correct to the best of my knowlege and belief.

} l/s't'

_ gix A e

Ben L. Ridings Subscribed and sworn to before me this @X day of M,1992.

N hu On o

My ccmmision expires:

'$ - M ~ S b

()005 h c

v

5 k

k O.

I/

Port 50, App. A 10 Cf R Ch.1 (l.143 Edillon)

Nftloor R*9uletoe CHierion #F-Comtvined retetivtly cositrol periodic trasection trid testing of important cdttng syst1m shall systems cepet>dity. The rtketivity control trets and features to hatets thelt structurtl appford"I# M systerns shall 14 deal ned to hate 6 tom.

and lenktight integrity, bred (3) En approptl.

tarig comWneW. W t

btned capability, in conjunction with riolt.on ate entteilti surveillarite program for the tend tof P''" "'

Eddition by the tir 'tgency core coollt g ggsctor pressure vennel glee and piping. to i 1

system, of tellably ~orittolllrig tractivit y Crtlerton JJ-Rtector coolsal mtAthp. A

., ttp6DUUI DI thtnges to tature that under postulated sc systern to supply reactor coolant enskeup

'r,N#" en The i

tident conditions and with appropslate for protection against amkil bretka in the f oggny syst rntigtn for stuck tods the capability to cool teactor coolant pressure boundary shall t.e system shall be deste

)

the core la rnalntained.

proilded. The system attely function shall O ate terMC prN

,l Criterton t#-Rea lit. sly hmits. The rett.

be to sAsure that specified acteptable fuel t'"^**"

I'

);

ttvity control systems shall tie destened with design limits are not esteeded to a result of 6 tettity of its compoi appropriate limits on the potential amosnl retetor coolant loss due to lenktge from the i

6.nd 1* M t W and rtte of teactivity increue to tasure that reactor toolant pressure teundary trid tup.

, of the spm. Md

.o' the effects of postultted rebetivity tecidents ture of Small piping or other small compo.

'systern as a whoie i can neither til result in damage to the reac' nents which are part of the teundary, '!he

,y ter coolant pressure boundary greater than

.ystem shall be designed to kssure that for

1. I U gio i

Ilmited local yleiding tiot (3) suf ficiently dis' onsite elktric pottr system opertuon its.

the sH M {

(

i turb the core. ILS support structures or l

other temeter pressure vessel internals to s.rning offsite power is not evallablel and trnptit significantly the etMblilty to cool for offsite electric power systern eteration U" "U

"' the t I

the core. These postuitted reactivity tecl-itssuming onsite power is not tvtllablel the

End eningW io, dents shall include considetsuon of rod system safety function can be accompitshed cla Jg Co ustne the plptng pumps, and valves used to I

ejection tunless prevented by positive meknal, rnd dropout, stearn litie rupture, maintain coolt. tit inventory during normtl A ""

to temm ttactor overstion "t thall that get fn.tctor evolant temperature and t elfh th Criterton Jd. tesidual head remopol A t

etto 2 e ti a po r.sf satici. ustem to Mrnm residual heat shall be pro-acc$sted systems, t peted operational occurrences The protec.

vided. The system Enfety functkn shall be End tempertture i tion and "metirtty control systems shall be to transfH Hasim pmlutt dMay heat and i knt tecident and I other residual heat from the reteter core at Ebty low levett-det ene".' a osure En estremely h'It probt.

i bility 4

.t">mplishing their safety func.

t rtte such that specified screptable fuel ISultable redund Uons in tne event of anticipated operttionti design limits and the design conditions of features, and suits occurretices, the teactor coolant pressure boundary s.te detection, Laolatio8 tiot esceeded.

, bilities shall t>e pt J V. y1mid 3rstems Sultable redundancy in components and

onsite electric poi Crtierton J0-owanty c/ reactor coolanf features, and sultable interconnntions, leak suming of fsite Po pressure teundery. Components whkh are Muum, and inoltuon capabulWs shall be

' for offsite electib part of the reactor coolant pressure Wunds. provided to tasure that tot onsite electric (t.asuming onsite I ry shdi be designed, f abricated, erected, and pown sysum opuSUM (assuming OU4He sptem gamy fun tested to the highest gutilty standarcis prte.

power La not availablel and for offalte elec.

assuming a stnsle c Mwn antem Mertum (Essuming

• Wimon W tietL Means shall be provided fot detecting and, to the estent practicas, Identifying the msne powH La not tv6Htblel the system het rempoJ sq location of the source of reactor coolant asMy funcum can 44 Scromphalad, tasum-nmoval sWm o le kk tg e, ing a single It!)ure,

y appropelste $wrk Crtierton Jf-tracture presention c/ reae.

Crtierson J5-tmerpency core cooline. A tant components.

for cooloni pressure boundary. The teacto, system to provide abundant emergency core spray riotsl*8 6"

coolant pressure boundary shdl be designed cooling shall be provided. The system safety

,. territy and capat with sufficient mtssin to Ensure that then function shall be to trsnsfer heat frorn the Crtierton 40-7 stressed under opertling, maintenkt ce, test.

retcLot core following any las of tenctot remos.aj systen ing, and pottulated tecident condittorts (1) cMant at a rate such th6L til fuel and cind moval spte) A at the boundary twhaves in a nonbrittle darnage that could interfere with continued appropritte pctb manner trid (3) the prnbability of rapidly effective core cooling is prete ed and 135 at tesung to ass propassting fracture la mintmtzed. The clad metal water tenedon is lire i at to petil-t leaktight intest D(,

design shall reflect consideration of servic, glble amounta, the operEbtlity temperttures and other conditions of the Sultable redundancy in comte.ents and p active componer boundary material under opersting, mainte, features, and suitable interconnections, leak i

the operability ntnce, testing, and postulated tecideni con, detection, isolation, and containment caps.

and under condi u

diuons End the uncertaintles in determining bilities shall be provided to tasure that for E

na pttetical the til material properties,(3) the effe ts of tr, onsite electrle power system operation its.

oper*Uch*I8

• raditUon on material propstiles, (3) residu, tuming offsite power La not tytilable) and into operstlorb I al, steady state and transient strettes, and for of fsite elect 1e power system operation cable poruons of tilsise offitws.

(tasuming onsit power la not tenitable) the trans!M MW Criterton J2-Inspecito4 of reactor cool-system safety function tan be scoomplished, power sources, e sai presswre boundary. Components which tasuming s tingle f allure.

tociated cooling Ett part of the reactor coolant pretsute Criterton J8-Inspection of emerpency Crtierton 43-boundary shall be designed to permit til core co, Wing systen The emergency ter, clea n s" Syster 546 M

-e P

?5

)

1 188 (dillon)

Hudoor Regulatory Commission Port 50, App. A cooling sy6 tem 6holl t.e designed to termit ocks, hydr og e n, anygtn, &nd other aute appropriate periodic instection of impora stantes thlch may te releued into the rent-4titig of trnportant 6e their structural tant components, such u sprey tir go in the for containrrient shall t.e provided as neces-d til tu approprt.

teactor pressure teksti, water injettlon hos.

Stry to redute, constatent with the function.

progrtrn for the li s.les, and piping. 40 usure the integrity arvi Ing of other tuociated systerns, the conten-i 6

tapatillity of the system.

tration and quality of fikslon pttujutts re-l soient meats A A Cr11trson Jf-Testint of emerpency core Irthed to the environtnent following postu-i cooltrit mahtup fooII"F 86'stes The emergency core toolms lated accidenta, tnd to control the concere iall breaks in the system shkin t.e designed to permit approprl' trallon of hydrogen or osystn and other

>oundsty shall tse ste periodic pressure and f urvitonal testing aututancca in the containment atmosphere ety f unction shall to tasm 8 t) the structural and lenktight in*

f ollem ing postulated accidents to tuure d acceptable fuel tertity of its cornponents. (2) the operability that contalttrneret integrity la maintaltwd.

tded as a result of and performer ce of the &ctive components Wil sum Med l

s lethste from the of the system, and (3) the opersbility of the cy in cornporients and features, and suitable i

soundary and rup-tystem ts a whole and, under conditions as interconnectioru, leak detMtion, Isolatlon l

ther small comte.

cicae design Es prncucal the MrMmance and containment capabilities to kasure that he boundary. The of the full otwrttlonal sequer ce that brings for onsite electrit power system operation g

7

• "# # hat I#

l the systern into operation, including oper, (muming of f site power is not evallable) and

,em operation its-M sppikable portions of the protec.

for of fsite electric power sy6 tem operttlun not avtllable) and Lion system. the tratufer betteen norrnal tusuming cruite power is not evallatN lt.s systerri operation and emergtrrey power sources, and the oper, tafety f unction can te attomplished, usum.

not tvtllable) the SLlon of the tuociated cooling aster system.

n t>e accomplished Wie - J8-Conf almment Atef remomf.

ing a single f ailure.

Cnterion (F-f astection of containment and valves used to A systeni so remove heat from the reactor ofmosphere cleanup systems. The contain-try during normal contalttment shall be provided. The system snent strnospf.ere cleanup systems sht!I be

$6fety functiott shall be to reduce rag: Idly,

^' 8 I

'*"0 "I ^

consLatent with the f unctioning of other u-designed to permit appropriate periodic ire i

I hett 6 hall be pro-tociated systemt, the containment preuure spection of trnportant cornponents, such as

• function shall t*

and temperature folloming any late of 4ool.

filter frtrnes, ducts, and piping to nature the l

1ct decay heat and ant accident and rnanntain them 6% tecept.

Integelty and capability of the systems.

the reactor core 6%

ably low levels.

Criterios g). Testing ed confeinment of-ed r-teptable fuel Sultable redunda.ncy in component 4 and mosphere eftontp systems. The containment I

raint,onditions of features, and sulttble Interconnections, leak strnosphere cleanup systerns thsti be de.

7 c

sure tsoundary ase

{

detection, isoittlort and containtnent capt' tigned to permit appropriate periodle pres-r g

g billtles shall te provided to usure that for sure and functional testing to usure (l) the n

ponent.s and onsite elettric power system operation its.

6Lructural and letklight IntegrHy of its com.

cremnectlord. leth suming offsite power ts not tvtllable) and ponents, (2) the operability and perform-

.spobillties thtll t4 for offsite electric power system operation ante of the active components of the sya-(usuming ornite poser is not svallable) the terns such as fans, filters, dampers, pumps, for onsite electric f

s (tasumlng of fsite system safety function can be secompitshed, si d valves and (3) the operability of the syt-and for of fsite elec.

kssuming a single f ailure' n of confaf amenf terns as a whole and, under conditions as

.e ration (usuming Crtierson JD-fnspectio close to design as practical, the Inerf ormance 6116ble) the system 9

heaf remooal systen The contattunent heat the u o e

L6 n) wornplished, assum-removal system shall be designed to permit gy t g

6ppropriate periodic instection of impor.

atton of applicable portions of the Erotec-icy core roofing. A tant components, such u the torus, sumps.

tion system the traruf tr between normal ant emergency core spray notzles, and piping to tasure int in-and emergency power sources, and the oper-L The system safety

't

. territy and capability of the system, allon of tasociated systems, ufer best from the y

Critenon (0- Tesfine of conte (mment Acal Criferion (f-Cooling sneler. A system to any lot.s of reactor remooal systen The containment heat re.

transfet heat from structures, systems, and ist (1) fuel and cind uoval system shall be designed to permig components important to safety, to an ulti-fere with continued appropriate periodic pressure and function, mate heat sink thall te provided. The i prevented and (2)

Y' si testing to assure (fl the structorsJ and system safete function thall t,e to tratufer n is limited to negil-f letktight integrity of its components. (2) the combinu best load of these structures, the operability and performance of the systems, and component 4 under normal op-active esmponents of the system. and (3) the operability of the system as a whole.

ersting and 6ccident conditions.

in components and Sultable redundancy in components and te rconnections, le ak i

I containment capa.

j and under conditions u cicae to the design f eatutes, and suitable intertonnections, leak ta practiehl the perfortnance of the full detection, and isoittfon capabilities shall tw d to assure that for istem operation (u.

?

operational sequence that brings the system i not tvallablel and e

into operttlort including operation of appil.

provided to usure that for onalle electric cable portions of the protection system, the power system operation (stsuming of fsite i

transfer between normal and emergency power la not stallablel and for offsite elec.

er system operation

an be accomplished, power sources, And the operation of the ts-tric power system operation (assuming is not evallablel the cruite power ls not available) the system tociated coollng water system, M

Crtlerion di-Containment atmosphere safety function can be accompitshed, tasum-e,

-tron of emergency The emergency core j cleenWA Systerns to control fission prod-ing a single it!!ure.

S47 MitcbcWA--2.

.cJ n--m-v.- n

p

$ ~.

w t!MITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILt ANCE RCf}UI RTHt'HT __ __ _, _,

3.1.8 11101 PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION 4.1.8 IIIGI PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION Appitcability':

M iicability:

Applies to the operational. status of the Applies to the periodic testing requirements high pressure coolant injection systen.

for the high pressure cool.ent injection systems.

Objective:

Objective:

A To. assure the capability of the high To verify the operability of the higte pressun.

_ [,

pressure coolant injection system to coolant injection system.

cool reactor fuel in the event of a -

o-loss-of-coolant accident.

Spect fication:

12f' Spect flcation:

3 D

_~

Diaring the power operating con--

The high pressure coolant injection sur-

~ tt a.

i dition whenever the reactor vel 11ance shall be perfonned as indicated (d

coolant pressure is greater than below:

110 psig and the reactor coolant At least MterqltY,"shrat~f Aq cycig temperature greater than saturation a.

~

~ * - -

temperature, the high pressure i

coolant injection systein shall be Automatic start-up of the high pressure operable except as specified in coolant injection systens shall be demon-I_

Spect flcation "b" below.

s trated. -

b.

If a redundant componerit of the high b.

At least once per quarter, -

pressure coolant injection system -

becomes inoperable the high pressure-Pung operability shall bc detenained.

coolant' injection shall be considered

- operable provided that the component is returned ;to an operable condition within 15. days and the' additional sur-veillance. required is performed.

71 s

~

LIMITING CONDITION F0fLGPERATlH1 SURVElt t ArgE PEQtlitarMt Nf c.

If Speci fication "a" and "b" are not Surveillance with Inoperatile,Lottiinnent c.

act, a normal orderly shutdown s!iall be initiated within one hour and When a conponent becones inoperabic its reactor coolant pressure ared temp-redundant couponent shall be demonstrated erature shall be reduced to less than to be operable inmediately and dalli 110 psig and saturation temperature thereafter.

within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

W ob t

n d

72

m

- kD f *:fg..

M (*f.;;~& '.;-2% ;$lg )g.-

D Jg

,, ;l.M

.- gqK4R'Q* ?*%

l a

}

qi g ' ~ %....

_. %. n.. y

. s.,...

BASES FOR 3.1.8 AND 4.1.8 HIGH PRESSURE LuutANT INJEttlON is provided to ensure adequate core cooling in the unlikely event of a High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI)-The HPCI System is required.for line breaks which exceed the capability of the for core spray to be ntr'al Rod Drive pumps and which are not large enough to allow fast enough depressurization all reactor coolant line break.

fective.

t e set cf high pressure coolant injection pumps consists of a condensate pump, a feedwater booster p One set of pumps is capable of delivering 3.800 gpm to the reactor vessel at reactor The performance capability of HPCI alone and in conjunction with other systems to provide adequat lven feedvater pump.

oling for a spectrum of line breaks is discussed in the Fifth Supplement of the fSAR.

essure.

the required performance capability of various components shall be i detercining the operability of the liPCI System, insidered.

The HPCI System shal'1 be capable of meeting its pump head versus flow curve.

l l

t tic The motor driven feedwater pump shall be capable of automatic initiation upon receipt of either an au oma

.g i

I turbine trip signal or reactor low-water level signal.

fiheCondenserhotwellfevelshallnotbelessthan57 inches (75.000 gallons).

w 105,000 gallons.

The Condensate storage tanks inventory shall not be less than i d for ten seconds The motor-driven feedwater pump will automatically trip if reactor high water level is susta ne and the associated pump downstream flow control valve and low flow control valve are not closed.

booster pumps are in operation. At iring reactor start-up, operation and shutdown, the condensate and Jeedwater Above 450 psig a eactor pressures up to 450 psig, these pumps are capable of supplying the required 3.800 gpm.

at:r-driven-feedwater pump is necessary to provide the required flow rate.

t d by their h2 capability of the condensate, feedwa'-' booster and motor driven feedwater pumps will be demonstra eStand-peration as part of the feedwater supply during normal station operation.An automatic system initiation test will be t least quarterly to supply feedwater during station operation.This will involve automatic starting of the cotor driven feedwater pumps erformed at least once per operating cycle.

nd floa to the reactor vessel.

73 Octoter 1, 1986 Revised

PGil R, V!l-61 1.

HIGH-PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION Oj 1.0 Design Bases The high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system is an operating mode of the feedwater system available in the event of a small reactor coolant line break which exceeds the capability of the control rod 2

drive pumps (0.003 ft ).

HPCI along with one emergency cooling system has the capability of keeping the swollen reactor coolant level above Rev. 7 the top of active fuel for small reactor coolant boundary breaks up to 0.07 ft2 for at least 1000 seconds.

The HPCI system with one of the two emergency cooling systems and two core spray systems, will provide core cooling for the complete spectrum of oreak sizes up to the maximum design basis recirculation discharge line break 2

(5.446 ft ).

Its primary purpose is to:

a, provide adequ'd ' ^olina of the reactor core under abnormi ! en

~ t nt conditions.

b.

remove the hes; 7;s.r:sig u e decay and residual heat inn tj. Nactor core at such a rate that fuel clad melting would be prevented.

)

provide for continulti of core cooling over the c.

complete range of postulated break sizes in the primary system process barrier.

HPCI 15 not an engineered safeguards system and is g

not considered in any loss of Coolant Accident i

Analyses.

It is discussed in this section because of Rev. 7 its capability to provide makeup water at reactor operating pressure.

2.0 System Design The HPCI system utilizes the two condensate storage Rev. 7 tanks, the main condenser hotwell, two condensate pumps, condensate demineralizers, two feedwater booster pumps, feedwater heaters, two motor-driven feedwater pumps, an integrated control system and all associated piping and valves.

The system is capable of delivering 7600 gpm into the reactor vessel at reactor pressure when using two trains of feedwater pumps. The condensate and feedwater booster pumps are capable of supplying the required 3,800 gpm at approximately reactor pressures up to 270 psig.

Above 270 psig a motor-driven feedwater pump is Rev. 7 necessary to provide the required flow rate.

MhkcInwh-#

VII-61a The feedwater system pumps have recirculation lines C

with air operated flow control valves to prevent the

)

pumps from operating against a closed system.

In the event of loss of air pressure, these valves open recycling part of the HPCI flow to the hotwell. HPCI Rev. 7 flow would be reduced to approximately 3,000 gpm at a reactor pressure of 1,150 psig and 3,800 gpm at a reactor pressure of 940 psig.

Condensate inventory is maintained at an available minimum volume of 180,000 gallons.

3.0 Design Evaluation During a loss-of-coolant accident within the drywell, Rev. 7 high drywell pressure due to a line break will cause a reactor scram.

This automatic scram will cause a turbine trip after a five-second delay.

In order to j

prevent cladding temperatures from exceeding their maximum limit for the entire spectrum of breaks, the 3800 gpm (from one train of HPCI/feedwater pumps) would have to be available immediately, feedwater flow would be available for considerable time from the shaft-driven feedwater pump.

The shaft-driven feedwater pump would coast down while the electric motor-driven condensate pumps and feedwater booster pumps would continue to operate.

The coast down time to reach 3,800 gpm delivery to the core is approximately 3.2 minutes (figure VII-17), since both the condensate and feedwater booster pumps will continue to operate on off-site power.

l The turbine trip will signal the motor-driven feedwater pump to start.

The signal will be simultaneous with the start of the shaft pump coast down.

The motor-driven feedwater pump will be up to speed and capable of supplying 3,800 gpm in about ten seconds. As a backup, low reactor water level will also signal the motor-driven pump to start.

The initiation signal transfers control from the normal feedwater to the HPCI instrumentation and controller which has been continuously tracking the normal feedwater control signal.

Thus there will be a continuous supply of feedwater to the reactor.

The HPCI single element control system will attempt to maintain reactor vessel water level at 65 inches or 72 inches (depending upon which pump, 11 or 12 respectively, is in service) with a maximum feedwater flow Ilmit of 3800 gpm.

l l

hebn&4

Vll-62 A sustained high reactor water level reactor h

protection system si nal coincident with an open g

j feedwater flow control valve will selectively trip the associated feedwater pump.

The clutch of the shaft-driven pump will also be disengaged immediately upon high reactor water level.

Should the reactor water level reach the low' level scram setpoint the motor driven pump that tripped on high reactor water level will restart.

Necessary feedwater pump recirculation is provided to allow for continued pump operation with the flow control valve closed.

As feedwater is pumped out of the condenser hotwell, through the selected equipment of the condensate and feedwater systems and into the reactor, the condenser hotwell level will fall.

Since condensed steam from the turbine no longer replenishes the condenser hotwell, condensate will be transferred from the condensate storage tanks to the hotwell for makeup.

The feedwater system pumps operate on 4160 v.

When the plant is in operation, the power is supplied from the main generator through the station service transformer when the generator is on-line and Q

connected to the grid. When the main generator is

-)

off-line, the feedwater pumps are supplied with V

normal off-site power from the 115 KV system through the reserve transformers.

If a HPCI initiation a

signal should occur, all HPC1/feedwater system pumps would start immediately with two feedwater pump trains available for HPCI injection using the single Rev. 7 element feedwater control system for reactor vessel level control.

If a major power disturbance were to occur that resulted in loss of the 115 KV power supply to the Nine Mlle Point 115 KV bus, power would be restored from a generator located at the Bennetts Bridge hydro Station. This generator would have the capacity of supplying approximately 6,000 KVA which is sufficient to operate one train of HPCI/feedwater system pumps.

If HPCI initiation were to occur, the preferred feedwater train pumps (feedwater pump 12 feedwater booster pump 13, condensate pump 13) would start. The non-preferred train pumps would be locked out on loss of off-site power arJ not start until the operator manually reset the lock out.

If a preferred train pump had been locked out prior to the loss of off-site power, it would remain locked out and the non-preferred train backup pump would automatically start on HPCI initiation.

If both the preferred and backup pumps are running, the preferred pump would h

remain in service and the backup pump will trip. The WO

I Vll-62a i

use of a Bennetts Bridge hydro generator, while not i

Q),

i equivalent to an on-site emergency power source.

Rev. 7 i

provides a highly reliable alternate off-site power supply for the HPCI function of the feedwater system.

i 4.0 Tests and Inspections t

4 Tests and inspections of the various components are described in Section XI - Steam to Power Conversion.

4 t

i i

4 1

I I

4 h

i 1

I i

i i

)

i l

)

}

l l

1I-i i

1 i

0 l

i 1

1 l

o l

--.--__,_,r...,_.

,,-......_,.._,__,._,,.r__.,_..,__..._.,,-,_..-._,..._

i.

i P9ro j

ccattacT

.ADfNilF/ED FSAR FLAR IMDioTIGEO TC T.5 Prims i/0 F5AR MML _5T po rc s IcedAL. _)I Ih Ris let,.@jf j

'Ib W _

i 05-03 V

cur 5

M 4

pk n

)

D6-02 Y

cwss 5

0 71-12.

'(

cess 5

0 y'

q Y

4

'Jt- \\ \\

Y case 5

M l

74-13 Y

cast s

k)

Y 9

l Sel-\\H Y

aosE 5

0 V

1l V

Il

/3 l

Al0-12.

Y cped Y

li U

l 40-Ol

'(

OP&h)

^

~

Y I

'lo -C'1 Y

CPE0 k\\

l 40-l)

Y 0p90 M

Y

\\.

40 -)D Y

O'EO Y

l N

~

l 40-0a Y

cnw 3) y 1

l

)2 l-ol cx3 y

so 9

v I

R)-lift N

L3 2.

l 30-31 r0 4

1. fv_r FI

[

30-52 9

M ger vs

(

00l, t -lL(

h1 Y

it Q

/

l\\

i del-lb d

A.)

fJ f

\\\\

00t. l-09 h3

~

001 1-1l C

Y

\\\\

bJ G3 04 Y

cleSE

'30 b5 V

12.

G3 06 Y

ct.ose w

k)

T te l

&D ~ l6 Y

(pb Y

8PiD bO Y

3 /11

~

00 Y

ej e

f sA7 a>-ito Y

l 20-L5 Y

60

'I opgm (00 Y

2/g i

80- %

Y

(,0 Y

0p30 60 Y

sh 1

% ~ 6*d ADY ff& gk a g 5'

+

f' g'

I' Parb

.w, peg :bsmsrato BAR F5 M Loc 0TIFleb TS T6 pglo%

ST- _ _.rb (It cyg NOTES

g 'y so vsAQ 56c41.

-<E Ju TG SvooAL- __

212-IM Y

ctcss IsD F4

'Y 11

~

Y 20\\.2 \\\\2.

Y cwSG (p0 0

\\\\

\\ M2-15 Y

ccoSG t2 Y

cwSE lo Y

A j H4.? -Ib Y

c wSE

\\8 Y

CLD56 lO

{

H

@ - ?.D Y

ct.oss So Y

CLOS &

30 Y

G l Rb-SI Y

closE 30 Y

&tosC 30 Y

5

!40-3E N'

CLoSC 50 y

cLoSE To Y

5 l 46-53 1

CLOSE SO Y

CLDSG So V

5 Y

l a.

122-03 Y

cess 30 u

Y R

I10- 12:1 N'

cLAC 20 N

t/

cl j llo-tag Y

6t.osE ao 0

! w-o?

V ctc56 60 tJ V

ie.

)

l! e-as b2 'o8 Y

cess to 0

y se y'

ccoss ko rd y

le Y

se

ht- %

Y cast cro 10

Yo-im V

cLCSE elo/70 0

Y r.,

~

^

l g>-t m y

ctosg go/;p g

y 6,

V 7

i :ois-08 ta l acl3-oct

'f

'l IJ

mi.2-as y

cass a y'

ctose c,o y

e

>ot.a-x Y

(.sasE 40 Y

aosE 40 1'

e xt.2-27 Y

ao,sE (iC 1

clo.sE 40 V

2 ot. *2.-2W Y

CL0fE Y

CLb5 f.oD f

g

-CI. 2. - M Y

C OSE b0 i

6 LOSE QO Y

g

6. 2-30 Y

clos 6 60 f

ctoIE foo Y

8 of. 2 -23

'f' cLOSG W>

f cwgE GO y

6 t01.2-2A Y

ca s OD

'Y cess (eO 9'

8

~

ANel,ws-s

PBID

.:cunnta nAR r.sM 2

.sDEA)T/ A7Eb Tc TS PgIsoTS e a,iyy N

7..._

- %AJAL_

ST

/N 7 S Sicahlq S T _.tD R P$ l %IC.

A'FSAC Y

\\\\

0 8. - b l Y

cLDb6

((D 0

jcl.1-oz Y

CLOW (b

0 Y

ti Y

ti

' 81.7-03 I

C40!E do O

~

' Cl.1 SI CL666

$0 0

f

\\\\

o n -to Y

GwW GO A) y' Is i S t.1-ll Y

L*L OGG (C0 k)

V n\\

~~

l cu t-\\\\o.

Y cast 60 0

y st oI.a m Y

closE M

10 y

s,

?4-on Y

30 Y'

30 10 m-si n

M sect e

29-5 1 t)

G 4Fer 15 le-p Y'

cc.csc Go u

Y< %

sq IM-Y CLc5E 90 D

.K W M

re-s y

closE 60 0

1. R g

MM I4 IM Y

ciME

&O M

. 0-qq y'

so Y

ss/is so a

30 V

o-u Y

so a

is ro.q3 y

Y

~

D 70 qt{

Y 7

G 16 80 17

't' Y'

O M

~~

~

~

80-12 7

Y o

17 wn y

y a

n

@-rd V

Y O

M

@-65 Y

Y O

O Ja Y

O a

Y Y'

60 V7 Y

O n

30-68 Y

y O

n j

4th d.m w / - b

~

kowseror.4W0pt_c F54R SAQ

-7IOJrlFK.D 75 75

,Pgg ysfr io r344 sta>r g io %

sl60At sr at ces me.

fo b y

70 Y

70 Q

/7

^

6 02 Y

70

'{

'70 0

In

~

to.2\\

Y 30 Y

90 U

17

~

%-22.

Y 1b Y

no M

IJ S t-0(

'1' 70 Y'

20 6J If 61-02 Y

70 Y

30 h) 19 bl-?I Y

70 Y

90 N

Id'

~

al-22.

'I 70 Y

70 IJ

//

4

O f30TES'.

O F6AP,. scAnw.EE rugse Thc. values b o opus., g/m, coue, 9

Ib b,ved.l n kla h;c Jwcl RPS.smuntsd n'<.<1 % c?u'lo e 9,<m a uA rs role s.s.s a Frasa rd(e. vi-se.

%, ila u v&a a ve mweco y,.4;< A cethv,o.o es vatwc aJ.ue a+ 6es kcad aesec/iady.

ceaJ c 7 T.es.m aow,dl olm& reaue e

y RPS sjnd le p cle.ceA.

A +llafawas.a axleavuard spw/ paup a se awWgyo,d nto uc6t rap age awm&bN+) cbau AA+v.sAuc6l We a4ejobsfA%w y

damty wMyD m6m d yuypawp.

Nu, de a a etfemusc adee ala, af ny MM aenoG l nd' chadd appan a is u.T 7y ind t.snie risia vi-2 L -

FSAR Ta6te VI-Sb dven the uulve: teelei>e & ap.s.s, pal.

s4uso rt' oe wl/es recievo es.w/ k on,0. A tO TS Table 3.3 4 u

cisol2c.she,, ens Ayu h it(e.ce +v/w.s.

Nes, du c ac<.

Ghetto Glo w.\\VG valve'b ad are a f-deed9 fes k d e x.crceapb<

F.SAR., Table. V)- 3 A. 6bM d-c/cac s/vc/<a de[cc e[ /f o4 cad 5 c Lile 7.5 r % s.a n slava w w d c4os. E'wh/

a

)

& e w et e< w & 4 ckse m g g ea m 4 6 + a a s 3

tuov-kccouse syswah stre. Not lukvid'alQ kkd a* kbl<s.

• r-Ascluwa -s

de+es

, co.a v._

FSAR. Tabl* Le skor. RPS lscjc. 40 cloSe svirl cire spraq ac{cudhht. urd8t. Ts %6(e 5.23 cic..ved.

F6 AR. TA6 % dsws,(u.c.e valver calyd et 70 ced auJ oo u w sr>oA %.

% va/ws ska/c/

alu 9 y e s.o rs raWe.u.<i.

Psza iwnc. dc e s4m Au cu/<<s <ooteve a res si uac{ kosoavev-FSAR Rble R-eL au J

% mL/e s.3.<<

AtI h ave /4 'he pese t rafrav.cx,,J rheL :Ma.

i r@D

%e value aee cv.k w s(o v~lv<s cv/ed ym

.v s

ruve r uc 2r-i h.

% u\\ses om av us, a+

a (w ix+oa ) appew i;u Tr ML/c u.a.

7s a vile <,

l It a v, pts / Ale. do ct,wayaaf /sema wu'u un/m au IcIt<tl*l'.th i.stywellheeCl de.s/ [A)t snGC) c /Z.o ccep/ wet s

c< % a..

l rs a w. r a t,_ n - u _ tsk w n R P S l e ic. J o clo e la v e vre.

TS Tak ?. 2.7 cho wf 6fid, duse va(va-s Mac, veclues(m)

<ttptar tro MDCl2% C vih >x RPS Inic adde h aec Ikdf<J con 4 Res I,,pe_. oc Pa 2 ctvonc..

%e valaes ave deac(iyse l.<d <wci t u. rc ic.,J ci, y,rprud.c t

FLAe sceh% cAzewM u veuked -/s refled rfus c6oga.

)

}fIfac/i,,esb-5

l I,iJ0Tgb

) GOOT.

b

)

)

!O The.44_ valves <tre k_l<=fdtel em PBID cl@4c.

cit. (

RPG \\ch c. Ve4 cIe No15 afpute su /3AR i

% recieviok j

7tble El-56 n. 76 Table S.3 4, FSAR. Tee Ilt-% clno RPS lo<f c., do c/ese bwever i

l TS TAl<. 3.?,4 cha <> cf ideecf/& edw. valves,C+%k Cwucibe Awd Met 2Att. Ao+7'5/#/t),

f fr#gtA4A P

l Pa ro aeces c 5/st.1. Aw forJ l59 c

• c lo c e

/

l yed r#e 00+ k.kwfid 10 T5<n. FLAh..

Alse

& Idadilitcl N ~LST Preegnant.

l FSAR.To.ble.E-26 s.k RPS (s>jic-b cbte Iw0s v.4.

l T6 TnWe 3.3 4 ch aest /clut2[t.f t6uc t,w/vr5 4/

/ so,

& p1dcttht44. S oeo TS testd 1AD DI-ST-QG, kt cledJ Jte$ Jk'/SY; )

l st44ef>ltnet* cr>ik/kh b

I T su t/a(t/t.s & A.kp*f A yttar 90 clMichrys c/fG/t/c.

t l

asIcleu#4'sd<;o.15Tt % t.

dQ Wed 140 Mi-ST-&7 toftA 1sTpeup>huce las l

snaaa f w a..

AJo w ie m is oles k n c

idad$ed.

4 h FSAR.EI-Ic ideuAiftes

-tdem valves as cri4evioc r7 l

w.\\ves.

TG Titble 1;.'s.t ?cL4!fvs 1Atae values x,.c beA l

)

cc,% u,,a sb u d c7 valve.c TQ is P vsidv wpuale.

L SecondIr; due. m ises ue 00+ deste-)do of thet ceden'ou.

i N {h

,. _ __a

_4_A_Am.

a.

A u,

J 4_

m.a_

d

__m.__.

__m A__

a_._

A

_A2.

w.__._._A a

__.,_,-____-,_a

__,,,_.w-.,

h ce w

\\h FGA9. TAlale E-3 b ctwc3 76 Tcf ble

3. T,el

/cb4i[t'[tf duc v dves as celbien sc. valves lwoevcle e

nr.e.eF Q Aes.kA accorduck.

4 4

i

)

i

)

- -