05000483/FIN-2011005-06: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | ||
| Inspector = S Hedger, C Alldredge, Z Hollcraft, G Apgar, L Ricketson, K Clayton, D Dumbacher, L Willoughby, N O, | | Inspector = S Hedger, C Alldredge, Z Hollcraft, G Apgar, L Ricketson, K Clayton, D Dumbacher, L Willoughby, N O'Keefe, C Long, A Fairbanks, T Buchanan, D Reinert | ||
| CCA = H.12 | | CCA = H.12 | ||
| INPO aspect = QA.4 | | INPO aspect = QA.4 | ||
| description = The inspectors reviewed a Green self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, involving the failure to isolate an electrical power supply during maintenance on control room air conditioning system train A. Specifically, while removing an electrical cabinet for maintenance; workers discovered an energized lead that was supposed to have been isolated for the work. Workers failed to stop work and make appropriate notifications. As a result, when the lead was re-terminated, it grounded the bus and caused inverter NN11 to shift to an alternate power supply. This caused operators to make an unplanned entry into a 24-hour shutdown technical specification action statement. The licensee restored normal power to inverter NN11 within 4 hours. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201107612. Failure to stop work when a lockout tagout isolation was discovered to be inadequate was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, inverter NN11 was rendered less reliable by the improper maintenance. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not create a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage times, and did not affect seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because licensee personnel failed to stop in the face of uncertainty or unexpected circumstances [H.4(a)]. | | description = The inspectors reviewed a Green self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, involving the failure to isolate an electrical power supply during maintenance on control room air conditioning system train A. Specifically, while removing an electrical cabinet for maintenance; workers discovered an energized lead that was supposed to have been isolated for the work. Workers failed to stop work and make appropriate notifications. As a result, when the lead was re-terminated, it grounded the bus and caused inverter NN11 to shift to an alternate power supply. This caused operators to make an unplanned entry into a 24-hour shutdown technical specification action statement. The licensee restored normal power to inverter NN11 within 4 hours. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201107612. Failure to stop work when a lockout tagout isolation was discovered to be inadequate was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, inverter NN11 was rendered less reliable by the improper maintenance. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not create a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage times, and did not affect seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because licensee personnel failed to stop in the face of uncertainty or unexpected circumstances [H.4(a)]. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 00:17, 22 February 2018
| Site: | Callaway  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000483/2011005 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | S Hedger C Alldredge Z Hollcraft G Apgar L Ricketson K Clayton D Dumbacher L Willoughby N O'Keefe C Long A Fairbanks T Buchanan D Reinert |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
| ' | |