05000456/FIN-2011004-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.01 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.01 | ||
| Inspector = A Garmoe, B Palagi, D Reeser, E Duncan, G O,' | | Inspector = A Garmoe, B Palagi, D Reeser, E Duncan, G O, 'Dwyerj Benjamin, M Perry, R Nga, Garmoeb Bartlett, D Szwarc, E Duncan, J Benjamin, J Robbins, M Perry, R Langstaff, R Ng, T Go, V Meghani | ||
| CCA = H.2 | | CCA = H.2 | ||
| INPO aspect = LA.2 | | INPO aspect = LA.2 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance when licensee personnel failed to adhere to station housekeeping procedures to ensure materials that could become missile hazards during high winds or tornado conditions were not stored in the vicinity of the stations offsite power transformers. Specifically, the licensee failed to remove or secure three boards and a tarp within the secured material zone that were intended for work scheduled the next day. No violation of regulatory requirements was identified. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Issue Report (IR) 1243186 and IR 1246870. Corrective actions included plans to brief licensee staff and supervisors on the procedural requirements to ensure materials that could become missile hazards during high winds or tornado conditions were not stored in the vicinity of the stations offsite power transformers, a daily walkdown of outdoor areas to identify inappropriately stored material, reduction in the size of the secured material zone to credit buildings as a barrier, and painting to identify the boundaries of the secured material zone. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, controls prescribed by station procedures to limit the likelihood of losing offsite power during adverse weather conditions were not adhered to by station personnel. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a, for the Initiating Events Cornerstone. Specifically, the inspectors answered No to all of the Transient Initiator questions in IMC 0609.04, Table 4a, and therefore the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area [H.4(c)] since the licensee failed to provide supervisory and management oversight of work activities to ensure that nuclear safety was supported. | | description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance when licensee personnel failed to adhere to station housekeeping procedures to ensure materials that could become missile hazards during high winds or tornado conditions were not stored in the vicinity of the stations offsite power transformers. Specifically, the licensee failed to remove or secure three boards and a tarp within the secured material zone that were intended for work scheduled the next day. No violation of regulatory requirements was identified. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Issue Report (IR) 1243186 and IR 1246870. Corrective actions included plans to brief licensee staff and supervisors on the procedural requirements to ensure materials that could become missile hazards during high winds or tornado conditions were not stored in the vicinity of the stations offsite power transformers, a daily walkdown of outdoor areas to identify inappropriately stored material, reduction in the size of the secured material zone to credit buildings as a barrier, and painting to identify the boundaries of the secured material zone. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, controls prescribed by station procedures to limit the likelihood of losing offsite power during adverse weather conditions were not adhered to by station personnel. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a, for the Initiating Events Cornerstone. Specifically, the inspectors answered No to all of the Transient Initiator questions in IMC 0609.04, Table 4a, and therefore the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area [H.4(c)] since the licensee failed to provide supervisory and management oversight of work activities to ensure that nuclear safety was supported. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 19:43, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Braidwood  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000456/2011004 Section 1R01 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Garmoe B Palagi D Reeser E Duncan G O 'Dwyerj Benjamin M Perry R Nga Garmoeb Bartlett D Szwarc E Duncan J Benjamin J Robbins M Perry R Langstaff R Ng T Go V Meghani |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
| ' | |