ML20245L252: Difference between revisions

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MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-336 INTRODUCTI_0N By applications for license amendments dated October 14, 1986, July 21, 1987
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-336 INTRODUCTI_0N By applications for license amendments dated October 14, 1986, July 21, 1987
   .                      and January 12, 1989, Northeast Nuclear Energy Corrpany (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Millstone Unit 2 to address recommendations of Generic Letter 83-37. The proposed change to the TS would incorporate Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) and Surveillance Requirements (SRs) for the Reactor Vessel Coolant Level (RVCL) instrumentation into TS 3/4.3.3.8, " Instrumentation - Accident Monitoring."
   .                      and January 12, 1989, Northeast Nuclear Energy Corrpany (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Millstone Unit 2 to address recommendations of Generic Letter 83-37. The proposed change to the TS would incorporate Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) and Surveillance Requirements (SRs) for the Reactor Vessel Coolant Level (RVCL) instrumentation into TS 3/4.3.3.8, " Instrumentation - Accident Monitoring."
DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION The RVCL instrumentation for Millstone Unit 2 is based upcn the heated junction thermocouple technology for post-accident detennination of reactor pressure vessel water inventory. In our safety evaluations dated April 18, 1985 and August 28, 1986, the NRC staff addressed the adequacy of the RVCL instrumentation for Millstone Unit 2. The need for RVCL instrumentation and assoc 4ted TS was one of a number of post-TMI initiatives that had been established by the NRC staff. Based upon discussions with the NRC staff, and applications for license amendments dated October 14, 1986 and July 21, 1987, the licensee has submitted revised proposed LCOs and SRs for the RVCL instrumentation in a letter dated January 12, 1989.
DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION The RVCL instrumentation for Millstone Unit 2 is based upcn the heated junction thermocouple technology for post-accident detennination of reactor pressure vessel water inventory. In our safety evaluations dated April 18, 1985 and August 28, 1986, the NRC staff addressed the adequacy of the RVCL instrumentation for Millstone Unit 2. The need for RVCL instrumentation and assoc 4ted TS was one of a number of post-TMI initiatives that had been established by the NRC staff. Based upon discussions with the NRC staff, and applications for license amendments dated October 14, 1986 and July 21, 1987, the licensee has submitted revised proposed LCOs and SRs for the RVCL instrumentation in a {{letter dated|date=January 12, 1989|text=letter dated January 12, 1989}}.
The proposed LCO for the RVCL instrumentation would require at least one of the two channels to be operable. In the event that no channel is operable either restore the inoperable channel (s) to operable status in 48 hours or:
The proposed LCO for the RVCL instrumentation would require at least one of the two channels to be operable. In the event that no channel is operable either restore the inoperable channel (s) to operable status in 48 hours or:
: 1.      prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status; and P
: 1.      prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status; and P

Latest revision as of 03:54, 9 March 2021

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 140 to License DPR-65
ML20245L252
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 04/21/1989
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20245L210 List:
References
NUDOCS 8905050345
Download: ML20245L252 (1)


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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT N0240 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65 NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-336 INTRODUCTI_0N By applications for license amendments dated October 14, 1986, July 21, 1987

. and January 12, 1989, Northeast Nuclear Energy Corrpany (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Millstone Unit 2 to address recommendations of Generic Letter 83-37. The proposed change to the TS would incorporate Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) and Surveillance Requirements (SRs) for the Reactor Vessel Coolant Level (RVCL) instrumentation into TS 3/4.3.3.8, " Instrumentation - Accident Monitoring."

DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION The RVCL instrumentation for Millstone Unit 2 is based upcn the heated junction thermocouple technology for post-accident detennination of reactor pressure vessel water inventory. In our safety evaluations dated April 18, 1985 and August 28, 1986, the NRC staff addressed the adequacy of the RVCL instrumentation for Millstone Unit 2. The need for RVCL instrumentation and assoc 4ted TS was one of a number of post-TMI initiatives that had been established by the NRC staff. Based upon discussions with the NRC staff, and applications for license amendments dated October 14, 1986 and July 21, 1987, the licensee has submitted revised proposed LCOs and SRs for the RVCL instrumentation in a letter dated January 12, 1989.

The proposed LCO for the RVCL instrumentation would require at least one of the two channels to be operable. In the event that no channel is operable either restore the inoperable channel (s) to operable status in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or:

1. prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status; and P

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2. Restore the system to operable status at the next scheduled refueling; and
3. Initiate an alternate method of monitoring the reactor vessel inventory.

The SRs for the RVCL instrumentation include monthly channel checks (a detennination of operability) and calibration of the instrumentation (from the electronic cabinets only) during refueling. The approval of similar, generic, requirements is contained in a letter from Mr. D. Crutchfield, NRC, to Mr.

R. W. Wells, Chairman, Combustion Engineering Owners Group, dated October 28, 1986. The LCOs and SRs contained in this amendment are new limitations imposed on the new post-accident monitoring instrumentation, the RVCL instrument, and are not changes to previous requirements.

Based upon the above, the proposed change to TS 3/4.3.3.8 is acceptable.

ENVIRONffENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and chances surveillance requirements. We have determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The staff has previously published a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusico set forth in 10 CFR 951.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 951.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: April 21, 1989 Principal Contributor: G. S. Vissing