05000483/FIN-2016002-05: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | ||
| Inspector = J Drake, J Josey, J O | | Inspector = J Drake, J Josey, J O'Donnell, M Langelier, N Taylor, P Hernandez, R Kopriva, T Hartman | ||
| CCA = H.9 | | CCA = H.9 | ||
| INPO aspect = CL.4 | | INPO aspect = CL.4 | ||
| description = The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed finding for the licensees failure to follow the plant procedure for foreign material exclusion. Specifically, after finding foreign material (broken cable ties) within the main generator excitation transformer, established as a foreign material exclusion Level 2 area, the licensee failed to determine the reason for the foreign material and enter the issue into the corrective action program for resolution as required by Procedure APA-ZZ-00801, Foreign Material Exclusion, Revision 32. The licensees failure to follow the plant procedure for foreign material exclusion was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, after identifying several broken cable ties on the floor inside a foreign material exclusion Level 2 area the licensee did not determine the reason for the foreign material nor enter the condition into the corrective action program as required by Procedure APA-ZZ-00801. Because the licensee failed to understand what caused the cable tie degradation, a subsequent cable tie failure resulted in a plant trip. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of training in the human performance area because the organization did not provide training and ensure knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workforce and instill nuclear safety values. Specifically, several groups within the licensees organization were unaware the excitation transformer cabinet was classified as a foreign material exclusion Level 2 area nor the requirements if foreign material is found within the foreign material exclusion area [H.9]. | | description = The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed finding for the licensees failure to follow the plant procedure for foreign material exclusion. Specifically, after finding foreign material (broken cable ties) within the main generator excitation transformer, established as a foreign material exclusion Level 2 area, the licensee failed to determine the reason for the foreign material and enter the issue into the corrective action program for resolution as required by Procedure APA-ZZ-00801, Foreign Material Exclusion, Revision 32. The licensees failure to follow the plant procedure for foreign material exclusion was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, after identifying several broken cable ties on the floor inside a foreign material exclusion Level 2 area the licensee did not determine the reason for the foreign material nor enter the condition into the corrective action program as required by Procedure APA-ZZ-00801. Because the licensee failed to understand what caused the cable tie degradation, a subsequent cable tie failure resulted in a plant trip. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of training in the human performance area because the organization did not provide training and ensure knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workforce and instill nuclear safety values. Specifically, several groups within the licensees organization were unaware the excitation transformer cabinet was classified as a foreign material exclusion Level 2 area nor the requirements if foreign material is found within the foreign material exclusion area [H.9]. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 23:24, 21 February 2018
| Site: | Callaway  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000483/2016002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2016 (2016Q2) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Drake J Josey J O'Donnell M Langelier N Taylor P Hernandez R Kopriva T Hartman |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
| ' | |