05000458/FIN-2011008-07: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.9 | | CCA = H.9 | ||
| INPO aspect = CL.4 | | INPO aspect = CL.4 | ||
| description = The team identified a Green, noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, which states, in part, Instructions, procedures, and drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, prior to October 27, 2011, the licensee failed to include appropriate qualitative and quantitative acceptance criteria in abnormal operating procedures for control room operators to recognize the need to reduce loads on the standby diesel generators during design basis accidents. This finding was entered the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2011-07716. The team determined that the failure to include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria in abnormal operating procedures for control room operators to recognize the need to reduce loads on the standby diesel generators during design basis accidents was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesired consequences. Specifically, a control room operating crew's failure to recognize the need to reduce loads to prevent the standby diesel generator failure during design basis accidents adversely affected the reliability of the standby diesel generators. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality, loss of a system safety function, loss of a single train for greater than technical specification ailowed outage time, loss of one or more non-technical specification risk significant equipment for greater than 24 hours, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources component, because the licensee did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety for the correct training of licensed operator personnel | | description = The team identified a Green, noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, which states, in part, Instructions, procedures, and drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, prior to October 27, 2011, the licensee failed to include appropriate qualitative and quantitative acceptance criteria in abnormal operating procedures for control room operators to recognize the need to reduce loads on the standby diesel generators during design basis accidents. This finding was entered the licensee\'s corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2011-07716. The team determined that the failure to include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria in abnormal operating procedures for control room operators to recognize the need to reduce loads on the standby diesel generators during design basis accidents was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesired consequences. Specifically, a control room operating crew\'s failure to recognize the need to reduce loads to prevent the standby diesel generator failure during design basis accidents adversely affected the reliability of the standby diesel generators. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality, loss of a system safety function, loss of a single train for greater than technical specification ailowed outage time, loss of one or more non-technical specification risk significant equipment for greater than 24 hours, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources component, because the licensee did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety for the correct training of licensed operator personnel | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:44, 20 February 2018
| Site: | River Bend  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000458/2011008 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | K Clayton G George T Farnholtz S Makor N Greca C Edwards J Braisted B Latta |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
| ' | |