ML20138E974
| ML20138E974 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 04/12/1996 |
| From: | Merschoff E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Imbro E NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137B842 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-96-485 NUDOCS 9605020246 | |
| Download: ML20138E974 (84) | |
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UNITED STATES g
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
f REGloN 11 101 MAReETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2B0D i
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E ATLANTA. GEORGIA 303Do180 k
April 12, 1996 MEMORANDUM TO:
Eugene V. Imbro, Project Directorate l
Division of Reactor Projects I/II, NRR 3
i FRON:
Ellis W. Merschoff, Director Division of Reactor Projects
SUBJECT:
THE REGULATORY ACCEPTABILITY OF PRELUBRICA NG VALVES PRIOR TO SURVEILLANCE (STROKE) TESTING (TIA 96-0 7) 1 l
St. Lucie Inspection Report 50-335,389/95-15, Section 3.f.1, documented an occurrence in which the licensee lubricated a containment spray flow control s
valve prior to ASME Section XI stroke time testing. This pre-lubrication was called for in the licensee's surveillance test procedure and was meant to L
ensure a satisfactory stroke time test.
The inspectors, and members of the licensee's~ quality organization, found that this practice resulted in a nonrepresentative test of valve capabilities. Since the event, personnel from l
Region II and OE have attempted to find explicit prohibitions against such preconditioning, but without success. Consequently, we propose the following j
i questions:
i 1.
Is the practice of lubricating a valve prior to stroke time testing acceptable under the regulations?
2.
Is the purpose of stroke time testing under ASME Section XI to demonstrate the current and past operability of a valve, the current and future operability of a valve, or both?
)
This request has been discussed with J. Norris of the NRR staff.
If you have any questions concerning this request, please contact M. Miller (407-464-7822) or K. Landis (407-331-5509).
Docket No. 50-335/389 License No. DPR-67/NFP-16 cc:
R. Cooper, RI W. Axelson, RIII J. Dyer, RIV K. Perkins, WCFO J. Barnes, RII p
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'l IXECUTIVE SUMARY "li
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o Semiannual lant Performance Assessmert - Sr.:
NN' St. Lucie I and 2
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... w Current SALP Assessment Period: 1/7/96 through 6/97
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Last SALP Rating Previous SALP Rating M / d /M ['f f f #/
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1 Maintenance 2
1 Engineering 1
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,J fjp-Last INPO Assessment: 1 Previous INPO Assessment: 1 4g,y I.
Performance Overview Y
b ine= Aly199btherehavebeenabriesofevent3thatledto questioning the plant's overall performance.
Inese have included:
j A Unit l' turbine trip due to precedural weaknesses, i
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poor operator performance, and weak s::pervisory oversight.
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The attempt to restage an RCP seal using inadequate and inappropriate procedural guidance. The evolution was compounded by failing to follow aspects of the guidance that did exist, which led to the failure of the second and third stage seals.
A main steam isolation signal due to an operator failing to block the MSIS signal during a cooldown when an annunciator indicated
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that the block was enabled.
This failure occurred despite the fact that the operator's attention was directed to the annunciator on at lesst two different occasions.
Both pressurizer power operated relief valves being found p'
inoperable due to incorrect assembly during a refueling outage.
The conditions had existed for approximately 10 months (SL3,CP).
An-loss of RCS inventory (4000 gallons) due to a shutdown cooling relief valve which lifted and then failed to reseat due to incorrect setpoint' margins (a generic problem involving several valves). The licensee had sufficient evidence that this generic condition existed, but had failed to act promptly to evaluate the
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conditions (SL4).
The spraydown of containment due to an inadequate procedure and operator error coupled with an existing operator-work-around.
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The significant operator inattentiveness which resulted in the
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overdilution event on January 22, 1996, highlighted the recent i
large number of personnel errors and lack of command and control i
j in the control room.
These and several other recent deficiencies involvin6ak procedure 3 a I
general lack of procedural compliance, equipment failures, and personnel j
errors clearly indicated
- hat the plant's past high level of performance _
had declined. An NRC[roo; causf ettort cetermineft' fin ~Tn7ddition lo i
procedural adherencelanaguacy_wghnessa_m tha licensee suffered from z
weaknesses in both (f5terfaces across organizationap lines and corrective actions.
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II.
Functional Area Assessments i
L A SALP board convened on January 18, 1996.
The board concluded that the l
licensee's performance in the areas of Operations and Maintenance had i.
declined from excellent levels of performance to good levels. The conclusions reached by the board are summarized below.
i 2
Operations The board determined that safety performance in the Operations area had l
declined, particularly in the final six months of the assessment period.
l As bases, the board noted an increase in the number of operational
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events attributable to:
i Weaknesses in operator performance-i
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4 Acceptance of long-standing equipment deficiencies j
Management expectations were not effectively communicated to personnel and enforced l
Weaknesses in procedural adequacy and adherence Implementation and adequacy of corrective actions The licensee und:rtook a number of efforts to reverse declining performance following the onset of the operational events described i
above.
Verbatim procedural compliance was established as the norm for the site, which resulted in the need for literally hundreds of l
procedural changes and around-the-clock on-site review committee 1
meetings. An increased emphasis on the initiation of corrective action documentation resulted in an increase in the number of documents j.
initiated, but has also resulted in increases in backlogs.
Maintenance The board determined that performance in this area declined during the previous assessment period. However, the board found that six unit i[
trips which occurred during the period had roots in maintenance, Weaknesses identified by the board included:
Inadequate post-maintenance testing Procedural adequacy and adherence Instability in management due to acting managers while the maintenance manager received SRO training j.
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The board indicated that the. current stability of the maintenance
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management appeared to be reversing the observed negative trends.
Engineering The board found that engineering had sustained a superior level of.
i performance.
Support to both operations and maintenance, the quality l
and support of design modifications, and initiatives to reduce the i '
numbers of operator workarounds and jumpers / lifted leads we seen as strengths.
Licensee submittals to the NRC were noted to be of high
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quality, as were safety evaluations.
Plant Support i
]
The board found that plant support organizations collectively perfomed i
at a superior level. Area breakdowns were as follows:
Health Physics was identified as having strong management support and initiatives such as remote monitoring and electronic dosimetry j
were seen as strengths. Reductions in the areas of contaminated j
floor space and the volume of solid waste were also' noted.
Security was cited as maintaining an excellent level of performance-during staff reductions due to the implementation of i
biometrics. Training, including the use of a combat firing range, and self-assessments were considered good.
Some performance i
problems were noted through the period, however, including two failures to provide compensatory measures during computer failures.
l Fire Protection performed well in both drills and in responding to
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l plant fires; however, surveillance testing observations indicated l
weak procedures, poor. attention to detail, and hardware deficiencies.
4 Emergency preparedness was considered good, and the status of equipment and supplies were found to be adequate.
The full l-participation exercise was successful.
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i DESCRIPTION OF EVENT 8 - ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 1.
On January 9, the unit was manually tripped in response to a loss of the.1B MFWP.
2.
The unit tripped from loss of load when the generator excitor circuit breaker was t
inadvertently opened locally on March 28, 1994 -
i 3.
On June 6, 1994, the unit experienced a main generator lockout, followed by turbine and reactor trips, when a thunderstorm blew a section of flashing across two output terminals of main transformer 1A.
4.
Power was reduced to 80% power on August 10, 1994, due to Digital Electro-Hydraulic f
System (DEH) leak. ~ The unit was returned to full power on August 23, 1994.
5.
The turbine was taken of line on. August 28, 1994, to repair a leak in the DEH.
Repairs were completed and the unit returned to power on the afternoon of August 28, 1994.
The
.i unit was returned to full power on September 2, 1994.
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6.
The unit tripped as the result of a lighting strike in the switch'Jard on October 26, 1994.
Since the unit was scheduled to start a refueling outage on October 31, 1994, a j
decision was made to start the refueling outage 7.
On February 27, 1995, the unit was removed from service for the replacement of pressurizer code safety valves which had been leaking by the seat since shortly after startup in November, 1994.
The unit was returned to power on March 8, 1995.
8.
On July 8, 1995, the unit tripped during turbine valve surveillance testing.
The unit l
was returned to power on July 12, 1995.
9.
On August 1, 1995,. the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane Erin.
Due to a series of equipment problems and personnel performance issues the unit remained shutdown until
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October 9, 1995.
10.
On November 17, 1995, the unit was manually tripped due to low steam gene rator level
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when the feed regulating valve failed to mid position.
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DESCRIPTION OF ava-a. - ST LUCIE UNIT 2-1.
On February 27, 1994, the unit was coasting down to-the cycle 8 refueling outage.
The unit was taken.off-line on February 14, 1994.
2.
On April 23, 1994, the unit. tripped from.30% power during RPS adjustment.
3.
The unit 2 turbine was shutdown on July 9, 1994, and reactor power reduced to Mode 2 on July 10, 1994.
On July 14, 1994, the unit was shutdown to repair a stuck closed trip circuit breaker.
The unit was restarted and placed'on line on July 15, 1994.
4.
On February 21, 1995, the unit tripped as a result of low steam generator water level.
1 The condition was the result of a feedwater regulating valve closure after a steam generator water level control level transmitter failed high.
The transmitter was l
replaced and the unit was returned to service on February 25, 1995.
1 5.
On April-25, 1995, the main generator was taken of line to repair a faulty power supply in the DEH system.
l 6.
On August 1, 1995, the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane Erin. It was restarted on August 4, 1995.
7.
On October 9, 1995, the unit.was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage.
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On January 1, 1996, the unit went critical.
9.
On January 5, 1996, a manual trip was initiated on high generator hydrogen temperature.
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UPLOAD TO R:\\PLTDATA\\ MATRIX \\STLUCIE.SIM February 7s 1996 ST LUCIE Site Intearation Matrix Date Satp Ref.
Cause Idemified Description F. A.
1/23/96 MS IR 9641 Electrical arc during Self-Identifying Blown fuse results in loss of erpmximately 25% of maisenance control room annunciators.
1/22/96 OPS IR 96-01 Operator Error Self-Idemifying _
panel while dilution was in prognes.
Bomn dilution event due to gerator leaving commi l/5/96 OPS /M IR 95-22 Temp Corarol valve Licensee U-2 manual RXtrip on high generator H tenip due to i
S Failure failure of temp comrd volve.
1/5/96 OPS IR 95-22 Inadequate Procedum NRC Several procedural deficiencies and calculatenal Review and Execution errors idersiSed in reload physics test procedure.
1/5/96 OPS /
R 95-22 Failure to Properly NRC Severni deficiencies in procedure change procesa PS NCV 95-22-01 Inglement Procedures implementation idemiSed-Expired or canceled TCs faimd in contml rooms and bot shutdown panel.
12/27/95 OPS IR 95-22 Lack of Attendance at self Identifying FRG meeting suffered /itema deferred due to lack of FRG OPS /Eng*g auendance at meeting. Majorisones at meeting effected OPS /Eng*g.
12/20/95 MS IR 95-22 Pitting -Imalized Self Identifying RXvessel flange inner 0-ring gmove pitting resulted in Corrosion cooldown and head removal for repair.
12/9/95 MS IR 95-22 Filling RCS Before Ucensee 2A2 RCP seal pkg lower seal destaged due to reverse Coupling RCP pressure across seal.
12/5/95 OPS /M IR 95-22 Poor Legkeeping/Atta NRC ESFAS cabinet doors found unlocked followmg S
to Detail maintenance work -IACermr. leg entries associated with work were not corglete.
12/1/95 PS IR 95-21 Failure to Document NRC Red survey tesults unavailaole for B hat leg work.
RADSurvey Surveys performed but not documemed 12/1/95 OPS IR 95-21 Corrective Actions NRC Followup to presious mspecten findings indicated a weakness in foIIM 4. in addressing de6ciencies.
12/1/95 OPS IR 95-21 Procedural Inadequacy NRC SDC Procedure required natural circ-related surveillance prior to establish *mg RCS pressure boundary. Natural cire not possible without pressurization.
12/1/95 OPS R 95-21 FTF Procedure NRC Rzcurrem nwrahd alarms when seernag fire pumpe were not documemed as operator workarounds-Voltage dire sesociated wish such somete were comributors to e trip previously.
g ' 1f95 OPS R 95-21 Poor Corrective Actione NRC Cleerence in place to isolete Nrfrom CST to facilmene pressure switch replacement for nine days wnhout work order being wriaen.
12/1/95 OPS R 95-21 FTF Procedure NRC CCW aseple volve showed dual indication wahaut corrective action -f _ -
- -- initiated.
12/1/95 z OPS R 95 Inadequate Operator NRC OperMore unable to effectively obtain IACseapoonee Training from computer aher hard copies were naioved froen control recen.
12/l/95 OPS R 95-21 Procedural wealtnese/
NRC SDC procedure comenmed contheting values for RX Inadequate Review cavity level requerennente Procedure had been approved since emphesse on occuracy seresend 12/1/95' OPS R 95-21 Velve Poortion NRC Unit 2 g wedures and valve devisesos log used to Adnunistrative Comrole cycle Unit I crose commect velves.
11/27/95 OPS R 95-21 Personnel Error Lscensee Miemed RCS Boroa eengle survedlemee -Repeat Som VIO 95-21-03 R 95-18 11/21/95 OPS R 95 FTF Procedure Licensee Failure to mensein Penetreuen I.mg NCV 95-21-04 11/21/95' OPS R 95-21 Egenpmes Failure Self Memifying Light sucket failure durig leap replacement resuhe in lose cooling to I A Main Treneformer Unit dowspawer to ~60%.
II/20/95 OPS R 95-2i FTF Procedure NRC Velve discovered Closed vice Imched th=d se VIO 95-2141 speci6ed on
- Clearance Order.
I1/16/95 OPS /M R 95-21 tong-Standmg Self Unit I manually tripped when IB MFRViocked in 50%
- -J-Problem Idemifying/ Licensee poonson Root cause -degraded power supply,
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eq by volenge dip on eteense boek semaine fue pumps.
11/11/95 OPS R 95-21 FTF Procedure NRC Tech. Spec. egepmem not specified for IVon VIO 95-21-02 Equipament clearance Order.
11/6/95 MS R 95-21 Equipmes Feilure Self Mereifying Feilure of EDG 2A relay sockets. Fotonnel comason niode failure.
11/1/95 MS R 95-18 Personnel Error Self Identifying
'sCIwiring error during RXbend W less RPO.
NCV 95-18-05 10/19/95 OPS R 95-18 Personnel Error Self ldencifying Missed shit CEApesanon indication marveellence NCV 95-1846 10/18/95 OPS R 95-18 Personnel Error 1.icensee Missed RCS Boroa emagle surveillmace.
NCV 95-18-07
10/17/95 OPS Q 95-18 Personnel Error Self Identifying Lack of atternion to task resulted is overfilling RCB lower cavity during flood up.
10/12/95 ENG IR 95-18 Design Error Self identifying Inserting CIAS signal during safeguards test shifted VIO 95-18-04 EDG 2A to isochronous mode while EDO paralleled with ofrsite power.
10M/95 PS LER 95-S02 Personnel Error Licensee Peternial route for unauthorized access to protected ares, CW water piping.
10/7/95 OPS IR 9518 Failure to Follow NRC Did not enter bypass key position in deviation log.
VIO95-1841 Procedures 10/5/95 MS IR 95-18 Equipment Failure Self Identifying DG IB developed FO leak at threaded connection during surveillance run.
9/30/95 OPS IR 95-18 Failure to Follow NRC Did not enter bypass key position in deviation log.
VIO 95-IS-02 Procedures C/28/95 ENG IR 95-15 Equipment Failure Self lderaifying Leaking PZR SVs extended forced outage -problems with tailpipe alignment.
9/20/95 MS IR 95-18 Equipment Failure Self Idernifying EDG I AllB governor corarol problems resulted in load oscillations.
9/15/95 OPS /
1R 95-18 Failure to Follow Self Identifying Maint/ Ops did not provide clearance for work on MS VIO 95-18-03 Procedures condenser waterbox cover. When cover pulled closed, severed worker's finger.
9/14/95 PS LER Ul/U2 95 Failure to Follow Licensee Security failed to take correct conpensatory action on 501 Procedure computer failure.
s/10/95 OPS IR 95-18 Failure to Use Correct Self Identifying SG blowdown sent to incorrect system on RAB roof.
Procedure Operator used wrong procedure. When identified did not back out of procedure correctly.
g/9/95 MS IR 95-15 Weakness in W ork Self Identifying Leak on SV 1201 flange extended outage, identified Screening and one month earlier but not worked.
Planning f/7/95 OPS IR 95-15 Personnel Error /
Licensee Unit 2 Main Generator overpressurized while filling inoperable with H2. Inattention by operators.
Equipment /OWA 7/2/95 OPS IR 95-15 Personnel Error NRC Weaknesses identified in logs relating to abnormal VIO 95-15-03 equipment conditions and out of service equipment not logged (muhiple exangles).
8/31/95 MS IR 95-15 Personnel Error self Identifying Damaged cylinder and head on IB EDG due to loose lash adjustment.
8/30/95 PS IR 95-15 Mansgement and QC NRC Containment closure walkdowns by management were weaknesses inadequate and depended heavily on QC involvement to identify deficiencies.
8!30M5 MS Ct 95-15 Supervisory overdght NRC M intenance persrennel not using procedures for work and worker attitude in progress.
8/29/95 OPS IR 95-15 Personnel Error Licensee Started IB LPSIpump with suction valve clored. (No VIO 95-15-04 damage to pump) 8/29/95 MS IR 95-15 Procedure Use NRC Maintenance jotineyman not signirs off pacedure VIO95-15-06 steps as work completed (previously identibd as a weakness in May 1995).
0/23/95 MS IR 95-15 Equipment Failure /
Self Identifying 2A HDP trip due to relay failure. Eight HDP trips in Inadequate Corrective past year. Engineering solution available but not Action implemented.
8/22/95 PS IR 95-15 Personnel Error NRC QA failed to document a deficiency on corsainmers spray valve surveillance idertified in an audit.
8/19/95 OPS
[R 95-15 Operstor Enor/
Self identifying Overfill of PWT. Spilled approx.10K gallons on Operator Workaround ground inside RCA. Operator work around on level control system and inauention to filling process by operator caused error.
g/3 g/95 MS IR 95-15 Procedural Weakness NRC Procedural weakness involving supervisory oversight and journeyman qualification.
8/17/95 OPS LER UI 95-007 Procedural Inadequacy Self Identifying Spraydomt of Unit I containmera. STAR process did VIO95-15 and Weakness /
not assign accountability for corrective action. Valve Operator-Work-Around surveillance prelube not documented on STAR.
8/9/95 MS IR 95-16 Maintenance /
Licensee Inoperable Unit i PORVs due to mairmenance LER UI 95-005 Testing errors error / testing inadequacies. (Valves assembled EA 95-180 incorrectly) (Used acoustic data only) 8/6/95 ENO LER UI 95-006 Corrective Self Identifying Lifting of Unit i SDC thermal relief due to procedural VIO 95-204I Action / Procedural revision from previous corrective action. Inoperable Weakness equipment not logged.
8/2/95 OPS LER UI 95-004 Procedural Licensee I A2 RCP seal failure due to
- restaging
- at high VIO 95-15-02 Weakness / Failure to temperature.
Follow Procedures 8/2/95 OPS LER UI 95-04 Operator Error Self-identifying Operator failed to block MSIS actuation during VIO 95-15-Ol cooldown.
7/29/95 MS IR 95-14 Procedural Weakness Self Identifying 1&Crersonnel attempt to test a level switch circuit which could not actuate given system conditions.
7/29/95 OPS IR 95-14 Operator Self Identifying Turbine / Reactor Trip due to test error.
Error / Procedural Weakness 7/29/95 MS IR 95-14 Root Cause Pending Self Identifying Catastrophic failure of Unit 2 B train CEDM cooling fan.
7/3/95 PS IR 95-14 Security We kness self Identifying Automobile passed through neanally closed security gare to plant intate/ discharge canals at beach.
Subsequera accident resuhed in vehicle lodged in discharge canal piping.
7/1/95 OPS IR 95-12 Weak leg Keeping NRC Weaknecies identified in logs relating to battery jumper installation and out-of-service equipment.
7/1/95 PS IR 95-12 Maintenance Self Identifying Corrosion in transformer fire protection deluge system results in multiple failures.
7/1/95 PS IR 9512 Personnel Error NRC Three pieces of SNM found improperly tagged.
NCV 95-12-02 7/1/95 PS IR 95-12 Program Weaknesses NRC Fire Protection program weaknesses identified in fire-fighting techniques and respirator qualification program.
7/1/95 MS IR 95-12 Personnel Error NRC M&TEfound installed across battery cell without J/LL NCV 95-12-01 authorization.
6/3/95 MS IR 95-10 Procedural Adeqsacy/
NRC Several examples of weak adherence to procedures, Adherence including step signoffs and independent verification, identified.
6/3/95 MS IR 95-10 Poor Communication 1.icensee Poor communication / lack of detailed istruction leads to improper IB EDG governor installation.
6/3/95 MS IR 95-10 Poor Maintenance /
NRC HVACrystems for both unita poody Procedures maintained / Operating procedures contained numerous deficiencies.
6/3/95 MS IR 95-10 Poor Surveillance Licensee Missed several surveillances (7 day) on EDG.
NCV 95-10-01 Tracking System 0 29/95 MS IR 95-09 Personnel Error IJcensee Failure to perform personnel air lock testing on time.
NCV 95-09-01 f./28/95 OPS IR 95-05 Corrective Action NRC STAR /NCR program did rxt addresa evaluating past Program Weakness operability 4/28/95 MS IR 95-05 Maintenance Error licensee Incore Instruments at ICIFlange 8 miswired -ICI output signals directed to wrong cornputer poiss.
4/28/95 ENG IR 95-05 Weakness in Temp NRC Weakness in addressing how mods would affect Mod Procedure control room drsuings.
4/28/95 ENG IR 95-05 Failure to Implement NRC Failure to document nonconformance regarding ICI NCV 95-05-04 Corrective Action flange 8 conditions.
Program 4/28/95 MS IR 95-05 Design Implementation NRC Installation of wrong overload heater models in VIO 95-0541 Discrepancy switchgear.
~
4/1/95 OPS IR 95-07 Apparera Personnel Licensee Unit I experienced m approximate 14 minute loss of NCV 95-07-02 Error shutdown cooling shile shining fmm one shutdown cooling loop to the other. The root cause was the closing of the wrong SDC suction roolation valve (the valve for the operating. vice idle, pung) on the part of the operator.
4/1/95 MS IR 95-07 Poor Adherence to Ucensee Jumper leR installed in ECCS ventilation denper aRer NCV 95-07-02 J/LL and Maintenance work complete.
Procedures 4/1/95 OPS IR 95-07 Weak Annunciator NRC Weak annuncistor response by RO: weM to
Response
loss of shuidown cooling event.
3/26/95 MS IR 94-09 Procedural Weakness NRC LPSI mechanical seal housing outer cap misinstalled.
3/26/95 OPS IR 94-09 Operator NRC Operator failure to recognize out-of-sight high Error /Procedurst indication on EDG cooling water tank. Failure of Weakness procedure to include instructions on draining tank.
3/04/95 ENG IR 95-04 Design Licensee SDC suction reiief valve liR due to um hammer.
3/04/95 OPS R 95-04 House-NRC toose plastic debris found in Unit 2 fbel pool area.
keeping 2/27/95 MS R 95-04 Equipment Failure Self Identifying Unit I was shut down for the replacement of3-pressurizer code safety valves. The valves were leaking by the seat.
2/21/95 OPS R 95-04 Equipment Failure Self Identifying Unit 2 trip due to failure of a SGWL control level transmitter. Transmitter failed high, resuking in closure of the FRVand a subsequent trip on low SGWL (95-04) 2/20/95 005 R 95-04 Equipment Anon aly Self Identifying 2B LPSIpump found air-bound during survedlance testing. The licensee has theonzed that the migration of air in the system resulted in the conStion as a result of previous surveillance testing. The pangs are not self-venting.
2/I7/95 MS R 95-02 Physical Condition NRC Nornerous areas of corrosion identi6ed in Unit t/2 CCW areas.
2/17/95 PS IR 95-03 Personnel Error NRC la two observed exercises, ECs failed to notify states (Training Weakness within 15 minutes.
2/16/95 MS R 95-04 Maintenance Error /
Self Identifying lead shed of the I A3 IE 4160 bus due to inadvertent Procedural Weakness jumper contact while replacing a degraded voltage relay.
2/4/95 OPS M 95-01 Operator Ucensee Failure to sample STTwithin TS required time frame VIO 95-01-01 Error / Communications following volume addition-Second occurrence in 2 years.
e e.
2/4/95 OPS IR 5541 Peor Communications NRC Failure to identify rnd analyze Unit I bc4 leg flow stratification 2/4/95 MS IR 95-01 Personnel Error /
Self Identifying Inadequate independent verification resuhed in CVCS VIO 9541-02 Program Weakness letdown control valve failing to respond due to reversed leads. Resulted in a cessation ofletdown flow.
12/31/94 ENG IR 94-25 Engineering Design Self Identifying inadequate design control of NaOH cross-connectron NCV 94-2541 Error between ECCS trains.
12/3/94 PS IR 94-24 Procedure Review Licensee Failure to perform TS quired periodic pmcedure NCV 94-24-01 Inadequacy reviews.
12/3/94 MS IR 94-24 Maintenance NRC Inadequate process for changes to vendor technical VIO 94-24-02 Procedures manuals.
Inadequacy 11/25/94 MS IR 94-22 Program weakness Licensee The licensee's QA organization identiSed numerous weaknesses in the implementation of the site's welding program. As a result, the Maintensnee Manager placed a stop work order on welding activities. The stoppage lasted one week.
I1/24/94 MS IR 94-24 Prncedure we kness Self-identifying Unit i B side SIAS actuation due to a bistable module which had not been adequately withdrawn fmm the ESFAS cabinet during maintenance.
11/23/94 MS IR 94-24 Equipment Failure Self Identifying Unit i SIAS with usiit in mode 5 due to common mode failure of Rosemount transmitters us.d forpresourizer pressure channels.
11/5/94 OPS IR 94-22 Operations, Licensee Weste gas release on Sept. 10,1993, with NCV 94-22-03 Maintenance meteorological instruments out of service.
Ermrs 10/26/94 MS IR 94-22 Weather-Related/
Self-Identifying Unit I automatically tripped due to arc-over frr s a a
LER Maintenance potential transformer due to salt buildup on swnchyard insulators.
T/30/94 OPS IR 94-20 inconsistent NRC Local valve position indicators not maintained MS Expectations accurate. Procedures / training provided to operators on verifying valve pocition found weak.
f/30/94 OPS IR 94-20 Operations.
NRC Plant personnel not trained on IPE snd run using it for Maintenance work planning and scheduling.
Deficiency 9/30/94 OPS IR 94-19 Operatio is Weakness NRC During requal exem, a licensed operator exhibited an apparent disregard for EOPs.
9/30/94 MS IR 94-20 Personnel Error Licensee Maintenance personnel begin to work the wmng R%T isolation valve, threatening the operability of both trains of ECCS.
V/30/94 OPS IR M-19 Operations Error Ucensee Fciture to nc'ify the NRC of changes in status of NCV 94-19-01 licensed operators' medical conditions.
8/29/94 OPS IR 94-20 Operations Errors NRC Operators placed I A EDG in an electrical lineup for VIO 94-22-01 which TS-required surveillance tests had na been VIO 94-22-02 performed (with the ser-ey-related swing bus pered from it). Also, related control room log entries appeared to be inaccurate.
8/28/94 OPS IR 94-20 Equipment Failure Licensee Unit I was taken offline (Mode 2) to repair a DEH leak. The unit was returned on line later the same day.
8/12/94 OPS IR 94-18 Operations /
NRC The licensee was unloading new fuel for Unit I with a Maintenance Error and hoist grapple that was rnissing the safety latch sleeve Lack of Engineering locating pin. The safety sleeve functioned by friction Drawings / Inspection only.
Criteria 7/14/94 MS IR 94-15 Equipment LicenseeINRC During surveillance test, TCB 5 failed to open due to LER U-2 944)6 Failure / Poor mechanical binding (licensee). The Ikensee failed to VIO 94-15-01 Management Decision recognize the condition as requiring a shutdown per TS (NRC).
7/9/94 OPS IR 94-15 Equipment Failure Licensee Unit 2 turbine was shut down and reactor power reduced to Mode 2 because the 2BI RCP Inwer oil level indication showed a leak. The indication was later shown to be erroneous.
7/8/94 OPS IR 94-15 Operator Error Licensee TS 3.0.3 entry due to placing 2Al LPSIpurry and 23 LER U2 94-05 charging pump 005 at the same time.
6/28/94 MS IR 9414 Personnel Error /
Licensee Inoperable Unit 2 RAB ventilation exhaust WRGM oue NCV 94-14-01 Procedural Weakness to failure to connect sample lines.
LER U-2 94-04 6/6/94 OPS IR 9414 Weather Licensee Unit I trip from 100% power during a severe thunderstorm due to debris blown across two main transformer output terminals.
5/28/94 PS IR 94-13 Poor Cor ective Action NRC Emergency supplies in control toorn less that s:sted in DEV 94-13-01 FSAR.
5/6/94 ENG I* 94-11 Engineering Error NRC Inadequate corrective action for MOVs stich stalled VIO 94-II-01 during surveillances.
4/23/94 OPS IR 94-12 Mfg. Error Self Identifying Unit 2 auto reactor trip from 30% power caused by LER U-2 94-03 RPS cabinet wiring error for trip bypass circuit, fuorn original unit construction.
4/23/94 MS 1R 94-12 Equipment Failure Self-Identifying Following unit 2 trip, steam bypass system operated unexpectedly and dropped RCS temp by seven degrees F, pressurizer heaters turned off.
.e 4/21/94 OPS IR 94-12 Operator licensee Unit 2 rescw powa incretsed from 26 to 31% due to Insttentiveness positive MTC.
An/94 MS IR 94-10 Maintenance Error NRC Contractor personnel nude and comrnctor QC VIO 94-10-01 accepted pressurizer nozzle weld prep that did not eneet procedural requirernents for bevel angle.
Licensee engineering had specified overly tight tolerances.
4/3/94 OPS IR 94-12 Operations Procedure Self-identifying Unit I auto reactor trip due to unusual electrical lineup LER UI 94-04 Error (Lack of sufficient (isochronous EDG paralleled with offsite power depth in review) through TCBs).
4/3/94 ENG IR 94-12 Surveillance Error Licensee Licensee discovered that the 4160 VIAB Bust swing VIO 9412-01 bus components [C ICW Pump and C CCW Pump]
would not strip from the bus upon undervoltage ifthe bus were aligned to the B bus due to a missing wire.
3/28/94 MS IR 94-09 Personnel Error Self Identifying Unit I auto reactor trip. Maintenance foreman ened LER UI 9443 generator exciter breaker on wrong unit.
3/16/94 ENG IR 9448 Engineering Corrective NRC Regional inspector had two Unit 2 SIA violations: Is VIO 94-0841 Action corrective action for an 11/24/92 water hamcwr evers VIO 94-08-02 was done without documersed instmetions or procedures, resuhing in operating urail 3/94 with five snubbers on the SRV and PORV tailpipes inoperable.
- 2) Failure to write a nonconformance report for a damaged pipe support in March 1994.
3/16/94 ENG IR 94-10 Equipment Failure Licensee AUnit 2 pressurizer instrumera nozzle that had been LER U-294-02 repaired a year ago was found leaking stile the unit was in Mode 5. The unit remained shut down for repairs.
3/4/94 ENG IR 94-06 Engineering Design Ucensee inadequate design controle on Unit 2 sequencer NCV-94-06-02 Error charging pump loading block.
3/4/94 ENG IR 94-06 Engineering Error Licensee Failure to report an EDG failure.
NCV 94-06-01 2/28/94 ENG IR 94-09 Refueling procedure &
Ucensee/NRC Inadequate grappling of a fuel assembly caused by NCV 94-04-01 operator error error in Recommended Move List and operator error in following procedure. (IR 9449) 2/17/94 OPS IR 94-05 Operator Error Licensee Pressurizer sur. spray isolation valve had been locked NCV 94-05-01 closed (vice open) since 3/27/93.
LER U2 94-01 2/llN4 PS IR 94-02 Security Error Licensee Failure to provide required compensatory measures in NCV 94-02-01 response to a security computer system failure.
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J Semiannual Plant Performance Assessment' St. Lucie 1 and 2 Current SALP Assessment Period: 1/7/96 through 3/97 Last SALP Rating' Previous SALP Rating 1/2/94 - 1/6/96 5/3/92 - 1/1/94 Operations 2
1 Maintenance 2
1 Engineering 1
1 Plant Support 1
1 I.
Performance Overview Since July 1995 there have been a series of events that led to questioning the plant's overall performance.
An NRC root cause effort determined that. In addition to procedural adherence / adequacy weaknesses.' the licensee suffered from weaknesses in both interfaces across organizational lines and corrective actions.
The SALP board concluded that performance in the areas of Operations and Maintenance had declined to level 2.
Since the SALP board, additional examples of declined performance were noted.
These have included:
Significant operator inattentiveness which resulted in the overailution event on January 22. 1996, highlighted the recent large number of personnel errors and lack of command and control in the control room (SL3. CP).
On February 22. 1996, a dropped CEA and an ensuing Unit 1 shutdown resulted in the declaration of an unusual event.
During the shutcown. main feedwater regulating valve instabilities resulted in operators manually tripping the unit.
On February 24. a containment radiation monitor was rendered inoperable for two days due to an improper valve lineup following a grab sample.
As a result, the unit was started up without this TS-required component available.
Several instances of failure to follow procedures and operator inattention led to the extended period of inoperability (SL4).
On May 7. an inspection indicated that a significant number of shifts had been worked with fire brigade members which were not medically qualified.
A breakdown in the tracking of this data resulted from a key individual being laid off.
On May 12. fuel movement was commenced on Unit 1 without only 1 of 2 wide range NI channels available.
Operators performing a
' surveillance test on the inoperable channel did not coordinate with the refueling center properly.
Additionally, the fuel offload was commenced without incorporating requirements from the
spent fuel pool heat load calculation into the appropriate operational procedures, On June 6. Unit 2 was manually tripped due to high generator gas e
temperature.
Root cause was a screw which vibrated loose and resulted a temperature control valve feedback arm falling free of its connection.
This failure mode had been encountered before.
e On June 16. an inspection identified that 56 individual violations of overtime guidelines had occurred on the part of 4 individuals over a 30 day period.
Evidence also existed that employees were regularly working longer hours than those reported on their timesheets.
On July 20. Unit 1 experienced a loss of charging flow when, due e
to a mispositioned board selector switch, both operating pumps stopped on a faulty indication of high pressurizer level, caused by I&C errors.
A number of engineering-related problems have been identified to e
include:
e A number of annunciator response procedures which were inaccurate due to a failure to update them when design modifications took place.
e Four similarly miswired nuclear instrumentation channels due to errors in control wiring diagrams implemented during a modi fication.
The condition was identified at full power and resulted in an entry into TS 3.0.3.
Nonconservative errors were identified in auxiliary e
feedwater actuation system setpoints due to a failure to incorporate as-built data in instrument calibration calculations.
e-On August 14. glue was found in key lock switches on both units' hot shutdown panels, rendering the switches inoperable. ' The cpering instances appeared to be additional examples of padlocks-and door locks which were identified in July.
In addition to the inspection findings above. the inspectors have noted a general low state of morale.
A great number of both management and non-management employees have expressed concern with regard to the company's ongoing downsizing effort.
The general feeling is that, unlike Turkey Point. which was afforded the budget and time to improve prior to cownsizing. St. Lucie is expected to improve AND downsize simultaneously.
N c
II.
Functional Area Assessment - Ooerations A.
Assessment 4
Performance in Operations appears to have leveled.
At the time of the last PPR. operator errors and operational events were on the increase.
In the past six months, examples of improved operator attention to detail and conservative decision-making have been' identified.
Strong performance was identified in the area of reduced inventory operation. Weaknesses were identified in the
~
areas of-procedural quality _and operability maintenance and decision-making.
Improvements in control. room environment.
formality, and communications have been noted.
The licensee has E
appeared to make inroads in the areas of operator self-assessment and documentation of adverse conditions.
B.
Basis 1.
Attention to Detail and Conservative Decision-Making Non-licensed operators were successful in identifying e
two cases of inadvertent containment radiation monitor inoperability and a breach in a fire-rated assembly.
e After a non-conservative decision which resulted in a late declaration of an NOUE for CVCS system leakage.
operators have declared three NOUEs for'similar 4
circumstances (CVCS leakage outside containment which could not be quickly quantified).
Management has been
~
effective in encouraging conservative decision-making.
i e
Entry into a shutdown action statement when 4 Unit 2 control rods would not respond electrically.
i
[
e Five entries into reduced inventory during the period without error.
Timely trip of Unit 1 due-to apparent gas buildup in e
4 the 1B transformer.
1 e
Terminating a Unit 1 startup due to predictions that xenon decay would invalidate the estimation of
]
critical conditions.
2.
Weaknesses in Procedures and Maintenance of Operability l
e Numerous errors identified in annunciator response procedures.
e Full core offload began on Unit 1 without incorporating requirements from the fuel pool heat load calculation into operational procedures.
Operator aids found in the field did not agree with e
procedural requirements for the tasks they described.
Unit 1 fuel movement began without the required 2 operable channels of wide range nuclear instruments due to the performance of a surveillance test.
Clearance hung during the Unit 1 outage resulted in inoperability of audible count rate in containment.
3.
Other Observations Good performance was noted during a Unit 2 downpower due to low turbine auto-stop oil pressure.. a Unit 2 trip due to a failed turbine cooling water valve.
several startups, and fuel movements in Unit 1 containment.
Poor performance was noted in the use of a single operator for @ l movement in the spent fuel pool, in the control of keys for PORV operation outside of the control room. in the control of backup charging pump selector switch position and in performing a test of a turbine-driven AFP which resulted in a pump trip.
Equipment failures continue to challenge operators, with the occurrence of two manual trips per unit this calendar year due to equipment failures.
C.
Future Inspections The high number of allegations and an increase in resident involvement with engineering activities has reduced the available time for core Operations inspections.
The site has been brought to an N+1 staffing level: however, qualification of the new resident is not anticipateo until February. 1997.
Additionally, both assigned Resident Inspectors will be attending CE training at TTC for three weeks in October / November.
An acting resident has been arranged for the period: however, inspection at the N+1 level will not be possible until the end of the current SALP cycle (March 1997).
Consequently. Senior Resident and Resident Inspectors objectivity visits, involving control room observations, are planned.
Additionally. DRS inspections of the licensee's procedure development and approval process. which has recently changed in an effort to improve procedure quality. are planned.
III.
Functional area Assessment - Maintenance A
Assessment. An increase in personnel errors and equipment problems was noted.
The majority of the equipment problems are BOP related.
For the most part the licensee considered safety in j
establishment of goals and for monitoring of systems and
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components in the maintenance rule.
The maintenance program is adequate.
B.
Basis:
The maintenance area was rated good overall the last SALP period.
The last PPR indicated a problem with EDGs and procedure problems.
The plant matrix indicates 12 equipment failures.12 personnel errors and 3 procedure problems during the last 6 months.
Examples of personnel errors were:
- 8/31/96 Improper use of M&TE for meggering NI cables
- 8/3/96 Freeze seal left unattended
- 7/30/96 3 of 4 linear NI channels found miswired
- 7/20/96 2 charging pumps tripped due to erroneous level signal Power Reduction caused by Equipment Failures in the last 6 months:
- 4/20/96: Unit 2 - Turbine Stop Oil orifice blockage.
- 4/09/96: Unit 2 - Downpower due to Circ Water Piping leakage.
- 5/24/96: Unit 2 - Downpower due to CEDM problems.
- 5/31/96: Unit 2 - Downpower due to MSR TCV closure due to blown fuse.
- 6/06/96: Unit 2 - Reactor trip resulting from high generator H2 temp due to failed TCV.
- 6/22/96: Unit 2 - Downpower due to 2B FRV Controller problems.
- 7/23/96: Unit 1 - Manual trip due to turbine maintenance.
Maintenance Backlog:
- Non-outage corrective maintenance backlog: 1101 items. no significant changes since beginning of year.
- Overdue Preventive Maintenance Backlog: 30 Maintenance PMs were late Maintenance Rule A(1) systems: 6 systems
- EDG governors. EDGs. 4.16 KV AC safety relatea breakers. PORVs.
C Future Inspections:
- Maintenance Rule follow-up: 62703 (RI) - 1 week
- ISI inspection: 73753 (core) - 1 week
- Integrated S/G Replacement Inspection: 73753 (RI) - 3 weeks IV.
Functional Area Assessment - Enaineerina A.
Assessment St. Lucle received a SALP 1 rating during the SALP period that ended January 6. 1996.
The licensee has declined in performance during this PPR period (March-September 1996) due to problems with configuration management / design control and a failure to identify an US0.
y, a
2 3+
I B.
Basis PIM TRENDS / ISSUES:
The trend indicated was for decline in configuration management as described in design control issues below and an issue for failure to identify an USO for a 50.59 evaluation (September 19. 1996).
ENFORCEMENT: Letter of violation issued September 19. 1996. One level III and two level IVs in the area of US0 and configuration management.
DESIGN CONTROL ISSUES:
Recently enforcement identified two problems One was failure to coordinate design changes to operating procedures with three exam]les: 1) set point change to low level alarm in the Hydrazine tanc. 2) removal of ICW lube water piping and did not change abnormal procedure which affects operator actions. and 3) disabled a steam dump valve annunciator without changing the annunicator response procedure.
The second problem identified the failure to change ICW drawings after a modi fication.
OPERATING FOCUS:
The licensee took steps to prevent tube failure of its steam generators on Unit 1 by plugging approximately 2300 tubes.
These steam generators will be replaced in a fall 1997 outage.
MAJOR INITIATIVES:
Unit 2 outage 4/15/97. Unit 1 S/G replacement outage fall '97 FSAR INITIATIVES:
A review has been conducted of approximately one-third of the FSAR (July 1996 inspection). This review was performed mostly on Unit 1 and was performed on text material and not for curves and tables.
No US0 or operability problems were found.
Approval pending for reviewing remaining part of FSAR.
DBD/R:
A Design Basis Documentation was performed for 20 design basis documents.
The program was completed near the end of 1995.
C.
Future Inspections Engineering-9 weeks. basis:
Evaluate new engineering organization. FSAR project, configuration management and followup on design control issues.
L V.
Functional Area Assessments - Plant Sucoort A,
Assessment i
The last SALP cycle ended 1/6/96.
Plant Support was Category 1.
Tne lic;ensee continues to maintain a satisfactory level of performance in the area of Plant Support.
Some decline in Radiation Protection has been noted due to the loss of control of contaminated tools and exceeding dose goals.
Emergency Preparedness ongoing inspection indicates a decline in 1
l
performance.
Hurricane preparations for hurricane Bertha were conservative.
Overall. site security has been adequate.
Training and qualification was noted as a strength and management observed to be aggressive in pursuing issues, but not aggressive in doing indepth review of events.
Implementation of the fire protection program continued to be satisfactory.
B.
Basis Radiation Protection NCV for failure to control contaminated tools used in RCA (96-04.
p 45)
Violation (repeat of above NCV) for numerous examples of failure to control contaminated tools. (96-09. p 25)
Internal and external exposures below 10 CFR Part 20 limits. (96-04, p 45 and 96-04, p 23).
4 1995 dose was 412 person-rem. Unplanned maintenance and rework caused 1995 dose goal of 283 person-rem to be exceeded by 129 person-rem. (96-04. p 50)
Rad Techs decreased from 32 to 30 and 2 supervisors lost (96-04 p 48)
Decon staff reduced from 22 to 12 persons.
Levels of contaminated equipment and materials increasing. (96-04. p 46)
Good radiological housekeeping and controls. (96-09. p 28) 4 2
The total area contaminated was at 250 ft (96-04, p 47)
Licensee accreditation of the FP&L DADS a good example of Radiation Protection staff's technical capabilities.
(96-04 p 44)
Emeroency PreDaredness Conservative actions taken to prepare for Hurricane Bertha.(96-11.
p 3)
Securit y Failure to report a confirmed tampering event within one hour, whicn resulted in a violation.
Two events prior to the above tampering event were documented as tampered or unauthorized work. but management failed to notify security of these events.
Numerous problems discovered by a OA audit determined the FFD program to be weak.
Fire Protection A backup fire pump was installed to replace an out of service fire pump.
C.
Future Inspections Insoections Rationale i
Health Physics (SALP 1 decline - maintain: watch)
Operational HP(83750) 2-Inspections with focus on j
procedure coroliance: rework doses Eff1/RadWast(84/86750) 3-inspections with focus on
{
accident / process monitor installation & maintenance l
TI 133 Rad Waste Combine with 86750 Emergency Preparedness 1-Inspection with focus on Self-Prog. (82701)
Assessment results i
Regional Initiative inspection on i
allegation followuo (3 weeks. 2 inspectors)
Security Prog (81700)
Core Insp. to review security audits. corrective actions, j
management support and i
effectiveness, and review protected area detection equipment Security Prg/FFD (81700/
One regional initiative to followup 81502) on tampering and FFD issues Fire Protection None VI.
Attachments 1.
St. Lucle. Inspection Plan 2.
Power Profile 3.
Plant Issues Matrix 4.
Current NRC Performance Indicators 5.
Licensee Organization Charts 6.
Allegation Status l
7.
Enforcement History 8.
Major Assessments 9.
Recent Generic Issues Status List I
I i
ST. LUCIE - INSPECTION PLAN INSPECTION NUMBER OF PLANNED PROCEDURE /
TITLE / PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS INSPECTION TYPE OF INSPECTION -
TEMPORARY DATES COMMENTS INSTRUCTION 37550 fl0 CLEAR INSTRUMENTATION 2
10/7-18/96 REGIONAL INITIATIVE INSPECTION 82701 OPERATIONAL STATUS OF Tile EP 2
10/7-18/96 REGIONAL INITIATIVE PROGRAM 10/28-11/1/96 81502 FITNESS FOR DUTY 1
10/21-25/96 FOLLOWUP FFD/ TAMPERING 40500 EFFECTIVENESS OF LICENSEE 1
10/21-25/96 INSPECT STATUS OF CON 1ROLS IN IDENilFYlilG 1
1/6-17/97 PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT RESOLVING. AND PREVENTING PROGRAM PROBLEMS: CORRECTIVE ACTION REVIEW l
t 84750 RADIOACTIVE WASTE TREATMENT AND 1
11/4-8/96 CORE l
EFFLUENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL Tl 133/86750 MONITORING: SOLID RADIDACTIVE 1
11/18-22/96 CORE WASTE MANAGEMENT AND i
TRANSPORIATION OF RADI0 ACTIVE 1
2/24-28/97 CORE i
MATERIAL 93801 A/E EXPANDED SSFI INSPECTION 2
11/4-6/96 NRR INITIATIVE 5
11/18-22/96 5
12/2-6/96 5
12/9-13/96 5
1/6-10/96 i
I L
-2 INSPECTION NUMBER OF PLANNED PROCEDURE /
TITLE / PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS INSPECTION TYPE OF INSPECTION -
TEMPORARY DATES COMMENTS
' INSTRUCTION
-83750 OCCtlPATIONAl RADIATION EXPOSURf 1
12/2-6/96 CORE 1
1/6-10/97 CORE 71001 LICENSED OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION 2
12/2/96 REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM PROGRAM EVALUATION INSPECTION 81700 PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM FOR 1
1/6-10/97 CORE - SAFEGUARDS POWER REACTORS 62703 FOLLOWUP MAINTENANCE RULE TEAM 1
1/27 -31/97 REGIONAL INITIATIVE INSPECTION 73753 STEAM GENERATOR INTEGRATED 1
1/27-31/97 REGIONAL INITIATIVE INSPECTION 2/10-14/97 5/5-9/97 37550 ENGINEERING 1
2/3-7/97 CORE 50.59 FOCUS 92703 FOLLOWUP A/E EXPANDED SSFI lEAM 3
3/3-14/97 REGIONAL INITIATIVE INSPECTION OPEN ISSUES 73753 INSERVICE INSPECTION 1
4/28-5/2/97 CORE -MAINTENANCE 82701 OPERATIONAL STATUS OF EP PROGRAM 1
1/6-10/97 CORE
.-.~....
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STm LUCIE UNIT 1
Operational Period Fe b ru a ry 1996 th ro u gli October 18, 1996 1
2 3
100-
=
3On August 23,1996, 1
On February 24,1996, 60 -
a manual trip was a manua trip was initiated initiated to perform N
while going to a TS required turbine maintenance.
ko 60-shutdown A
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2 April 29,
- 1996, 4
The unit opei ated at S
shutdow 1 for 60% power d n to main
- a refueling transformer 3 oblems l
l O
noin n i u n o n i n o n o"trentrentntunnnnnt"n o n i o: :nnonionnoun F
M A
M J
J A
S 0
PERIOD OF OPERATION Graph does not include power reductions for routine repairs, waterbox cleaning, or required repairs.
ST.
LUCIE UNIT 2
Ope ra tio n al Period Fe b ru a ry 1995 through October 18, 1996 1
2 100
=
1 On April 20,1996 80 -
the unit was removed c4 r.za from service during
>g turbine testing 60 -
a g
ZW 40-U 2 On June 6,1996, the l
c4 rza unit was manually tripped i
20 -
due to high generator i
hydrogen gas temperature.
0 n o n o n o n u n i n i m"" n o n i n u n"it"nmnu n i o n n i o n n i n i n o n o n n o m F
M A
M J
J A
S O
~:
PERIOD OF OPERATION Graph does not include power reductions for ro u tin e repairs, waterbox
- cleaning, or required repairs.
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BY SALP AREA St. Lucie SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS ENGINEERING 4/18/96 NCV IR 96-06 M
L Missing orifice plate identified in Unit 1 Either failure to install orifice during ICW system during licensee field plant modification, or failure to reinstall walkdowns orifice following maintenance.
4/29/96 NCV IR 96-06 N
Failure to promptly document a Engineering failed to initiate CR upon nonconformance discovery that approx. 35 S-R instruments on each unit might have been calibrated at temperatures lower than those assumed in setpoint cales 5/12/96 NCV IR 96-12. EA O
L Initial temperature (and other) conditions Programmatic weakness in Plant 96-236 specified in Unit I spent fuel pool heat Change / Modification process.
load calculation (to support total core offload) was not factored into procedures 4/9/96 NEG S
CIRC water piping through-wall leaks Galvanic corrosion due to inadequate observed in two water boxes' outlets.
cathodic protection following installation of stainless steel Tapparogge components.
i 6/3/96 OTHER 1R 96-08 O
L Unit 1 outage extended due to expansion New plugging cnteria resulting from of SG MRPC tube inspections. Tube discussions with NRR on defect plugging approached 25% limit. PLAs characterization methodologies submitted to NRR to allow plugging up to 30%.
6/8/96 OTHER IR 96-08 L
Ongoing review by licensee of UFSAR Failure to update FSAR over time and accuracy identified approximately 150 failure to review FSAR properly when items, ranging from typographical errors to preparing procedures.
I more substantive issues.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 1 of 26 21-Oct-96
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE I COMMENTS 7/18/96 OTHER 1R 96-11 M
1.
Unit 1 AFAS setpoints found Failure to employ as-built elevations of nonconservative during review of condensate pots in the development of recalibration activities.
calibration critena.
7/30/96 OTHER IR 96-11 O
L 3 of 4 Unit 1 knear Ni channels found Drawing errors - discrepancy between miswired, with the detectors
- upper vendor technical manuals and control chambers feeding the lower NI drawer wiring diagrams generated for the inputs and vice-versa Result was 3 installation of the new Unit 1 NI drawers channels for which axial shape index was in error.
4/13/96 POS IR 96-06 N
Engineering response to failure of HVS-4A Procurement engineering effective in motor considered good.
locating and dedicating replacement motor and in identifying and resolving incorrect bearing rating calc for new motor. Minor problem existed in that new starting current profile was not adequately treated.
6/1/96 POS IR 96-08 N
CNRB activities surrounding PLA reviews in support of SG tube plugging issues were probing and competent.
6/8/96 POS IR 96-08 M
N Unit 1 RWT liner inspection.
Licensee satisfied committments to inspect fiberglass liner in RWT. Results sat.
8/26/96 POS IR 96-14 N
Engineering activities associated with leak in class 3 line to containment fan cooler in accordance with GL 91-18 and GL 90-05 for non-code repair.
6/8/96 STREN IR 96-08 M
N ISI activities for SG and reactor vessel Examinations well-planned, performed eddy current examinations reviewed.
and managed by very talented and knowledgable personnel.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 2 of 26 21-Oct-96
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEl COMMENTS 6/6/96 VIO IR 96-12, EA-N USO, involving taking a normally open Licensee determined that small increase 96-249 EDG fuel oil line isolation valve to the in the probability of failure could be closed position and the use of operator overcome by admin processes.
action to open the valve on EDG start.
cited at SL 111.
Two SL IV violations cited for Lack of appropriate pre and post-96-236 configuration management control installation review.
problems involving inaccuracies in procedures and drawings due to design changes.
8/3/96 VIO IR 96-11 M
N Prelubrication of valves prior to Procedure which required prelube had surveillance testing in 1995 resolved as not been considered for potential effects being a violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B on stroke time.
criterion XI.
10/18/96 VIO IR 96-17 L
Failure to satisfy QA plan requirements in Failure to perform independent the development of design modifications verifications of design outputs to the Unit 1 Nuclear instrumentation (drawmgs). Multiple examples. Also, system.
failure to perform adequate validation and verification of software for incore monitoring.
6/3/96 WEAK IR 96-12 EA M
S High temperature condition in Unit 2 rod Failure of an air conditioner. Further 96-236 control cabinet room due to failure of an review by licensee /NRC showed air l
sir conditioner led to indications of rod conditioner was temporacy equipment control problems. Indications later shown installed without design controls during to be false. Also, high temp condition led pre-op test phase.
to failure of a diverse turbine trip relay.
7/12/96 WEAK IR 96-12 L
Licensee veritcal slice inspection of EDG, Lack of proper configuration control over HPSI, and CCW systems revealed time.
numerous deficiencies in procedure, design document and FSAR accuracy.
L l
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 3 of 26 21-Oct-96
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 10/12/96 WEAK IR 96-15 PS N
No evidence could be found that lack of design basis documentation.
containment leakage detection systems satisfied leak-before-break assumptions for detectability or seismicity.
MONTENANCE 11/1/95 NCV IR 95 S ICI wiring error during RX head installation Personnel Error NCV 95-18-05 last RFO.
2/17/96 NCV IR 96-01. IR PS N
Work on 1 A ECCS suction header through-Personnelwork practices (workers 96-04 wall leak revealed strong FME, but poor ignored RWP requirements)
HP work practices observed regarding contamination control resulted in NCV.
5/8/96 NCV IR 96-06 N
Lack of verified (controlled) copy of Failure of Maintenance workers to procedure identified at CCW heat property verify procedures prior to exchanger jobsite.
beginning work.
i 5/17/96 NCV IR 96-08 N
Failure to verify the currency of procedure Cognitive personnelerror in use at jobsite 5/17/96 NCV IR 96-08 N
Failure to satisfy requirements for Cognitive error.
" independence" on the part of independent verifier.
8/3/96 NCV 1R 96-11 N
Review of outage freeze seals indicated Stop work order by management for i
that one freeze seal had been left cleanup of the Unit 1 pipe tunnel unattended for approximately one hour.
resulted in directing freeze seal watch to another area to make room for trash being hauled out of area.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 4 of 26 21-Oct-96
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEICOMMENTS 10/12/96 NCV IR 96-15 N
QA identified 3 areas of noncompliance M&TE storage area had been relyted with M&TE controls; one lack of a cat to a self-service facility, counter to QA sticker, lack of segregation of sat and plan requirements. Indications are that unsat M&TE, lack of an individual a lack of personnot contributed.
controlling M&TE.
2/17/96 NEG IR96-01 N
Freeze seal procedure lacked objective ProceduralWeakness criteria defining when a freeze seal existed.
2/17/96 NEG IR 96-01 L
Weakness identified in l&C calibration ProceduralInadequacy procedure -lack of detail provided for safety related calibrations.
3/30/96 NEG 1R 96-04 N
Control of maintenance procedures was Programmatic vunerability.
such that an outdated procedures could, programmatically, wind up in the field due to their inclusion in previously prepared packages. Licensee corrective action adequate.
6/8/96 NEG IR 96-08 N
Appleation of ladder and scaffolding programs appears to be rr.inimally compliant with licensee's self-imposed requirements. Many scaffolds and ladders required caution tags or had not been removed promptly after use.
11/6/95 OTHER 1R 95-21 S
Failure of EDG 2A relay sockets.
Equipment Failure Potential common mode failure.
12/9/95 OTHER 1R 95-22 L
2A2 RCP seal pkg lower seal destaged Filling RCS Before Coupling RCP due to reverse pressure across seal.
i FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 5 of 26 21-Oct-96
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 12/20/95 OTHER IR 95-22 S
RX vessel flange inner O-ring groove Pitting - Localized Corrosion pitting resulted in cooldown and head removal for repair 3/30/96 OTHER IR 96-04 S
Maintenance underwent major departmentalreorganization. Selected supervisors' qualifications found satisfactory per TS requirements.
5/22/96 OTHER L
V 3483 (SDC Suction Relief) setpoint Root cause not e.;tablished. Either found out-of-spec high, rendering valve tampering or poor maintenance incapable of performing its intended practices (most likely).
function.
6/3/96 OTHER 1R 96-08 N
EDG reliability calculations indicate that EDG reliability is in keening with SBO assumptions 6/8/96 OTHER 1R 96-08 N
Review of maintenance backlog indicated thatlicensee had a plan for backlog reduction in place but has yet to meet goals.
8/3/96 OTHER 1R 96-11 E
N Licensee's activities regarding maintenance of rod control system were adequate.
9/7/96 OTHER 1R 96-14 N
Apparent improper use of M&TE for Failure to follow procedure.
meggering NI cabling identified. Lack of tracability from M&TE to work order due to borrowing the equipment from one job for use on anotherjob. URI.
9/9/96 OTHER 1R 96-15 S
Set screw / locknut in Trip Circuit Breaker 5 Root cause pending. Initialindications sheared off during surveillance testing and were of apparent hydrogen was later found in breaker cubicle.
embnttlement.
kN
?}
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 6 of 26 21-Oct-96
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEICOMMENTS 2117/96 POS IR 96-01 N
Noted improvernents in housekeeping and material conditions.
3/30/96 POS IR 96-04 N
10 maintenance activitss observed during inspection period. No significani deficiencies noted.
5/11/96 POS IR 96-06 N
Observations of Pressurizer Code Safety No deficiencies noted Valve testing and repair 5/11/96 POS IR 96-06 N
Preparations for Unit I reactor vessel ISI.
In accordance with requirements and showed good outage planning.
5/11/96 POS IR 96-06 N
Observations of maintenance activities in No deficencies noted.
containment (Unit 1 outage) involving valve packing replacement and modification.
5/11/96 POS IR 96-06 N
MSSV testing - Unit 1 Outage Review of test data and methodology sat.
5/11/96 POS IR 96-06 E
N Polar crane load rating calc and Unit 1 No deficiencies identifHui.
nead lift.
6/8/96 POS IR 96-08 N
Repair work for Unit 1 fuel transfer tube Conducted satisfactorily isolation valve.
6/13/96 POS IR 96-09 N
Maintenance activities associated with Work conducted satisfactorily.
Unit i reactor head lift and Unit 2 feed reg valve work.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 7 of 26 21-Oct-96
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 6/20/96 POS IR 96-09 O
L Loss of 3 Wide Range Nuclear instrument Operators prompt and accurate in Channels on Unit I resulted in entering TS verifying shutdown margin requirements.
AS for Nis.
7/20/96 POS 1R 96-11 O
N Post-outage walkdown of Unit 1 containment indicated excellent cleanliness.
9/7/96 POS IR 96-14 N
ESF response time testing procedure identified as weak in detail. CR resolution to change procedure appropriate. Review of last 4 performances of procedure for each unit indicated that TS satisfied for competion of all channels.
9/7/96 POS IR 96-14 N
Review of 20 work orders indicated I
appropriate control of work scope.
2/24/96 VIO IR 96-04 N
Acceptance criteria specif,ed for CEDM Fadure ofI&C System Supervisor to coil resistances in PC/M package found adhere to test criteria compounded by varied and unclear. Criteria were not failure of I&C management to identify properly applied and values outside of obvious errors during post-work review.
specifications were not documented and 1
resolved.
6/13/96 VIO IR 96-09 N
A review of overtime for a one month Failure of management to track the use period indicated that overtime guidelines of overtime as specified in site were routinely exceeded without prior (or procedure. Procedure poorly defined subsequent) approval. 56 examples cited requirements.
for 5 individuals.
7/6/96 VIO IR 96-09 E
N Review of testing activities for continment Fadure to property implement App. B blast dampers indicated that violations of and QA plan as they related to 10 CFR 50 App. B and site procedures documenting as-found and as-left data.
existed. Two violations cited.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 8 of 26 21-Oct-96
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COIMIENTS 10/12/96 VIO IR 96-15 N
M&TE used in testing control channel Ni M&TE was borrowed from another job, dunng installation was not logged out in violation of procedural controls.
against the work order for the job.
Tracability was thus lost.
10/18/96 VIO IR 96-17 N
Failure to initiate a condition report for a Resulted in miswiring the detector.
deficiency when cable labeling for Unit 1 B channel Ni detector did not agree with drawing.
2/24/96 WEAK IR 96-04 N
Maintenance practices for Steam Bypass Poor preventive rnaintenance on SCBC and Control System and Feedwater valve air lines and FRVs.
Regulating valves found weak in inspection following 2/22/96 Unit 1 trip.
OPERATIONS 1/7/96 N
SALP CYCLE 12 BEGINS t
t 3/31/96 EMERG IR 96-06 PS N
Operator response to RCS leakage Operators effective at through CVCS system.
identifying / isolating leak; however, Unusual Event callwas non-conservative in that the call was delayed to allow a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> RCS inventory balance to be calc'd when otherinformation indicated that excessive leakage existed.
7/13/96 EMERG IR 96-11 M
L NOUE declared when 2C charging pump Check valve stuck open due to possibly check valve stuck open, creating bypass generic effects of pulsating low flow in a flowpath from charging pumps to VCT.
continuous service valve.
Operators timely in declaring event.
8/9/96 EMERG IR 96-14 M
L NOUE declared due to RCS leakage in Chafging pump packing leakage excess of 1 gpm unidentified.
identlSed as source of leak. Operators correctly applied EAL.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 9 of 26 21-Oct-96
4 SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEICOMMENTS i
2/22/96 LER LER 335/96-M S
Dropped CEA led to declaration of NOUE 002 and plant shutdown. During shutdown, failure of air line to a FRV led to manual trip.
5/29/96 LER M
L Suspected loss of approximately 1200 condenser tube cleaning balls reported to state /NRC. Balls were found unaccounted for during an inventory balance.
Suspected that balls were released to Atlantic Ocean.
6/2/96 LER M
L Non-safety related breaker alignments to Operators not aware that containment support Unit 1 outage resulted in loss of amplifierwas going to be affected by audible count rate emplifier for imeup Control room amplifier not containment. Audib5 counts lost in affected containment for approximately 5 minutes during fuel movements.
10/18/95 NCV IR 95 L Missed RCS Boron sample surveillance.
Personnel Error NCV 95-18-07
[
10/19195 NCV IR 95 S Missed shift CEA position indication Personnel Error NCV 95-1846 surveillance.
11/21/95 NCV IR 95 L Failure to maintain Penetration Log.
FTF Procedure l
NCV 95-21-04 1/5/96 NCV IR 95 PS N
Several deficiencies in prodecure change Failure to Properly implement NCV 95-22-01 process implementation identified.
Procedures Expired or cancelled TCs found in control rooms and hot shutdown panel.
t 7
,5 FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 10 of 26 21-Oct-96 i
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE E COlWMENTS 4/22/96 NCV IR 964)6 E
L Unauthorized breech in RAB fire barrier.
Operators showed good attention to during installation of CCW piping detail in identifying two holes bored in modification.
wall. Engineering failed to account for the effects of modification installation in fire rated assembly, as required by procedure for engineering packages.
5/14/96 NCV IR 96-08 L
Fuel movement begun with only one of Poor communication between control two required wide range NI channels room operators performing surveillance operable. Condition identified and fuel testing (which inop'd NI) on the subject movement secured after approximately 1 channel and the refueling center.
ft of travel.
8/3/96 NCV IR 96-11 L
QA audit discovered that corrective action Rush to close out STARS (old corrective documents had been closed without being action document) when CRs (new forwarded to originator for approval (as corrective action document) were required by procedure). NRC identified instituted.
that personnel without signature authority were closing documents.
8/6/96 NCV IR 96-14 N
Operator observed not walking down control boards prior to assuming shift, as required by procedure. Operator terminated.
9/9/96 NCV IR 96-15 PS L
Licensee had not complied with Failure to follow procedures.
requirements for ensuring that operators
.ead training bulletins required to maintain requalification current. Licensee identified issue, with independent NRC findings.
9/18/96 NCV IR 96-15 L
Licensee bypassed the wrong ESFAS Poor labeling of bypass key slots.
steam generatorlow level channelin response to channelinoperability.
Resulted in a failure to satisfy TS action statement requirements.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 11 of 26 21-Oct-96
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE1 COMMENTS 12/1/95 NEG IR 95-21 N
Recurrent non-valid alarms when starting FTF Procedure fire pumps were not documented as operator workarounds. Voltage dips dssociated with such starts were contributors to a trip previously.
12/1/95 NEG IR 95-21 N
Operators unable to effectively obtain I&C Inadequate Operator Training setpoints from computer after hard copies were removed from control room.
12/1/95 NEG IR 95-21 N
Unit 2 procedures and valve deviation log Valve Position Administrative Controls used to cycle Unit 1 cross connect valves.
12/1/95 NEG IR 95-21 N
SDC Procedure required natural circ-Proceduralinadequacy related surveillance prior to establishing RCS pressure boundary. Natural circ not possible without pressurization.
12/27/95 NEG IR 95-22 E
S FRG meeting suffered!itens deferred due Lack of Attendance at FRG to lack of OPS /Eng'g atter. dance at meeting. Major issues at meeting affected OPS /Eng*g.
1/5/96 NEG IR 95-22 N
Several procedural deficiencies and inadequate Procedure Review and calculational errors identif.ed in reload Execution physics test procedure.
2115/96 NEG IR 96-01 M
N Tours of ECCS rooms revealed several Material Condition active leaks. Licensee could not explain how (if) FSAR assumptions on ECCS leakage were satisfied. Later review of FSAR indicated leakage within assumptions.
3/7/96 NEG IR 96-04 N
Licensee failed to place a CEA which had Operator oversight.
been declared administrative!y inoperable in the equipment out-of-service log. CEA was operable per TS.
FROM.10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 12 of 26 21-Oct-96
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 3/7/96 NEG IR 96-04 N
During MTC testing, inspector noted that Poor attention to detail.
boron concentration had been verified at 30 minute intervals, vice 15 minute intervals as called for in procedure.
6/3/96 NEG IR 96-08 N
Poor practice observed in spent fuel pool "On deck" status was an effort to operations Fuel assemblies were left expedite reload. Operatorleaving hanging in an "on deck" status while machine was due to inadequate awaiting upender availability. Also, manpower-operator had to operate operator left machine unattended with fuel upender contmis, which were mounted hanging at least once per movement.
on waii.
7/16/96 NEG IR 96-11 L
2C auxilliary feedwater pump tripped on Operator errorin not property overspeed during post-maintenance implementing cautions in a procedure.
testing.
7/20/96 NEG IR 96-11 M
L 2 operating charging pumps tripped when I&C failed to recognize that reactor rnaintenance induced an erroneous level regulating system would be affected by signal into reactor regulating system.
their activities. Operators had charging Letdown isolated by operators. Upon pump backup switch in wrong position, reinitiating letdown, minor waterhammer leading to cessation of charging flow.
event occurred.
10/1/96 NEG IR 96-15 O
N 2B HPSI pump discharge pressure noted Poor attention to detail.
to be 880#. Operators could not explain it, had not noticed it. Was due to a pump run a week before.
11/16/95 OTHER 1R 95-21 M
S Unit 1 manually tripped when 1B MFRV Long-Standing Equipment Problem locked in 50% position. Root cause -
degraded power supply, compounded by voltage dip on starting both station fire pumps.
11/21/95 OTHER 1R 95-21 S
Light socket failure during lamp Equipment Failure replacement results in loss cooling to 1 A Main Transformer. Unit downpower to
-60%.
FROM.10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 13 of 26 21-Oct-96
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE-SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 1/26/96 OTHER 1R 96-01 N
Inspection of corrective action program Corrective Achons revealed timely action on the part of management, but weaknesses in plans for tracking progress on personnel performance and procedure quality improvement.
3/1/96 OTHER L
Management Changes - T. Plunkett succeeds G. Goldberg, C. Wood replaces L. Rogers as manager of SCE, C. Marple replaces C. Wood as Ops Supervisor.
t 3/10/96 OTHER IR 96-04 L
Unit 1 downpowered to 97.5% due to hot Hot leg stratification.
leg stratification and flow swirl which resulted in higher than actual indicated reactor power.
4/4/96 OTHER IR 96-06 L
Interim Operations Manager (H. Johnson) named.
r 4/10/96 OTHER 1R 96-300 N
4 of 4 SRO candidates passed SRO examination. In 3 of the cases, performance was marginally satisfactory.
No generic candidate weaknesses identified.
4/20/96 OTHER IR 96-06 S
Unit 2 downpowered and taken off-line Blockage in auto-stop oil line orifice due to low pressure condition in auto-stop which prevented buildup of auto-stop oil oil. Operators observed to control pressure. Only negative aspect was evolution well.
crowding of control panels by control room SROs during portions of evolution.
i 5/31/96 OTHER 1R 96-08 M
S Blown fuse resulted in closure of all Unit 2 Moisture found in a junction box MSR temperature control valves, resulting following heavy rain.
in a 5% load rejection.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 14 of 26 21-Oct-96
CECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE E COMMENTS 6/27/96 OTHER 1R 96-09 E
L Site reorganization announced which would place almost all engineering functions (system engineering. STAS, test engineers) under Engineering. Also.
Outage Management folded into a global work planning group under the Plant General Manager.
3/12/96 POS IR 96-04 S
Licensee disposition for deficiency noted in 1 boroflex panel (top 15" missing) found satisfactory. FRG treatment ofissue found appropriate.
3/29/96 POS
!R 96-04 N
Operator requalification program found to be supporting management expectations for operations and covering timely and important topics.
3/30/96 POS IR 96-04 N
Review of 5 clearances indicates better attention to detail than had been observed in past.
4/10/96 POS IR 96-300 N
Simulator performed well throughout SRO qua!ification testing.
4/28/96 POS IR 96-06 N
Operators performed well during Unit 1 Communications formal, excellent use RFO shutdown.
of annunciator response procedure.
Performance of rod drop time testing a noteworthy initiative.
1 5/2/96 POS IR 96-06 N
Good performance by operators and test personnel during integrated safeguards testing on Unit 1.1B EDG output breaker failed to close during first test. Operators handled situation well.
5/5/96 POS IR 96-06 N
Reduced inveritory operations conducted well by operators.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 15 of 26 21-Oct-96
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE1 COMMENTS 5/11/96 POS IR 96-06 N
2 clearances audited, both correct.
5/14/96 POS IR 96-08 N
Fuel movements during Unit 1 core omoad and reload performed well.
5/24/96 POS IR 96-08 M
S Rod control system failure resulted in Operators conservative in interpreting inability to move (electrically) 4 CEAs.
TS, plant organizations provided timely Operators conservatively interpreted TS to support with lists of equipment which require shutdown in this instance.
would be inoperable when the main Situation complicated by an out of service generator was tripped.
Startup Transformer.
6/6/96 POS 1R 96-08 S
Unit 2 manually tripped due to high main Operators acted promptly and correctly generator gas temperature due to failed in tripping the unit. Post trip response of temperature controlvalve.
both plant and operators was good.
6/8/96 POS IR 96-08 N
3 QA audits reviewed Broad in scope, appropriatefy focused, indicated an aggressive application of quality standards.
6/8/96 POS IR 96-08 N
3 QA Audits reviewed Broad in scope, focused on weak areas. Agressive application of standards evident in the number of findings cited.
6/19/96 POS IR 96-09 N
Unit 1 reduced inventory preparations and Controls were appropriate.
execution.
7/5/96 POS IR 96-09 N
Unit 1 reduced inventory preparations and Mid-Loop controls effective. Licensee execution.
attention and management oversight excellent.
FROM.10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 16 of 26 21-Oct-96
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE1 COMMENTS 7/8/96 POS IR 96-11 M
N
!.5:ensee preparations for Hurricane Hurricane forcasts showed storm Bertha proactive and responsible.
missing area, but licensee prepared as though it would change course.
8/31/96 POS IR 96-14 M
L Operators manually tripped Unit 1 due to Operators acted quickly, conservatively, indications of gas accumulating in the 18 nnd in accordance with plant transformer. Operating crew self-procedures.
assessment following event viewed as exce!!ent.
9/2/96 POS IR 96-14 N
Unit 1 startup conducted well. Operator action to terminated first approach to criticality when Xe decay drove estimated critical conditions near allowed band limits l
was appropriate.
I 9/9/96 POS IR 96-15 PS N
Control room watchstanding practices satisfactory. Watchstanders maintained a professional environment and were attentive to plant paramenters.
10/9/96 POS IR 96-15 N
Surveillance testing of 2A EDG performed well. Good use of Real Time Training Coordinators 7/9/96 STREN IR 96-11 N
Two entries into reduced inventory made during inspection period. Strong management involvement in scheduling around Hurricane Bertha. Reduced inventory operations continues to be a strength.
11/11/95 VIO IR 95 N Tech. Spec. equipment not specified for IV FTF Procedure VIO 95-21-02 on Equipment Clearance Order.
11/20/95 VIO IR 95 N Valve discovered Closed vice Locked FTF Procedure VIO 95-21-01 Closed as specified on Equipment Clearance Order.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 17 of 26 21-Oct-96
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE1 COMMENTS 11/27/95 VIO IR 95 L Missed RCS Boron sample surveillance -
Personnel Error VIO 95-21-03 Repeat from IR 95-18 1/5/96 VIO IR 96-04 L
NLO failed to employ procedure when Failure to use procedure, failure to notify placing EDG fuel oil tank on recirculation control room of evolution.
for chemistry. As a result, he improperty performed the evolution by isolating the discharge of the EDGFO transfer pump, which resulted in an inoperable EDG.
L Boron dilution event due to operator Operator error, poor short term 96-040 leaving control panel while dilution was in tumover, poor command and control progress. Weak command and control, procedural adherence, and short-term tumover. Additionally, OP for boration/ dilution not consistent with FSAR and no 50.59 performed.
1/26/96 VIO IR 96 N Violation identified regarding temporary' Procedure Control VIO 96-01-01 changes to procedure which changed intent and which were approved for use without prior FRG review.
2/22/96 VIO lR 96-04 O
N Operators found adding boric acid to VCT Procedures were put away to tidy up without procedure in hand, as required by control room prior to NRC senior conduct of operations procedure.
managers' tour prior to SALP meeting.
Additional example of EEA 96-040.
3/27/96 VIO IR 96-04 N
Operators failed to properly log boron Management direction to operators dilution evolutions. Globallog entry was allowing global log entries for reactivity made at the beginning of the shift stating manipulations during transient dilutions would be made; however, conditions (e.g. uppower) which was procedure required each dilution to be not in accordance with Conduct of logged.
Operations procedure.
8/19/96 VIO IR 96-16 N
Operations key controls found inadequate Keys found uncontrolled at for keys associated with control room normal / isolate switch boxes for unit 2 evacuation / remote shutdown PORVs.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 18 of 26 21-Oct-96
~ =.. - -
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 12/1/95 WEAK IR 95-21 N
SDC procedure contained conflicting ProceduralWeakness/ Inadequate values for RX cavity level requirements.
Review Procedure had been approved since emphasis on accuracy stressed.
12/1/95 WEAK IR 95-21 N
CCW sample valve,showed dual FTF Procedure indication without corrective action documentation initiated.
12/1/95 WEAK IR 95-21 N
. Clearance in place to isolate N2 from CST Poor Corrective Actions i
to facilitate pressure switch replacement for nine days without work order being written.
12/1/95 WEAK 1R 95-21 N
Followup to previous inspection findings Corrective Actions indicated a weakness in followthrough in addressing deficiencies.
12/5/95 WEAK IR 95-22 M
N ESFAS cabinet doors found unlocked Poor Logkeeping/ Attn to Detail following maintenance work - I&C error.
Log entries associated with work were not complete.
1/5/96 WEAK IR 95-22 M
L U2 manual RX trip on high generator H2 Temp ControlValve Failure.
temp due to failure of temp control valve.
Additionally, failure to identify Operator awareness of RPS status post-unexpected reactor trip signals which trip poor. Inspection of post-trip review (for came in during trip.
current trip as well as past trips) indicated weaknesses in the rigor of post-trip reviews 2/17/96 WEAK IR 96-01 E
N Numerous deficiencies identified in ProceduralInadequacy instrument air system walkdowns, including drawings accuracy, ONOP adequacy, and annunciator response procedure accuracy.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 19 of 26 21-Oct-96
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 2/24/96 WEAK IR 96-04 S
Procedural weak.. ass results in attempting Procedure review weakness -lack of to synchronize main generator with grid verification that disconnect links were with generator disconnect links open.
closed.
4/14/96 WEAK IR 96-06 E
N Configuration Control issues resulted from Walksdowns of both units' CS, ICW and ESF system walkdowns.
IA systems indicate programmatic failures in incorporating design changes into drawings, the FSAR and operating procedures. Unresolved item tracking expansion ofinspection scope to include instrumentation setpoints.
4/14/96 WEAK IR 96-06 E
N ICW system walkdown.
Results in'dicate weaknesses in procedure-to-procedure agreement, labelirg, and surveillance requirements, in addition to configuration control issues disussed separately.
8/6/96 WEAK IR 96-14 N
Operator aids found in vario'is areas of Type of aids identified did not meet the plant which were not in agreement criteria for inclusion in operator aid with system operating pro.;edures.
program and were not controlled.
PLANT SUPPORT 8/14/96 EMERG IR 96-16 O
L NOUE declared due to security alert Event was similar to discoveries made resulting from discovery of tampering. A in July of a glue-like substance in glue-like substance had been injected into padlocks.
Unit 1 and 2 hot shutdown panel key lock switches.
3/1/96 NCV IR 96-04 N
Inspection of Hot Too! Room identified Attention to detail in tool storage and several tools which were either not surveying.
painted purple (as required) or which slightly exceeded limits for contamination.
8/12/96 NCV IR 96-15 O
L Failure to follow procedure resulted in the Poorly written procedure, compounded inoperability of the Unit 1 containment by weak execution by chemistry radiation monitcr following PASS panel personnel. Good attention to detail be operability check.
NLO in identifying condition.
FROM.10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 20 of 26 21-Oct-96
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEi CONIMENTS 12/1/95 NEG IR 95-21 N
Rad survey results unavailable for B hot Failure to Document RAD Survey leg work. Surveys performed but not documented.
2/7/96 NEG IR 96-02 N
Two areas for improvement identified in inconsistencies in the use of Florida graded EP exercise - Need for Notification Message Form. Confusion management to become more involved in existed between NLOs dispatched from assuring correctness ofinfo being OSC and Control room for similar repair provided in offsite notification forms and missions.
need to refine C&C for damage control teams.
5/15/96 NEG 1R 96-08 N
Observations of radiation worker practices revealed inconsistencies in the application of site practices (e g. wearing of dosimetry, donning / doffing PCs).
7/26/96 NEG IR 96-10 L
QA audit of Fitness for Duty program Failure to follow procedures and lack of identified problems including personnel both attention to detail and self-checking with negative tests being recorded as cited as root causes.
positive (and vice versa) and personnel l
randomly selected for testing not being tested (even though they were available).
8/9/96 NEG IR 96-14 N
Examples of poor radiolaogical housekeeping observed. Barrels for anti-C collection located outside of contaminated areas, use of multiple, undefined, stepoff pads, contaminated trash overflowing contaminated area boundaries.
8/23/96 NEG IR 96-16 N
Licensee extended control room access to a large number of personnel, potentially in excess of those needing access.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 21 of 26 21-Oct-96
SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 9/19/96 NEG IR 96-16 N
Licensee response to identification of glue.
Events believed to have occurred at in padlocks in July not thorough, as glue same time, and licensee's intitial audits was later found in key lock switches.
included only padlocks, door locks and valve locks.
2/7/96 OTHER 1R 96-02 N
EP exercise demonstrated that onsite emergency plans were adequate and that licensee was capable of implementing them.
3/1/96 OTHER IR 96-04 N
Licensee found to be utilizing ALARA techniques and making progress at reducing collective doses for staff, 3/1/96 OTHER 1R 96-04 N
Licensee found to be implementing adequate RP controls and monitoring individual exposures per code requirements.
3/1/96 OTHER 1R 96-04 N
Housekeeping in RABs generally good; however, equipment storage areas found cluttered and untidy.
3/14/96 OTHER L
Management change. A. Desoiza (human resources manager) replaced by Lynn Morgan (from TP) 8/12/96 OTHER 1R 96-14 O
L Operator identified low flow in Unit 1 Failure to follow procedure.
containment air monitor. Condition the result of Chemistry personnel failing to properly secure from a PASS system surveillance. URI 2/7/96 POS IR 96-02 N
Observations of licensee performance in CR, TSC, OSC, and EOF indicated good command and control, staff utilization and staff demeanor during graded exercise.
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 22 of 26 21.Oct-96
s SECONDARY DATE TYPE SOURCE SALP AREA ID ITEM APPARENT CAUSEICOMMENTS 2/7/96 POS IR 96-02 N
Licensee's onsite emergency organization was found to be well-defined and 9enerally effective at dealing with i
simulated emergency during graded exercise.
2/7/96 POS IR 96-02 N
Communication among the licensee's
[
emergency response facilities and
~
emergency organization and emergency response organization and offsite authorities were good during graded exercise.
l 2/7/96 POS IR 96-02 N
Licensee made significant observation of Licensee objectively questioning overali E-Plan execution - 2 practice drills were state of readiness.
required prior to graded exercise for management to be satisfied with performance. Management determined t
that more frequent drills were required to ensure readiness.
3/1/96 POS IR 96-04 N
Ongoing HP efforts to obtain accreditation of FPL electronic dosimetry program l
identified as a good example of department's technical capabilities.
i 5/3/96 POS IR 96-05 N
Inspection of FPL Speakout program.
Program effective in handling and resolving employee safety concerns.
r 6/8/96 POS 1R 96-08 N
Fire barrier inspections performed by the licensee were found to employ.
l conservative criteria and be detailed.
7/6/96 POS IR 96-09 N
Review of RCP oilcollection system.
System met description in FSAR and was in accordance with App R, except as allowed by approved exemption.
i l
FROM: 10/18/95 TO: 10/18/
Page 23 of 26 21-Oct-96
l l
Exposure (Man-REM)
PWR Average Forced Outage Rate (%)
Nurr'w of Events Number of Screme
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4 PennaPTmIONRL 4
E ST. LUCIE.1 i
j PI EVENTS FOR 95-3 SCRAM 07/es/95 LERs 33595oo3 50.72s: 29e39 pim NIST: POWR OPERATIONS AT 1005 DESC
- TIE REACTM TRIPPED CII NIGN PRESmRIZER PREsmM WNEN TIIE MAIN TURSINE GOWERNOR Am INTERCEPT VALVES ISIT CLORED DimING TESTIIIG. TNIS EVENT WAS CAUBED BY AN CPERATOR OMITTING A TEST panrmes l
w.
5 SSF Os/os/95 LERs 33595005 50.72e: 2917s i
Me NIST: CCWITION EXISTB IN ALL MSES UP 70 1005 POWR SINCE 1994 eine : SAFETT A m RELIEF VALVES GRIRr SYSTM : REACTM COOLANT SYST M DESC *: TIE PERER OPERATB RELIEF VALVEl WRE PtRAS INEPERASLE DURING TESTING. THE MAIN DISC allDES nERE INBTALLED INC MRECTLY DURING THE 1996 REFUELING CUTAGE.
i SSF on/1o/95 LERs 33595006 50.72s:
s Mat NIST: EVENT OCCURRED IN COLD SIRJIDOWN GRERP : RESIOUAL NEAT RBWWAL SYSTMS GROUP SYSTEM : RESIOUAL MAT RWWWAL SYSTBI DESC
- SOTN TRAINS OF RESIDUAL MEAT REMOVAL WRE RESERED INOPERABLE AS A RESULT OF A FAILED GPEN SUCTION i
RELIEF VALVE. TIE 2007 CAUSE WAS INADEcuATE DESIGN MARGIN SETWEEN THE RELIEF Als BLOW 0lAl SETPOINTS ads NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATING PRESERE.
t PI EVENTS TOR 95-4 NONE PI EVENTS FOR 96-1 1
SSF 02/19/96 LERs 33596001 50.72s: 29994 PWR NIST: EWNT wrmeen DIMING OPERAfl0N AT 1005 poler GRERJP
- CONTROL 80831 E8ERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM GROUP SYSTEM : CINITROL BUILDING / CONTROL CtBIPLEX ENVIROINENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM DESC
- THE CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM WAS REWERED INCAPASLE OF PERFORMING ITS DESIGN FUNCTIOlt WNEN Tne CONTROL ROOM ACCESS NATCNES WRE LEFT OPEN FOLLOWING MAINTENANCE. THE CAUSE WAS IIIADE4RAATE l
GUIDAalCE Ase WORE CONTROLS FOR MAINTAINING THE 80UNDARY.
PI EVENTS FOR 96-2 SSA 06/07/96 LERs 33596007 50.72s: 30603 PWR MIST: REFUELING DESC
- All EDG STARTED AaC LOADED WNEN A SUS LOA 0 SNED OCCURRED DURING A COIITAlllMENT !$0LATitBI ACTUATION
$1ENAL TEST. AN lisADEGUATE PROCEDIRE CONTAINED No INSTRUCT!0sts 70 REINSTALL FUSES WIIICN WRE RBWWED AS PART Of A PREVIOUS TEST.
SSA 06/0s/96 LERs 3359600s
- 50. 72s: 30604 PW NIST: REFUELING DESC
- A 4.16EV ELECTRICAL BUS LOST POWER DURING MAINTEIIANCE 00f Taft ESF SYSTEM POWER SUPPLIES. THE EDG DID 180T START SECAUSE IT WAS QUT OF SERVICE. THE POWER SUPPLY FAILED DURING INSTALLATICII 0F A CIRCUIT CARD.
SSA 06/08/M LERs 33596008 50.72s: 30604 Pnat MIST: REFUELING DESC
- A SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION SIGalAL WAS GENERATED DURING MAINTENAalCE ON THE ESF SYSTEM POWER MPPLIES. THE POWER SUPPLY FAILED DURING INSTALLATION OF A CIRCUIT CARD.
i l
ST. LUCIE 1
PREEQSomt_
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ST. LUCIE 2
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- sees censmesses ter oversement orese
.- _.. _ _ _ _ _ _.. ~. _ _. _..
N PREDICIOIONRL Pi j
ST. LUCIE 2 1
PI EVENTS FOR 95-3
)
MM l
PI EVENTS POR 95-4 SSF 11/20/95 LERe 3e995005 so.72s: 29626 -
PtR NIST C2 W ITION EXISTS FOR AN INDETERMINATE PERIts OF TIME GROUP : WERENCY AC/DC PEREE SYSTEMS MIRJP SYSTBI : M ONSITE POWR SUPPLY SYSTDI l
DESC
OTWR. VIERATION IImuCED FAffmE CaueID THE SOCIET CONIECTION DEGRADAfl0II.
PI EVENTS FOR 95-1 NONE i
l PI EVENTS FOR 96-2 SSF 06/25/96 LERs 50.72s: 30676 PtR HIST: COISITIglt EXISTED FOR AN INDETEINIINATE PERIOD OF TIME GROUP
- EMRGENCT CORE COOLING ffSTEMS GROUP STSTEM : LOW PREsamE SAFETT INJECTION SYSTEM DESC
. TNE PLAlff PRACTICE OF DEENERSIZING THE SA'ETT !NJECT!Oes TANIC ISCLATICII VALVES AFTER CL0euRE IN MODE FOUR DEFEATS TNE AUTOMATIC OPEN FEATultf AT 515 PSI A Aac QN A SI AS. TNIS CONDITION WAS CAUSED BT 1
INADEcuATE PLANT PROCEDURES.
)
i l
i l
1 4
1
.i
ST. LUGIE 2 eneoecac*w_
Trends & Deviations
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PLANT IPE CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY INFORMATION
.l a
i Iri-i coF c=e ne=ese F.e.ene, p= acessmes casse p eemee 0.e me se n e,ge,a-se en se i
Plant IPE l am l 7-= l ulca l== listwal -
=
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=
General Electric BWR 1 l
i og neck re.ni l s.4E45l5.t0E 073.e0E 08 S.50E m 4.32E45 negasten 1.10E4p tS 7%
12%
1B0%l -
0%l
{
0%
General Electric BWRs 2 and 3 (Isolation Condensers) i on,,e nase Peet 1 5.5E46 3.50E-08 5.40E 07 7.90E-07 7.00E-07 2.00E-00 noghetes 84 %
10%
14 %
13%
0%
0%
'[
Oystee Creek toes teste iIll '
3 SE OS 2 30E OS 2.40E 07 S.20E-07 2.50E-07 1.03E-07 2.10E-07 59 %
SH 23%
0%
3%
g%
Orenden 213 ISWR 31 1.9E-05 9.30E-07 5 30E-07 1.40E 05 1.SOE-08 4.34E-10 negagnie 5%
3%
S3%
9%
0%
0%
estseene 1 (SWR 38 1.1E 05 7.00E 06 0.00E 07 1.00E46 0 04E-07 1.30E-07 2.50E-07 05 %
7%
10 %
0%
15 2%
[
Flagran 1 (WWR 31 5.0E 05 neghghee 4.10E-08 5.05E-05 3 20E-00 1.00E-07 7 07E-07 0%
7%
80 %
SS 0%
1%
General Electric BWRs 3 and 4 asent.come 18WR 31 2.SE-05 1.20E 05 2.50E-06 3.47E46 1.20E-00 3.20E-10 8.00E48 40 %
10%
13%
SS 0%
20 %
Quod Cateos 1/2 town 31 1.2E-OS 5.72E 07 7.01E-00 2.95E-07 2.00E-07 noge tes neghghte 50 %
7%
20 %
18%
h s
0%
0%
Orowns Ferry 2 4.8E45 1.30E-05 1.30E-06 2.79E-05 4.80E-07 4.00E-00 4.70E-00 27%
3%
5t%
1%
0%
.10%
grunswick 112 2.M-05 1.00E G 7.00E-07 0.72E-00 t.90E-07 5.10E 00 1.90E-06 07%
3%
25 %
15 r
0%
7%
l Cooper -
8.0E-05 2.00E M 3.90E-OS 3.97Em B.33E-08 noghgelo neghgtie 35 %
5%
50%
10%
0%
0%
Duane Arnoed 7.0E-00 1.90E-08 1.90E-06 3.90E-00 1.00E-07 nega tle negughts 24 %
24 %
50%
2%
s 0%
0%
}
l
~ 0%
j Fernu 2 5.M OS 1.30E-07 1.00E-OS 3.50E-OS reghgelo 4%
25 k
2.00E-07 9.7M40 2%
32 %
et%
t Fhapetnck 1.9E OS 1.75E-00 1.20E-00 1.5 tE47 7.40E-09 negsgese negegete 91 %
1%
0%
9%
0%
0%
i 4
Hetch 1 2.2E-05 3.30E-08 5.10E 07 2.07E 05 2.22E-07 1.7 tE-07 1.20E47 IS%
2%
00%
1%
1%
1%
i t
k Hetch 2 2.4E-05 3.23E-00 S.3?E-07 1.90E-05 2.22E-07 1.77E 07 1.00E47 14 %
3%
00%
1%
1%
1%
j Hope Cseek 4.0E 45 3.30E-05 7.45E-07 4.4M48 3.03E-08 neghette 5.50E-07 78 %
1%
14 %
7%
0%
1%
timerick 112 4.3E-08 1.00E-07 9.30E-07 2.9M-08 1.20E47 negastes 1.00E-07 2%
22 %
00%
35 4
05 45 noggette 1.4M47 9%
28 %
52%
195 5
0%
35 i
ptoch tenem 2/3 5.OE-05 4.81E47 1.44E-00 2.8M48 5.92E47 Vermont Yentee 4.4E-08 8.24E-07 7.90E-07 2.70E-08 mi.42E-00 2.3M-OS negAgels 14 %
ISS 825 15 15 0%
t l
1 FILE:IPE-COF.Tel.
e
-s
1 l
PLANT IPE CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY INFORMATION j
c-o Do eSe e.e e e,
.eoise ciese e
- e. 0ese te e eece e,
- c.ees i
I=cm Plant IPE l== 1 moca l = as e = l a7= l = l taa l== lmma l = Etes l
=
a7=
mas toca Generd Electric BWR S 7%
j tossee n2 4.M45 3 eM45 1.e7E 07 7.30E48 2.e3E45 noessano 3.3sE46 Si%
0%
tot 0%
og,,, gene Pen,t 2 3.tE45 5.50E OS t.10E-06 2.3 TEM 7.40E47 2.50E 08 1.50E M 18%
4%
75 %
It 0%
-8%
W2 1.8E-05 1.10E M S.25E 07 2.83E OS 5.10E47 negagtes 2.52EM S3%
4%
15 %
3%
0%
14 %
General Electric BWR 6 I
Cg,,eo,,
2.M 05 9 00E OS l.40E 07 1.40E45 1.10E48 negRghts 1.00E-OS 38 %
1%
53%
4%
0%
0%
arene ouw I t.M OS 7.4eE OS 5.5eE OS s.3sE48
- 5. tee 47 negagnes 1.e0E.07 43%
og 3.g 3,
Perry 1 -
.l.3E-05 2 25E OS 4.70E OS 4.30E48 4.50E OF neguetee 1.50E-08 17%
30 %
33%
3%
- 0%
12%
ISver send 1.9E 05 1.35E 05 neghgets 2.0SE 08 noghette negsgeen 1.00E-00 87%
0%
13%
0%
0%
0%
Bobcock and Wilcox PWR 2-loop Afec t 4.M 05 1.58E-05 9 93E-07 1.48E-05 1.57E-05 9.20E-08 8.90E-OS 9.34E47. 34 %
2%
32%
34 %
0%
0%
2%
Cryotes ferver 3 3.5E-05 3.20E M noghget, 9.45E-07 9.00E-OS 9.70E47 negeghin 3 25E-00 23%
0%
8%
OSS 4%
0%
8%
3 54E 0?
5.7tE-05 5.24E-OS 4.80E-07 8.00E 07 2.00E40 1%
OS%
8%
15 1%
3%
Oev6s tesse 8.0E-05 Oconee 1.2.3 2.3E-05 2.57EM 1.00E-07 5.33E40 9.70E-00 2.10E-07 4.90E 10 5.00E48 11 %
0%
23%
42%
1%
0%
24 %
I 15s 4.5E-05 1.5 M-OS nogentle 2.30E-06 1.5MM S.94E-07 1.00E-07 3 00E.00 3%
0%
52%
35 %
2%
0%
7%
Combustion Engineering PWR 2-loop
(
4100 2 3.4E45 123E 08 1.02E48 2.9M-05 4.00E-OS 9.53E-08 3.30E 07 nogmente 4%
3%
79%
14%
0%
1%
0%
Coevert chtts 112 2.4E 04 2.40E-05 1.30E 04 S.SSE-05 4.40E-OS 1.90E-OS 1.59E-05 10 %
54 %
30%
2%
1%
0%
}
i 2%
SS%
8%
8%
9%
14 %
-[
2.89E-07 5.93E-Os 3.07E-OS 7.9M 07 S.74E-07 1.SM 08 Fort Coshoun 1 1.4E-05
}
StLucie 1 2.3E-05 2.SSE OS 4.13E-07 5.30E OS 1.2N 05 0.lGE-07 f.74E48 5.00E-07 12%
25 23%
SSS 4%
8%
25 t
St Lucie 2 2.eE-05 2.84E-OS 1.70E48 5.3tE-08 1.29E-05 0.90E47 2.73E46 5.00E47 10%
7%
20%
48%
3%
10 %
2%
heinstone 2 3.4E-05 4.3E-07 1.5E40 2.9E45 0.01548 5.2M47 0.00E48 2.00E47 15 4%
74 %
10 %
2%
0%
1%
f P.esedse 5.1E-05 9.ON48 4.00E-00 2.0M 05 1.57E-05 2.04E4B M47 M47 18%
0%
38%
31 %
45 0%
0%
t i
FILE: IPE.COF.v5L 04an Sep 30.199813-2Ipmi
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1 PLANT IPE CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY INFORMATION Inont CDF Cor. Dame.e ree e c, w=ede ames cerce t se ee.e oe e e.e o ef e.moeide ass.
Plant IPE soo at*s t-mCa
==
'saca m' amed ams ww e
me.
mv.
m.C.
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....M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
steeee en CDF ochsee:
- For Davis Besso. Calvert Chtts. & Fort Coahoun. separete 590 CDF was unewedstrie, so Transeen' For furtey #omt. the CDF Ested in the esec summary of the subnutth, which CDF and % CDF.ncludes SBO contreution corresponds to *e5 leyese of recovery." was used I'IThe database values for Oyster Creen do not appeer to melude the CDF for internet floods; the For Salem I & 2. the revised flood end plant CDFe Seted in the submittelletter for teio IP1 values bsted here include the CDF for intemel flood were used The Surry meernel flood CDF is from page 9 of 4/21rS2 NRR letter which bsts a revesed value t58 from 11/28/98 Surry ser,elyse subnuttet For Weits Ber. the CDf s from the revised tutwrmtial were used Deferred means that bconsee included hiernel flood enelysm si then IPEEE i
t L
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FILE:IPE CDF.TOL Man % 1ri togstst atame
.__....m.._...
___.._m_.
__m m.
m.
t Pt ANT IPE CONTAIN0AENT FAILURE FREQUEteCY INFORRAATION i
Care Damage Fwy By - FeSove IBodo Pweent of Case Damage Psessemey Per h Fehme Maes f
pg ng l
l IOCF Dypeos l
l LF piens IPE COF Sypese EF LF SICF EF Geneest Electetc. E sege Dey l
5.4E 05l 7.50E-Otl 2.32E-OSl noghg4eel 5 00E-06l 4%l.
0%l Set i
1%
SIO ROCK POINT Generet Electne. Deeet I 3
GROWNS FERRY 2 4.9E-05 4.40E 07 2.10E-05 1.25E-05 1.33E-05 1%
45%
20 %
29%
ORUNSWICK I&2 2 7E 05 6 21E 08 2.30E 06 1.03E 05 8 33E-06 1%
9%
90%
31 %
- [
COOPER 8 OE 05 neghytdo I.29E-05 5.77E 05 9 13E 06 0%
15%
72%
11 %
ORESDEN 2&3 19E 05 6
5 55E-07 1.5M M 2.04E M 0%
3%
M%
11 %
l OUANE ARNOLD 7.9E 06 neghgelo 3 57E OS 2 49E-08 1.SOE-08 0%
47%
32%
It%
FERhet 2 5 7E 06 2 00E-07 1.71E OS 2.22E 05 1.57E-05 4%
30%
39%
28 %
j
{
Fli2 PATRICK 19E 06 noghg4to 1.20E-05 4.10E-07 3 03E 07 0%
53%
22%
19 %
HATCH g 2 2E 05 t 35E 07 5 47E 08 5.70E OS 3.10E 05 1%
25 %
20 %
49%
g HATCH 2 2 4E 05 1.94E 07 5 00E-06 5 SIE OS 1.25E 05 1%
21 %
25 %
M HOPE CREEK 4 6E 05 noghpete 2.87E 05 1.20E 05 5 5eE-06 0%
S2%
20 %
12%
ASILLSTONE 1.1E 05 1.25E 07 3.74E 06 3.27E-06 3 87E-06 1%
34 %
30 %
35 %
GAONTICELLO 2.6E 05 5 20E 09 4.15E-06 S.24E-OS 1.50E-05 1%
IS%
24 %
00%
NINE SAILE POINT 1 5.5E 06 7.40E 00 1.31E-08 3.40E-OS 7.12E-07 1%
24 %
82%
13%
OYSTER CREEK
- 3. 7E-06
10%
26 %
St%
PEACH BOTTOM 2&3 5 SE 06 8 64E-09 1.55E-08 t.40E-05 2.57E-06 1%
20 %
25 %
40 %
i PILGRIM 5 OE 05 2.32E 07 1.25E-05 3.54E-05 9.00E-06 1%
22%
St%
17%
OUAD CITIES 162 1.2E-06 6 00E.10 2 84E-07 6.82E-07 2.53E-07 1%
24 %
55 %
21%
i 1
VERT 40NT YANKEE 4 3E 06 4 30E 00 211E 06 9.99E-07 1.18E-06 1%
49%
23%
27%
h l
t t
i
' [
I IPE-CFF.19L September 30.1996 i
p.a. t at t
..__._._m._..
=._=..m
.m
_m
.. ~.
Pt ANT IPE CONT AINMENT FAILURE FREQUENCY INFORMAll0N Cere Damage Freepsoney By Centehuisent Fasere Mode Poeceset of Core Desunge Feegmaysy PM W Fehme M Pient IPE CDF Sypees EF LE NCF Sypees l
l l
EF LF NQt Geneent Electele Mort N LA SALLE l&2 - 5305 I
4.7E 05 noghg4ee 166E-05 2.42E-05 8 64E-06 0%
' 35%
51 %
14 %
LIMERICK 1&2 4.3E 06 neghgele 3 96E 07 1.16E Ot>
2.75E 06 0%
9%
27%
S4%
rwtE MEE POINT 2 3 IE 05 2.79E 06 2.32E 06 2.04E OS
- 8. 30E-06 1%
7%
86 %
27%
WNP 2 18E 05 2 98E OS 5 34E 06 5 30E 06 6 83E-06 1%
31 %
30 %
39 %
Geseest Eleciele. Meek til 591 TON 2 SE-05 neghgele 8 27E-07 4 84E-07 2 4?E-05 0%
3%
2%
96 %
GRAND GUtF 1 17E 05 neghgete 8 05E 06 5 66E 06 3.51E 06 0%
47%
33%
20 %
PERRY 1 13E 05 nogheele 3 14E -06 4.76E 06 5.30E 06 0%
24 %
36 %
40 %
MfVER BEND 16E 05 neghgele 4.38E-06 2.14E 06 8 99E 06 0%
28%
14 %
58 %
PWR Ice Condenser i
1%l^
CATAWBA 1&2 4 3E 05 7.71E-Os 2.31E-07 2.02E-05 2.27E-05 1%
47%
$3%
D C. COOK 1&2 6 3E 05 7.11E 06 9.26E-07 1.13E OS 5.40E 05 11 %
1%
2%
80 %
MCGUIRE 1&2 4 OE-05 9 60E-07 9 50E-07 1.64E-05 2.20E-05 2%
2%
40%
54 %
SEQUOYAH 1&2 1.7E 04 7.99E-06 2 81E-06 8 32E-05 7.60E-05 5%
2%
49%
45%
WATTS BAR 1&2 8 OE-05 5 95E 06 4.03E 06 1.72E-05 5.27E OS 7%
5%
22%
46 %
PWR - Subetmospheelc OEAVER VALLEY 1 2.1 E -04 1.02E-05 4.73E-05 9.15E-05 6.17E 45 5%
23%
44 %
29 %
8EAVER VALLEY 2 1.9E 04 9 84E 06 4.74E 05 8.54E 05 4.69E-05 5%
25 %
45%
25 %
NORTH ANNA 1&2 68E05 8 98E-06 1.05E 06 7.68E 06 5.03E-05 13%
2%
11 %
74 %
SURRY 1&2 MsLLSTONE 3 5 6E-05 3.99E-07 2.24E-08 1.10E-05 4.4 ?E-05 1%
1%
20 %
30%
Pt ANIIPE CONTAINMENT FAKURE FREOUENCY WFORMATION h
pi,
Core Deenste Freesency Sy Cenessunent Femme neede Percene of Core Ousente T
_,For h Femme asede i
l Plent tPE CDF j
Sypsas EF LF NCF Sypees EF LF IOCF P W R.terge Dry ARKANSAS NUCLE AR ONE 1 4 9E 05 2 DeE 07 3.03EM 5.95E 00 3 98EM 1%
8%
12%
81 %
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE 2 3 7E 05 4 07E 07 4 51E 08 5.14E 00 2.89E-05 1%
12%
14%
73%
ORAt0 WOOD t&2 2.7E-05 1.10E 00 5 40E-08 2.54E-08 2.48E 05 1%
1%
9%
90%
SYRON 1&2 3.1E-05 1.24E-00 2.13E-07 2.50E-00 2 52E M 1%
1%
0%
91%
CAtt AWA y 5.9E 05 1.17E M 1.17E 07 3.09E-05 2 83E-05 2%
1%
53%
48 %
CALVERT CtFFS 1&2 2.4E 04 7.44EM 2.11E-05 9.53E-05 1.18E-04 3%
9%
40 %
4e%
6 COMANCHE PEAK 1&2 5.7E-05 4.87E M 6.75E 07 2.93E-05 2.20E M 5%
1%
51%
39%
CRYSTAL river 3 1.5E M5 7.39E-07 5 53E-C7 9 58E-08 4.42E-08 5%
4%
53%
29%
OAVIS SESSE 8 SE-05 1.72E OS 415E 08 4 SSE 08 5.52E-05 3%
8%
3%
S4%
OlA8tO CANYON 1&2 8 BE-05 163E 08 1.0lE-05 3 90E-05 3 85E-05 2%
11%
45%
41%
FARLEy 1&2 1.2E 04 4.47E 07 7.19E-04 3 90EM 1.20E 04 1%
8%
3%
Set FORT CALHOUN 1 1 4E-05 1.44E 08 2.23E-07 3.80E-08 8.13E-08 11%
2%
28 %
80%
L OlNNA 8 7E 05 3.71E-05 2.87E-06 1.27E-05 3 50E 05 42%
3%
15%
40 %
H.S. ROSINSON 2 3.2E-04 8.37E 08 4.19E M 3.20EM 2.40E-04 2%
13%
10%
75 %
HA00AM NECK 1.8E -04 1.114 45 1.21E-06 9.70E-05 7.0IE-05 4%
1%
54 %
39 %
INotAN POINT 2 31E-05 1.94E OG 5 81EM 2.82E 00 2.85E-05 8%
1%
9%
85 %
INotAN POINT 3 4.4E-05 2 44E-04 3.12E-07 1.07EM 3.05EM 8%
1%
24 %
09%
KEWAUNEE 6.8E-05 5.29E-08 1.40E 00 3.22E-05 2.00E M 8%
1%
49%
43%
MAINE YANKEE 7.4E 05 1.21E-08 5.79E-06 3.54E-05 3.18E-05 2%
3%
48%
42%
MILLSTONE 2 3.4E-05 7.88E-07 3.22E 08 1.11E-05 1.91E-05 2%
9%
32%
54 %
OCONEE 1.2.&3 2.3E-05 4 80E.10 2.81E-07 1.71E-05 5.81E-00 0%
1%
74 %
24 %
PALISADES 5.1E-05 2 89EM 1.87E M 7.90E-06 2.35E-05 8%
33%
15 %
40%
1 PALO VER0E 1.2.53 9.0E-05 3.20E 00 9.41E-08 1.21EM 8.53E-05 4%
10%
13%
73%
POINT DEACH 1&2 1.0E-04 6.32E-OS 3.24E45 1.81E-05 7.97E45 et 15 17%
77%
PRAmfE ISLANO 1&2 4.9E-05 2.19E-05 4.15E-07 1.1tE-05 1.54E-08 44 %
1%
22%
31 %
IPE-CFF.TOL Septevreer 30.1996 e
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a OPEN ALLEGATIONS AS OF 10/L /9o ALLEGATION: RII %-A-0145 FACILITY:
ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD:
%0628
SUBJECT:
RESPONSE TIE TESTING ON SAFETY-RELATED. TS TRANSMITTERS NOT DUE DATE:
% 1028 PERFORED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ADEO PROCEDURE. UNCOMPENSATED DAYS OPEN:
111 ACTION PNDG:
RESIDENT INS ISS 2, 3. DRS PROVIDE INPUT TOORP IR:% 14 RSP DIV:
L-DRP/PB3 LCA:
8/14/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 10/13/% CLOSURE ALLEGATION: RIl %-A-0150 FACILITY:
ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD:
960709
SUBJECT:
CONTAINE NT RAD MONITORS CANNOT BE SAFELY WORKED ON. Cn. ur DUE DATE:
% 1210 U1 CONTROL RH RAD MONITORS WAS PERFORED BASED ON VERBAL DAYS OPEN:
100 ACTION PNDG:
ISS 1-OSHA CONCERN. RESIDENT INFORM MANAGEE NT OF CONCERN.
DRS/PSB INSPT ISSUES 2-4. IR: 96-17 4
RSP DIV:
L DRS/PSB. DRP/PB3 LCA:
8/12/% ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 12/02/% CLOSURE ALLEGATION: RIl-96-A-0154 FACILITY:
ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD:
960716
SUBJECT:
MAINT PERSONNEL DIRECTED PULL WORK RE0 VEST / TAGS FROM EQUIP DUE DATE:
961018 THAT ARE GREATER THAN 8-MNTHOLD. DIRECTED TO SPRAY VALVES DAYS OPEN:
93 ACTION PNDG:
DRP/PB3 RESIDENT FOLLOWUP ISS 1. ISSUE 2 MAY BE EPA ISSUE.RI l
FOLLOWUP. IR:%-14 i
RSP DIV:
L-DRP/PB3 LCA:
8/27/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 10/18/% CLOSURE i
ALLEGATION: RII-96 A-0180 FACILITY:
ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD:
960822
SUBJECT:
REVISED EERGENCY PLAN DECREASES THE PLAN'S EFFECTIVENESS.
)
DUE DATE:
961210 NRC APPROVAL OF PLAN REVISION WAS NOT OBTAINED. DECREASE IN DAYS OPEN:
56 ACTION PNDG:
DRS/PSB INSPECTION SCHEDULED 10/7/96 (2 WEEKS)
IR:96-17 4
RSP DIV:
DRS/PSB l
LCA:
8/29/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 12/02/% CLOSURE ALLEGATION: RII-96-A-0191 FACILITY:
ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD:
960903
SUBJECT:
ALGR FAILED PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST AFTER 2 ATTEMPTS. AFTER DUE DATE:
961203 FAILING 2ND ATTEMPT. WAS REASSIGNED & THEN LAID OFF. FILED DAYS OPEN:
44 ACTION PNDG:
DRS/ SIB UNCERTAIN BASED ON PLAN REVIEW. DRS/ SIB TO INSPECT RSP DIV:
DRS/ SIB LCA:
09/26/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 12/03/96 CLOSURE ALLEGATION: R!l-96-A 0192 FACILITY:
ST LUCIE 1 DATE RCVD:
960904
SUBJECT:
POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED H2O FROM EDG CATC MENT IS RELEASED DUE DATE:
961204 FROM RCA WITHOUT PROPER SCREENING. ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN DA75 DPEN:
43 ACTION PNDG:
DRS/PSB INSP BASED ON CONDITION REPORT THAT DRUMS HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THE RCA & THAT MANGEMENT HAD BEEN INFORMED RSP DIV:
DRS/PSB LCA:
9/26/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 12/19/96 CLOSURE ALLEGATION: RIl-96-A-0194 FACILITY:
ST LUCIE DATE RCVD:
960904
SUBJECT:
FP&L HAS NOT RESPONDED TO INDIVIDUAL'S APPEAL OF FIRING AS DUE DATE:
961210 RESULT OF URINE SAMPLE WHICH REPORTEDLY SHOWED SIGNS OF DAVS OPEN:
43 ACTION PNDG:
DRS/ SIB INSPECT RSP DIV:
DRS/ SIB 6 LCA:
9/27/96:ACK LTR ACTION DUE DATE: 11/30/96 CLOSURE 1
j EFORCEENT HISTORY EA 95-026 - Weaknesses in the control of maintenance and testing that resulted in inoperability of both of the U1 PORVs during periods that the PORVs were relied upon to provide low tenperature overpressure protection (CP issued on 11/13/95: SL III: $50.000)
EA %-003 - Overdilution event occurred when a licensed operator left the controls without informing his relief that a dilution.was.in progress (CP issued on 3/18/96: SL III: $50,000)
ATTA00ENT 6 4
I h
ST LUCIE MAJOR' ASSESSMENTS i
DATE' TYPE OF ASSESSENT JULY 1995 INPO ASSESSENT - CATEGORY 1 AUGUST 1995 DR. CHOU ANALYSIS BY REGION II TO IDENTIFY ROOT CAUSES OF TE RECENT DECLIE IN I
PERFORMANCE AND MULTIPLE EVENTS i
The team concluded that the predoeinant root cause for the events observed at St Lucie was insufficient detail and scope in site oroarass and procedures. Th~is causal factor i
was found to result in recent events which demonstrated deficiencies in the following areas.
1 e
job skills, work practices, and decision making:
~
i interface among organizations as evidenced by a lack of interface formality:
j e
i e
organizational authority for program implementation as evidenced by instances i
of unclear responsibility and accountability.
j AUGUST 1995 LICENSEE SELF-ASSESSENT: A SPECIAL TEAN PERFORNED AN ASSESSENT OF OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS AND IDENTIFIED ROOT CAUSES: MANAGEENT AND STAFF COMPLACENCY - POOR PERFORMANCE, i
ACCEPTING LONGSTAEING EQUIPENT PROBLEMS, AND NOT KEEPING UP WITH IEUSTRY INPROVEENTS.
i I
t I
I
GENERIC ISSUES ST. LUCIE ISSUE STATUS NRC Bulletin 92 Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 The licensee has identified those areas with installed thermo-lag and implemented compensatory measures IAW NRC Bulletin 92-01 and Supplement 1.
Compensatory measures will remain in effect until en acceptable solution is implemented.
o NRCB 92-01, response dated July 27, 1992 e
NRCB 92-01 Supp 1, response dated September 29, 1992 GL 92 Thermo-Lag 330-1 The licensee has outstanding commitments to GL 92-00 in the following areas:
Update response on status of ampacity, exemptions and schedule for modifications e
(5/30/96) ontt 1 Evaluate Thermo-Lag barriers to NEI App. guide or select alternate option (due 1/30/97) e Determine acceptability of Thermo-Lag well configurations and radiant heat shields e
e combustibility losues (due 1/31/97)
Complete evaluations and submit Thermo-Lag exemptions (due 4/30/97) e Complete design changes to support implementation of modification during spring 1998 e
outage (Spring 1998) e Submit summary report to NRC within 100 days of end of Spring 1998 outage (due ISO days after breaker closed Spring 1993)
Unit 2 Evaluate Thermo-Lag barriers to NEI App. guide or select alternate option (due 5/31/96) e e
Submit Thermo-Lag exemptions (due S/30/96) i Complete design changes to support implementation of modification during spring 1997
{
e outage (Spring 1997)
Unit 2 - Submit summary report to NRC within 100 days of and of Spring 1997 outage (due e
150 days after breaker closed Spring 1997)
NRC Bulletin 96 Control Rod Insertion N/A Action requested from Westinghouse-designed plants only.
f Problems i
GL 39-10 Safety Related MOVs Testing &
The licensee has completed the design bases verification of safety-related motor operated Surveillance valves (MOVs) and is available to meet with the NRC to discuss alternatives for closing the NRC GL 89-10 program, i
e GL response, dated February 2, 1994 (Unit 1) o GL response, dated March 14, 1996 (Unit 2)
Unit 1 Completed during the Fall 1994 refueling outage (SL1-13)
L malt 2 Completed during the Fall 1995 refueling outage (SL2-9) g;nsric iss PWR
ST. LUCIE ISSUE STATUS Gr,. 95 Pressure Locking and Thermal The licensee has completed the assessment sad evaluation of both Unit 1 and Unit 2 power Linding (PL/TB) of SR Power Operated Gate operated valves (POVs) susceptible to PL/TB.
Valves e
GL response, dated Pobruary 13, 1996 The licensee has outstanding commitments to GL 92-07 in the following areas:
Dalt 2 Schedule submitted including justification for modification to shutdown cooling valves e
V.3400 V-3652 and V-3651 during Spring 1997 refueling outage (BL2-10)
Bormflex Borsfler installed on Unit 1 in 1988.
Two successful blackness testing campaigne completed (5 year surveillance). Upper 15 inches of one panel discovered missing. Engineering Rvaluation (JPN-P5L-SEPJ-95-023 Rev. 3) completed March 5, 1996. Licensee reviewed manufacturer's fabrication records and concluded that the missing boraflex in PSL1 spent fuel pool was an isolated incident and did not affect SPF criticality.
Boraflex not installed on Unit 2.
m
w ST. LUCIE I'
l ISSUE STATUS spent Fuel Full Offload Permitted From the UFSAR:
Dait 1 Two thermal analyses were performods the Normal Batch Discharge and the Full Core Discharge.
1 In the case of the Normal match Discharge, the analysis assumes 80 assemblies each have been discharged from the core in 18 month intervals. A refuellag batch of 80 assemblies is added 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> after reactor shutdown. This analysis shows a maximum pool bulk temperature of 133.3 degrees F with the fuel pool cooling system in service.
For the Full Core Discharge, assuming that 73 of the assemblies have 90 days of irradiation. 72 have 21 months of irradiation and the remaining 72 assemblies have 39 months of irradiation (217 assemblies totall, the analysis shows a maximum pool bulk temperature of 150.8 degrees F with the fuel pool cooling system in service.
i hit 2 Two thermal analyses have been performeds the Normal and the Accident Case Assumptions.
The Normal Case assumess a.
11 batches (each 1/3 core) discharged b.
Most recent batch cooling for five days after shutdown c.
Adiabatic heat up of the pool l
The analysis shows a maximum pool bulk temperature of 131 degrees F with the fuel pool cooling system in service.
j The Accident Case assumess a.
11 batches plus one full core discharged b.
One (1) core cools for 7 days ce Most recent 1/3 core batch cools for SO days f
This analysis shows a maximum pool bulk temperature of 148 degrees F with the fuel pool cooling system in service.
The licensee has furnished a tabulated SFP Storage Date on both Units for PM on site inspection i
the week of March 25, 1996.
Improved Standardized Technical Specifications No Licenses commitment f
r l
P
[
gen:ric.iss PWR i
ST. LUCIE i
ISSUE STATUS Steam Generator Issues wmC Bulletin 89 Westinghouse Alloy 500 The licensee has addressed the predicted service life of Thermally Treated (TT) Alloy 500 Steam Generator Mechanical Tube Plugs Mechanical Tube Plugs identified by Westinghouse.
Unit 1 Tube plug repair plan formulated for April 1995 refueling outage. All plugs e
will be visuelty inspected and repaired or replaced, if leaking.
Both SGe scheduled for replacement let quarter 1998.
o Unit 2 No installed Westinghousa mechanical plugs.
e GL 95 Circumferential Cracking of Steam The licenses has addressed the detection and slaing of circumferential indications to determine Generator Tubes applicability including the requested RAI dated Emptember 25, 1995. No tube leaks have occurred on either unit due to circumferential cracks.
The licensee has outstanding commitments to GL 95-03 in the following areas:
Unit 1 100% tube inspection of all active tubes using both full length bobbin coil and e
conventional motorised rotating pancake coil (NRPC) technique for selected bobbin indications, i.e. 100% Ret Leg and 3% Cold Leg, during Spring 1996 outage.
Maintenance Rule Program defined and implemented. Resident Inspectors confirmed. A Raintenance Rule Team inspection completed on 9/20/96. Although the licensee's maintenance rule implementation program found to be satisfactory three apparent violations were identified in the areas of program design isues, system scoping issues, and procedure implementation.
t IPERE Submitted PSL-IPERE Rev. O, submitted December 1994 which met the objectives of GL 88-20, Supplement 4.
The licensee has one outstanding commitment to GL 88-20, supplement 4, in response to RAI dated January 9, 1995.
Action 1 The Engineering evaluation has been completed to allow use of the station blackout cromotie between the units to mitigate an IPERE fire and plant operating procedure changes are scheduled to be completed by August 1995.
..-. ~ -.
I j
l l
ENCLOSURE 2 i
i f
Docket Nos.:
50-389 I
SALP REPORT l
LICENSEE:
Florida Power & Light Company
]
REVIEWER:
Patricia Campbell i
FUNCTIONAL ACTIVITY:
SAFETY EVALUATION OF THE INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAN t
RELIEF REQUESTS FOR PUNPS AND VALVES ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNIT 2 TAC No. M-84563 AND M-85670 FACILITY NAME:
St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2 j
SUffiARY OF REVIEW / INSPECTION ACTIVITIES This SALP input is for the St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, Inservice Testing (IST)
)
program for pumps and valves.
The review was conducted by the Mechanical Engineering Branch with assistance from its contractor, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL).
NARRATIVE DISCUSSION OF LICENSEES PERFORMANCE - FUNCTIONAL AREA i
SAFETY ASSESSMENT /0UALITY VERIFICATION The relief requests generally contained sufficient information for evaluation of the proposal. The particular subjects of the relief requests were not unusual in comparison to other IST programs. Overall, the program would be considered j
good.
An updated IST Program for the second ten-year interval is expected by August 1993.
The licensee should review the SE/TER to incorporate any action j
items into the revised program, j
i 1.
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1
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