05000263/FIN-2014002-03: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | ||
| Inspector = B Jose, C Zoia, J Beavers, J Corujo, | | Inspector = B Jose, C Zoia, J Beavers, J Corujo Sandin, K Riemer, K Walton, M Bielby, M Jones, M Ziolkowski, P Voss, P Zurawski, S Bell, A Shaikh | ||
| CCA = H.5, H.5 | | CCA = H.5, H.5 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.1, WP.1 | | INPO aspect = WP.1, WP.1 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service are identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures, which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Specifically, on May 22, 2013, the licensee failed to ensure that post-maintenance and return-to-service testing was performed on all eight safety-related drywell-torus vacuum breakers after refueling outage maintenance, to ensure that surveillance requirements for the valves opening setpoints were met prior to the valve being returned to service and prior to entry into MODE 2. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP, and additional corrective actions were in development at the time of this report. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to perform required PMTs for vacuum breakers prior to their return-to-service and making a mode change was a performance deficiency requiring evaluation. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, because it adversely impacted the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of SSC and Barrier Performance, and affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers, including containment, protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors assessed the significance of this finding in accordance with IMC 0609 and determined this finding was of very low safety significance. The inspectors concluded that this finding was cross-cutting in the Human Performance, Work Management area, because of the failure to implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority, and to ensure that the work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. | | description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service are identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures, which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Specifically, on May 22, 2013, the licensee failed to ensure that post-maintenance and return-to-service testing was performed on all eight safety-related drywell-torus vacuum breakers after refueling outage maintenance, to ensure that surveillance requirements for the valves opening setpoints were met prior to the valve being returned to service and prior to entry into MODE 2. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP, and additional corrective actions were in development at the time of this report. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to perform required PMTs for vacuum breakers prior to their return-to-service and making a mode change was a performance deficiency requiring evaluation. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, because it adversely impacted the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of SSC and Barrier Performance, and affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers, including containment, protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors assessed the significance of this finding in accordance with IMC 0609 and determined this finding was of very low safety significance. The inspectors concluded that this finding was cross-cutting in the Human Performance, Work Management area, because of the failure to implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority, and to ensure that the work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:50, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2014002 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Jose C Zoia J Beavers J Corujo Sandin K Riemer K Walton M Bielby M Jones M Ziolkowski P Voss P Zurawski S Bell A Shaikh |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XI |
| CCA | , |
| INPO aspect | WP.1, WP.1 |
| ' | |