05000275/FIN-2011005-03: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = E Ruesch, D Reinert, C Alldredge, L Micewski, N Makris, L Ricketson, G Guerra, M Peck, N O,' | | Inspector = E Ruesch, D Reinert, C Alldredge, L Micewski, N Makris, L Ricketson, G Guerra, M Peck, N O, 'Keefem Young, A Fairbanks | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = Title 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, required the licensee to perform activities affecting quality in accordance with procedures appropriate to the circumstances. Quality Procedure OP1.DC40, Operations Equipment Deficiency Tracking, Revision 5, required the shift manager or designee to identify and evaluate operator work arounds for the cumulative effect on the capability of plant operators to implement compensatory actions during plant transients. On November 21, 2011, the licensee identified that neither the shift manager nor designee had identified or evaluated the cumulative effect of operator work arounds. The finding was more than minor because the performance deficiency was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone human performance attribute and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance, Green, because the performance deficiency was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of Technical Specification equipment, or potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. Pacific Gas and Electric entered the issue into the corrective action program as Notification 50441633. | | description = Title 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, required the licensee to perform activities affecting quality in accordance with procedures appropriate to the circumstances. Quality Procedure OP1.DC40, Operations Equipment Deficiency Tracking, Revision 5, required the shift manager or designee to identify and evaluate operator work arounds for the cumulative effect on the capability of plant operators to implement compensatory actions during plant transients. On November 21, 2011, the licensee identified that neither the shift manager nor designee had identified or evaluated the cumulative effect of operator work arounds. The finding was more than minor because the performance deficiency was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone human performance attribute and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance, Green, because the performance deficiency was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of Technical Specification equipment, or potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. Pacific Gas and Electric entered the issue into the corrective action program as Notification 50441633. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 19:43, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000275/2011005 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | E Ruesch D Reinert C Alldredge L Micewski N Makris L Ricketson G Guerra M Peck N O 'Keefem Young A Fairbanks |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |