ML20128F018

Proposed Tech Specs Changing Table 3.3.7.9-1 to Add Four Smoke Detectors in Area 1A12

ML20128F018
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	07/03/1985
From:	MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20128F010	List: AECM-85-0168, Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-29,changing Tech Spec Table 3.3.7.9-1 to Add Four Smoke Detectors in Area 1A12.Fee Paid ML20128F013 ML20128F018
References
TAC-59184, TAC-59185, TAC-59186, TAC-59187, NUDOCS 8507080093
Download: ML20128F018 (17)

Text

.

! . (nw-n/o4Q TABLE 3.3.7.9-1 (Continued)

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION l

MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE

• CI) f ROOM ELEV ROOM NAME HEAT FLAME (1) SM0KE TX79) (X/Y) (X/Y) 16/0

12. Zone 2-17 1A101 93' Passage 1A109 93' HPCS Pump Rm.

1A111 93' Piping Penetration Rm.

1A114 93' Fan Coil Area (Partial) 1A117 93' Misc. Equip. Area (Partial) 1A121 103' East Corridor 1A122 103 South Corridor (Partial) 1A123 103' North Corridor (Partial) 20/0

13. Zone 2-18 1A201 119' East Corridor 1A211 119' North Corridor (Par'.ial) 1A215 119' South Corridor (Partial) 13/0

14. Zone 2-19 1A314 139' South Corridor (Partial) 1A316 139' North Corridor (Partial) 1A321 139' MCC Area 1A322 139' Centrifugal Chiller Area 1A323 139' SGTS Area 1A324 139' HVAC Equip. Area

.1A326 139' SGTS Area 2/0

15. Zone 2-20 1A305 139' Steam Tunnel "JCNS ERT

d. DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING

1. Zone 2-10 M

1D301 133' Corridor 0/3 (Deluge) l 10304 133' Day Tank Area (NPE-SS/ll -

! 1D306 133' Div. III Diesel Gen. Room 1D401 158' Div. III Diesel Gen.

Room 0/7 (Deluge) 6/0

2. 2-11 i

1D303 133' Day Tank Area 1D308 133' Div. II Diesel Gen. Room 10402 158' Div. 11 Diesel Gen.

0/7 (Delcge) 8507000093 850703 - 9oom PDR ADOCK 05000416 P PDR GRAND GULF-UNII 1 3/4 3-87 Apexdmed b - i

1. (NPE-85/04)

INSERT to page 3/4 87 MINIMUM INSTRUMENT OPERABLE

• ROOM ELEV ROOM NAME HEAT FLAME SMOKE (

(X/Y) (X/Y) (X/Y)

16. Zone 2-21 4/0 1A12 185' Stairwell 1A12 208' Stairwell 1A12 245' Stairwell J

t J0P13 MISC 85031502 - 1

2. (NPE-85/12)-

SUBJECT:

Technical Specification Table 3.8.4.1-1, page 3/4 8-26 DISCUSSION: This technical specification change results from a design change to the plant and is planned for implementation in an outage presently scheduled to commence in October, 1985.

It is proposed to add primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection circuit breaker number 52-1252-27 for the Horizontal Fuel Transfer System (HFTS) main console 480 VAC power circuit to the subject table.

. JUSTIFICATION: The proposed change will ensure adequate surveillance of the subject breaker when the design change enhancing the safety of operation of the HFTS is completed. The current HFTS design has a fuel bundle upending mechanism which incorporates a mechanical cam plate and pivot pin actuation device. The design change will replace this device with two (2) hydraulic servo mechanisms which will substantially- increase the stability and reliability of the upending assembly. These servos will be driven by two (2) hydraulic power units located inside containment and powered by a 480 VAC circuit from the HFTS main console. The breaker provides redundant overcurrent protection to the associated electrical penetration in accordance with MP&L com-mitments to Regulatory Guide 1.63.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION:

The design change is being performed in accordance with appropriate regulatory and industry codes and standards.and the Grand Gulf Quality Assurance Program. The circuit design meets the requirements described in the GGNS FSAR. As such, it is included in the current licensing bases and bounded by existing safety analyses. The proposed change to the technical specifications does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated or create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, nor does it involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change involves no significant hazards considerations.

L J0P10PMI85052808 - 8

2, (NPE -8s/' /2)

TABLE 3.8.4.1-1 (Continued)

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

c. 480 VAC Circuit Breakers (Continued)

Molded Case, Type NZM TRIP RESPONSE BREAKER SETPOINT TIME SYSTEM / COMPONENT NUMBER (Amperes) (Seconds) AFFECTED 52-1251-13 800 0.100 CNTMT CLR FAN COIL UNIT FAN (N1M418001C-N) 52-1251-15 32 0.100 M0V - RWCS HX INL ISOL VLV (N1G33F256-N) 52-1251-18 38 0.100 M0V - REGEN HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS (Q1G33F107-N) 52-1251-19 38 0.100 MOV - RWCU DRAIN FLOW ORIFICE BYP (N1G33F0.31-N) 52-1251-20 320 0.100 CNTMT EQUIP DRAIN PUMP (N1P45C004B-N) 52-1251-22 32 0.100 MOV - RWCU TO FLT "S" ISOL VLV (N1G33F255-N) 52-1251-26 1200 0.100 LIGHTING XFMR 1X112 (N1R18S112-D) 52-1251-28 5 0.100 M0V - STM TUNNEL COOLER INLET (N1P44F105B-N) 52 1252-23 60 0.100 DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN SUMP PUMP (N1P45C001B-N) _

E2-1252-27 Soo 0.too 4 FUEL TRANSFER 52-1411-01 '

38 0.100 M0V - VESSEL HEAD Sys MW CONSOLE VENTILATION (N/F//E0/5-MC)

(Q1821F002-N) -

+

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 8-26 M e b e d M8'-

3. (NPE-85/11)

SUBJECT:

Technical Specification Table 3.3.7.9-1, page 3/4 3-87 DISCUSSION:

This technical specification change results from a design change to replace the three (3) smoke detectors in the diesel generator corridor with three (3) flame detectors and is planned for implementation during an outage currently scheduled to commence in October, 1985.

It is proposed to change the minimum instrument operable requirement for zone 2-10 of the diesel generator building in the subject table from 6/0 flame detectors and 3/0 smoke detectors to 9/0 flame detectors. (Please note that attached technical specification page 3/4 3-87 is also affected by change NPE-85/04, item 1 of this submittal, and has been marked to reflect both changes.)

JUSTIFICATION:

As reported in LER 82-050/99 X-1, dated August 29, 1983, diesel generator exhaust fumes drif t into the corridor between the diesel generator and auxiliary buildings and contaminate the smoke detectors, thereby causing false alarms. The design change for which this technical specification is required will replace those smoke detectors with flame detectors which are not sensitive to dust or fumes. Flame detectors are adequate for the fire detection function. MP&L will submit a change to GGNS FSAR Appendix 9A at the next annual update to reflect this change from smoke to flame detectors.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS C0:ISIDERATION:

The proposed change is an operational enhancement which will lessen the frequency of occurrence of false fire alarms. The design change will be performed in accordance with applicable industry and regulatory codes and standards, the GGNS Ouality Assurance Program and the requirements of the GGNS FSAR. It is consistent with the licensing basis and the safety analyses. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated or create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, nor does it involve a reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change involves no significant hazards considerations.

J0P14 MISC 85042201 - 4

j, (NPE -8Sll1)

TABLE 3.3.7.9-1 (Continued)

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION l MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE

• ROOM ELEV ROOM NAME HEAT FLAME (1) SM0KE(1)

[X7f) [X/77 (X/Y)

12. Zone 2-17 16/0 1A101 93' Passage 1A109 93' HPCS Pump Rm.

1A111 93' Piping Penetration Rm.

1A114 93' Fan Coil Area (Partial) 1A117 -93' Misc. Equip. Area (Partial) 1A121 103' East Corridor 1A122 103 South Corridor (Partial) 1A123 103' North Corridor (Partial)

13. Zone 2-18 20/0 1A201 119' East Corridor 1A211 119' North Corridor (Partial) 1A215 119' South Corridor (Partial)

14. Zone 2-19 13/0 1A314 139' South Corridor (Partial) 1A316 139' North Corridor (Partial) 1A321 139' MCC Area 1A322 139' Centrifugal Chiller Area 1A323 139' SGTS Area 1A324 139' HVAC Equip. Area 1A326 139' SGTS Area

15. Zone 2-20 2/0 1A305 139' Steam Tunnel (IMSERT frem NPE-SS/oY j Lem 1 of + U.s sdm ', Ma h

d. DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING

1. Zone 2-10 -WG-10301 133' Corridor 0/3 (Deluge) 1D304 133' Day Tank Area 10306 133' Div. III Diesel Gen. Room 10401 158' Div. III Diesel Gen.

Room 0/7 (Deluge)

2. 2-11 6/0 1D303 133' Day Tank Area 1D308 13b' Div. II Diesel Gen. Room 10402 158' Div. II Diesel Gen.

Room 0/7 (Deluge)

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 3-87 Ahwedmeld MO -

~

4.- (NLS-85/06)

SUBJECT:

Technical Specification Table 3.6.4-1, pages 3/4 6-31, 35, 39 and 43 DISCUSSION:

-This technical specification change results from a design change to extend the RHR "C" and LPCS test return lines to the suppression pool to ensure that they will maintain a water seal during accident conditions and is planned for implementation during an outage currently scheduled to commence in October, 1985.

It is proposed that footnote "d" be added to valves E12-F021-B, E21-F012-A, E12-F064C-B, E21-F011-A, E12-F280 and 281, E21-F217 and 218, and that footnote "c" be added to valves E12-F311 and 304 and E21-F222 and 221. This revises the required local leak rate test method from pneumatic to hydrostatic.

JUSTIFICATION:

The RHR "C" and LPCS test return lines currently terminate above the minimum suppression pool water level analyzed for accident conditions.

This necessitated that the~ associated valves be pneumatically tested since a water seal of the lines could not be assured. The design change will add sufficient pipe to the lines to ensure that the line exits will remain under water during accident conditions but will terminate high enough to allow normal test flow to discharge into the suppression pool.

The proposed change will allow credit for the water seal and less restrictive leak testing in accordance with tt.e requirements of ASME Section XI.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION:

The design change is an enhancement that is conservative in nature since it will ensure that a water seal of potential containment leakage paths will be maintained during accident conditions. The supporting technical spec 1fication change will allow less restrictive testing in accordance with the applicable requirements of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and 10 CFR 50 Appendix J. The proposed change is consistent with the requirements of ASME Section XI and therefore provides consistency with the licensing bases and the safety analyses.

The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated or create the possibility of an new or different kind of accident from any accident.previously evaluated, nor does it involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change involves no significant hazards considerations.

J0P14 MISC 85042201 - 6

h, (NLS - 85/06)

TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES MAXIMUM SYSTEM AND PENETRATION ISOLATION TIME VALVE NUMBER NUMBER VALVE GROUP (a) (Seconds)

Containment (Continued) .

Main Steam Line B21-F016-B 19(I) 1 20 Drains RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F028A-A 20(I) 5 90 "A" to LPCI RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F037A-A 20(I) 3 74 "A" to LPCI RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F028B-3 21(I) 5 90 "B" to LPCI RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F037B-B 21(I) 3 74 "B" to LPCI RHR "A" Test Line E12-F024A-A 23(0)(d) 5 90 to Supp. Pool RHR "A" Test Line E12-F011A-A 23(0)(d) 5 36 to Supp. Pool RHR "C" Test Line E12-F021-B 24(0) 5 144 to Supp. Pool HPCS Test Line E22-F023-C 27(0)(d) 6B 75 RCIC Pump Suction E51-F031-A 28(0)(d) 4 56 RCIC Turbine E51-F077-A 29(0)(c) 9 26 Exhaust LPCS Test Line E21-F012-A 32(0) 5 144 Cont. Purge and M41-F011-(A) 34(0) 7 4 Vent Air Supply Cont. Purge and M41-F012-(B) 34(I) 7 4 Vent Air Supply Cont. Purge and M41-F034-(B) 35(I) 7 4 Vent Air Exh.

Cont. Purge and M41-F035-(A) 35(0) 7 4 Vent Air Exh.

Plant Service P44-F070-B 36(I) 6A 33 Water Return Plant Service P44-F069-A 36(0) 6A 33 Water Return Plant Service P44-F053-A 37(0) 6A 33 Water Supply Chilled Water P71-F150-(A) 38(0) 6A 12 i Supply GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-31 Amendment No. _

Io f (NL S -25/06)

TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES SYSTEM AND PENETRATION VALVE NUMBER NUMBER

2. Manual Isolation Valves (9)#

a. Containment Main Steam Lines E32-F001A-A 5(0)

Main Steam Lines E32-F001E-A 6(0)

Main Steam Lines E32-F001J-A 7(0)

Main Steam Lines E32-F001N-A 8(0)

Feedwater Inlet B21-F065A-A 9(0)

Feedwater Inlet B21-F065B-A RHR Pump "A" E12-F004A-A 10(0)(d) 11(0)

Suction RHR Pump "B" E12-F004B-B 12(0)(d)

Suction RHR Pump "C" E12-F004C-B 13(0)(d)

Suction RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F042A-A 20(I)

"A" to LPCI RHR Heat Ex. "A" E12-F027A-A 20(0) to LPCI RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F0428-B 21(I)

"B" to LPCI RHR Heat Ex. "B" E12-F0278-8 21(0) to LPCI RHR Pump "C" to E12-F042C-B 22(0)

LPCI RHR "A" Test Line E12-F064A-A 23(0)(d)

To Suppr. Pool RHR "C" Test Line E12-F064C-2 24(0)g)

To Suppr. Pool HPCS Suction E22-F015-C 25(0)(d)

HPCS Discharge E22-F004-C HPCS Test Line E22-F012-C 26(0)(d) 27(0)

RCIC Turbine Exh. E51-F068-A 29(0)(c)

LPCS Pump Suction E21-F001-A 30(0)(d)

LPCS Pump E21-F005-A 31(0)

Discharge LPCS Min. Flow E21-F011-A 32(0) g CRD Pump C11-F083-A 33(0)

Discharge CCW Supply P42-F066-A 44(0)

CCW Return P42-F067-A 45(0)

CCW Return P42-F068-B RCIC Pump E51-F019-A 45(I)(d) 46(0)

Discharge Min. Flow Reactor Recirc. B33-F128-B 47(I)

Post Accident i Sampling GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-35 Amendment No. ___

v. Ong-ss/oD

. TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES SYSTEM AND PENETRATION VALVE NUMBER NUMBER Containment (Continued)

RHR Pump "A" Test E12-F227 23(0)(*)

Line to Suppr.

Pool RHR Pump "A" Test E12-F262 23(0)(*) ,

Line to Suppr.

Pool-RHR Pump "A" Test E12-F228 23(0)(*)

Line to Suppr.

Pool RHR "A" Test Line E12-F290A-A 23(0)(d) to Supp. Pool RHR Pump "A" Test E12-F338 23(0)(c)

Line to Suppr.

Pool RHR Pump "A" Test E12-F339 23(0)(c)

Line to Suppr.

Pool RHR Pump "A" Test E12-F260 23(0)(*)

Line to Suppr.

Pool RHR Pump "C" Test E12-F280 24(0) g)

Line to Suppr.

Pool RHR Pump "C" Test E12-F281 24(0)

Line to Suppr.

Pool HPCS Suction E22-F014 25(0)(d)

HPCS Discharge E22-F005-(C) 26(I)

HPCS Discharge E22-F218 26(I)

HPCS Discharge E22-F201 26(I)

HPCS Test Line E22-F035 27(0)(d)

HPCS Test Line E22-F302 27(0)((,))

HPCS Test Line E22-F301 27(0)(,)

LPCS Pump Suction E21-F031 30(0) d LPCS Discharge E21-F006-(A) 31(I)

LPCS Discharge E21-F200 31(I)

LPCS Discharge E21-F207 31(I)g)

LPCS Test Line E21-F217 LPCS Test Line E21-F218 32(0) 32(0) N CR0 Pump C11-F122 33(I)

Discharge PSW Supply P44-F043 37(I)

Plant Chilled P71-F151 38(I)

Water Supply Service Air- P52-F122 41(I)

Supply GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-39 Amendment No. _

--mr ---~"- -ewa wre

4. (NLs-85/od TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES 1 l

SYSTEM AND PENETRATION VALVE NUMBER NUMBER

4. Test Connections (9)

a. Containment

, Main Steam T/C B21-F025A 5(0)

Main Steam T/C B21-F025B 6(0)

Main Steam T/C B21-F025C 7(0)

Main Steam T/C B21-F025D 8(0)

Feedwater T/C B21-F030A 9(0)

Feedwater T/C B21-F063A 9(0)

Feedwater T/C B21-F063B 10(0)

Feedwater T/C B21-F030B 10(0)

RHR Shutdown Cool. E12-F002 14(0)

Suction T/C RCIC Steam Line E51-F072 17(0)

T/C RHR to Head E12-F342 18(0)

Spray T/C RHR to Head E12-F061 18(0)

Spray T/C LPCI "C" T/C E12-F056C RHR "A" Pump E12-F322 22(0)(c) 23(0)

Test Line T/C RHR "A" Pump E12-F336 23(0)(c)

Test Line T/C RHR "A" Pump E12-F349 23(0)(c)

Test Line T/C RHR "A" Pump E12-F303 23(0)(c)

Test Line T/C RHR "A" Pump E12-F310 23(0)(c)

Test Line T/C RHR "A" Pump E12-F348 23(0)(c)

Test Line T/C RHR"C" Pump E12-F311 24(0)(c)

Test Line T/C l RHR"C" Pump E12-F304 24(0)(CI l Test Line T/C HPCS Discharge T/C E22-F021 HPCS Test Line T/C E22-F303 26(0)(c)

HPCS Test Line T/C E22-F304 27(0)(c)

RCIC Turbine E51-F258 27(0)(c) 29(0)

Exhaust T/C RCIC Turbine E51-F257 29(0)(c)

Exhaust T/C LPCS T/C E21-F013 LPCS Test Line E21-F222 31(0)(c) 32(0)

T/C LPCS Test Line E21-F221 32(0)(c)

T/C GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-43 Amendment No. _

- 5 .- (OLCR NLS-85/02)

SUBJECT:

Facility Operating License No. NPF-29, page 14 -

~ DISCUSSION: It is proposed to amend the subject license to allow a temporary exception to Technical Specification 3/4.6.6.1 requirements whereby the railroad bay area including the exterior railroad bay door on the

. auxiliary building will be classified as a secondary containment isolation boundary, subject to the same actions and requirements as

, other secondary containment isolation boundaries. This exception will:last for the duration of the task of moving new high density spent-fuel storage racks, horizontal fuel transfer mechanism and associated equipment into the auxiliary building, but not to exceed 144 cumulative hours. The proposed license condition is as follows:

(39) For a period of time not to exceed 144 cumulative hours, the provisions of Specification 3/4.6.6.1 may be applied to the railroad bay area including the exterior railroad bay door on the auxiliary building in lieu of the present secondary containment boundaries that isolate the railroad bay ares. While the railroad bay door is being used as a secondary containment boundary, it may remain open for periods of time for the purpose of moving trucks in and out provided that Technical Specification 3.6.6.1 action statements are applied. A fire watch shall be established in the railroad bay area while the door is being used as a secondary containment boundary.

JUSTIFICATION: During an outage scheduled for October, 1985, MP&L plans to install high density spent fuel storage racks in the CGNS upper containment pool. On May 5, 1985, MP&L submitted a proposed change to the operating license requesting that Technical Specification Section 5.6 be amended to incorporate the high density racks in the design features section of the technical specifications. Prior to this outage, MP&L intends to complete installation of the racks that are to be installed in the spent fuel storage pool in the auxiliary building. MP&L believes that it is permissible to proceed with this installation prior to approval of the referenced request for a technical specification-change provided no fuel is placed in the l racks before issuance of the revised technical specification. MP&L l also plans to place a new Horizontal Fuel Transfer Mechanism in the fuel handling area of the auxiliary building prior to the outage

! scheduled for October, 1985.

! The proposed operating license condition is necessary to allow -

! movement of the new high density spent fuel racks, horizontal fuel

! transfer mechanism and associated equipment into the auxiliary building fuel handling area while the plant is in operation. This activity is scheduled to begin about September 1, 1985 depending on L

shipment schedules. The present design configuration of the i auxiliary building railroad bay area does not qualify this area to be

a part of secondary containment. This area is isolated from

secondary containment by inner railroad bay doors and overhead 4 equipment hatch plugs. In order to move the new spent fuel racks and other equipment to the fuel handling area of the auxiliary building, i the exterior railroad bay door must be opened and reclosed when a J0P10PMI85052808 - 1 l

truck is placed in the railroad bay. The railroad bay door is not expected to remain open longer than one hour at a time when moving trucks in and out of the railroad bay. Then the equipment hatch plugs must be removed which technically causes a loss of secondary containment integrity. _MP&L does not intend to reinstall the equipment hatch plugs each time a truckload of fuel racks or other ,

equipment is moved into or an empty truck is moved out of the '

railroad bay area. Instead, MP&L proposes to credit the exterior railroad bay door as a secondary containment isolation barrier during the estimated 144 hours0.00167 days <br />0.04 hours <br />2.380952e-4 weeks <br />5.4792e-5 months <br /> required to complete the task.

If at any time during the activity secondary containment-integrity cannot be obtained using the exterior railroad bay door, the provisions of Technical Specification 3/4.6.6.1 will be applied. This will allow four (4) hours to reestablish secondary containment integrity or be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for operational conditions 1, 2 or 3. If required, the equipment hatch plugs can be reinstalled in six to eight (6 to-

8) hours.

While the railroad bay door does not meet secondary containment design requirements, it has a seal and the secondary containment function operability using this railroad bay door will be proven in accordance with the requiremouts of specification 4.6.6.1 prior to initial removal of the equipment hatch plugs. Functional operability will consist of meeting the surteillance requiremento specified in Technical Specification 4.6.6.1.b and will only be demonstrated at the start of this license condition. Furthermore, the actions required by specification 3.6.6.1 will be applied should the bay door ever fail to serve the secondary containment integrity function.

Additionally, administrative controls shall be implemented during the exception period to ensure' periodic monitoring of meterological conditions so that appropriate precautions may be taken to fulfill the design requirements for tornado depressurization. Fire protection for the railroad bay area is provided by a 6 inch fire water line passing through a penetration that does not conform to secondary containment isolation design requirements. This line will be isolated by a manually operated valve. Fire protection for the railroad bay area during this evolution will then be assured by establishment of a fire watch.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION:

While the railroad bay door is not seismic category one, it will serve to provide secondary containment integrity for the proposed license condition period in accordance with the requirements of specification 3/4.6.6.1. Should the bay door fail for any reason to provide the secondary containment function, it has been found that the equipment hatch can be reclosed in six to eight (6 to 8) hours, and failure to reestablish secondary containment will result in the unit being placed in a condition where secondary containment integrity is not required in accordance with Technical J0P10PMI85052808 - 2

Specification 3.6.6.1. Furthermore, the probability of an accident including a seismic event during the relatively brief period for which the exception is requested is low. Fire protection during this period of time will be assured by establishing a fire watch.

Therefore,-the proposed change to the operating license does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated or create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, nor does it involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change involves no significant hazards considerations.

l l

J0P10 PHI 85052808 - 3

1

. $,{0L Ck bk$4Sld2.b \

l l

(b) Provide the second level undervoltage protection for l Division 3 power supply (Item No. 373, T.S. Table 3.3.3-2). l (c) Incorporate a bypass or coincident logic in all Division 1 l and 2 diesel generator protective trips, except for trips l on diesel engine overspeed and generator differential cur-rent (Item No. 808. T.S. 4.8.1.1.2.d.16.d).

(38) Control Room Leak Rate (Section 6.2.6, SSER #6)

MP&L shall operate Grand Gulf Unit I with an allowable control room leak rate not to exceed 590 cfm. Upon restart of construc-tion of Unit 2 control room, MP&L will be permitted to operate at a leak rate of 760 cfm as evaluated in SSER No. 6.

.rNscRr 4 l D. The facility requires exemptions from certain requirements of Appendices Ar to 10 CFR Part 50. These include: (a) exemption from General Dt .riterion 17 of Appendix A until startup following the first reft .1g outage, for (1) the emer the Division 3 diesel engine, (2)the gency override second of the testprotec-level undervoltage mode for tion for the Division 3 diesel engine, and (3) the generator ground over current trip function for the Division 1 and 2 diesel generators (Section 8.3.1 of SSER #7) and (b) exemption from the requirements of Paragraph III.D.2(b)(ii) of Appendix J for the containment airlock testing following not required normal (Section 6.2.6door opening of SSER w) henexemptions

1. 7 . These containmentare integrity is authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest. There-fore, these exemptions are hereby granted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12.

With the granting of these exemptions, the facility will operate, to the extent authorized herein, in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act and the rules and regulations of the Commission.

l E. MP&L shall maintain in effect and fully implement all the provisions l

of the Commission-approved physical security plan, guard training and l qualification plan and safeguards contingency plan, including amend- ,

! ments made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR Section 50.54(p). The approved plans, which are safeguards information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, are collectively entitled Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

" Physical Security Plan," Revision 1, 2 and 3; the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station " Security Training and Qualification Plan," and the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station " Safeguards Contingency Plan." The identification of vital areas and measures used to control access to these areas, as t

' described in the physical security plan, may be subject to amendments i in the future based upon a confimatory evaluation of the plant to determine those areas where acts of sabotage might cause a release of l radionuclides in sufficient quantities to result in dose rates equal to or exceeding 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines.

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5.(OLCR NLS-85/02)

Insert-To Facility Operating License NPF-29, Page 14 (39) For a period of time not to exceed 144 cumulative hours, the provisions of Specification 3/4.6.6.1 may be applied to the railroad bay area including the exterior railroad bay door on the auxiliary building in lieu of the present secondary containment boundaries that isolate the railroad bay area. While the railroad bay door is being used as a secondary containment boundary, it may remain open for periods of time for.the the purpose of moving trucks in and out provided that Technical Specification 3.6.6.1 action statements are applied. A fire watch shall be established in the railroad bay area while the door is being used as a secondary containment boundary.

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