05000456/FIN-2011004-08: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.22 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.22 | ||
| Inspector = A Garmoe, B Palagi, D Reeser, E Duncan, G O, | | Inspector = A Garmoe, B Palagi, D Reeser, E Duncan, G O'Dwyer, J Benjamin, M Perry, R Nga, Garmoeb Bartlett, D Szwarc, E Duncan, J Benjamin, J Robbins, M Perry, R Langstaff, R Ng, T Go, V Meghani | ||
| CCA = H.7 | | CCA = H.7 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.3 | | INPO aspect = WP.3 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when licensee personnel failed to adhere to licensee procedure ER-AA-310, Implementation of the Maintenance Rule. Specifically, the licensee failed to adhere to the requirements of procedure ER-AA-310 when crediting availability of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 B train AF pumps by not having documented restoration actions (i.e. Risk Management Actions (RMAs)) during quarterly in-service testing surveillances that involved the manual cycling of cooling water valves. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as IR 1251652 and took immediate corrective actions to revise the applicable portion of the Excel spreadsheet that documented restoration actions. The licensee was also considering a more robust process for the documentation of restoration actions to credit equipment availability. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of system that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, procedural requirements to credit the availability of the B train AF pumps were not met. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase - 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a, for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors answered No to all of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone questions in Table 4a of IMC 0609.04 and, as a result, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area [H.2(c)] since during performance of the 1B and 2B AF pump surveillances that involved the manual cycling of cooling water valves, the licensee did not have complete and accurate documentation related to the implementation of RMAs for these surveillances. | | description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when licensee personnel failed to adhere to licensee procedure ER-AA-310, Implementation of the Maintenance Rule. Specifically, the licensee failed to adhere to the requirements of procedure ER-AA-310 when crediting availability of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 B train AF pumps by not having documented restoration actions (i.e. Risk Management Actions (RMAs)) during quarterly in-service testing surveillances that involved the manual cycling of cooling water valves. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as IR 1251652 and took immediate corrective actions to revise the applicable portion of the Excel spreadsheet that documented restoration actions. The licensee was also considering a more robust process for the documentation of restoration actions to credit equipment availability. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of system that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, procedural requirements to credit the availability of the B train AF pumps were not met. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase - 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a, for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors answered No to all of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone questions in Table 4a of IMC 0609.04 and, as a result, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area [H.2(c)] since during performance of the 1B and 2B AF pump surveillances that involved the manual cycling of cooling water valves, the licensee did not have complete and accurate documentation related to the implementation of RMAs for these surveillances. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 23:17, 21 February 2018
| Site: | Braidwood  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000456/2011004 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Garmoe B Palagi D Reeser E Duncan G O'Dwyer J Benjamin M Perry R Nga Garmoeb Bartlett D Szwarc E Duncan J Benjamin J Robbins M Perry R Langstaff R Ng T Go V Meghani |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
| ' | |