05000247/FIN-2012009-02: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| Line 15: | Line 15: | ||
| CCA = H.8 | | CCA = H.8 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.4 | | INPO aspect = WP.4 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a Green, Non-Cited Violation of the lndian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 Amended Facility Operating License, Condition 2.K, in that ENO failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the NRC-approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Specifically, ENO failed to minimize transient combustible materials within the primary auxiliary building (PAB) and stored a compressed gas cylinder containing hydrogen gas under cable trays. The hydrogen gas cylinder was inappropriately left in its storage location after a calibration gas cylinder change-out occurred for the waste gas analyzer, ENO promptly entered this issue into its corrective action program and removed the hydrogen cylinder from the PAB. ENO initiated a corrective action to evaluate the identified condition and ensure actions to prevent its recurrence. ENO\'s failure to remove the compressed hydrogen gas cylinder from the PAB after its intended use as a calibration gas for the waste gas analyzer was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the External Factors attribute (fire) of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, the hydrogen gas cylinder was stored below cable trays in an area that includes safe shutdown circuits and the associated cables were at increased risk to fire damage. The inspectors used IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 and a Senior Reactor Analyst conducted a Phase 3 evaluation, to determine that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance associated with the work practice attribute because ENO personnel did not follow procedure, Control of Combustibles, EN-DC-161, Rev. 6, as written and did not remove the hydrogen gas cylinder from the PAB after it was disconnected from the waste gas analyzer contrary to Control of Combustibles, EN-DC-161, Rev. 6. (H.4(b) per IMC 0310). | | description = The inspectors identified a Green, Non-Cited Violation of the lndian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 Amended Facility Operating License, Condition 2.K, in that ENO failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the NRC-approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Specifically, ENO failed to minimize transient combustible materials within the primary auxiliary building (PAB) and stored a compressed gas cylinder containing hydrogen gas under cable trays. The hydrogen gas cylinder was inappropriately left in its storage location after a calibration gas cylinder change-out occurred for the waste gas analyzer, ENO promptly entered this issue into its corrective action program and removed the hydrogen cylinder from the PAB. ENO initiated a corrective action to evaluate the identified condition and ensure actions to prevent its recurrence. ENO\\\'s failure to remove the compressed hydrogen gas cylinder from the PAB after its intended use as a calibration gas for the waste gas analyzer was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the External Factors attribute (fire) of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, the hydrogen gas cylinder was stored below cable trays in an area that includes safe shutdown circuits and the associated cables were at increased risk to fire damage. The inspectors used IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 and a Senior Reactor Analyst conducted a Phase 3 evaluation, to determine that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance associated with the work practice attribute because ENO personnel did not follow procedure, Control of Combustibles, EN-DC-161, Rev. 6, as written and did not remove the hydrogen gas cylinder from the PAB after it was disconnected from the waste gas analyzer contrary to Control of Combustibles, EN-DC-161, Rev. 6. (H.4(b) per IMC 0310). | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:47, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Indian Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000247/2012009 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Orr J Lilliendahl J Rogge W Schmidt |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
| ' | |