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=Text=
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{{#Wiki_filter:.. -         - -. --.-.~..
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                      -                      -....--          .-.    .-~.             -~~~-           - --    -- -~---~     --- .
- -. --.-.~..
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l g                                                                    UNITED STATES l                  -#g merug'q,,                               NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f
-~~~-
e
-- -~---~
                                      ,                                        REGloN 11                                             l j                                                                  101 MAReETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2B0D                               i E                                                   ATLANTA. GEORGIA 303Do180 k                                                           April 12, 1996
l i.
,                              MEMORANDUM TO:       Eugene V. Imbro, Project Directorate l                                                     Division of Reactor Projects I/II, NRR                   .
-#g merug'q,,
3                                                                                                                                       .
UNITED STATES g
i                               FRON:                 Ellis W. Merschoff, Director Division of Reactor Projects
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
f REGloN 11 101 MAReETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2B0D i
j e
E ATLANTA. GEORGIA 303Do180 k
April 12, 1996 MEMORANDUM TO:
Eugene V. Imbro, Project Directorate l
Division of Reactor Projects I/II, NRR 3
i FRON:
Ellis W. Merschoff, Director Division of Reactor Projects


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
THE REGULATORY ACCEPTABILITY OF PRELUBRICA NG VALVES PRIOR
THE REGULATORY ACCEPTABILITY OF PRELUBRICA NG VALVES PRIOR TO SURVEILLANCE (STROKE) TESTING (TIA 96-0 7) 1 l
;                                                    TO SURVEILLANCE (STROKE) TESTING (TIA 96-0 7) 1 l                             St. Lucie Inspection Report 50-335,389/95-15, Section 3.f.1, documented an s            .                occurrence in which the licensee lubricated a containment spray flow control
St. Lucie Inspection Report 50-335,389/95-15, Section 3.f.1, documented an occurrence in which the licensee lubricated a containment spray flow control s
:                              valve prior to ASME Section XI stroke time testing. This pre-lubrication was
valve prior to ASME Section XI stroke time testing. This pre-lubrication was called for in the licensee's surveillance test procedure and was meant to L
!                              called for in the licensee's surveillance test procedure and was meant to L                             ensure a satisfactory stroke time test. The inspectors, and members of the
ensure a satisfactory stroke time test.
:                              licensee's~ quality organization, found that this practice resulted in a nonrepresentative test of valve capabilities. Since the event, personnel from l
The inspectors, and members of the licensee's~ quality organization, found that this practice resulted in a nonrepresentative test of valve capabilities. Since the event, personnel from l
Region II and OE have attempted to find explicit prohibitions against such
Region II and OE have attempted to find explicit prohibitions against such preconditioning, but without success. Consequently, we propose the following j
,                              preconditioning, but without success. Consequently, we propose the following                           j i                             questions:                                                                                               <
i questions:
i                                                                                                                                       l
i 1.
: 1. Is the practice of lubricating a valve prior to stroke time                                 l testing acceptable under the regulations?
Is the practice of lubricating a valve prior to stroke time testing acceptable under the regulations?
: 2. Is the purpose of stroke time testing under ASME Section XI to                             l demonstrate the current and past operability of a valve, the                               !
2.
current and future operability of a valve, or both?                                       )
Is the purpose of stroke time testing under ASME Section XI to demonstrate the current and past operability of a valve, the current and future operability of a valve, or both?
This request has been discussed with J. Norris of the NRR staff. If you have any questions concerning this request, please contact M. Miller (407-464-7822) or K. Landis (407-331-5509).                                                                             l Docket No. 50-335/389                                                                                     i License No. DPR-67/NFP-16 cc:   R. Cooper, RI W. Axelson, RIII J. Dyer, RIV K. Perkins, WCFO J. Barnes, RII p
)
l 3 FA2. I no NRC FILE CENTER C n20105 Q&osom disTC .                                                                                               O$
This request has been discussed with J. Norris of the NRR staff.
If you have any questions concerning this request, please contact M. Miller (407-464-7822) or K. Landis (407-331-5509).
Docket No. 50-335/389 License No. DPR-67/NFP-16 cc:
R. Cooper, RI W. Axelson, RIII J. Dyer, RIV K. Perkins, WCFO J. Barnes, RII p
l 3 FA2.
no NRC FILE CENTER C n20105 Q&osom disTC.
O$


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                  . ~~~~ g /a u m .             ,                Semiannual    lant Performance Assessmert - Sr.: ym a *"                                       /',j''
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(.;         . .. w Current SALP Assessment Period: 1/7/96 through 6/97                                       --5r prg C m y/ * /
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Last SALP Rating             Previous SALP Rating               M / d /M ['f f f #/                               '
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1/2/94 - 1/6/96             5/3/92 - 1/1/94                     g g4 Operations                        2                                                                                    fu9-f /J '-
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P1 ant Support                   1                           1                         _
o Semiannual lant Performance Assessmert - Sr.:
                                                                                                                                          /
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I.         Performance Overview                                                                                         ,
(.;
Y       -
... w Current SALP Assessment Period: 1/7/96 through 6/97
b ine= Aly199btherehavebeenabriesofevent3thatledto                                                                                       l questioning the plant's overall performance.                             Inese have included:                                   j e          A Unit l' turbine trip due to precedural weaknesses,                                                                   i D                         poor operator performance, and weak s::pervisory oversight.                                                                                                             )
--5r prg C m y/ * /
                                      .          The attempt to restage an RCP seal using inadequate and inappropriate procedural guidance. The evolution was compounded by failing to follow aspects of the guidance that did exist, which led to the failure of the second and third stage seals.                                                                 !
Last SALP Rating Previous SALP Rating M / d /M ['f f f #/
                                      .          A main steam isolation signal due to an operator failing to block the MSIS signal during a cooldown when an annunciator indicated
1/2/94 - 1/6/96 5/3/92 - 1/1/94 g g4 g Tp fu9-f /J '-
                        }                         that the block was enabled. This failure occurred despite the fact that the operator's attention was directed to the annunciator on at lesst two different occasions.                                                                                   ;
Operations 2
                                      .          Both pressurizer power operated relief valves being found p'                           inoperable due to incorrect assembly during a refueling outage.
1 Maintenance 2
1 Engineering 1
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Performance Overview Y
b ine= Aly199btherehavebeenabriesofevent3thatledto questioning the plant's overall performance.
Inese have included:
j A Unit l' turbine trip due to precedural weaknesses, i
e D
poor operator performance, and weak s::pervisory oversight.
)
The attempt to restage an RCP seal using inadequate and inappropriate procedural guidance. The evolution was compounded by failing to follow aspects of the guidance that did exist, which led to the failure of the second and third stage seals.
A main steam isolation signal due to an operator failing to block the MSIS signal during a cooldown when an annunciator indicated
}
that the block was enabled.
This failure occurred despite the fact that the operator's attention was directed to the annunciator on at lesst two different occasions.
Both pressurizer power operated relief valves being found p'
inoperable due to incorrect assembly during a refueling outage.
The conditions had existed for approximately 10 months (SL3,CP).
The conditions had existed for approximately 10 months (SL3,CP).
* An-loss of RCS inventory (4000 gallons) due to a shutdown cooling                                                       l
An-loss of RCS inventory (4000 gallons) due to a shutdown cooling relief valve which lifted and then failed to reseat due to incorrect setpoint' margins (a generic problem involving several valves). The licensee had sufficient evidence that this generic condition existed, but had failed to act promptly to evaluate the
                      -,                          relief valve which lifted and then failed to reseat due to incorrect setpoint' margins (a generic problem involving several valves). The licensee had sufficient evidence that this generic condition existed, but had failed to act promptly to evaluate the
~~~
                                                                                      ~~~
conditions (SL4).
conditions (SL4).                                                                                                        .
The spraydown of containment due to an inadequate procedure and operator error coupled with an existing operator-work-around.
                                      .            The spraydown of containment due to an inadequate procedure and                                                         l operator error coupled with an existing operator-work-around.                                                         l 1
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i


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3 .                                                                                                       ;
3.I.
I.                                                                                                         !
The significant operator inattentiveness which resulted in the
!                        .      The significant operator inattentiveness which resulted in the             ;
$y -
!          $y -               overdilution event on January 22, 1996, highlighted the recent             ;
overdilution event on January 22, 1996, highlighted the recent i
i                              large number of personnel errors and lack of command and control           i j                               in the control room.
large number of personnel errors and lack of command and control i
;                      These and several other recent deficiencies involvin6ak procedure 3 a             I
j in the control room.
:                      general lack of procedural compliance, equipment failures, and personnel           j errors clearly indicated : hat the plant's past high level of performance _
These and several other recent deficiencies involvin6ak procedure 3 a I
;                      had declined. An NRC[roo; causf ettort cetermineft' fin ~Tn7ddition lo             i
general lack of procedural compliance, equipment failures, and personnel j
!                      procedural adherencelanaguacy_wghnessa_m     z  tha licensee suffered from       ,
errors clearly indicated
;-                      weaknesses in both (f5terfaces across organizationap lines and corrective
: hat the plant's past high level of performance _
:                      actions.
had declined. An NRC[roo; causf ettort cetermineft' fin ~Tn7ddition lo i
i.-             II. Functional Area Assessments                                                       ,
procedural adherencelanaguacy_wghnessa_m tha licensee suffered from z
i L                     A SALP board convened on January 18, 1996.       The board concluded that the l                       licensee's performance in the areas of Operations and Maintenance had
weaknesses in both (f5terfaces across organizationap lines and corrective actions.
: i.                     declined from excellent levels of performance to good levels. The                   ,
i.-
!                      conclusions reached by the board are summarized below.
II.
i 2                     Operations
Functional Area Assessments i
.-                    The board determined that safety performance in the Operations area had             l
L A SALP board convened on January 18, 1996.
!                      declined, particularly in the final six months of the assessment period.           l
The board concluded that the l
!                      As bases, the board noted an increase in the number of operational                 !
licensee's performance in the areas of Operations and Maintenance had i.
[                     events attributable to:                                                             i
declined from excellent levels of performance to good levels. The conclusions reached by the board are summarized below.
!                                                                                                          l 4
i 2
                      =      Weaknesses in operator performance-       .
Operations The board determined that safety performance in the Operations area had l
                                                                                -                          i
declined, particularly in the final six months of the assessment period.
'                      .      Acceptance of long-standing equipment deficiencies                           j
l As bases, the board noted an increase in the number of operational
                      .      Management expectations were not effectively communicated to                 I personnel and enforced l
[
                      .      Weaknesses in procedural adequacy and adherence
events attributable to:
                      .      Implementation and adequacy of corrective actions
i Weaknesses in operator performance-i
!                    The licensee und:rtook a number of efforts to reverse declining
=
:                    performance following the onset of the operational events described i                     above. Verbatim procedural compliance was established as the norm for
4 Acceptance of long-standing equipment deficiencies j
;                    the site, which resulted in the need for literally hundreds of                       !
Management expectations were not effectively communicated to personnel and enforced l
l                    procedural changes and around-the-clock on-site review committee                     1 meetings. An increased emphasis on the initiation of corrective action
Weaknesses in procedural adequacy and adherence Implementation and adequacy of corrective actions The licensee und:rtook a number of efforts to reverse declining performance following the onset of the operational events described i
!                    documentation resulted in an increase in the number of documents
above.
: j.                   initiated, but has also resulted in increases in backlogs.                         ,
Verbatim procedural compliance was established as the norm for the site, which resulted in the need for literally hundreds of l
l Maintenance The board determined that performance in this area declined during the               ,
procedural changes and around-the-clock on-site review committee 1
previous assessment period. However, the board found that six unit                   :
meetings. An increased emphasis on the initiation of corrective action documentation resulted in an increase in the number of documents j.
i[                   trips which occurred during the period had roots in maintenance, Weaknesses identified by the board included:
initiated, but has also resulted in increases in backlogs.
i
Maintenance The board determined that performance in this area declined during the previous assessment period. However, the board found that six unit i[
                      .      Inadequate post-maintenance testing
trips which occurred during the period had roots in maintenance, Weaknesses identified by the board included:
                      .      Procedural adequacy and adherence
Inadequate post-maintenance testing Procedural adequacy and adherence Instability in management due to acting managers while the maintenance manager received SRO training j.
* Instability in management due to acting managers while the maintenance manager received SRO training I
j.
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4                               - - , - - . , . -mry---   ,  , _ _    y
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i i       .                                                                                                                                      i
i i
;                                                                                                                                                i
i i
:                                              The board indicated that the. current stability of the maintenance                               !
The board indicated that the. current stability of the maintenance
[                                               management appeared to be reversing the observed negative trends.
[
Engineering
management appeared to be reversing the observed negative trends.
!                                              The board found that engineering had sustained a superior level of.
Engineering The board found that engineering had sustained a superior level of.
i                                               performance. Support to both operations and maintenance, the quality l                                               and support of design modifications, and initiatives to reduce the numbers of operator workarounds and jumpers / lifted leads we seen as                             ,
i performance.
i'                                              strengths. Licensee submittals to the NRC were noted to be of high                               l
Support to both operations and maintenance, the quality l
]                                             quality, as were safety evaluations.
and support of design modifications, and initiatives to reduce the i '
:                                              Plant Support i
numbers of operator workarounds and jumpers / lifted leads we seen as strengths.
]                                             The board found that plant support organizations collectively perfomed i                                             at a superior level. Area breakdowns were as follows:
Licensee submittals to the NRC were noted to be of high
"
]
* Health Physics was identified as having strong management support
quality, as were safety evaluations.
;                                                    and initiatives such as remote monitoring and electronic dosimetry j                                                     were seen as strengths. Reductions in the areas of contaminated j                                                     floor space and the volume of solid waste were also' noted.
Plant Support i
;
]
* Security was cited as maintaining an excellent level of i
The board found that plant support organizations collectively perfomed i
performance-during staff reductions due to the implementation of biometrics. Training, including the use of a combat firing range,
at a superior level. Area breakdowns were as follows:
:                                                    and self-assessments were considered good.                 Some performance i                                                     problems were noted through the period, however, including two failures to provide compensatory measures during computer failures.
Health Physics was identified as having strong management support and initiatives such as remote monitoring and electronic dosimetry j
l                                             =      Fire Protection performed well in both drills and in responding to                         l l                                                    plant fires; however, surveillance testing observations indicated l                                                     weak procedures, poor. attention to detail, and hardware
were seen as strengths. Reductions in the areas of contaminated j
;                                                    deficiencies.                                                                              .
floor space and the volume of solid waste were also' noted.
4                                                                                                                                                 I
Security was cited as maintaining an excellent level of performance-during staff reductions due to the implementation of i
                                              .      Emergency preparedness was considered good, and the status of
biometrics. Training, including the use of a combat firing range, and self-assessments were considered good.
,                                                    equipment and supplies were found to be adequate. The full participation exercise was successful.
Some performance i
l-i i
problems were noted through the period, however, including two failures to provide compensatory measures during computer failures.
4 i
l Fire Protection performed well in both drills and in responding to
l J
=
l plant fires; however, surveillance testing observations indicated l
weak procedures, poor. attention to detail, and hardware deficiencies.
4 Emergency preparedness was considered good, and the status of equipment and supplies were found to be adequate.
The full l-participation exercise was successful.
i i
4 l
i J
)
)
3 1                                                                                                                                                 2
3 1
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2
- =.,. _.


PERCENT POWER (%)
PERCENT POWER (%)
m M     4       m                             a                                         o o o   o       o                             o                                         o 1/94e         :    :        ;                                ;
m M
2/94'ie 3/94 i=                                                                                                                 W 4/94!!                                                                                                         ~       d-i                                   5/94 i                                                                                                                   F c_ m                                                     6/943::                                                                                                                0
4 m
      >=
a o
Il 7/94 =       z o
o o
o zc l0                                                                  o                                                                                                        g EC                                                         8/94 !       rri                                             s                                          e
o o
    <o                                                        9/941        m                =
o o
                                                                                                                                                                          %            d
1/94e 2/94'ie 3/94 i W
  $m                                                10/94 !                $                                                                                                        3 EO                                              11/94 3                s.                                                                                              =
d-
H 0T                                              12/94 2 5$                                                          1/95 !        $                                                                                                        Z
=
    @h                                                        2/95 !        _3,
4/94!!
                                                                              =                                                                                                        >
~
oO z                                                          3/95 g      :
i 5/94 i F
g                                                                                                ~
c_ m 6/943 0
p 42                                                            4/95 l        g                                                                                                        *t Eg                                                        5/95 l          l                                                                                                        C EO                                                        6/95 "          gi-                                                                                                      M
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>=
O M
Il z l0 7/94 o
Py                                                                                                                                                                    i.
z c
gz                                                        8/95 j                                                                                                    -e m
=
E -Q                                                      9/95 l                                                                                                                    w 10/95 j 11/95 j                                        -
o g
12/95 ,i                                                                                                                                            ;
EC 8/94 !
1/96 a!                                                                                                  4 2/96:                                                                                                                                    -
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i DESCRIPTION OF EVENT 8 - ST. LUCIE UNIT 1
i DESCRIPTION OF EVENT 8 - ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 1.
: 1. On January 9,           the unit was manually tripped in response to a loss of the.1B MFWP.                                                   '
On January 9, the unit was manually tripped in response to a loss of the.1B MFWP.
: 2. The unit tripped from loss of load when the generator excitor circuit breaker was                                                             t inadvertently opened locally on March 28, 1994 -                                                                                             '
2.
i
The unit tripped from loss of load when the generator excitor circuit breaker was t
: 3. On June 6,       1994, the unit experienced a main generator lockout, followed by turbine and                                                 !
inadvertently opened locally on March 28, 1994 -
reactor trips, when a thunderstorm blew a section of flashing across two output                                                               :
i 3.
terminals of main transformer 1A.                                                                                                           !
On June 6, 1994, the unit experienced a main generator lockout, followed by turbine and reactor trips, when a thunderstorm blew a section of flashing across two output terminals of main transformer 1A.
: 4. Power was reduced to 80% power on August 10, 1994, due to Digital Electro-Hydraulic System (DEH) leak. ~ The unit was returned to full power on August 23, 1994.                                                                 ;
4.
The turbine was taken of line on. August 28, 1994, to repair a leak in the DEH. Repairs
Power was reduced to 80% power on August 10, 1994, due to Digital Electro-Hydraulic f
: 5.
System (DEH) leak. ~ The unit was returned to full power on August 23, 1994.
* were completed and the unit returned to power on the afternoon of August 28, 1994. The                                                     .i unit was returned to full power on September 2, 1994.                                                                                         I r
5.
: 6. The unit tripped as the result of a lighting strike in the switch'Jard on October 26,                                                       !
The turbine was taken of line on. August 28, 1994, to repair a leak in the DEH.
1994. Since the unit was scheduled to start a refueling outage on October 31, 1994, a                                                     j decision was made to start the refueling outage
Repairs were completed and the unit returned to power on the afternoon of August 28, 1994.
: 7. On February 27,             1995, the unit was removed from service for the replacement of pressurizer code safety valves which had been leaking by the seat since shortly after                                                       ;
The
startup in November, 1994.                             The unit was returned to power on March 8,               1995.
.i unit was returned to full power on September 2, 1994.
: 8. On July 8, 1995, the unit tripped during                                         turbine valve surveillance testing. The unit               l was returned to power on July 12, 1995.
I r
: 9. On August 1, 1995, . the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane Erin.                                     Due to a series               ,
6.
of equipment problems and personnel performance issues the unit remained shutdown until October 9, 1995.                                                                                                                             [
The unit tripped as the result of a lighting strike in the switch'Jard on October 26, 1994.
: 10. On November 17, 1995, the unit was manually tripped due to low steam gene rator level when the feed regulating valve failed to mid position.                                                                                       ;
Since the unit was scheduled to start a refueling outage on October 31, 1994, a j
                                                                                                                                                  ?
decision was made to start the refueling outage 7.
On February 27, 1995, the unit was removed from service for the replacement of pressurizer code safety valves which had been leaking by the seat since shortly after startup in November, 1994.
The unit was returned to power on March 8, 1995.
8.
On July 8, 1995, the unit tripped during turbine valve surveillance testing.
The unit l
was returned to power on July 12, 1995.
9.
On August 1, 1995,. the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane Erin.
Due to a series of equipment problems and personnel performance issues the unit remained shutdown until
[
October 9, 1995.
10.
On November 17, 1995, the unit was manually tripped due to low steam gene rator level
(
when the feed regulating valve failed to mid position.
?


ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 - SALP CYCLE 11 1                                           3                                                           4             5                       6           7 100'm                                                                                                                 ;"            =
ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 - SALP CYCLE 11 i
i
1 3
  -  go _,      ,
4 5
se v
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E IM 3   60 -
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O                                                       -                                                                                    .
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E                                                             NOTE: See attached page fo i event camments ud                                                                                                 .                                                                          .
O D.
0- 20 -
I-Z 40 si IM t
i 1111111111ti umununutun   11111111lll11111111111lli i intillin Ilit tittlitullin ninnluninnt n!!!!in uniintillli t.Jinntunlinnuimininnuununma==i ilnistilful!!Iltn nimtununmurmn i nruti teetweetentemmmmmmmmmmmmee 4
2 O
CD On 03 CD CD (D CD CD On On CD On On 03 03 01 03 On On 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 T - N M 4 m W N m On O i-- N v- N M e m e N W On O v- N v- N                                                                                                                                 ,
f E
v- v         v--                                                                   v- v- v-PERIOD OF OPERATION (MONTHLY)
NOTE: See attached page fo i event camments t
                                                .lANilARY 2.1994 THROUGH JANUARY 8,1996                                                                                                               i
ud 0-20 i
f 1111111111ti umununutun 11111111lll11111111111lli i intillin Ilit tittlitullin ninnluninnt n!!!!in uniintillli t.Jinntunlinnuimininnuununma==i ilnistilful!!Iltn nimtununmurmn i nruti teetweetentemmmmmmmmmmmmee CD On 03 CD CD (D CD CD On On CD On On 03 03 01 03 On On 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 4
T - N M 4 m W N m On O i-- N v-N M e m e N W On O v-N v-N v-v v--
v-v- v-PERIOD OF OPERATION (MONTHLY)
.lANilARY 2.1994 THROUGH JANUARY 8,1996 i


DESCRIPTION OF ava-a. - ST LUCIE UNIT 2-
DESCRIPTION OF ava-a. - ST LUCIE UNIT 2-1.
: 1. On February 27, 1994, the unit was coasting down to-the cycle 8 refueling outage.                                                                         The unit was taken.off-line on February 14, 1994.
On February 27, 1994, the unit was coasting down to-the cycle 8 refueling outage.
: 2. On April 23, 1994, the unit. tripped from.30% power during RPS adjustment.
The unit was taken.off-line on February 14, 1994.
: 3. The unit 2 turbine was shutdown on July 9, 1994, and reactor power reduced to                                                                     Mode 2 on July 10, 1994. On July 14, 1994, the unit was shutdown to repair a stuck closed trip
2.
* circuit breaker. The unit was restarted and placed'on line on July 15, 1994.
On April 23, 1994, the unit. tripped from.30% power during RPS adjustment.
: 4. On February 21, 1995, the unit tripped as a result of low steam generator water level.                                                                                 1 The condition was the result of a feedwater regulating valve closure after a steam                                                                                     ,
3.
generator water level control level transmitter failed high.                                                               The transmitter was replaced and the unit was returned to service on February 25, 1995.                                                                                                     !
The unit 2 turbine was shutdown on July 9, 1994, and reactor power reduced to Mode 2 on July 10, 1994.
1
On July 14, 1994, the unit was shutdown to repair a stuck closed trip circuit breaker.
: 5. On April-25, 1995, the main generator was taken of line to repair a faulty power supply                                                                                 ,
The unit was restarted and placed'on line on July 15, 1994.
in the DEH system.
4.
: 6. On August 1, 1995, the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane Erin. It was restarted on August 4, 1995.                                                                                                                                                     ;
On February 21, 1995, the unit tripped as a result of low steam generator water level.
: 7. On October 9,                                 1995, the unit.was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage.                                                         l
1 The condition was the result of a feedwater regulating valve closure after a steam generator water level control level transmitter failed high.
: 8. On January 1, 1996, the unit went critical.
The transmitter was l
: 9. On January 5, 1996, a manual trip was initiated on high generator hydrogen temperature.                                                                               ,
replaced and the unit was returned to service on February 25, 1995.
1 5.
On April-25, 1995, the main generator was taken of line to repair a faulty power supply in the DEH system.
l 6.
On August 1, 1995, the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane Erin. It was restarted on August 4, 1995.
7.
On October 9, 1995, the unit.was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage.
l 8.
On January 1, 1996, the unit went critical.
9.
On January 5, 1996, a manual trip was initiated on high generator hydrogen temperature.
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UPLOAD TO R:\\PLTDATA\\ MATRIX \\STLUCIE.SIM February 7s 1996 ST LUCIE Site Intearation Matrix Date Satp Ref.
_y
Cause Idemified Description F. A.
                            $        iag      :
1/23/96 MS IR 9641 Electrical arc during Self-Identifying Blown fuse results in loss of erpmximately 25% of maisenance control room annunciators.
8 ge as j    gr      g
1/22/96 OPS IR 96-01 Operator Error Self-Idemifying _
                                              -~
panel while dilution was in prognes.
w If e~
Bomn dilution event due to gerator leaving commi l/5/96 OPS /M IR 95-22 Temp Corarol valve Licensee U-2 manual RXtrip on high generator H tenip due to i
c, jg dm a
S Failure failure of temp comrd volve.
Il e
1/5/96 OPS IR 95-22 Inadequate Procedum NRC Several procedural deficiencies and calculatenal Review and Execution errors idersiSed in reload physics test procedure.
rE  ,.-               i-i4 E
1/5/96 OPS /
is              si      8 I
R 95-22 Failure to Properly NRC Severni deficiencies in procedure change procesa PS NCV 95-22-01 Inglement Procedures implementation idemiSed-Expired or canceled TCs faimd in contml rooms and bot shutdown panel.
                        !*  !?      35      . *t O          ~
12/27/95 OPS IR 95-22 Lack of Attendance at self Identifying FRG meeting suffered /itema deferred due to lack of FRG OPS /Eng*g auendance at meeting. Majorisones at meeting effected OPS /Eng*g.
E!
12/20/95 MS IR 95-22 Pitting -Imalized Self Identifying RXvessel flange inner 0-ring gmove pitting resulted in Corrosion cooldown and head removal for repair.
                        .. Y.      - !,N      ji_
12/9/95 MS IR 95-22 Filling RCS Before Ucensee 2A2 RCP seal pkg lower seal destaged due to reverse Coupling RCP pressure across seal.
J                su  3 8    e      ;
12/5/95 OPS /M IR 95-22 Poor Legkeeping/Atta NRC ESFAS cabinet doors found unlocked followmg S
3                    :
to Detail maintenance work -IACermr. leg entries associated with work were not corglete.
s            '
12/1/95 PS IR 95-21 Failure to Document NRC Red survey tesults unavailaole for B hat leg work.
b-i                                             '
RADSurvey Surveys performed but not documemed 12/1/95 OPS IR 95-21 Corrective Actions NRC Followup to presious mspecten findings indicated a weakness in foIIM 4. in addressing de6ciencies.
s      :                                        1
12/1/95 OPS IR 95-21 Procedural Inadequacy NRC SDC Procedure required natural circ-related surveillance prior to establish *mg RCS pressure boundary. Natural cire not possible without pressurization.
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UPLOAD TO R:\PLTDATA\ MATRIX \STLUCIE.SIM February 7s 1996 ST LUCIE Site Intearation Matrix Date  Satp        Ref.            Cause      Idemified                                        Description F. A.
12/1/95 OPS R 95-21 FTF Procedure NRC Rzcurrem nwrahd alarms when seernag fire pumpe were not documemed as operator workarounds-Voltage dire sesociated wish such somete were comributors to e trip previously.
1/23/96  MS    IR 9641      Electrical arc during Self-Identifying      Blown fuse results in loss of erpmximately 25% of maisenance                                  control room annunciators.
g ' 1f95 OPS R 95-21 Poor Corrective Actione NRC Cleerence in place to isolete Nrfrom CST to facilmene pressure switch replacement for nine days wnhout work order being wriaen.
1/22/96  OPS    IR 96-01    Operator Error        Self-Idemifying _      Bomn dilution event due to gerator leaving commi panel while dilution was in prognes.
12/1/95 OPS R 95-21 FTF Procedure NRC CCW aseple volve showed dual indication wahaut corrective action -f _ -
l/5/96  OPS /M IR 95-22    Temp Corarol valve    Licensee              U-2 manual RXtrip on high generator Hi tenip due to S                  Failure                                      failure of temp comrd volve.
: -- initiated.
1/5/96  OPS    IR 95-22    Inadequate Procedum  NRC                    Several procedural deficiencies and calculatenal Review and Execution                        errors idersiSed in reload physics test procedure.
12/1/95 z OPS R 95 Inadequate Operator NRC OperMore unable to effectively obtain IACseapoonee Training from computer aher hard copies were naioved froen control recen.
1/5/96  OPS /  R 95-22      Failure to Properly  NRC                    Severni deficiencies in procedure change procesa PS    NCV 95-22-01 Inglement Procedures                        implementation idemiSed- Expired or canceled TCs faimd in contml rooms and bot shutdown panel.
12/l/95 OPS R 95-21 Procedural wealtnese/
12/27/95 OPS    IR 95-22    Lack of Attendance at self Identifying      FRG meeting suffered /itema deferred due to lack of FRG                                          OPS /Eng*g auendance at meeting. Majorisones at meeting effected OPS /Eng*g.
NRC SDC procedure comenmed contheting values for RX Inadequate Review cavity level requerennente Procedure had been approved since emphesse on occuracy seresend 12/1/95' OPS R 95-21 Velve Poortion NRC Unit 2 g wedures and valve devisesos log used to Adnunistrative Comrole cycle Unit I crose commect velves.
12/20/95 MS    IR 95-22    Pitting -Imalized    Self Identifying      RXvessel flange inner 0-ring gmove pitting resulted in Corrosion                                    cooldown and head removal for repair.
11/27/95 OPS R 95-21 Personnel Error Lscensee Miemed RCS Boroa eengle survedlemee -Repeat Som VIO 95-21-03 R 95-18 11/21/95 OPS R 95 FTF Procedure Licensee Failure to mensein Penetreuen I.mg NCV 95-21-04 11/21/95' OPS R 95-21 Egenpmes Failure Self Memifying Light sucket failure durig leap replacement resuhe in lose cooling to I A Main Treneformer Unit dowspawer to ~60%.
12/9/95  MS    IR 95-22    Filling RCS Before    Ucensee                2A2 RCP seal pkg lower seal destaged due to reverse Coupling RCP                                pressure across seal.
II/20/95 OPS R 95-2i FTF Procedure NRC Velve discovered Closed vice Imched th=d se VIO 95-2141 speci6ed on
12/5/95  OPS /M IR 95-22    Poor Legkeeping/Atta  NRC                    ESFAS cabinet doors found unlocked followmg S                  to Detail                                    maintenance work -IACermr. leg entries associated with work were not corglete.
12/1/95 PS    IR 95-21    Failure to Document  NRC                    Red survey tesults unavailaole for B hat leg work.
RADSurvey                                    Surveys performed but not documemed 12/1/95  OPS    IR 95-21    Corrective Actions    NRC                    Followup to presious mspecten findings indicated a weakness in foIIM 4. in addressing de6ciencies.
12/1/95  OPS    IR 95-21    Procedural Inadequacy NRC                    SDC Procedure required natural circ-related surveillance prior to establish *mg RCS pressure boundary. Natural cire not possible without pressurization.
 
12/1/95  OPS   R 95-21     FTF Procedure           NRC                   Rzcurrem nwrahd alarms when seernag fire pumpe were not documemed as operator workarounds-Voltage dire sesociated wish such somete were comributors to e trip previously.
g ' 1f95 OPS   R 95-21     Poor Corrective Actione NRC                 Cleerence in place to isolete Nrfrom CST to facilmene pressure switch replacement for nine days wnhout work order being wriaen.
12/1/95   OPS   R 95-21     FTF Procedure           NRC                 CCW aseple volve showed dual indication wahaut corrective action -f _ -       : -- initiated.
12/1/95 z OPS   R 95   Inadequate Operator     NRC                 OperMore unable to effectively obtain IACseapoonee Training                                     from computer aher hard copies were naioved froen control recen.
12/l/95   OPS   R 95-21     Procedural wealtnese/   NRC                 SDC procedure comenmed contheting values for RX Inadequate Review                           cavity level requerennente Procedure had been approved since emphesse on occuracy seresend 12/1/95' OPS   R 95-21     Velve Poortion         NRC                 Unit 2 g wedures and valve devisesos log used to Adnunistrative Comrole                       cycle Unit I crose commect velves.
11/27/95 OPS   R 95-21     Personnel Error         Lscensee             Miemed RCS Boroa eengle survedlemee -Repeat Som VIO 95-21-03                                             R 95-18 11/21/95 OPS   R 95   FTF Procedure           Licensee             Failure to mensein Penetreuen I.mg NCV 95-21-04 11/21/95' OPS   R 95-21     Egenpmes Failure       Self Memifying       Light sucket failure durig leap replacement resuhe in lose cooling to I A Main Treneformer Unit dowspawer to ~60%.
II/20/95 OPS   R 95-2i     FTF Procedure           NRC                 Velve discovered Closed vice Imched th=d se VIO 95-2141                                               speci6ed on
* Clearance Order.
* Clearance Order.
I1/16/95 OPS /M R 95-21     tong-Standmg           Self             _
I1/16/95 OPS /M R 95-21 tong-Standmg Self Unit I manually tripped when IB MFRViocked in 50%
Unit I manually tripped when IB MFRViocked in 50%
- -J-Problem Idemifying/ Licensee poonson Root cause -degraded power supply,
                              *~
*~
          $                          - -J- Problem   Idemifying/ Licensee poonson Root cause -degraded power supply, eq             by volenge dip on eteense boek semaine fue pumps.
eq by volenge dip on eteense boek semaine fue pumps.
11/11/95 OPS   R 95-21     FTF Procedure           NRC                 Tech. Spec. egepmem not specified for IVon VIO 95-21-02                                             Equipament clearance Order.
11/11/95 OPS R 95-21 FTF Procedure NRC Tech. Spec. egepmem not specified for IVon VIO 95-21-02 Equipament clearance Order.
11/6/95   MS     R 95-21     Equipmes Feilure       Self Mereifying     Feilure of EDG 2A relay sockets. Fotonnel comason niode failure.
11/6/95 MS R 95-21 Equipmes Feilure Self Mereifying Feilure of EDG 2A relay sockets. Fotonnel comason niode failure.
11/1/95   MS     R 95-18     Personnel Error         Self Identifying     'sCIwiring error during RXbend W less RPO.
11/1/95 MS R 95-18 Personnel Error Self Identifying
NCV 95-18-05 10/19/95 OPS   R 95-18     Personnel Error         Self ldencifying     Missed shit CEApesanon indication marveellence NCV 95-1846 10/18/95 OPS   R 95-18     Personnel Error         1.icensee           Missed RCS Boroa emagle surveillmace.
'sCIwiring error during RXbend W less RPO.
NCV 95-18-05 10/19/95 OPS R 95-18 Personnel Error Self ldencifying Missed shit CEApesanon indication marveellence NCV 95-1846 10/18/95 OPS R 95-18 Personnel Error 1.icensee Missed RCS Boroa emagle surveillmace.
NCV 95-18-07
NCV 95-18-07


10/17/95 OPS   Q 95-18     Personnel Error       Self Identifying Lack of atternion to task resulted is overfilling RCB lower cavity during flood up.
10/17/95 OPS Q 95-18 Personnel Error Self Identifying Lack of atternion to task resulted is overfilling RCB lower cavity during flood up.
10/12/95 ENG   IR 95-18     Design Error           Self identifying Inserting CIAS signal during safeguards test shifted VIO 95-18-04                                         EDG 2A to isochronous mode while EDO paralleled with ofrsite power.
10/12/95 ENG IR 95-18 Design Error Self identifying Inserting CIAS signal during safeguards test shifted VIO 95-18-04 EDG 2A to isochronous mode while EDO paralleled with ofrsite power.
10M/95   PS   LER 95-S02   Personnel Error       Licensee         Peternial route for unauthorized access to protected ares, CW water piping.
10M/95 PS LER 95-S02 Personnel Error Licensee Peternial route for unauthorized access to protected ares, CW water piping.
10/7/95 OPS   IR 9518     Failure to Follow     NRC               Did not enter bypass key position in deviation log.
10/7/95 OPS IR 9518 Failure to Follow NRC Did not enter bypass key position in deviation log.
VIO95-1841   Procedures 10/5/95 MS   IR 95-18     Equipment Failure     Self Identifying DG IB developed FO leak at threaded connection during surveillance run.
VIO95-1841 Procedures 10/5/95 MS IR 95-18 Equipment Failure Self Identifying DG IB developed FO leak at threaded connection during surveillance run.
9/30/95 OPS   IR 95-18     Failure to Follow     NRC               Did not enter bypass key position in deviation log.
9/30/95 OPS IR 95-18 Failure to Follow NRC Did not enter bypass key position in deviation log.
VIO 95-IS-02 Procedures C/28/95 ENG   IR 95-15     Equipment Failure     Self lderaifying Leaking PZR SVs extended forced outage -problems with tailpipe alignment.
VIO 95-IS-02 Procedures C/28/95 ENG IR 95-15 Equipment Failure Self lderaifying Leaking PZR SVs extended forced outage -problems with tailpipe alignment.
9/20/95 MS   IR 95-18     Equipment Failure     Self Idernifying EDG I AllB governor corarol problems resulted in load oscillations.
9/20/95 MS IR 95-18 Equipment Failure Self Idernifying EDG I AllB governor corarol problems resulted in load oscillations.
9/15/95 OPS / 1R 95-18     Failure to Follow     Self Identifying Maint/ Ops did not provide clearance for work on MS   VIO 95-18-03 Procedures                             condenser waterbox cover. When cover pulled closed, severed worker's finger.
9/15/95 OPS /
9/14/95 PS   LER Ul/U2 95 Failure to Follow     Licensee         Security failed to take correct conpensatory action on 501         Procedure                               computer failure.
1R 95-18 Failure to Follow Self Identifying Maint/ Ops did not provide clearance for work on MS VIO 95-18-03 Procedures condenser waterbox cover. When cover pulled closed, severed worker's finger.
s/10/95 OPS   IR 95-18     Failure to Use Correct Self Identifying SG blowdown sent to incorrect system on RAB roof.
9/14/95 PS LER Ul/U2 95 Failure to Follow Licensee Security failed to take correct conpensatory action on 501 Procedure computer failure.
Procedure                               Operator used wrong procedure. When identified did not back out of procedure correctly.
s/10/95 OPS IR 95-18 Failure to Use Correct Self Identifying SG blowdown sent to incorrect system on RAB roof.
g/9/95   MS   IR 95-15     Weakness in W ork     Self Identifying Leak on SV 1201 flange extended outage, identified Screening and                           one month earlier but not worked.
Procedure Operator used wrong procedure. When identified did not back out of procedure correctly.
Planning f/7/95   OPS   IR 95-15     Personnel Error /     Licensee         Unit 2 Main Generator overpressurized while filling inoperable                             with H2. Inattention by operators.
g/9/95 MS IR 95-15 Weakness in W ork Self Identifying Leak on SV 1201 flange extended outage, identified Screening and one month earlier but not worked.
Equipment /OWA 7/2/95   OPS   IR 95-15     Personnel Error       NRC             Weaknesses identified in logs relating to abnormal VIO 95-15-03                                         equipment conditions and out of service equipment not logged (muhiple exangles).
Planning f/7/95 OPS IR 95-15 Personnel Error /
8/31/95 MS   IR 95-15     Personnel Error       self Identifying Damaged cylinder and head on IB EDG due to loose lash adjustment.
Licensee Unit 2 Main Generator overpressurized while filling inoperable with H2. Inattention by operators.
8/30/95 PS   IR 95-15     Mansgement and QC     NRC             Containment closure walkdowns by management were weaknesses                             inadequate and depended heavily on QC involvement to identify deficiencies.
Equipment /OWA 7/2/95 OPS IR 95-15 Personnel Error NRC Weaknesses identified in logs relating to abnormal VIO 95-15-03 equipment conditions and out of service equipment not logged (muhiple exangles).
8/31/95 MS IR 95-15 Personnel Error self Identifying Damaged cylinder and head on IB EDG due to loose lash adjustment.
8/30/95 PS IR 95-15 Mansgement and QC NRC Containment closure walkdowns by management were weaknesses inadequate and depended heavily on QC involvement to identify deficiencies.


8!30M5   MS Ct 95-15     Supervisory overdght NRC                                   M intenance persrennel not using procedures for work and worker attitude                                         in progress.
8!30M5 MS Ct 95-15 Supervisory overdght NRC M intenance persrennel not using procedures for work and worker attitude in progress.
8/29/95 OPS IR 95-15     Personnel Error       Licensee                             Started IB LPSIpump with suction valve clored. (No VIO 95-15-04                                                             damage to pump) 8/29/95 MS IR 95-15     Procedure Use         NRC                                 Maintenance jotineyman not signirs off pacedure VIO95-15-06                                                             steps as work completed (previously identibd as a weakness in May 1995).
8/29/95 OPS IR 95-15 Personnel Error Licensee Started IB LPSIpump with suction valve clored. (No VIO 95-15-04 damage to pump) 8/29/95 MS IR 95-15 Procedure Use NRC Maintenance jotineyman not signirs off pacedure VIO95-15-06 steps as work completed (previously identibd as a weakness in May 1995).
0/23/95 MS IR 95-15     Equipment Failure /   Self Identifying                     2A HDP trip due to relay failure. Eight HDP trips in Inadequate Corrective                                     past year. Engineering solution available but not Action                                                     implemented.
0/23/95 MS IR 95-15 Equipment Failure /
8/22/95 PS IR 95-15     Personnel Error       NRC                                 QA failed to document a deficiency on corsainmers spray valve surveillance idertified in an audit.
Self Identifying 2A HDP trip due to relay failure. Eight HDP trips in Inadequate Corrective past year. Engineering solution available but not Action implemented.
8/19/95 OPS [R 95-15     Operstor Enor/       Self identifying                   Overfill of PWT. Spilled approx.10K gallons on Operator Workaround                                       ground inside RCA. Operator work around on level control system and inauention to filling process by operator caused error.
8/22/95 PS IR 95-15 Personnel Error NRC QA failed to document a deficiency on corsainmers spray valve surveillance idertified in an audit.
g/3 g/95 MS IR 95-15     Procedural Weakness   NRC                                 Procedural weakness involving supervisory oversight and journeyman qualification.
8/19/95 OPS
8/17/95 OPS LER UI 95-007 Procedural Inadequacy Self Identifying                   Spraydomt of Unit I containmera. STAR process did VIO95-15     and Weakness /                                           not assign accountability for corrective action. Valve Operator-Work-Around                                     surveillance prelube not documented on STAR.
[R 95-15 Operstor Enor/
8/9/95   MS IR 95-16     Maintenance /         Licensee                           Inoperable Unit i PORVs due to mairmenance LER UI 95-005 Testing errors                                           error / testing inadequacies. (Valves assembled EA 95-180                                                             incorrectly) (Used acoustic data only) 8/6/95   ENO LER UI 95-006 Corrective           Self Identifying                   Lifting of Unit i SDC thermal relief due to procedural VIO 95-204I   Action / Procedural                                     revision from previous corrective action. Inoperable Weakness                                                 equipment not logged.
Self identifying Overfill of PWT. Spilled approx.10K gallons on Operator Workaround ground inside RCA. Operator work around on level control system and inauention to filling process by operator caused error.
8/2/95   OPS LER UI 95-004 Procedural           Licensee                           I A2 RCP seal failure due to
g/3 g/95 MS IR 95-15 Procedural Weakness NRC Procedural weakness involving supervisory oversight and journeyman qualification.
8/17/95 OPS LER UI 95-007 Procedural Inadequacy Self Identifying Spraydomt of Unit I containmera. STAR process did VIO95-15 and Weakness /
not assign accountability for corrective action. Valve Operator-Work-Around surveillance prelube not documented on STAR.
8/9/95 MS IR 95-16 Maintenance /
Licensee Inoperable Unit i PORVs due to mairmenance LER UI 95-005 Testing errors error / testing inadequacies. (Valves assembled EA 95-180 incorrectly) (Used acoustic data only) 8/6/95 ENO LER UI 95-006 Corrective Self Identifying Lifting of Unit i SDC thermal relief due to procedural VIO 95-204I Action / Procedural revision from previous corrective action. Inoperable Weakness equipment not logged.
8/2/95 OPS LER UI 95-004 Procedural Licensee I A2 RCP seal failure due to
* restaging
* restaging
* at high VIO 95-15-02 Weakness / Failure to                                   temperature.
* at high VIO 95-15-02 Weakness / Failure to temperature.
Follow Procedures 8/2/95   OPS LER UI 95-04 Operator Error       Self-identifying                   Operator failed to block MSIS actuation during VIO 95-15-Ol                                                           cooldown.
Follow Procedures 8/2/95 OPS LER UI 95-04 Operator Error Self-identifying Operator failed to block MSIS actuation during VIO 95-15-Ol cooldown.
7/29/95 MS IR 95-14     Procedural Weakness   Self Identifying                   1&Crersonnel attempt to test a level switch circuit which could not actuate given system conditions.
7/29/95 MS IR 95-14 Procedural Weakness Self Identifying 1&Crersonnel attempt to test a level switch circuit which could not actuate given system conditions.
7/29/95 OPS IR 95-14     Operator             Self Identifying                 Turbine / Reactor Trip due to test error.
7/29/95 OPS IR 95-14 Operator Self Identifying Turbine / Reactor Trip due to test error.
Error / Procedural Weakness 7/29/95 MS IR 95-14     Root Cause Pending   Self Identifying                   Catastrophic failure of Unit 2 B train CEDM cooling fan.
Error / Procedural Weakness 7/29/95 MS IR 95-14 Root Cause Pending Self Identifying Catastrophic failure of Unit 2 B train CEDM cooling fan.


7/3/95   PS IR 95-14     Security We kness     self Identifying       Automobile passed through neanally closed security gare to plant intate/ discharge canals at beach.
7/3/95 PS IR 95-14 Security We kness self Identifying Automobile passed through neanally closed security gare to plant intate/ discharge canals at beach.
Subsequera accident resuhed in vehicle lodged in discharge canal piping.
Subsequera accident resuhed in vehicle lodged in discharge canal piping.
7/1/95   OPS IR 95-12     Weak leg Keeping     NRC                   Weaknecies identified in logs relating to battery jumper installation and out-of-service equipment.
7/1/95 OPS IR 95-12 Weak leg Keeping NRC Weaknecies identified in logs relating to battery jumper installation and out-of-service equipment.
7/1/95   PS IR 95-12     Maintenance           Self Identifying       Corrosion in transformer fire protection deluge system results in multiple failures.
7/1/95 PS IR 95-12 Maintenance Self Identifying Corrosion in transformer fire protection deluge system results in multiple failures.
7/1/95   PS IR 9512       Personnel Error       NRC                   Three pieces of SNM found improperly tagged.
7/1/95 PS IR 9512 Personnel Error NRC Three pieces of SNM found improperly tagged.
NCV 95-12-02 7/1/95   PS IR 95-12     Program Weaknesses   NRC                     Fire Protection program weaknesses identified in fire-fighting techniques and respirator qualification program.
NCV 95-12-02 7/1/95 PS IR 95-12 Program Weaknesses NRC Fire Protection program weaknesses identified in fire-fighting techniques and respirator qualification program.
7/1/95   MS IR 95-12     Personnel Error       NRC                   M&TEfound installed across battery cell without J/LL NCV 95-12-01                                               authorization.
7/1/95 MS IR 95-12 Personnel Error NRC M&TEfound installed across battery cell without J/LL NCV 95-12-01 authorization.
6/3/95   MS IR 95-10     Procedural Adeqsacy/ NRC                   Several examples of weak adherence to procedures, Adherence                               including step signoffs and independent verification, identified.
6/3/95 MS IR 95-10 Procedural Adeqsacy/
6/3/95   MS IR 95-10     Poor Communication   1.icensee               Poor communication / lack of detailed istruction leads to improper IB EDG governor installation.
NRC Several examples of weak adherence to procedures, Adherence including step signoffs and independent verification, identified.
6/3/95   MS IR 95-10     Poor Maintenance /   NRC                     HVACrystems for both unita poody Procedures                                   maintained / Operating procedures contained numerous deficiencies.
6/3/95 MS IR 95-10 Poor Communication 1.icensee Poor communication / lack of detailed istruction leads to improper IB EDG governor installation.
6/3/95   MS IR 95-10     Poor Surveillance     Licensee               Missed several surveillances (7 day) on EDG.
6/3/95 MS IR 95-10 Poor Maintenance /
NCV 95-10-01 Tracking System 0 29/95 MS IR 95-09     Personnel Error       IJcensee               Failure to perform personnel air lock testing on time.
NRC HVACrystems for both unita poody Procedures maintained / Operating procedures contained numerous deficiencies.
NCV 95-09-01 f./28/95 OPS IR 95-05     Corrective Action     NRC                   STAR /NCR program did rxt addresa evaluating past Program Weakness                             operability 4/28/95 MS IR 95-05     Maintenance Error     licensee               Incore Instruments at ICIFlange 8 miswired -ICI output signals directed to wrong cornputer poiss.
6/3/95 MS IR 95-10 Poor Surveillance Licensee Missed several surveillances (7 day) on EDG.
4/28/95 ENG IR 95-05     Weakness in Temp     NRC                   Weakness in addressing how mods would affect Mod Procedure                               control room drsuings.
NCV 95-10-01 Tracking System 0 29/95 MS IR 95-09 Personnel Error IJcensee Failure to perform personnel air lock testing on time.
4/28/95 ENG IR 95-05     Failure to Implement NRC                     Failure to document nonconformance regarding ICI NCV 95-05-04 Corrective Action                             flange 8 conditions.
NCV 95-09-01 f./28/95 OPS IR 95-05 Corrective Action NRC STAR /NCR program did rxt addresa evaluating past Program Weakness operability 4/28/95 MS IR 95-05 Maintenance Error licensee Incore Instruments at ICIFlange 8 miswired -ICI output signals directed to wrong cornputer poiss.
Program 4/28/95 MS   IR 95-05     Design Implementation NRC                     Installation of wrong overload heater models in VIO 95-0541 Discrepancy                                   switchgear.
4/28/95 ENG IR 95-05 Weakness in Temp NRC Weakness in addressing how mods would affect Mod Procedure control room drsuings.
_ - _                  - _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ . -..    ~
4/28/95 ENG IR 95-05 Failure to Implement NRC Failure to document nonconformance regarding ICI NCV 95-05-04 Corrective Action flange 8 conditions.
Program 4/28/95 MS IR 95-05 Design Implementation NRC Installation of wrong overload heater models in VIO 95-0541 Discrepancy switchgear.
~
 
4/1/95 OPS IR 95-07 Apparera Personnel Licensee Unit I experienced m approximate 14 minute loss of NCV 95-07-02 Error shutdown cooling shile shining fmm one shutdown cooling loop to the other. The root cause was the closing of the wrong SDC suction roolation valve (the valve for the operating. vice idle, pung) on the part of the operator.
4/1/95 MS IR 95-07 Poor Adherence to Ucensee Jumper leR installed in ECCS ventilation denper aRer NCV 95-07-02 J/LL and Maintenance work complete.
Procedures 4/1/95 OPS IR 95-07 Weak Annunciator NRC Weak annuncistor response by RO: weM to


4/1/95  OPS IR 95-07    Apparera Personnel    Licensee            Unit I experienced m approximate 14 minute loss of NCV 95-07-02 Error                                      shutdown cooling shile shining fmm one shutdown cooling loop to the other. The root cause was the closing of the wrong SDC suction roolation valve (the valve for the operating. vice idle, pung) on the part of the operator.
===Response===
4/1/95  MS  IR 95-07    Poor Adherence to      Ucensee            Jumper leR installed in ECCS ventilation denper aRer NCV 95-07-02 J/LL and Maintenance                      work complete.
loss of shuidown cooling event.
Procedures 4/1/95  OPS IR 95-07    Weak Annunciator      NRC                Weak annuncistor response by RO: weM to Response                                  loss of shuidown cooling event.
3/26/95 MS IR 94-09 Procedural Weakness NRC LPSI mechanical seal housing outer cap misinstalled.
3/26/95 MS IR 94-09     Procedural Weakness   NRC               LPSI mechanical seal housing outer cap misinstalled.
3/26/95 OPS IR 94-09 Operator NRC Operator failure to recognize out-of-sight high Error /Procedurst indication on EDG cooling water tank. Failure of Weakness procedure to include instructions on draining tank.
3/26/95 OPS IR 94-09     Operator               NRC               Operator failure to recognize out-of-sight high Error /Procedurst                         indication on EDG cooling water tank. Failure of Weakness                                 procedure to include instructions on draining tank.
3/04/95 ENG IR 95-04 Design Licensee SDC suction reiief valve liR due to um hammer.
3/04/95 ENG IR 95-04     Design                 Licensee           SDC suction reiief valve liR due to um hammer.
3/04/95 OPS R 95-04 House-NRC toose plastic debris found in Unit 2 fbel pool area.
3/04/95 OPS R 95-04     House-                 NRC               toose plastic debris found in Unit 2 fbel pool area.
keeping 2/27/95 MS R 95-04 Equipment Failure Self Identifying Unit I was shut down for the replacement of3-pressurizer code safety valves. The valves were leaking by the seat.
keeping 2/27/95 MS R 95-04     Equipment Failure     Self Identifying Unit I was shut down for the replacement of3-pressurizer code safety valves. The valves were leaking by the seat.
2/21/95 OPS R 95-04 Equipment Failure Self Identifying Unit 2 trip due to failure of a SGWL control level transmitter. Transmitter failed high, resuking in closure of the FRVand a subsequent trip on low SGWL (95-04) 2/20/95 005 R 95-04 Equipment Anon aly Self Identifying 2B LPSIpump found air-bound during survedlance testing. The licensee has theonzed that the migration of air in the system resulted in the conStion as a result of previous surveillance testing. The pangs are not self-venting.
2/21/95 OPS R 95-04     Equipment Failure     Self Identifying Unit 2 trip due to failure of a SGWL control level transmitter. Transmitter failed high, resuking in closure of the FRVand a subsequent trip on low SGWL (95-04) 2/20/95 005 R 95-04     Equipment Anon aly     Self Identifying 2B LPSIpump found air-bound during survedlance testing. The licensee has theonzed that the migration of air in the system resulted in the conStion as a result of previous surveillance testing. The pangs are not self-venting.
2/I7/95 MS R 95-02 Physical Condition NRC Nornerous areas of corrosion identi6ed in Unit t/2 CCW areas.
2/I7/95 MS R 95-02     Physical Condition     NRC               Nornerous areas of corrosion identi6ed in Unit t/2 CCW areas.
2/17/95 PS IR 95-03 Personnel Error NRC la two observed exercises, ECs failed to notify states (Training Weakness within 15 minutes.
2/17/95 PS IR 95-03     Personnel Error       NRC               la two observed exercises, ECs failed to notify states (Training Weakness                       within 15 minutes.
2/16/95 MS R 95-04 Maintenance Error /
2/16/95 MS R 95-04     Maintenance Error /   Self Identifying lead shed of the I A3 IE 4160 bus due to inadvertent Procedural Weakness                     jumper contact while replacing a degraded voltage relay.
Self Identifying lead shed of the I A3 IE 4160 bus due to inadvertent Procedural Weakness jumper contact while replacing a degraded voltage relay.
2/4/95 OPS M 95-01     Operator               Ucensee           Failure to sample STTwithin TS required time frame VIO 95-01-01 Error / Communications                   following volume addition- Second occurrence in 2 years.
2/4/95 OPS M 95-01 Operator Ucensee Failure to sample STTwithin TS required time frame VIO 95-01-01 Error / Communications following volume addition-Second occurrence in 2 years.


e e.
e e.
2/4/95   OPS IR 5541       Peor Communications NRC               Failure to identify rnd analyze Unit I bc4 leg flow stratification 2/4/95   MS IR 95-01     Personnel Error /   Self Identifying   Inadequate independent verification resuhed in CVCS VIO 9541-02   Program Weakness                       letdown control valve failing to respond due to reversed leads. Resulted in a cessation ofletdown flow.
2/4/95 OPS IR 5541 Peor Communications NRC Failure to identify rnd analyze Unit I bc4 leg flow stratification 2/4/95 MS IR 95-01 Personnel Error /
12/31/94 ENG IR 94-25     Engineering Design Self Identifying   inadequate design control of NaOH cross-connectron NCV 94-2541   Error                                 between ECCS trains.
Self Identifying Inadequate independent verification resuhed in CVCS VIO 9541-02 Program Weakness letdown control valve failing to respond due to reversed leads. Resulted in a cessation ofletdown flow.
12/3/94 PS IR 94-24     Procedure Review   Licensee           Failure to perform TS quired periodic pmcedure NCV 94-24-01 Inadequacy                           reviews.
12/31/94 ENG IR 94-25 Engineering Design Self Identifying inadequate design control of NaOH cross-connectron NCV 94-2541 Error between ECCS trains.
12/3/94 MS IR 94-24     Maintenance         NRC               Inadequate process for changes to vendor technical VIO 94-24-02 Procedures                           manuals.
12/3/94 PS IR 94-24 Procedure Review Licensee Failure to perform TS quired periodic pmcedure NCV 94-24-01 Inadequacy reviews.
Inadequacy 11/25/94 MS IR 94-22     Program weakness     Licensee         The licensee's QA organization identiSed numerous weaknesses in the implementation of the site's welding program. As a result, the Maintensnee Manager placed a stop work order on welding activities. The stoppage lasted one week.
12/3/94 MS IR 94-24 Maintenance NRC Inadequate process for changes to vendor technical VIO 94-24-02 Procedures manuals.
I1/24/94 MS IR 94-24     Prncedure we kness   Self-identifying Unit i B side SIAS actuation due to a bistable module which had not been adequately withdrawn fmm the ESFAS cabinet during maintenance.
Inadequacy 11/25/94 MS IR 94-22 Program weakness Licensee The licensee's QA organization identiSed numerous weaknesses in the implementation of the site's welding program. As a result, the Maintensnee Manager placed a stop work order on welding activities. The stoppage lasted one week.
11/23/94 MS IR 94-24     Equipment Failure   Self Identifying Unit i SIAS with usiit in mode 5 due to common mode failure of Rosemount transmitters us.d forpresourizer pressure channels.
I1/24/94 MS IR 94-24 Prncedure we kness Self-identifying Unit i B side SIAS actuation due to a bistable module which had not been adequately withdrawn fmm the ESFAS cabinet during maintenance.
11/5/94   OPS IR 94-22     Operations,         Licensee         Weste gas release on Sept. 10,1993, with NCV 94-22-03 Maintenance                           meteorological instruments out of service.
11/23/94 MS IR 94-24 Equipment Failure Self Identifying Unit i SIAS with usiit in mode 5 due to common mode failure of Rosemount transmitters us.d forpresourizer pressure channels.
Ermrs 10/26/94 MS IR 94-22     Weather-Related/     Self-Identifying Unit I automatically tripped due to arc-over frra s a LER         Maintenance                           potential transformer due to salt buildup on swnchyard insulators.
11/5/94 OPS IR 94-22 Operations, Licensee Weste gas release on Sept. 10,1993, with NCV 94-22-03 Maintenance meteorological instruments out of service.
T/30/94   OPS IR 94-20     inconsistent         NRC             Local valve position indicators not maintained MS               Expectations                         accurate. Procedures / training provided to operators on verifying valve pocition found weak.
Ermrs 10/26/94 MS IR 94-22 Weather-Related/
f/30/94   OPS IR 94-20     Operations.         NRC             Plant personnel not trained on IPE snd run using it for Maintenance                           work planning and scheduling.
Self-Identifying Unit I automatically tripped due to arc-over frr s a a
Deficiency 9/30/94   OPS IR 94-19     Operatio is Weakness NRC             During requal exem, a licensed operator exhibited an apparent disregard for EOPs.
LER Maintenance potential transformer due to salt buildup on swnchyard insulators.
9/30/94   MS IR 94-20     Personnel Error     Licensee         Maintenance personnel begin to work the wmng R%T isolation valve, threatening the operability of both trains of ECCS.
T/30/94 OPS IR 94-20 inconsistent NRC Local valve position indicators not maintained MS Expectations accurate. Procedures / training provided to operators on verifying valve pocition found weak.
f/30/94 OPS IR 94-20 Operations.
NRC Plant personnel not trained on IPE snd run using it for Maintenance work planning and scheduling.
Deficiency 9/30/94 OPS IR 94-19 Operatio is Weakness NRC During requal exem, a licensed operator exhibited an apparent disregard for EOPs.
9/30/94 MS IR 94-20 Personnel Error Licensee Maintenance personnel begin to work the wmng R%T isolation valve, threatening the operability of both trains of ECCS.


V/30/94 OPS IR M-19     Operations Error       Ucensee           Fciture to nc'ify the NRC of changes in status of NCV 94-19-01                                           licensed operators' medical conditions.
V/30/94 OPS IR M-19 Operations Error Ucensee Fciture to nc'ify the NRC of changes in status of NCV 94-19-01 licensed operators' medical conditions.
8/29/94 OPS IR 94-20     Operations Errors       NRC               Operators placed I A EDG in an electrical lineup for VIO 94-22-01                                           which TS-required surveillance tests had na been VIO 94-22-02                                           performed (with the ser-ey-related swing bus pered from it). Also, related control room log entries appeared to be inaccurate.
8/29/94 OPS IR 94-20 Operations Errors NRC Operators placed I A EDG in an electrical lineup for VIO 94-22-01 which TS-required surveillance tests had na been VIO 94-22-02 performed (with the ser-ey-related swing bus pered from it). Also, related control room log entries appeared to be inaccurate.
8/28/94 OPS IR 94-20     Equipment Failure     Licensee           Unit I was taken offline (Mode 2) to repair a DEH leak. The unit was returned on line later the same day.
8/28/94 OPS IR 94-20 Equipment Failure Licensee Unit I was taken offline (Mode 2) to repair a DEH leak. The unit was returned on line later the same day.
8/12/94 OPS IR 94-18     Operations /           NRC               The licensee was unloading new fuel for Unit I with a Maintenance Error and                   hoist grapple that was rnissing the safety latch sleeve Lack of Engineering                     locating pin. The safety sleeve functioned by friction Drawings / Inspection                   only.
8/12/94 OPS IR 94-18 Operations /
Criteria 7/14/94 MS IR 94-15     Equipment             LicenseeINRC     During surveillance test, TCB 5 failed to open due to LER U-2 944)6 Failure / Poor                           mechanical binding (licensee). The Ikensee failed to VIO 94-15-01 Management Decision                     recognize the condition as requiring a shutdown per TS (NRC).
NRC The licensee was unloading new fuel for Unit I with a Maintenance Error and hoist grapple that was rnissing the safety latch sleeve Lack of Engineering locating pin. The safety sleeve functioned by friction Drawings / Inspection only.
7/9/94 OPS IR 94-15     Equipment Failure     Licensee         Unit 2 turbine was shut down and reactor power reduced to Mode 2 because the 2BI RCP Inwer oil level indication showed a leak. The indication was later shown to be erroneous.
Criteria 7/14/94 MS IR 94-15 Equipment LicenseeINRC During surveillance test, TCB 5 failed to open due to LER U-2 944)6 Failure / Poor mechanical binding (licensee). The Ikensee failed to VIO 94-15-01 Management Decision recognize the condition as requiring a shutdown per TS (NRC).
7/8/94 OPS IR 94-15     Operator Error         Licensee         TS 3.0.3 entry due to placing 2Al LPSIpurry and 23 LER U2 94-05                                         charging pump 005 at the same time.
7/9/94 OPS IR 94-15 Equipment Failure Licensee Unit 2 turbine was shut down and reactor power reduced to Mode 2 because the 2BI RCP Inwer oil level indication showed a leak. The indication was later shown to be erroneous.
6/28/94 MS IR 9414       Personnel Error /     Licensee         Inoperable Unit 2 RAB ventilation exhaust WRGM oue NCV 94-14-01 Procedural Weakness                     to failure to connect sample lines.
7/8/94 OPS IR 94-15 Operator Error Licensee TS 3.0.3 entry due to placing 2Al LPSIpurry and 23 LER U2 94-05 charging pump 005 at the same time.
LER U-2 94-04 6/6/94 OPS IR 9414       Weather               Licensee         Unit I trip from 100% power during a severe thunderstorm due to debris blown across two main transformer output terminals.
6/28/94 MS IR 9414 Personnel Error /
5/28/94 PS IR 94-13     Poor Cor ective Action NRC             Emergency supplies in control toorn less that s:sted in DEV 94-13-01                                         FSAR.
Licensee Inoperable Unit 2 RAB ventilation exhaust WRGM oue NCV 94-14-01 Procedural Weakness to failure to connect sample lines.
5/6/94 ENG I* 94-11     Engineering Error     NRC             Inadequate corrective action for MOVs stich stalled VIO 94-II-01                                         during surveillances.
LER U-2 94-04 6/6/94 OPS IR 9414 Weather Licensee Unit I trip from 100% power during a severe thunderstorm due to debris blown across two main transformer output terminals.
4/23/94 OPS IR 94-12     Mfg. Error             Self Identifying Unit 2 auto reactor trip from 30% power caused by LER U-2 94-03                                         RPS cabinet wiring error for trip bypass circuit, fuorn original unit construction.
5/28/94 PS IR 94-13 Poor Cor ective Action NRC Emergency supplies in control toorn less that s:sted in DEV 94-13-01 FSAR.
4/23/94 MS 1R 94-12     Equipment Failure     Self-Identifying Following unit 2 trip, steam bypass system operated unexpectedly and dropped RCS temp by seven degrees F, pressurizer heaters turned off.
5/6/94 ENG I* 94-11 Engineering Error NRC Inadequate corrective action for MOVs stich stalled VIO 94-II-01 during surveillances.
4/23/94 OPS IR 94-12 Mfg. Error Self Identifying Unit 2 auto reactor trip from 30% power caused by LER U-2 94-03 RPS cabinet wiring error for trip bypass circuit, fuorn original unit construction.
4/23/94 MS 1R 94-12 Equipment Failure Self-Identifying Following unit 2 trip, steam bypass system operated unexpectedly and dropped RCS temp by seven degrees F, pressurizer heaters turned off.


                                                                                                                                        .. .e 4/21/94   OPS IR 94-12             Operator                 licensee           Unit 2 rescw powa incretsed from 26 to 31% due to Insttentiveness                             positive MTC.
.e 4/21/94 OPS IR 94-12 Operator licensee Unit 2 rescw powa incretsed from 26 to 31% due to Insttentiveness positive MTC.
An/94     MS IR 94-10             Maintenance Error         NRC               Contractor personnel nude and comrnctor QC VIO 94-10-01                                                     accepted pressurizer nozzle weld prep that did not eneet procedural requirernents for bevel angle.
An/94 MS IR 94-10 Maintenance Error NRC Contractor personnel nude and comrnctor QC VIO 94-10-01 accepted pressurizer nozzle weld prep that did not eneet procedural requirernents for bevel angle.
Licensee engineering had specified overly tight tolerances.
Licensee engineering had specified overly tight tolerances.
4/3/94   OPS IR 94-12             Operations Procedure     Self-identifying Unit I auto reactor trip due to unusual electrical lineup LER UI 94-04         Error (Lack of sufficient                   (isochronous EDG paralleled with offsite power depth in review)                           through TCBs).
4/3/94 OPS IR 94-12 Operations Procedure Self-identifying Unit I auto reactor trip due to unusual electrical lineup LER UI 94-04 Error (Lack of sufficient (isochronous EDG paralleled with offsite power depth in review) through TCBs).
4/3/94   ENG IR 94-12             Surveillance Error       Licensee         Licensee discovered that the 4160 VIAB Bust swing VIO 9412-01                                                     bus components [C ICW Pump and C CCW Pump]
4/3/94 ENG IR 94-12 Surveillance Error Licensee Licensee discovered that the 4160 VIAB Bust swing VIO 9412-01 bus components [C ICW Pump and C CCW Pump]
would not strip from the bus upon undervoltage ifthe bus were aligned to the B bus due to a missing wire.
would not strip from the bus upon undervoltage ifthe bus were aligned to the B bus due to a missing wire.
3/28/94   MS IR 94-09             Personnel Error           Self Identifying Unit I auto reactor trip. Maintenance foreman ened LER UI 9443                                                     generator exciter breaker on wrong unit.
3/28/94 MS IR 94-09 Personnel Error Self Identifying Unit I auto reactor trip. Maintenance foreman ened LER UI 9443 generator exciter breaker on wrong unit.
3/16/94   ENG IR 9448             Engineering Corrective   NRC               Regional inspector had two Unit 2 SIA violations: Is VIO 94-0841         Action                                     corrective action for an 11/24/92 water hamcwr evers VIO 94-08-02                                                   was done without documersed instmetions or procedures, resuhing in operating urail 3/94 with five snubbers on the SRV and PORV tailpipes inoperable.
3/16/94 ENG IR 9448 Engineering Corrective NRC Regional inspector had two Unit 2 SIA violations: Is VIO 94-0841 Action corrective action for an 11/24/92 water hamcwr evers VIO 94-08-02 was done without documersed instmetions or procedures, resuhing in operating urail 3/94 with five snubbers on the SRV and PORV tailpipes inoperable.
: 2) Failure to write a nonconformance report for a damaged pipe support in March 1994.
: 2) Failure to write a nonconformance report for a damaged pipe support in March 1994.
3/16/94   ENG IR 94-10             Equipment Failure         Licensee         AUnit 2 pressurizer instrumera nozzle that had been LER U-294-02                                                   repaired a year ago was found leaking stile the unit was in Mode 5. The unit remained shut down for repairs.
3/16/94 ENG IR 94-10 Equipment Failure Licensee AUnit 2 pressurizer instrumera nozzle that had been LER U-294-02 repaired a year ago was found leaking stile the unit was in Mode 5. The unit remained shut down for repairs.
3/4/94   ENG IR 94-06             Engineering Design       Ucensee         inadequate design controle on Unit 2 sequencer NCV-94-06-02         Error                                     charging pump loading block.
3/4/94 ENG IR 94-06 Engineering Design Ucensee inadequate design controle on Unit 2 sequencer NCV-94-06-02 Error charging pump loading block.
3/4/94   ENG IR 94-06             Engineering Error         Licensee         Failure to report an EDG failure.
3/4/94 ENG IR 94-06 Engineering Error Licensee Failure to report an EDG failure.
NCV 94-06-01 2/28/94   ENG IR 94-09             Refueling procedure &     Ucensee/NRC     Inadequate grappling of a fuel assembly caused by NCV 94-04-01         operator error                             error in Recommended Move List and operator error in following procedure. (IR 9449) 2/17/94   OPS IR 94-05             Operator Error           Licensee         Pressurizer sur. spray isolation valve had been locked NCV 94-05-01                                                   closed (vice open) since 3/27/93.
NCV 94-06-01 2/28/94 ENG IR 94-09 Refueling procedure &
LER U2 94-01 2/llN4   PS IR 94-02             Security Error           Licensee         Failure to provide required compensatory measures in NCV 94-02-01                                                   response to a security computer system failure.
Ucensee/NRC Inadequate grappling of a fuel assembly caused by NCV 94-04-01 operator error error in Recommended Move List and operator error in following procedure. (IR 9449) 2/17/94 OPS IR 94-05 Operator Error Licensee Pressurizer sur. spray isolation valve had been locked NCV 94-05-01 closed (vice open) since 3/27/93.
LER U2 94-01 2/llN4 PS IR 94-02 Security Error Licensee Failure to provide required compensatory measures in NCV 94-02-01 response to a security computer system failure.


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J Semiannual Plant Performance Assessment' St. Lucie 1 and 2 Current SALP Assessment Period: 1/7/96 through 3/97 Last SALP Rating'     Previous SALP Rating 1/2/94 - 1/6/96       5/3/92 - 1/1/94 Operations           2                       1 Maintenance           2                       1 Engineering           1                       1 Plant Support         1                       1 I. Performance Overview Since July 1995 there have been a series of events that led to questioning the plant's overall performance. An NRC root cause effort determined that. In addition to procedural adherence / adequacy weaknesses.' the licensee suffered from weaknesses in both interfaces     I across organizational lines and corrective actions.     The SALP board   i concluded that performance in the areas of Operations and Maintenance     I had declined to level 2. Since the SALP board, additional examples of declined performance were noted. These have included:
J Semiannual Plant Performance Assessment' St. Lucie 1 and 2 Current SALP Assessment Period: 1/7/96 through 3/97 Last SALP Rating' Previous SALP Rating 1/2/94 - 1/6/96 5/3/92 - 1/1/94 Operations 2
* Significant operator inattentiveness which resulted in the         ,
1 Maintenance 2
overailution event on January 22. 1996, highlighted the recent     !
1 Engineering 1
large number of personnel errors and lack of command and control in the control room (SL3. CP).
1 Plant Support 1
* On February 22. 1996, a dropped CEA and an ensuing Unit 1 shutdown l resulted in the declaration of an unusual event. During the       '
1 I.
shutcown. main feedwater regulating valve instabilities resulted   ,
Performance Overview Since July 1995 there have been a series of events that led to questioning the plant's overall performance.
in operators manually tripping the unit.                           '
An NRC root cause effort determined that. In addition to procedural adherence / adequacy weaknesses.' the licensee suffered from weaknesses in both interfaces across organizational lines and corrective actions.
* On February 24. a containment radiation monitor was rendered inoperable for two days due to an improper valve lineup following a grab sample. As a result, the unit was started up without this TS-required component available. Several instances of failure to follow procedures and operator inattention led to the extended period of inoperability (SL4).
The SALP board concluded that performance in the areas of Operations and Maintenance had declined to level 2.
* On May 7. an inspection indicated that a significant number of shifts had been worked with fire brigade members which were not medically qualified. A breakdown in the tracking of this data resulted from a key individual being laid off.
Since the SALP board, additional examples of declined performance were noted.
* On May 12. fuel movement was commenced on Unit 1 without only 1 of 2 wide range NI channels available. Operators performing a
These have included:
              ' surveillance test on the inoperable channel did not coordinate with the refueling center properly. Additionally, the fuel offload was commenced without incorporating requirements from the
Significant operator inattentiveness which resulted in the overailution event on January 22. 1996, highlighted the recent large number of personnel errors and lack of command and control in the control room (SL3. CP).
On February 22. 1996, a dropped CEA and an ensuing Unit 1 shutdown resulted in the declaration of an unusual event.
During the shutcown. main feedwater regulating valve instabilities resulted in operators manually tripping the unit.
On February 24. a containment radiation monitor was rendered inoperable for two days due to an improper valve lineup following a grab sample.
As a result, the unit was started up without this TS-required component available.
Several instances of failure to follow procedures and operator inattention led to the extended period of inoperability (SL4).
On May 7. an inspection indicated that a significant number of shifts had been worked with fire brigade members which were not medically qualified.
A breakdown in the tracking of this data resulted from a key individual being laid off.
On May 12. fuel movement was commenced on Unit 1 without only 1 of 2 wide range NI channels available.
Operators performing a
' surveillance test on the inoperable channel did not coordinate with the refueling center properly.
Additionally, the fuel offload was commenced without incorporating requirements from the


spent fuel pool heat load calculation into the appropriate operational procedures, e      On June 6. Unit 2 was manually tripped due to high generator gas temperature. Root cause was a screw which vibrated loose and resulted a temperature control valve feedback arm falling free of its connection. This failure mode had been encountered before.
spent fuel pool heat load calculation into the appropriate operational procedures, On June 6. Unit 2 was manually tripped due to high generator gas e
e     On June 16. an inspection identified that 56 individual violations of overtime guidelines had occurred on the part of 4 individuals over a 30 day period. Evidence also existed that employees were regularly working longer hours than those reported on their timesheets.
temperature.
e      On July 20. Unit 1 experienced a loss of charging flow when, due to a mispositioned board selector switch, both operating pumps stopped on a faulty indication of high pressurizer level, caused by I&C errors.
Root cause was a screw which vibrated loose and resulted a temperature control valve feedback arm falling free of its connection.
e      A number of engineering-related problems have been identified to include:
This failure mode had been encountered before.
e     A number of annunciator response procedures which were inaccurate due to a failure to update them when design modifications took place.
e On June 16. an inspection identified that 56 individual violations of overtime guidelines had occurred on the part of 4 individuals over a 30 day period.
e     Four similarly miswired nuclear instrumentation channels due to errors in control wiring diagrams implemented during a modi fication. The condition was identified at full power and resulted in an entry into TS 3.0.3.
Evidence also existed that employees were regularly working longer hours than those reported on their timesheets.
e      Nonconservative errors were identified in auxiliary feedwater actuation system setpoints due to a failure to incorporate as-built data in instrument calibration calculations.
On July 20. Unit 1 experienced a loss of charging flow when, due e
e-     On August 14. glue was found in key lock switches on both units' hot shutdown panels, rendering the switches inoperable. ' The cpering instances appeared to be additional examples of padlocks-and door locks which were identified in July.
to a mispositioned board selector switch, both operating pumps stopped on a faulty indication of high pressurizer level, caused by I&C errors.
In addition to the inspection findings above. the inspectors have noted a general low state of morale. A great number of both management and non-management employees have expressed concern with regard to the company's ongoing downsizing effort. The general feeling is that, unlike Turkey Point. which was afforded the budget and time to improve prior to cownsizing. St. Lucie is expected to improve AND downsize simultaneously.
A number of engineering-related problems have been identified to e
include:
e A number of annunciator response procedures which were inaccurate due to a failure to update them when design modifications took place.
e Four similarly miswired nuclear instrumentation channels due to errors in control wiring diagrams implemented during a modi fication.
The condition was identified at full power and resulted in an entry into TS 3.0.3.
Nonconservative errors were identified in auxiliary e
feedwater actuation system setpoints due to a failure to incorporate as-built data in instrument calibration calculations.
e-On August 14. glue was found in key lock switches on both units' hot shutdown panels, rendering the switches inoperable. ' The cpering instances appeared to be additional examples of padlocks-and door locks which were identified in July.
In addition to the inspection findings above. the inspectors have noted a general low state of morale.
A great number of both management and non-management employees have expressed concern with regard to the company's ongoing downsizing effort.
The general feeling is that, unlike Turkey Point. which was afforded the budget and time to improve prior to cownsizing. St. Lucie is expected to improve AND downsize simultaneously.


N c
N c
.              II. Functional Area Assessment - Ooerations A. Assessment 4
II.
:                          Performance in Operations appears to have leveled. At the time of the last PPR. operator errors and operational events were on the
Functional Area Assessment - Ooerations A.
,                          increase. In the past six months, examples of improved operator attention to detail and conservative decision-making have been' identified. Strong performance was identified in the area of
Assessment 4
;                          reduced inventory operation. Weaknesses were identified in the areas of-procedural quality _and operability maintenance and
Performance in Operations appears to have leveled.
~
At the time of the last PPR. operator errors and operational events were on the increase.
decision-making. Improvements in control. room environment.
In the past six months, examples of improved operator attention to detail and conservative decision-making have been' identified.
E formality, and communications have been noted. The licensee has appeared to make inroads in the areas of operator self-assessment and documentation of adverse conditions.
Strong performance was identified in the area of reduced inventory operation. Weaknesses were identified in the
Basis B.
~
: 1. Attention to Detail and Conservative Decision-Making e      Non-licensed operators were successful in identifying two cases of inadvertent containment radiation monitor
areas of-procedural quality _and operability maintenance and decision-making.
!      .                                inoperability and a breach in a fire-rated assembly.
Improvements in control. room environment.
:                                e     After a non-conservative decision which resulted in a late declaration of an NOUE for CVCS system leakage.
formality, and communications have been noted.
4 operators have declared three NOUEs for'similar circumstances (CVCS leakage outside containment which
The licensee has E
,                                        could not be quickly quantified).       Management has been effective in encouraging conservative decision-making.
appeared to make inroads in the areas of operator self-assessment and documentation of adverse conditions.
  ~
B.
i                                 e     Entry into a shutdown action statement when 4 Unit 2 control rods would not respond electrically.
Basis 1.
Attention to Detail and Conservative Decision-Making Non-licensed operators were successful in identifying e
two cases of inadvertent containment radiation monitor inoperability and a breach in a fire-rated assembly.
e After a non-conservative decision which resulted in a late declaration of an NOUE for CVCS system leakage.
operators have declared three NOUEs for'similar 4
circumstances (CVCS leakage outside containment which could not be quickly quantified).
Management has been
~
effective in encouraging conservative decision-making.
i e
Entry into a shutdown action statement when 4 Unit 2 control rods would not respond electrically.
i
i
[                                 e     Five entries into reduced inventory during the period without error.
[
e      Timely trip of Unit 1 due-to apparent gas buildup in 4
e Five entries into reduced inventory during the period without error.
the 1B transformer.
Timely trip of Unit 1 due-to apparent gas buildup in e
1 e     Terminating a Unit 1 startup due to predictions that xenon decay would invalidate the estimation of
4 the 1B transformer.
]                                       critical conditions.
1 e
: 2. Weaknesses in Procedures and Maintenance of Operability l                                 e     Numerous errors identified in annunciator response procedures.
Terminating a Unit 1 startup due to predictions that xenon decay would invalidate the estimation of
  ,                              e     Full core offload began on Unit 1 without incorporating requirements from the fuel pool heat load calculation into operational procedures.
]
critical conditions.
2.
Weaknesses in Procedures and Maintenance of Operability l
e Numerous errors identified in annunciator response procedures.
e Full core offload began on Unit 1 without incorporating requirements from the fuel pool heat load calculation into operational procedures.


e      Operator aids found in the field did not agree with procedural requirements for the tasks they described.
Operator aids found in the field did not agree with e
* Unit 1 fuel movement began without the required 2 operable channels of wide range nuclear instruments due to the performance of a surveillance test.
procedural requirements for the tasks they described.
* Clearance hung during the Unit 1 outage resulted in inoperability of audible count rate in containment.
Unit 1 fuel movement began without the required 2 operable channels of wide range nuclear instruments due to the performance of a surveillance test.
: 3. Other Observations
Clearance hung during the Unit 1 outage resulted in inoperability of audible count rate in containment.
* Good performance was noted during a Unit 2 downpower due to low turbine auto-stop oil pressure.. a Unit 2 trip due to a failed turbine cooling water valve.
3.
Other Observations Good performance was noted during a Unit 2 downpower due to low turbine auto-stop oil pressure.. a Unit 2 trip due to a failed turbine cooling water valve.
several startups, and fuel movements in Unit 1 containment.
several startups, and fuel movements in Unit 1 containment.
* Poor performance was noted in the use of a single operator for @ l movement in the spent fuel pool, in   l the control of keys for PORV operation outside of the I control room. in the control of backup charging pump   !
Poor performance was noted in the use of a single operator for @ l movement in the spent fuel pool, in the control of keys for PORV operation outside of the control room. in the control of backup charging pump selector switch position and in performing a test of a turbine-driven AFP which resulted in a pump trip.
selector switch position and in performing a test of a turbine-driven AFP which resulted in a pump trip.
Equipment failures continue to challenge operators, with the occurrence of two manual trips per unit this calendar year due to equipment failures.
* Equipment failures continue to challenge operators, with the occurrence of two manual trips per unit this calendar year due to equipment failures.
C.
C. Future Inspections The high number of allegations and an increase in resident involvement with engineering activities has reduced the available time for core Operations inspections. The site has been brought to an N+1 staffing level: however, qualification of the new resident is not anticipateo until February. 1997. Additionally, both assigned Resident Inspectors will be attending CE training at TTC for three weeks in October / November. An acting resident has been arranged for the period: however, inspection at the N+1 level will not be possible until the end of the current SALP cycle (March 1997). Consequently. Senior Resident and Resident Inspectors objectivity visits, involving control room observations, are planned. Additionally. DRS inspections of the licensee's procedure development and approval process. which has recently changed in an effort to improve procedure quality. are planned.
Future Inspections The high number of allegations and an increase in resident involvement with engineering activities has reduced the available time for core Operations inspections.
III. Functional area Assessment - Maintenance A     Assessment. An increase in personnel errors and equipment problems was noted. The majority of the equipment problems are BOP related. For the most part the licensee considered safety in j             establishment of goals and for monitoring of systems and
The site has been brought to an N+1 staffing level: however, qualification of the new resident is not anticipateo until February. 1997.
Additionally, both assigned Resident Inspectors will be attending CE training at TTC for three weeks in October / November.
An acting resident has been arranged for the period: however, inspection at the N+1 level will not be possible until the end of the current SALP cycle (March 1997).
Consequently. Senior Resident and Resident Inspectors objectivity visits, involving control room observations, are planned.
Additionally. DRS inspections of the licensee's procedure development and approval process. which has recently changed in an effort to improve procedure quality. are planned.
III.
Functional area Assessment - Maintenance A
Assessment. An increase in personnel errors and equipment problems was noted.
The majority of the equipment problems are BOP related.
For the most part the licensee considered safety in j
establishment of goals and for monitoring of systems and


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The maintenance program is adequate.
B.
Basis:
The maintenance area was rated good overall the last SALP period.
The maintenance area was rated good overall the last SALP period.
The last PPR indicated a problem with EDGs and procedure problems.
The last PPR indicated a problem with EDGs and procedure problems.
The plant matrix indicates 12 equipment failures.12 personnel errors and 3 procedure problems during the last 6 months.
The plant matrix indicates 12 equipment failures.12 personnel errors and 3 procedure problems during the last 6 months.
Examples of personnel errors were:
Examples of personnel errors were:
                            - 8/31/96 Improper use of M&TE for meggering NI cables
- 8/31/96 Improper use of M&TE for meggering NI cables
                            - 8/3/96 Freeze seal left unattended
- 8/3/96 Freeze seal left unattended
                            - 7/30/96 3 of 4 linear NI channels found miswired
- 7/30/96 3 of 4 linear NI channels found miswired
                            - 7/20/96 2 charging pumps tripped due to erroneous level signal Power Reduction caused by Equipment Failures in the last 6 months:
- 7/20/96 2 charging pumps tripped due to erroneous level signal Power Reduction caused by Equipment Failures in the last 6 months:
                            - 4/20/96: Unit 2 - Turbine Stop Oil orifice blockage.
- 4/20/96: Unit 2 - Turbine Stop Oil orifice blockage.
                            - 4/09/96: Unit 2 - Downpower due to Circ Water Piping leakage.
- 4/09/96: Unit 2 - Downpower due to Circ Water Piping leakage.
                            - 5/24/96: Unit 2 - Downpower due to CEDM problems.
- 5/24/96: Unit 2 - Downpower due to CEDM problems.
                            - 5/31/96: Unit 2 - Downpower due to MSR TCV closure due to blown fuse.
- 5/31/96: Unit 2 - Downpower due to MSR TCV closure due to blown fuse.
                            - 6/06/96: Unit 2 - Reactor trip resulting from high generator H2 temp due to failed TCV.
- 6/06/96: Unit 2 - Reactor trip resulting from high generator H2 temp due to failed TCV.
                            - 6/22/96: Unit 2 - Downpower due to 2B FRV Controller problems.
- 6/22/96: Unit 2 - Downpower due to 2B FRV Controller problems.
                            - 7/23/96: Unit 1 - Manual trip due to turbine maintenance.
- 7/23/96: Unit 1 - Manual trip due to turbine maintenance.
Maintenance Backlog:
Maintenance Backlog:
                            - Non-outage corrective maintenance backlog: 1101 items. no significant changes since beginning of year.
- Non-outage corrective maintenance backlog: 1101 items. no significant changes since beginning of year.
                            - Overdue Preventive Maintenance Backlog: 30 Maintenance PMs were late Maintenance Rule A(1) systems: 6 systems
- Overdue Preventive Maintenance Backlog: 30 Maintenance PMs were late Maintenance Rule A(1) systems: 6 systems
                            - EDG governors. EDGs. 4.16 KV AC safety relatea breakers. PORVs.
- EDG governors. EDGs. 4.16 KV AC safety relatea breakers. PORVs.
C AFW. and RCP seals.
C AFW. and RCP seals.
C       Future Inspections:
C Future Inspections:
                            - Maintenance Rule follow-up: 62703 (RI) - 1 week
- Maintenance Rule follow-up: 62703 (RI) - 1 week
                            - ISI inspection: 73753 (core) - 1 week
- ISI inspection: 73753 (core) - 1 week
                            - Integrated S/G Replacement Inspection: 73753 (RI) - 3 weeks IV.     Functional Area Assessment - Enaineerina A.     Assessment St. Lucle received a SALP 1 rating during the SALP period that ended January 6. 1996. The licensee has declined in performance during this PPR period (March-September 1996) due to problems with
- Integrated S/G Replacement Inspection: 73753 (RI) - 3 weeks IV.
-                          configuration management / design control and a failure to identify
Functional Area Assessment - Enaineerina A.
!                          an US0.
Assessment St. Lucle received a SALP 1 rating during the SALP period that ended January 6. 1996.
The licensee has declined in performance during this PPR period (March-September 1996) due to problems with configuration management / design control and a failure to identify an US0.


y,               _ , .  --    a   2   3+ -
y, a
I B. Basis PIM TRENDS / ISSUES:   The trend indicated was for decline in configuration management as described in design control issues below and an issue for failure to identify an USO for a 50.59 evaluation (September 19. 1996).
2 3+
I B.
Basis PIM TRENDS / ISSUES:
The trend indicated was for decline in configuration management as described in design control issues below and an issue for failure to identify an USO for a 50.59 evaluation (September 19. 1996).
ENFORCEMENT: Letter of violation issued September 19. 1996. One level III and two level IVs in the area of US0 and configuration management.
ENFORCEMENT: Letter of violation issued September 19. 1996. One level III and two level IVs in the area of US0 and configuration management.
DESIGN CONTROL ISSUES:     Recently enforcement identified two problems     One was failure to coordinate design changes to operating procedures with three exam]les: 1) set point change to low level alarm in the Hydrazine tanc. 2) removal of ICW lube         '
DESIGN CONTROL ISSUES:
water piping and did not change abnormal procedure which affects operator actions. and 3) disabled a steam dump valve annunciator without changing the annunicator response procedure. The second problem identified the failure to change ICW drawings after a modi fication.
Recently enforcement identified two problems One was failure to coordinate design changes to operating procedures with three exam]les: 1) set point change to low level alarm in the Hydrazine tanc. 2) removal of ICW lube water piping and did not change abnormal procedure which affects operator actions. and 3) disabled a steam dump valve annunciator without changing the annunicator response procedure.
OPERATING FOCUS:     The licensee took steps to prevent tube failure of its steam generators on Unit 1 by plugging approximately 2300 tubes. These steam generators will be replaced in a fall 1997 outage.
The second problem identified the failure to change ICW drawings after a modi fication.
MAJOR INITIATIVES:     Unit 2 outage 4/15/97. Unit 1 S/G replacement outage fall '97 FSAR INITIATIVES: A review has been conducted of approximately one-third of the FSAR (July 1996 inspection). This review was
OPERATING FOCUS:
:            performed mostly on Unit 1 and was performed on text material and not for curves and tables. No US0 or operability problems were found. Approval pending for reviewing remaining part of FSAR.
The licensee took steps to prevent tube failure of its steam generators on Unit 1 by plugging approximately 2300 tubes.
DBD/R:   A Design Basis Documentation was performed for 20 design basis documents. The program was completed near the end of 1995.
These steam generators will be replaced in a fall 1997 outage.
C. Future Inspections Engineering-9 weeks. basis: Evaluate new engineering organization. FSAR project, configuration management and followup
MAJOR INITIATIVES:
;            on design control issues.
Unit 2 outage 4/15/97. Unit 1 S/G replacement outage fall '97 FSAR INITIATIVES:
L V. Functional Area Assessments - Plant Sucoort A,   Assessment i
A review has been conducted of approximately one-third of the FSAR (July 1996 inspection). This review was performed mostly on Unit 1 and was performed on text material and not for curves and tables.
The last SALP cycle ended 1/6/96.     Plant Support was Category 1.
No US0 or operability problems were found.
Tne lic;ensee continues to maintain a satisfactory level of performance in the area of Plant Support. Some decline in Radiation Protection has been noted due to the loss of control of contaminated tools and exceeding dose goals. Emergency
Approval pending for reviewing remaining part of FSAR.
;            Preparedness ongoing inspection indicates a decline in 1
DBD/R:
A Design Basis Documentation was performed for 20 design basis documents.
The program was completed near the end of 1995.
C.
Future Inspections Engineering-9 weeks. basis:
Evaluate new engineering organization. FSAR project, configuration management and followup on design control issues.
L V.
Functional Area Assessments - Plant Sucoort A,
Assessment i
The last SALP cycle ended 1/6/96.
Plant Support was Category 1.
Tne lic;ensee continues to maintain a satisfactory level of performance in the area of Plant Support.
Some decline in Radiation Protection has been noted due to the loss of control of contaminated tools and exceeding dose goals.
Emergency Preparedness ongoing inspection indicates a decline in 1
l
l


performance. Hurricane preparations for hurricane Bertha were conservative. Overall. site security has been adequate.
performance.
Training and qualification was noted as a strength and management observed to be aggressive in pursuing issues, but not aggressive in doing indepth review of events. Implementation of the fire protection program continued to be satisfactory.
Hurricane preparations for hurricane Bertha were conservative.
B. Basis Radiation Protection NCV for failure to control contaminated tools used in RCA (96-04.
Overall. site security has been adequate.
Training and qualification was noted as a strength and management observed to be aggressive in pursuing issues, but not aggressive in doing indepth review of events.
Implementation of the fire protection program continued to be satisfactory.
B.
Basis Radiation Protection NCV for failure to control contaminated tools used in RCA (96-04.
p 45)
p 45)
Violation (repeat of above NCV) for numerous examples of failure to control contaminated tools. (96-09. p 25)
Violation (repeat of above NCV) for numerous examples of failure to control contaminated tools. (96-09. p 25)
Internal and external exposures below 10 CFR Part 20 limits. (96-04, p 45 and 96-04, p 23).
Internal and external exposures below 10 CFR Part 20 limits. (96-04, p 45 and 96-04, p 23).
4
4 1995 dose was 412 person-rem. Unplanned maintenance and rework caused 1995 dose goal of 283 person-rem to be exceeded by 129 person-rem. (96-04. p 50)
;    1995 dose was 412 person-rem. Unplanned maintenance and rework caused 1995 dose goal of 283 person-rem to be exceeded by 129 person-rem. (96-04. p 50)
Rad Techs decreased from 32 to 30 and 2 supervisors lost (96-04 p 48)
Rad Techs decreased from 32 to 30 and 2 supervisors lost (96-04 p 48)
Decon staff reduced from 22 to 12 persons. Levels of contaminated equipment and materials increasing. (96-04. p 46) 4 Good radiological housekeeping and controls. (96-09. p 28)
Decon staff reduced from 22 to 12 persons.
The total area contaminated was at 250 ft2    (96-04, p 47)
Levels of contaminated equipment and materials increasing. (96-04. p 46)
Licensee accreditation of the FP&L DADS a good example of Radiation Protection staff's technical capabilities.     (96-04 p
Good radiological housekeeping and controls. (96-09. p 28) 4 2
,    44)
The total area contaminated was at 250 ft (96-04, p 47)
Licensee accreditation of the FP&L DADS a good example of Radiation Protection staff's technical capabilities.
(96-04 p 44)
Emeroency PreDaredness Conservative actions taken to prepare for Hurricane Bertha.(96-11.
Emeroency PreDaredness Conservative actions taken to prepare for Hurricane Bertha.(96-11.
p 3)
p 3)
Line 661: Line 970:


Fire Protection A backup fire pump was installed to replace an out of service fire pump.
Fire Protection A backup fire pump was installed to replace an out of service fire pump.
C. Future Inspections Insoections                 Rationale                           i Health Physics               (SALP 1 decline - maintain: watch)   l Operational HP(83750)         2-Inspections with focus on         j procedure coroliance: rework doses   :
C.
Eff1/RadWast(84/86750)       3-inspections with focus on         {
Future Inspections Insoections Rationale i
accident / process monitor           ;
Health Physics (SALP 1 decline - maintain: watch)
installation & maintenance           l TI 133 Rad Waste             Combine with 86750                   l Emergency Preparedness       1-Inspection with focus on Self-Prog. (82701)                 Assessment results                   i Regional Initiative inspection on   i allegation followuo (3 weeks. 2 inspectors)
Operational HP(83750) 2-Inspections with focus on j
Security Prog (81700)         Core Insp. to review security       I audits. corrective actions,         j management support and               i effectiveness, and review protected :
procedure coroliance: rework doses Eff1/RadWast(84/86750) 3-inspections with focus on
area detection equipment             '
{
Security Prg/FFD (81700/     One regional initiative to followup 81502)                       on tampering and FFD issues         ;
accident / process monitor installation & maintenance l
Fire Protection               None VI. Attachments                                                             ,
TI 133 Rad Waste Combine with 86750 Emergency Preparedness 1-Inspection with focus on Self-Prog. (82701)
: 1. St. Lucle. Inspection Plan
Assessment results i
: 2. Power Profile
Regional Initiative inspection on i
: 3. Plant Issues Matrix
allegation followuo (3 weeks. 2 inspectors)
: 4. Current NRC Performance Indicators
Security Prog (81700)
: 5. Licensee Organization Charts l
Core Insp. to review security audits. corrective actions, j
: 6. Allegation Status
management support and i
: 7. Enforcement History
effectiveness, and review protected area detection equipment Security Prg/FFD (81700/
: 8. Major Assessments
One regional initiative to followup 81502) on tampering and FFD issues Fire Protection None VI.
: 9. Recent Generic Issues Status List I
Attachments 1.
St. Lucle. Inspection Plan 2.
Power Profile 3.
Plant Issues Matrix 4.
Current NRC Performance Indicators 5.
Licensee Organization Charts 6.
Allegation Status l
7.
Enforcement History 8.
Major Assessments 9.
Recent Generic Issues Status List I
I i
I i


ST. LUCIE - INSPECTION PLAN INSPECTION                                                                   NUMBER OF         PLANNED PROCEDURE /           TITLE / PROGRAM AREA                                   INSPECTORS       INSPECTION       TYPE OF INSPECTION -
ST. LUCIE - INSPECTION PLAN INSPECTION NUMBER OF PLANNED PROCEDURE /
TEMPORARY                                                                                       DATES               COMMENTS INSTRUCTION 37550   fl0 CLEAR INSTRUMENTATION                                               2       10/7-18/96     REGIONAL INITIATIVE INSPECTION                                                                                                                                     ,
TITLE / PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS INSPECTION TYPE OF INSPECTION -
82701   OPERATIONAL STATUS OF Tile EP                                           2       10/7-18/96     REGIONAL INITIATIVE PROGRAM                                                                         10/28-11/1/96 81502   FITNESS FOR DUTY                                                       1       10/21-25/96     FOLLOWUP FFD/ TAMPERING 40500   EFFECTIVENESS OF LICENSEE                                               1       10/21-25/96     INSPECT STATUS OF CON 1ROLS IN IDENilFYlilG                                               1         1/6-17/97     PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT RESOLVING. AND PREVENTING                                                                       PROGRAM PROBLEMS: CORRECTIVE ACTION REVIEW t
TEMPORARY DATES COMMENTS INSTRUCTION 37550 fl0 CLEAR INSTRUMENTATION 2
84750   RADIOACTIVE WASTE TREATMENT AND                                         1         11/4-8/96     CORE                                           l EFFLUENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL Tl 133/86750 MONITORING: SOLID RADIDACTIVE                                           1       11/18-22/96     CORE                                           .
10/7-18/96 REGIONAL INITIATIVE INSPECTION 82701 OPERATIONAL STATUS OF Tile EP 2
WASTE MANAGEMENT AND                                                                                                                             i TRANSPORIATION OF RADI0 ACTIVE                                         1       2/24-28/97     CORE                                           i MATERIAL 93801   A/E EXPANDED SSFI INSPECTION                                           2         11/4-6/96     NRR INITIATIVE 5       11/18-22/96 5         12/2-6/96 5         12/9-13/96                                                   ;
10/7-18/96 REGIONAL INITIATIVE PROGRAM 10/28-11/1/96 81502 FITNESS FOR DUTY 1
5          1/6-10/96 i
10/21-25/96 FOLLOWUP FFD/ TAMPERING 40500 EFFECTIVENESS OF LICENSEE 1
10/21-25/96 INSPECT STATUS OF CON 1ROLS IN IDENilFYlilG 1
1/6-17/97 PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT RESOLVING. AND PREVENTING PROGRAM PROBLEMS: CORRECTIVE ACTION REVIEW l
t 84750 RADIOACTIVE WASTE TREATMENT AND 1
11/4-8/96 CORE l
EFFLUENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL Tl 133/86750 MONITORING: SOLID RADIDACTIVE 1
11/18-22/96 CORE WASTE MANAGEMENT AND i
TRANSPORIATION OF RADI0 ACTIVE 1
2/24-28/97 CORE i
MATERIAL 93801 A/E EXPANDED SSFI INSPECTION 2
11/4-6/96 NRR INITIATIVE 5
11/18-22/96 5
12/2-6/96 5
12/9-13/96 5
1/6-10/96 i
I L
I L


                                                                                                                              -2 INSPECTION                                                                                                 NUMBER OF                                                               PLANNED PROCEDURE /           TITLE / PROGRAM AREA                                                               INSPECTORS                                                   INSPECTION                                                                                                                       TYPE OF INSPECTION -
-2 INSPECTION NUMBER OF PLANNED PROCEDURE /
TEMPORARY                                                                                                                                                                                 DATES                                                                                                                 COMMENTS
TITLE / PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS INSPECTION TYPE OF INSPECTION -
              ' INSTRUCTION
TEMPORARY DATES COMMENTS
                    -83750       OCCtlPATIONAl RADIATION EXPOSURf                                                                 1                                                               12/2-6/96                                                                                             CORE 1                                                           1/6-10/97                                                                                               CORE                                           ,
' INSTRUCTION
71001       LICENSED OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION                                                               2                                                                   12/2/96                                                                                           REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM                       ,
-83750 OCCtlPATIONAl RADIATION EXPOSURf 1
PROGRAM EVALUATION                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     INSPECTION 81700       PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM FOR                                                                   1                                     _                    1/6-10/97                                                                                               CORE - SAFEGUARDS POWER REACTORS 62703       FOLLOWUP MAINTENANCE RULE TEAM                                                                   1                                                   1/27 -31/97                                                                                                     REGIONAL INITIATIVE INSPECTION 73753       STEAM GENERATOR INTEGRATED                                                                       1                                                       1/27-31/97                                                                                                   REGIONAL INITIATIVE INSPECTION                                                                                                                                             2/10-14/97                                                                                                                                                   -
12/2-6/96 CORE 1
5/5-9/97 37550       ENGINEERING                                                                                     1                                                             2/3-7/97                                                                                             CORE 50.59 FOCUS 92703       FOLLOWUP A/E EXPANDED SSFI lEAM                                                                 3                                                           3/3-14/97                                                                                                 REGIONAL INITIATIVE INSPECTION OPEN ISSUES 73753       INSERVICE INSPECTION                                                                             1                                                   4/28-5/2/97                                                                                                       CORE -MAINTENANCE 82701       OPERATIONAL STATUS OF EP PROGRAM                                                                 1                                                           1/6-10/97                                                                                               CORE
1/6-10/97 CORE 71001 LICENSED OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION 2
__ - - . - - _                __            _ . -  _ - . _ - _ - _ _ - - - - _ . _ . . . -__--_---___----__.-.~._...__..-.e-
12/2/96 REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM PROGRAM EVALUATION INSPECTION 81700 PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM FOR 1
                                                                                                  -                                  _ . _ . . _ . - _ _ _ - - _ . - _ . _ _ - - - ~ . . _ _ - - - - _ _ - - - _ _ - . - . _ _ - _ - - . . _ - . - - . - - - . - _ - - _ - . - - - - . _ , . - . _ - , . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . -
1/6-10/97 CORE - SAFEGUARDS POWER REACTORS 62703 FOLLOWUP MAINTENANCE RULE TEAM 1
1/27 -31/97 REGIONAL INITIATIVE INSPECTION 73753 STEAM GENERATOR INTEGRATED 1
1/27-31/97 REGIONAL INITIATIVE INSPECTION 2/10-14/97 5/5-9/97 37550 ENGINEERING 1
2/3-7/97 CORE 50.59 FOCUS 92703 FOLLOWUP A/E EXPANDED SSFI lEAM 3
3/3-14/97 REGIONAL INITIATIVE INSPECTION OPEN ISSUES 73753 INSERVICE INSPECTION 1
4/28-5/2/97 CORE -MAINTENANCE 82701 OPERATIONAL STATUS OF EP PROGRAM 1
1/6-10/97 CORE
.-.~....
..-.e-
_. _.. _. - _ _ _ - - _. - _. _ _ - - - ~.. _ _ - - - - _ _ - - - _ _ -. -. _ _ - _ - -.. _ -. - -. - - -. - _ - - _ -. - - - -. _,. -. _ -,. _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _. -


STm     LUCIE UNIT                                                             1 Operational           Period Fe b ru a ry 1996 th ro u gli     October 18, 1996 1                     2                                                                             3 100-         "                                                                                      "              -            =
STm LUCIE UNIT 1
3On August 23,1996, 1   On February 24,1996,                                                                             a manual trip was 60 -              a manua trip was initiated                                                                     initiated to perform N                     while going to a TS required k                                                                                                                    turbine maintenance.
Operational Period Fe b ru a ry 1996 th ro u gli October 18, 1996 1
o  60-               shutdown                                                                                   -
2 3
A 4
100-
E-Z m  4g~-           2   April 29, 1996,                                                       4   The unit opei ated at S                       shutdow 1 for                                                           60% power d n to main
=
* transformer 3 oblems a                      refueling l l O   noin   n i u n o n i n o n o"trentrentntunnnnnt"n o n i o:                                             :nnonionnoun F       M       A         M                                                         J J       A       S         0 PERIOD OF OPERATION Graph does not include power reductions for routine repairs, waterbox cleaning, or required repairs.
3On August 23,1996, 1
On February 24,1996, 60 -
a manual trip was a manua trip was initiated initiated to perform N
while going to a TS required turbine maintenance.
ko 60-shutdown A
4 E-Zm 4g~-
2 April 29,
: 1996, 4
The unit opei ated at S
shutdow 1 for 60% power d n to main
*a refueling transformer 3 oblems l
l O
noin n i u n o n i n o n o"trentrentntunnnnnt"n o n i o: :nnonionnoun F
M A
M J
J A
S 0
PERIOD OF OPERATION Graph does not include power reductions for routine repairs, waterbox cleaning, or required repairs.


ST. LUCIE                 UNIT         2 Ope ra tio n al           Period Fe b ru a ry 1995 through     October 18, 1996 1               2 100                             "                    "                                        =
ST.
1 On April 20,1996 80 -                                                             the unit was removed c4 r.za                                                                     from service during g                                                                       turbine testing a    60 -
LUCIE UNIT 2
g                                                                                                         ,
Ope ra tio n al Period Fe b ru a ry 1995 through October 18, 1996 1
Z W 40-U                                                                     2 On June 6,1996, the c4 rza                                                                     unit was manually tripped
2 100
%                                                                                                          i 20 -                                                             due to high generator             i hydrogen gas temperature.
=
0   n o n o n o n u n i n i m"" n o n i n u n"it"nmnu n i o n n i o n n i n i n o n o n n o m F       M             A       M           J     J         A       S             O         ~:
1 On April 20,1996 80 -
PERIOD OF OPERATION Graph       does         not include power reductions for ro u tin e repairs, waterbox                               cleaning, or required repairs.
the unit was removed c4 r.za from service during
>g turbine testing 60 -
a g
ZW 40-U 2 On June 6,1996, the l
c4 rza unit was manually tripped i
20 -
due to high generator i
hydrogen gas temperature.
0 n o n o n o n u n i n i m"" n o n i n u n"it"nmnu n i o n n i o n n i n i n o n o n n o m F
M A
M J
J A
S O
~:
PERIOD OF OPERATION Graph does not include power reductions for ro u tin e repairs, waterbox
: cleaning, or required repairs.


PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BY SALP AREA St. Lucie SECONDARY DATE       TYPE           SOURCE     SALP AREA   ID   ITEM                                                                                                             APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS ENGINEERING 4/18/96   NCV             IR 96-06       M         L   Missing orifice plate identified in Unit 1                                                                         Either failure to install orifice during ICW system during licensee field                                                                                   plant modification, or failure to reinstall walkdowns                                                                                                         orifice following maintenance.
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BY SALP AREA St. Lucie SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS ENGINEERING 4/18/96 NCV IR 96-06 M
4/29/96   NCV             IR 96-06                 N   Failure to promptly document a                                                                                     Engineering failed to initiate CR upon nonconformance                                                                                                     discovery that approx. 35 S-R instruments on each unit might have been calibrated at temperatures lower than those assumed in setpoint cales         '
L Missing orifice plate identified in Unit 1 Either failure to install orifice during ICW system during licensee field plant modification, or failure to reinstall walkdowns orifice following maintenance.
5/12/96   NCV             IR 96-12. EA   O         L   Initial temperature (and other) conditions                                                                         Programmatic weakness in Plant 96-236                       specified in Unit I spent fuel pool heat                                                                           Change / Modification process.           '
4/29/96 NCV IR 96-06 N
load calculation (to support total core                                                                                                                         ,
Failure to promptly document a Engineering failed to initiate CR upon nonconformance discovery that approx. 35 S-R instruments on each unit might have been calibrated at temperatures lower than those assumed in setpoint cales 5/12/96 NCV IR 96-12. EA O
offload) was not factored into procedures 4/9/96   NEG                                       S   CIRC water piping through-wall leaks                                                                               Galvanic corrosion due to inadequate observed in two water boxes' outlets.                                                                             cathodic protection following installation of stainless steel Tapparogge components.                                   ,
L Initial temperature (and other) conditions Programmatic weakness in Plant 96-236 specified in Unit I spent fuel pool heat Change / Modification process.
i 6/3/96   OTHER           1R 96-08       O         L   Unit 1 outage extended due to expansion                                                                           New plugging cnteria resulting from of SG MRPC tube inspections. Tube                                                                                 discussions with NRR on defect plugging approached 25% limit. PLAs                                                                               characterization methodologies submitted to NRR to allow plugging up to 30%.                                                                                                                                                             ,
load calculation (to support total core offload) was not factored into procedures 4/9/96 NEG S
6/8/96   OTHER           IR 96-08                 L   Ongoing review by licensee of UFSAR                                                                               Failure to update FSAR over time and accuracy identified approximately 150                                                                             failure to review FSAR properly when items, ranging from typographical errors to                                                                       preparing procedures.                         I more substantive issues.                                                                                                                                         ;
CIRC water piping through-wall leaks Galvanic corrosion due to inadequate observed in two water boxes' outlets.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                                   Page 1 of 26                                                                                                                             21-Oct-96
cathodic protection following installation of stainless steel Tapparogge components.
i 6/3/96 OTHER 1R 96-08 O
L Unit 1 outage extended due to expansion New plugging cnteria resulting from of SG MRPC tube inspections. Tube discussions with NRR on defect plugging approached 25% limit. PLAs characterization methodologies submitted to NRR to allow plugging up to 30%.
6/8/96 OTHER IR 96-08 L
Ongoing review by licensee of UFSAR Failure to update FSAR over time and accuracy identified approximately 150 failure to review FSAR properly when items, ranging from typographical errors to preparing procedures.
I more substantive issues.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 1 of 26 21-Oct-96


SECONDARY DATE       TYPE           SOURCE SALP AREA ID     ITEM                                                             APPARENT CAUSE I COMMENTS 7/18/96   OTHER           1R 96-11   M       1. Unit 1 AFAS setpoints found                                         Failure to employ as-built elevations of nonconservative during review of                                   condensate pots in the development of recalibration activities.                                         calibration critena.
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE I COMMENTS 7/18/96 OTHER 1R 96-11 M
7/30/96   OTHER           IR 96-11   O       L   3 of 4 Unit 1 knear Ni channels found                               Drawing errors - discrepancy between miswired, with the detectors
1.
* upper                               vendor technical manuals and control chambers feeding the lower NI drawer                               wiring diagrams generated for the inputs and vice-versa Result was 3                                 installation of the new Unit 1 NI drawers channels for which axial shape index was in error.
Unit 1 AFAS setpoints found Failure to employ as-built elevations of nonconservative during review of condensate pots in the development of recalibration activities.
4/13/96   POS           IR 96-06             N   Engineering response to failure of HVS-4A                         Procurement engineering effective in motor considered good.                                             locating and dedicating replacement motor and in identifying and resolving incorrect bearing rating calc for new motor. Minor problem existed in that new starting current profile was not adequately treated.
calibration critena.
6/1/96   POS             IR 96-08             N CNRB activities surrounding PLA reviews in support of SG tube plugging issues were probing and competent.
7/30/96 OTHER IR 96-11 O
6/8/96   POS             IR 96-08     M       N Unit 1 RWT liner inspection.                                       Licensee satisfied committments to inspect fiberglass liner in RWT. Results sat.
L 3 of 4 Unit 1 knear Ni channels found Drawing errors - discrepancy between miswired, with the detectors
8/26/96   POS             IR 96-14           N   Engineering activities associated with leak in class 3 line to containment fan cooler in accordance with GL 91-18 and GL 90-05 for non-code repair.
* upper vendor technical manuals and control chambers feeding the lower NI drawer wiring diagrams generated for the inputs and vice-versa Result was 3 installation of the new Unit 1 NI drawers channels for which axial shape index was in error.
6/8/96   STREN           IR 96-08     M     N   ISI activities for SG and reactor vessel                           Examinations well-planned, performed eddy current examinations reviewed.                                 and managed by very talented and knowledgable personnel.
4/13/96 POS IR 96-06 N
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                                           Page 2 of 26                                                                           21-Oct-96
Engineering response to failure of HVS-4A Procurement engineering effective in motor considered good.
locating and dedicating replacement motor and in identifying and resolving incorrect bearing rating calc for new motor. Minor problem existed in that new starting current profile was not adequately treated.
6/1/96 POS IR 96-08 N
CNRB activities surrounding PLA reviews in support of SG tube plugging issues were probing and competent.
6/8/96 POS IR 96-08 M
N Unit 1 RWT liner inspection.
Licensee satisfied committments to inspect fiberglass liner in RWT. Results sat.
8/26/96 POS IR 96-14 N
Engineering activities associated with leak in class 3 line to containment fan cooler in accordance with GL 91-18 and GL 90-05 for non-code repair.
6/8/96 STREN IR 96-08 M
N ISI activities for SG and reactor vessel Examinations well-planned, performed eddy current examinations reviewed.
and managed by very talented and knowledgable personnel.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 2 of 26 21-Oct-96


SECONDARY DATE       TYPE           SOURCE       SALP AREA ID ITEM                                               APPARENT CAUSEl COMMENTS 6/6/96   VIO             IR 96-12, EA-           N USO, involving taking a normally open             Licensee determined that small increase 96-249                     EDG fuel oil line isolation valve to the           in the probability of failure could be closed position and the use of operator           overcome by admin processes.
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEl COMMENTS 6/6/96 VIO IR 96-12, EA-N USO, involving taking a normally open Licensee determined that small increase 96-249 EDG fuel oil line isolation valve to the in the probability of failure could be closed position and the use of operator overcome by admin processes.
action to open the valve on EDG start.
action to open the valve on EDG start.
cited at SL 111.
cited at SL 111.
7/12/96   VIO             lR 96-12. EA             N Two SL IV violations cited for                     Lack of appropriate pre and post-96-236                     configuration management control                   installation review.
7/12/96 VIO lR 96-12. EA N
Two SL IV violations cited for Lack of appropriate pre and post-96-236 configuration management control installation review.
problems involving inaccuracies in procedures and drawings due to design changes.
problems involving inaccuracies in procedures and drawings due to design changes.
8/3/96   VIO             IR 96-11         M       N Prelubrication of valves prior to                 Procedure which required prelube had surveillance testing in 1995 resolved as           not been considered for potential effects being a violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B           on stroke time.
8/3/96 VIO IR 96-11 M
N Prelubrication of valves prior to Procedure which required prelube had surveillance testing in 1995 resolved as not been considered for potential effects being a violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B on stroke time.
criterion XI.
criterion XI.
10/18/96 VIO             IR 96-17                 L Failure to satisfy QA plan requirements in         Failure to perform independent the development of design modifications           verifications of design outputs to the Unit 1 Nuclear instrumentation             (drawmgs). Multiple examples. Also,                             ;
10/18/96 VIO IR 96-17 L
system.                                           failure to perform adequate validation                         -
Failure to satisfy QA plan requirements in Failure to perform independent the development of design modifications verifications of design outputs to the Unit 1 Nuclear instrumentation (drawmgs). Multiple examples. Also, system.
and verification of software for incore monitoring.
failure to perform adequate validation and verification of software for incore monitoring.
6/3/96   WEAK           IR 96-12 EA     M       S High temperature condition in Unit 2 rod           Failure of an air conditioner. Further                         ,
6/3/96 WEAK IR 96-12 EA M
96-236                     control cabinet room due to failure of an         review by licensee /NRC showed air                             l sir conditioner led to indications of rod         conditioner was temporacy equipment                           !
S High temperature condition in Unit 2 rod Failure of an air conditioner. Further 96-236 control cabinet room due to failure of an review by licensee /NRC showed air l
control problems. Indications later shown         installed without design controls during to be false. Also, high temp condition led         pre-op test phase.
sir conditioner led to indications of rod conditioner was temporacy equipment control problems. Indications later shown installed without design controls during to be false. Also, high temp condition led pre-op test phase.
to failure of a diverse turbine trip relay.
to failure of a diverse turbine trip relay.
7/12/96   WEAK           IR 96-12                 L Licensee veritcal slice inspection of EDG,         Lack of proper configuration control over HPSI, and CCW systems revealed                     time.
7/12/96 WEAK IR 96-12 L
numerous deficiencies in procedure, design document and FSAR accuracy.                                                                               ,
Licensee veritcal slice inspection of EDG, Lack of proper configuration control over HPSI, and CCW systems revealed time.
numerous deficiencies in procedure, design document and FSAR accuracy.
L l
L l
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                               Page 3 of 26                                                               21-Oct-96
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 3 of 26 21-Oct-96


SECONDARY DATE       TYPE           SOURCE       SALP AREA ID   ITEM                                                                                                                                                               APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 10/12/96 WEAK           IR 96-15         PS       N   No evidence could be found that                                                                                                                                     lack of design basis documentation.
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 10/12/96 WEAK IR 96-15 PS N
No evidence could be found that lack of design basis documentation.
containment leakage detection systems satisfied leak-before-break assumptions for detectability or seismicity.
containment leakage detection systems satisfied leak-before-break assumptions for detectability or seismicity.
MONTENANCE 11/1/95   NCV             IR 95                 S   ICI wiring error during RX head installation                                                                                                                       Personnel Error NCV 95-18-05                   last RFO.
MONTENANCE 11/1/95 NCV IR 95 S ICI wiring error during RX head installation Personnel Error NCV 95-18-05 last RFO.
2/17/96   NCV             IR 96-01. IR     PS       N   Work on 1 A ECCS suction header through- Personnelwork practices (workers 96-04                         wall leak revealed strong FME, but poor                                                                                                                             ignored RWP requirements)
2/17/96 NCV IR 96-01. IR PS N
Work on 1 A ECCS suction header through-Personnelwork practices (workers 96-04 wall leak revealed strong FME, but poor ignored RWP requirements)
HP work practices observed regarding contamination control resulted in NCV.
HP work practices observed regarding contamination control resulted in NCV.
5/8/96   NCV             IR 96-06                   N   Lack of verified (controlled) copy of                                                                                                                               Failure of Maintenance workers to procedure identified at CCW heat                                                                                                                                   property verify procedures prior to exchanger jobsite.                                                                                                                                                 beginning work.                             i 5/17/96   NCV             IR 96-08                   N   Failure to verify the currency of procedure                                                                                                                         Cognitive personnelerror in use at jobsite 5/17/96   NCV             IR 96-08                   N   Failure to satisfy requirements for                                                                                                                                 Cognitive error.
5/8/96 NCV IR 96-06 N
                                                        " independence" on the part of independent verifier.
Lack of verified (controlled) copy of Failure of Maintenance workers to procedure identified at CCW heat property verify procedures prior to exchanger jobsite.
8/3/96   NCV             1R 96-11                   N   Review of outage freeze seals indicated                                                                                                                             Stop work order by management for           i that one freeze seal had been left                                                                                                                                 cleanup of the Unit 1 pipe tunnel           '
beginning work.
unattended for approximately one hour.                                                                                                                             resulted in directing freeze seal watch to another area to make room for trash being hauled out of area.
i 5/17/96 NCV IR 96-08 N
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                                   Page 4 of 26                                                                                                                                                                             21-Oct-96
Failure to verify the currency of procedure Cognitive personnelerror in use at jobsite 5/17/96 NCV IR 96-08 N
Failure to satisfy requirements for Cognitive error.
" independence" on the part of independent verifier.
8/3/96 NCV 1R 96-11 N
Review of outage freeze seals indicated Stop work order by management for i
that one freeze seal had been left cleanup of the Unit 1 pipe tunnel unattended for approximately one hour.
resulted in directing freeze seal watch to another area to make room for trash being hauled out of area.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 4 of 26 21-Oct-96


SECONDARY DATE       TYPE           SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM                                     APPARENT CAUSEICOMMENTS 10/12/96 NCV             IR 96-15           N QA identified 3 areas of noncompliance     M&TE storage area had been relyted with M&TE controls; one lack of a cat     to a self-service facility, counter to QA sticker, lack of segregation of sat and   plan requirements. Indications are that unsat M&TE, lack of an individual         a lack of personnot contributed.
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEICOMMENTS 10/12/96 NCV IR 96-15 N
QA identified 3 areas of noncompliance M&TE storage area had been relyted with M&TE controls; one lack of a cat to a self-service facility, counter to QA sticker, lack of segregation of sat and plan requirements. Indications are that unsat M&TE, lack of an individual a lack of personnot contributed.
controlling M&TE.
controlling M&TE.
2/17/96   NEG             IR96-01             N Freeze seal procedure lacked objective     ProceduralWeakness criteria defining when a freeze seal existed.
2/17/96 NEG IR96-01 N
2/17/96   NEG             IR 96-01           L Weakness identified in l&C calibration     ProceduralInadequacy procedure -lack of detail provided for safety related calibrations.
Freeze seal procedure lacked objective ProceduralWeakness criteria defining when a freeze seal existed.
3/30/96   NEG             1R 96-04           N Control of maintenance procedures was     Programmatic vunerability.
2/17/96 NEG IR 96-01 L
such that an outdated procedures could, programmatically, wind up in the field due                                         '
Weakness identified in l&C calibration ProceduralInadequacy procedure -lack of detail provided for safety related calibrations.
to their inclusion in previously prepared packages. Licensee corrective action adequate.
3/30/96 NEG 1R 96-04 N
6/8/96   NEG             IR 96-08           N Appleation of ladder and scaffolding programs appears to be rr.inimally compliant with licensee's self-imposed requirements. Many scaffolds and ladders required caution tags or had not been removed promptly after use.
Control of maintenance procedures was Programmatic vunerability.
11/6/95   OTHER           1R 95-21           S Failure of EDG 2A relay sockets.           Equipment Failure Potential common mode failure.
such that an outdated procedures could, programmatically, wind up in the field due to their inclusion in previously prepared packages. Licensee corrective action adequate.
12/9/95   OTHER           1R 95-22           L 2A2 RCP seal pkg lower seal destaged       Filling RCS Before Coupling RCP due to reverse pressure across seal.
6/8/96 NEG IR 96-08 N
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                           Page 5 of 26                                                     21-Oct-96
Appleation of ladder and scaffolding programs appears to be rr.inimally compliant with licensee's self-imposed requirements. Many scaffolds and ladders required caution tags or had not been removed promptly after use.
11/6/95 OTHER 1R 95-21 S
Failure of EDG 2A relay sockets.
Equipment Failure Potential common mode failure.
12/9/95 OTHER 1R 95-22 L
2A2 RCP seal pkg lower seal destaged Filling RCS Before Coupling RCP due to reverse pressure across seal.
i FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 5 of 26 21-Oct-96


SECONDARY DATE       TYPE             SOURCE         SALP AREA ID         ITEM                                                                                                                                                               APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 12/20/95 OTHER           IR 95-22                   S         RX vessel flange inner O-ring groove                                                                                                                               Pitting - Localized Corrosion pitting resulted in cooldown and head removal for repair 3/30/96   OTHER           IR 96-04                   S         Maintenance underwent major departmentalreorganization. Selected supervisors' qualifications found satisfactory per TS requirements.
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 12/20/95 OTHER IR 95-22 S
5/22/96   OTHER                                       L         V 3483 (SDC Suction Relief) setpoint                                                                                                                               Root cause not e.;tablished. Either found out-of-spec high, rendering valve                                                                                                                             tampering or poor maintenance incapable of performing its intended                                                                                                                               practices (most likely).
RX vessel flange inner O-ring groove Pitting - Localized Corrosion pitting resulted in cooldown and head removal for repair 3/30/96 OTHER IR 96-04 S
Maintenance underwent major departmentalreorganization. Selected supervisors' qualifications found satisfactory per TS requirements.
5/22/96 OTHER L
V 3483 (SDC Suction Relief) setpoint Root cause not e.;tablished. Either found out-of-spec high, rendering valve tampering or poor maintenance incapable of performing its intended practices (most likely).
function.
function.
6/3/96   OTHER           1R 96-08                   N         EDG reliability calculations indicate that EDG reliability is in keening with SBO assumptions 6/8/96   OTHER           1R 96-08                   N         Review of maintenance backlog indicated thatlicensee had a plan for backlog reduction in place but has yet to meet goals.
6/3/96 OTHER 1R 96-08 N
8/3/96   OTHER           1R 96-11           E       N         Licensee's activities regarding maintenance of rod control system were adequate.
EDG reliability calculations indicate that EDG reliability is in keening with SBO assumptions 6/8/96 OTHER 1R 96-08 N
9/7/96   OTHER           1R 96-14                   N         Apparent improper use of M&TE for                                                                                                                                   Failure to follow procedure.
Review of maintenance backlog indicated thatlicensee had a plan for backlog reduction in place but has yet to meet goals.
8/3/96 OTHER 1R 96-11 E
N Licensee's activities regarding maintenance of rod control system were adequate.
9/7/96 OTHER 1R 96-14 N
Apparent improper use of M&TE for Failure to follow procedure.
meggering NI cabling identified. Lack of tracability from M&TE to work order due to borrowing the equipment from one job for use on anotherjob. URI.
meggering NI cabling identified. Lack of tracability from M&TE to work order due to borrowing the equipment from one job for use on anotherjob. URI.
9/9/96   OTHER           1R 96-15                   S         Set screw / locknut in Trip Circuit Breaker 5                                                                                                                       Root cause pending. Initialindications sheared off during surveillance testing and                                                                                                                         were of apparent hydrogen was later found in breaker cubicle.                                                                                                                                 embnttlement.
9/9/96 OTHER 1R 96-15 S
Set screw / locknut in Trip Circuit Breaker 5 Root cause pending. Initialindications sheared off during surveillance testing and were of apparent hydrogen was later found in breaker cubicle.
embnttlement.
kN
kN
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ?}
?}
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                                           Page 6 of 26                                                                                                                                                                             21-Oct-96
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 6 of 26 21-Oct-96


SECONDARY DATE       TYPE           SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM                                       APPARENT CAUSEICOMMENTS 2117/96   POS             IR 96-01           N Noted improvernents in housekeeping and material conditions.
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEICOMMENTS 2117/96 POS IR 96-01 N
3/30/96   POS             IR 96-04           N 10 maintenance activitss observed during inspection period. No significani deficiencies noted.
Noted improvernents in housekeeping and material conditions.
5/11/96   POS             IR 96-06           N Observations of Pressurizer Code Safety     No deficiencies noted Valve testing and repair 5/11/96   POS             IR 96-06           N Preparations for Unit I reactor vessel ISI. In accordance with requirements and showed good outage planning.
3/30/96 POS IR 96-04 N
5/11/96   POS             IR 96-06           N Observations of maintenance activities in   No deficencies noted.
10 maintenance activitss observed during inspection period. No significani deficiencies noted.
5/11/96 POS IR 96-06 N
Observations of Pressurizer Code Safety No deficiencies noted Valve testing and repair 5/11/96 POS IR 96-06 N
Preparations for Unit I reactor vessel ISI.
In accordance with requirements and showed good outage planning.
5/11/96 POS IR 96-06 N
Observations of maintenance activities in No deficencies noted.
containment (Unit 1 outage) involving valve packing replacement and modification.
containment (Unit 1 outage) involving valve packing replacement and modification.
5/11/96   POS             IR 96-06           N MSSV testing - Unit 1 Outage                 Review of test data and methodology sat.
5/11/96 POS IR 96-06 N
5/11/96   POS             IR 96-06   E       N Polar crane load rating calc and Unit 1     No deficiencies identifHui.
MSSV testing - Unit 1 Outage Review of test data and methodology sat.
5/11/96 POS IR 96-06 E
N Polar crane load rating calc and Unit 1 No deficiencies identifHui.
nead lift.
nead lift.
6/8/96   POS             IR 96-08           N Repair work for Unit 1 fuel transfer tube   Conducted satisfactorily isolation valve.
6/8/96 POS IR 96-08 N
6/13/96   POS             IR 96-09           N Maintenance activities associated with       Work conducted satisfactorily.
Repair work for Unit 1 fuel transfer tube Conducted satisfactorily isolation valve.
6/13/96 POS IR 96-09 N
Maintenance activities associated with Work conducted satisfactorily.
Unit i reactor head lift and Unit 2 feed reg valve work.
Unit i reactor head lift and Unit 2 feed reg valve work.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                         Page 7 of 26                                                     21-Oct-96
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 7 of 26 21-Oct-96


SECONDARY DATE       TYPE           SOURCE SALP AREA ID   ITEM                                       APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 6/20/96   POS             IR 96-09   O       L Loss of 3 Wide Range Nuclear instrument     Operators prompt and accurate in Channels on Unit I resulted in entering TS   verifying shutdown margin requirements.
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 6/20/96 POS IR 96-09 O
L Loss of 3 Wide Range Nuclear instrument Operators prompt and accurate in Channels on Unit I resulted in entering TS verifying shutdown margin requirements.
AS for Nis.
AS for Nis.
7/20/96   POS             1R 96-11   O       N Post-outage walkdown of Unit 1 containment indicated excellent cleanliness.
7/20/96 POS 1R 96-11 O
9/7/96     POS             IR 96-14           N ESF response time testing procedure identified as weak in detail. CR resolution to change procedure appropriate. Review of last 4 performances of procedure for each unit indicated that TS satisfied for competion of all channels.
N Post-outage walkdown of Unit 1 containment indicated excellent cleanliness.
9/7/96     POS           IR 96-14             N Review of 20 work orders indicated                                                     I appropriate control of work scope.
9/7/96 POS IR 96-14 N
2/24/96   VIO             IR 96-04           N Acceptance criteria specif,ed for CEDM       Fadure ofI&C System Supervisor to coil resistances in PC/M package found       adhere to test criteria compounded by varied and unclear. Criteria were not       failure of I&C management to identify properly applied and values outside of       obvious errors during post-work review.
ESF response time testing procedure identified as weak in detail. CR resolution to change procedure appropriate. Review of last 4 performances of procedure for each unit indicated that TS satisfied for competion of all channels.
specifications were not documented and                                                 1 resolved.
9/7/96 POS IR 96-14 N
6/13/96   VIO             IR 96-09           N A review of overtime for a one month         Failure of management to track the use period indicated that overtime guidelines   of overtime as specified in site were routinely exceeded without prior (or   procedure. Procedure poorly defined subsequent) approval. 56 examples cited     requirements.
Review of 20 work orders indicated I
appropriate control of work scope.
2/24/96 VIO IR 96-04 N
Acceptance criteria specif,ed for CEDM Fadure ofI&C System Supervisor to coil resistances in PC/M package found adhere to test criteria compounded by varied and unclear. Criteria were not failure of I&C management to identify properly applied and values outside of obvious errors during post-work review.
specifications were not documented and 1
resolved.
6/13/96 VIO IR 96-09 N
A review of overtime for a one month Failure of management to track the use period indicated that overtime guidelines of overtime as specified in site were routinely exceeded without prior (or procedure. Procedure poorly defined subsequent) approval. 56 examples cited requirements.
for 5 individuals.
for 5 individuals.
7/6/96   VIO             IR 96-09     E     N Review of testing activities for continment Fadure to property implement App. B blast dampers indicated that violations of   and QA plan as they related to             !
7/6/96 VIO IR 96-09 E
10 CFR 50 App. B and site procedures         documenting as-found and as-left data.
N Review of testing activities for continment Fadure to property implement App. B blast dampers indicated that violations of and QA plan as they related to 10 CFR 50 App. B and site procedures documenting as-found and as-left data.
existed. Two violations cited.
existed. Two violations cited.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                           Page 8 of 26                                                     21-Oct-96
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 8 of 26 21-Oct-96


SECONDARY DATE       TYPE           SOURCE SALP AREA ID       ITEM                                                           APPARENT CAUSEI COIMIENTS 10/12/96 VIO             IR 96-15           N       M&TE used in testing control channel Ni                       M&TE was borrowed from another job, dunng installation was not logged out                           in violation of procedural controls.
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COIMIENTS 10/12/96 VIO IR 96-15 N
M&TE used in testing control channel Ni M&TE was borrowed from another job, dunng installation was not logged out in violation of procedural controls.
against the work order for the job.
against the work order for the job.
Tracability was thus lost.
Tracability was thus lost.
10/18/96 VIO             IR 96-17           N       Failure to initiate a condition report for a                   Resulted in miswiring the detector.
10/18/96 VIO IR 96-17 N
Failure to initiate a condition report for a Resulted in miswiring the detector.
deficiency when cable labeling for Unit 1 B channel Ni detector did not agree with drawing.
deficiency when cable labeling for Unit 1 B channel Ni detector did not agree with drawing.
2/24/96   WEAK           IR 96-04           N     Maintenance practices for Steam Bypass                         Poor preventive rnaintenance on SCBC and Control System and Feedwater                               valve air lines and FRVs.
2/24/96 WEAK IR 96-04 N
Maintenance practices for Steam Bypass Poor preventive rnaintenance on SCBC and Control System and Feedwater valve air lines and FRVs.
Regulating valves found weak in inspection following 2/22/96 Unit 1 trip.
Regulating valves found weak in inspection following 2/22/96 Unit 1 trip.
OPERATIONS 1/7/96                                       N     SALP CYCLE 12 BEGINS t
OPERATIONS 1/7/96 N
3/31/96   EMERG           IR 96-06   PS     N     Operator response to RCS leakage                               Operators effective at                                                     '
SALP CYCLE 12 BEGINS t
through CVCS system.                                           identifying / isolating leak; however, Unusual Event callwas non-conservative in that the call was delayed to allow a 1 hour RCS inventory balance to be calc'd when otherinformation indicated that excessive leakage existed.
t 3/31/96 EMERG IR 96-06 PS N
7/13/96   EMERG           IR 96-11   M       L     NOUE declared when 2C charging pump                           Check valve stuck open due to possibly check valve stuck open, creating bypass                       generic effects of pulsating low flow in a flowpath from charging pumps to VCT.                           continuous service valve.
Operator response to RCS leakage Operators effective at through CVCS system.
identifying / isolating leak; however, Unusual Event callwas non-conservative in that the call was delayed to allow a 1 hour RCS inventory balance to be calc'd when otherinformation indicated that excessive leakage existed.
7/13/96 EMERG IR 96-11 M
L NOUE declared when 2C charging pump Check valve stuck open due to possibly check valve stuck open, creating bypass generic effects of pulsating low flow in a flowpath from charging pumps to VCT.
continuous service valve.
Operators timely in declaring event.
Operators timely in declaring event.
8/9/96   EMERG           IR 96-14   M       L     NOUE declared due to RCS leakage in                           Chafging pump packing leakage excess of 1 gpm unidentified.                                 identlSed as source of leak. Operators correctly applied EAL.
8/9/96 EMERG IR 96-14 M
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                               Page 9 of 26                                                                                                               21-Oct-96
L NOUE declared due to RCS leakage in Chafging pump packing leakage excess of 1 gpm unidentified.
identlSed as source of leak. Operators correctly applied EAL.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 9 of 26 21-Oct-96


4 SECONDARY DATE       TYPE           SOURCE     SALP AREA ID ITEM                                                       APPARENT CAUSEICOMMENTS 2/22/96   LER             LER 335/96-   M       S Dropped CEA led to declaration of NOUE 002                     and plant shutdown. During shutdown, failure of air line to a FRV led to manual trip.
4 SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEICOMMENTS i
5/29/96   LER                             M       L Suspected loss of approximately 1200 condenser tube cleaning balls reported to state /NRC. Balls were found unaccounted for during an inventory balance.
2/22/96 LER LER 335/96-M S
Dropped CEA led to declaration of NOUE 002 and plant shutdown. During shutdown, failure of air line to a FRV led to manual trip.
5/29/96 LER M
L Suspected loss of approximately 1200 condenser tube cleaning balls reported to state /NRC. Balls were found unaccounted for during an inventory balance.
Suspected that balls were released to Atlantic Ocean.
Suspected that balls were released to Atlantic Ocean.
6/2/96   LER                             M       L Non-safety related breaker alignments to                   Operators not aware that containment support Unit 1 outage resulted in loss of                 amplifierwas going to be affected by audible count rate emplifier for                           imeup Control room amplifier not containment. Audib5 counts lost in                         affected containment for approximately 5 minutes during fuel movements.
6/2/96 LER M
10/18/95 NCV             IR 95             L Missed RCS Boron sample surveillance.                     Personnel Error NCV 95-18-07 10/19195 NCV             IR 95             S Missed shift CEA position indication                       Personnel Error NCV 95-1846               surveillance.
L Non-safety related breaker alignments to Operators not aware that containment support Unit 1 outage resulted in loss of amplifierwas going to be affected by audible count rate emplifier for imeup Control room amplifier not containment. Audib5 counts lost in affected containment for approximately 5 minutes during fuel movements.
11/21/95 NCV             IR 95             L Failure to maintain Penetration Log.                       FTF Procedure                                                             l NCV 95-21-04 1/5/96   NCV             IR 95     PS     N Several deficiencies in prodecure change                   Failure to Properly implement NCV 95-22-01             process implementation identified.                         Procedures Expired or cancelled TCs found in control                                                                                           :
10/18/95 NCV IR 95 L Missed RCS Boron sample surveillance.
rooms and hot shutdown panel.
Personnel Error NCV 95-18-07
[
10/19195 NCV IR 95 S Missed shift CEA position indication Personnel Error NCV 95-1846 surveillance.
11/21/95 NCV IR 95 L Failure to maintain Penetration Log.
FTF Procedure l
NCV 95-21-04 1/5/96 NCV IR 95 PS N
Several deficiencies in prodecure change Failure to Properly implement NCV 95-22-01 process implementation identified.
Procedures Expired or cancelled TCs found in control rooms and hot shutdown panel.
t 7
t 7
                                                                                                                  ,5 FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                             Page 10 of 26                                                                                       21-Oct-96 i
,5 FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 10 of 26 21-Oct-96 i


SECONDARY DATE       TYPE           SOURCE SALP AREA ID   ITEM                                       APPARENT CAUSE E COlWMENTS 4/22/96   NCV             IR 964)6   E       L   Unauthorized breech in RAB fire barrier. Operators showed good attention to during installation of CCW piping           detail in identifying two holes bored in modification.                               wall. Engineering failed to account for the effects of modification installation in fire rated assembly, as required by procedure for engineering packages.
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE E COlWMENTS 4/22/96 NCV IR 964)6 E
5/14/96   NCV             IR 96-08           L Fuel movement begun with only one of       Poor communication between control two required wide range NI channels         room operators performing surveillance operable. Condition identified and fuel     testing (which inop'd NI) on the subject movement secured after approximately 1     channel and the refueling center.
L Unauthorized breech in RAB fire barrier.
Operators showed good attention to during installation of CCW piping detail in identifying two holes bored in modification.
wall. Engineering failed to account for the effects of modification installation in fire rated assembly, as required by procedure for engineering packages.
5/14/96 NCV IR 96-08 L
Fuel movement begun with only one of Poor communication between control two required wide range NI channels room operators performing surveillance operable. Condition identified and fuel testing (which inop'd NI) on the subject movement secured after approximately 1 channel and the refueling center.
ft of travel.
ft of travel.
8/3/96     NCV           IR 96-11             L QA audit discovered that corrective action Rush to close out STARS (old corrective documents had been closed without being     action document) when CRs (new forwarded to originator for approval (as   corrective action document) were required by procedure). NRC identified       instituted.
8/3/96 NCV IR 96-11 L
QA audit discovered that corrective action Rush to close out STARS (old corrective documents had been closed without being action document) when CRs (new forwarded to originator for approval (as corrective action document) were required by procedure). NRC identified instituted.
that personnel without signature authority were closing documents.
that personnel without signature authority were closing documents.
8/6/96     NCV           IR 96-14           N Operator observed not walking down control boards prior to assuming shift, as required by procedure. Operator terminated.
8/6/96 NCV IR 96-14 N
9/9/96   NCV             IR 96-15     PS     L Licensee had not complied with               Failure to follow procedures.
Operator observed not walking down control boards prior to assuming shift, as required by procedure. Operator terminated.
9/9/96 NCV IR 96-15 PS L
Licensee had not complied with Failure to follow procedures.
requirements for ensuring that operators
requirements for ensuring that operators
                                                .ead training bulletins required to maintain                                                                                               ,
.ead training bulletins required to maintain requalification current. Licensee identified issue, with independent NRC findings.
requalification current. Licensee identified issue, with independent NRC findings.
9/18/96 NCV IR 96-15 L
9/18/96   NCV             IR 96-15           L Licensee bypassed the wrong ESFAS           Poor labeling of bypass key slots.
Licensee bypassed the wrong ESFAS Poor labeling of bypass key slots.
steam generatorlow level channelin response to channelinoperability.                                                                                                           ;
steam generatorlow level channelin response to channelinoperability.
Resulted in a failure to satisfy TS action statement requirements.
Resulted in a failure to satisfy TS action statement requirements.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                           Page 11 of 26                                                                           21-Oct-96
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 11 of 26 21-Oct-96


SECONDARY DATE       TYPE           SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM                                         APPARENT CAUSE1 COMMENTS 12/1/95   NEG             IR 95-21           N Recurrent non-valid alarms when starting   FTF Procedure fire pumps were not documented as operator workarounds. Voltage dips dssociated with such starts were contributors to a trip previously.
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE1 COMMENTS 12/1/95 NEG IR 95-21 N
12/1/95   NEG           IR 95-21             N Operators unable to effectively obtain I&C Inadequate Operator Training setpoints from computer after hard copies were removed from control room.
Recurrent non-valid alarms when starting FTF Procedure fire pumps were not documented as operator workarounds. Voltage dips dssociated with such starts were contributors to a trip previously.
12/1/95   NEG           IR 95-21             N Unit 2 procedures and valve deviation log Valve Position Administrative Controls used to cycle Unit 1 cross connect valves.
12/1/95 NEG IR 95-21 N
12/1/95   NEG           IR 95-21             N SDC Procedure required natural circ-       Proceduralinadequacy related surveillance prior to establishing RCS pressure boundary. Natural circ not possible without pressurization.
Operators unable to effectively obtain I&C Inadequate Operator Training setpoints from computer after hard copies were removed from control room.
12/27/95 NEG           IR 95-22     E       S FRG meeting suffered!itens deferred due     Lack of Attendance at FRG to lack of OPS /Eng'g atter. dance at meeting. Major issues at meeting affected OPS /Eng*g.
12/1/95 NEG IR 95-21 N
1/5/96   NEG           IR 95-22             N Several procedural deficiencies and         inadequate Procedure Review and calculational errors identif.ed in reload   Execution physics test procedure.
Unit 2 procedures and valve deviation log Valve Position Administrative Controls used to cycle Unit 1 cross connect valves.
2115/96   NEG           IR 96-01     M       N Tours of ECCS rooms revealed several       Material Condition active leaks. Licensee could not explain how (if) FSAR assumptions on ECCS leakage were satisfied. Later review of FSAR indicated leakage within assumptions.
12/1/95 NEG IR 95-21 N
3/7/96   NEG           IR 96-04           N Licensee failed to place a CEA which had   Operator oversight.
SDC Procedure required natural circ-Proceduralinadequacy related surveillance prior to establishing RCS pressure boundary. Natural circ not possible without pressurization.
12/27/95 NEG IR 95-22 E
S FRG meeting suffered!itens deferred due Lack of Attendance at FRG to lack of OPS /Eng'g atter. dance at meeting. Major issues at meeting affected OPS /Eng*g.
1/5/96 NEG IR 95-22 N
Several procedural deficiencies and inadequate Procedure Review and calculational errors identif.ed in reload Execution physics test procedure.
2115/96 NEG IR 96-01 M
N Tours of ECCS rooms revealed several Material Condition active leaks. Licensee could not explain how (if) FSAR assumptions on ECCS leakage were satisfied. Later review of FSAR indicated leakage within assumptions.
3/7/96 NEG IR 96-04 N
Licensee failed to place a CEA which had Operator oversight.
been declared administrative!y inoperable in the equipment out-of-service log. CEA was operable per TS.
been declared administrative!y inoperable in the equipment out-of-service log. CEA was operable per TS.
FROM.10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                           Page 12 of 26                                                 21-Oct-96
FROM.10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 12 of 26 21-Oct-96


SECONDARY DATE       TYPE           SOURCE SALP AREA ID   ITEM                                                                                                                                                                           APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 3/7/96   NEG             IR 96-04           N During MTC testing, inspector noted that                                                                                                                                       Poor attention to detail.
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 3/7/96 NEG IR 96-04 N
During MTC testing, inspector noted that Poor attention to detail.
boron concentration had been verified at 30 minute intervals, vice 15 minute intervals as called for in procedure.
boron concentration had been verified at 30 minute intervals, vice 15 minute intervals as called for in procedure.
6/3/96   NEG           IR 96-08             N Poor practice observed in spent fuel pool                                                                                                                                       "On deck" status was an effort to operations Fuel assemblies were left                                                                                                                                           expedite reload. Operatorleaving hanging in an "on deck" status while                                                                                                                                           machine was due to inadequate awaiting upender availability. Also,                                                                                                                                             manpower- operator had to operate operator left machine unattended with fuel                                                                                                                                       upender contmis, which were mounted hanging at least once per movement.                                                                                                                                             on waii.
6/3/96 NEG IR 96-08 N
7/16/96   NEG           IR 96-11             L 2C auxilliary feedwater pump tripped on                                                                                                                                         Operator errorin not property overspeed during post-maintenance                                                                                                                                               implementing cautions in a procedure.
Poor practice observed in spent fuel pool "On deck" status was an effort to operations Fuel assemblies were left expedite reload. Operatorleaving hanging in an "on deck" status while machine was due to inadequate awaiting upender availability. Also, manpower-operator had to operate operator left machine unattended with fuel upender contmis, which were mounted hanging at least once per movement.
on waii.
7/16/96 NEG IR 96-11 L
2C auxilliary feedwater pump tripped on Operator errorin not property overspeed during post-maintenance implementing cautions in a procedure.
testing.
testing.
7/20/96   NEG           IR 96-11     M       L 2 operating charging pumps tripped when                                                                                                                                         I&C failed to recognize that reactor rnaintenance induced an erroneous level                                                                                                                                         regulating system would be affected by signal into reactor regulating system.                                                                                                                                           their activities. Operators had charging Letdown isolated by operators. Upon                                                                                                                                             pump backup switch in wrong position, reinitiating letdown, minor waterhammer                                                                                                                                         leading to cessation of charging flow.
7/20/96 NEG IR 96-11 M
L 2 operating charging pumps tripped when I&C failed to recognize that reactor rnaintenance induced an erroneous level regulating system would be affected by signal into reactor regulating system.
their activities. Operators had charging Letdown isolated by operators. Upon pump backup switch in wrong position, reinitiating letdown, minor waterhammer leading to cessation of charging flow.
event occurred.
event occurred.
10/1/96   NEG           IR 96-15     O       N 2B HPSI pump discharge pressure noted                                                                                                                                           Poor attention to detail.
10/1/96 NEG IR 96-15 O
N 2B HPSI pump discharge pressure noted Poor attention to detail.
to be 880#. Operators could not explain it, had not noticed it. Was due to a pump run a week before.
to be 880#. Operators could not explain it, had not noticed it. Was due to a pump run a week before.
11/16/95 OTHER         1R 95-21     M       S Unit 1 manually tripped when 1B MFRV                                                                                                                                             Long-Standing Equipment Problem locked in 50% position. Root cause -
11/16/95 OTHER 1R 95-21 M
S Unit 1 manually tripped when 1B MFRV Long-Standing Equipment Problem locked in 50% position. Root cause -
degraded power supply, compounded by voltage dip on starting both station fire pumps.
degraded power supply, compounded by voltage dip on starting both station fire pumps.
11/21/95 OTHER         1R 95-21             S Light socket failure during lamp                                                                                                                                                 Equipment Failure replacement results in loss cooling to 1 A Main Transformer. Unit downpower to
11/21/95 OTHER 1R 95-21 S
                                                -60%.
Light socket failure during lamp Equipment Failure replacement results in loss cooling to 1 A Main Transformer. Unit downpower to
FROM.10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                           Page 13 of 26                                                                                                                                                                                         21-Oct-96
-60%.
FROM.10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 13 of 26 21-Oct-96


SECONDARY DATE       TYPE           SOURCE-       SALP AREA   ID     ITEM                                                                                       APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 1/26/96   OTHER           1R 96-01                   N     Inspection of corrective action program                                                 Corrective Achons revealed timely action on the part of management, but weaknesses in plans for tracking progress on personnel performance and procedure quality improvement.
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE-SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 1/26/96 OTHER 1R 96-01 N
3/1/96     OTHER                                       L   Management Changes - T. Plunkett succeeds G. Goldberg, C. Wood replaces L. Rogers as manager of SCE, C. Marple replaces C. Wood as Ops Supervisor.
Inspection of corrective action program Corrective Achons revealed timely action on the part of management, but weaknesses in plans for tracking progress on personnel performance and procedure quality improvement.
3/10/96   OTHER         IR 96-04                     L   Unit 1 downpowered to 97.5% due to hot                                                   Hot leg stratification.
3/1/96 OTHER L
Management Changes - T. Plunkett succeeds G. Goldberg, C. Wood replaces L. Rogers as manager of SCE, C. Marple replaces C. Wood as Ops Supervisor.
t 3/10/96 OTHER IR 96-04 L
Unit 1 downpowered to 97.5% due to hot Hot leg stratification.
leg stratification and flow swirl which resulted in higher than actual indicated reactor power.
leg stratification and flow swirl which resulted in higher than actual indicated reactor power.
4/4/96   OTHER           IR 96-06                     L   Interim Operations Manager (H. Johnson) named.
4/4/96 OTHER IR 96-06 L
r 4/10/96   OTHER           1R 96-300                   N   4 of 4 SRO candidates passed SRO examination. In 3 of the cases, performance was marginally satisfactory.
Interim Operations Manager (H. Johnson) named.
r 4/10/96 OTHER 1R 96-300 N
4 of 4 SRO candidates passed SRO examination. In 3 of the cases, performance was marginally satisfactory.
No generic candidate weaknesses identified.
No generic candidate weaknesses identified.
4/20/96   OTHER           IR 96-06                     S   Unit 2 downpowered and taken off-line                                                   Blockage in auto-stop oil line orifice due to low pressure condition in auto-stop                                               which prevented buildup of auto-stop oil oil. Operators observed to control                                                       pressure. Only negative aspect was evolution well.                                                                         crowding of control panels by control room SROs during portions of evolution.
4/20/96 OTHER IR 96-06 S
i 5/31/96   OTHER           1R 96-08         M         S   Blown fuse resulted in closure of all Unit 2                                             Moisture found in a junction box MSR temperature control valves, resulting                                               following heavy rain.                                .
Unit 2 downpowered and taken off-line Blockage in auto-stop oil line orifice due to low pressure condition in auto-stop which prevented buildup of auto-stop oil oil. Operators observed to control pressure. Only negative aspect was evolution well.
crowding of control panels by control room SROs during portions of evolution.
i 5/31/96 OTHER 1R 96-08 M
S Blown fuse resulted in closure of all Unit 2 Moisture found in a junction box MSR temperature control valves, resulting following heavy rain.
in a 5% load rejection.
in a 5% load rejection.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                                       Page 14 of 26                                                                                                 21-Oct-96
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 14 of 26 21-Oct-96


CECONDARY DATE       TYPE           SOURCE   SALP AREA ID               ITEM                                                               APPARENT CAUSE E COMMENTS 6/27/96   OTHER           1R 96-09     E       L             Site reorganization announced which would place almost all engineering functions (system engineering. STAS, test engineers) under Engineering. Also.
CECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE E COMMENTS 6/27/96 OTHER 1R 96-09 E
L Site reorganization announced which would place almost all engineering functions (system engineering. STAS, test engineers) under Engineering. Also.
Outage Management folded into a global work planning group under the Plant General Manager.
Outage Management folded into a global work planning group under the Plant General Manager.
3/12/96   POS             IR 96-04             S             Licensee disposition for deficiency noted in 1 boroflex panel (top 15" missing) found satisfactory. FRG treatment ofissue found appropriate.
3/12/96 POS IR 96-04 S
3/29/96   POS             !R 96-04             N             Operator requalification program found to be supporting management expectations for operations and covering timely and important topics.
Licensee disposition for deficiency noted in 1 boroflex panel (top 15" missing) found satisfactory. FRG treatment ofissue found appropriate.
3/30/96   POS             IR 96-04             N             Review of 5 clearances indicates better attention to detail than had been observed in past.
3/29/96 POS
4/10/96   POS             IR 96-300           N             Simulator performed well throughout SRO qua!ification testing.
!R 96-04 N
4/28/96   POS             IR 96-06             N           Operators performed well during Unit 1                                 Communications formal, excellent use RFO shutdown.                                                         of annunciator response procedure.     '
Operator requalification program found to be supporting management expectations for operations and covering timely and important topics.
3/30/96 POS IR 96-04 N
Review of 5 clearances indicates better attention to detail than had been observed in past.
4/10/96 POS IR 96-300 N
Simulator performed well throughout SRO qua!ification testing.
4/28/96 POS IR 96-06 N
Operators performed well during Unit 1 Communications formal, excellent use RFO shutdown.
of annunciator response procedure.
Performance of rod drop time testing a noteworthy initiative.
Performance of rod drop time testing a noteworthy initiative.
1 5/2/96   POS             IR 96-06             N           Good performance by operators and test personnel during integrated safeguards testing on Unit 1.1B EDG output breaker failed to close during first test. Operators handled situation well.
1 5/2/96 POS IR 96-06 N
5/5/96   POS             IR 96-06             N             Reduced inveritory operations conducted well by operators.
Good performance by operators and test personnel during integrated safeguards testing on Unit 1.1B EDG output breaker failed to close during first test. Operators handled situation well.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                                                 Page 15 of 26                                                                   21-Oct-96
5/5/96 POS IR 96-06 N
Reduced inveritory operations conducted well by operators.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 15 of 26 21-Oct-96


SECONDARY                                                 -
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE1 COMMENTS 5/11/96 POS IR 96-06 N
DATE     TYPE           SOURCE SALP AREA ID   ITEM                                           APPARENT CAUSE1 COMMENTS 5/11/96 POS             IR 96-06           N 2 clearances audited, both correct.
2 clearances audited, both correct.
5/14/96 POS             IR 96-08           N Fuel movements during Unit 1 core omoad                           ,
5/14/96 POS IR 96-08 N
and reload performed well.
Fuel movements during Unit 1 core omoad and reload performed well.
5/24/96   POS             IR 96-08   M       S Rod control system failure resulted in         Operators conservative in interpreting inability to move (electrically) 4 CEAs.       TS, plant organizations provided timely Operators conservatively interpreted TS to     support with lists of equipment which require shutdown in this instance.             would be inoperable when the main Situation complicated by an out of service     generator was tripped.
5/24/96 POS IR 96-08 M
S Rod control system failure resulted in Operators conservative in interpreting inability to move (electrically) 4 CEAs.
TS, plant organizations provided timely Operators conservatively interpreted TS to support with lists of equipment which require shutdown in this instance.
would be inoperable when the main Situation complicated by an out of service generator was tripped.
Startup Transformer.
Startup Transformer.
6/6/96   POS           1R 96-08             S Unit 2 manually tripped due to high main       Operators acted promptly and correctly generator gas temperature due to failed       in tripping the unit. Post trip response of temperature controlvalve.                     both plant and operators was good.
6/6/96 POS 1R 96-08 S
6/8/96   POS           IR 96-08           N 3 QA audits reviewed                           Broad in scope, appropriatefy focused, indicated an aggressive application of quality standards.
Unit 2 manually tripped due to high main Operators acted promptly and correctly generator gas temperature due to failed in tripping the unit. Post trip response of temperature controlvalve.
6/8/96   POS           IR 96-08           N 3 QA Audits reviewed                           Broad in scope, focused on weak areas. Agressive application of standards evident in the number of findings cited.
both plant and operators was good.
6/19/96   POS           IR 96-09           N Unit 1 reduced inventory preparations and     Controls were appropriate.
6/8/96 POS IR 96-08 N
3 QA audits reviewed Broad in scope, appropriatefy focused, indicated an aggressive application of quality standards.
6/8/96 POS IR 96-08 N
3 QA Audits reviewed Broad in scope, focused on weak areas. Agressive application of standards evident in the number of findings cited.
6/19/96 POS IR 96-09 N
Unit 1 reduced inventory preparations and Controls were appropriate.
execution.
execution.
7/5/96   POS           IR 96-09           N Unit 1 reduced inventory preparations and     Mid-Loop controls effective. Licensee execution.                                     attention and management oversight excellent.
7/5/96 POS IR 96-09 N
FROM.10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                           Page 16 of 26                                                         21-Oct-96
Unit 1 reduced inventory preparations and Mid-Loop controls effective. Licensee execution.
attention and management oversight excellent.
FROM.10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 16 of 26 21-Oct-96


SECONDARY DATE       TYPE           SOURCE     SALP AREA ID   ITEM                                         APPARENT CAUSE1 COMMENTS 7/8/96     POS             IR 96-11       M       N !.5:ensee preparations for Hurricane         Hurricane forcasts showed storm Bertha proactive and responsible.           missing area, but licensee prepared as though it would change course.
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE1 COMMENTS 7/8/96 POS IR 96-11 M
8/31/96   POS             IR 96-14       M       L Operators manually tripped Unit 1 due to     Operators acted quickly, conservatively, indications of gas accumulating in the 18   nnd in accordance with plant transformer. Operating crew self-           procedures.
N
!.5:ensee preparations for Hurricane Hurricane forcasts showed storm Bertha proactive and responsible.
missing area, but licensee prepared as though it would change course.
8/31/96 POS IR 96-14 M
L Operators manually tripped Unit 1 due to Operators acted quickly, conservatively, indications of gas accumulating in the 18 nnd in accordance with plant transformer. Operating crew self-procedures.
assessment following event viewed as exce!!ent.
assessment following event viewed as exce!!ent.
9/2/96     POS             IR 96-14               N Unit 1 startup conducted well. Operator action to terminated first approach to criticality when Xe decay drove estimated critical conditions near allowed band limits was appropriate.
9/2/96 POS IR 96-14 N
I 9/9/96     POS           IR 96-15       PS     N Control room watchstanding practices satisfactory. Watchstanders maintained a professional environment and were attentive to plant paramenters.
Unit 1 startup conducted well. Operator action to terminated first approach to criticality when Xe decay drove estimated critical conditions near allowed band limits l
10/9/96   POS             IR 96-15               N Surveillance testing of 2A EDG performed well. Good use of Real Time Training Coordinators 7/9/96   STREN           IR 96-11               N Two entries into reduced inventory made during inspection period. Strong management involvement in scheduling around Hurricane Bertha. Reduced inventory operations continues to be a strength.
was appropriate.
11/11/95 VIO             IR 95             N Tech. Spec. equipment not specified for IV   FTF Procedure VIO 95-21-02             on Equipment Clearance Order.
I 9/9/96 POS IR 96-15 PS N
11/20/95 VIO             IR 95             N Valve discovered Closed vice Locked           FTF Procedure VIO 95-21-01             Closed as specified on Equipment Clearance Order.
Control room watchstanding practices satisfactory. Watchstanders maintained a professional environment and were attentive to plant paramenters.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                               Page 17 of 26                                                   21-Oct-96
10/9/96 POS IR 96-15 N
Surveillance testing of 2A EDG performed well. Good use of Real Time Training Coordinators 7/9/96 STREN IR 96-11 N
Two entries into reduced inventory made during inspection period. Strong management involvement in scheduling around Hurricane Bertha. Reduced inventory operations continues to be a strength.
11/11/95 VIO IR 95 N Tech. Spec. equipment not specified for IV FTF Procedure VIO 95-21-02 on Equipment Clearance Order.
11/20/95 VIO IR 95 N Valve discovered Closed vice Locked FTF Procedure VIO 95-21-01 Closed as specified on Equipment Clearance Order.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 17 of 26 21-Oct-96


SECONDARY DATE       TYPE             SOURCE     SALP AREA   ID   ITEM                                         APPARENT CAUSE1 COMMENTS 11/27/95 VIO             IR 95               L   Missed RCS Boron sample surveillance -       Personnel Error VIO 95-21-03                   Repeat from IR 95-18 1/5/96   VIO             IR 96-04                   L   NLO failed to employ procedure when           Failure to use procedure, failure to notify placing EDG fuel oil tank on recirculation   control room of evolution.
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE1 COMMENTS 11/27/95 VIO IR 95 L Missed RCS Boron sample surveillance -
Personnel Error VIO 95-21-03 Repeat from IR 95-18 1/5/96 VIO IR 96-04 L
NLO failed to employ procedure when Failure to use procedure, failure to notify placing EDG fuel oil tank on recirculation control room of evolution.
for chemistry. As a result, he improperty performed the evolution by isolating the discharge of the EDGFO transfer pump, which resulted in an inoperable EDG.
for chemistry. As a result, he improperty performed the evolution by isolating the discharge of the EDGFO transfer pump, which resulted in an inoperable EDG.
1/22/96   VIO             IR 96 EA         E   L   Boron dilution event due to operator         Operator error, poor short term 96-040                         leaving control panel while dilution was in tumover, poor command and control progress. Weak command and control, procedural adherence, and short-term tumover. Additionally, OP for boration/ dilution not consistent with FSAR and no 50.59 performed.
1/22/96 VIO IR 96 EA E
1/26/96   VIO             IR 96                 N Violation identified regarding temporary'     Procedure Control VIO 96-01-01                 changes to procedure which changed intent and which were approved for use without prior FRG review.
L Boron dilution event due to operator Operator error, poor short term 96-040 leaving control panel while dilution was in tumover, poor command and control progress. Weak command and control, procedural adherence, and short-term tumover. Additionally, OP for boration/ dilution not consistent with FSAR and no 50.59 performed.
2/22/96   VIO             lR 96-04             O     N Operators found adding boric acid to VCT     Procedures were put away to tidy up without procedure in hand, as required by   control room prior to NRC senior conduct of operations procedure.             managers' tour prior to SALP meeting.
1/26/96 VIO IR 96 N Violation identified regarding temporary' Procedure Control VIO 96-01-01 changes to procedure which changed intent and which were approved for use without prior FRG review.
2/22/96 VIO lR 96-04 O
N Operators found adding boric acid to VCT Procedures were put away to tidy up without procedure in hand, as required by control room prior to NRC senior conduct of operations procedure.
managers' tour prior to SALP meeting.
Additional example of EEA 96-040.
Additional example of EEA 96-040.
3/27/96   VIO             IR 96-04                   N Operators failed to properly log boron       Management direction to operators dilution evolutions. Globallog entry was     allowing global log entries for reactivity made at the beginning of the shift stating   manipulations during transient dilutions would be made; however,           conditions (e.g. uppower) which was procedure required each dilution to be       not in accordance with Conduct of logged.                                       Operations procedure.
3/27/96 VIO IR 96-04 N
8/19/96   VIO             IR 96-16                   N Operations key controls found inadequate     Keys found uncontrolled at                       "
Operators failed to properly log boron Management direction to operators dilution evolutions. Globallog entry was allowing global log entries for reactivity made at the beginning of the shift stating manipulations during transient dilutions would be made; however, conditions (e.g. uppower) which was procedure required each dilution to be not in accordance with Conduct of logged.
for keys associated with control room       normal / isolate switch boxes for unit 2 evacuation / remote shutdown                 PORVs.
Operations procedure.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                                   Page 18 of 26                                                     21-Oct-96
8/19/96 VIO IR 96-16 N
Operations key controls found inadequate Keys found uncontrolled at for keys associated with control room normal / isolate switch boxes for unit 2 evacuation / remote shutdown PORVs.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 18 of 26 21-Oct-96


        . _ . . ..          .  ~ = . . - -           . - .          .-      .  -.                .    - . -    , .            -      .        . . _ . .
~ =.. - -
SECONDARY DATE           TYPE       SOURCE         SALP AREA       ID   ITEM                                           APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 12/1/95       WEAK       IR 95-21                         N   SDC procedure contained conflicting           ProceduralWeakness/ Inadequate values for RX cavity level requirements.       Review Procedure had been approved since emphasis on accuracy stressed.
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 12/1/95 WEAK IR 95-21 N
12/1/95       WEAK       IR 95-21                         N   CCW sample valve,showed dual                   FTF Procedure indication without corrective action documentation initiated.
SDC procedure contained conflicting ProceduralWeakness/ Inadequate values for RX cavity level requirements.
12/1/95       WEAK       IR 95-21                           N . Clearance in place to isolate N2 from CST     Poor Corrective Actions                       i to facilitate pressure switch replacement for nine days without work order being                                                       ,
Review Procedure had been approved since emphasis on accuracy stressed.
written.
12/1/95 WEAK IR 95-21 N
12/1/95       WEAK       1R 95-21                           N Followup to previous inspection findings       Corrective Actions indicated a weakness in followthrough in addressing deficiencies.
CCW sample valve,showed dual FTF Procedure indication without corrective action documentation initiated.
12/5/95       WEAK       IR 95-22             M             N ESFAS cabinet doors found unlocked             Poor Logkeeping/ Attn to Detail following maintenance work - I&C error.
12/1/95 WEAK IR 95-21 N
. Clearance in place to isolate N2 from CST Poor Corrective Actions i
to facilitate pressure switch replacement for nine days without work order being written.
12/1/95 WEAK 1R 95-21 N
Followup to previous inspection findings Corrective Actions indicated a weakness in followthrough in addressing deficiencies.
12/5/95 WEAK IR 95-22 M
N ESFAS cabinet doors found unlocked Poor Logkeeping/ Attn to Detail following maintenance work - I&C error.
Log entries associated with work were not complete.
Log entries associated with work were not complete.
1/5/96       WEAK       IR 95-22             M             L U2 manual RX trip on high generator H2         Temp ControlValve Failure.
1/5/96 WEAK IR 95-22 M
temp due to failure of temp control valve.     Additionally, failure to identify Operator awareness of RPS status post-         unexpected reactor trip signals which trip poor. Inspection of post-trip review (for came in during trip.
L U2 manual RX trip on high generator H2 Temp ControlValve Failure.
current trip as well as past trips) indicated weaknesses in the rigor of post-trip reviews 2/17/96       WEAK       IR 96-01             E             N Numerous deficiencies identified in             ProceduralInadequacy instrument air system walkdowns, including drawings accuracy, ONOP adequacy, and annunciator response procedure accuracy.
temp due to failure of temp control valve.
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Additionally, failure to identify Operator awareness of RPS status post-unexpected reactor trip signals which trip poor. Inspection of post-trip review (for came in during trip.
current trip as well as past trips) indicated weaknesses in the rigor of post-trip reviews 2/17/96 WEAK IR 96-01 E
N Numerous deficiencies identified in ProceduralInadequacy instrument air system walkdowns, including drawings accuracy, ONOP adequacy, and annunciator response procedure accuracy.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 19 of 26 21-Oct-96


SECONDARY DATE       TYPE           SOURCE SALP AREA ID   ITEM                                         APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 2/24/96   WEAK           IR 96-04           S   Procedural weak.. ass results in attempting   Procedure review weakness -lack of to synchronize main generator with grid       verification that disconnect links were with generator disconnect links open.         closed.
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 2/24/96 WEAK IR 96-04 S
4/14/96   WEAK           IR 96-06   E       N Configuration Control issues resulted from   Walksdowns of both units' CS, ICW and ESF system walkdowns.                       IA systems indicate programmatic failures in incorporating design changes into drawings, the FSAR and operating procedures. Unresolved item tracking expansion ofinspection scope to include instrumentation setpoints.
Procedural weak.. ass results in attempting Procedure review weakness -lack of to synchronize main generator with grid verification that disconnect links were with generator disconnect links open.
4/14/96   WEAK           IR 96-06   E       N ICW system walkdown.                         Results in'dicate weaknesses in procedure-to-procedure agreement, labelirg, and surveillance requirements, in addition to configuration control issues disussed separately.
closed.
8/6/96   WEAK           IR 96-14             N Operator aids found in vario'is areas of     Type of aids identified did not meet the plant which were not in agreement       criteria for inclusion in operator aid with system operating pro.;edures.           program and were not controlled.
4/14/96 WEAK IR 96-06 E
PLANT SUPPORT 8/14/96   EMERG         IR 96-16     O       L NOUE declared due to security alert         Event was similar to discoveries made resulting from discovery of tampering. A     in July of a glue-like substance in glue-like substance had been injected into   padlocks.
N Configuration Control issues resulted from Walksdowns of both units' CS, ICW and ESF system walkdowns.
IA systems indicate programmatic failures in incorporating design changes into drawings, the FSAR and operating procedures. Unresolved item tracking expansion ofinspection scope to include instrumentation setpoints.
4/14/96 WEAK IR 96-06 E
N ICW system walkdown.
Results in'dicate weaknesses in procedure-to-procedure agreement, labelirg, and surveillance requirements, in addition to configuration control issues disussed separately.
8/6/96 WEAK IR 96-14 N
Operator aids found in vario'is areas of Type of aids identified did not meet the plant which were not in agreement criteria for inclusion in operator aid with system operating pro.;edures.
program and were not controlled.
PLANT SUPPORT 8/14/96 EMERG IR 96-16 O
L NOUE declared due to security alert Event was similar to discoveries made resulting from discovery of tampering. A in July of a glue-like substance in glue-like substance had been injected into padlocks.
Unit 1 and 2 hot shutdown panel key lock switches.
Unit 1 and 2 hot shutdown panel key lock switches.
3/1/96   NCV           IR 96-04           N Inspection of Hot Too! Room identified       Attention to detail in tool storage and several tools which were either not           surveying.
3/1/96 NCV IR 96-04 N
Inspection of Hot Too! Room identified Attention to detail in tool storage and several tools which were either not surveying.
painted purple (as required) or which slightly exceeded limits for contamination.
painted purple (as required) or which slightly exceeded limits for contamination.
8/12/96   NCV           IR 96-15   O       L Failure to follow procedure resulted in the   Poorly written procedure, compounded inoperability of the Unit 1 containment       by weak execution by chemistry radiation monitcr following PASS panel       personnel. Good attention to detail be operability check.                           NLO in identifying condition.
8/12/96 NCV IR 96-15 O
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L Failure to follow procedure resulted in the Poorly written procedure, compounded inoperability of the Unit 1 containment by weak execution by chemistry radiation monitcr following PASS panel personnel. Good attention to detail be operability check.
NLO in identifying condition.
FROM.10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 20 of 26 21-Oct-96


SECONDARY DATE       TYPE             SOURCE SALP AREA ID     ITEM                                       APPARENT CAUSEi CONIMENTS 12/1/95   NEG             IR 95-21           N   Rad survey results unavailable for B hot   Failure to Document RAD Survey leg work. Surveys performed but not documented.
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEi CONIMENTS 12/1/95 NEG IR 95-21 N
2/7/96     NEG             IR 96-02           N   Two areas for improvement identified in   inconsistencies in the use of Florida graded EP exercise - Need for             Notification Message Form. Confusion management to become more involved in     existed between NLOs dispatched from assuring correctness ofinfo being         OSC and Control room for similar repair provided in offsite notification forms and missions.
Rad survey results unavailable for B hot Failure to Document RAD Survey leg work. Surveys performed but not documented.
2/7/96 NEG IR 96-02 N
Two areas for improvement identified in inconsistencies in the use of Florida graded EP exercise - Need for Notification Message Form. Confusion management to become more involved in existed between NLOs dispatched from assuring correctness ofinfo being OSC and Control room for similar repair provided in offsite notification forms and missions.
need to refine C&C for damage control teams.
need to refine C&C for damage control teams.
5/15/96   NEG             1R 96-08             N   Observations of radiation worker practices revealed inconsistencies in the application of site practices (e g. wearing of dosimetry, donning / doffing PCs).
5/15/96 NEG 1R 96-08 N
7/26/96   NEG             IR 96-10             L   QA audit of Fitness for Duty program       Failure to follow procedures and lack of identified problems including personnel     both attention to detail and self-checking
Observations of radiation worker practices revealed inconsistencies in the application of site practices (e g. wearing of dosimetry, donning / doffing PCs).
;                                                    with negative tests being recorded as       cited as root causes.
7/26/96 NEG IR 96-10 L
l positive (and vice versa) and personnel randomly selected for testing not being tested (even though they were available).
QA audit of Fitness for Duty program Failure to follow procedures and lack of identified problems including personnel both attention to detail and self-checking with negative tests being recorded as cited as root causes.
8/9/96   NEG             IR 96-14             N   Examples of poor radiolaogical housekeeping observed. Barrels for anti-C collection located outside of contaminated areas, use of multiple, undefined, stepoff pads, contaminated trash overflowing contaminated area boundaries.
positive (and vice versa) and personnel l
8/23/96   NEG             IR 96-16           N   Licensee extended control room access to a large number of personnel, potentially in excess of those needing access.
randomly selected for testing not being tested (even though they were available).
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                               Page 21 of 26                                                   21-Oct-96
8/9/96 NEG IR 96-14 N
Examples of poor radiolaogical housekeeping observed. Barrels for anti-C collection located outside of contaminated areas, use of multiple, undefined, stepoff pads, contaminated trash overflowing contaminated area boundaries.
8/23/96 NEG IR 96-16 N
Licensee extended control room access to a large number of personnel, potentially in excess of those needing access.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 21 of 26 21-Oct-96


SECONDARY DATE       TYPE             SOURCE                                                 SALP AREA       ID   ITEM                                         APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 9/19/96   NEG             IR 96-16                                                                 N Licensee response to identification of glue . Events believed to have occurred at in padlocks in July not thorough, as glue     same time, and licensee's intitial audits was later found in key lock switches.         included only padlocks, door locks and valve locks.
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 9/19/96 NEG IR 96-16 N
2/7/96     OTHER           1R 96-02                                                                 N EP exercise demonstrated that onsite emergency plans were adequate and that licensee was capable of implementing them.
Licensee response to identification of glue.
3/1/96     OTHER           IR 96-04                                                                 N Licensee found to be utilizing ALARA techniques and making progress at reducing collective doses for staff, 3/1/96     OTHER         1R 96-04                                                                   N Licensee found to be implementing adequate RP controls and monitoring individual exposures per code requirements.
Events believed to have occurred at in padlocks in July not thorough, as glue same time, and licensee's intitial audits was later found in key lock switches.
3/1/96   OTHER           1R 96-04                                                                   N Housekeeping in RABs generally good; however, equipment storage areas found cluttered and untidy.
included only padlocks, door locks and valve locks.
3/14/96   OTHER                                                                                     L Management change. A. Desoiza (human resources manager) replaced by Lynn Morgan (from TP) 8/12/96   OTHER           1R 96-14                                                               O L Operator identified low flow in Unit 1         Failure to follow procedure.
2/7/96 OTHER 1R 96-02 N
containment air monitor. Condition the result of Chemistry personnel failing to properly secure from a PASS system surveillance. URI 2/7/96   POS             IR 96-02                                                                 N Observations of licensee performance in CR, TSC, OSC, and EOF indicated good command and control, staff utilization and staff demeanor during graded exercise.
EP exercise demonstrated that onsite emergency plans were adequate and that licensee was capable of implementing them.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                                                                                 Page 22 of 26                                                     21.Oct-96
3/1/96 OTHER IR 96-04 N
Licensee found to be utilizing ALARA techniques and making progress at reducing collective doses for staff, 3/1/96 OTHER 1R 96-04 N
Licensee found to be implementing adequate RP controls and monitoring individual exposures per code requirements.
3/1/96 OTHER 1R 96-04 N
Housekeeping in RABs generally good; however, equipment storage areas found cluttered and untidy.
3/14/96 OTHER L
Management change. A. Desoiza (human resources manager) replaced by Lynn Morgan (from TP) 8/12/96 OTHER 1R 96-14 O
L Operator identified low flow in Unit 1 Failure to follow procedure.
containment air monitor. Condition the result of Chemistry personnel failing to properly secure from a PASS system surveillance. URI 2/7/96 POS IR 96-02 N
Observations of licensee performance in CR, TSC, OSC, and EOF indicated good command and control, staff utilization and staff demeanor during graded exercise.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 22 of 26 21.Oct-96


s SECONDARY DATE               TYPE       SOURCE             SALP AREA                                                                   ID                                 ITEM                                                                                                         APPARENT CAUSEICOMMENTS                   .
s SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEICOMMENTS 2/7/96 POS IR 96-02 N
2/7/96           POS       IR 96-02                                                                                             N                             Licensee's onsite emergency organization was found to be well-defined and 9enerally effective at dealing with                                                                                                                     i simulated emergency during graded exercise.
Licensee's onsite emergency organization was found to be well-defined and 9enerally effective at dealing with i
2/7/96             POS       IR 96-02                                                                                             N                             Communication among the licensee's                                                                                                                       [
simulated emergency during graded exercise.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              ~
2/7/96 POS IR 96-02 N
emergency response facilities and emergency organization and emergency response organization and offsite authorities were good during graded exercise.                                                                                                                                                 l 2/7/96           POS       IR 96-02                                                                                             N                             Licensee made significant observation of                                                                       Licensee objectively questioning overali E-Plan execution - 2 practice drills were                                                                     state of readiness.                       !
Communication among the licensee's
required prior to graded exercise for management to be satisfied with performance. Management determined                                                                                                                       t that more frequent drills were required to                                                                                                               ;
[
ensure readiness.
emergency response facilities and
3/1/96           POS       IR 96-04                                                                                             N                             Ongoing HP efforts to obtain accreditation of FPL electronic dosimetry program identified as a good example of department's technical capabilities.                                                                                                                       i 5/3/96           POS       IR 96-05                                                                                             N                             Inspection of FPL Speakout program.                                                                             Program effective in handling and resolving employee safety concerns.       r 6/8/96           POS       1R 96-08                                                                                             N                             Fire barrier inspections performed by the licensee were found to employ.                                                                                                         !                  l conservative criteria and be detailed.                                                                                                                     ;
~
7/6/96           POS       IR 96-09                                                                                             N                             Review of RCP oilcollection system.                                                                             System met description in FSAR and was in accordance with App R, except as allowed by approved exemption.
emergency organization and emergency response organization and offsite authorities were good during graded exercise.
l 2/7/96 POS IR 96-02 N
Licensee made significant observation of Licensee objectively questioning overali E-Plan execution - 2 practice drills were state of readiness.
required prior to graded exercise for management to be satisfied with performance. Management determined t
that more frequent drills were required to ensure readiness.
3/1/96 POS IR 96-04 N
Ongoing HP efforts to obtain accreditation of FPL electronic dosimetry program l
identified as a good example of department's technical capabilities.
i 5/3/96 POS IR 96-05 N
Inspection of FPL Speakout program.
Program effective in handling and resolving employee safety concerns.
r 6/8/96 POS 1R 96-08 N
Fire barrier inspections performed by the licensee were found to employ.
l conservative criteria and be detailed.
7/6/96 POS IR 96-09 N
Review of RCP oilcollection system.
System met description in FSAR and was in accordance with App R, except as allowed by approved exemption.
i l
i l
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/                                                                                                                                                 Page 23 of 26                                                                                                                     21-Oct-96
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 23 of 26 21-Oct-96


l Exposure (Man-REM)
l l
PWR Average                     Forced Outage Rate (%)                       Nurr'w of Events                                 Number of Screme o
Exposure (Man-REM)
: 3. . $.. $,_ 8 o
PWR Average Forced Outage Rate (%)
N. .,_8 8. . 8.._ $                     0
Nurr'w of Events Number of Screme
_ < _ m. . _
: 3.. $.. $,_ 8
                                                                                                      $    $          5              o u
: 8..8.._ $
_ < _ m.. _
u.
u.
s'       $                    f                     ,.
0 5
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                                      - EM Forced Outogost 1000 Comm. Crit Hours
[
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~
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i *-- '-
1000 Comm. Crit Hours PWR Average Nurr6erof Actuallone
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1 PI4EDECIB00NAL a
i                     ST. LUCIE 1                                                       I     t    neS - Senmen                                             in
i ST. LUCIE 1 I
  !                    Peer GrosetComhummon Engmoenne wWo CPC                             l                                                             Wh m s                                                                                         1                                                                   Law t*~~
neS - Senmen t
a                     93 3 to SS 2                           Trones and Downstons:
in Peer GrosetComhummon Engmoenne wWo CPC l
i
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  ,                                                                                                                                      Deviatens From j                                                                                                     Plant                                   Peer Group
1 Law t*~~
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a 93 3 to SS 2 Trones and Downstons:
j                                                                                             Short Term                                   Long Term                     l l                                                                                    Deshned               improvee                 Wuse                 Bemer           j i                     OPERKf10NS                                                                                                                                           i J
i Deviatens From j
Plant Peer Group sew Trend Medsen 4
j Short Term Long Term l
Deshned improvee Wuse Bemer j
i OPERKf10NS i
J
}
}
Automatic Scrams While Critical -                                          g                  -
r-
r-
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]
j i                                       Safety System A*=*% -                                             o o
Automatic Scrams While Critical -
j                                                   Signmcant Events -                                       o                 -
g
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. -0.18 l.
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)
  !                                                                                                -                              i                                   .
j i
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Safety System A*=*% -
i                                           Cause Codes (All LERs)
o o
: a. - -            comem pressene -
j Signmcant Events -
M 0.88                                                          o 4            0.10 i
o o
: n. uneness osmamer arters -                  1.05
4 Safety System Failures -
                                                                                                                                                  .:2
-0.24 i 1
<                                                    s. ouest perummans errors -                      i 0.90                  -
0 i
                                                                                                                                          -0.16 --
I i
: e. -              er===me -                      _ o.26 030
                                                              =          eroemans -                        0                                        E o.30
:                          e. r .--                                                                                          -
: v. -              -                        o                -
I          :oAs SHUTDOWN l
Safety System Actuations -                                        -0.90            -
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o
!                                          Safety System Faliures -                                      o                -
l 0.32 l
Cause Codes (All LERs)
Cause Codes (All LERs)
;                                          a. Am==marseve c ==w er e==.         -
I M 0.88 o
0                 -
: a. - -
0.05 ej
comem pressene -
: n. uc=== s oeweer arr r, d                             o                -
: n. uneness osmamer arters -
0 I
1.05 4
: s. oour e.r anse en.c.                               o                 -              0.09 -
0.10 i
nee pressens                      I o
.:2
: e. -                                                                   --
: s. ouest perummans errors -
                                                                                                                                                  ] o.02 i                                                           '
i 0.90
0                                         E o.17
-0.16 --
                          ..'-                                          presiens -                                          -
030
l                                                              r. -              -
: e. -
0                 -                        0 FORCED OUTAGES Forced Outage Rate *
er===me -
* 1      .                    Equipment Forced Outages /
_ o.26
: e. r.--
=
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0 E o.30 o
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: v. -
SHUTDOWN l
Safety System Actuations -
-0.90
-1.24 Significant Events -
o o
Safety System Faliures -
o l
l 0.32 Cause Codes (All LERs)
: a. Am==marseve c==w er e==.
0 0.05 ej
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0 o
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FORCED OUTAGES Forced Outage Rate *
* 1.43
* 1.43
                                                                                                                            ] I
-0.27
                                                                                                                                      -0.27 3 05                         -'                        -0.80 1000 Commercial Critical Hours j                                                                               10     0.5         on           0.5 1.0 10         0.5       0.0         05     10 performance inoex                             Performance inoex
]
* seen comumane ser r_       cm 4
1 Equipment Forced Outages /
* I
-0.80 3 05 1000 Commercial Critical Hours j
10 0.5 on 0.5 1.0 10 0.5 0.0 05 10 performance inoex Performance inoex
* seen comumane ser r_
cm 4


4 PennaPTmIONRL 4
4 PennaPTmIONRL 4
E ST. LUCIE.1 i
E ST. LUCIE.1 i
j                                                                   PI EVENTS FOR 95-3 SCRAM 07/es/95                       LERs 33595oo3 50.72s: 29e39         pim NIST: POWR OPERATIONS AT 1005 DESC
j PI EVENTS FOR 95-3 SCRAM 07/es/95 LERs 33595oo3 50.72s: 29e39 pim NIST: POWR OPERATIONS AT 1005 DESC
: TIE REACTM TRIPPED CII NIGN PRESmRIZER PREsmM WNEN TIIE MAIN TURSINE GOWERNOR Am INTERCEPT VALVES ISIT CLORED DimING TESTIIIG. TNIS EVENT WAS CAUBED BY AN CPERATOR OMITTING A TEST panrmes l                             w.
: TIE REACTM TRIPPED CII NIGN PRESmRIZER PREsmM WNEN TIIE MAIN TURSINE GOWERNOR Am INTERCEPT VALVES ISIT CLORED DimING TESTIIIG. TNIS EVENT WAS CAUBED BY AN CPERATOR OMITTING A TEST panrmes l
5 SSF           Os/os/95             LERs 33595005 50.72e: 2917s i
w.
Me NIST: CCWITION EXISTB IN ALL MSES UP 70 1005 POWR SINCE 1994
5 SSF Os/os/95 LERs 33595005 50.72e: 2917s i
,              eine : SAFETT A m RELIEF VALVES GRIRr SYSTM : REACTM COOLANT SYST M                     . .
Me NIST: CCWITION EXISTB IN ALL MSES UP 70 1005 POWR SINCE 1994 eine : SAFETT A m RELIEF VALVES GRIRr SYSTM : REACTM COOLANT SYST M DESC *: TIE PERER OPERATB RELIEF VALVEl WRE PtRAS INEPERASLE DURING TESTING. THE MAIN DISC allDES nERE INBTALLED INC MRECTLY DURING THE 1996 REFUELING CUTAGE.
'            DESC *: TIE PERER OPERATB RELIEF VALVEl WRE PtRAS INEPERASLE DURING TESTING. THE MAIN DISC allDES nERE INBTALLED INC MRECTLY DURING THE 1996 REFUELING CUTAGE.
i SSF on/1o/95 LERs 33595006 50.72s:
i s            SSF             on/1o/95               LERs 33595006 50.72s:
s Mat NIST: EVENT OCCURRED IN COLD SIRJIDOWN GRERP : RESIOUAL NEAT RBWWAL SYSTMS GROUP SYSTEM : RESIOUAL MAT RWWWAL SYSTBI DESC
Mat NIST: EVENT OCCURRED IN COLD SIRJIDOWN                                                                                 I GRERP : RESIOUAL NEAT RBWWAL SYSTMS GROUP                                                                                 !
: SOTN TRAINS OF RESIDUAL MEAT REMOVAL WRE RESERED INOPERABLE AS A RESULT OF A FAILED GPEN SUCTION i
SYSTEM : RESIOUAL MAT RWWWAL SYSTBI
RELIEF VALVE. TIE 2007 CAUSE WAS INADEcuATE DESIGN MARGIN SETWEEN THE RELIEF Als BLOW 0lAl SETPOINTS ads NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATING PRESERE.
,          DESC          : SOTN TRAINS OF RESIDUAL MEAT REMOVAL WRE RESERED INOPERABLE AS A RESULT OF A FAILED GPEN SUCTION i                           RELIEF VALVE. TIE 2007 CAUSE WAS INADEcuATE DESIGN MARGIN SETWEEN THE RELIEF Als BLOW 0lAl SETPOINTS
,                            ads NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATING PRESERE.
t PI EVENTS TOR 95-4 NONE PI EVENTS FOR 96-1 1
t PI EVENTS TOR 95-4 NONE PI EVENTS FOR 96-1 1
SSF             02/19/96               LERs 33596001     50.72s: 29994                                                     l PWR NIST: EWNT wrmeen DIMING OPERAfl0N AT 1005 poler                                                                         '
SSF 02/19/96 LERs 33596001 50.72s: 29994 PWR NIST: EWNT wrmeen DIMING OPERAfl0N AT 1005 poler GRERJP
GRERJP        : CONTROL 80831 E8ERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM GROUP SYSTEM : CINITROL BUILDING / CONTROL CtBIPLEX ENVIROINENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM DESC           : THE CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM WAS REWERED INCAPASLE OF PERFORMING ITS DESIGN FUNCTIOlt WNEN           l Tne CONTROL ROOM ACCESS NATCNES WRE LEFT OPEN FOLLOWING MAINTENANCE. THE CAUSE WAS IIIADE4RAATE           l GUIDAalCE Ase WORE CONTROLS FOR MAINTAINING THE 80UNDARY.
: CONTROL 80831 E8ERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM GROUP SYSTEM : CINITROL BUILDING / CONTROL CtBIPLEX ENVIROINENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM DESC
PI EVENTS FOR 96-2 SSA               06/07/96             LERs 33596007 50.72s: 30603           PWR MIST: REFUELING DESC           : All EDG STARTED AaC LOADED WNEN A SUS LOA 0 SNED OCCURRED DURING A COIITAlllMENT !$0LATitBI ACTUATION
: THE CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM WAS REWERED INCAPASLE OF PERFORMING ITS DESIGN FUNCTIOlt WNEN Tne CONTROL ROOM ACCESS NATCNES WRE LEFT OPEN FOLLOWING MAINTENANCE. THE CAUSE WAS IIIADE4RAATE l
                            $1ENAL TEST. AN lisADEGUATE PROCEDIRE CONTAINED No INSTRUCT!0sts 70 REINSTALL FUSES WIIICN WRE RBWWED AS PART Of A PREVIOUS TEST.
GUIDAalCE Ase WORE CONTROLS FOR MAINTAINING THE 80UNDARY.
SSA               06/0s/96             LERs 3359600s     50. 72s: 30604       PW NIST: REFUELING DESC         : A 4.16EV ELECTRICAL BUS LOST POWER DURING MAINTEIIANCE 00f Taft ESF SYSTEM POWER SUPPLIES. THE EDG DID 180T START SECAUSE IT WAS QUT OF SERVICE. THE POWER SUPPLY FAILED DURING INSTALLATICII 0F A CIRCUIT CARD.
PI EVENTS FOR 96-2 SSA 06/07/96 LERs 33596007 50.72s: 30603 PWR MIST: REFUELING DESC
SSA               06/08/M               LERs 33596008     50.72s: 30604       Pnat MIST: REFUELING DESC         : A SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION SIGalAL WAS GENERATED DURING MAINTENAalCE ON THE ESF SYSTEM POWER MPPLIES. THE POWER SUPPLY FAILED DURING INSTALLATION OF A CIRCUIT CARD.
: All EDG STARTED AaC LOADED WNEN A SUS LOA 0 SNED OCCURRED DURING A COIITAlllMENT !$0LATitBI ACTUATION
$1ENAL TEST. AN lisADEGUATE PROCEDIRE CONTAINED No INSTRUCT!0sts 70 REINSTALL FUSES WIIICN WRE RBWWED AS PART Of A PREVIOUS TEST.
SSA 06/0s/96 LERs 3359600s
: 50. 72s: 30604 PW NIST: REFUELING DESC
: A 4.16EV ELECTRICAL BUS LOST POWER DURING MAINTEIIANCE 00f Taft ESF SYSTEM POWER SUPPLIES. THE EDG DID 180T START SECAUSE IT WAS QUT OF SERVICE. THE POWER SUPPLY FAILED DURING INSTALLATICII 0F A CIRCUIT CARD.
SSA 06/08/M LERs 33596008 50.72s: 30604 Pnat MIST: REFUELING DESC
: A SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION SIGalAL WAS GENERATED DURING MAINTENAalCE ON THE ESF SYSTEM POWER MPPLIES. THE POWER SUPPLY FAILED DURING INSTALLATION OF A CIRCUIT CARD.
i l
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ST. LUCIE 1                                                               PREEQSomt_
ST. LUCIE 1
PREEQSomt_
Trends & Deviations
Trends & Deviations
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Shaded Regions: Inadequate phase time in last 2 quarters to update calculatione
Shaded Regions: Inadequate phase time in last 2 quarters to update calculatione


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ST. LUCIE 2
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* o.0 '                                                                         o                                                   N e53     94 1-     94 3     96 1     95 3   98-1'                             93 3   94       94 3 96 1'       96 3     OS 1' Year Quarter                                                                   Year. Querser Essestpsnent Fomed N
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seco cenensecial Cruical Neure F
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* 80 -
I a: .o                                                                   ig        '"                                                                      l u
I ig '"
f                                                                                 2]
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i n-j l0 -
                                            "--M" 93 3   94 1-     94 3
AK s.1 m
                                                                        ~
mM y
95                                                                                 ~
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e S33     94 1-AK 94 s.1 96 1-9M 98 1' Year . Quarter                                                                 Year - Quarter Cause Codes
~
: s. Aemst                     b. Lac Omer           c. ceter Por 20e 080***'' RMI' ** E*888"'"                         '
~
i g            .                            ,
w o e
                                                                                                          .                      ,==                         e.
93 3 94 1-94 3 95 95 3 9s 1' w
i;                     .;                      i E g1802                                                                      3 j ) ,,,;
S33 94 1-94 96 1-9M 98 1' Year. Quarter Year - Quarter Cause Codes
                                                                                                      ,          =- -               ,
: s. Aemst
                                                                                                                  ..        e                 .. ~                     ,-
: b. Lac Omer
: c. ceter Por 080***'' RMI' ** E*888"'"
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94-1*     94 3     95   95-3   96 1-m  ''
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93 3 94-1*
Year . Querger                               .                g , . ~ "
94 3 95 95-3 96 1-Year. Querger g,. ~ "
* See Aussego Meeseen Espootse
* See Aussego Meeseen Espootse e
* e
 
* i 4
i 4
I STe LUCIE 2                                                                    t  une st=e.ws. *en e                                         -
I une st=e.ws. *en e STe LUCIE 2 t
Peer Growtceneuston Engineenng wWo CPC                                     i                                                         tesehen m l                           35 3 to 062                                     Trones and Dewiesens                                                                     #C i                                                                                                                                                   Devistons From
Peer Growtceneuston Engineenng wWo CPC i
                                                                                                                .N..
tesehen m l
Self-Trend
35 3 to 062 Trones and Dewiesens
_ . _ _ Peer Group l                                                                                                                                                          Medsen Short Term                               Long Term OPERATMMd8 (includine startup)
#C i
Automatic Scrams While Critical -                                               0                 -
Devistons From
0 Safety System Actuations -                                       0                   -
.N..
0.90                   l Significant Events -                                   o                   -
l Self-Trend
f s
_. _ _ Peer Group Medsen Short Term Long Term OPERATMMd8 (includine startup)
o 4
Automatic Scrams While Critical -
Safety System Failures                     -0.45                                 -
0 0
10.30 Cause Codes (All LERs)
Safety System Actuations -
: a. - -         _ _ comem pressene                             0                 -
0 0.90 l
f Significant Events -
o o
s Safety System Failures
-0.45 1.30 4
0 Cause Codes (All LERs)
: a. - -
_ _ comem pressene 0
0.54
0.54
: m. E           ossemerarvers -t                       0                 -
: m. E ossemerarvers -t 0
0.90 M 2                                                                 s.comrPerumanesarvers -                           0                 -
0.90 M 2
0.72
s.comrPerumanesarvers -
]                                                                                                                   } 0.03              -
0 0.72
0.13 se      -                        s.enemme=seP' esse =e}
]
                                                                          ;          evenemme                       0                 -
s.enemme=seP' esse =e}
0.e0 e                                                                             f. -                                   0                 -
} 0.03 0.13 se evenemme 0
1        lOAS SHUTDOWN i
0.e0 e
i                                                 Safety System Actuations -                                         o                 -
: f. -
o Significant Events -                                   o                 -
0 1
o Safety System Failures -                                       0.05             -
lOAS SHUTDOWN i
0.83 Cause Codes (All LERs)
i Safety System Actuations -
: a. - -       - comew Presamme q                               0                 -
o o
Significant Events -
o o
Safety System Failures -
0.05 0.83 Cause Codes (All LERs)
: a. - -
- comew Presamme q 0
0.59 E
0.59 E
: n. unasses osereur ervers                             0                 -
: n. unasses osereur ervers 0
O s.omerpeveommes arvers q                             0                              0.13 I
O 0
: a. -               -preemans -                     0.03 q                      [ 0.09
0.13 I s.omerpeveommes arvers q q
[ 0.09
: a. -
-preemans -
0.03
: e. -
: e. -
pesammes -                     0                 -
pesammes -
0.55
0 0.55 0
: f. '                                   0                                          0
0
                                                                                      ~
: f. '
FORCED OUTAGES Forced Outage Rate * -                         -0.19                           -
~
l 0.36
FORCED OUTAGES Forced Outage Rate * -
                      -                                                                                                                                ~
-0.19 l 0.36
Equipment Forced Outages /
~
* 1000 Commercial CrMical Hours                             1M.                                     -
Equipment Forced Outages / *
                                                                                                                                                -0.26 1 1.0   -0.5       0.0       03 1.0     1.0       -0.5       OD       0.5     1.0 Performance Index                           Performance index
-0.26 1 1000 Commercial CrMical Hours 1M.
1.0
-0.5 0.0 03 1.0 1.0
-0.5 OD 0.5 1.0 Performance Index Performance index
* sees censmesses ter oversement orese
* sees censmesses ter oversement orese


_ _ _._ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ .                        -.._ _. .._ _ _ . _      .- _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . ~ . _ _ . _ . .                 _  _ _ _ _
.- _.. _ _ _ _ _ _.. ~. _ _. _..
N PREDICIOIONRL Pi j                                                                                           ST. LUCIE 2 1
N PREDICIOIONRL Pi j
PI EVENTS FOR 95-3                                                         )
ST. LUCIE 2 1
MM                                                       l l
PI EVENTS FOR 95-3
PI EVENTS POR 95-4 SSF         11/20/95       LERe 3e995005   so.72s: 29626 -
)
PtR NIST C2 W ITION EXISTS FOR AN INDETERMINATE PERIts OF TIME GROUP : WERENCY AC/DC PEREE SYSTEMS MIRJP SYSTBI : M ONSITE POWR SUPPLY SYSTDI l                                     DESC     : SEmmem EELAY SOCIET CONNECTIONS CaueED TNE FAILINE OF ONE EDG, AIS TME POTENTIAL FAILINE OF TE j                                                   OTWR. VIERATION IImuCED FAffmE CaueID THE SOCIET CONIECTION DEGRADAfl0II.
MM l
PI EVENTS FOR 95-1 NONE                                                       '
PI EVENTS POR 95-4 SSF 11/20/95 LERe 3e995005 so.72s: 29626 -
PtR NIST C2 W ITION EXISTS FOR AN INDETERMINATE PERIts OF TIME GROUP : WERENCY AC/DC PEREE SYSTEMS MIRJP SYSTBI : M ONSITE POWR SUPPLY SYSTDI l
DESC
: SEmmem EELAY SOCIET CONNECTIONS CaueED TNE FAILINE OF ONE EDG, AIS TME POTENTIAL FAILINE OF TE j
OTWR. VIERATION IImuCED FAffmE CaueID THE SOCIET CONIECTION DEGRADAfl0II.
PI EVENTS FOR 95-1 NONE i
l PI EVENTS FOR 96-2 SSF 06/25/96 LERs 50.72s: 30676 PtR HIST: COISITIglt EXISTED FOR AN INDETEINIINATE PERIOD OF TIME GROUP
* EMRGENCT CORE COOLING ffSTEMS GROUP STSTEM : LOW PREsamE SAFETT INJECTION SYSTEM DESC
. TNE PLAlff PRACTICE OF DEENERSIZING THE SA'ETT !NJECT!Oes TANIC ISCLATICII VALVES AFTER CL0euRE IN MODE FOUR DEFEATS TNE AUTOMATIC OPEN FEATultf AT 515 PSI A Aac QN A SI AS. TNIS CONDITION WAS CAUSED BT 1
INADEcuATE PLANT PROCEDURES.
)
i l
i l
PI EVENTS FOR 96-2 l
SSF        06/25/96      LERs              50.72s: 30676                                                            '
PtR HIST: COISITIglt EXISTED FOR AN INDETEINIINATE PERIOD OF TIME                                                      l GROUP
* EMRGENCT CORE COOLING ffSTEMS GROUP STSTEM : LOW PREsamE SAFETT INJECTION SYSTEM DESC    . TNE PLAlff PRACTICE OF DEENERSIZING THE SA'ETT !NJECT!Oes TANIC ISCLATICII VALVES AFTER CL0euRE IN MODE FOUR DEFEATS TNE AUTOMATIC OPEN FEATultf AT 515 PSI A Aac QN A SI AS. TNIS CONDITION WAS CAUSED BT        1 INADEcuATE PLANT PROCEDURES.
                                                                                                                                                              )
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ST. Trends & Deviations LUGIE 2                                             eneoecac*w_
ST. LUGIE 2 eneoecac*w_
        ....              _mu rv._. ..-- n_a . 4 6..
Trends & Deviations
                                                                                . ...         .ar.
_mu rv._...-- n_a. 4 6..
                                                                                                --    m.-a.         oaa..                   ....._u_., , , . _._             , , . . . , , , , ,
.....ar. m.-a.
          =         .                                      -
oaa..
                                                                                .=.     .
....._u_.,,,. _._
=
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m,
m,
                                                              ~
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un se
                                                                                                                              ~
' ri E
                                                                                                                                                  ...              J
s.-..
                ...                                        um                        .~                                    un                   .
a i
se E              ,,,    a c_
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c
c i ,,,,        ,, -
=:
                                                                                                                                                . s.-. .
5 r=
              =:                     5                     r=                     = :-                   a                   n.                 =:     .
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s 1
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,fi.
:=_ .                                                               _":**
. =._..
_        :      'i                   ,                 _ =_ :
:=_.
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                  ..  - . - .. , . 2. .               .
,l,
J..,   ..      .                ..
=_ :
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l u
          .....,w~.-..          -.
u
                                          ~      --
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                                                    . ..nu.                      ....._v., , . . _ . . . _-
. J..,.
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, 1. =..- - G..-
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.....,w~.-..
            - :-                      ,                                          '.=-                     ,                                  '.=-
....._v.,,.. _... -
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b               =:
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                    ..                                      In                         ~.                 1                                        -                                    -              ,
b
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Shaded Regions: Inadequate phase time in last 2 quarters to update calctdations t
Shaded Regions: Inadequate phase time in last 2 quarters to update calctdations t


PLANT IPE CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY INFORMATION                                                                                           .l
i l
!                                                                                                                                                                                                                            a c=e ne=ese F.e.ene, p= acessmes casse                                   p eemee 0.e me se n     e,ge,a-se     en se Plant IPE                   Iri-i coF          =      l am l           7-=
B i
l ulca l == listwal -                             =     .m l 5         Emm l wm lmM g-
i l
,                    General Electric BWR 1
i
!                    og neck re.ni                                                                 S.50E m 4.32E45 l s.4E45l5.t0E 073.e0E 08                                                 -      negasten       1.10E4p   tS     7%     12%
}
1B0%l -         0%l       0%
PLANT IPE CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY INFORMATION
General Electric BWRs 2 and 3 (Isolation Condensers) on,,e nase Peet 1                       5.5E46 3.50E-08 5.40E 07               7.90E-07   7.00E-07         -
.l a
2.00E-00 noghetes   84 %     10%     14 %   13% ,-        0%         0%       '[
i Iri-i coF c=e ne=ese F.e.ene, p= acessmes casse p eemee 0.e me se n e,ge,a-se en se i
Oystee Creek toes teste iIll '           3 SE OS     2 30E OS     2.40E 07     S.20E-07     2.50E-07         -
Plant IPE l am l 7-= l ulca l== listwal -
1.03E-07   2.10E-07 59 %     SH     23%     0%   -
=
3%         g%
.m l 5 Emm l wm lmM g-
Orenden 213 ISWR 31                       1.9E-05 9.30E-07       5 30E-07       1.40E 05   1.SOE-08         --
=
4.34E-10 negagnie     5%     3%     S3%     9%   -        0%         0%
General Electric BWR 1 l
estseene 1 (SWR 38                       1.1E 05 7.00E 06       0.00E 07       1.00E46 0 04E-07             -
i og neck re.ni l s.4E45l5.t0E 073.e0E 08 S.50E m 4.32E45 negasten 1.10E4p tS 7%
1.30E-07   2.50E-07 05 %     7%     10 %   0%   -
12%
15       2%
1B0%l -
Flagran 1 (WWR 31                       5.0E 05 neghghee         4.10E-08     5.05E-05     3 20E-00         -
0%l
1.00E-07   7 07E-07 0%       7%     80 %     SS 0%         1%
{
General Electric BWRs 3 and 4 asent.come 18WR 31                       2.SE-05     1.20E 05     2.50E-06     3.47E46     1.20E-00         -          3.20E-10 8.00E48   40 %     10%     13%     SS   -
0%
0%       20 %       !
General Electric BWRs 2 and 3 (Isolation Condensers) i on,,e nase Peet 1 5.5E46 3.50E-08 5.40E 07 7.90E-07 7.00E-07 2.00E-00 noghetes 84 %
Quod Cateos 1/2 town 31                 1.2E-OS     5.72E 07     7.01E-00     2.95E-07     2.00E-07         -
10%
noges tes   neghghte 50 %     7%     20 %   18%     -
14 %
0%         0%
13%
Orowns Ferry 2                           4.8E45 1.30E-05         1.30E-06     2.79E-05 4.80E-07             -
0%
4.00E-00   4.70E-00 27%       3%     5t%     1%             0%
0%
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  .10%
'[
grunswick 112                           2.M-05 1.00E G           7.00E-07     0.72E-00     t.90E-07         -
Oystee Creek toes teste iIll '
5.10E 00   1.90E-06 07%       3%     25 %     15             0%
3 SE OS 2 30E OS 2.40E 07 S.20E-07 2.50E-07 1.03E-07 2.10E-07 59 %
                                                                                                                                                                                                -                    7%         !
SH 23%
Cooper -                                 8.0E-05 2.00E M         3.90E-OS     3.97Em B.33E-08               -      noghgelo     neghgtie 35 %     5%     50%   10%   -
0%
0%         0%         ;
3%
Duane Arnoed                             7.0E-00     1.90E-08     1.90E-06     3.90E-00                                                                                                                   :
g%
1.00E-07         -      negas tle   negughts 24 %   24 %     50%     2%   -        0%         0%         }
Orenden 213 ISWR 31 1.9E-05 9.30E-07 5 30E-07 1.40E 05 1.SOE-08 4.34E-10 negagnie 5%
l j                   Fernu 2                                 5.M OS 1.30E-07         1.00E-OS     3.50E-OS reghgelo           -          2.00E-07   9.7M40   2%              et%
3%
32 %           ~ 0%   -        4%        25 Fhapetnck                               1.9E OS     1.75E-00     1.20E-00     1.5 tE47     7.40E-09       -        negsgese     negegete 91 %     1%       0%
S3%
t 4                                                                                                                                                                                        9%   -
9%
0%         0%         i Hetch 1                                 2.2E-05 3.30E-08                                                                                                                                                   '
0%
5.10E 07     2.07E 05 2.22E-07           -          1.7 tE-07 1.20E47 IS%       2%     00%     1%   -
0%
1%         1%         i t
estseene 1 (SWR 38 1.1E 05 7.00E 06 0.00E 07 1.00E46 0 04E-07 1.30E-07 2.50E-07 05 %
Hetch 2                                 2.4E-05 3.23E-00         S.3?E-07 j
7%
k 1.90E-05     2.22E-07       -          1.77E 07   1.00E47 14 %     3%     00%     1%   -
10 %
1%         1%
0%
Hope Cseek                               4.0E 45 3.30E-05         7.45E-07     4.4M48 3.03E-08             -        neghette     5.50E-07 78 %     1%     14 %   7%   -
15 2%
0%         1%
[
timerick 112                             4.3E-08 1.00E-07         9.30E-07     2.9M-08 1.20E47             -        negastes     1.00E-07 2%     22 %     00%     35   4         05 45 ptoch tenem 2/3                         5.OE-05 4.81E47         1.44E-00     2.8M48 5.92E47               -        noggette      1.4M47    9%                    195        5 28 %    52%          -        0%        35        i Vermont Yentee                           4.4E-08 8.24E-07         7.90E-07     2.70E-08 mi.42E-00           -
Flagran 1 (WWR 31 5.0E 05 neghghee 4.10E-08 5.05E-05 3 20E-00 1.00E-07 7 07E-07 0%
2.3M-OS negAgels     14 %   ISS     825     15   -
7%
15         0%
80 %
SS 0%
1%
General Electric BWRs 3 and 4 asent.come 18WR 31 2.SE-05 1.20E 05 2.50E-06 3.47E46 1.20E-00 3.20E-10 8.00E48 40 %
10%
13%
SS 0%
20 %
Quod Cateos 1/2 town 31 1.2E-OS 5.72E 07 7.01E-00 2.95E-07 2.00E-07 noge tes neghghte 50 %
7%
20 %
18%
h s
0%
0%
Orowns Ferry 2 4.8E45 1.30E-05 1.30E-06 2.79E-05 4.80E-07 4.00E-00 4.70E-00 27%
3%
5t%
1%
0%
.10%
grunswick 112 2.M-05 1.00E G 7.00E-07 0.72E-00 t.90E-07 5.10E 00 1.90E-06 07%
3%
25 %
15 r
0%
7%
l Cooper -
8.0E-05 2.00E M 3.90E-OS 3.97Em B.33E-08 noghgelo neghgtie 35 %
5%
50%
10%
0%
0%
Duane Arnoed 7.0E-00 1.90E-08 1.90E-06 3.90E-00 1.00E-07 nega tle negughts 24 %
24 %
50%
2%
s 0%
0%
}
l
~ 0%
j Fernu 2 5.M OS 1.30E-07 1.00E-OS 3.50E-OS reghgelo 4%
25 k
2.00E-07 9.7M40 2%
32 %
et%
t Fhapetnck 1.9E OS 1.75E-00 1.20E-00 1.5 tE47 7.40E-09 negsgese negegete 91 %
1%
0%
9%
0%
0%
i 4
Hetch 1 2.2E-05 3.30E-08 5.10E 07 2.07E 05 2.22E-07 1.7 tE-07 1.20E47 IS%
2%
00%
1%
1%
1%
i t
k Hetch 2 2.4E-05 3.23E-00 S.3?E-07 1.90E-05 2.22E-07 1.77E 07 1.00E47 14 %
3%
00%
1%
1%
1%
j Hope Cseek 4.0E 45 3.30E-05 7.45E-07 4.4M48 3.03E-08 neghette 5.50E-07 78 %
1%
14 %
7%
0%
1%
timerick 112 4.3E-08 1.00E-07 9.30E-07 2.9M-08 1.20E47 negastes 1.00E-07 2%
22 %
00%
35 4
05 45 noggette 1.4M47 9%
28 %
52%
195 5
0%
35 i
ptoch tenem 2/3 5.OE-05 4.81E47 1.44E-00 2.8M48 5.92E47 Vermont Yentee 4.4E-08 8.24E-07 7.90E-07 2.70E-08 mi.42E-00 2.3M-OS negAgels 14 %
ISS 825 15 15 0%
t l
t l
1                                                                                                                                                                                                                               !
1 FILE:IPE-COF.Tel.
FILE:IPE-COF.Tel.
e
                                                                                                                                                                                              .. e   -s . . - . . . . .
-s


                                                                                                                                                                                                                        .                                                                        1 PLANT IPE CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY INFORMATION                                                                                                                                                         j c-o Do eSe e.e e e,       .eoise ciese                                                 e             e. 0ese te e eece e ,             - c.ees Plant IPE                      I=cm                 =                        a7=        mas      toca l == 1 moca l = as e = l a7= l = l taa l == lmma l = Etes Generd Electric BWR S                                                                                                                                                                                                                         >
1 l
tossee n2                                       4.M45 3 eM45                             1.e7E 07   7.30E48 2.e3E45           -
PLANT IPE CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY INFORMATION j
noessano   3.3sE46       Si%                           0%     tot     0% .-                                  7%                                j og,,, gene Pen,t 2                             3.tE45     5.50E OS                       t.10E-06   2.3 TEM   7.40E47         -
c-o Do eSe e.e e e,
2.50E 08 1.50E M       18%                           4%     75 %     It   -                        0%     -8%
.eoise ciese e
W2                                             1.8E-05     1.10E M                       S.25E 07   2.83E OS 5.10E47         ---          negagtes   2.52EM       S3%                           4%     15 %     3%   -                        0%     14 %                               !
: e. 0ese te e eece e,
General Electric BWR 6 Cg,,eo,,                                       2.M 05     9 00E OS                     l.40E 07   1.40E45   1.10E48         -            negRghts   1.00E-OS     38 % I                        1%     53%     4%   -
- c.ees i
0%       0%
I=cm Plant IPE l== 1 moca l = as e = l a7= l = l taa l== lmma l = Etes l
arene ouw I                                     t.M OS 7.4eE OS 5.5eE OS                             s.3sE48 5. tee 47         -            negagnes   1.e0E.07     43%                           og     3.g     3,                              ,,      ,,
=
Perry 1 -                                     .l.3E-05 2 25E OS 4.70E OS                             4.30E48 4.50E OF         -
a7=
neguetee   1.50E-08     17%                       30 %         33%     3%   -
mas toca Generd Electric BWR S 7%
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  - 0%       12%
j tossee n2 4.M45 3 eM45 1.e7E 07 7.30E48 2.e3E45 noessano 3.3sE46 Si%
ISver send                                     1.9E 05 1.35E 05 neghgets                             2.0SE 08 noghette         -          negsgeen   1.00E-00     87%                           0%     13%     0%   -                        0%       0%
0%
Bobcock and Wilcox PWR 2-loop                                                                 -
tot 0%
Afec t                                         4.M 05 1.58E-05 9 93E-07                               1.48E-05 1.57E-05   9.20E-08           8.90E-OS   9.34E47 . 34 %                               2%     32%   34 %       0%                   0%       2%
og,,, gene Pen,t 2 3.tE45 5.50E OS t.10E-06 2.3 TEM 7.40E47 2.50E 08 1.50E M 18%
Cryotes ferver 3                               3.5E-05 3.20E M noghget,                             9.45E-07 9.00E-OS 9.70E47 negeghin                 3 25E-00     23%                           0%       8%   OSS         4%                   0%       8%
4%
                                                                    "                    3 54E 0?   5.7tE-05 5.24E-OS 4.80E-07               8.00E 07 2.00E40       "
75 %
Oev6s tesse                                    8.0E-05                                                                                                                                              1%     OS%     8%         15                   1%     3%
It 0%
Oconee 1.2.3                                   2.3E-05   2.57EM 1.00E-07                           5.33E40 9.70E-00 2.10E-07               4.90E 10 5.00E48       11 %                           0%     23%   42%         1%                   0%     24 %
-8%
15s                                             4.5E-05 1.5 M-OS nogentle                             2.30E-06 1.5MM     S.94E-07           1.00E-07 3 00E.00       3%                           0%     52%   35 %         2%                   0%       7%
W2 1.8E-05 1.10E M S.25E 07 2.83E OS 5.10E47 negagtes 2.52EM S3%
Combustion Engineering PWR 2-loop 4100 2                                         3.4E45 123E 08                           1.02E48     2.9M-05 4.00E-OS 9.53E-08               3.30E 07 nogmente         4%                           3%     79%     14%         0%                   1%     0%                               :
4%
                                                                      "                  2.40E-05   1.30E 04 S.SSE-05                                               "
15 %
Coevert chtts 112                              2.4E 04                                                                    4.40E-OS           1.90E-OS 1.59E-05                                 10 %       54 %   30%         2%                   1%       0%
3%
i Fort Coshoun 1                                  1.4E-05              "                  2.89E-07   5.93E-Os 3.07E-OS   7.9M 07             S.74E-07 1.SM 08       "                              2%      SS%      8%        8%                  9%      14 %                              -[
0%
StLucie 1                                       2.3E-05 2.SSE OS                         4.13E-07   5.30E OS 1.2N 05 0.lGE-07               f.74E48 5.00E-07       12%                           25     23%     SSS         4%                   8%       25                               t St Lucie 2                                     2.eE-05 2.84E-OS                         1.70E48     5.3tE-08 1.29E-05 0.90E47               2.73E46 5.00E47         10%                           7%     20%   48%         3%                 10 %     2%
14 %
heinstone 2                                   3.4E-05     4.3E-07                       1.5E40     2.9E45 0.01548 5.2M47                 0.00E48 2.00E47           15                           4%     74 %   10 %       2%                   0%       1%                               ;
General Electric BWR 6 I
P.esedse                                       5.1E-05 9.ON48                           4.00E-00   2.0M 05 1.57E-05 2.04E4B                 M47       M47         18%                           0%     38%   31 %         45                   0%       0%
Cg,,eo,,
2.M 05 9 00E OS l.40E 07 1.40E45 1.10E48 negRghts 1.00E-OS 38 %
1%
53%
4%
0%
0%
arene ouw I t.M OS 7.4eE OS 5.5eE OS s.3sE48
: 5. tee 47 negagnes 1.e0E.07 43%
og 3.g 3,
Perry 1 -
.l.3E-05 2 25E OS 4.70E OS 4.30E48 4.50E OF neguetee 1.50E-08 17%
30 %
33%
3%
- 0%
12%
ISver send 1.9E 05 1.35E 05 neghgets 2.0SE 08 noghette negsgeen 1.00E-00 87%
0%
13%
0%
0%
0%
Bobcock and Wilcox PWR 2-loop Afec t 4.M 05 1.58E-05 9 93E-07 1.48E-05 1.57E-05 9.20E-08 8.90E-OS 9.34E47. 34 %
2%
32%
34 %
0%
0%
2%
Cryotes ferver 3 3.5E-05 3.20E M noghget, 9.45E-07 9.00E-OS 9.70E47 negeghin 3 25E-00 23%
0%
8%
OSS 4%
0%
8%
3 54E 0?
5.7tE-05 5.24E-OS 4.80E-07 8.00E 07 2.00E40 1%
OS%
8%
15 1%
3%
Oev6s tesse 8.0E-05 Oconee 1.2.3 2.3E-05 2.57EM 1.00E-07 5.33E40 9.70E-00 2.10E-07 4.90E 10 5.00E48 11 %
0%
23%
42%
1%
0%
24 %
I 15s 4.5E-05 1.5 M-OS nogentle 2.30E-06 1.5MM S.94E-07 1.00E-07 3 00E.00 3%
0%
52%
35 %
2%
0%
7%
Combustion Engineering PWR 2-loop
(
4100 2 3.4E45 123E 08 1.02E48 2.9M-05 4.00E-OS 9.53E-08 3.30E 07 nogmente 4%
3%
79%
14%
0%
1%
0%
Coevert chtts 112 2.4E 04 2.40E-05 1.30E 04 S.SSE-05 4.40E-OS 1.90E-OS 1.59E-05 10 %
54 %
30%
2%
1%
0%
}
i 2%
SS%
8%
8%
9%
14 %
-[
2.89E-07 5.93E-Os 3.07E-OS 7.9M 07 S.74E-07 1.SM 08 Fort Coshoun 1 1.4E-05
}
StLucie 1 2.3E-05 2.SSE OS 4.13E-07 5.30E OS 1.2N 05 0.lGE-07 f.74E48 5.00E-07 12%
25 23%
SSS 4%
8%
25 t
St Lucie 2 2.eE-05 2.84E-OS 1.70E48 5.3tE-08 1.29E-05 0.90E47 2.73E46 5.00E47 10%
7%
20%
48%
3%
10 %
2%
heinstone 2 3.4E-05 4.3E-07 1.5E40 2.9E45 0.01548 5.2M47 0.00E48 2.00E47 15 4%
74 %
10 %
2%
0%
1%
f P.esedse 5.1E-05 9.ON48 4.00E-00 2.0M 05 1.57E-05 2.04E4B M47 M47 18%
0%
38%
31 %
45 0%
0%
t i
t i
FILE: IPE.COF.v5L 04an Sep 30.199813-2Ipmi
FILE: IPE.COF.v5L 04an Sep 30.199813-2Ipmi
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1 PLANT IPE CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY INFORMATION Inont CDF Cor. Dame.e ree e c, w=ede ames cerce t se ee.e oe e e.e o ef e.moeide ass.
Plant IPE soo at*s t-mCa


PLANT IPE CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY INFORMATION Cor. Dame.e ree e c, w=ede ames cerce t se ee.e oe e e.e o ef e.moeide ass.
==
Plant IPE              Inont CDF                    soo M
'saca m' amed ams ww e
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                                                                                                        ....M
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                                                                                                            ==
m.C.
M
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                                                                                                                      'saca M
....M M
m' amed M      M ams ww M
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me. mv. m.C. w ,.ed M         M         M steeee en CDF ochsee:
M M
      ** For Davis Besso. Calvert Chtts. & Fort Coahoun. separete 590 CDF was unewedstrie, so Transeen'                 For furtey #omt. the CDF Ested in the esec summary of the subnutth, which CDF and % CDF .ncludes SBO contreution                                                                         corresponds to *e5 leyese of recovery." was used I'I The database values for Oyster Creen do not appeer to melude the CDF for internet floods; the                 For Salem I & 2. the revised flood end plant CDFe Seted in the submittelletter for teio IP1 values bsted here include the CDF for intemel flood                                                             were used The Surry meernel flood CDF is from page 9 of 4/21rS2 NRR letter which bsts a revesed value t58 from 11/28/98 Surry ser,elyse subnuttet                                                                             For Weits Ber. the CDf s from the revised tutwrmtial were used Deferred means that bconsee included hiernel flood enelysm si then IPEEE i
M M
steeee en CDF ochsee:
** For Davis Besso. Calvert Chtts. & Fort Coahoun. separete 590 CDF was unewedstrie, so Transeen' For furtey #omt. the CDF Ested in the esec summary of the subnutth, which CDF and % CDF.ncludes SBO contreution corresponds to *e5 leyese of recovery." was used I'IThe database values for Oyster Creen do not appeer to melude the CDF for internet floods; the For Salem I & 2. the revised flood end plant CDFe Seted in the submittelletter for teio IP1 values bsted here include the CDF for intemel flood were used The Surry meernel flood CDF is from page 9 of 4/21rS2 NRR letter which bsts a revesed value t58 from 11/28/98 Surry ser,elyse subnuttet For Weits Ber. the CDf s from the revised tutwrmtial were used Deferred means that bconsee included hiernel flood enelysm si then IPEEE i
t L
t L
V i
V i
Line 1,692: Line 2,951:
FILE:IPE CDF.TOL Man % 1ri togstst atame
FILE:IPE CDF.TOL Man % 1ri togstst atame


                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        .__....m.._...     ___.._m_.         _    __m . _ _ . _ . .        m.   . . - _ . . . . - _ m.
.__....m.._...
___.._m_.
__m m.
m.
t Pt ANT IPE CONTAIN0AENT FAILURE FREQUEteCY INFORRAATION i
t Pt ANT IPE CONTAIN0AENT FAILURE FREQUEteCY INFORRAATION i
pg ng                                            Care Damage Fwy By - FeSove IBodo                                                                                                                                     Pweent of Case Damage Psessemey Per h Fehme Maes                                                   f piens IPE                                                                                                 COF                                           Sypese                                                   EF                                                 LF                                             IOCF              Dypeos              EF         LF                SICF l                                                l                                                l                l Geneest Electetc . E sege Dey
Care Damage Fwy By - FeSove IBodo Pweent of Case Damage Psessemey Per h Fehme Maes f
* SIO ROCK POINT                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      noghg4eel                                                                    1%                                              Set                                i l                        5.4E 05l                                       7.50E-Otl                                         2.32E-OSl                                                                                           5 00E-06l                                 4%l.         0%l Generet Electne . Deeet I 3
pg ng l
GROWNS FERRY 2                                                                                                   4.9E-05                                       4.40E 07                                           2.10E-05                                           1.25E-05                                         1.33E-05                 1%             45%         20 %                 29%
l IOCF Dypeos l
ORUNSWICK I&2                                                                                                   2 7E 05                                       6 21E 08                                           2.30E 06                                           1.03E 05                                         8 33E-06                 1%               9%         90%                   31 %                             -
l LF piens IPE COF Sypese EF LF SICF EF Geneest Electetc. E sege Dey l
COOPER                                                                                                           8 OE 05                                       neghytdo                                           I .29E-05                                         5.77E 05                                         9 13E 06                 0%             15%         72%                   11 %                             !
5.4E 05l 7.50E-Otl 2.32E-OSl noghg4eel 5 00E-06l 4%l.
ORESDEN 2&3                                                                                                       19E 05                                       6                                                   5 55E-07                                           1.5M M                                           2.04E M                 0%               3%         M%                   11 %
0%l Set i
l OUANE ARNOLD                                                                                                     7.9E 06                                     neghgelo                                           3 57E OS                                         2 49E-08                                           1.SOE-08                 0%             47%         32%                   It%
1%
FERhet 2                                                                                                         5 7E 06                                       2 00E-07                                           1.71E OS                                         2.22E 05                                           1.57E-05                 4%             30%         39%                 28 %                               j Fli2 PATRICK                                                                                                     19E 06                                       noghg4to                                           1.20E-05                                         4.10E-07                                           3 03E 07                 0%             53%         22%                   19 %                             {
SIO ROCK POINT Generet Electne. Deeet I 3
HATCH g                                                                                                         2 2E 05                                         t 35E 07 g                                        5 47E 08                                         5.70E OS                                           3.10E 05                 1%             25 %       20 %                 49%
GROWNS FERRY 2 4.9E-05 4.40E 07 2.10E-05 1.25E-05 1.33E-05 1%
HATCH 2                                                                                                         2 4E 05                                       1.94E 07                                         5 00E-06                                           5 SIE OS                                           1.25E 05                 1%             21 %       25 %               M HOPE CREEK                                                                                                       4 6E 05                                       noghpete                                           2.87E 05                                           1.20E 05                                         5 5eE-06                 0%             S2%         20 %                 12%                               !
45%
ASILLSTONE                                                                                                       1.1E 05                                       1.25E 07                                           3.74E 06                                         3.27E-06                                           3 87E-06                 1%             34 %       30 %                 35 %
20 %
GAONTICELLO                                                                                                     2.6E 05                                       5 20E 09                                           4.15E-06                                         S.24E-OS                                           1.50E-05                 1%             IS%         24 %                 00%
29%
NINE SAILE POINT 1                                                                                               5.5E 06                                       7.40E 00                                           1.31E-08                                         3.40E-OS                                           7.12E-07                 1%             24 %       82%                   13%
ORUNSWICK I&2 2 7E 05 6 21E 08 2.30E 06 1.03E 05 8 33E-06 1%
OYSTER CREEK                                                                                                     3. 7E-06                                       2. 70E-07                                         5.5 7E-07                                         9.89E-07                                           1.00E-06                 7%             10%         26 %                 St%
9%
PEACH BOTTOM 2&3                                                                                                 5 SE 06                                       8 64E-09                                           1.55E-08                                           t.40E-05                                         2.57E-06                 1%             20 %       25 %                 40 %                               i PILGRIM                                                                                                         5 OE 05                                       2.32E 07                                           1.25E-05                                         3.54E-05                                           9.00E-06                 1%             22%         St%                   17%
90%
OUAD CITIES 162                                                                                                   1.2E-06                                       6 00E.10                                           2 84E-07                                         6.82E-07                                           2.53E-07                 1%             24 %       55 %                 21%                               i 1
31 %
VERT 40NT YANKEE                                                                                                 4 3E 06                                       4 30E 00                                           211E 06                                           9.99E-07                                           1.18E-06               1%             49%         23%                 27%   l t
- [
t i
COOPER 8 OE 05 neghytdo I.29E-05 5.77E 05 9 13E 06 0%
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          '[
15%
I
72%
* IPE-CFF.19L September 30.1996                                   i p.a. t at t                         *
11 %
ORESDEN 2&3 19E 05 6
5 55E-07 1.5M M 2.04E M 0%
3%
M%
11 %
l OUANE ARNOLD 7.9E 06 neghgelo 3 57E OS 2 49E-08 1.SOE-08 0%
47%
32%
It%
FERhet 2 5 7E 06 2 00E-07 1.71E OS 2.22E 05 1.57E-05 4%
30%
39%
28 %
j
{
Fli2 PATRICK 19E 06 noghg4to 1.20E-05 4.10E-07 3 03E 07 0%
53%
22%
19 %
HATCH g 2 2E 05 t 35E 07 5 47E 08 5.70E OS 3.10E 05 1%
25 %
20 %
49%
g HATCH 2 2 4E 05 1.94E 07 5 00E-06 5 SIE OS 1.25E 05 1%
21 %
25 %
M HOPE CREEK 4 6E 05 noghpete 2.87E 05 1.20E 05 5 5eE-06 0%
S2%
20 %
12%
ASILLSTONE 1.1E 05 1.25E 07 3.74E 06 3.27E-06 3 87E-06 1%
34 %
30 %
35 %
GAONTICELLO 2.6E 05 5 20E 09 4.15E-06 S.24E-OS 1.50E-05 1%
IS%
24 %
00%
NINE SAILE POINT 1 5.5E 06 7.40E 00 1.31E-08 3.40E-OS 7.12E-07 1%
24 %
82%
13%
OYSTER CREEK
: 3. 7E-06
: 2. 70E-07 5.5 7E-07 9.89E-07 1.00E-06 7%
10%
26 %
St%
PEACH BOTTOM 2&3 5 SE 06 8 64E-09 1.55E-08 t.40E-05 2.57E-06 1%
20 %
25 %
40 %
i PILGRIM 5 OE 05 2.32E 07 1.25E-05 3.54E-05 9.00E-06 1%
22%
St%
17%
OUAD CITIES 162 1.2E-06 6 00E.10 2 84E-07 6.82E-07 2.53E-07 1%
24 %
55 %
21%
i 1
VERT 40NT YANKEE 4 3E 06 4 30E 00 211E 06 9.99E-07 1.18E-06 1%
49%
23%
27%
h l
t t
i
' [
I IPE-CFF.19L September 30.1996 i
p.a. t at t


. ..                      . _ . _ ___  .          . . . _ _ . _            ..__._._m._..         .  =._=..m     ._ . . _                  ._        .m   . . _ .          ._    _m   . _. . . ~ .
..__._._m._..
Pt ANT IPE CONT AINMENT FAILURE FREQUENCY INFORMAll0N
=._=..m
                                          %                      Cere Damage Freepsoney By Centehuisent Fasere Mode         Poeceset of Core Desunge Feegmaysy PM W Fehme M Pient IPE                             CDF                   Sypees                 EF       LE             NCF             Sypees           EF             LF             NQt l              l                l Geneent Electele Mort N LA SALLE l&2 - 5305               I     4.7E 05               noghg4ee           166E-05   2.42E-05       8 64E-06               0%         ' 35%           51 %             14 %
.m
LIMERICK 1&2                           4.3E 06               neghgele           3 96E 07 1.16E Ot>       2.75E 06               0%             9%           27%             S4%
_m
rwtE MEE POINT 2                       3 IE 05               2.79E 06           2.32E 06 2.04E OS       8. 30E-06               1%           7%           86 %             27%
.. ~.
WNP 2                                   18E 05               2 98E OS           5 34E 06 5 30E 06       6 83E-06                 1%           31 %           30 %             39 %
Pt ANT IPE CONT AINMENT FAILURE FREQUENCY INFORMAll0N Cere Damage Freepsoney By Centehuisent Fasere Mode Poeceset of Core Desunge Feegmaysy PM W Fehme M Pient IPE CDF Sypees EF LE NCF Sypees l
Geseest Eleciele . Meek til 591 TON                               2 SE-05               neghgele           8 27E-07 4 84E-07       2 4?E-05               0%             3%             2%             96 %
l l
GRAND GUtF 1                           17E 05               neghgete           8 05E 06 5 66E 06       3.51E 06               0%           47%             33%             20 %
EF LF NQt Geneent Electele Mort N LA SALLE l&2 - 5305 I
PERRY 1                                 13E 05               nogheele           3 14E -06 4.76E 06       5.30E 06               0%           24 %           36 %           40 %
4.7E 05 noghg4ee 166E-05 2.42E-05 8 64E-06 0%
MfVER BEND                             16E 05               neghgele           4.38E-06   2.14E 06       8 99E 06               0%           28%             14 %             58 %
' 35%
PWR Ice Condenser CATAWBA 1&2                            4 3E 05                7.71E-Os          2.31E-07  2.02E-05        2.27E-05                1%                          47%            $3%
51 %
14 %
LIMERICK 1&2 4.3E 06 neghgele 3 96E 07 1.16E Ot>
2.75E 06 0%
9%
27%
S4%
rwtE MEE POINT 2 3 IE 05 2.79E 06 2.32E 06 2.04E OS
: 8. 30E-06 1%
7%
86 %
27%
WNP 2 18E 05 2 98E OS 5 34E 06 5 30E 06 6 83E-06 1%
31 %
30 %
39 %
Geseest Eleciele. Meek til 591 TON 2 SE-05 neghgele 8 27E-07 4 84E-07 2 4?E-05 0%
3%
2%
96 %
GRAND GUtF 1 17E 05 neghgete 8 05E 06 5 66E 06 3.51E 06 0%
47%
33%
20 %
PERRY 1 13E 05 nogheele 3 14E -06 4.76E 06 5.30E 06 0%
24 %
36 %
40 %
MfVER BEND 16E 05 neghgele 4.38E-06 2.14E 06 8 99E 06 0%
28%
14 %
58 %
PWR Ice Condenser i
1%l^
1%l^
D C. COOK 1&2                         6 3E 05               7.11E 06           9.26E-07   1.13E OS       5.40E 05               11 %           1%             2%             80 %
CATAWBA 1&2 4 3E 05 7.71E-Os 2.31E-07 2.02E-05 2.27E-05 1%
MCGUIRE 1&2                           4 OE-05               9 60E-07           9 50E-07   1.64E-05       2.20E-05               2%             2%           40%             54 %
47%
SEQUOYAH 1&2                           1.7E 04               7.99E-06           2 81E-06   8 32E-05       7.60E-05               5%             2%           49%             45%
$3%
WATTS BAR 1&2                         8 OE-05               5 95E 06           4.03E 06   1.72E-05       5.27E OS               7%             5%           22%             46 %
D C. COOK 1&2 6 3E 05 7.11E 06 9.26E-07 1.13E OS 5.40E 05 11 %
PWR - Subetmospheelc OEAVER VALLEY 1                       2.1 E -04             1.02E-05           4.73E-05   9.15E-05       6.17E 45               5%           23%             44 %             29 %
1%
8EAVER VALLEY 2                         1.9E 04               9 84E 06           4.74E 05   8.54E 05       4.69E-05               5%           25 %           45%             25 %
2%
NORTH ANNA 1&2                         68E05                 8 98E-06           1.05E 06 7.68E 06       5.03E-05               13%             2%           11 %             74 %
80 %
SURRY 1&2                                                                                                                                                     *
MCGUIRE 1&2 4 OE-05 9 60E-07 9 50E-07 1.64E-05 2.20E-05 2%
* MsLLSTONE 3                           5 6E-05               3.99E-07           2.24E-08   1.10E-05       4.4 ?E-05               1%             1%           20 %           30%
2%
40%
54 %
SEQUOYAH 1&2 1.7E 04 7.99E-06 2 81E-06 8 32E-05 7.60E-05 5%
2%
49%
45%
WATTS BAR 1&2 8 OE-05 5 95E 06 4.03E 06 1.72E-05 5.27E OS 7%
5%
22%
46 %
PWR - Subetmospheelc OEAVER VALLEY 1 2.1 E -04 1.02E-05 4.73E-05 9.15E-05 6.17E 45 5%
23%
44 %
29 %
8EAVER VALLEY 2 1.9E 04 9 84E 06 4.74E 05 8.54E 05 4.69E-05 5%
25 %
45%
25 %
NORTH ANNA 1&2 68E05 8 98E-06 1.05E 06 7.68E 06 5.03E-05 13%
2%
11 %
74 %
SURRY 1&2 MsLLSTONE 3 5 6E-05 3.99E-07 2.24E-08 1.10E-05 4.4 ?E-05 1%
1%
20 %
30%
IPE CFF.TOL September 30,1998
IPE CFF.TOL September 30,1998


Pt ANIIPE CONTAINMENT FAKURE FREOUENCY WFORMATION pi ,         Core Deenste Freesency Sy Cenessunent Femme neede                                                                         Percene of Core Ousente T                           _,For h Femme asede Plent tPE               CDF       j Sypsas                   EF                                                                             LF       NCF           Sypees                                   EF         LF l                                                                                    IOCF P W R .terge Dry ARKANSAS NUCLE AR ONE 1   4 9E 05       2 DeE 07           3.03EM                                                                         5.95E 00   3 98EM                 1%                                 8%       12%                 81 %
Pt ANIIPE CONTAINMENT FAKURE FREOUENCY WFORMATION h
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE 2   3 7E 05       4 07E 07           4 51E 08                                                                       5.14E 00   2.89E-05               1%                                 12%       14%                 73%
pi,
ORAt0 WOOD t&2             2.7E-05       1.10E 00         5 40E-08                                                                         2.54E-08   2.48E 05               1%                                 1%         9%                 90%
Core Deenste Freesency Sy Cenessunent Femme neede Percene of Core Ousente T
SYRON 1&2                 3.1E-05       1.24E-00           2.13E-07                                                                       2.50E-00   2 52E M                 1%                                 1%         0%                 91%
_,For h Femme asede i
CAtt AWA y                 5.9E 05         1.17E M           1.17E 07                                                                       3.09E-05   2 83E-05               2%                                   1%       53%                 48 %
l Plent tPE CDF j
CALVERT CtFFS 1&2         2.4E 04       7.44EM             2.11E-05                                                                       9.53E-05   1.18E-04               3%                                   9%       40 %               4e%
Sypsas EF LF NCF Sypees EF LF IOCF P W R.terge Dry ARKANSAS NUCLE AR ONE 1 4 9E 05 2 DeE 07 3.03EM 5.95E 00 3 98EM 1%
COMANCHE PEAK 1&2         5.7E-05       4.87E M           6.75E 07                                                                         2.93E-05   2.20E M               5%                                   1%       51%                 39%
8%
CRYSTAL river 3           1.5E M5       7.39E-07         5 53E-C7                                                                         9 58E-08   4.42E-08               5%                                   4%       53%                 29%
12%
OAVIS SESSE               8 SE-05       1.72E OS         415E 08                                                                         4 SSE 08   5.52E-05               3%                                   8%         3%                 S4%
81 %
OlA8tO CANYON 1&2         8 BE-05       163E 08           1.0lE-05                                                                       3 90E-05   3 85E-05               2%                                 11%       45%                 41%
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE 2 3 7E 05 4 07E 07 4 51E 08 5.14E 00 2.89E-05 1%
FARLEy 1&2                 1.2E 04       4.47E 07           7.19E-04                                                                       3 90EM     1.20E 04               1%                                 8%         3%                 Set FORT CALHOUN 1             1 4E-05       1.44E 08         2.23E-07                                                                         3.80E-08   8.13E-08             11%                                   2%       28 %               80%
12%
OlNNA                     8 7E 05       3.71E-05           2.87E-06                                                                         1.27E-05   3 50E 05             42%                                   3%       15%                 40 %
14%
H.S. ROSINSON 2           3.2E-04     8.37E 08           4.19E M                                                                           3.20EM     2.40E-04               2%                                 13%       10%                 75 %
73%
HA00AM NECK               1.8E -04     1.114 45           1.21E-06                                                                         9.70E-05   7.0IE-05               4%                                   1%       54 %               39 %
ORAt0 WOOD t&2 2.7E-05 1.10E 00 5 40E-08 2.54E-08 2.48E 05 1%
INotAN POINT 2             31E-05       1.94E OG         5 81EM                                                                           2.82E 00   2.85E-05               8%                                   1%         9%                 85 %
1%
INotAN POINT 3             4.4E-05     2 44E-04           3.12E-07                                                                         1.07EM     3.05EM                 8%                                   1%       24 %               09%
9%
KEWAUNEE                   6.8E-05     5.29E-08           1.40E 00                                                                         3.22E-05   2.00E M               8%                                   1%       49%                 43%
90%
MAINE YANKEE               7.4E 05       1.21E-08         5.79E-06                                                                         3.54E-05   3.18E-05               2%                                   3%       48%                 42%
SYRON 1&2 3.1E-05 1.24E-00 2.13E-07 2.50E-00 2 52E M 1%
MILLSTONE 2               3.4E-05       7.88E-07         3.22E 08                                                                         1.11E-05   1.91E-05               2%                                   9%       32%                 54 %
1%
OCONEE 1.2.&3             2.3E-05     4 80E.10           2.81E-07                                                                         1.71E-05   5.81E-00               0%                                   1%       74 %               24 %
0%
PALISADES                 5.1E-05     2 89EM             1.87E M                                                                         7.90E-06   2.35E-05               8%                                 33%       15 %               40%
91%
PALO VER0E 1.2.53         9.0E-05     3.20E 00           9.41E-08                                                                         1.21EM     8.53E-05               4%                                 10%       13%                 73%
CAtt AWA y 5.9E 05 1.17E M 1.17E 07 3.09E-05 2 83E-05 2%
POINT DEACH 1&2           1.0E-04     6.32E-OS           3.24E45                                                                           1.81E-05   7.97E45               et                                   15       17%               77%
1%
PRAmfE ISLANO 1&2         4.9E-05     2.19E-05           4.15E-07                                                                         1.1tE-05   1.54E-08             44 %                                   1%       22%               31 %
53%
IPE-CFF.TOL Septevreer 30.1996 e   ,m -e s
48 %
CALVERT CtFFS 1&2 2.4E 04 7.44EM 2.11E-05 9.53E-05 1.18E-04 3%
9%
40 %
4e%
6 COMANCHE PEAK 1&2 5.7E-05 4.87E M 6.75E 07 2.93E-05 2.20E M 5%
1%
51%
39%
CRYSTAL river 3 1.5E M5 7.39E-07 5 53E-C7 9 58E-08 4.42E-08 5%
4%
53%
29%
OAVIS SESSE 8 SE-05 1.72E OS 415E 08 4 SSE 08 5.52E-05 3%
8%
3%
S4%
OlA8tO CANYON 1&2 8 BE-05 163E 08 1.0lE-05 3 90E-05 3 85E-05 2%
11%
45%
41%
FARLEy 1&2 1.2E 04 4.47E 07 7.19E-04 3 90EM 1.20E 04 1%
8%
3%
Set FORT CALHOUN 1 1 4E-05 1.44E 08 2.23E-07 3.80E-08 8.13E-08 11%
2%
28 %
80%
L OlNNA 8 7E 05 3.71E-05 2.87E-06 1.27E-05 3 50E 05 42%
3%
15%
40 %
H.S. ROSINSON 2 3.2E-04 8.37E 08 4.19E M 3.20EM 2.40E-04 2%
13%
10%
75 %
HA00AM NECK 1.8E -04 1.114 45 1.21E-06 9.70E-05 7.0IE-05 4%
1%
54 %
39 %
INotAN POINT 2 31E-05 1.94E OG 5 81EM 2.82E 00 2.85E-05 8%
1%
9%
85 %
INotAN POINT 3 4.4E-05 2 44E-04 3.12E-07 1.07EM 3.05EM 8%
1%
24 %
09%
KEWAUNEE 6.8E-05 5.29E-08 1.40E 00 3.22E-05 2.00E M 8%
1%
49%
43%
MAINE YANKEE 7.4E 05 1.21E-08 5.79E-06 3.54E-05 3.18E-05 2%
3%
48%
42%
MILLSTONE 2 3.4E-05 7.88E-07 3.22E 08 1.11E-05 1.91E-05 2%
9%
32%
54 %
OCONEE 1.2.&3 2.3E-05 4 80E.10 2.81E-07 1.71E-05 5.81E-00 0%
1%
74 %
24 %
PALISADES 5.1E-05 2 89EM 1.87E M 7.90E-06 2.35E-05 8%
33%
15 %
40%
1 PALO VER0E 1.2.53 9.0E-05 3.20E 00 9.41E-08 1.21EM 8.53E-05 4%
10%
13%
73%
POINT DEACH 1&2 1.0E-04 6.32E-OS 3.24E45 1.81E-05 7.97E45 et 15 17%
77%
PRAmfE ISLANO 1&2 4.9E-05 2.19E-05 4.15E-07 1.1tE-05 1.54E-08 44 %
1%
22%
31 %
IPE-CFF.TOL Septevreer 30.1996 e
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a                                                 OPEN ALLEGATIONS AS OF 10/L /9o ALLEGATION: RII %-A-0145 FACILITY:             ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD: %0628          
a OPEN ALLEGATIONS AS OF 10/L /9o ALLEGATION: RII %-A-0145 FACILITY:
ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD:
%0628


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
RESPONSE TIE TESTING ON SAFETY-RELATED. TS TRANSMITTERS NOT     <
RESPONSE TIE TESTING ON SAFETY-RELATED. TS TRANSMITTERS NOT DUE DATE:
DUE DATE:   % 1028                             PERFORED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ADEO PROCEDURE. UNCOMPENSATED DAYS OPEN:             111 ACTION PNDG:       RESIDENT INS ISS 2, 3. DRS PROVIDE INPUT TOORP IR:% 14 RSP DIV:         L-DRP/PB3 LCA:             8/14/96:ACK LTR                                                   ,
% 1028 PERFORED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ADEO PROCEDURE. UNCOMPENSATED DAYS OPEN:
ACTION DUE DATE: 10/13/% CLOSURE l
111 ACTION PNDG:
ALLEGATION: RIl %-A-0150 FACILITY:             ST LUCIE 1                                                         .
RESIDENT INS ISS 2, 3. DRS PROVIDE INPUT TOORP IR:% 14 RSP DIV:
DATE RCVD:   960709          
L-DRP/PB3 LCA:
8/14/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 10/13/% CLOSURE ALLEGATION: RIl %-A-0150 FACILITY:
ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD:
960709


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
CONTAINE NT RAD MONITORS CANNOT BE SAFELY WORKED ON. Cn. ur       l DUE DATE:   % 1210                             U1 CONTROL RH RAD MONITORS WAS PERFORED BASED ON VERBAL DAYS OPEN:             100 ACTION PNDG:       ISS 1-OSHA CONCERN. RESIDENT INFORM MANAGEE NT OF CONCERN.
CONTAINE NT RAD MONITORS CANNOT BE SAFELY WORKED ON. Cn. ur DUE DATE:
4 DRS/PSB INSPT ISSUES 2-4. IR: 96-17 RSP DIV:         L DRS/PSB. DRP/PB3 LCA:             8/12/% ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 12/02/% CLOSURE ALLEGATION: RIl-96-A-0154   FACILITY:         ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD: 960716          
% 1210 U1 CONTROL RH RAD MONITORS WAS PERFORED BASED ON VERBAL DAYS OPEN:
100 ACTION PNDG:
ISS 1-OSHA CONCERN. RESIDENT INFORM MANAGEE NT OF CONCERN.
DRS/PSB INSPT ISSUES 2-4. IR: 96-17 4
RSP DIV:
L DRS/PSB. DRP/PB3 LCA:
8/12/% ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 12/02/% CLOSURE ALLEGATION: RIl-96-A-0154 FACILITY:
ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD:
960716


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
MAINT PERSONNEL DIRECTED PULL WORK RE0 VEST / TAGS FROM EQUIP DUE DATE:   961018                             THAT ARE GREATER THAN 8-MNTHOLD. DIRECTED TO SPRAY VALVES DAYS OPEN:               93 ACTION PNDG:       DRP/PB3 RESIDENT FOLLOWUP ISS 1. ISSUE 2 MAY BE EPA ISSUE.RI     l
MAINT PERSONNEL DIRECTED PULL WORK RE0 VEST / TAGS FROM EQUIP DUE DATE:
,                                                    FOLLOWUP. IR:%-14                                                 l i                                   RSP DIV:         L-DRP/PB3                                                         ;
961018 THAT ARE GREATER THAN 8-MNTHOLD. DIRECTED TO SPRAY VALVES DAYS OPEN:
LCA:             8/27/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 10/18/% CLOSURE                                                     i i
93 ACTION PNDG:
ALLEGATION: RII-96 A-0180 FACILITY:           ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD: 960822          
DRP/PB3 RESIDENT FOLLOWUP ISS 1. ISSUE 2 MAY BE EPA ISSUE.RI l
FOLLOWUP. IR:%-14 i
RSP DIV:
L-DRP/PB3 LCA:
8/27/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 10/18/% CLOSURE i
ALLEGATION: RII-96 A-0180 FACILITY:
ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD:
960822


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
REVISED EERGENCY PLAN DECREASES THE PLAN'S EFFECTIVENESS.         )
REVISED EERGENCY PLAN DECREASES THE PLAN'S EFFECTIVENESS.
DUE DATE:   961210                             NRC APPROVAL OF PLAN REVISION WAS NOT OBTAINED. DECREASE IN DAYS OPEN:               56 ACTION PNDG:       DRS/PSB INSPECTION SCHEDULED 10/7/96 (2 WEEKS)
)
IR:96-17                                                         4 RSP DIV:         DRS/PSB                                                           l LCA:             8/29/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 12/02/% CLOSURE ALLEGATION: RII-96-A-0191   FACILITY:         ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD: 960903          
DUE DATE:
961210 NRC APPROVAL OF PLAN REVISION WAS NOT OBTAINED. DECREASE IN DAYS OPEN:
56 ACTION PNDG:
DRS/PSB INSPECTION SCHEDULED 10/7/96 (2 WEEKS)
IR:96-17 4
RSP DIV:
DRS/PSB l
LCA:
8/29/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 12/02/% CLOSURE ALLEGATION: RII-96-A-0191 FACILITY:
ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD:
960903


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
ALGR FAILED PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST AFTER 2 ATTEMPTS. AFTER DUE DATE:   961203                             FAILING 2ND ATTEMPT. WAS REASSIGNED & THEN LAID OFF. FILED DAYS OPEN:               44 ACTION PNDG:       DRS/ SIB UNCERTAIN BASED ON PLAN REVIEW. DRS/ SIB TO INSPECT RSP DIV:         DRS/ SIB LCA:             09/26/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 12/03/96 CLOSURE ALLEGATION: R!l-96-A 0192   FACILITY:         ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD: 960904          
ALGR FAILED PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST AFTER 2 ATTEMPTS. AFTER DUE DATE:
961203 FAILING 2ND ATTEMPT. WAS REASSIGNED & THEN LAID OFF. FILED DAYS OPEN:
44 ACTION PNDG:
DRS/ SIB UNCERTAIN BASED ON PLAN REVIEW. DRS/ SIB TO INSPECT RSP DIV:
DRS/ SIB LCA:
09/26/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 12/03/96 CLOSURE ALLEGATION: R!l-96-A 0192 FACILITY:
ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD:
960904


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED H2O FROM EDG CATC MENT IS RELEASED DUE DATE:   961204                             FROM RCA WITHOUT PROPER SCREENING. ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN DA75 DPEN:             43 ACTION PNDG:       DRS/PSB INSP BASED ON CONDITION REPORT THAT DRUMS HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THE RCA & THAT MANGEMENT HAD BEEN INFORMED RSP DIV:         DRS/PSB LCA:             9/26/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 12/19/96 CLOSURE ALLEGATION: RIl-96-A-0194   FACILITY:         ST LUCIE DATE RCVD: 960904          
POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED H2O FROM EDG CATC MENT IS RELEASED DUE DATE:
961204 FROM RCA WITHOUT PROPER SCREENING. ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN DA75 DPEN:
43 ACTION PNDG:
DRS/PSB INSP BASED ON CONDITION REPORT THAT DRUMS HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THE RCA & THAT MANGEMENT HAD BEEN INFORMED RSP DIV:
DRS/PSB LCA:
9/26/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 12/19/96 CLOSURE ALLEGATION: RIl-96-A-0194 FACILITY:
ST LUCIE DATE RCVD:
960904


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
FP&L HAS NOT RESPONDED TO INDIVIDUAL'S APPEAL OF FIRING AS DUE DATE:   961210                             RESULT OF URINE SAMPLE WHICH REPORTEDLY SHOWED SIGNS OF DAVS OPEN:             43 ACTION PNDG:       DRS/ SIB INSPECT RSP DIV:         DRS/ SIB 6 LCA:             9/27/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 11/30/96 CLOSURE 1
FP&L HAS NOT RESPONDED TO INDIVIDUAL'S APPEAL OF FIRING AS DUE DATE:
961210 RESULT OF URINE SAMPLE WHICH REPORTEDLY SHOWED SIGNS OF DAVS OPEN:
43 ACTION PNDG:
DRS/ SIB INSPECT RSP DIV:
DRS/ SIB 6 LCA:
9/27/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 11/30/96 CLOSURE 1


j EFORCEENT HISTORY l
j EFORCEENT HISTORY EA 95-026 - Weaknesses in the control of maintenance and testing that resulted in inoperability of both of the U1 PORVs during periods that the PORVs were relied upon to provide low tenperature overpressure protection (CP issued on 11/13/95: SL III: $50.000)
EA 95-026 - Weaknesses in the control of maintenance and testing that resulted in inoperability of both of the U1 PORVs during periods that the PORVs were relied upon to provide low tenperature overpressure protection (CP issued on 11/13/95: SL III: $50.000)
EA %-003 - Overdilution event occurred when a licensed operator left the controls without informing his relief that a dilution.was.in progress (CP issued on 3/18/96: SL III: $50,000)
EA %-003 - Overdilution event occurred when a licensed operator left the controls without informing his relief that a dilution.was .in progress (CP issued on 3/18/96: SL III: $50,000)
ATTA00ENT 6 4
ATTA00ENT 6 4


ST LUCIE MAJOR' ASSESSMENTS DATE'                                                                       TYPE OF ASSESSENT JULY 1995   INPO ASSESSENT - CATEGORY 1 AUGUST 1995 DR. CHOU ANALYSIS BY REGION II TO IDENTIFY ROOT CAUSES OF TE RECENT DECLIE IN PERFORMANCE AND MULTIPLE EVENTS i
I h
The team concluded that the predoeinant root cause for the events observed at St Lucie                                 !
ST LUCIE MAJOR' ASSESSMENTS i
was insufficient detail and scope in site oroarass and procedures. Th~is causal factor                                 i was found to result in recent events which demonstrated deficiencies in the following                                 '
DATE' TYPE OF ASSESSENT JULY 1995 INPO ASSESSENT - CATEGORY 1 AUGUST 1995 DR. CHOU ANALYSIS BY REGION II TO IDENTIFY ROOT CAUSES OF TE RECENT DECLIE IN I
areas.
PERFORMANCE AND MULTIPLE EVENTS i
e     job skills, work practices, and decision making:
The team concluded that the predoeinant root cause for the events observed at St Lucie was insufficient detail and scope in site oroarass and procedures. Th~is causal factor i
                                                                                                                        ~
was found to result in recent events which demonstrated deficiencies in the following areas.
e    interface among organizations as evidenced by a lack of interface formality:
1 e
i e     organizational authority for program implementation as evidenced by instances                             i of unclear responsibility and accountability.
job skills, work practices, and decision making:
AUGUST 1995 LICENSEE SELF-ASSESSENT: A SPECIAL TEAN PERFORNED AN ASSESSENT OF OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS AND IDENTIFIED ROOT CAUSES: MANAGEENT AND STAFF COMPLACENCY - POOR PERFORMANCE,                                       i ACCEPTING LONGSTAEING EQUIPENT PROBLEMS, AND NOT KEEPING UP WITH IEUSTRY INPROVEENTS.
~
i interface among organizations as evidenced by a lack of interface formality:
j e
i e
organizational authority for program implementation as evidenced by instances i
of unclear responsibility and accountability.
j AUGUST 1995 LICENSEE SELF-ASSESSENT: A SPECIAL TEAN PERFORNED AN ASSESSENT OF OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS AND IDENTIFIED ROOT CAUSES: MANAGEENT AND STAFF COMPLACENCY - POOR PERFORMANCE, i
ACCEPTING LONGSTAEING EQUIPENT PROBLEMS, AND NOT KEEPING UP WITH IEUSTRY INPROVEENTS.
i I
i I
t I
t I
I
I


GENERIC ISSUES                                                                                       .
GENERIC ISSUES ST. LUCIE ISSUE STATUS NRC Bulletin 92 Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 The licensee has identified those areas with installed thermo-lag and implemented compensatory measures IAW NRC Bulletin 92-01 and Supplement 1.
ST. LUCIE ISSUE                                                                                                                           STATUS NRC Bulletin 92 Failure of Thermo-Lag 330                                             The licensee has identified those areas with installed thermo-lag and implemented compensatory measures IAW NRC Bulletin 92-01 and Supplement 1.                     Compensatory measures will remain in effect until en acceptable solution is implemented.
Compensatory measures will remain in effect until en acceptable solution is implemented.
o                         NRCB 92-01, response dated July 27, 1992 e                         NRCB 92-01 Supp 1, response dated September 29, 1992 GL 92 Thermo-Lag 330-1                                                               The licensee has outstanding commitments to GL 92-00 in the following areas:
o NRCB 92-01, response dated July 27, 1992 e
e                        Update response on status of ampacity, exemptions and schedule for modifications (5/30/96) ontt 1 e                        Evaluate Thermo-Lag barriers to NEI App. guide or select alternate option (due 1/30/97) e                         Determine acceptability of Thermo-Lag well configurations and radiant heat shields                   e combustibility losues (due 1/31/97) e                          Complete evaluations and submit Thermo-Lag exemptions (due 4/30/97)                                 '
NRCB 92-01 Supp 1, response dated September 29, 1992 GL 92 Thermo-Lag 330-1 The licensee has outstanding commitments to GL 92-00 in the following areas:
e                         Complete design changes to support implementation of modification during spring 1998 outage (Spring 1998) e                         Submit summary report to NRC within 100 days of end of Spring 1998 outage (due ISO days after breaker closed Spring 1993)
Update response on status of ampacity, exemptions and schedule for modifications e
Unit 2 e                        Evaluate Thermo-Lag barriers to NEI App. guide or select alternate option (due 5/31/96) e                         Submit Thermo-Lag exemptions (due S/30/96)                                                           i e                        Complete design changes to support implementation of modification during spring 1997 outage (Spring 1997) e                        Unit 2 - Submit summary report to NRC within 100 days of and of Spring 1997 outage (due             ;
(5/30/96) ontt 1 Evaluate Thermo-Lag barriers to NEI App. guide or select alternate option (due 1/30/97) e Determine acceptability of Thermo-Lag well configurations and radiant heat shields e
e combustibility losues (due 1/31/97)
Complete evaluations and submit Thermo-Lag exemptions (due 4/30/97) e Complete design changes to support implementation of modification during spring 1998 e
outage (Spring 1998) e Submit summary report to NRC within 100 days of end of Spring 1998 outage (due ISO days after breaker closed Spring 1993)
Unit 2 Evaluate Thermo-Lag barriers to NEI App. guide or select alternate option (due 5/31/96) e e
Submit Thermo-Lag exemptions (due S/30/96) i Complete design changes to support implementation of modification during spring 1997
{
e outage (Spring 1997)
Unit 2 - Submit summary report to NRC within 100 days of and of Spring 1997 outage (due e
150 days after breaker closed Spring 1997)
150 days after breaker closed Spring 1997)
NRC Bulletin 96 Control Rod Insertion                                               N/A                       Action requested from Westinghouse-designed plants only.
NRC Bulletin 96 Control Rod Insertion N/A Action requested from Westinghouse-designed plants only.
Problems i
f Problems i
GL 39-10 Safety Related MOVs Testing &                                                   The licensee has completed the design bases verification of safety-related motor operated Surveillance                                                                             valves (MOVs) and is available to meet with the NRC to discuss alternatives for closing the NRC GL 89-10 program, i
GL 39-10 Safety Related MOVs Testing &
e                         GL response, dated February 2, 1994 (Unit 1) o                         GL response, dated March 14, 1996 (Unit 2)                                                           ,
The licensee has completed the design bases verification of safety-related motor operated Surveillance valves (MOVs) and is available to meet with the NRC to discuss alternatives for closing the NRC GL 89-10 program, i
e GL response, dated February 2, 1994 (Unit 1) o GL response, dated March 14, 1996 (Unit 2)
Unit 1 Completed during the Fall 1994 refueling outage (SL1-13)
Unit 1 Completed during the Fall 1994 refueling outage (SL1-13)
L malt 2 Completed during the Fall 1995 refueling outage (SL2-9) g;nsric iss                                                                                                                                                                                                     PWR
L malt 2 Completed during the Fall 1995 refueling outage (SL2-9) g;nsric iss PWR


ST. LUCIE ISSUE                                                                                                   STATUS Gr,. 95 Pressure Locking and Thermal     The licensee has completed the assessment sad evaluation of both Unit 1 and Unit 2 power Linding (PL/TB) of SR Power Operated Gate     operated valves (POVs) susceptible to PL/TB.
ST. LUCIE ISSUE STATUS Gr,. 95 Pressure Locking and Thermal The licensee has completed the assessment sad evaluation of both Unit 1 and Unit 2 power Linding (PL/TB) of SR Power Operated Gate operated valves (POVs) susceptible to PL/TB.
Valves e                   GL response, dated Pobruary 13, 1996 The licensee has outstanding commitments to GL 92-07 in the following areas:
Valves e
Dalt 2 e                    Schedule submitted including justification for modification to shutdown cooling valves V.3400 V-3652 and V-3651 during Spring 1997 refueling outage (BL2-10)
GL response, dated Pobruary 13, 1996 The licensee has outstanding commitments to GL 92-07 in the following areas:
Bormflex                                     Borsfler installed on Unit 1 in 1988.                                         Two successful blackness testing campaigne completed (5 year surveillance). Upper 15 inches of one panel discovered missing. Engineering Rvaluation (JPN-P5L-SEPJ-95-023 Rev. 3) completed March 5, 1996. Licensee reviewed manufacturer's fabrication records and concluded that the missing boraflex in PSL1 spent fuel pool was an isolated incident and did not affect SPF criticality.
Dalt 2 Schedule submitted including justification for modification to shutdown cooling valves e
V.3400 V-3652 and V-3651 during Spring 1997 refueling outage (BL2-10)
Bormflex Borsfler installed on Unit 1 in 1988.
Two successful blackness testing campaigne completed (5 year surveillance). Upper 15 inches of one panel discovered missing. Engineering Rvaluation (JPN-P5L-SEPJ-95-023 Rev. 3) completed March 5, 1996. Licensee reviewed manufacturer's fabrication records and concluded that the missing boraflex in PSL1 spent fuel pool was an isolated incident and did not affect SPF criticality.
Boraflex not installed on Unit 2.
Boraflex not installed on Unit 2.
_:-___.______--_____m__-          - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ . .
m


w ST. LUCIE                                                                                                                                       I' l
w ST. LUCIE I'
ISSUE                                                                     STATUS spent Fuel Full Offload Permitted               From the UFSAR:
l ISSUE STATUS spent Fuel Full Offload Permitted From the UFSAR:
Dait 1 Two thermal analyses were performods the Normal Batch Discharge and the Full Core Discharge.                                                                                                                                                         ,
Dait 1 Two thermal analyses were performods the Normal Batch Discharge and the Full Core Discharge.
In the case of the Normal match Discharge, the analysis assumes 80 assemblies each have been discharged from the core in 18 month intervals. A refuellag batch of 80 assemblies is added 150 hours after reactor shutdown. This analysis shows a maximum pool bulk                                                                               >
1 In the case of the Normal match Discharge, the analysis assumes 80 assemblies each have been discharged from the core in 18 month intervals. A refuellag batch of 80 assemblies is added 150 hours after reactor shutdown. This analysis shows a maximum pool bulk temperature of 133.3 degrees F with the fuel pool cooling system in service.
temperature of 133.3 degrees F with the fuel pool cooling system in service.                                                                                       '
For the Full Core Discharge, assuming that 73 of the assemblies have 90 days of irradiation. 72 have 21 months of irradiation and the remaining 72 assemblies have 39 months of irradiation (217 assemblies totall, the analysis shows a maximum pool bulk temperature of 150.8 degrees F with the fuel pool cooling system in service.
For the Full Core Discharge, assuming that 73 of the assemblies have 90 days of irradiation. 72 have 21 months of irradiation and the remaining 72 assemblies have 39 months of irradiation (217 assemblies totall, the analysis shows a maximum pool bulk temperature of 150.8 degrees F with the fuel pool cooling system in service.                                                                                       i hit 2 Two thermal analyses have been performeds the Normal and the Accident Case Assumptions.
i hit 2 Two thermal analyses have been performeds the Normal and the Accident Case Assumptions.
The Normal Case assumess
The Normal Case assumess a.
: a.       11 batches (each 1/3 core) discharged
11 batches (each 1/3 core) discharged b.
: b.       Most recent batch cooling for five days after shutdown
Most recent batch cooling for five days after shutdown c.
: c.       Adiabatic heat up of the pool                                                                                                                           l The analysis shows a maximum pool bulk temperature of 131 degrees F with the fuel pool cooling system in service.
Adiabatic heat up of the pool l
j The Accident Case assumess
The analysis shows a maximum pool bulk temperature of 131 degrees F with the fuel pool cooling system in service.
: a.       11 batches plus one full core discharged                                                                                                                 '
j The Accident Case assumess a.
: b.       One (1) core cools for 7 days ce       Most recent 1/3 core batch cools for SO days f
11 batches plus one full core discharged b.
This analysis shows a maximum pool bulk temperature of 148 degrees F with the fuel pool                                                                           '
One (1) core cools for 7 days ce Most recent 1/3 core batch cools for SO days f
cooling system in service.
This analysis shows a maximum pool bulk temperature of 148 degrees F with the fuel pool cooling system in service.
The licensee has furnished a tabulated SFP Storage Date on both Units for PM on site inspection                                                                             i the week of March 25, 1996.                                                                                                                                                 '
The licensee has furnished a tabulated SFP Storage Date on both Units for PM on site inspection i
Improved Standardized Technical Specifications No Licenses commitment                                                                                                                                                     ;
the week of March 25, 1996.
f r
Improved Standardized Technical Specifications No Licenses commitment f
l P
r l
P
[
[
gen:ric.iss                                                                                                                                                                                                       PWR i
gen:ric.iss PWR i


ST. LUCIE                                                                                                                                                                   i ISSUE                                                                                 STATUS Steam Generator Issues wmC Bulletin 89 Westinghouse Alloy 500   The licensee has addressed the predicted service life of Thermally Treated (TT) Alloy 500 Steam Generator Mechanical Tube Plugs         Mechanical Tube Plugs identified by Westinghouse.
ST. LUCIE i
Unit 1 e        Tube plug repair plan formulated for April 1995 refueling outage. All plugs will be visuelty inspected and repaired or replaced, if leaking.
ISSUE STATUS Steam Generator Issues wmC Bulletin 89 Westinghouse Alloy 500 The licensee has addressed the predicted service life of Thermally Treated (TT) Alloy 500 Steam Generator Mechanical Tube Plugs Mechanical Tube Plugs identified by Westinghouse.
o        Both SGe scheduled for replacement let quarter 1998.
Unit 1 Tube plug repair plan formulated for April 1995 refueling outage. All plugs e
Unit 2 e        No installed Westinghousa mechanical plugs.
will be visuelty inspected and repaired or replaced, if leaking.
GL 95 Circumferential Cracking of Steam The licenses has addressed the detection and slaing of circumferential indications to determine Generator Tubes                             applicability including the requested RAI dated Emptember 25, 1995. No tube leaks have occurred on either unit due to circumferential cracks.
Both SGe scheduled for replacement let quarter 1998.
o Unit 2 No installed Westinghousa mechanical plugs.
e GL 95 Circumferential Cracking of Steam The licenses has addressed the detection and slaing of circumferential indications to determine Generator Tubes applicability including the requested RAI dated Emptember 25, 1995. No tube leaks have occurred on either unit due to circumferential cracks.
The licensee has outstanding commitments to GL 95-03 in the following areas:
The licensee has outstanding commitments to GL 95-03 in the following areas:
Unit 1 e        100% tube inspection of all active tubes using both full length bobbin coil and conventional motorised rotating pancake coil (NRPC) technique for selected bobbin indications, i.e. 100% Ret Leg and 3% Cold Leg, during Spring 1996                                                                                                       ,
Unit 1 100% tube inspection of all active tubes using both full length bobbin coil and e
outage.
conventional motorised rotating pancake coil (NRPC) technique for selected bobbin indications, i.e. 100% Ret Leg and 3% Cold Leg, during Spring 1996 outage.
Maintenance Rule                             Program defined and implemented. Resident Inspectors confirmed. A Raintenance Rule Team inspection completed on 9/20/96. Although the licensee's maintenance rule implementation program found to be satisfactory three apparent violations were identified in the areas of program design isues, system scoping issues, and procedure implementation.                                                                                                                         t IPERE Submitted                             PSL-IPERE Rev. O, submitted December 1994 which met the objectives of GL 88-20, Supplement 4.
Maintenance Rule Program defined and implemented. Resident Inspectors confirmed. A Raintenance Rule Team inspection completed on 9/20/96. Although the licensee's maintenance rule implementation program found to be satisfactory three apparent violations were identified in the areas of program design isues, system scoping issues, and procedure implementation.
t IPERE Submitted PSL-IPERE Rev. O, submitted December 1994 which met the objectives of GL 88-20, Supplement 4.
The licensee has one outstanding commitment to GL 88-20, supplement 4, in response to RAI dated January 9, 1995.
The licensee has one outstanding commitment to GL 88-20, supplement 4, in response to RAI dated January 9, 1995.
* Action 1 The Engineering evaluation has been completed to allow use of the station blackout cromotie between the units to mitigate an IPERE fire and plant operating procedure changes are scheduled to be completed by August 1995.
Action 1 The Engineering evaluation has been completed to allow use of the station blackout cromotie between the units to mitigate an IPERE fire and plant operating procedure changes are scheduled to be completed by August 1995.


  .. .- -..      . . - . . . . -.. -.        __ - . .        ..-. ~ -.    - - - - . - - . - . . . - .                . - .
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!                                                                                                      ENCLOSURE 2           l i                                                                                                                             i Docket Nos.:           50-389 f
ENCLOSURE 2 i
I                                                            SALP REPORT l
i f
LICENSEE:                           Florida Power & Light Company
Docket Nos.:
]             REVIEWER:                           Patricia Campbell i
50-389 I
;              FUNCTIONAL ACTIVITY:                 SAFETY EVALUATION OF THE INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAN t                                                   RELIEF REQUESTS FOR PUNPS AND VALVES
SALP REPORT l
;                                                  ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNIT 2
LICENSEE:
;                                                TAC No. M-84563 AND M-85670 FACILITY NAME:                       St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2                                                   j SUffiARY OF REVIEW / INSPECTION ACTIVITIES This SALP input is for the St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, Inservice Testing (IST)
Florida Power & Light Company
)             program for pumps and valves. The review was conducted by the Mechanical Engineering Branch with assistance from its contractor, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL).                                                                                   *
]
!              NARRATIVE DISCUSSION OF LICENSEES PERFORMANCE - FUNCTIONAL AREA i             SAFETY ASSESSMENT /0UALITY VERIFICATION
REVIEWER:
'              The relief requests generally contained sufficient information for evaluation of the proposal. The particular subjects of the relief requests were not unusual                                   '
Patricia Campbell i
:              in comparison to other IST programs. Overall, the program would be considered                                   ;
FUNCTIONAL ACTIVITY:
j              good. An updated IST Program for the second ten-year interval is expected by                                   '
SAFETY EVALUATION OF THE INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAN t
:              August 1993. The licensee should review the SE/TER to incorporate any action                                   j
RELIEF REQUESTS FOR PUNPS AND VALVES ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNIT 2 TAC No. M-84563 AND M-85670 FACILITY NAME:
;              items into the revised program,                                                                                 j i
St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2 j
1.
SUffiARY OF REVIEW / INSPECTION ACTIVITIES This SALP input is for the St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, Inservice Testing (IST)
)
program for pumps and valves.
The review was conducted by the Mechanical Engineering Branch with assistance from its contractor, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL).
NARRATIVE DISCUSSION OF LICENSEES PERFORMANCE - FUNCTIONAL AREA i
SAFETY ASSESSMENT /0UALITY VERIFICATION The relief requests generally contained sufficient information for evaluation of the proposal. The particular subjects of the relief requests were not unusual in comparison to other IST programs. Overall, the program would be considered j
good.
An updated IST Program for the second ten-year interval is expected by August 1993.
The licensee should review the SE/TER to incorporate any action j
items into the revised program, j
i 1.
i i
i i
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Latest revision as of 19:39, 11 December 2024

Discusses Regulatory Acceptability of Prelubricating Valves Prior to Surveillance (Stroke) Testing TIA 96-007 Re Licenses NPF-16 & DPR-67
ML20138E974
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie  
Issue date: 04/12/1996
From: Merschoff E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Imbro E
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
Shared Package
ML20137B842 List:
References
FOIA-96-485 NUDOCS 9605020246
Download: ML20138E974 (84)
v • d • e


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UNITED STATES g

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

f REGloN 11 101 MAReETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2B0D i

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E ATLANTA. GEORGIA 303Do180 k

April 12, 1996 MEMORANDUM TO:

Eugene V. Imbro, Project Directorate l

Division of Reactor Projects I/II, NRR 3

i FRON:

Ellis W. Merschoff, Director Division of Reactor Projects

SUBJECT:

THE REGULATORY ACCEPTABILITY OF PRELUBRICA NG VALVES PRIOR TO SURVEILLANCE (STROKE) TESTING (TIA 96-0 7) 1 l

St. Lucie Inspection Report 50-335,389/95-15, Section 3.f.1, documented an occurrence in which the licensee lubricated a containment spray flow control s

valve prior to ASME Section XI stroke time testing. This pre-lubrication was called for in the licensee's surveillance test procedure and was meant to L

ensure a satisfactory stroke time test.

The inspectors, and members of the licensee's~ quality organization, found that this practice resulted in a nonrepresentative test of valve capabilities. Since the event, personnel from l

Region II and OE have attempted to find explicit prohibitions against such preconditioning, but without success. Consequently, we propose the following j

i questions:

i 1.

Is the practice of lubricating a valve prior to stroke time testing acceptable under the regulations?

2.

Is the purpose of stroke time testing under ASME Section XI to demonstrate the current and past operability of a valve, the current and future operability of a valve, or both?

)

This request has been discussed with J. Norris of the NRR staff.

If you have any questions concerning this request, please contact M. Miller (407-464-7822) or K. Landis (407-331-5509).

Docket No. 50-335/389 License No. DPR-67/NFP-16 cc:

R. Cooper, RI W. Axelson, RIII J. Dyer, RIV K. Perkins, WCFO J. Barnes, RII p

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... w Current SALP Assessment Period: 1/7/96 through 6/97

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Performance Overview Y

b ine= Aly199btherehavebeenabriesofevent3thatledto questioning the plant's overall performance.

Inese have included:

j A Unit l' turbine trip due to precedural weaknesses, i

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poor operator performance, and weak s::pervisory oversight.

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The attempt to restage an RCP seal using inadequate and inappropriate procedural guidance. The evolution was compounded by failing to follow aspects of the guidance that did exist, which led to the failure of the second and third stage seals.

A main steam isolation signal due to an operator failing to block the MSIS signal during a cooldown when an annunciator indicated

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that the block was enabled.

This failure occurred despite the fact that the operator's attention was directed to the annunciator on at lesst two different occasions.

Both pressurizer power operated relief valves being found p'

inoperable due to incorrect assembly during a refueling outage.

The conditions had existed for approximately 10 months (SL3,CP).

An-loss of RCS inventory (4000 gallons) due to a shutdown cooling relief valve which lifted and then failed to reseat due to incorrect setpoint' margins (a generic problem involving several valves). The licensee had sufficient evidence that this generic condition existed, but had failed to act promptly to evaluate the

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conditions (SL4).

The spraydown of containment due to an inadequate procedure and operator error coupled with an existing operator-work-around.

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The significant operator inattentiveness which resulted in the

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overdilution event on January 22, 1996, highlighted the recent i

large number of personnel errors and lack of command and control i

j in the control room.

These and several other recent deficiencies involvin6ak procedure 3 a I

general lack of procedural compliance, equipment failures, and personnel j

errors clearly indicated

hat the plant's past high level of performance _

had declined. An NRC[roo; causf ettort cetermineft' fin ~Tn7ddition lo i

procedural adherencelanaguacy_wghnessa_m tha licensee suffered from z

weaknesses in both (f5terfaces across organizationap lines and corrective actions.

i.-

II.

Functional Area Assessments i

L A SALP board convened on January 18, 1996.

The board concluded that the l

licensee's performance in the areas of Operations and Maintenance had i.

declined from excellent levels of performance to good levels. The conclusions reached by the board are summarized below.

i 2

Operations The board determined that safety performance in the Operations area had l

declined, particularly in the final six months of the assessment period.

l As bases, the board noted an increase in the number of operational

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events attributable to:

i Weaknesses in operator performance-i

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4 Acceptance of long-standing equipment deficiencies j

Management expectations were not effectively communicated to personnel and enforced l

Weaknesses in procedural adequacy and adherence Implementation and adequacy of corrective actions The licensee und:rtook a number of efforts to reverse declining performance following the onset of the operational events described i

above.

Verbatim procedural compliance was established as the norm for the site, which resulted in the need for literally hundreds of l

procedural changes and around-the-clock on-site review committee 1

meetings. An increased emphasis on the initiation of corrective action documentation resulted in an increase in the number of documents j.

initiated, but has also resulted in increases in backlogs.

Maintenance The board determined that performance in this area declined during the previous assessment period. However, the board found that six unit i[

trips which occurred during the period had roots in maintenance, Weaknesses identified by the board included:

Inadequate post-maintenance testing Procedural adequacy and adherence Instability in management due to acting managers while the maintenance manager received SRO training j.

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The board indicated that the. current stability of the maintenance

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management appeared to be reversing the observed negative trends.

Engineering The board found that engineering had sustained a superior level of.

i performance.

Support to both operations and maintenance, the quality l

and support of design modifications, and initiatives to reduce the i '

numbers of operator workarounds and jumpers / lifted leads we seen as strengths.

Licensee submittals to the NRC were noted to be of high

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quality, as were safety evaluations.

Plant Support i

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The board found that plant support organizations collectively perfomed i

at a superior level. Area breakdowns were as follows:

Health Physics was identified as having strong management support and initiatives such as remote monitoring and electronic dosimetry j

were seen as strengths. Reductions in the areas of contaminated j

floor space and the volume of solid waste were also' noted.

Security was cited as maintaining an excellent level of performance-during staff reductions due to the implementation of i

biometrics. Training, including the use of a combat firing range, and self-assessments were considered good.

Some performance i

problems were noted through the period, however, including two failures to provide compensatory measures during computer failures.

l Fire Protection performed well in both drills and in responding to

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l plant fires; however, surveillance testing observations indicated l

weak procedures, poor. attention to detail, and hardware deficiencies.

4 Emergency preparedness was considered good, and the status of equipment and supplies were found to be adequate.

The full l-participation exercise was successful.

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i DESCRIPTION OF EVENT 8 - ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 1.

On January 9, the unit was manually tripped in response to a loss of the.1B MFWP.

2.

The unit tripped from loss of load when the generator excitor circuit breaker was t

inadvertently opened locally on March 28, 1994 -

i 3.

On June 6, 1994, the unit experienced a main generator lockout, followed by turbine and reactor trips, when a thunderstorm blew a section of flashing across two output terminals of main transformer 1A.

4.

Power was reduced to 80% power on August 10, 1994, due to Digital Electro-Hydraulic f

System (DEH) leak. ~ The unit was returned to full power on August 23, 1994.

5.

The turbine was taken of line on. August 28, 1994, to repair a leak in the DEH.

Repairs were completed and the unit returned to power on the afternoon of August 28, 1994.

The

.i unit was returned to full power on September 2, 1994.

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6.

The unit tripped as the result of a lighting strike in the switch'Jard on October 26, 1994.

Since the unit was scheduled to start a refueling outage on October 31, 1994, a j

decision was made to start the refueling outage 7.

On February 27, 1995, the unit was removed from service for the replacement of pressurizer code safety valves which had been leaking by the seat since shortly after startup in November, 1994.

The unit was returned to power on March 8, 1995.

8.

On July 8, 1995, the unit tripped during turbine valve surveillance testing.

The unit l

was returned to power on July 12, 1995.

9.

On August 1, 1995,. the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane Erin.

Due to a series of equipment problems and personnel performance issues the unit remained shutdown until

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October 9, 1995.

10.

On November 17, 1995, the unit was manually tripped due to low steam gene rator level

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when the feed regulating valve failed to mid position.

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DESCRIPTION OF ava-a. - ST LUCIE UNIT 2-1.

On February 27, 1994, the unit was coasting down to-the cycle 8 refueling outage.

The unit was taken.off-line on February 14, 1994.

2.

On April 23, 1994, the unit. tripped from.30% power during RPS adjustment.

3.

The unit 2 turbine was shutdown on July 9, 1994, and reactor power reduced to Mode 2 on July 10, 1994.

On July 14, 1994, the unit was shutdown to repair a stuck closed trip circuit breaker.

The unit was restarted and placed'on line on July 15, 1994.

4.

On February 21, 1995, the unit tripped as a result of low steam generator water level.

1 The condition was the result of a feedwater regulating valve closure after a steam generator water level control level transmitter failed high.

The transmitter was l

replaced and the unit was returned to service on February 25, 1995.

1 5.

On April-25, 1995, the main generator was taken of line to repair a faulty power supply in the DEH system.

l 6.

On August 1, 1995, the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane Erin. It was restarted on August 4, 1995.

7.

On October 9, 1995, the unit.was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage.

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On January 1, 1996, the unit went critical.

9.

On January 5, 1996, a manual trip was initiated on high generator hydrogen temperature.

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UPLOAD TO R:\\PLTDATA\\ MATRIX \\STLUCIE.SIM February 7s 1996 ST LUCIE Site Intearation Matrix Date Satp Ref.

Cause Idemified Description F. A.

1/23/96 MS IR 9641 Electrical arc during Self-Identifying Blown fuse results in loss of erpmximately 25% of maisenance control room annunciators.

1/22/96 OPS IR 96-01 Operator Error Self-Idemifying _

panel while dilution was in prognes.

Bomn dilution event due to gerator leaving commi l/5/96 OPS /M IR 95-22 Temp Corarol valve Licensee U-2 manual RXtrip on high generator H tenip due to i

S Failure failure of temp comrd volve.

1/5/96 OPS IR 95-22 Inadequate Procedum NRC Several procedural deficiencies and calculatenal Review and Execution errors idersiSed in reload physics test procedure.

1/5/96 OPS /

R 95-22 Failure to Properly NRC Severni deficiencies in procedure change procesa PS NCV 95-22-01 Inglement Procedures implementation idemiSed-Expired or canceled TCs faimd in contml rooms and bot shutdown panel.

12/27/95 OPS IR 95-22 Lack of Attendance at self Identifying FRG meeting suffered /itema deferred due to lack of FRG OPS /Eng*g auendance at meeting. Majorisones at meeting effected OPS /Eng*g.

12/20/95 MS IR 95-22 Pitting -Imalized Self Identifying RXvessel flange inner 0-ring gmove pitting resulted in Corrosion cooldown and head removal for repair.

12/9/95 MS IR 95-22 Filling RCS Before Ucensee 2A2 RCP seal pkg lower seal destaged due to reverse Coupling RCP pressure across seal.

12/5/95 OPS /M IR 95-22 Poor Legkeeping/Atta NRC ESFAS cabinet doors found unlocked followmg S

to Detail maintenance work -IACermr. leg entries associated with work were not corglete.

12/1/95 PS IR 95-21 Failure to Document NRC Red survey tesults unavailaole for B hat leg work.

RADSurvey Surveys performed but not documemed 12/1/95 OPS IR 95-21 Corrective Actions NRC Followup to presious mspecten findings indicated a weakness in foIIM 4. in addressing de6ciencies.

12/1/95 OPS IR 95-21 Procedural Inadequacy NRC SDC Procedure required natural circ-related surveillance prior to establish *mg RCS pressure boundary. Natural cire not possible without pressurization.

12/1/95 OPS R 95-21 FTF Procedure NRC Rzcurrem nwrahd alarms when seernag fire pumpe were not documemed as operator workarounds-Voltage dire sesociated wish such somete were comributors to e trip previously.

g ' 1f95 OPS R 95-21 Poor Corrective Actione NRC Cleerence in place to isolete Nrfrom CST to facilmene pressure switch replacement for nine days wnhout work order being wriaen.

12/1/95 OPS R 95-21 FTF Procedure NRC CCW aseple volve showed dual indication wahaut corrective action -f _ -

-- initiated.

12/1/95 z OPS R 95 Inadequate Operator NRC OperMore unable to effectively obtain IACseapoonee Training from computer aher hard copies were naioved froen control recen.

12/l/95 OPS R 95-21 Procedural wealtnese/

NRC SDC procedure comenmed contheting values for RX Inadequate Review cavity level requerennente Procedure had been approved since emphesse on occuracy seresend 12/1/95' OPS R 95-21 Velve Poortion NRC Unit 2 g wedures and valve devisesos log used to Adnunistrative Comrole cycle Unit I crose commect velves.

11/27/95 OPS R 95-21 Personnel Error Lscensee Miemed RCS Boroa eengle survedlemee -Repeat Som VIO 95-21-03 R 95-18 11/21/95 OPS R 95 FTF Procedure Licensee Failure to mensein Penetreuen I.mg NCV 95-21-04 11/21/95' OPS R 95-21 Egenpmes Failure Self Memifying Light sucket failure durig leap replacement resuhe in lose cooling to I A Main Treneformer Unit dowspawer to ~60%.

II/20/95 OPS R 95-2i FTF Procedure NRC Velve discovered Closed vice Imched th=d se VIO 95-2141 speci6ed on

  • Clearance Order.

I1/16/95 OPS /M R 95-21 tong-Standmg Self Unit I manually tripped when IB MFRViocked in 50%

- -J-Problem Idemifying/ Licensee poonson Root cause -degraded power supply,

  • ~

eq by volenge dip on eteense boek semaine fue pumps.

11/11/95 OPS R 95-21 FTF Procedure NRC Tech. Spec. egepmem not specified for IVon VIO 95-21-02 Equipament clearance Order.

11/6/95 MS R 95-21 Equipmes Feilure Self Mereifying Feilure of EDG 2A relay sockets. Fotonnel comason niode failure.

11/1/95 MS R 95-18 Personnel Error Self Identifying

'sCIwiring error during RXbend W less RPO.

NCV 95-18-05 10/19/95 OPS R 95-18 Personnel Error Self ldencifying Missed shit CEApesanon indication marveellence NCV 95-1846 10/18/95 OPS R 95-18 Personnel Error 1.icensee Missed RCS Boroa emagle surveillmace.

NCV 95-18-07

10/17/95 OPS Q 95-18 Personnel Error Self Identifying Lack of atternion to task resulted is overfilling RCB lower cavity during flood up.

10/12/95 ENG IR 95-18 Design Error Self identifying Inserting CIAS signal during safeguards test shifted VIO 95-18-04 EDG 2A to isochronous mode while EDO paralleled with ofrsite power.

10M/95 PS LER 95-S02 Personnel Error Licensee Peternial route for unauthorized access to protected ares, CW water piping.

10/7/95 OPS IR 9518 Failure to Follow NRC Did not enter bypass key position in deviation log.

VIO95-1841 Procedures 10/5/95 MS IR 95-18 Equipment Failure Self Identifying DG IB developed FO leak at threaded connection during surveillance run.

9/30/95 OPS IR 95-18 Failure to Follow NRC Did not enter bypass key position in deviation log.

VIO 95-IS-02 Procedures C/28/95 ENG IR 95-15 Equipment Failure Self lderaifying Leaking PZR SVs extended forced outage -problems with tailpipe alignment.

9/20/95 MS IR 95-18 Equipment Failure Self Idernifying EDG I AllB governor corarol problems resulted in load oscillations.

9/15/95 OPS /

1R 95-18 Failure to Follow Self Identifying Maint/ Ops did not provide clearance for work on MS VIO 95-18-03 Procedures condenser waterbox cover. When cover pulled closed, severed worker's finger.

9/14/95 PS LER Ul/U2 95 Failure to Follow Licensee Security failed to take correct conpensatory action on 501 Procedure computer failure.

s/10/95 OPS IR 95-18 Failure to Use Correct Self Identifying SG blowdown sent to incorrect system on RAB roof.

Procedure Operator used wrong procedure. When identified did not back out of procedure correctly.

g/9/95 MS IR 95-15 Weakness in W ork Self Identifying Leak on SV 1201 flange extended outage, identified Screening and one month earlier but not worked.

Planning f/7/95 OPS IR 95-15 Personnel Error /

Licensee Unit 2 Main Generator overpressurized while filling inoperable with H2. Inattention by operators.

Equipment /OWA 7/2/95 OPS IR 95-15 Personnel Error NRC Weaknesses identified in logs relating to abnormal VIO 95-15-03 equipment conditions and out of service equipment not logged (muhiple exangles).

8/31/95 MS IR 95-15 Personnel Error self Identifying Damaged cylinder and head on IB EDG due to loose lash adjustment.

8/30/95 PS IR 95-15 Mansgement and QC NRC Containment closure walkdowns by management were weaknesses inadequate and depended heavily on QC involvement to identify deficiencies.

8!30M5 MS Ct 95-15 Supervisory overdght NRC M intenance persrennel not using procedures for work and worker attitude in progress.

8/29/95 OPS IR 95-15 Personnel Error Licensee Started IB LPSIpump with suction valve clored. (No VIO 95-15-04 damage to pump) 8/29/95 MS IR 95-15 Procedure Use NRC Maintenance jotineyman not signirs off pacedure VIO95-15-06 steps as work completed (previously identibd as a weakness in May 1995).

0/23/95 MS IR 95-15 Equipment Failure /

Self Identifying 2A HDP trip due to relay failure. Eight HDP trips in Inadequate Corrective past year. Engineering solution available but not Action implemented.

8/22/95 PS IR 95-15 Personnel Error NRC QA failed to document a deficiency on corsainmers spray valve surveillance idertified in an audit.

8/19/95 OPS

[R 95-15 Operstor Enor/

Self identifying Overfill of PWT. Spilled approx.10K gallons on Operator Workaround ground inside RCA. Operator work around on level control system and inauention to filling process by operator caused error.

g/3 g/95 MS IR 95-15 Procedural Weakness NRC Procedural weakness involving supervisory oversight and journeyman qualification.

8/17/95 OPS LER UI 95-007 Procedural Inadequacy Self Identifying Spraydomt of Unit I containmera. STAR process did VIO95-15 and Weakness /

not assign accountability for corrective action. Valve Operator-Work-Around surveillance prelube not documented on STAR.

8/9/95 MS IR 95-16 Maintenance /

Licensee Inoperable Unit i PORVs due to mairmenance LER UI 95-005 Testing errors error / testing inadequacies. (Valves assembled EA 95-180 incorrectly) (Used acoustic data only) 8/6/95 ENO LER UI 95-006 Corrective Self Identifying Lifting of Unit i SDC thermal relief due to procedural VIO 95-204I Action / Procedural revision from previous corrective action. Inoperable Weakness equipment not logged.

8/2/95 OPS LER UI 95-004 Procedural Licensee I A2 RCP seal failure due to

  • restaging
  • at high VIO 95-15-02 Weakness / Failure to temperature.

Follow Procedures 8/2/95 OPS LER UI 95-04 Operator Error Self-identifying Operator failed to block MSIS actuation during VIO 95-15-Ol cooldown.

7/29/95 MS IR 95-14 Procedural Weakness Self Identifying 1&Crersonnel attempt to test a level switch circuit which could not actuate given system conditions.

7/29/95 OPS IR 95-14 Operator Self Identifying Turbine / Reactor Trip due to test error.

Error / Procedural Weakness 7/29/95 MS IR 95-14 Root Cause Pending Self Identifying Catastrophic failure of Unit 2 B train CEDM cooling fan.

7/3/95 PS IR 95-14 Security We kness self Identifying Automobile passed through neanally closed security gare to plant intate/ discharge canals at beach.

Subsequera accident resuhed in vehicle lodged in discharge canal piping.

7/1/95 OPS IR 95-12 Weak leg Keeping NRC Weaknecies identified in logs relating to battery jumper installation and out-of-service equipment.

7/1/95 PS IR 95-12 Maintenance Self Identifying Corrosion in transformer fire protection deluge system results in multiple failures.

7/1/95 PS IR 9512 Personnel Error NRC Three pieces of SNM found improperly tagged.

NCV 95-12-02 7/1/95 PS IR 95-12 Program Weaknesses NRC Fire Protection program weaknesses identified in fire-fighting techniques and respirator qualification program.

7/1/95 MS IR 95-12 Personnel Error NRC M&TEfound installed across battery cell without J/LL NCV 95-12-01 authorization.

6/3/95 MS IR 95-10 Procedural Adeqsacy/

NRC Several examples of weak adherence to procedures, Adherence including step signoffs and independent verification, identified.

6/3/95 MS IR 95-10 Poor Communication 1.icensee Poor communication / lack of detailed istruction leads to improper IB EDG governor installation.

6/3/95 MS IR 95-10 Poor Maintenance /

NRC HVACrystems for both unita poody Procedures maintained / Operating procedures contained numerous deficiencies.

6/3/95 MS IR 95-10 Poor Surveillance Licensee Missed several surveillances (7 day) on EDG.

NCV 95-10-01 Tracking System 0 29/95 MS IR 95-09 Personnel Error IJcensee Failure to perform personnel air lock testing on time.

NCV 95-09-01 f./28/95 OPS IR 95-05 Corrective Action NRC STAR /NCR program did rxt addresa evaluating past Program Weakness operability 4/28/95 MS IR 95-05 Maintenance Error licensee Incore Instruments at ICIFlange 8 miswired -ICI output signals directed to wrong cornputer poiss.

4/28/95 ENG IR 95-05 Weakness in Temp NRC Weakness in addressing how mods would affect Mod Procedure control room drsuings.

4/28/95 ENG IR 95-05 Failure to Implement NRC Failure to document nonconformance regarding ICI NCV 95-05-04 Corrective Action flange 8 conditions.

Program 4/28/95 MS IR 95-05 Design Implementation NRC Installation of wrong overload heater models in VIO 95-0541 Discrepancy switchgear.

~

4/1/95 OPS IR 95-07 Apparera Personnel Licensee Unit I experienced m approximate 14 minute loss of NCV 95-07-02 Error shutdown cooling shile shining fmm one shutdown cooling loop to the other. The root cause was the closing of the wrong SDC suction roolation valve (the valve for the operating. vice idle, pung) on the part of the operator.

4/1/95 MS IR 95-07 Poor Adherence to Ucensee Jumper leR installed in ECCS ventilation denper aRer NCV 95-07-02 J/LL and Maintenance work complete.

Procedures 4/1/95 OPS IR 95-07 Weak Annunciator NRC Weak annuncistor response by RO: weM to

Response

loss of shuidown cooling event.

3/26/95 MS IR 94-09 Procedural Weakness NRC LPSI mechanical seal housing outer cap misinstalled.

3/26/95 OPS IR 94-09 Operator NRC Operator failure to recognize out-of-sight high Error /Procedurst indication on EDG cooling water tank. Failure of Weakness procedure to include instructions on draining tank.

3/04/95 ENG IR 95-04 Design Licensee SDC suction reiief valve liR due to um hammer.

3/04/95 OPS R 95-04 House-NRC toose plastic debris found in Unit 2 fbel pool area.

keeping 2/27/95 MS R 95-04 Equipment Failure Self Identifying Unit I was shut down for the replacement of3-pressurizer code safety valves. The valves were leaking by the seat.

2/21/95 OPS R 95-04 Equipment Failure Self Identifying Unit 2 trip due to failure of a SGWL control level transmitter. Transmitter failed high, resuking in closure of the FRVand a subsequent trip on low SGWL (95-04) 2/20/95 005 R 95-04 Equipment Anon aly Self Identifying 2B LPSIpump found air-bound during survedlance testing. The licensee has theonzed that the migration of air in the system resulted in the conStion as a result of previous surveillance testing. The pangs are not self-venting.

2/I7/95 MS R 95-02 Physical Condition NRC Nornerous areas of corrosion identi6ed in Unit t/2 CCW areas.

2/17/95 PS IR 95-03 Personnel Error NRC la two observed exercises, ECs failed to notify states (Training Weakness within 15 minutes.

2/16/95 MS R 95-04 Maintenance Error /

Self Identifying lead shed of the I A3 IE 4160 bus due to inadvertent Procedural Weakness jumper contact while replacing a degraded voltage relay.

2/4/95 OPS M 95-01 Operator Ucensee Failure to sample STTwithin TS required time frame VIO 95-01-01 Error / Communications following volume addition-Second occurrence in 2 years.

e e.

2/4/95 OPS IR 5541 Peor Communications NRC Failure to identify rnd analyze Unit I bc4 leg flow stratification 2/4/95 MS IR 95-01 Personnel Error /

Self Identifying Inadequate independent verification resuhed in CVCS VIO 9541-02 Program Weakness letdown control valve failing to respond due to reversed leads. Resulted in a cessation ofletdown flow.

12/31/94 ENG IR 94-25 Engineering Design Self Identifying inadequate design control of NaOH cross-connectron NCV 94-2541 Error between ECCS trains.

12/3/94 PS IR 94-24 Procedure Review Licensee Failure to perform TS quired periodic pmcedure NCV 94-24-01 Inadequacy reviews.

12/3/94 MS IR 94-24 Maintenance NRC Inadequate process for changes to vendor technical VIO 94-24-02 Procedures manuals.

Inadequacy 11/25/94 MS IR 94-22 Program weakness Licensee The licensee's QA organization identiSed numerous weaknesses in the implementation of the site's welding program. As a result, the Maintensnee Manager placed a stop work order on welding activities. The stoppage lasted one week.

I1/24/94 MS IR 94-24 Prncedure we kness Self-identifying Unit i B side SIAS actuation due to a bistable module which had not been adequately withdrawn fmm the ESFAS cabinet during maintenance.

11/23/94 MS IR 94-24 Equipment Failure Self Identifying Unit i SIAS with usiit in mode 5 due to common mode failure of Rosemount transmitters us.d forpresourizer pressure channels.

11/5/94 OPS IR 94-22 Operations, Licensee Weste gas release on Sept. 10,1993, with NCV 94-22-03 Maintenance meteorological instruments out of service.

Ermrs 10/26/94 MS IR 94-22 Weather-Related/

Self-Identifying Unit I automatically tripped due to arc-over frr s a a

LER Maintenance potential transformer due to salt buildup on swnchyard insulators.

T/30/94 OPS IR 94-20 inconsistent NRC Local valve position indicators not maintained MS Expectations accurate. Procedures / training provided to operators on verifying valve pocition found weak.

f/30/94 OPS IR 94-20 Operations.

NRC Plant personnel not trained on IPE snd run using it for Maintenance work planning and scheduling.

Deficiency 9/30/94 OPS IR 94-19 Operatio is Weakness NRC During requal exem, a licensed operator exhibited an apparent disregard for EOPs.

9/30/94 MS IR 94-20 Personnel Error Licensee Maintenance personnel begin to work the wmng R%T isolation valve, threatening the operability of both trains of ECCS.

V/30/94 OPS IR M-19 Operations Error Ucensee Fciture to nc'ify the NRC of changes in status of NCV 94-19-01 licensed operators' medical conditions.

8/29/94 OPS IR 94-20 Operations Errors NRC Operators placed I A EDG in an electrical lineup for VIO 94-22-01 which TS-required surveillance tests had na been VIO 94-22-02 performed (with the ser-ey-related swing bus pered from it). Also, related control room log entries appeared to be inaccurate.

8/28/94 OPS IR 94-20 Equipment Failure Licensee Unit I was taken offline (Mode 2) to repair a DEH leak. The unit was returned on line later the same day.

8/12/94 OPS IR 94-18 Operations /

NRC The licensee was unloading new fuel for Unit I with a Maintenance Error and hoist grapple that was rnissing the safety latch sleeve Lack of Engineering locating pin. The safety sleeve functioned by friction Drawings / Inspection only.

Criteria 7/14/94 MS IR 94-15 Equipment LicenseeINRC During surveillance test, TCB 5 failed to open due to LER U-2 944)6 Failure / Poor mechanical binding (licensee). The Ikensee failed to VIO 94-15-01 Management Decision recognize the condition as requiring a shutdown per TS (NRC).

7/9/94 OPS IR 94-15 Equipment Failure Licensee Unit 2 turbine was shut down and reactor power reduced to Mode 2 because the 2BI RCP Inwer oil level indication showed a leak. The indication was later shown to be erroneous.

7/8/94 OPS IR 94-15 Operator Error Licensee TS 3.0.3 entry due to placing 2Al LPSIpurry and 23 LER U2 94-05 charging pump 005 at the same time.

6/28/94 MS IR 9414 Personnel Error /

Licensee Inoperable Unit 2 RAB ventilation exhaust WRGM oue NCV 94-14-01 Procedural Weakness to failure to connect sample lines.

LER U-2 94-04 6/6/94 OPS IR 9414 Weather Licensee Unit I trip from 100% power during a severe thunderstorm due to debris blown across two main transformer output terminals.

5/28/94 PS IR 94-13 Poor Cor ective Action NRC Emergency supplies in control toorn less that s:sted in DEV 94-13-01 FSAR.

5/6/94 ENG I* 94-11 Engineering Error NRC Inadequate corrective action for MOVs stich stalled VIO 94-II-01 during surveillances.

4/23/94 OPS IR 94-12 Mfg. Error Self Identifying Unit 2 auto reactor trip from 30% power caused by LER U-2 94-03 RPS cabinet wiring error for trip bypass circuit, fuorn original unit construction.

4/23/94 MS 1R 94-12 Equipment Failure Self-Identifying Following unit 2 trip, steam bypass system operated unexpectedly and dropped RCS temp by seven degrees F, pressurizer heaters turned off.

.e 4/21/94 OPS IR 94-12 Operator licensee Unit 2 rescw powa incretsed from 26 to 31% due to Insttentiveness positive MTC.

An/94 MS IR 94-10 Maintenance Error NRC Contractor personnel nude and comrnctor QC VIO 94-10-01 accepted pressurizer nozzle weld prep that did not eneet procedural requirernents for bevel angle.

Licensee engineering had specified overly tight tolerances.

4/3/94 OPS IR 94-12 Operations Procedure Self-identifying Unit I auto reactor trip due to unusual electrical lineup LER UI 94-04 Error (Lack of sufficient (isochronous EDG paralleled with offsite power depth in review) through TCBs).

4/3/94 ENG IR 94-12 Surveillance Error Licensee Licensee discovered that the 4160 VIAB Bust swing VIO 9412-01 bus components [C ICW Pump and C CCW Pump]

would not strip from the bus upon undervoltage ifthe bus were aligned to the B bus due to a missing wire.

3/28/94 MS IR 94-09 Personnel Error Self Identifying Unit I auto reactor trip. Maintenance foreman ened LER UI 9443 generator exciter breaker on wrong unit.

3/16/94 ENG IR 9448 Engineering Corrective NRC Regional inspector had two Unit 2 SIA violations: Is VIO 94-0841 Action corrective action for an 11/24/92 water hamcwr evers VIO 94-08-02 was done without documersed instmetions or procedures, resuhing in operating urail 3/94 with five snubbers on the SRV and PORV tailpipes inoperable.

2) Failure to write a nonconformance report for a damaged pipe support in March 1994.

3/16/94 ENG IR 94-10 Equipment Failure Licensee AUnit 2 pressurizer instrumera nozzle that had been LER U-294-02 repaired a year ago was found leaking stile the unit was in Mode 5. The unit remained shut down for repairs.

3/4/94 ENG IR 94-06 Engineering Design Ucensee inadequate design controle on Unit 2 sequencer NCV-94-06-02 Error charging pump loading block.

3/4/94 ENG IR 94-06 Engineering Error Licensee Failure to report an EDG failure.

NCV 94-06-01 2/28/94 ENG IR 94-09 Refueling procedure &

Ucensee/NRC Inadequate grappling of a fuel assembly caused by NCV 94-04-01 operator error error in Recommended Move List and operator error in following procedure. (IR 9449) 2/17/94 OPS IR 94-05 Operator Error Licensee Pressurizer sur. spray isolation valve had been locked NCV 94-05-01 closed (vice open) since 3/27/93.

LER U2 94-01 2/llN4 PS IR 94-02 Security Error Licensee Failure to provide required compensatory measures in NCV 94-02-01 response to a security computer system failure.

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J Semiannual Plant Performance Assessment' St. Lucie 1 and 2 Current SALP Assessment Period: 1/7/96 through 3/97 Last SALP Rating' Previous SALP Rating 1/2/94 - 1/6/96 5/3/92 - 1/1/94 Operations 2

1 Maintenance 2

1 Engineering 1

1 Plant Support 1

1 I.

Performance Overview Since July 1995 there have been a series of events that led to questioning the plant's overall performance.

An NRC root cause effort determined that. In addition to procedural adherence / adequacy weaknesses.' the licensee suffered from weaknesses in both interfaces across organizational lines and corrective actions.

The SALP board concluded that performance in the areas of Operations and Maintenance had declined to level 2.

Since the SALP board, additional examples of declined performance were noted.

These have included:

Significant operator inattentiveness which resulted in the overailution event on January 22. 1996, highlighted the recent large number of personnel errors and lack of command and control in the control room (SL3. CP).

On February 22. 1996, a dropped CEA and an ensuing Unit 1 shutdown resulted in the declaration of an unusual event.

During the shutcown. main feedwater regulating valve instabilities resulted in operators manually tripping the unit.

On February 24. a containment radiation monitor was rendered inoperable for two days due to an improper valve lineup following a grab sample.

As a result, the unit was started up without this TS-required component available.

Several instances of failure to follow procedures and operator inattention led to the extended period of inoperability (SL4).

On May 7. an inspection indicated that a significant number of shifts had been worked with fire brigade members which were not medically qualified.

A breakdown in the tracking of this data resulted from a key individual being laid off.

On May 12. fuel movement was commenced on Unit 1 without only 1 of 2 wide range NI channels available.

Operators performing a

' surveillance test on the inoperable channel did not coordinate with the refueling center properly.

Additionally, the fuel offload was commenced without incorporating requirements from the

spent fuel pool heat load calculation into the appropriate operational procedures, On June 6. Unit 2 was manually tripped due to high generator gas e

temperature.

Root cause was a screw which vibrated loose and resulted a temperature control valve feedback arm falling free of its connection.

This failure mode had been encountered before.

e On June 16. an inspection identified that 56 individual violations of overtime guidelines had occurred on the part of 4 individuals over a 30 day period.

Evidence also existed that employees were regularly working longer hours than those reported on their timesheets.

On July 20. Unit 1 experienced a loss of charging flow when, due e

to a mispositioned board selector switch, both operating pumps stopped on a faulty indication of high pressurizer level, caused by I&C errors.

A number of engineering-related problems have been identified to e

include:

e A number of annunciator response procedures which were inaccurate due to a failure to update them when design modifications took place.

e Four similarly miswired nuclear instrumentation channels due to errors in control wiring diagrams implemented during a modi fication.

The condition was identified at full power and resulted in an entry into TS 3.0.3.

Nonconservative errors were identified in auxiliary e

feedwater actuation system setpoints due to a failure to incorporate as-built data in instrument calibration calculations.

e-On August 14. glue was found in key lock switches on both units' hot shutdown panels, rendering the switches inoperable. ' The cpering instances appeared to be additional examples of padlocks-and door locks which were identified in July.

In addition to the inspection findings above. the inspectors have noted a general low state of morale.

A great number of both management and non-management employees have expressed concern with regard to the company's ongoing downsizing effort.

The general feeling is that, unlike Turkey Point. which was afforded the budget and time to improve prior to cownsizing. St. Lucie is expected to improve AND downsize simultaneously.

N c

II.

Functional Area Assessment - Ooerations A.

Assessment 4

Performance in Operations appears to have leveled.

At the time of the last PPR. operator errors and operational events were on the increase.

In the past six months, examples of improved operator attention to detail and conservative decision-making have been' identified.

Strong performance was identified in the area of reduced inventory operation. Weaknesses were identified in the

~

areas of-procedural quality _and operability maintenance and decision-making.

Improvements in control. room environment.

formality, and communications have been noted.

The licensee has E

appeared to make inroads in the areas of operator self-assessment and documentation of adverse conditions.

B.

Basis 1.

Attention to Detail and Conservative Decision-Making Non-licensed operators were successful in identifying e

two cases of inadvertent containment radiation monitor inoperability and a breach in a fire-rated assembly.

e After a non-conservative decision which resulted in a late declaration of an NOUE for CVCS system leakage.

operators have declared three NOUEs for'similar 4

circumstances (CVCS leakage outside containment which could not be quickly quantified).

Management has been

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effective in encouraging conservative decision-making.

i e

Entry into a shutdown action statement when 4 Unit 2 control rods would not respond electrically.

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e Five entries into reduced inventory during the period without error.

Timely trip of Unit 1 due-to apparent gas buildup in e

4 the 1B transformer.

1 e

Terminating a Unit 1 startup due to predictions that xenon decay would invalidate the estimation of

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critical conditions.

2.

Weaknesses in Procedures and Maintenance of Operability l

e Numerous errors identified in annunciator response procedures.

e Full core offload began on Unit 1 without incorporating requirements from the fuel pool heat load calculation into operational procedures.

Operator aids found in the field did not agree with e

procedural requirements for the tasks they described.

Unit 1 fuel movement began without the required 2 operable channels of wide range nuclear instruments due to the performance of a surveillance test.

Clearance hung during the Unit 1 outage resulted in inoperability of audible count rate in containment.

3.

Other Observations Good performance was noted during a Unit 2 downpower due to low turbine auto-stop oil pressure.. a Unit 2 trip due to a failed turbine cooling water valve.

several startups, and fuel movements in Unit 1 containment.

Poor performance was noted in the use of a single operator for @ l movement in the spent fuel pool, in the control of keys for PORV operation outside of the control room. in the control of backup charging pump selector switch position and in performing a test of a turbine-driven AFP which resulted in a pump trip.

Equipment failures continue to challenge operators, with the occurrence of two manual trips per unit this calendar year due to equipment failures.

C.

Future Inspections The high number of allegations and an increase in resident involvement with engineering activities has reduced the available time for core Operations inspections.

The site has been brought to an N+1 staffing level: however, qualification of the new resident is not anticipateo until February. 1997.

Additionally, both assigned Resident Inspectors will be attending CE training at TTC for three weeks in October / November.

An acting resident has been arranged for the period: however, inspection at the N+1 level will not be possible until the end of the current SALP cycle (March 1997).

Consequently. Senior Resident and Resident Inspectors objectivity visits, involving control room observations, are planned.

Additionally. DRS inspections of the licensee's procedure development and approval process. which has recently changed in an effort to improve procedure quality. are planned.

III.

Functional area Assessment - Maintenance A

Assessment. An increase in personnel errors and equipment problems was noted.

The majority of the equipment problems are BOP related.

For the most part the licensee considered safety in j

establishment of goals and for monitoring of systems and

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components in the maintenance rule.

The maintenance program is adequate.

B.

Basis:

The maintenance area was rated good overall the last SALP period.

The last PPR indicated a problem with EDGs and procedure problems.

The plant matrix indicates 12 equipment failures.12 personnel errors and 3 procedure problems during the last 6 months.

Examples of personnel errors were:

- 8/31/96 Improper use of M&TE for meggering NI cables

- 8/3/96 Freeze seal left unattended

- 7/30/96 3 of 4 linear NI channels found miswired

- 7/20/96 2 charging pumps tripped due to erroneous level signal Power Reduction caused by Equipment Failures in the last 6 months:

- 4/20/96: Unit 2 - Turbine Stop Oil orifice blockage.

- 4/09/96: Unit 2 - Downpower due to Circ Water Piping leakage.

- 5/24/96: Unit 2 - Downpower due to CEDM problems.

- 5/31/96: Unit 2 - Downpower due to MSR TCV closure due to blown fuse.

- 6/06/96: Unit 2 - Reactor trip resulting from high generator H2 temp due to failed TCV.

- 6/22/96: Unit 2 - Downpower due to 2B FRV Controller problems.

- 7/23/96: Unit 1 - Manual trip due to turbine maintenance.

Maintenance Backlog:

- Non-outage corrective maintenance backlog: 1101 items. no significant changes since beginning of year.

- Overdue Preventive Maintenance Backlog: 30 Maintenance PMs were late Maintenance Rule A(1) systems: 6 systems

- EDG governors. EDGs. 4.16 KV AC safety relatea breakers. PORVs.

C AFW. and RCP seals.

C Future Inspections:

- Maintenance Rule follow-up: 62703 (RI) - 1 week

- ISI inspection: 73753 (core) - 1 week

- Integrated S/G Replacement Inspection: 73753 (RI) - 3 weeks IV.

Functional Area Assessment - Enaineerina A.

Assessment St. Lucle received a SALP 1 rating during the SALP period that ended January 6. 1996.

The licensee has declined in performance during this PPR period (March-September 1996) due to problems with configuration management / design control and a failure to identify an US0.

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I B.

Basis PIM TRENDS / ISSUES:

The trend indicated was for decline in configuration management as described in design control issues below and an issue for failure to identify an USO for a 50.59 evaluation (September 19. 1996).

ENFORCEMENT: Letter of violation issued September 19. 1996. One level III and two level IVs in the area of US0 and configuration management.

DESIGN CONTROL ISSUES:

Recently enforcement identified two problems One was failure to coordinate design changes to operating procedures with three exam]les: 1) set point change to low level alarm in the Hydrazine tanc. 2) removal of ICW lube water piping and did not change abnormal procedure which affects operator actions. and 3) disabled a steam dump valve annunciator without changing the annunicator response procedure.

The second problem identified the failure to change ICW drawings after a modi fication.

OPERATING FOCUS:

The licensee took steps to prevent tube failure of its steam generators on Unit 1 by plugging approximately 2300 tubes.

These steam generators will be replaced in a fall 1997 outage.

MAJOR INITIATIVES:

Unit 2 outage 4/15/97. Unit 1 S/G replacement outage fall '97 FSAR INITIATIVES:

A review has been conducted of approximately one-third of the FSAR (July 1996 inspection). This review was performed mostly on Unit 1 and was performed on text material and not for curves and tables.

No US0 or operability problems were found.

Approval pending for reviewing remaining part of FSAR.

DBD/R:

A Design Basis Documentation was performed for 20 design basis documents.

The program was completed near the end of 1995.

C.

Future Inspections Engineering-9 weeks. basis:

Evaluate new engineering organization. FSAR project, configuration management and followup on design control issues.

L V.

Functional Area Assessments - Plant Sucoort A,

Assessment i

The last SALP cycle ended 1/6/96.

Plant Support was Category 1.

Tne lic;ensee continues to maintain a satisfactory level of performance in the area of Plant Support.

Some decline in Radiation Protection has been noted due to the loss of control of contaminated tools and exceeding dose goals.

Emergency Preparedness ongoing inspection indicates a decline in 1

l

performance.

Hurricane preparations for hurricane Bertha were conservative.

Overall. site security has been adequate.

Training and qualification was noted as a strength and management observed to be aggressive in pursuing issues, but not aggressive in doing indepth review of events.

Implementation of the fire protection program continued to be satisfactory.

B.

Basis Radiation Protection NCV for failure to control contaminated tools used in RCA (96-04.

p 45)

Violation (repeat of above NCV) for numerous examples of failure to control contaminated tools. (96-09. p 25)

Internal and external exposures below 10 CFR Part 20 limits. (96-04, p 45 and 96-04, p 23).

4 1995 dose was 412 person-rem. Unplanned maintenance and rework caused 1995 dose goal of 283 person-rem to be exceeded by 129 person-rem. (96-04. p 50)

Rad Techs decreased from 32 to 30 and 2 supervisors lost (96-04 p 48)

Decon staff reduced from 22 to 12 persons.

Levels of contaminated equipment and materials increasing. (96-04. p 46)

Good radiological housekeeping and controls. (96-09. p 28) 4 2

The total area contaminated was at 250 ft (96-04, p 47)

Licensee accreditation of the FP&L DADS a good example of Radiation Protection staff's technical capabilities.

(96-04 p 44)

Emeroency PreDaredness Conservative actions taken to prepare for Hurricane Bertha.(96-11.

p 3)

Securit y Failure to report a confirmed tampering event within one hour, whicn resulted in a violation.

Two events prior to the above tampering event were documented as tampered or unauthorized work. but management failed to notify security of these events.

Numerous problems discovered by a OA audit determined the FFD program to be weak.

Fire Protection A backup fire pump was installed to replace an out of service fire pump.

C.

Future Inspections Insoections Rationale i

Health Physics (SALP 1 decline - maintain: watch)

Operational HP(83750) 2-Inspections with focus on j

procedure coroliance: rework doses Eff1/RadWast(84/86750) 3-inspections with focus on

{

accident / process monitor installation & maintenance l

TI 133 Rad Waste Combine with 86750 Emergency Preparedness 1-Inspection with focus on Self-Prog. (82701)

Assessment results i

Regional Initiative inspection on i

allegation followuo (3 weeks. 2 inspectors)

Security Prog (81700)

Core Insp. to review security audits. corrective actions, j

management support and i

effectiveness, and review protected area detection equipment Security Prg/FFD (81700/

One regional initiative to followup 81502) on tampering and FFD issues Fire Protection None VI.

Attachments 1.

St. Lucle. Inspection Plan 2.

Power Profile 3.

Plant Issues Matrix 4.

Current NRC Performance Indicators 5.

Licensee Organization Charts 6.

Allegation Status l

7.

Enforcement History 8.

Major Assessments 9.

Recent Generic Issues Status List I

I i

ST. LUCIE - INSPECTION PLAN INSPECTION NUMBER OF PLANNED PROCEDURE /

TITLE / PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS INSPECTION TYPE OF INSPECTION -

TEMPORARY DATES COMMENTS INSTRUCTION 37550 fl0 CLEAR INSTRUMENTATION 2

10/7-18/96 REGIONAL INITIATIVE INSPECTION 82701 OPERATIONAL STATUS OF Tile EP 2

10/7-18/96 REGIONAL INITIATIVE PROGRAM 10/28-11/1/96 81502 FITNESS FOR DUTY 1

10/21-25/96 FOLLOWUP FFD/ TAMPERING 40500 EFFECTIVENESS OF LICENSEE 1

10/21-25/96 INSPECT STATUS OF CON 1ROLS IN IDENilFYlilG 1

1/6-17/97 PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT RESOLVING. AND PREVENTING PROGRAM PROBLEMS: CORRECTIVE ACTION REVIEW l

t 84750 RADIOACTIVE WASTE TREATMENT AND 1

11/4-8/96 CORE l

EFFLUENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL Tl 133/86750 MONITORING: SOLID RADIDACTIVE 1

11/18-22/96 CORE WASTE MANAGEMENT AND i

TRANSPORIATION OF RADI0 ACTIVE 1

2/24-28/97 CORE i

MATERIAL 93801 A/E EXPANDED SSFI INSPECTION 2

11/4-6/96 NRR INITIATIVE 5

11/18-22/96 5

12/2-6/96 5

12/9-13/96 5

1/6-10/96 i

I L

-2 INSPECTION NUMBER OF PLANNED PROCEDURE /

TITLE / PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS INSPECTION TYPE OF INSPECTION -

TEMPORARY DATES COMMENTS

' INSTRUCTION

-83750 OCCtlPATIONAl RADIATION EXPOSURf 1

12/2-6/96 CORE 1

1/6-10/97 CORE 71001 LICENSED OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION 2

12/2/96 REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM PROGRAM EVALUATION INSPECTION 81700 PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM FOR 1

1/6-10/97 CORE - SAFEGUARDS POWER REACTORS 62703 FOLLOWUP MAINTENANCE RULE TEAM 1

1/27 -31/97 REGIONAL INITIATIVE INSPECTION 73753 STEAM GENERATOR INTEGRATED 1

1/27-31/97 REGIONAL INITIATIVE INSPECTION 2/10-14/97 5/5-9/97 37550 ENGINEERING 1

2/3-7/97 CORE 50.59 FOCUS 92703 FOLLOWUP A/E EXPANDED SSFI lEAM 3

3/3-14/97 REGIONAL INITIATIVE INSPECTION OPEN ISSUES 73753 INSERVICE INSPECTION 1

4/28-5/2/97 CORE -MAINTENANCE 82701 OPERATIONAL STATUS OF EP PROGRAM 1

1/6-10/97 CORE

.-.~....

..-.e-

_. _.. _. - _ _ _ - - _. - _. _ _ - - - ~.. _ _ - - - - _ _ - - - _ _ -. -. _ _ - _ - -.. _ -. - -. - - -. - _ - - _ -. - - - -. _,. -. _ -,. _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _. -

STm LUCIE UNIT 1

Operational Period Fe b ru a ry 1996 th ro u gli October 18, 1996 1

2 3

100-

=

3On August 23,1996, 1

On February 24,1996, 60 -

a manual trip was a manua trip was initiated initiated to perform N

while going to a TS required turbine maintenance.

ko 60-shutdown A

4 E-Zm 4g~-

2 April 29,

1996, 4

The unit opei ated at S

shutdow 1 for 60% power d n to main

  • a refueling transformer 3 oblems l

l O

noin n i u n o n i n o n o"trentrentntunnnnnt"n o n i o: :nnonionnoun F

M A

M J

J A

S 0

PERIOD OF OPERATION Graph does not include power reductions for routine repairs, waterbox cleaning, or required repairs.

ST.

LUCIE UNIT 2

Ope ra tio n al Period Fe b ru a ry 1995 through October 18, 1996 1

2 100

=

1 On April 20,1996 80 -

the unit was removed c4 r.za from service during

>g turbine testing 60 -

a g

ZW 40-U 2 On June 6,1996, the l

c4 rza unit was manually tripped i

20 -

due to high generator i

hydrogen gas temperature.

0 n o n o n o n u n i n i m"" n o n i n u n"it"nmnu n i o n n i o n n i n i n o n o n n o m F

M A

M J

J A

S O

~:

PERIOD OF OPERATION Graph does not include power reductions for ro u tin e repairs, waterbox

cleaning, or required repairs.

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BY SALP AREA St. Lucie SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS ENGINEERING 4/18/96 NCV IR 96-06 M

L Missing orifice plate identified in Unit 1 Either failure to install orifice during ICW system during licensee field plant modification, or failure to reinstall walkdowns orifice following maintenance.

4/29/96 NCV IR 96-06 N

Failure to promptly document a Engineering failed to initiate CR upon nonconformance discovery that approx. 35 S-R instruments on each unit might have been calibrated at temperatures lower than those assumed in setpoint cales 5/12/96 NCV IR 96-12. EA O

L Initial temperature (and other) conditions Programmatic weakness in Plant 96-236 specified in Unit I spent fuel pool heat Change / Modification process.

load calculation (to support total core offload) was not factored into procedures 4/9/96 NEG S

CIRC water piping through-wall leaks Galvanic corrosion due to inadequate observed in two water boxes' outlets.

cathodic protection following installation of stainless steel Tapparogge components.

i 6/3/96 OTHER 1R 96-08 O

L Unit 1 outage extended due to expansion New plugging cnteria resulting from of SG MRPC tube inspections. Tube discussions with NRR on defect plugging approached 25% limit. PLAs characterization methodologies submitted to NRR to allow plugging up to 30%.

6/8/96 OTHER IR 96-08 L

Ongoing review by licensee of UFSAR Failure to update FSAR over time and accuracy identified approximately 150 failure to review FSAR properly when items, ranging from typographical errors to preparing procedures.

I more substantive issues.

FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 1 of 26 21-Oct-96

SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE I COMMENTS 7/18/96 OTHER 1R 96-11 M

1.

Unit 1 AFAS setpoints found Failure to employ as-built elevations of nonconservative during review of condensate pots in the development of recalibration activities.

calibration critena.

7/30/96 OTHER IR 96-11 O

L 3 of 4 Unit 1 knear Ni channels found Drawing errors - discrepancy between miswired, with the detectors

  • upper vendor technical manuals and control chambers feeding the lower NI drawer wiring diagrams generated for the inputs and vice-versa Result was 3 installation of the new Unit 1 NI drawers channels for which axial shape index was in error.

4/13/96 POS IR 96-06 N

Engineering response to failure of HVS-4A Procurement engineering effective in motor considered good.

locating and dedicating replacement motor and in identifying and resolving incorrect bearing rating calc for new motor. Minor problem existed in that new starting current profile was not adequately treated.

6/1/96 POS IR 96-08 N

CNRB activities surrounding PLA reviews in support of SG tube plugging issues were probing and competent.

6/8/96 POS IR 96-08 M

N Unit 1 RWT liner inspection.

Licensee satisfied committments to inspect fiberglass liner in RWT. Results sat.

8/26/96 POS IR 96-14 N

Engineering activities associated with leak in class 3 line to containment fan cooler in accordance with GL 91-18 and GL 90-05 for non-code repair.

6/8/96 STREN IR 96-08 M

N ISI activities for SG and reactor vessel Examinations well-planned, performed eddy current examinations reviewed.

and managed by very talented and knowledgable personnel.

FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 2 of 26 21-Oct-96

SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEl COMMENTS 6/6/96 VIO IR 96-12, EA-N USO, involving taking a normally open Licensee determined that small increase 96-249 EDG fuel oil line isolation valve to the in the probability of failure could be closed position and the use of operator overcome by admin processes.

action to open the valve on EDG start.

cited at SL 111.

7/12/96 VIO lR 96-12. EA N

Two SL IV violations cited for Lack of appropriate pre and post-96-236 configuration management control installation review.

problems involving inaccuracies in procedures and drawings due to design changes.

8/3/96 VIO IR 96-11 M

N Prelubrication of valves prior to Procedure which required prelube had surveillance testing in 1995 resolved as not been considered for potential effects being a violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B on stroke time.

criterion XI.

10/18/96 VIO IR 96-17 L

Failure to satisfy QA plan requirements in Failure to perform independent the development of design modifications verifications of design outputs to the Unit 1 Nuclear instrumentation (drawmgs). Multiple examples. Also, system.

failure to perform adequate validation and verification of software for incore monitoring.

6/3/96 WEAK IR 96-12 EA M

S High temperature condition in Unit 2 rod Failure of an air conditioner. Further 96-236 control cabinet room due to failure of an review by licensee /NRC showed air l

sir conditioner led to indications of rod conditioner was temporacy equipment control problems. Indications later shown installed without design controls during to be false. Also, high temp condition led pre-op test phase.

to failure of a diverse turbine trip relay.

7/12/96 WEAK IR 96-12 L

Licensee veritcal slice inspection of EDG, Lack of proper configuration control over HPSI, and CCW systems revealed time.

numerous deficiencies in procedure, design document and FSAR accuracy.

L l

FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 3 of 26 21-Oct-96

SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 10/12/96 WEAK IR 96-15 PS N

No evidence could be found that lack of design basis documentation.

containment leakage detection systems satisfied leak-before-break assumptions for detectability or seismicity.

MONTENANCE 11/1/95 NCV IR 95 S ICI wiring error during RX head installation Personnel Error NCV 95-18-05 last RFO.

2/17/96 NCV IR 96-01. IR PS N

Work on 1 A ECCS suction header through-Personnelwork practices (workers 96-04 wall leak revealed strong FME, but poor ignored RWP requirements)

HP work practices observed regarding contamination control resulted in NCV.

5/8/96 NCV IR 96-06 N

Lack of verified (controlled) copy of Failure of Maintenance workers to procedure identified at CCW heat property verify procedures prior to exchanger jobsite.

beginning work.

i 5/17/96 NCV IR 96-08 N

Failure to verify the currency of procedure Cognitive personnelerror in use at jobsite 5/17/96 NCV IR 96-08 N

Failure to satisfy requirements for Cognitive error.

" independence" on the part of independent verifier.

8/3/96 NCV 1R 96-11 N

Review of outage freeze seals indicated Stop work order by management for i

that one freeze seal had been left cleanup of the Unit 1 pipe tunnel unattended for approximately one hour.

resulted in directing freeze seal watch to another area to make room for trash being hauled out of area.

FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 4 of 26 21-Oct-96

SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEICOMMENTS 10/12/96 NCV IR 96-15 N

QA identified 3 areas of noncompliance M&TE storage area had been relyted with M&TE controls; one lack of a cat to a self-service facility, counter to QA sticker, lack of segregation of sat and plan requirements. Indications are that unsat M&TE, lack of an individual a lack of personnot contributed.

controlling M&TE.

2/17/96 NEG IR96-01 N

Freeze seal procedure lacked objective ProceduralWeakness criteria defining when a freeze seal existed.

2/17/96 NEG IR 96-01 L

Weakness identified in l&C calibration ProceduralInadequacy procedure -lack of detail provided for safety related calibrations.

3/30/96 NEG 1R 96-04 N

Control of maintenance procedures was Programmatic vunerability.

such that an outdated procedures could, programmatically, wind up in the field due to their inclusion in previously prepared packages. Licensee corrective action adequate.

6/8/96 NEG IR 96-08 N

Appleation of ladder and scaffolding programs appears to be rr.inimally compliant with licensee's self-imposed requirements. Many scaffolds and ladders required caution tags or had not been removed promptly after use.

11/6/95 OTHER 1R 95-21 S

Failure of EDG 2A relay sockets.

Equipment Failure Potential common mode failure.

12/9/95 OTHER 1R 95-22 L

2A2 RCP seal pkg lower seal destaged Filling RCS Before Coupling RCP due to reverse pressure across seal.

i FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 5 of 26 21-Oct-96

SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 12/20/95 OTHER IR 95-22 S

RX vessel flange inner O-ring groove Pitting - Localized Corrosion pitting resulted in cooldown and head removal for repair 3/30/96 OTHER IR 96-04 S

Maintenance underwent major departmentalreorganization. Selected supervisors' qualifications found satisfactory per TS requirements.

5/22/96 OTHER L

V 3483 (SDC Suction Relief) setpoint Root cause not e.;tablished. Either found out-of-spec high, rendering valve tampering or poor maintenance incapable of performing its intended practices (most likely).

function.

6/3/96 OTHER 1R 96-08 N

EDG reliability calculations indicate that EDG reliability is in keening with SBO assumptions 6/8/96 OTHER 1R 96-08 N

Review of maintenance backlog indicated thatlicensee had a plan for backlog reduction in place but has yet to meet goals.

8/3/96 OTHER 1R 96-11 E

N Licensee's activities regarding maintenance of rod control system were adequate.

9/7/96 OTHER 1R 96-14 N

Apparent improper use of M&TE for Failure to follow procedure.

meggering NI cabling identified. Lack of tracability from M&TE to work order due to borrowing the equipment from one job for use on anotherjob. URI.

9/9/96 OTHER 1R 96-15 S

Set screw / locknut in Trip Circuit Breaker 5 Root cause pending. Initialindications sheared off during surveillance testing and were of apparent hydrogen was later found in breaker cubicle.

embnttlement.

kN

?}

FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 6 of 26 21-Oct-96

SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEICOMMENTS 2117/96 POS IR 96-01 N

Noted improvernents in housekeeping and material conditions.

3/30/96 POS IR 96-04 N

10 maintenance activitss observed during inspection period. No significani deficiencies noted.

5/11/96 POS IR 96-06 N

Observations of Pressurizer Code Safety No deficiencies noted Valve testing and repair 5/11/96 POS IR 96-06 N

Preparations for Unit I reactor vessel ISI.

In accordance with requirements and showed good outage planning.

5/11/96 POS IR 96-06 N

Observations of maintenance activities in No deficencies noted.

containment (Unit 1 outage) involving valve packing replacement and modification.

5/11/96 POS IR 96-06 N

MSSV testing - Unit 1 Outage Review of test data and methodology sat.

5/11/96 POS IR 96-06 E

N Polar crane load rating calc and Unit 1 No deficiencies identifHui.

nead lift.

6/8/96 POS IR 96-08 N

Repair work for Unit 1 fuel transfer tube Conducted satisfactorily isolation valve.

6/13/96 POS IR 96-09 N

Maintenance activities associated with Work conducted satisfactorily.

Unit i reactor head lift and Unit 2 feed reg valve work.

FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 7 of 26 21-Oct-96

SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 6/20/96 POS IR 96-09 O

L Loss of 3 Wide Range Nuclear instrument Operators prompt and accurate in Channels on Unit I resulted in entering TS verifying shutdown margin requirements.

AS for Nis.

7/20/96 POS 1R 96-11 O

N Post-outage walkdown of Unit 1 containment indicated excellent cleanliness.

9/7/96 POS IR 96-14 N

ESF response time testing procedure identified as weak in detail. CR resolution to change procedure appropriate. Review of last 4 performances of procedure for each unit indicated that TS satisfied for competion of all channels.

9/7/96 POS IR 96-14 N

Review of 20 work orders indicated I

appropriate control of work scope.

2/24/96 VIO IR 96-04 N

Acceptance criteria specif,ed for CEDM Fadure ofI&C System Supervisor to coil resistances in PC/M package found adhere to test criteria compounded by varied and unclear. Criteria were not failure of I&C management to identify properly applied and values outside of obvious errors during post-work review.

specifications were not documented and 1

resolved.

6/13/96 VIO IR 96-09 N

A review of overtime for a one month Failure of management to track the use period indicated that overtime guidelines of overtime as specified in site were routinely exceeded without prior (or procedure. Procedure poorly defined subsequent) approval. 56 examples cited requirements.

for 5 individuals.

7/6/96 VIO IR 96-09 E

N Review of testing activities for continment Fadure to property implement App. B blast dampers indicated that violations of and QA plan as they related to 10 CFR 50 App. B and site procedures documenting as-found and as-left data.

existed. Two violations cited.

FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 8 of 26 21-Oct-96

SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COIMIENTS 10/12/96 VIO IR 96-15 N

M&TE used in testing control channel Ni M&TE was borrowed from another job, dunng installation was not logged out in violation of procedural controls.

against the work order for the job.

Tracability was thus lost.

10/18/96 VIO IR 96-17 N

Failure to initiate a condition report for a Resulted in miswiring the detector.

deficiency when cable labeling for Unit 1 B channel Ni detector did not agree with drawing.

2/24/96 WEAK IR 96-04 N

Maintenance practices for Steam Bypass Poor preventive rnaintenance on SCBC and Control System and Feedwater valve air lines and FRVs.

Regulating valves found weak in inspection following 2/22/96 Unit 1 trip.

OPERATIONS 1/7/96 N

SALP CYCLE 12 BEGINS t

t 3/31/96 EMERG IR 96-06 PS N

Operator response to RCS leakage Operators effective at through CVCS system.

identifying / isolating leak; however, Unusual Event callwas non-conservative in that the call was delayed to allow a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> RCS inventory balance to be calc'd when otherinformation indicated that excessive leakage existed.

7/13/96 EMERG IR 96-11 M

L NOUE declared when 2C charging pump Check valve stuck open due to possibly check valve stuck open, creating bypass generic effects of pulsating low flow in a flowpath from charging pumps to VCT.

continuous service valve.

Operators timely in declaring event.

8/9/96 EMERG IR 96-14 M

L NOUE declared due to RCS leakage in Chafging pump packing leakage excess of 1 gpm unidentified.

identlSed as source of leak. Operators correctly applied EAL.

FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 9 of 26 21-Oct-96

4 SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEICOMMENTS i

2/22/96 LER LER 335/96-M S

Dropped CEA led to declaration of NOUE 002 and plant shutdown. During shutdown, failure of air line to a FRV led to manual trip.

5/29/96 LER M

L Suspected loss of approximately 1200 condenser tube cleaning balls reported to state /NRC. Balls were found unaccounted for during an inventory balance.

Suspected that balls were released to Atlantic Ocean.

6/2/96 LER M

L Non-safety related breaker alignments to Operators not aware that containment support Unit 1 outage resulted in loss of amplifierwas going to be affected by audible count rate emplifier for imeup Control room amplifier not containment. Audib5 counts lost in affected containment for approximately 5 minutes during fuel movements.

10/18/95 NCV IR 95 L Missed RCS Boron sample surveillance.

Personnel Error NCV 95-18-07

[

10/19195 NCV IR 95 S Missed shift CEA position indication Personnel Error NCV 95-1846 surveillance.

11/21/95 NCV IR 95 L Failure to maintain Penetration Log.

FTF Procedure l

NCV 95-21-04 1/5/96 NCV IR 95 PS N

Several deficiencies in prodecure change Failure to Properly implement NCV 95-22-01 process implementation identified.

Procedures Expired or cancelled TCs found in control rooms and hot shutdown panel.

t 7

,5 FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 10 of 26 21-Oct-96 i

SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE E COlWMENTS 4/22/96 NCV IR 964)6 E

L Unauthorized breech in RAB fire barrier.

Operators showed good attention to during installation of CCW piping detail in identifying two holes bored in modification.

wall. Engineering failed to account for the effects of modification installation in fire rated assembly, as required by procedure for engineering packages.

5/14/96 NCV IR 96-08 L

Fuel movement begun with only one of Poor communication between control two required wide range NI channels room operators performing surveillance operable. Condition identified and fuel testing (which inop'd NI) on the subject movement secured after approximately 1 channel and the refueling center.

ft of travel.

8/3/96 NCV IR 96-11 L

QA audit discovered that corrective action Rush to close out STARS (old corrective documents had been closed without being action document) when CRs (new forwarded to originator for approval (as corrective action document) were required by procedure). NRC identified instituted.

that personnel without signature authority were closing documents.

8/6/96 NCV IR 96-14 N

Operator observed not walking down control boards prior to assuming shift, as required by procedure. Operator terminated.

9/9/96 NCV IR 96-15 PS L

Licensee had not complied with Failure to follow procedures.

requirements for ensuring that operators

.ead training bulletins required to maintain requalification current. Licensee identified issue, with independent NRC findings.

9/18/96 NCV IR 96-15 L

Licensee bypassed the wrong ESFAS Poor labeling of bypass key slots.

steam generatorlow level channelin response to channelinoperability.

Resulted in a failure to satisfy TS action statement requirements.

FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 11 of 26 21-Oct-96

SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE1 COMMENTS 12/1/95 NEG IR 95-21 N

Recurrent non-valid alarms when starting FTF Procedure fire pumps were not documented as operator workarounds. Voltage dips dssociated with such starts were contributors to a trip previously.

12/1/95 NEG IR 95-21 N

Operators unable to effectively obtain I&C Inadequate Operator Training setpoints from computer after hard copies were removed from control room.

12/1/95 NEG IR 95-21 N

Unit 2 procedures and valve deviation log Valve Position Administrative Controls used to cycle Unit 1 cross connect valves.

12/1/95 NEG IR 95-21 N

SDC Procedure required natural circ-Proceduralinadequacy related surveillance prior to establishing RCS pressure boundary. Natural circ not possible without pressurization.

12/27/95 NEG IR 95-22 E

S FRG meeting suffered!itens deferred due Lack of Attendance at FRG to lack of OPS /Eng'g atter. dance at meeting. Major issues at meeting affected OPS /Eng*g.

1/5/96 NEG IR 95-22 N

Several procedural deficiencies and inadequate Procedure Review and calculational errors identif.ed in reload Execution physics test procedure.

2115/96 NEG IR 96-01 M

N Tours of ECCS rooms revealed several Material Condition active leaks. Licensee could not explain how (if) FSAR assumptions on ECCS leakage were satisfied. Later review of FSAR indicated leakage within assumptions.

3/7/96 NEG IR 96-04 N

Licensee failed to place a CEA which had Operator oversight.

been declared administrative!y inoperable in the equipment out-of-service log. CEA was operable per TS.

FROM.10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 12 of 26 21-Oct-96

SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 3/7/96 NEG IR 96-04 N

During MTC testing, inspector noted that Poor attention to detail.

boron concentration had been verified at 30 minute intervals, vice 15 minute intervals as called for in procedure.

6/3/96 NEG IR 96-08 N

Poor practice observed in spent fuel pool "On deck" status was an effort to operations Fuel assemblies were left expedite reload. Operatorleaving hanging in an "on deck" status while machine was due to inadequate awaiting upender availability. Also, manpower-operator had to operate operator left machine unattended with fuel upender contmis, which were mounted hanging at least once per movement.

on waii.

7/16/96 NEG IR 96-11 L

2C auxilliary feedwater pump tripped on Operator errorin not property overspeed during post-maintenance implementing cautions in a procedure.

testing.

7/20/96 NEG IR 96-11 M

L 2 operating charging pumps tripped when I&C failed to recognize that reactor rnaintenance induced an erroneous level regulating system would be affected by signal into reactor regulating system.

their activities. Operators had charging Letdown isolated by operators. Upon pump backup switch in wrong position, reinitiating letdown, minor waterhammer leading to cessation of charging flow.

event occurred.

10/1/96 NEG IR 96-15 O

N 2B HPSI pump discharge pressure noted Poor attention to detail.

to be 880#. Operators could not explain it, had not noticed it. Was due to a pump run a week before.

11/16/95 OTHER 1R 95-21 M

S Unit 1 manually tripped when 1B MFRV Long-Standing Equipment Problem locked in 50% position. Root cause -

degraded power supply, compounded by voltage dip on starting both station fire pumps.

11/21/95 OTHER 1R 95-21 S

Light socket failure during lamp Equipment Failure replacement results in loss cooling to 1 A Main Transformer. Unit downpower to

-60%.

FROM.10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 13 of 26 21-Oct-96

SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE-SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 1/26/96 OTHER 1R 96-01 N

Inspection of corrective action program Corrective Achons revealed timely action on the part of management, but weaknesses in plans for tracking progress on personnel performance and procedure quality improvement.

3/1/96 OTHER L

Management Changes - T. Plunkett succeeds G. Goldberg, C. Wood replaces L. Rogers as manager of SCE, C. Marple replaces C. Wood as Ops Supervisor.

t 3/10/96 OTHER IR 96-04 L

Unit 1 downpowered to 97.5% due to hot Hot leg stratification.

leg stratification and flow swirl which resulted in higher than actual indicated reactor power.

4/4/96 OTHER IR 96-06 L

Interim Operations Manager (H. Johnson) named.

r 4/10/96 OTHER 1R 96-300 N

4 of 4 SRO candidates passed SRO examination. In 3 of the cases, performance was marginally satisfactory.

No generic candidate weaknesses identified.

4/20/96 OTHER IR 96-06 S

Unit 2 downpowered and taken off-line Blockage in auto-stop oil line orifice due to low pressure condition in auto-stop which prevented buildup of auto-stop oil oil. Operators observed to control pressure. Only negative aspect was evolution well.

crowding of control panels by control room SROs during portions of evolution.

i 5/31/96 OTHER 1R 96-08 M

S Blown fuse resulted in closure of all Unit 2 Moisture found in a junction box MSR temperature control valves, resulting following heavy rain.

in a 5% load rejection.

FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 14 of 26 21-Oct-96

CECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE E COMMENTS 6/27/96 OTHER 1R 96-09 E

L Site reorganization announced which would place almost all engineering functions (system engineering. STAS, test engineers) under Engineering. Also.

Outage Management folded into a global work planning group under the Plant General Manager.

3/12/96 POS IR 96-04 S

Licensee disposition for deficiency noted in 1 boroflex panel (top 15" missing) found satisfactory. FRG treatment ofissue found appropriate.

3/29/96 POS

!R 96-04 N

Operator requalification program found to be supporting management expectations for operations and covering timely and important topics.

3/30/96 POS IR 96-04 N

Review of 5 clearances indicates better attention to detail than had been observed in past.

4/10/96 POS IR 96-300 N

Simulator performed well throughout SRO qua!ification testing.

4/28/96 POS IR 96-06 N

Operators performed well during Unit 1 Communications formal, excellent use RFO shutdown.

of annunciator response procedure.

Performance of rod drop time testing a noteworthy initiative.

1 5/2/96 POS IR 96-06 N

Good performance by operators and test personnel during integrated safeguards testing on Unit 1.1B EDG output breaker failed to close during first test. Operators handled situation well.

5/5/96 POS IR 96-06 N

Reduced inveritory operations conducted well by operators.

FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 15 of 26 21-Oct-96

SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE1 COMMENTS 5/11/96 POS IR 96-06 N

2 clearances audited, both correct.

5/14/96 POS IR 96-08 N

Fuel movements during Unit 1 core omoad and reload performed well.

5/24/96 POS IR 96-08 M

S Rod control system failure resulted in Operators conservative in interpreting inability to move (electrically) 4 CEAs.

TS, plant organizations provided timely Operators conservatively interpreted TS to support with lists of equipment which require shutdown in this instance.

would be inoperable when the main Situation complicated by an out of service generator was tripped.

Startup Transformer.

6/6/96 POS 1R 96-08 S

Unit 2 manually tripped due to high main Operators acted promptly and correctly generator gas temperature due to failed in tripping the unit. Post trip response of temperature controlvalve.

both plant and operators was good.

6/8/96 POS IR 96-08 N

3 QA audits reviewed Broad in scope, appropriatefy focused, indicated an aggressive application of quality standards.

6/8/96 POS IR 96-08 N

3 QA Audits reviewed Broad in scope, focused on weak areas. Agressive application of standards evident in the number of findings cited.

6/19/96 POS IR 96-09 N

Unit 1 reduced inventory preparations and Controls were appropriate.

execution.

7/5/96 POS IR 96-09 N

Unit 1 reduced inventory preparations and Mid-Loop controls effective. Licensee execution.

attention and management oversight excellent.

FROM.10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 16 of 26 21-Oct-96

SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE1 COMMENTS 7/8/96 POS IR 96-11 M

N

!.5:ensee preparations for Hurricane Hurricane forcasts showed storm Bertha proactive and responsible.

missing area, but licensee prepared as though it would change course.

8/31/96 POS IR 96-14 M

L Operators manually tripped Unit 1 due to Operators acted quickly, conservatively, indications of gas accumulating in the 18 nnd in accordance with plant transformer. Operating crew self-procedures.

assessment following event viewed as exce!!ent.

9/2/96 POS IR 96-14 N

Unit 1 startup conducted well. Operator action to terminated first approach to criticality when Xe decay drove estimated critical conditions near allowed band limits l

was appropriate.

I 9/9/96 POS IR 96-15 PS N

Control room watchstanding practices satisfactory. Watchstanders maintained a professional environment and were attentive to plant paramenters.

10/9/96 POS IR 96-15 N

Surveillance testing of 2A EDG performed well. Good use of Real Time Training Coordinators 7/9/96 STREN IR 96-11 N

Two entries into reduced inventory made during inspection period. Strong management involvement in scheduling around Hurricane Bertha. Reduced inventory operations continues to be a strength.

11/11/95 VIO IR 95 N Tech. Spec. equipment not specified for IV FTF Procedure VIO 95-21-02 on Equipment Clearance Order.

11/20/95 VIO IR 95 N Valve discovered Closed vice Locked FTF Procedure VIO 95-21-01 Closed as specified on Equipment Clearance Order.

FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 17 of 26 21-Oct-96

SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE1 COMMENTS 11/27/95 VIO IR 95 L Missed RCS Boron sample surveillance -

Personnel Error VIO 95-21-03 Repeat from IR 95-18 1/5/96 VIO IR 96-04 L

NLO failed to employ procedure when Failure to use procedure, failure to notify placing EDG fuel oil tank on recirculation control room of evolution.

for chemistry. As a result, he improperty performed the evolution by isolating the discharge of the EDGFO transfer pump, which resulted in an inoperable EDG.

1/22/96 VIO IR 96 EA E

L Boron dilution event due to operator Operator error, poor short term 96-040 leaving control panel while dilution was in tumover, poor command and control progress. Weak command and control, procedural adherence, and short-term tumover. Additionally, OP for boration/ dilution not consistent with FSAR and no 50.59 performed.

1/26/96 VIO IR 96 N Violation identified regarding temporary' Procedure Control VIO 96-01-01 changes to procedure which changed intent and which were approved for use without prior FRG review.

2/22/96 VIO lR 96-04 O

N Operators found adding boric acid to VCT Procedures were put away to tidy up without procedure in hand, as required by control room prior to NRC senior conduct of operations procedure.

managers' tour prior to SALP meeting.

Additional example of EEA 96-040.

3/27/96 VIO IR 96-04 N

Operators failed to properly log boron Management direction to operators dilution evolutions. Globallog entry was allowing global log entries for reactivity made at the beginning of the shift stating manipulations during transient dilutions would be made; however, conditions (e.g. uppower) which was procedure required each dilution to be not in accordance with Conduct of logged.

Operations procedure.

8/19/96 VIO IR 96-16 N

Operations key controls found inadequate Keys found uncontrolled at for keys associated with control room normal / isolate switch boxes for unit 2 evacuation / remote shutdown PORVs.

FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 18 of 26 21-Oct-96

~ =.. - -

SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 12/1/95 WEAK IR 95-21 N

SDC procedure contained conflicting ProceduralWeakness/ Inadequate values for RX cavity level requirements.

Review Procedure had been approved since emphasis on accuracy stressed.

12/1/95 WEAK IR 95-21 N

CCW sample valve,showed dual FTF Procedure indication without corrective action documentation initiated.

12/1/95 WEAK IR 95-21 N

. Clearance in place to isolate N2 from CST Poor Corrective Actions i

to facilitate pressure switch replacement for nine days without work order being written.

12/1/95 WEAK 1R 95-21 N

Followup to previous inspection findings Corrective Actions indicated a weakness in followthrough in addressing deficiencies.

12/5/95 WEAK IR 95-22 M

N ESFAS cabinet doors found unlocked Poor Logkeeping/ Attn to Detail following maintenance work - I&C error.

Log entries associated with work were not complete.

1/5/96 WEAK IR 95-22 M

L U2 manual RX trip on high generator H2 Temp ControlValve Failure.

temp due to failure of temp control valve.

Additionally, failure to identify Operator awareness of RPS status post-unexpected reactor trip signals which trip poor. Inspection of post-trip review (for came in during trip.

current trip as well as past trips) indicated weaknesses in the rigor of post-trip reviews 2/17/96 WEAK IR 96-01 E

N Numerous deficiencies identified in ProceduralInadequacy instrument air system walkdowns, including drawings accuracy, ONOP adequacy, and annunciator response procedure accuracy.

FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 19 of 26 21-Oct-96

SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 2/24/96 WEAK IR 96-04 S

Procedural weak.. ass results in attempting Procedure review weakness -lack of to synchronize main generator with grid verification that disconnect links were with generator disconnect links open.

closed.

4/14/96 WEAK IR 96-06 E

N Configuration Control issues resulted from Walksdowns of both units' CS, ICW and ESF system walkdowns.

IA systems indicate programmatic failures in incorporating design changes into drawings, the FSAR and operating procedures. Unresolved item tracking expansion ofinspection scope to include instrumentation setpoints.

4/14/96 WEAK IR 96-06 E

N ICW system walkdown.

Results in'dicate weaknesses in procedure-to-procedure agreement, labelirg, and surveillance requirements, in addition to configuration control issues disussed separately.

8/6/96 WEAK IR 96-14 N

Operator aids found in vario'is areas of Type of aids identified did not meet the plant which were not in agreement criteria for inclusion in operator aid with system operating pro.;edures.

program and were not controlled.

PLANT SUPPORT 8/14/96 EMERG IR 96-16 O

L NOUE declared due to security alert Event was similar to discoveries made resulting from discovery of tampering. A in July of a glue-like substance in glue-like substance had been injected into padlocks.

Unit 1 and 2 hot shutdown panel key lock switches.

3/1/96 NCV IR 96-04 N

Inspection of Hot Too! Room identified Attention to detail in tool storage and several tools which were either not surveying.

painted purple (as required) or which slightly exceeded limits for contamination.

8/12/96 NCV IR 96-15 O

L Failure to follow procedure resulted in the Poorly written procedure, compounded inoperability of the Unit 1 containment by weak execution by chemistry radiation monitcr following PASS panel personnel. Good attention to detail be operability check.

NLO in identifying condition.

FROM.10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 20 of 26 21-Oct-96

SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEi CONIMENTS 12/1/95 NEG IR 95-21 N

Rad survey results unavailable for B hot Failure to Document RAD Survey leg work. Surveys performed but not documented.

2/7/96 NEG IR 96-02 N

Two areas for improvement identified in inconsistencies in the use of Florida graded EP exercise - Need for Notification Message Form. Confusion management to become more involved in existed between NLOs dispatched from assuring correctness ofinfo being OSC and Control room for similar repair provided in offsite notification forms and missions.

need to refine C&C for damage control teams.

5/15/96 NEG 1R 96-08 N

Observations of radiation worker practices revealed inconsistencies in the application of site practices (e g. wearing of dosimetry, donning / doffing PCs).

7/26/96 NEG IR 96-10 L

QA audit of Fitness for Duty program Failure to follow procedures and lack of identified problems including personnel both attention to detail and self-checking with negative tests being recorded as cited as root causes.

positive (and vice versa) and personnel l

randomly selected for testing not being tested (even though they were available).

8/9/96 NEG IR 96-14 N

Examples of poor radiolaogical housekeeping observed. Barrels for anti-C collection located outside of contaminated areas, use of multiple, undefined, stepoff pads, contaminated trash overflowing contaminated area boundaries.

8/23/96 NEG IR 96-16 N

Licensee extended control room access to a large number of personnel, potentially in excess of those needing access.

FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 21 of 26 21-Oct-96

SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 9/19/96 NEG IR 96-16 N

Licensee response to identification of glue.

Events believed to have occurred at in padlocks in July not thorough, as glue same time, and licensee's intitial audits was later found in key lock switches.

included only padlocks, door locks and valve locks.

2/7/96 OTHER 1R 96-02 N

EP exercise demonstrated that onsite emergency plans were adequate and that licensee was capable of implementing them.

3/1/96 OTHER IR 96-04 N

Licensee found to be utilizing ALARA techniques and making progress at reducing collective doses for staff, 3/1/96 OTHER 1R 96-04 N

Licensee found to be implementing adequate RP controls and monitoring individual exposures per code requirements.

3/1/96 OTHER 1R 96-04 N

Housekeeping in RABs generally good; however, equipment storage areas found cluttered and untidy.

3/14/96 OTHER L

Management change. A. Desoiza (human resources manager) replaced by Lynn Morgan (from TP) 8/12/96 OTHER 1R 96-14 O

L Operator identified low flow in Unit 1 Failure to follow procedure.

containment air monitor. Condition the result of Chemistry personnel failing to properly secure from a PASS system surveillance. URI 2/7/96 POS IR 96-02 N

Observations of licensee performance in CR, TSC, OSC, and EOF indicated good command and control, staff utilization and staff demeanor during graded exercise.

FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 22 of 26 21.Oct-96

s SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEICOMMENTS 2/7/96 POS IR 96-02 N

Licensee's onsite emergency organization was found to be well-defined and 9enerally effective at dealing with i

simulated emergency during graded exercise.

2/7/96 POS IR 96-02 N

Communication among the licensee's

[

emergency response facilities and

~

emergency organization and emergency response organization and offsite authorities were good during graded exercise.

l 2/7/96 POS IR 96-02 N

Licensee made significant observation of Licensee objectively questioning overali E-Plan execution - 2 practice drills were state of readiness.

required prior to graded exercise for management to be satisfied with performance. Management determined t

that more frequent drills were required to ensure readiness.

3/1/96 POS IR 96-04 N

Ongoing HP efforts to obtain accreditation of FPL electronic dosimetry program l

identified as a good example of department's technical capabilities.

i 5/3/96 POS IR 96-05 N

Inspection of FPL Speakout program.

Program effective in handling and resolving employee safety concerns.

r 6/8/96 POS 1R 96-08 N

Fire barrier inspections performed by the licensee were found to employ.

l conservative criteria and be detailed.

7/6/96 POS IR 96-09 N

Review of RCP oilcollection system.

System met description in FSAR and was in accordance with App R, except as allowed by approved exemption.

i l

FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/

Page 23 of 26 21-Oct-96

l l

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j PI EVENTS FOR 95-3 SCRAM 07/es/95 LERs 33595oo3 50.72s: 29e39 pim NIST: POWR OPERATIONS AT 1005 DESC

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s Mat NIST: EVENT OCCURRED IN COLD SIRJIDOWN GRERP : RESIOUAL NEAT RBWWAL SYSTMS GROUP SYSTEM : RESIOUAL MAT RWWWAL SYSTBI DESC

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SSF 02/19/96 LERs 33596001 50.72s: 29994 PWR NIST: EWNT wrmeen DIMING OPERAfl0N AT 1005 poler GRERJP

CONTROL 80831 E8ERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM GROUP SYSTEM : CINITROL BUILDING / CONTROL CtBIPLEX ENVIROINENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM DESC
THE CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM WAS REWERED INCAPASLE OF PERFORMING ITS DESIGN FUNCTIOlt WNEN Tne CONTROL ROOM ACCESS NATCNES WRE LEFT OPEN FOLLOWING MAINTENANCE. THE CAUSE WAS IIIADE4RAATE l

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A SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION SIGalAL WAS GENERATED DURING MAINTENAalCE ON THE ESF SYSTEM POWER MPPLIES. THE POWER SUPPLY FAILED DURING INSTALLATION OF A CIRCUIT CARD.

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ST. LUCIE 2 1

PI EVENTS FOR 95-3

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PtR NIST C2 W ITION EXISTS FOR AN INDETERMINATE PERIts OF TIME GROUP : WERENCY AC/DC PEREE SYSTEMS MIRJP SYSTBI : M ONSITE POWR SUPPLY SYSTDI l

DESC

SEmmem EELAY SOCIET CONNECTIONS CaueED TNE FAILINE OF ONE EDG, AIS TME POTENTIAL FAILINE OF TE j

OTWR. VIERATION IImuCED FAffmE CaueID THE SOCIET CONIECTION DEGRADAfl0II.

PI EVENTS FOR 95-1 NONE i

l PI EVENTS FOR 96-2 SSF 06/25/96 LERs 50.72s: 30676 PtR HIST: COISITIglt EXISTED FOR AN INDETEINIINATE PERIOD OF TIME GROUP

  • EMRGENCT CORE COOLING ffSTEMS GROUP STSTEM : LOW PREsamE SAFETT INJECTION SYSTEM DESC

. TNE PLAlff PRACTICE OF DEENERSIZING THE SA'ETT !NJECT!Oes TANIC ISCLATICII VALVES AFTER CL0euRE IN MODE FOUR DEFEATS TNE AUTOMATIC OPEN FEATultf AT 515 PSI A Aac QN A SI AS. TNIS CONDITION WAS CAUSED BT 1

INADEcuATE PLANT PROCEDURES.

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PLANT IPE CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY INFORMATION

.l a

i Iri-i coF c=e ne=ese F.e.ene, p= acessmes casse p eemee 0.e me se n e,ge,a-se en se i

Plant IPE l am l 7-= l ulca l== listwal -

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General Electric BWR 1 l

i og neck re.ni l s.4E45l5.t0E 073.e0E 08 S.50E m 4.32E45 negasten 1.10E4p tS 7%

12%

1B0%l -

0%l

{

0%

General Electric BWRs 2 and 3 (Isolation Condensers) i on,,e nase Peet 1 5.5E46 3.50E-08 5.40E 07 7.90E-07 7.00E-07 2.00E-00 noghetes 84 %

10%

14 %

13%

0%

0%

'[

Oystee Creek toes teste iIll '

3 SE OS 2 30E OS 2.40E 07 S.20E-07 2.50E-07 1.03E-07 2.10E-07 59 %

SH 23%

0%

3%

g%

Orenden 213 ISWR 31 1.9E-05 9.30E-07 5 30E-07 1.40E 05 1.SOE-08 4.34E-10 negagnie 5%

3%

S3%

9%

0%

0%

estseene 1 (SWR 38 1.1E 05 7.00E 06 0.00E 07 1.00E46 0 04E-07 1.30E-07 2.50E-07 05 %

7%

10 %

0%

15 2%

[

Flagran 1 (WWR 31 5.0E 05 neghghee 4.10E-08 5.05E-05 3 20E-00 1.00E-07 7 07E-07 0%

7%

80 %

SS 0%

1%

General Electric BWRs 3 and 4 asent.come 18WR 31 2.SE-05 1.20E 05 2.50E-06 3.47E46 1.20E-00 3.20E-10 8.00E48 40 %

10%

13%

SS 0%

20 %

Quod Cateos 1/2 town 31 1.2E-OS 5.72E 07 7.01E-00 2.95E-07 2.00E-07 noge tes neghghte 50 %

7%

20 %

18%

h s

0%

0%

Orowns Ferry 2 4.8E45 1.30E-05 1.30E-06 2.79E-05 4.80E-07 4.00E-00 4.70E-00 27%

3%

5t%

1%

0%

.10%

grunswick 112 2.M-05 1.00E G 7.00E-07 0.72E-00 t.90E-07 5.10E 00 1.90E-06 07%

3%

25 %

15 r

0%

7%

l Cooper -

8.0E-05 2.00E M 3.90E-OS 3.97Em B.33E-08 noghgelo neghgtie 35 %

5%

50%

10%

0%

0%

Duane Arnoed 7.0E-00 1.90E-08 1.90E-06 3.90E-00 1.00E-07 nega tle negughts 24 %

24 %

50%

2%

s 0%

0%

}

l

~ 0%

j Fernu 2 5.M OS 1.30E-07 1.00E-OS 3.50E-OS reghgelo 4%

25 k

2.00E-07 9.7M40 2%

32 %

et%

t Fhapetnck 1.9E OS 1.75E-00 1.20E-00 1.5 tE47 7.40E-09 negsgese negegete 91 %

1%

0%

9%

0%

0%

i 4

Hetch 1 2.2E-05 3.30E-08 5.10E 07 2.07E 05 2.22E-07 1.7 tE-07 1.20E47 IS%

2%

00%

1%

1%

1%

i t

k Hetch 2 2.4E-05 3.23E-00 S.3?E-07 1.90E-05 2.22E-07 1.77E 07 1.00E47 14 %

3%

00%

1%

1%

1%

j Hope Cseek 4.0E 45 3.30E-05 7.45E-07 4.4M48 3.03E-08 neghette 5.50E-07 78 %

1%

14 %

7%

0%

1%

timerick 112 4.3E-08 1.00E-07 9.30E-07 2.9M-08 1.20E47 negastes 1.00E-07 2%

22 %

00%

35 4

05 45 noggette 1.4M47 9%

28 %

52%

195 5

0%

35 i

ptoch tenem 2/3 5.OE-05 4.81E47 1.44E-00 2.8M48 5.92E47 Vermont Yentee 4.4E-08 8.24E-07 7.90E-07 2.70E-08 mi.42E-00 2.3M-OS negAgels 14 %

ISS 825 15 15 0%

t l

1 FILE:IPE-COF.Tel.

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1 l

PLANT IPE CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY INFORMATION j

c-o Do eSe e.e e e,

.eoise ciese e

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I=cm Plant IPE l== 1 moca l = as e = l a7= l = l taa l== lmma l = Etes l

=

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mas toca Generd Electric BWR S 7%

j tossee n2 4.M45 3 eM45 1.e7E 07 7.30E48 2.e3E45 noessano 3.3sE46 Si%

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og,,, gene Pen,t 2 3.tE45 5.50E OS t.10E-06 2.3 TEM 7.40E47 2.50E 08 1.50E M 18%

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W2 1.8E-05 1.10E M S.25E 07 2.83E OS 5.10E47 negagtes 2.52EM S3%

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General Electric BWR 6 I

Cg,,eo,,

2.M 05 9 00E OS l.40E 07 1.40E45 1.10E48 negRghts 1.00E-OS 38 %

1%

53%

4%

0%

0%

arene ouw I t.M OS 7.4eE OS 5.5eE OS s.3sE48

5. tee 47 negagnes 1.e0E.07 43%

og 3.g 3,

Perry 1 -

.l.3E-05 2 25E OS 4.70E OS 4.30E48 4.50E OF neguetee 1.50E-08 17%

30 %

33%

3%

- 0%

12%

ISver send 1.9E 05 1.35E 05 neghgets 2.0SE 08 noghette negsgeen 1.00E-00 87%

0%

13%

0%

0%

0%

Bobcock and Wilcox PWR 2-loop Afec t 4.M 05 1.58E-05 9 93E-07 1.48E-05 1.57E-05 9.20E-08 8.90E-OS 9.34E47. 34 %

2%

32%

34 %

0%

0%

2%

Cryotes ferver 3 3.5E-05 3.20E M noghget, 9.45E-07 9.00E-OS 9.70E47 negeghin 3 25E-00 23%

0%

8%

OSS 4%

0%

8%

3 54E 0?

5.7tE-05 5.24E-OS 4.80E-07 8.00E 07 2.00E40 1%

OS%

8%

15 1%

3%

Oev6s tesse 8.0E-05 Oconee 1.2.3 2.3E-05 2.57EM 1.00E-07 5.33E40 9.70E-00 2.10E-07 4.90E 10 5.00E48 11 %

0%

23%

42%

1%

0%

24 %

I 15s 4.5E-05 1.5 M-OS nogentle 2.30E-06 1.5MM S.94E-07 1.00E-07 3 00E.00 3%

0%

52%

35 %

2%

0%

7%

Combustion Engineering PWR 2-loop

(

4100 2 3.4E45 123E 08 1.02E48 2.9M-05 4.00E-OS 9.53E-08 3.30E 07 nogmente 4%

3%

79%

14%

0%

1%

0%

Coevert chtts 112 2.4E 04 2.40E-05 1.30E 04 S.SSE-05 4.40E-OS 1.90E-OS 1.59E-05 10 %

54 %

30%

2%

1%

0%

}

i 2%

SS%

8%

8%

9%

14 %

-[

2.89E-07 5.93E-Os 3.07E-OS 7.9M 07 S.74E-07 1.SM 08 Fort Coshoun 1 1.4E-05

}

StLucie 1 2.3E-05 2.SSE OS 4.13E-07 5.30E OS 1.2N 05 0.lGE-07 f.74E48 5.00E-07 12%

25 23%

SSS 4%

8%

25 t

St Lucie 2 2.eE-05 2.84E-OS 1.70E48 5.3tE-08 1.29E-05 0.90E47 2.73E46 5.00E47 10%

7%

20%

48%

3%

10 %

2%

heinstone 2 3.4E-05 4.3E-07 1.5E40 2.9E45 0.01548 5.2M47 0.00E48 2.00E47 15 4%

74 %

10 %

2%

0%

1%

f P.esedse 5.1E-05 9.ON48 4.00E-00 2.0M 05 1.57E-05 2.04E4B M47 M47 18%

0%

38%

31 %

45 0%

0%

t i

FILE: IPE.COF.v5L 04an Sep 30.199813-2Ipmi

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1 PLANT IPE CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY INFORMATION Inont CDF Cor. Dame.e ree e c, w=ede ames cerce t se ee.e oe e e.e o ef e.moeide ass.

Plant IPE soo at*s t-mCa

==

'saca m' amed ams ww e

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M M

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steeee en CDF ochsee:

    • For Davis Besso. Calvert Chtts. & Fort Coahoun. separete 590 CDF was unewedstrie, so Transeen' For furtey #omt. the CDF Ested in the esec summary of the subnutth, which CDF and % CDF.ncludes SBO contreution corresponds to *e5 leyese of recovery." was used I'IThe database values for Oyster Creen do not appeer to melude the CDF for internet floods; the For Salem I & 2. the revised flood end plant CDFe Seted in the submittelletter for teio IP1 values bsted here include the CDF for intemel flood were used The Surry meernel flood CDF is from page 9 of 4/21rS2 NRR letter which bsts a revesed value t58 from 11/28/98 Surry ser,elyse subnuttet For Weits Ber. the CDf s from the revised tutwrmtial were used Deferred means that bconsee included hiernel flood enelysm si then IPEEE i

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FILE:IPE CDF.TOL Man % 1ri togstst atame

.__....m.._...

___.._m_.

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m.

t Pt ANT IPE CONTAIN0AENT FAILURE FREQUEteCY INFORRAATION i

Care Damage Fwy By - FeSove IBodo Pweent of Case Damage Psessemey Per h Fehme Maes f

pg ng l

l IOCF Dypeos l

l LF piens IPE COF Sypese EF LF SICF EF Geneest Electetc. E sege Dey l

5.4E 05l 7.50E-Otl 2.32E-OSl noghg4eel 5 00E-06l 4%l.

0%l Set i

1%

SIO ROCK POINT Generet Electne. Deeet I 3

GROWNS FERRY 2 4.9E-05 4.40E 07 2.10E-05 1.25E-05 1.33E-05 1%

45%

20 %

29%

ORUNSWICK I&2 2 7E 05 6 21E 08 2.30E 06 1.03E 05 8 33E-06 1%

9%

90%

31 %

- [

COOPER 8 OE 05 neghytdo I.29E-05 5.77E 05 9 13E 06 0%

15%

72%

11 %

ORESDEN 2&3 19E 05 6

5 55E-07 1.5M M 2.04E M 0%

3%

M%

11 %

l OUANE ARNOLD 7.9E 06 neghgelo 3 57E OS 2 49E-08 1.SOE-08 0%

47%

32%

It%

FERhet 2 5 7E 06 2 00E-07 1.71E OS 2.22E 05 1.57E-05 4%

30%

39%

28 %

j

{

Fli2 PATRICK 19E 06 noghg4to 1.20E-05 4.10E-07 3 03E 07 0%

53%

22%

19 %

HATCH g 2 2E 05 t 35E 07 5 47E 08 5.70E OS 3.10E 05 1%

25 %

20 %

49%

g HATCH 2 2 4E 05 1.94E 07 5 00E-06 5 SIE OS 1.25E 05 1%

21 %

25 %

M HOPE CREEK 4 6E 05 noghpete 2.87E 05 1.20E 05 5 5eE-06 0%

S2%

20 %

12%

ASILLSTONE 1.1E 05 1.25E 07 3.74E 06 3.27E-06 3 87E-06 1%

34 %

30 %

35 %

GAONTICELLO 2.6E 05 5 20E 09 4.15E-06 S.24E-OS 1.50E-05 1%

IS%

24 %

00%

NINE SAILE POINT 1 5.5E 06 7.40E 00 1.31E-08 3.40E-OS 7.12E-07 1%

24 %

82%

13%

OYSTER CREEK

3. 7E-06
2. 70E-07 5.5 7E-07 9.89E-07 1.00E-06 7%

10%

26 %

St%

PEACH BOTTOM 2&3 5 SE 06 8 64E-09 1.55E-08 t.40E-05 2.57E-06 1%

20 %

25 %

40 %

i PILGRIM 5 OE 05 2.32E 07 1.25E-05 3.54E-05 9.00E-06 1%

22%

St%

17%

OUAD CITIES 162 1.2E-06 6 00E.10 2 84E-07 6.82E-07 2.53E-07 1%

24 %

55 %

21%

i 1

VERT 40NT YANKEE 4 3E 06 4 30E 00 211E 06 9.99E-07 1.18E-06 1%

49%

23%

27%

h l

t t

i

' [

I IPE-CFF.19L September 30.1996 i

p.a. t at t

..__._._m._..

=._=..m

.m

_m

.. ~.

Pt ANT IPE CONT AINMENT FAILURE FREQUENCY INFORMAll0N Cere Damage Freepsoney By Centehuisent Fasere Mode Poeceset of Core Desunge Feegmaysy PM W Fehme M Pient IPE CDF Sypees EF LE NCF Sypees l

l l

EF LF NQt Geneent Electele Mort N LA SALLE l&2 - 5305 I

4.7E 05 noghg4ee 166E-05 2.42E-05 8 64E-06 0%

' 35%

51 %

14 %

LIMERICK 1&2 4.3E 06 neghgele 3 96E 07 1.16E Ot>

2.75E 06 0%

9%

27%

S4%

rwtE MEE POINT 2 3 IE 05 2.79E 06 2.32E 06 2.04E OS

8. 30E-06 1%

7%

86 %

27%

WNP 2 18E 05 2 98E OS 5 34E 06 5 30E 06 6 83E-06 1%

31 %

30 %

39 %

Geseest Eleciele. Meek til 591 TON 2 SE-05 neghgele 8 27E-07 4 84E-07 2 4?E-05 0%

3%

2%

96 %

GRAND GUtF 1 17E 05 neghgete 8 05E 06 5 66E 06 3.51E 06 0%

47%

33%

20 %

PERRY 1 13E 05 nogheele 3 14E -06 4.76E 06 5.30E 06 0%

24 %

36 %

40 %

MfVER BEND 16E 05 neghgele 4.38E-06 2.14E 06 8 99E 06 0%

28%

14 %

58 %

PWR Ice Condenser i

1%l^

CATAWBA 1&2 4 3E 05 7.71E-Os 2.31E-07 2.02E-05 2.27E-05 1%

47%

$3%

D C. COOK 1&2 6 3E 05 7.11E 06 9.26E-07 1.13E OS 5.40E 05 11 %

1%

2%

80 %

MCGUIRE 1&2 4 OE-05 9 60E-07 9 50E-07 1.64E-05 2.20E-05 2%

2%

40%

54 %

SEQUOYAH 1&2 1.7E 04 7.99E-06 2 81E-06 8 32E-05 7.60E-05 5%

2%

49%

45%

WATTS BAR 1&2 8 OE-05 5 95E 06 4.03E 06 1.72E-05 5.27E OS 7%

5%

22%

46 %

PWR - Subetmospheelc OEAVER VALLEY 1 2.1 E -04 1.02E-05 4.73E-05 9.15E-05 6.17E 45 5%

23%

44 %

29 %

8EAVER VALLEY 2 1.9E 04 9 84E 06 4.74E 05 8.54E 05 4.69E-05 5%

25 %

45%

25 %

NORTH ANNA 1&2 68E05 8 98E-06 1.05E 06 7.68E 06 5.03E-05 13%

2%

11 %

74 %

SURRY 1&2 MsLLSTONE 3 5 6E-05 3.99E-07 2.24E-08 1.10E-05 4.4 ?E-05 1%

1%

20 %

30%

IPE CFF.TOL September 30,1998

Pt ANIIPE CONTAINMENT FAKURE FREOUENCY WFORMATION h

pi,

Core Deenste Freesency Sy Cenessunent Femme neede Percene of Core Ousente T

_,For h Femme asede i

l Plent tPE CDF j

Sypsas EF LF NCF Sypees EF LF IOCF P W R.terge Dry ARKANSAS NUCLE AR ONE 1 4 9E 05 2 DeE 07 3.03EM 5.95E 00 3 98EM 1%

8%

12%

81 %

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE 2 3 7E 05 4 07E 07 4 51E 08 5.14E 00 2.89E-05 1%

12%

14%

73%

ORAt0 WOOD t&2 2.7E-05 1.10E 00 5 40E-08 2.54E-08 2.48E 05 1%

1%

9%

90%

SYRON 1&2 3.1E-05 1.24E-00 2.13E-07 2.50E-00 2 52E M 1%

1%

0%

91%

CAtt AWA y 5.9E 05 1.17E M 1.17E 07 3.09E-05 2 83E-05 2%

1%

53%

48 %

CALVERT CtFFS 1&2 2.4E 04 7.44EM 2.11E-05 9.53E-05 1.18E-04 3%

9%

40 %

4e%

6 COMANCHE PEAK 1&2 5.7E-05 4.87E M 6.75E 07 2.93E-05 2.20E M 5%

1%

51%

39%

CRYSTAL river 3 1.5E M5 7.39E-07 5 53E-C7 9 58E-08 4.42E-08 5%

4%

53%

29%

OAVIS SESSE 8 SE-05 1.72E OS 415E 08 4 SSE 08 5.52E-05 3%

8%

3%

S4%

OlA8tO CANYON 1&2 8 BE-05 163E 08 1.0lE-05 3 90E-05 3 85E-05 2%

11%

45%

41%

FARLEy 1&2 1.2E 04 4.47E 07 7.19E-04 3 90EM 1.20E 04 1%

8%

3%

Set FORT CALHOUN 1 1 4E-05 1.44E 08 2.23E-07 3.80E-08 8.13E-08 11%

2%

28 %

80%

L OlNNA 8 7E 05 3.71E-05 2.87E-06 1.27E-05 3 50E 05 42%

3%

15%

40 %

H.S. ROSINSON 2 3.2E-04 8.37E 08 4.19E M 3.20EM 2.40E-04 2%

13%

10%

75 %

HA00AM NECK 1.8E -04 1.114 45 1.21E-06 9.70E-05 7.0IE-05 4%

1%

54 %

39 %

INotAN POINT 2 31E-05 1.94E OG 5 81EM 2.82E 00 2.85E-05 8%

1%

9%

85 %

INotAN POINT 3 4.4E-05 2 44E-04 3.12E-07 1.07EM 3.05EM 8%

1%

24 %

09%

KEWAUNEE 6.8E-05 5.29E-08 1.40E 00 3.22E-05 2.00E M 8%

1%

49%

43%

MAINE YANKEE 7.4E 05 1.21E-08 5.79E-06 3.54E-05 3.18E-05 2%

3%

48%

42%

MILLSTONE 2 3.4E-05 7.88E-07 3.22E 08 1.11E-05 1.91E-05 2%

9%

32%

54 %

OCONEE 1.2.&3 2.3E-05 4 80E.10 2.81E-07 1.71E-05 5.81E-00 0%

1%

74 %

24 %

PALISADES 5.1E-05 2 89EM 1.87E M 7.90E-06 2.35E-05 8%

33%

15 %

40%

1 PALO VER0E 1.2.53 9.0E-05 3.20E 00 9.41E-08 1.21EM 8.53E-05 4%

10%

13%

73%

POINT DEACH 1&2 1.0E-04 6.32E-OS 3.24E45 1.81E-05 7.97E45 et 15 17%

77%

PRAmfE ISLANO 1&2 4.9E-05 2.19E-05 4.15E-07 1.1tE-05 1.54E-08 44 %

1%

22%

31 %

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a OPEN ALLEGATIONS AS OF 10/L /9o ALLEGATION: RII %-A-0145 FACILITY:

ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD:

%0628

SUBJECT:

RESPONSE TIE TESTING ON SAFETY-RELATED. TS TRANSMITTERS NOT DUE DATE:

% 1028 PERFORED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ADEO PROCEDURE. UNCOMPENSATED DAYS OPEN:

111 ACTION PNDG:

RESIDENT INS ISS 2, 3. DRS PROVIDE INPUT TOORP IR:% 14 RSP DIV:

L-DRP/PB3 LCA:

8/14/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 10/13/% CLOSURE ALLEGATION: RIl %-A-0150 FACILITY:

ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD:

960709

SUBJECT:

CONTAINE NT RAD MONITORS CANNOT BE SAFELY WORKED ON. Cn. ur DUE DATE:

% 1210 U1 CONTROL RH RAD MONITORS WAS PERFORED BASED ON VERBAL DAYS OPEN:

100 ACTION PNDG:

ISS 1-OSHA CONCERN. RESIDENT INFORM MANAGEE NT OF CONCERN.

DRS/PSB INSPT ISSUES 2-4. IR: 96-17 4

RSP DIV:

L DRS/PSB. DRP/PB3 LCA:

8/12/% ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 12/02/% CLOSURE ALLEGATION: RIl-96-A-0154 FACILITY:

ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD:

960716

SUBJECT:

MAINT PERSONNEL DIRECTED PULL WORK RE0 VEST / TAGS FROM EQUIP DUE DATE:

961018 THAT ARE GREATER THAN 8-MNTHOLD. DIRECTED TO SPRAY VALVES DAYS OPEN:

93 ACTION PNDG:

DRP/PB3 RESIDENT FOLLOWUP ISS 1. ISSUE 2 MAY BE EPA ISSUE.RI l

FOLLOWUP. IR:%-14 i

RSP DIV:

L-DRP/PB3 LCA:

8/27/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 10/18/% CLOSURE i

ALLEGATION: RII-96 A-0180 FACILITY:

ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD:

960822

SUBJECT:

REVISED EERGENCY PLAN DECREASES THE PLAN'S EFFECTIVENESS.

)

DUE DATE:

961210 NRC APPROVAL OF PLAN REVISION WAS NOT OBTAINED. DECREASE IN DAYS OPEN:

56 ACTION PNDG:

DRS/PSB INSPECTION SCHEDULED 10/7/96 (2 WEEKS)

IR:96-17 4

RSP DIV:

DRS/PSB l

LCA:

8/29/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 12/02/% CLOSURE ALLEGATION: RII-96-A-0191 FACILITY:

ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD:

960903

SUBJECT:

ALGR FAILED PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST AFTER 2 ATTEMPTS. AFTER DUE DATE:

961203 FAILING 2ND ATTEMPT. WAS REASSIGNED & THEN LAID OFF. FILED DAYS OPEN:

44 ACTION PNDG:

DRS/ SIB UNCERTAIN BASED ON PLAN REVIEW. DRS/ SIB TO INSPECT RSP DIV:

DRS/ SIB LCA:

09/26/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 12/03/96 CLOSURE ALLEGATION: R!l-96-A 0192 FACILITY:

ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD:

960904

SUBJECT:

POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED H2O FROM EDG CATC MENT IS RELEASED DUE DATE:

961204 FROM RCA WITHOUT PROPER SCREENING. ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN DA75 DPEN:

43 ACTION PNDG:

DRS/PSB INSP BASED ON CONDITION REPORT THAT DRUMS HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THE RCA & THAT MANGEMENT HAD BEEN INFORMED RSP DIV:

DRS/PSB LCA:

9/26/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 12/19/96 CLOSURE ALLEGATION: RIl-96-A-0194 FACILITY:

ST LUCIE DATE RCVD:

960904

SUBJECT:

FP&L HAS NOT RESPONDED TO INDIVIDUAL'S APPEAL OF FIRING AS DUE DATE:

961210 RESULT OF URINE SAMPLE WHICH REPORTEDLY SHOWED SIGNS OF DAVS OPEN:

43 ACTION PNDG:

DRS/ SIB INSPECT RSP DIV:

DRS/ SIB 6 LCA:

9/27/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 11/30/96 CLOSURE 1

j EFORCEENT HISTORY EA 95-026 - Weaknesses in the control of maintenance and testing that resulted in inoperability of both of the U1 PORVs during periods that the PORVs were relied upon to provide low tenperature overpressure protection (CP issued on 11/13/95: SL III: $50.000)

EA %-003 - Overdilution event occurred when a licensed operator left the controls without informing his relief that a dilution.was.in progress (CP issued on 3/18/96: SL III: $50,000)

ATTA00ENT 6 4

I h

ST LUCIE MAJOR' ASSESSMENTS i

DATE' TYPE OF ASSESSENT JULY 1995 INPO ASSESSENT - CATEGORY 1 AUGUST 1995 DR. CHOU ANALYSIS BY REGION II TO IDENTIFY ROOT CAUSES OF TE RECENT DECLIE IN I

PERFORMANCE AND MULTIPLE EVENTS i

The team concluded that the predoeinant root cause for the events observed at St Lucie was insufficient detail and scope in site oroarass and procedures. Th~is causal factor i

was found to result in recent events which demonstrated deficiencies in the following areas.

1 e

job skills, work practices, and decision making:

~

i interface among organizations as evidenced by a lack of interface formality:

j e

i e

organizational authority for program implementation as evidenced by instances i

of unclear responsibility and accountability.

j AUGUST 1995 LICENSEE SELF-ASSESSENT: A SPECIAL TEAN PERFORNED AN ASSESSENT OF OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS AND IDENTIFIED ROOT CAUSES: MANAGEENT AND STAFF COMPLACENCY - POOR PERFORMANCE, i

ACCEPTING LONGSTAEING EQUIPENT PROBLEMS, AND NOT KEEPING UP WITH IEUSTRY INPROVEENTS.

i I

t I

I

GENERIC ISSUES ST. LUCIE ISSUE STATUS NRC Bulletin 92 Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 The licensee has identified those areas with installed thermo-lag and implemented compensatory measures IAW NRC Bulletin 92-01 and Supplement 1.

Compensatory measures will remain in effect until en acceptable solution is implemented.

o NRCB 92-01, response dated July 27, 1992 e

NRCB 92-01 Supp 1, response dated September 29, 1992 GL 92 Thermo-Lag 330-1 The licensee has outstanding commitments to GL 92-00 in the following areas:

Update response on status of ampacity, exemptions and schedule for modifications e

(5/30/96) ontt 1 Evaluate Thermo-Lag barriers to NEI App. guide or select alternate option (due 1/30/97) e Determine acceptability of Thermo-Lag well configurations and radiant heat shields e

e combustibility losues (due 1/31/97)

Complete evaluations and submit Thermo-Lag exemptions (due 4/30/97) e Complete design changes to support implementation of modification during spring 1998 e

outage (Spring 1998) e Submit summary report to NRC within 100 days of end of Spring 1998 outage (due ISO days after breaker closed Spring 1993)

Unit 2 Evaluate Thermo-Lag barriers to NEI App. guide or select alternate option (due 5/31/96) e e

Submit Thermo-Lag exemptions (due S/30/96) i Complete design changes to support implementation of modification during spring 1997

{

e outage (Spring 1997)

Unit 2 - Submit summary report to NRC within 100 days of and of Spring 1997 outage (due e

150 days after breaker closed Spring 1997)

NRC Bulletin 96 Control Rod Insertion N/A Action requested from Westinghouse-designed plants only.

f Problems i

GL 39-10 Safety Related MOVs Testing &

The licensee has completed the design bases verification of safety-related motor operated Surveillance valves (MOVs) and is available to meet with the NRC to discuss alternatives for closing the NRC GL 89-10 program, i

e GL response, dated February 2, 1994 (Unit 1) o GL response, dated March 14, 1996 (Unit 2)

Unit 1 Completed during the Fall 1994 refueling outage (SL1-13)

L malt 2 Completed during the Fall 1995 refueling outage (SL2-9) g;nsric iss PWR

ST. LUCIE ISSUE STATUS Gr,. 95 Pressure Locking and Thermal The licensee has completed the assessment sad evaluation of both Unit 1 and Unit 2 power Linding (PL/TB) of SR Power Operated Gate operated valves (POVs) susceptible to PL/TB.

Valves e

GL response, dated Pobruary 13, 1996 The licensee has outstanding commitments to GL 92-07 in the following areas:

Dalt 2 Schedule submitted including justification for modification to shutdown cooling valves e

V.3400 V-3652 and V-3651 during Spring 1997 refueling outage (BL2-10)

Bormflex Borsfler installed on Unit 1 in 1988.

Two successful blackness testing campaigne completed (5 year surveillance). Upper 15 inches of one panel discovered missing. Engineering Rvaluation (JPN-P5L-SEPJ-95-023 Rev. 3) completed March 5, 1996. Licensee reviewed manufacturer's fabrication records and concluded that the missing boraflex in PSL1 spent fuel pool was an isolated incident and did not affect SPF criticality.

Boraflex not installed on Unit 2.

m

w ST. LUCIE I'

l ISSUE STATUS spent Fuel Full Offload Permitted From the UFSAR:

Dait 1 Two thermal analyses were performods the Normal Batch Discharge and the Full Core Discharge.

1 In the case of the Normal match Discharge, the analysis assumes 80 assemblies each have been discharged from the core in 18 month intervals. A refuellag batch of 80 assemblies is added 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> after reactor shutdown. This analysis shows a maximum pool bulk temperature of 133.3 degrees F with the fuel pool cooling system in service.

For the Full Core Discharge, assuming that 73 of the assemblies have 90 days of irradiation. 72 have 21 months of irradiation and the remaining 72 assemblies have 39 months of irradiation (217 assemblies totall, the analysis shows a maximum pool bulk temperature of 150.8 degrees F with the fuel pool cooling system in service.

i hit 2 Two thermal analyses have been performeds the Normal and the Accident Case Assumptions.

The Normal Case assumess a.

11 batches (each 1/3 core) discharged b.

Most recent batch cooling for five days after shutdown c.

Adiabatic heat up of the pool l

The analysis shows a maximum pool bulk temperature of 131 degrees F with the fuel pool cooling system in service.

j The Accident Case assumess a.

11 batches plus one full core discharged b.

One (1) core cools for 7 days ce Most recent 1/3 core batch cools for SO days f

This analysis shows a maximum pool bulk temperature of 148 degrees F with the fuel pool cooling system in service.

The licensee has furnished a tabulated SFP Storage Date on both Units for PM on site inspection i

the week of March 25, 1996.

Improved Standardized Technical Specifications No Licenses commitment f

r l

P

[

gen:ric.iss PWR i

ST. LUCIE i

ISSUE STATUS Steam Generator Issues wmC Bulletin 89 Westinghouse Alloy 500 The licensee has addressed the predicted service life of Thermally Treated (TT) Alloy 500 Steam Generator Mechanical Tube Plugs Mechanical Tube Plugs identified by Westinghouse.

Unit 1 Tube plug repair plan formulated for April 1995 refueling outage. All plugs e

will be visuelty inspected and repaired or replaced, if leaking.

Both SGe scheduled for replacement let quarter 1998.

o Unit 2 No installed Westinghousa mechanical plugs.

e GL 95 Circumferential Cracking of Steam The licenses has addressed the detection and slaing of circumferential indications to determine Generator Tubes applicability including the requested RAI dated Emptember 25, 1995. No tube leaks have occurred on either unit due to circumferential cracks.

The licensee has outstanding commitments to GL 95-03 in the following areas:

Unit 1 100% tube inspection of all active tubes using both full length bobbin coil and e

conventional motorised rotating pancake coil (NRPC) technique for selected bobbin indications, i.e. 100% Ret Leg and 3% Cold Leg, during Spring 1996 outage.

Maintenance Rule Program defined and implemented. Resident Inspectors confirmed. A Raintenance Rule Team inspection completed on 9/20/96. Although the licensee's maintenance rule implementation program found to be satisfactory three apparent violations were identified in the areas of program design isues, system scoping issues, and procedure implementation.

t IPERE Submitted PSL-IPERE Rev. O, submitted December 1994 which met the objectives of GL 88-20, Supplement 4.

The licensee has one outstanding commitment to GL 88-20, supplement 4, in response to RAI dated January 9, 1995.

Action 1 The Engineering evaluation has been completed to allow use of the station blackout cromotie between the units to mitigate an IPERE fire and plant operating procedure changes are scheduled to be completed by August 1995.

..-. ~ -.

I j

l l

ENCLOSURE 2 i

i f

Docket Nos.:

50-389 I

SALP REPORT l

LICENSEE:

Florida Power & Light Company

]

REVIEWER:

Patricia Campbell i

FUNCTIONAL ACTIVITY:

SAFETY EVALUATION OF THE INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAN t

RELIEF REQUESTS FOR PUNPS AND VALVES ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNIT 2 TAC No. M-84563 AND M-85670 FACILITY NAME:

St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2 j

SUffiARY OF REVIEW / INSPECTION ACTIVITIES This SALP input is for the St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, Inservice Testing (IST)

)

program for pumps and valves.

The review was conducted by the Mechanical Engineering Branch with assistance from its contractor, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL).

NARRATIVE DISCUSSION OF LICENSEES PERFORMANCE - FUNCTIONAL AREA i

SAFETY ASSESSMENT /0UALITY VERIFICATION The relief requests generally contained sufficient information for evaluation of the proposal. The particular subjects of the relief requests were not unusual in comparison to other IST programs. Overall, the program would be considered j

good.

An updated IST Program for the second ten-year interval is expected by August 1993.

The licensee should review the SE/TER to incorporate any action j

items into the revised program, j

i 1.

i i

l b

1

- -

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