05000483/FIN-2015009-06
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Have an Adequate Procedure for Testing the Torque and Thrust Values for the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Flow Control Valves |
| Description | The team reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to provide a procedure appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, on March 4, 2014, the licensee performed Job 08505547, and had not correctly accounted for the differential pressure the valve would actually experience, and had incorrectly set and tested the close torque switch on valve ALHV0005. As a result, On November 15, 2015, during steam generator filling operations, Valve ALHV0005 failed to move in the closed direction when the torque switch opened. The incorrect close torque switch setting prevented the valve from going full closed. In response to this issue, the licensee, using Job 14005755, repaired the valve, and confirmed that the close torque switch settings were correct and successfully retested. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Callaway Action Report 201508399. The failure to establish a procedure that included a suitable instructions to set the torque switch on a motor-driven AFW valve after maintenance or testing was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor, and therefore, a finding because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to establish a post-maintenance testing program for the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater valve torque and thrust settings caused valve ALHV0005 not to close completely, causing the operators to take action and shut down motor-driven feedwater pump B. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012, the issue screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. The team determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, challenge the unknown, because the licensee did not stop and challenge that the tested differential pressure across valve ALHV0005 was significantly different than the other valves (H.11). |
| Site: | Callaway  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000483/2015009 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2015 (2015Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 93812 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Proulx J Jacobson N Taylor R Kopriva |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.11, Challenge the Unknown |
| INPO aspect | QA.2 |
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Finding - Callaway - IR 05000483/2015009 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Callaway) @ 2015Q4
Self-Identified List (Callaway)
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