05000285/FIN-2012007-02: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.05 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.05 | ||
| Inspector = G George, H Barrett, J Hanna, J Jacobson, J Josey, J Polickoski, J Robles, J Watkins, J Wingebach, M Hay, N Patel, R Deese, R Haskell, R Telson, S Laur, S Makor, T Lighty, A Scarbeary, C Baron, C Henderson, C Sanders, C Smith, D Loveless, F Ramirezg, | | Inspector = G George, H Barrett, J Hanna, J Jacobson, J Josey, J Polickoski, J Robles, J Watkins, J Wingebach, M Hay, N Patel, R Deese, R Haskell, R Telson, S Laur, S Makor, T Lighty, A Scarbeary, C Baron, C Henderson, C Sanders, C Smith, D Loveless, F Ramirezg, Millerg Pick, J Mateychick, J Watkins, S Makor | ||
| CCA = H.13 | | CCA = H.13 | ||
| INPO aspect = DM.1 | | INPO aspect = DM.1 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a violation of Technical Specification 5.8.1.c regarding a failure to adequately implement the fire protection program. Specifically, the fire brigade failed to maintain command and control of the response to a fire event inside the protected area as required by fire protection program procedures. This finding, and its corrective actions, will be managed by the Manual Chapter 0350 Oversight Panel. Enforcement Action 12-121 is associated with this finding. The failure by station fire brigade personnel to implement the requirements of Procedure SO-G-28, Revision 81, in response to a fire at Fort Calhoun Station inside the licensees protected area which required fire brigade response was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external events (fire) and it affected the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The significance of this finding is bounded by the significance of a related Red finding regarding a fire in the 480 Vac safety-related switchgear in June 2011 (Inspection Report 05000285/2012010). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision making because the licensee failed to implement the fire brigade roles and authorities as designed for risk-significant decisions. | | description = The inspectors identified a violation of Technical Specification 5.8.1.c regarding a failure to adequately implement the fire protection program. Specifically, the fire brigade failed to maintain command and control of the response to a fire event inside the protected area as required by fire protection program procedures. This finding, and its corrective actions, will be managed by the Manual Chapter 0350 Oversight Panel. Enforcement Action 12-121 is associated with this finding. The failure by station fire brigade personnel to implement the requirements of Procedure SO-G-28, Revision 81, in response to a fire at Fort Calhoun Station inside the licensees protected area which required fire brigade response was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external events (fire) and it affected the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The significance of this finding is bounded by the significance of a related Red finding regarding a fire in the 480 Vac safety-related switchgear in June 2011 (Inspection Report 05000285/2012010). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision making because the licensee failed to implement the fire brigade roles and authorities as designed for risk-significant decisions. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:47, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000285/2012007 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | Violation: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G George H Barrett J Hanna J Jacobson J Josey J Polickoski J Robles J Watkins J Wingebach M Hay N Patel R Deese R Haskell R Telson S Laur S Makor T Lighty A Scarbeary C Baron C Henderson C Sanders C Smith D Loveless F Ramirezg Millerg Pick J Mateychick J Watkins S Makor |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
| ' | |