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| author name =  
| author name =  
| author affiliation = Constellation Energy Group
| author affiliation = Constellation Energy Group
| addressee name = Silk D M
| addressee name = Silk D
| addressee affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OB
| addressee affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OB
| docket = 05000317, 05000318
| docket = 05000317, 05000318
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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:D Scenario Outline Form FS-D-1 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of Facility:
{{#Wiki_filter:D                                   Scenario Outline                                 Form FS-D-1 Op-Test No.: 2008           Scenario No.:     1                                           Page 1   of 9 Facility:     Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2           Scenario No.:     1                     Op-Test No.:     2008 Examiners:                                                   Operators:
Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 2008 Examiners: Operators:
Turnover: Unit 1 was EOL at 100%for previous 9 months 2 hours ago power was reduced to 75% power to perform valve testing which was completed SAT. 11 & 12 charging pumps are running with boron equalization in progress. CVCS makeup is aligned for direct. No equipment out of service. Instructions for the shift is to return to 100% power.
Turnover:
*         (N)ormal,     (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,   (M)ajor 1.
Unit 1 was EOL at 100% for previous 9 months 2 hours ago power was reduced to 75% power to perform valve testing which was completed SAT.
Taraet Quantitative Attributes [Per Scenario: See Section D.5.d)
11 & 12 charging pumps are running with boron equalization in progress.
Total malfunctions (5-8)
CVCS makeup is aligned for direct.
Actual Attributes
No equipment out of service. Instructions for the shift is to return to 100% power. * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Taraet Quantitative Attributes  
                                                                                                  -+-I-
[Per Scenario:
: 2. Malfunctionsafter EOP entry (1-2)
See Section D.5.d) 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 2. 3. Abnormal events (2-4) Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4. Major transients (1-2)  
: 3. Abnormal events (2-4)
: 5. EOPs enteredreauirina substantive actions (1-2)  
: 4. Major transients (1-2)                                                     I      I
: 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 7. Critical tasks (2-3) Actual Attributes II 11 I/ -+-I-- @ 3 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of SCENARIO OVERVIEW LOSS 22 DC BUS / ATWS Initial Conditions:
: 5. EOPs enteredreauirina substantive actions (1-2)                             1      1
75% Rated Thermal Power, EOL, following valve testing last shift. Crew will begin raising power to 100% power following shift turnover The scenario starts with a trip of 11 component cooling pump, after the crew verifies no common mode failure 12 component cooling pump is started IAW AOP-7C. This will resume CC flow to all components.
: 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2)                       I      /
LCO 3.7.5 should be entered due to both 12 & 13 CC pps's aligned to 14 480V bus. After switching the power supply for 13 CC pp the LCO can be exited. A loss of 22 125V DC bus occurs which will cause multiple alarms. The crew will implement AOP-7J for loss of the DC bus. The crew will de-energize ESFAS Channel ZG, AFAS Channel ZG, RPS Channel D. 11B RCP will trip due to a locked rotor, this will cause numerous alarms.
: 7. Critical tasks (2-3)                                                                       3
The crew should check RPS calling for a trip due to multiple alarms.
 
Once crew identifies that reactor should have tripped CRS will order a reactor trip.
Op-Test No.: 2008     Scenario No.:   1                                       Page 2 of 9 --
The manual pushbuttons will not work causing the crew to perform alternate actions of de- energizing the CEDM MG sets. When the reactor trips one set of turbine valves will fail to go shut causing an overcooling of the RCS. Failure of SGIS to shut MSIV's will require the CRO to manually shut them. The crew should recognize the SGIS failure and hold Tcold constant at current temperature using ADV's. After completing EOP-0 the CRS will implement EOP-8 due to the loss of 22 DC bus. VA-1 will not be met in EOP-8 and CRO should immediately begin worlung that safety function causing the RO to assess the rest of the safety functions. After all safety functions are assessed the RO should be assigned PIC4 due to Pressure and Inventory Control not being met in EOP-0. The scenario ends when VA-1 is completed by CRO and he is assigned HR-2.
SCENARIO OVERVIEW LOSS 22 DC BUS / ATWS Initial Conditions: 75% Rated Thermal Power, EOL, following valve testing last shift. Crew will begin raising power to 100% power following shift turnover The scenario starts with a trip of 11 component cooling pump, after the crew verifies no common mode failure 12 component cooling pump is started IAW AOP-7C. This will resume CC flow to all components. LCO 3.7.5 should be entered due to both 12 & 13 CC ppss aligned to 14 480V bus. After switching the power supply for 13 CC pp the LCO can be exited.
INSTRUCTOR SCENARIO INFORMATION  
A loss of 22 125V DC bus occurs which will cause multiple alarms. The crew will implement AOP-7J for loss of the DC bus. The crew will de-energize ESFAS Channel ZG, AFAS Channel ZG, RPS Channel D.
: 1. Reset to IC-?? 2. Perform switch check.  
11B RCP will trip due to a locked rotor, this will cause numerous alarms. The crew should check RPS calling for a trip due to multiple alarms. Once crew identifies that reactor should have tripped CRS will order a reactor trip.
: 3. 4. Place simulator in FREEZE. Place simulator in CONTINUE, advance charts and clear alarm display.  
The manual pushbuttons will not work causing the crew to perform alternate actions of de-energizing the CEDM MG sets.
: 5. Enter Trigger a. None 6. Enter Malfunctions a. Trip 11 CC Pump. CCWOOZ-01 on F1 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. b. Loss of 22 125V DC Bus 125V004 on F2 C. 11B RCP Locked Rotor RCS008 on F3 d. Auto Trip Failure & Manual Trip Failure RPSOO5 & RPS006 at Time Zero e. Stop Valve #1 & Control Valve #1 Fail As-Is TGOO5-01 at Time Zero f. SGIS A & B failure ESFAS012-01  
When the reactor trips one set of turbine valves will fail to go shut causing an overcooling of the RCS. Failure of SGIS to shut MSIVs will require the CRO to manually shut them. The crew should recognize the SGIS failure and hold Tcold constant at current temperature using ADVs.
& ESFAS012-02 at Time Zero Page of Enter Panel Overrides  
After completing EOP-0 the CRS will implement EOP-8 due to the loss of 22 DC bus. VA-1 will not be met in EOP-8 and CRO should immediately begin worlung that safety function causing the RO to assess the rest of the safety functions. After all safety functions are assessed the RO should be assigned P I C 4 due to Pressure and Inventory Control not being met in EOP-0.
: a. None Enter Remote Functions  
The scenario ends when VA-1 is completed by CRO and he is assigned HR-2.
/ Administrative  
INSTRUCTOR SCENARIO INFORMATION
: a. Align CVCS makeup for direct.  
: 1. Reset to IC-??
(1-CVC-254 open, 1-CVC-256 shut) Set simulator time to real time, then place simulator in CONTINUE. Give crew briefing.  
: 2. Perform switch check.
: a. Present plant conditions: 75% load at EOL 17,500 MWDMTU b. Power history: C. Equipment out of service: None d. Abnormal conditions:
: 3. Place simulator in CONTINUE, advance charts and clear alarm display.
None e. Surveillances due:
: 4.      Place simulator in FREEZE.
None f. Instructions for shift: Raise power to 100%. 100% for 9 months, 2 hours ago reduced to 75% for valve testing. Allow crew 3-5 minutes to acclimate themselves with their positions.
: 5.     Enter Trigger
Instructions for the Booth Operator.  
: a.     None
: a. Activate F1 Trip of 11 CC Pump when cued by the lead evaluator.  
: 6.     Enter Malfunctions
: b. Activate F2 Loss of 22 DC Bus when cued by lead evaluator.  
: a. Trip 11 CC Pump.
: c. Activate F3 11B RCP Locked Rotor when cued by lead evaluator.
CCWOOZ-01 on F1
Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: I. Page 4 of RESPONSES TO CREW REQUEST If a request and response is not listed, delay response until reviewed with the examiner.
 
If one request is dependent upon completion of another, then subsequent actions should not be responded to until the appropriate time delay has been observed. Responses to routine requests, which have no effect the scenario, do not require examiner clearance.
Op-Test No.: 2008   Scenario No.:       1                                     Page 3
REQUEST 1. OWC/E&C investigate failure of 11 CC Pump TBO investigate loss of 11 CC Pump 2. 3 AB0 investigate loss of 11 CC Pump 4 5 OWC/E&C Investigate loss of 22 DC Bus OWC de-energize ESFAS ZG & AFAS ZG RESPONSE Acknowledge request. After 5 minutes report breaker tripped on overload.
                                                                                  --  of 9
Acknowledge request. After 3 minutes report breaker tripped on overload Acknowledge request. After 3 minutes report nothing abnormal at pump Critical Tasks Acknowledge request Acknowledge request, after 5 min de-energize ESFAS ZG, after another 3 minutes de-energize AFAS ZG 1. 2. 3. Evaluate common mode failure and start standby CC pump prior to reaching RCP temperature limits (thrust bearing 195", CBO 200"). Performs alternate actions for tripping reactor within 5 minutes of RCP trip. Recognize Turbine SV/CV still open, shuts MSIV's prior to AFAS actuation.
: b.     Loss of 22 125V DC Bus 125V004 on F2 C.       11B RCP Locked Rotor RCS008 on F3
Dendix D Required Operator Actions Form -- Time Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Event
: d.     Auto Trip Failure & Manual Trip Failure RPSOO5 & RPS006 at Time Zero
: e.     Stop Valve #1 & Control Valve #1 Fail As-Is TGOO5-01 at Time Zero
: f.     SGIS A & B failure ESFAS012-01 & ESFAS012-02 at Time Zero
: 7. Enter Panel Overrides
: a.     None
: 8. Enter Remote Functions / Administrative
: a.     Align CVCS makeup for direct. (1-CVC-254 open, 1-CVC-256 shut)
: 9. Set simulator time to real time, then place simulator in CONTINUE.
: 10. Give crew briefing.
: a.     Present plant conditions:             75% load at EOL 17,500 MWDMTU
: b.     Power history:                         100% for 9 months, 2 hours ago reduced to 75% for valve testing.
C.     Equipment out of service:             None
: d.     Abnormal conditions:                 None
: e.     Surveillances due:                   None
: f.     Instructions for shift:               Raise power to 100%.
: 11. Allow crew 3-5 minutes to acclimate themselves with their positions.
: 12. Instructions for the Booth Operator.
: a.     Activate F1 Trip of 11 CC Pump when cued by the lead evaluator.
: b.     Activate F2 Loss of 22 DC Bus when cued by lead evaluator.
: c.     Activate F3       11B RCP Locked Rotor when cued by lead evaluator.
 
Op-Test No.: 2008         Scenario No.:       I.                                           Page 4 of 9    --
RESPONSES TO CREW REQUEST If a request and response is not listed, delay response until reviewed with the examiner. If one request is dependent upon completion of another, then subsequent actions should not be responded to until the appropriate time delay has been observed. Responses to routine requests, which have no effect the scenario, do not require examiner clearance.
REQUEST                                                   RESPONSE
: 1.     OWC/E&C investigate failure of 11 CC                       Acknowledge request. After 5 minutes report Pump                                                       breaker tripped on overload.
: 2.      TBO investigate loss of 11 CC Pump                         Acknowledge request. After 3 minutes report breaker tripped on overload 3       AB0 investigate loss of 11 CC Pump                         Acknowledge request. After 3 minutes report nothing abnormal at pump 4       OWC/E&C Investigate loss of 22 DC Bus                     Acknowledge request 5      OWC de-energize ESFAS ZG & AFAS ZG                         Acknowledge request, after 5 min de-energize ESFAS ZG, after another 3 minutes de-energize AFAS ZG Critical Tasks
: 1.         Evaluate common mode failure and start standby CC pump prior to reaching RCP temperature limits (thrust bearing 195", CBO 200").
: 2.          Performs alternate actions for tripping reactor within 5 minutes of RCP trip.
: 3.          Recognize Turbine SV/CV still open, shuts MSIV's prior to AFAS actuation.
 
Dendix D                           Required Operator Actions                               Form         --
Op-Test No.: 2008     Scenario No.:   1     Event No.:     1                         Page 5--    of 9 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
11 CCW Pump Trip (Evaluator's Cue)
Time        Position                            Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRO        Acknowledges 1C13 alarms. Observes CC pump is tripped. Informs CRS.
CRS        Implement AOP-7C, make page announcement CRS/CRO        Evaluate for common mode failure and start a standby CC pump prior to reaching RCP temperature limits (thrust bearing 195'. CBO 200')
CRSRO        Monitors RCP temperatures including trip criteria CRS        Refers to T.S. 3.7.5 & 3.6.6 Declares 11 CC subsystem inoperable.
CRS/CRO        Direct realignment of 13 CC pump to 11 480V Bus.
CRS        Declares 11 CC subsystem operable. Exits T.S. 3.7.5 & 3.6.6 CRS        Informs maintenance of need to investigate and repair.
* Shading indicates Critical Task


11 CCW Pump Trip (Evaluator's Cue) Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Page of CRO CRS Acknowledges 1C13 alarms. Observes CC pump is tripped. Informs CRS. Implement AOP-7C, make page announcement CRS/CRO Evaluate for common mode failure and start a standby CC pump prior to reaching RCP temperature limits (thrust bearing 195'. CBO 200') CRSRO CRS CRS/CRO CRS CRS
Appendix D                         Required Operator Actions     Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008   Scenario No.:     1   Event No.:     2 Page 6
* Shading indicates Critical Task Monitors RCP temperatures including trip criteria Refers to T.S. 3.7.5 & 3.6.6 Declares 11 CC subsystem inoperable. Direct realignment of 13 CC pump to 11 480V Bus. Declares 11 CC subsystem operable. Exits T.S.
                                                                    -- of 9 Event
3.7.5 & 3.6.6 Informs maintenance of need to investigate and repair.
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page of Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Loss of 22 DC Bus      (Evaluators Cue)
I                I
* Shading indicates Critical Task


Loss of 22 DC Bus (Evaluator's Cue) I I
Appendix D                         Required Operator Actions                                 Form ES-DQ Op-Test No.: 2008     Scenario No.:   1     Event No.:     3                           Page 7    of 9 Event
* Shading indicates Critical Task Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DQ I Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Locked rotor on 11 B RCP (Evaluator's Cue)  
Locked rotor on 11B RCP       (Evaluators Cue)
~
-  Time
* Shading indicates Critical Task Page 7 of 9 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior  
      -    -  Position                           Applicants Actions or Behavior CRO/RO       Announce multiple alarms CRSKRO       CRS directs CRO to check RPS calling for a trip CRS/RO      CRS directs RO to monitor primary CRO        Reports RPS is calling for a trip CRS      Directs Reactor trip, implements EOP-0 RO       Attempts Reactor trip @ 1C05 unsuccessfully RO        Performs alternate actions for tripping reactor at 1C20within 5 minutes of 1 1B RCP trip
--- CRO/RO Announce multiple alarms CRSKRO CRS/RO CRO CRS CRS directs CRO to check RPS calling for a trip CRS directs RO to monitor primary Reports RPS is calling for a trip Directs Reactor trip, implements EOP-0 RO RO Attempts Reactor trip  
                                                                                                          ~
@ 1C05 unsuccessfully Performs alternate actions for tripping reactor at 1C20 within 5 minutes of 1 1B RCP trip Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
I
-~~ Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Event
* Shading indicates Critical Task
 
Appendix D                           Required Operator Actions                               Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008     Scenario No.:   1   Event No.:     4                         Page 8--  of 9--
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
EOP-0 (After Reactor Trip)
EOP-0   (After Reactor Trip)
CRO Page of Recognize Turbine SVlCV still open, shuts MSN's prior to MAS actuation All CRS/CRO RO CRO RO RO CRO CRO CRO or RO CRO or RO CRS CRS CRS Recognize SGIS failure Open ADV's to hold RCS temp constant Reports Reactivity Control is met Reports Vital Aux Safety Function not met due to 22 DC bus failure Verifies SIAS as part of PIC safety function Reports PIC not met due to low PZR lvl & press (may be met if temperature not held due to SGIS failure) Initiate AFW flow IAW HR alternate action Reports HR not met due to low RCS temp & S/G press (may be met if temperature not held due to SGIS failure) Reports Containment Environment is met Reports Rad Levels External to Containment is met End of EOP-0 brief Using EOP-0 flowchart determines EOP-8 is correct Implements EOP-8 due to loss of 22 DC bus I I I I
-~~Time        Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior CRO       Recognize Turbine SVlCV still open, shuts MSNs prior to M A S actuation All       Recognize SGIS failure CRS/CRO       Open ADVs to hold RCS temp constant RO        Reports Reactivity Control is met CRO        Reports Vital Aux Safety Function not met due to 22 DC bus failure RO        Verifies SIAS as part of PIC safety function RO        Reports PIC not met due to low PZR lvl & press (may be met if temperature not held due to SGIS failure)
* Shading indicates Critical Task Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DP 1 I ALL RO CRO CRS/CRO CRS/RO RO CRS/RO CRO Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page of Event
CRO        Initiate AFW flow IAW H R alternate action CRO        Reports HR not met due to low RCS temp & S/G press (may be met if temperature not held due to SGIS failure)
CRO or RO    Reports Containment Environment is met CRO or RO    Reports Rad Levels External to Containment is met CRS        End of EOP-0 brief CRS        Using EOP-0 flowchart determines EOP-8 is correct CRS        Implements EOP-8 due to loss of 22 DC bus I
I I               I
* Shading indicates Critical Task
 
Appendix D                         Required Operator Actions                                 Form ES-DP 1                                                                                                               I Op-Test No.: 2008     Scenario No.:   1     Event No.:     5                           Page 9 --      of 9 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
EOP-8 (After EOP-0)  
EOP-8   (After EOP-0)
~~ Evaluate Resource Assessment Table RC-1 Met, PIC-4 Met, VA-1 Not Met, Directs CRO commence VA- 1 Directs RO complete RAT HR-2 Met, CE-1 Met, RLEC-1 Met CRS directs RO to commence PIC-4 (RC-1 if PIC reported met in EOP-0) When all required actions taken for VA safety function are complete, notify CRS Time Position CRS/CRO CRS ~~ Direct CRO to commence working HR-2 Determines EAL H.A. 1.1.1 L I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event No. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Facility:
Time        Position
Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Malf. No. Event Event Type* Description AFWoo1-02 12 AFW Pump Failure RCS026-01 1 (RO) PZR Level X Transmitter Failure (Low) CEDS012-37 R (RO) CEA 37 Drop CEDS003 R (RO) CEDS Raise Relay sticks when CEA withdrawn RCS002 M (ALL) RCS Leak of 100 GPM RCS002 M (ALL) RCS Leak increases to 200 GPM Panel Override C (CRO) SIAS B Block Failure SIAS "B" Block Examiners:
                                                                                                      ~~
Operators:  
ALL        Evaluate Resource Assessment Table RO        RC-1 Met, PIC-4 Met, CRO        VA-1 Not Met, CRS/CRO      Directs CRO commence VA- 1 CRS/RO      Directs RO complete RAT RO        HR-2 Met, CE-1 Met, RLEC-1 Met CRS/RO      CRS directs RO to commence PIC-4 (RC-1 if PIC reported met in EOP-0)
: 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 2. Malfunctions after EOP entrv (1-2) Turnover: Unit 1 is at 100% power at MOL. 12 AFW pump tagged out for repair of overspeed trip device linkage (6 hours into 18 hour maintenance window). 11 6 11 2 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 4. Major transients (1-2) 5. EOPs enteredlrequiring substantive actions (1-2) EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 6. 7. Critical tasks (2-3) II Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario:
CRO        When all required actions taken for VA safety function are complete, notify CRS
See Section D.5.d) I Actual Attributes I -- I -- I -- 11 ~ 11 4 11 2 11 1 11 a 11 2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 2 SCENARIO OVERVIEW DROPPED CEA/RCS LEAK Initial Conditions: 100%
                                                                                                    ~~
Rated Thermal Power, MOL, 12 AFW pump 00s for repair of overspeed trip device linkage (6 hours into 18 hour maintenance window). Scenario starts with Pressurizer level transmitter X instrument failinmg low.
CRS/CRO       Direct CRO to commence working HR-2 CRS        Determines EAL H.A. 1.1.1 L         I
After identification of instrument failure channel Y level controller will be placed in service and PZR heater cutout selected to Y only (vice WY). Common tap analysis should be consulted and other instruments checked to ensure no instrument line leak.
 
CEA 37 in Group 5 will drop completely causing multiple alarms.
Appendix D                                           Scenario Outline                                 Form ES-D-1 Facility:     Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2         Scenario No.:       2                       Op-Test No.: 2008 Examiners:                                                  Operators:
CRS will implement AOP-lB, with CRO lowering turbine load to restore Tcold to program. CRS will also notify OWC of CEA drop to ensure E&C response.
Turnover: Unit 1 is at 100% power at MOL. 12 AFW pump tagged out for repair of overspeed trip device linkage (6 hours into 18 hour maintenance window).
When crew attempts to realign the CEA the outward motion relay will stick causing the CEA to continue withdrawing even after inholdout switch is released. CEDS will be placed in off stopping CEA motion. When crew realizes they cannot realign the CEA a power reduction to 70% power should be ordered. During the power reduction IAW OP-3 an RCS leak will begin in excess of 1 charging pump. AOP-2A will be implemented which will eventually lead to a reactor trip. After the trip the leak will increase in size to 200 gpm. EOP-5 will be entered after completing EOP-0. The crew will begin a cooldown and depressurization to minimize leakage, during this step the crew will be unable to block SIAS B. The scenario ends when the crew has throttled safety injection flow to prevent overfilling the pressurizer. CRS will declare EAL H.A.5.1.2.  
Event            Malf. No.        Event                                      Event No.                            Type*                                    Description 0        AFWoo1-02                            12 AFW Pump Failure 1        RCS026-01            1 (RO)         PZR Level X Transmitter Failure (Low) 2        CEDS012-37           R (RO)         CEA 37 Drop 3        CEDS003             R (RO)         CEDS Raise Relay sticks when CEA withdrawn 4        RCS002               M (ALL)       RCS Leak of 100 GPM 5        RCS002               M (ALL)       RCS Leak increases to 200 GPM 6        Panel Override       C (CRO)       SIAS B Block Failure SIAS B Block II        Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario: See Section D.5.d)    I    Actual Attributes I -- I -- I -- 11
: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. INSTRUCTOR SCENARIO INFORMATION Reset to IC-24 Perform switch check.
: 1. Total malfunctions (5-8)                                                       11            6
Place simulator in CONTINUE, advance charts and clear alarm display. Place simulator in FREEZE. Enter Trigger
: 2. Malfunctions after EOP entrv (1-2)                                             11      ~
: a. Enter Malfunctions
2
: a. T1: CEDS IdHoldOut switch moved PZRLevel X Transmitter Fails Low. RCS026-01 (Low) on Fl b. CEA37Drop CEDS012-37 on F2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. c. CEDS Raise Relay sticks when CEA withdrawn CEDSOO3 on T1 d. RCS leak of 100 gpm RCS002 lOOgpm on F3 e. 12 AFW Pump Failure AFW001-02 at Time Zero Enter Panel Overrides  
: 3. Abnormal events (2-4)                                                          11            4
: a. SIAS B Block Failure SIAS B Block keyswitch to normal at Time Zero Page 3 of 10 Enter Remote Functions  
: 4. Major transients (1-2)                                                         11           2
/ Administrative a. Place yellow tag on 12 AFW Pump trip pushbutton.
: 5. EOPs enteredlrequiring substantive actions (1-2)                               1    1      1
Set simulator time to real time, then place simulator in CONTINUE. Give crew briefing.  
: 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2)                         11            a
: a. Present plant conditions:
: 7. Critical tasks (2-3)                                                           1    1      2
100% load at MOL 10,885 MWDMTU b. Power history: 100% for 12 months C. Equipment out of service: d. Abnormal conditions:
 
None e. Surveillances due: None f. Instructions for shift: Maintain 100%
Op-Test No.: 2008      Scenario No.:    2                                    Page 2 of 2 SCENARIO OVERVIEW DROPPED CEA/RCS LEAK Initial Conditions: 100% Rated Thermal Power, MOL, 12 AFW pump 00s for repair of overspeed trip device linkage (6 hours into 18 hour maintenance window).
power 12 AFW Pump 00s (repairing overspeed trip linkage 6 hrs into 18 hr window) Allow crew 3-5 minutes to acclimate themselves with their positions.
Scenario starts with Pressurizer level transmitter X instrument failinmg low. After identification of instrument failure channel Y level controller will be placed in service and PZR heater cutout selected to Y only (vice WY). Common tap analysis should be consulted and other instruments checked to ensure no instrument line leak.
Instructions for the Booth Operator.  
CEA 37 in Group 5 will drop completely causing multiple alarms. CRS will implement AOP-lB, with CRO lowering turbine load to restore Tcold to program. CRS will also notify OWC of CEA drop to ensure E&C response. When crew attempts to realign the CEA the outward motion relay will stick causing the CEA to continue withdrawing even after inholdout switch is released. CEDS will be placed in off stopping CEA motion. When crew realizes they cannot realign the CEA a power reduction to 70% power should be ordered.
: a. Activate Fl PZR Level X transmitter fails low when cued by the lead evaluator.  
During the power reduction IAW OP-3 an RCS leak will begin in excess of 1 charging pump.
: b. Activate F2 CEA 37 drop when cued by lead evaluator.  
AOP-2A will be implemented which will eventually lead to a reactor trip.
: c. Remove CEDSO12-37 After CEA fully inserted.  
After the trip the leak will increase in size to 200 gpm. EOP-5 will be entered after completing EOP-0. The crew will begin a cooldown and depressurization to minimize leakage, during this step the crew will be unable to block SIAS B.
: d. Activate F3 100 gpm RCS leak when cued by lead evaluator.  
The scenario ends when the crew has throttled safety injection flow to prevent overfilling the pressurizer. CRS will declare EAL H.A.5.1.2.
: e. f. Modify RCS002 Raise RCS leak rate to 200 gpm when reactor trips.
INSTRUCTOR SCENARIO INFORMATION
Block SIAS B Use panel override to give ESFAS door alarm then block SIAS B, 1 minute after requested of PWS.
: 1. Reset to IC-24
Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Page 4 of 10 RESPONSES TO CREW REQUEST If a request and response is not listed, delay response until reviewed with the examiner.
: 2.      Perform switch check.
If one request is dependent upon completion of another, then subsequent actions should not be responded to until the appropriate time delay has been observed. Responses to routine requests, which have no effect the scenario, do not require examiner clearance.
: 3. Place simulator in CONTINUE, advance charts and clear alarm display.
REQUEST RESPONSE 1. TBO check IC43 PZR level indication Acknowledge request. After 2 minutes report 216 inches. 2. OWC contact I&C to investigate PZR Level Acknowledge request. transmitter failure 3 NFM for Fxyt & Frt Report Fxyt is 1.023 and Frt 1.58,2 days ago 4 Chemistry sample both S/G's for activity Acknowledge request IAW CP-436 5 PWS block SIAS B locally at ESFAS cabinet Acknowledge request, After 1 minute give ESFAS door alarm then block SIAS B using panel override for block WS Critical Tasks 1. 2. Place CEDS panel to off prior to high power pretrip alarm Commence cooldown of RCS prior to subcooling lowering below 30".
: 4.      Place simulator in FREEZE.
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Time Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page 5 of 10 Event
: 5. Enter Trigger
: a.     T1: CEDS IdHoldOut switch moved
: 6.      Enter Malfunctions
: a.      PZRLevel X Transmitter Fails Low.
RCS026-01 (Low) on Fl
: b.     CEA37Drop CEDS012-37 on F2
 
Op-Test No.: 2008   Scenario No.:       1                                         Page 3 of 1    0
: c.     CEDS Raise Relay sticks when CEA withdrawn CEDSOO3 on T1
: d.     RCS leak of 100 gpm RCS002 lOOgpm on F3
: e.     12 AFW Pump Failure AFW001-02 at Time Zero
: 7. Enter Panel Overrides
: a.     SIAS B Block Failure SIAS B Block keyswitch to normal at Time Zero
: 8. Enter Remote Functions / Administrative
: a.     Place yellow tag on 12 AFW Pump trip pushbutton.
: 9. Set simulator time to real time, then place simulator in CONTINUE.
: 10. Give crew briefing.
: a.     Present plant conditions:               100%load at MOL 10,885 MWDMTU
: b.     Power history:                           100% for 12 months C.     Equipment out of service:               12 AFW Pump 00s (repairing overspeed trip linkage 6 hrs into 18 hr window)
: d.      Abnormal conditions:                     None
: e.     Surveillances due:                       None
: f.     Instructions for shift:                 Maintain 100% power
: 11. Allow crew 3-5 minutes to acclimate themselves with their positions.
: 12. Instructions for the Booth Operator.
: a.     Activate Fl       PZR Level X transmitter fails low when cued by the lead evaluator.
: b.     Activate F2       CEA 37 drop when cued by lead evaluator.
: c.     Remove CEDSO12-37             After CEA fully inserted.
: d.     Activate F3       100 gpm RCS leak when cued by lead evaluator.
: e.     Modify RCS002 Raise RCS leak rate to 200 gpm when reactor trips.
: f.      Block SIAS B Use panel override to give ESFAS door alarm then block SIAS B, 1 minute after requested of PWS.
 
Op-Test No.: 2008         Scenario No.:       1                                           Page 4 of 1      0 RESPONSES TO CREW REQUEST If a request and response is not listed, delay response until reviewed with the examiner. If one request is dependent upon completion of another, then subsequent actions should not be responded to until the appropriate time delay has been observed. Responses to routine requests, which have no effect the scenario, do not require examiner clearance.
REQUEST                                                   RESPONSE
: 1.       TBO check IC43 PZR level indication                       Acknowledge request. After 2 minutes report 216 inches.
: 2.       OWC contact I&C to investigate PZR Level                   Acknowledge request.
transmitter failure 3       NFM for Fxyt & Frt                                         Report Fxyt is 1.023 and Frt 1.58,2 days ago 4       Chemistry sample both S/G's for activity                   Acknowledge request IAW CP-436 5       PWS block SIAS B locally at ESFAS cabinet                 Acknowledge request, After 1 minute give ESFAS door alarm then block SIAS B using panel override for block WS Critical Tasks
: 1.         Place CEDS panel to off prior to high power pretrip alarm
: 2.          Commence cooldown of RCS prior to subcooling lowering below 30".
 
Appendix D                         Required Operator Actions                     Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008     Scenario No.: 1   Event No.: 1                     Page 5 of 10 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
PZR Level X Transmitter Failure (Evaluator Cue)
Time    -  Position                        Applicants Actions or Behavior I        I                I


PZR Level X Transmitter Failure (Evaluator Cue) Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior --- I I I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Event
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008     Scenario No.:     1     Event No.:   2 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Group 5 CEA Drop (Evaluator Cue)
RO        Places CEDS to off RO        Informs CRS that CEA motion stops CRS        Refers to TS 3.1.4 CRS        Enters LCO 3.1.4.A CRS/CRO        Calculates time to realign CEA is 30 minutes CRS        Directs power reduction to 70%


Group 5 CEA Drop (Evaluator Cue) RO Places CEDS to off RO CRS Refers to TS 3.1.4 CRS Enters LCO 3.1.4.A Informs CRS that CEA motion stops CRS/CRO CRS Calculates time to realign CEA is 30 minutes Directs power reduction to 70%
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008     Scenario No.: 1   Event No.: 3 Event
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ~ ~~ Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior -~~ Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Power Reduction to 70% (Realignment Time Expiration)
                                                                            ~ ~~
Time
-~~          Position                      Applicants Actions or Behavior


Power Reduction to 70% (Realignment Time Expiration)
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DQ Op-Test No.: 2008   Scenario No.:   1     Event No.:     4                 Page 8
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DQ RO CRO RO CRO CRO CRS Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page of 10 Event
                                                                                    -- of 10 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
RCS Leak / AOPQA (After Power Lowered By 5%)
RO      Secure L/D (Shut I-CVC-515 & 516)
CRO      Check for S/G tube leak (determines no tube leakage)
RO      Detrmine if leak is on charging header CRO      Determine leak is in containment CRO      Starts all CACs with max flow CRS      Determines leak not isolated, directs Rx trip


RCS Leak / AOPQA (After Power Lowered By 5%) Secure L/D (Shut I-CVC-515
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008     Scenario No.:   1   Event No.:     5                         Page 9
& 516) Check for S/G tube leak (determines no tube leakage)
                                                                                          --    of 1  0 Event
Detrmine if leak is on charging header Determine leak is in containment Starts all CAC's with max flow Determines leak not isolated, directs Rx trip Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 CRO CRS CRS Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
EOP-0 (After Reactor Trip) Perform Rad Levels External to Containment (Met)
EOP-0 (After Reactor Trip)
Perform EOP-0 brief Implements EOP-5 Page of 10 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior pP ~ Report CE not met due to containment pressure & temp trends (may call met Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 5 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 10 of 10 Event
Time   p Position                         Applicants Actions or Behavior P
                                                                                                    ~
Report CE not met due to containment pressure & temp trends (may call met CRO        Perform Rad Levels External to Containment (Met)
CRS        Perform EOP-0 brief CRS        Implements EOP-5
 
Appendix D                         Required Operator Actions           Form ES-D-2 5
Op-Test No.: 2008   Scenario No.:   1   Event No.:     6     Page 10of 1 0 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
EOP-5 (After EOP-0)
RO      Depressurize RCS to maintain subcooling CRO      Throttle HPST Flow CRS      Determines EAL H.A.5.1.2
                                                                              ~
* Shading indicates a Critical Task
ndix D                                        Scenario Outline                                          - -
Form ES D I Scenario No.:      3                                            Page __
1 o f x Facility:    Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2            Scenario No.:      3                      Op-Test No.:    2008 Examiners:                                                  Operators:
Turnover: Unit 1 is at 100%power, MOL equilibrium conditions. 13 HPSI pump tagged out for repair of excessive vibration during last STP 0-7B (3 hours into 36 hour maintenance window) IAS LCO 3.5.2.A.
*        (N)ormal,      (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor 1.
2.
Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d)
Total malfunctions (5-8)
Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)
Actual Attributes I
t t
I 5
1
                                                                                                                -- I
: 3. Abnormal events (2-4)                                                        I      t        3
: 4. Major transients (1-2)                                                      I      t        1
: 5. EOPs enteredhequiringsubstantive actions (1-2)                              I    t        1
: 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2)                        I    t        0
: 7. Critical tasks (2-3)                                                        I    t        3
Op-Test No.: 2008        Scenario No.:      3                                            Page 2 of 1      1 SCENARIO OVERVIEW RCP SEALSRUBE LEAK Initial Conditions: 100% Rated Thermal Power, MOL, Eqilibrium conditions. 13 HPSI pump tagged out for repair of excessive vibration during last STP 0-7B (3 hours into 36 hour maintenance window) IAS LCO 3.5.2.A.
Scenario starts with 12A RCP 1" stage seal failure. The crew ensures only a single seal failed and notifies engineering.
Channel B RPS matrix power supply will fail causing multiple alarms at 1C05. After ensuring RPS is not calling for a trip the crew should enter LCO's 3.3.3.A & 3.3.3.B. The CRS should call OWC to get I&C working on repairs to the power supply problem.
After all LCO's determined calls made 12A RCP 3d stage seal will also fail. This second seal failure will require an expeditious shutdown IAW Alarm Manual.
During the shutdown turbine valve CV-3 fails as is and turbine control becomes more difficult. The crew should recognize valve failure and implement AOP-7E.
After crew stabilizes the plant a CIS B spurious actuation occurs which causes a loss of component cooling water to the RCP's. The crew will be unable to reset the CIS B and a reactor trip will be ordered.
After verifying Reactivity control in EOP-0 the RCP's should be secured. After completing EOP-0 a transition to EOP-2 should occur.
After a few steps are completed in EQP-2 a tube leak develops in 12 S/G causing the crew to transition to EQP-6.
The scenario will end when the 12 S/G is isolated IAW EQP-6. CRS will declare EAL H.A.5.1.2 INSTRUCTOR SCENARIO INFORMATION
: 1.      Reset to IC-24
: 2.      Perform switch check.
- 3.              Place simulator in CONTINUE, advance charts and clear alarm display
- 4.              Place simulator in FlIEEZE.
- 5.              EnterTrigger
: a.      None
: 6.      Enter Malfunctions
: a.      12A RCP Lower Seal Failure RCSOl1-03 on F1
: b.      Channel B RPS Matrix Power Supply Failure RPS007-02 on F2
Op-Test No.: 2008  Scenario No.:      3                                      Page -&of 1      1 C.      12A RCP 3rdStage Seal Failure RCSO13-03 on F3
: d.      Spurious CIS B Actuation ESFA009 on F4
: e.      11 S/G Tube Leak (2 Tubes)
MS002-01 at F5
: f.      CV-3 Fails AS-IS TG005 at Time Zero
: 7. Enter Panel Overrides
: a.      None
: 8. Enter Remote Functions / Administrative
-            a.      Place yellow tag on 13 HPSI Pump WS in PTL.
: b.      Place red dot on H20 13 HPSI PP BKR L/UIMPR
: 9. Set simulator time to real time, then place simulator in CONTINUE.
: 10. Give crew briefing.
: a.      Present plant conditions:              100%load at MOL 10,885 MWDMTU
: b.      Power history:                          100% for 9 months C.      Equipment out of service:              13 HPSI Pump 0 0 s (repairing excessive vibration during STP-0-7, 3 hrs into 36 hr window)
: d.      Abnormal conditions:                    None
: e.      Surveillances due:                      None
: f.      Instructions for shift:                Maintain 100%power
: 11. Allow crew 3-5 minutes to acclimate themselves with their positions.
: 12. Instructions for the Booth Operator.
: a.      Activate Fl        12A RCP Lower Seal Failure when cued by the lead evaluator.
: b. Activate F2        Channel B RPS Matrix Power Supply Failure when cued by lead evaluator.
: c. Activate F3        12A RCP 3rdStage Seal Failure when cued by lead evaluator.
: d. Activate F4        Spurious CIS B Actuation when cued by lead.
: e. Activate F5        11 S/G Tube Leak (2 Tubes) when cued by lead
Op-Test No.: 2008        Scenario No.:      3                                            Page 4 of RESPONSES TO CREW REQUEST If a request and response is not listed, delay response until reviewed with the examiner. If one request is dependent upon completion of another, then subsequent actions should not be responded to until the appropriate time delay has been observed. Responses to routine requests, which have no effect the scenario, do not require examiner clearance.
REQUEST                                                    RESPONSE
: 1.      OWC contact Engineering about 12 A RCP                    Acknowledge request.
lower seal failure
: 2.      OWC contact I&C to investigate loss of RPS                Acknowledge request.
matrix power supply 3      OWC contact Engineering about 12 A RCP                    Acknowledge request upper seal failure
: 4.      TBO/PPO check CV-3                                        Acknowledge request, after 5 minutes report nothing unusual except it appears more open then other 3 CVs
: 5.      OWC contact Engineering about CV-3 failing Acknowledge request as-is
: 6.      PWS attempt reset of CIS B locally at ESFAS Acknowledge request, After 2 minute give cabinet                                                    ESFAS door alarm then clear alarm after another 2 minutes. Call CR and report unable to reset CIS B locally Critical Tasks
: 1.        Recognize need for expeditious shutdown within 5 minutes of 2ndseal failure
: 2.          Secures all RCPs within 3 minutes of reaching RCP temperature limits.
: 3.          Isolate 11 S/G prior to S/G filling solid and MSSVs open.
Dendix D                    Required Operator Actions                    Form FS- -
Time    Position                        Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO      Acknowledges 1C06 & computer alarms.
RO      Evaluates 12A RCP, determines lower seal failure CRO      Evaluate Alarm Manual CRS      Directs RO to monitor other RCP seals CRS      Notifies Engineering of seal failure I            I I                  I w


EOP-5 (After EOP-0) RO CRO Throttle HPST Flow CRS Determines EAL H.A.5.1.2 Depressurize RCS to maintain subcooling
Appendix D                         Required Operator Actions                     Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008     Scenario No.: 3   Event No.: 2                     Page 6
~
                                                                                  -- of 11 Event
* Shading indicates a Critical Task ndix D Scenario Outline Form ES -- D I Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) Scenario No.: 3 Pa g e __ 1 ofx Facility:
Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 2008 Examiners: Operators:
-- I Actual Attributes
-- __ It 5 Turnover:
Unit 1 is at 100% power, MOL equilibrium conditions.
13 HPSI pump tagged out for repair of excessive vibration during last STP 0-7B (3 hours into 36 hour maintenance window) IAS LCO 3.5.2.A. 2. 3. Abnormal events (2-4)
Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)
* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor tI 1 It 3 4. Major transients (1-2)
: 5. 6. EOPs enteredhequiring substantive actions (1-2)
EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) It 1 It 1 It 0 7. Critical tasks (2-3)
It 3 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Page 2 of 11 SCENARIO OVERVIEW RCP SEALSRUBE LEAK Initial Conditions:
of excessive vibration during last STP 0-7B (3 hours into 36 hour maintenance window) IAS LCO 3.5.2.A. 100% Rated Thermal Power, MOL, Eqilibrium conditions.
13 HPSI pump tagged out for repair Scenario starts with 12A RCP 1" stage seal failure.
The crew ensures only a single seal failed and notifies engineering.
Channel B RPS matrix power supply will fail causing multiple alarms at 1C05. After ensuring RPS is not calling for a trip the crew should enter LCO's 3.3.3.A
& 3.3.3.B. The CRS should call OWC to get I&C working on repairs to the power supply problem. After all LCO's determined calls made 12A RCP 3d stage seal will also fail. This second seal failure will require an expeditious shutdown IAW Alarm Manual. During the shutdown turbine valve CV-3 fails as is and turbine control becomes more difficult. The crew should recognize valve failure and implement AOP-7E. After crew stabilizes the plant a CIS B spurious actuation occurs which causes a loss of component cooling water to the RCP's. The crew will be unable to reset the CIS B and a reactor trip will be ordered. After verifying Reactivity control in EOP-0 the RCP's should be secured. After completing EOP-0 a transition to EOP-2 should occur. After a few steps are completed in EQP-2 a tube leak develops in 12 S/G causing the crew to transition to EQP-6. The scenario will end when the 12 S/G is isolated IAW EQP-6. CRS will declare EAL H.A.5.1.2 INSTRUCTOR SCENARIO INFORMATION
: 1. Reset to IC-24 2. Perform switch check. - 3. Place simulator in CONTINUE, advance charts and clear alarm display - 4. Place simulator in FlIEEZE. - 5. EnterTrigger
: a. None 6. Enter Malfunctions
: a. 12A RCP Lower Seal Failure RCSOl1-03 on F1 b. Channel B RPS Matrix Power Supply Failure RPS007-02 on F2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Page -& of 11 7. 8. - 9. 10. 11. 12. C. 12A RCP 3rd Stage Seal Failure RCSO13-03 on F3 d. Spurious CIS B Actuation ESFA009 on F4 11 S/G Tube Leak (2 Tubes)
MS002-01 at F5 e. f. CV-3 Fails AS-IS TG005 at Time Zero Enter Panel Overrides
: a. None Enter Remote Functions
/ Administrative
: a. Place yellow tag on 13 HPSI Pump WS in PTL. b. Place red dot on H20 "13 HPSI PP BKR L/U IMPR' Set simulator time to real time, then place simulator in CONTINUE. Give crew briefing.
: a. Present plant conditions:
100% load at MOL 10,885 MWDMTU b. Power history:
100% for 9 months C. Equipment out of service: 13 HPSI Pump 00s (repairing excessive vibration during STP-0-7, 3 hrs into 36 hr window) d. Abnormal conditions:
None e. Surveillances due: None f. Instructions for shift:
Maintain 100% power Allow crew 3-5 minutes to acclimate themselves with their positions. Instructions for the Booth Operator.
: a. Activate Fl 12A RCP Lower Seal Failure when cued by the lead evaluator.
Activate F2 Channel B RPS Matrix Power Supply Failure when cued by lead evaluator. 12A RCP 3rd Stage Seal Failure when cued by lead evaluator. Activate F4 Spurious CIS B Actuation when cued by lead. Activate F5 11 S/G Tube Leak (2 Tubes) when cued by lead b. c. Activate F3 d. e.
Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Page 4 of RESPONSES TO CREW REQUEST If a request and response is not listed, delay response until reviewed with the examiner.
If one request is dependent upon completion of another, then subsequent actions should not be responded to until the appropriate time delay has been observed. Responses to routine requests, which have no effect the scenario, do not require examiner clearance.
: 1. 2. 3 4. 5. 6. REQUEST OWC contact Engineering about 12 A RCP lower seal failure OWC contact I&C to investigate loss of RPS matrix power supply OWC contact Engineering about 12 A RCP upper seal failure TBO/PPO check CV-3 OWC contact Engineering about CV-3 failing as-is PWS attempt reset of CIS B locally at ESFAS cabinet Critical Tasks RESPONSE Acknowledge request. Acknowledge request. Acknowledge request Acknowledge request, after 5 minutes report "nothing unusual except it appears more open then other 3 CV's" Acknowledge request Acknowledge request, After 2 minute give ESFAS door alarm then clear alarm after another 2 minutes. Call CR and report "unable to reset CIS B locally" 1. 2. 3. Recognize need for expeditious shutdown within 5 minutes of 2nd seal failure Secures all RCP's within 3 minutes of reaching RCP temperature limits.
Isolate 11 S/G prior to S/G filling solid and MSSV's open.
Dendix D Required Operator Actions Form FS -- Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO RO CRO Evaluate Alarm Manual CRS CRS Acknowledges 1C06
& computer alarms. Evaluates 12A RCP, determines lower seal failure Directs RO to monitor other RCP seals Notifies Engineering of seal failure II I I I w Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior --- Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page of 11 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Channel B RPS Matrix Power Supply Failure (Evaluator's Cue)
Channel B RPS Matrix Power Supply Failure (Evaluators Cue)
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page of --J- Event
Time    -  Position                      Applicants Actions or Behavior
 
Appendix D                         Required Operator Actions                               Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008     Scenario No.:   3     Event No.:     3                       Page 7--  of --J-Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
12A RCP 3rdStage Failure        (Evaluator's Cue)
- Time
    -    -  Position                            Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO        Acknowledges 1C06 & computer alarms.
RO        Evaluates 12A RCP, determines a upper seal failure CRO        Evaluate Alarm Manual CRS        Recognize need for expeditious shutdown to protect against RCS leak from RCP s
                                  . .          v nf ?* s a l i a l w e CRS      Directs an expeditious shutdown CRS      Notifies Engineering of 2ndseal failure
* Shading indicates critical task


12A RCP 3rd Stage Failure (Evaluator's Cue) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior --- RO RO Acknowledges 1C06
Appendix   D                         Required Operator Actions                       Form ES-DQ
& computer alarms. Evaluates 12A RCP, determines a upper seal failure CRO Evaluate Alarm Manual CRS Recognize need for expeditious shutdown to protect against RCS leak from RCP sv nf ?* salialwe .. CRS Directs an expeditious shutdown CRS Notifies Engineering of 2nd seal failure
                                                                                              ~
* Shading indicates critical task Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DQ Time ~ Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of > Event
Op-Test No.: 2008     Scenario No.:   3     Event No.:     4                   Page 8of >
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Expeditious S/D with CV-3 fails As-Is (When Down Power Commenced)
Time        Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior RO        Place all PZR Heaters to On RO        Lowers PZR Press controllers to -2200#
RO        Borate from RWT IAW OP-3 CRO        Lower turbine load using load set I
CRO        Recognizes CV-3 failing as-is CRS        Implements AOP-7E CRS        Directs RO/CRO to stabilize plant CRS        Notify Main Turbine Engineer


Expeditious S/D with CV-3 fails As-Is (When Down Power Commenced)
Appendix D                         Required Operator Actions                               Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008   Scenario No.:     3     Event No.:   5                         Page 9
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO RO RO CRO CRO CRS CRS CRS I Place all PZR Heaters to On Lowers PZR Press controllers to
                                                                                            -- of 11 Event
-2200# Borate from RWT IAW OP-3 Lower turbine load using load set Recognizes CV-3 failing as-is Implements AOP-7E Directs RO/CRO to stabilize plant Notify Main Turbine Engineer Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page of 11 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Spurious CIS B (Evaluators Cue)
RO/CRO      Announce CIS alarm CRS        Direct RO to monitor primary CRO        Evaluate CIS, determines spurious CRO        Attempts to reset CIS unsuccessfully at both l C l 0 & ESFAS CRS        Holds short brief, then orders Reactor Trip


Spurious CIS B (Evaluator's Cue) RO/CRO CRS CRO CRO CRS Announce CIS alarm Direct RO to monitor primary Evaluate CIS, determines spurious Attempts to reset CIS unsuccessfully at both lCl0 & ESFAS Holds short brief, then orders Reactor Trip Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DP CRO CRO CRO CRS CRS CRS Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 10 of & Event
Appendix D                         Required Operator Actions                             Form ES-DP Op-Test No.: 2008     Scenario No.:   3     Event No.:     6                   Page 1  0of &
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
EOP-0 (After Reactor Trip)
- Time
    -    -  Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS      Directs EOP-0 CRO        Performs Core & RCS Heat Removal (Not Met due to no operating RCPs)
CRO        Performs Containment Environment (Met)
CRO        Perform Rad Levels External to Containment (Met)
CRS      Perform EOP-0 brief CRS      Using EOP-0 flowchart determines EOP-2 is correct EOP CRS      Implements EOP-2
                                                                                                ~
I
* Shading indicates critical task


EOP-0 (After Reactor Trip) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior --- CRS Directs EOP-0 Performs Core
Appendix D                         Required Operator Actions                           Form ES-DQ Event
& RCS Heat Removal (Not Met due to no operating RCP's) Performs Containment Environment (Met)
Perform Rad Levels External to Containment (Met) Perform EOP-0 brief Using EOP-0 flowchart determines EOP-2 is correct EOP Implements EOP-2 I ~
* Shading indicates critical task Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DQ Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
S/G Tube Leak (EOP-6)        (Evaluator's Cue after steps assigned in EOP-2)
RO        Depressurize RCS to -25' Subcooling CRS        Determines EAL H.A.5.1.2 I                I
* Shading indicates critical task
Appendix D                                          Scenario Outline                            Form ES-D-1 Scenario No.:      4                                      Page __
1 of 10 Facility:    Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2        Scenario No.:        4                Op-Test No.:      2008 Examiners:                                                  Operators:
Turnover: Unit 1 is at 100% power, BOL, Equilibrium Conditions. 12 AFW pump tagged out for repair of overspeed trip device linkage (6 hours into 18 hour maintenance window).
Event Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d)  Actual Attributes    --    _- -_
: 1. Total malfunctions (5-8)                                                I    1        5
                                                                                                    ~
: 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)                                      I    1        2
: 3. Abnormal events (2-4)                                                  1    1        2
: 4. Major transients (1-2)                                                  I    1        1
: 5. EOPs enteredlrequiring substantive actions (1-2)                        I    1        1
: 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2)                  I    1        0
: 7. Critical tasks (2-3)                                                  I    1        3


S/G Tube Leak (EOP-6) (Evaluator's Cue after steps assigned in EOP-2) RO CRS Determines EAL H.A.5.1.2 Depressurize RCS to -25' Subcooling I I
Op-Test No.: 2008     Scenario No.:   4                                   Page 2 of 1    0 SCENARIO OVERVIEW NI POWER SUMMERLOSS OF ALL FEED Initial Condition is steady state at 100% power with 12 AFW pump tagged out for repair of overspeed trip device linkage (6 hours into 18 hour maintenance window).
* Shading indicates critical task Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) Scenario No.: 4 Pa g e __ 1 of 10 Facility: Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 4 Op-Test No.: 2008 Examiners:
After crew takes the watch a NI channel A power summer amp fails causing multiple alarms.
Operators: Actual Attributes
Once crew identifies failed power summer amp NO-1-200 should be referenced and LCOs 3.3.1.A & 3.3.1.D should be entered. CRO will bypass channel A trip units 1,2,7,8,10.
-- _- -_ I1 5 Turnover: Unit 1 is at 100% power, BOL, Equilibrium Conditions.
A failure of the 12 S/G Main FRV controller will cause the FRV to fail to the D/P controller in manual. AOP-3G should be implemented. After verifying a good setpoint signal the CRO will commence auto operation with the Main Feed Bypass valve.
12 AFW pump tagged out for repair of overspeed trip device linkage (6 hours into 18 hour maintenance window). 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 4. Major transients (1-2) Event ~ I1 2 11 2 I1 1 5. 6. EOPs enteredlrequiring substantive actions (1-2) EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) I1 1 I1 0 7. Critical tasks (2-3) I1 3 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Page 2 of 10 SCENARIO OVERVIEW NI POWER SUMMERLOSS OF ALL FEED Initial Condition is steady state at 100% power with 12 AFW pump tagged out for repair of overspeed trip device linkage (6 hours into 18 hour maintenance window). After crew takes the watch a NI channel A power summer amp fails causing multiple alarms. Once crew identifies failed power summer amp NO-1-200 should be referenced and LCO's 3.3.1.A & 3.3.1.D should be entered. CRO will bypass channel A trip units 1,2,7,8,10. A failure of the 12 S/G Main FRV controller will cause the FRV to fail to the D/P controller in manual. AOP-3G should be implemented. After verifying a good setpoint signal the CRO will commence auto operation with the Main Feed Bypass valve. Once feedwater is in auto a loss of offsite power will occur concurrent with a fault on the 11 4KV bus. This will cause a loss of all A train components. During EOP-0 the CRO will need to start 12 CC pp to prevent a RCS leak from the RCP seals. During the wrap up brief for EOP-0 the 11 AFW pump will trip causing a loss of all feedwater. CRS should implement EOP-3.
Once feedwater is in auto a loss of offsite power will occur concurrent with a fault on the 11 4KV bus. This will cause a loss of all A train components. During EOP-0 the CRO will need to start 12 CC pp to prevent a RCS leak from the RCP seals. During the wrap up brief for EOP-0 the 11 AFW pump will trip causing a loss of all feedwater. CRS should implement EOP-3.
During EOP-3 the crew will cool down the primary using available S/G inventory and commence once through core cooling when S/G level reaches  
During EOP-3 the crew will cool down the primary using available S/G inventory and commence once through core cooling when S/G level reaches -350. CRS should direct tying MCC 114 to MCC 104 to maximize PORV flow.
-350". CRS should direct tying MCC 114 to MCC 104 to maximize PORV flow. Scenario ends when crew has determined OTCC will be successful IAW EOP Attachments.
Scenario ends when crew has determined OTCC will be successful IAW EOP Attachments.
CRS will declare Alert based on either A.A.7.1.2 or H.A.5.1.2  
CRS will declare Alert based on either A.A.7.1.2 or H.A.5.1.2 INSTRUCTOR SCENARIO INFORMATION
: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. INSTRUCTOR SCENARIO INFORMATION Reset to IC-24 Perform switch check. Place simulator in CONTINUE, advance charts and clear alarm display.
: 1. Reset to IC-24
Place simulator in FREEZE. Enter Trigger  
: 2. Perform switch check.
: a. None Enter Malfunctions  
: 3. Place simulator in CONTINUE, advance charts and clear alarm display.
: a. Channel A NI Power Summer Failure NIOOll-01 on F1 b. 12 FRV Controller Failure FWO18-02onF2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 - 7. 8. 9. - 10. 11. 12. C. Loss of Offsite Power SWYD002 on F3 d. 11 4KV bus fault 4KVOO1-01 on F4 e. 11 AFW Pump Failure AFWOO1-01 on F5 f. 12 AFW Pump Failure AFWOO1-02 at Time Zero Enter Panel Overrides  
: 4. Place simulator in FREEZE.
: a. None Page of 10 Enter Remote Functions  
: 5. Enter Trigger
/ Administrative  
: a.       None
: a. Place yellow tag on 12 AFW Pump trip pushbutton. Set simulator time to real time, then place simulator in CONTINUE. Give crew briefing.  
: 6. Enter Malfunctions
: a. Present plant conditions: 100% load at BOL 2545 h4WDMTU b. Power history: 100% for 2 months C. Equipment out of service: d. Abnormal conditions:
: a.       Channel A NI Power Summer Failure NIOOll-01 on F1
None e. Surveillances due:
: b.       12 FRV Controller Failure FWO18-02onF2
None f. Instructions for shift:
 
Maintain 100% power 12 AFW Pump 00s (repairing overspeed trip linkage 6 hrs into 18 hr window) Allow crew 3-5 minutes to acclimate themselves with their positions.
Op-Test No.: 2008   Scenario No.:       4                                         Page 3--   of 10 C.     Loss of Offsite Power SWYD002 on F3
Instructions for the Booth Operator.  
: d.     11 4KV bus fault 4KVOO1-01 on F4
: a. Activate F1 Channel A NI Power Summer Failure when cued by the lead evaluator.  
: e.     11 AFW Pump Failure AFWOO1-01 on F5
: b. Activate F2 12 FRV Controller Failure when cued by lead evaluator.
: f.     12 AFW Pump Failure AFWOO1-02 at Time Zero
C. Activate F3  
- 7.          Enter Panel Overrides
& F4 Loss of Offsite Power & 11 4KV bus fault at same time when cued by lead evaluator.  
: a.     None
: d. Activate F5 11 AFW Pump Failure when cued by lead evaluator Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Page of a RESPONSES TO CREW REQUEST If a request and response is not listed, delay response until reviewed with the examiner.
: 8. Enter Remote Functions / Administrative
If one request is dependent upon completion of another, then subsequent actions should not be responded to until the appropriate time delay has been observed. Responses to routine requests, which have no effect the scenario, do not require examiner clearance.  
: a.     Place yellow tag on 12 AFW Pump trip pushbutton.
: 1. 2. 3 4 5 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 1. 2. 3. REQUEST OWC contact IM for assistance for NI Power Summer OWC contact Engineering  
: 9. Set simulator time to real time, then place simulator in CONTINUE.
& IM for FRV Controller Failure PWS tie 1Y09 to lYlO with lYlO supplying IAW local plaque TBO shift13 charging pump to 14 480V Bus ABOEPO check SWGR Ventilation in service ABO/PPO operate ADV's locally with chain operator OWC/TBO check 11 AFW pp U2 CRO align 23 AFW pp to supply U-1 OWC expedite return of 12 AFW pp to service ABO/PPO/PWS tie MCC-114 to MCC-104 RESPONSE Acknowledge Request Acknowledge Request Acknowledge Request, after 4 minutes tie lYO9 to lYlO Acknowledge Request, after 1 minute shift power supply Acknowledge Request, after 2 minutes report SWGR Ventilation in service Acknowledge Request, after 2 minutes open ADV's to requested position.
- 10.        Give crew briefing.
Acknowledge Request, after 2 minutes report 11 AEW pp appears seized.
: a.     Present plant conditions:               100% load at BOL 2545 h4WDMTU
Acknowledge Request, after 2 minutes report cross-connect valve will not open, OWC informed Acknowledge Request Acknowledge Request, after 5 minutes tie MCC's using Remote Function Critical Tasks Commence boration as alternate action fox inability to assess CEA position within 5 minutes of Starts 12 Component Cooling Pump prior to exceeding RCP temperature limits. (thrust bearing 195", CBO 200"). Commence OTCC within 5 minutes of both S/G's c-350" or Tcold rising 5"uncontrollably (must be commenced prior to CET temperature reaching 560°F. trip.
: b.     Power history:                           100% for 2 months C.     Equipment out of service:                12 AFW Pump 00s (repairing overspeed trip linkage 6 hrs into 18 hr window)
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page __ of - Event
: d.     Abnormal conditions:                   None
: e.     Surveillances due:                     None
: f.     Instructions for shift:                 Maintain 100%power
: 11. Allow crew 3-5 minutes to acclimate themselves with their positions.
: 12. Instructions for the Booth Operator.
: a.     Activate F1 Channel A NI Power Summer Failure when cued by the lead evaluator.
: b.     Activate F2       12 FRV Controller Failure when cued by lead evaluator.
C.     Activate F3 & F4 Loss of Offsite Power & 11 4KV bus fault at same time when cued by lead evaluator.
: d.     Activate F5       11 AFW Pump Failure when cued by lead evaluator
 
Op-Test No.: 2008         Scenario No.:       4                                           Page 4--  of a RESPONSES TO CREW REQUEST If a request and response is not listed, delay response until reviewed with the examiner. If one request is dependent upon completion of another, then subsequent actions should not be responded to until the appropriate time delay has been observed. Responses to routine requests, which have no effect the scenario, do not require examiner clearance.
REQUEST                                                    RESPONSE
: 1.     OWC contact IM for assistance for NI Power                 Acknowledge Request Summer
: 2.      OWC contact Engineering & IM for FRV                       Acknowledge Request Controller Failure 3      PWS tie 1Y09 to lYlO with lYlO supplying                   Acknowledge Request, after 4 minutes tie lYO9 IAW local plaque                                           to lYlO 4      TBO shift13 charging pump to 14 480V Bus                   Acknowledge Request, after 1 minute shift power supply 5      ABOEPO check SWGR Ventilation in                            Acknowledge Request, after 2 minutes report service                                                    SWGR Ventilation in service
: 6.      ABO/PPO operate ADV's locally with chain                    Acknowledge Request, after 2 minutes open operator                                                  ADV's to requested position.
: 7.      OWC/TBO check 11 AFW pp                                    Acknowledge Request, after 2 minutes report 11 AEW pp appears seized.
: 8.      U2 CRO align 23 AFW pp to supply U-1                      Acknowledge Request, after 2 minutes report cross-connect valve will not open, OWC informed
: 9.      OWC expedite return of 12 AFW pp to                        Acknowledge Request service
: 10. ABO/PPO/PWS tie MCC-114 to MCC-104                        Acknowledge Request, after 5 minutes tie MCC's using Remote Function Critical Tasks
: 1.          Commence boration as alternate action fox inability to assess CEA position within 5 minutes of trip.
: 2.          Starts 12 Component Cooling Pump prior to exceeding RCP temperature limits. (thrust bearing 195", CBO 200").
: 3.        Commence OTCC within 5 minutes of both S/G's c-350"or Tcold rising 5"uncontrollably (must be commenced prior to CET temperature reaching 560°F.
 
Appendix D                         Required Operator Actions                       Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008     Scenario No.:   4     Event No.:       1                 Page __ of -
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Channel A NI Power Summer Failure (Evaluators Cue)
Time  I    Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior RO                        1cos w CRO        Verifies FWS not calling for a trip CRO/RO        Recognize power summer failure on channel A CRS        Reference NO-1-200 matrix for T.S. applicability CRO        Bypass T/U 1,2,7,8,10 on Channel A CRS        Enter LCOs 3.3.1.A & 3.3.1.D RO        Evaluate Alarm Manual for compensatory actions


Channel A NI Power Summer Failure (Evaluator's Cue) Time I Position RO CRO CRO/RO CRS CRO CRS RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1cos w Verifies FWS not calling for a trip Recognize power summer failure on channel A Reference NO-1-200 matrix for T.S. applicability Bypass T/U 1,2,7,8,10 on Channel A Enter LCO's 3.3.1.A & 3.3.1.D Evaluate Alarm Manual for compensatory actions Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Page __ of __ Event
Appendix D                         Required Operator Actions     Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008     Scenario No.:   4   Event No.: 2     Page __ of __
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
12 FRV Controller Failure (Evaluators Cue)


12 FRV Controller Failure (Evaluator's Cue)
Appendix D                             Required Operator Actions                                 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008     Scenario No.:       4   Event No.:     3                           Page __ of -
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page __ of - Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power & 11 4KV bus fault, EOP-0 (Evaluator's Cue)
CRS        Implement EOP-0 RO          Commence boration as alternate action for inability to assess CEA position within 5 min of trip I Reports Reactivity Control (Met)
I        I RO CRO I
Performs Turbine Trip (Met)
CRO          Starts 12 Component Cooling Pump prior to reaching RCP temperature limits (thrust bearing 195", CBO 200')
CRO          Performs Containment Environment (Met). (May call Not Met unable to assess)
CRO          Secures Blowdown due to not able to assess Rad Levels CRO          Reports Rad Levels External to Containment (Not Met)
CRS          Contact PWS to tie 1Y09 to 1Y10 IAW local plaque
* Shading indicates Critical Task


Loss of Offsite Power & 11 4KV bus fault, EOP-0 (Evaluator's Cue) - CRS Implement EOP-0 RO Commence boration as alternate action for inability to assess CEA position within 5 min of trip II RO I I I Reports Reactivity Control (Met)
Appendix D                       Required Operator Actions                     Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008   Scenario No.: 4   Event No.: 4                       Page -of -
CRO Performs Turbine Trip (Met) CRO Starts 12 Component Cooling Pump prior to reaching RCP temperature limits (thrust bearing 195", CBO 200') CRO CRO CRO CRS Performs Containment Environment (Met). (May call Not Met unable to assess) Secures Blowdown due to not able to assess Rad Levels Reports Rad Levels External to Containment (Not Met)
Event
Contact PWS to tie 1Y09 to 1Y 10 IAW local plaque
* Shading indicates Critical Task Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page - of - Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Loss of 11 AFW Pump (Evaluators Cue, z 3 minutes after pump started)


Loss of 11 AFW Pump (Evaluator's Cue, z 3 minutes after pump started)
Appendix D                           Required Operator Actions                             Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008     Scenario No.:     4     Event No.:   5                         Page -of __
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Page - of __ Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
 
EOP-3 Time       Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior CRO         Commence rapid cooldown to 465°F CRO        Block SGIS CRS        Contact maintenance for AFW pps & 1A DG(if not done during EOP-0)
EOP-3 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRO CRO Block SGIS CRS RO Commence rapid cooldown to 465°F Contact maintenance for AFW pp's & 1A DG(if not done during EOP-0) Prepares for Once Through Core Cooling (Starts HPSI, charging pumps, etc) CRO Prevent dryout of SIG's CRS CRS CRS EAL A.A.7.1.2 or H.A.5.1.2 Direct tying MCCll4 to MCC 104 Direct initiation of SIAS A6 & B6 t 1 I
RO        Prepares for Once Through Core Cooling (Starts HPSI, charging pumps, etc)
CRO         Prevent dryout of SIGs CRS       Direct tying MCCll4 to MCC 104 CRS       Direct initiation of SIAS A6 & B6 CRS       EAL A.A.7.1.2 or H.A.5.1.2 t
1               I
* Shading indicates Critical Task}}
* Shading indicates Critical Task}}

Latest revision as of 00:54, 13 March 2020

Draft - Section C Operator Licensing Operating Exam (Folder 2)
ML081690719
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 02/15/2008
From:
Constellation Energy Group
To: David Silk
Operations Branch I
Shared Package
ML073040307 List:
References
TAC U01633
Download: ML081690719 (39)
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Text

D Scenario Outline Form FS-D-1 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 9 Facility: Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 2008 Examiners: Operators:

Turnover: Unit 1 was EOL at 100%for previous 9 months 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago power was reduced to 75% power to perform valve testing which was completed SAT. 11 & 12 charging pumps are running with boron equalization in progress. CVCS makeup is aligned for direct. No equipment out of service. Instructions for the shift is to return to 100% power.

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1.

Taraet Quantitative Attributes [Per Scenario: See Section D.5.d)

Total malfunctions (5-8)

Actual Attributes

-+-I-

2. Malfunctionsafter EOP entry (1-2)
3. Abnormal events (2-4)
4. Major transients (1-2) I I
5. EOPs enteredreauirina substantive actions (1-2) 1 1
6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) I /
7. Critical tasks (2-3) 3

Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of 9 --

SCENARIO OVERVIEW LOSS 22 DC BUS / ATWS Initial Conditions: 75% Rated Thermal Power, EOL, following valve testing last shift. Crew will begin raising power to 100% power following shift turnover The scenario starts with a trip of 11 component cooling pump, after the crew verifies no common mode failure 12 component cooling pump is started IAW AOP-7C. This will resume CC flow to all components. LCO 3.7.5 should be entered due to both 12 & 13 CC ppss aligned to 14 480V bus. After switching the power supply for 13 CC pp the LCO can be exited.

A loss of 22 125V DC bus occurs which will cause multiple alarms. The crew will implement AOP-7J for loss of the DC bus. The crew will de-energize ESFAS Channel ZG, AFAS Channel ZG, RPS Channel D.

11B RCP will trip due to a locked rotor, this will cause numerous alarms. The crew should check RPS calling for a trip due to multiple alarms. Once crew identifies that reactor should have tripped CRS will order a reactor trip.

The manual pushbuttons will not work causing the crew to perform alternate actions of de-energizing the CEDM MG sets.

When the reactor trips one set of turbine valves will fail to go shut causing an overcooling of the RCS. Failure of SGIS to shut MSIVs will require the CRO to manually shut them. The crew should recognize the SGIS failure and hold Tcold constant at current temperature using ADVs.

After completing EOP-0 the CRS will implement EOP-8 due to the loss of 22 DC bus. VA-1 will not be met in EOP-8 and CRO should immediately begin worlung that safety function causing the RO to assess the rest of the safety functions. After all safety functions are assessed the RO should be assigned P I C 4 due to Pressure and Inventory Control not being met in EOP-0.

The scenario ends when VA-1 is completed by CRO and he is assigned HR-2.

INSTRUCTOR SCENARIO INFORMATION

1. Reset to IC-??
2. Perform switch check.
3. Place simulator in CONTINUE, advance charts and clear alarm display.
4. Place simulator in FREEZE.
5. Enter Trigger
a. None
6. Enter Malfunctions
a. Trip 11 CC Pump.

CCWOOZ-01 on F1

Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Page 3

-- of 9

b. Loss of 22 125V DC Bus 125V004 on F2 C. 11B RCP Locked Rotor RCS008 on F3
d. Auto Trip Failure & Manual Trip Failure RPSOO5 & RPS006 at Time Zero
e. Stop Valve #1 & Control Valve #1 Fail As-Is TGOO5-01 at Time Zero
f. SGIS A & B failure ESFAS012-01 & ESFAS012-02 at Time Zero
7. Enter Panel Overrides
a. None
8. Enter Remote Functions / Administrative
a. Align CVCS makeup for direct. (1-CVC-254 open, 1-CVC-256 shut)
9. Set simulator time to real time, then place simulator in CONTINUE.
10. Give crew briefing.
a. Present plant conditions: 75% load at EOL 17,500 MWDMTU
b. Power history: 100% for 9 months, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago reduced to 75% for valve testing.

C. Equipment out of service: None

d. Abnormal conditions: None
e. Surveillances due: None
f. Instructions for shift: Raise power to 100%.
11. Allow crew 3-5 minutes to acclimate themselves with their positions.
12. Instructions for the Booth Operator.
a. Activate F1 Trip of 11 CC Pump when cued by the lead evaluator.
b. Activate F2 Loss of 22 DC Bus when cued by lead evaluator.
c. Activate F3 11B RCP Locked Rotor when cued by lead evaluator.

Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: I. Page 4 of 9 --

RESPONSES TO CREW REQUEST If a request and response is not listed, delay response until reviewed with the examiner. If one request is dependent upon completion of another, then subsequent actions should not be responded to until the appropriate time delay has been observed. Responses to routine requests, which have no effect the scenario, do not require examiner clearance.

REQUEST RESPONSE

1. OWC/E&C investigate failure of 11 CC Acknowledge request. After 5 minutes report Pump breaker tripped on overload.
2. TBO investigate loss of 11 CC Pump Acknowledge request. After 3 minutes report breaker tripped on overload 3 AB0 investigate loss of 11 CC Pump Acknowledge request. After 3 minutes report nothing abnormal at pump 4 OWC/E&C Investigate loss of 22 DC Bus Acknowledge request 5 OWC de-energize ESFAS ZG & AFAS ZG Acknowledge request, after 5 min de-energize ESFAS ZG, after another 3 minutes de-energize AFAS ZG Critical Tasks
1. Evaluate common mode failure and start standby CC pump prior to reaching RCP temperature limits (thrust bearing 195", CBO 200").
2. Performs alternate actions for tripping reactor within 5 minutes of RCP trip.
3. Recognize Turbine SV/CV still open, shuts MSIV's prior to AFAS actuation.

Dendix D Required Operator Actions Form --

Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page 5-- of 9 Event

Description:

11 CCW Pump Trip (Evaluator's Cue)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRO Acknowledges 1C13 alarms. Observes CC pump is tripped. Informs CRS.

CRS Implement AOP-7C, make page announcement CRS/CRO Evaluate for common mode failure and start a standby CC pump prior to reaching RCP temperature limits (thrust bearing 195'. CBO 200')

CRSRO Monitors RCP temperatures including trip criteria CRS Refers to T.S. 3.7.5 & 3.6.6 Declares 11 CC subsystem inoperable.

CRS/CRO Direct realignment of 13 CC pump to 11 480V Bus.

CRS Declares 11 CC subsystem operable. Exits T.S. 3.7.5 & 3.6.6 CRS Informs maintenance of need to investigate and repair.

  • Shading indicates Critical Task

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 6

-- of 9 Event

Description:

Loss of 22 DC Bus (Evaluators Cue)

I I

  • Shading indicates Critical Task

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DQ Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 9 Event

Description:

Locked rotor on 11B RCP (Evaluators Cue)

- Time

- - Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRO/RO Announce multiple alarms CRSKRO CRS directs CRO to check RPS calling for a trip CRS/RO CRS directs RO to monitor primary CRO Reports RPS is calling for a trip CRS Directs Reactor trip, implements EOP-0 RO Attempts Reactor trip @ 1C05 unsuccessfully RO Performs alternate actions for tripping reactor at 1C20within 5 minutes of 1 1B RCP trip

~

I

  • Shading indicates Critical Task

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 8-- of 9--

Event

Description:

EOP-0 (After Reactor Trip)

-~~Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRO Recognize Turbine SVlCV still open, shuts MSNs prior to M A S actuation All Recognize SGIS failure CRS/CRO Open ADVs to hold RCS temp constant RO Reports Reactivity Control is met CRO Reports Vital Aux Safety Function not met due to 22 DC bus failure RO Verifies SIAS as part of PIC safety function RO Reports PIC not met due to low PZR lvl & press (may be met if temperature not held due to SGIS failure)

CRO Initiate AFW flow IAW H R alternate action CRO Reports HR not met due to low RCS temp & S/G press (may be met if temperature not held due to SGIS failure)

CRO or RO Reports Containment Environment is met CRO or RO Reports Rad Levels External to Containment is met CRS End of EOP-0 brief CRS Using EOP-0 flowchart determines EOP-8 is correct CRS Implements EOP-8 due to loss of 22 DC bus I

I I I

  • Shading indicates Critical Task

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DP 1 I Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 9 -- of 9 Event

Description:

EOP-8 (After EOP-0)

Time Position

~~

ALL Evaluate Resource Assessment Table RO RC-1 Met, PIC-4 Met, CRO VA-1 Not Met, CRS/CRO Directs CRO commence VA- 1 CRS/RO Directs RO complete RAT RO HR-2 Met, CE-1 Met, RLEC-1 Met CRS/RO CRS directs RO to commence PIC-4 (RC-1 if PIC reported met in EOP-0)

CRO When all required actions taken for VA safety function are complete, notify CRS

~~

CRS/CRO Direct CRO to commence working HR-2 CRS Determines EAL H.A. 1.1.1 L I

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Examiners: Operators:

Turnover: Unit 1 is at 100% power at MOL. 12 AFW pump tagged out for repair of overspeed trip device linkage (6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> into 18 hour2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> maintenance window).

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 0 AFWoo1-02 12 AFW Pump Failure 1 RCS026-01 1 (RO) PZR Level X Transmitter Failure (Low) 2 CEDS012-37 R (RO) CEA 37 Drop 3 CEDS003 R (RO) CEDS Raise Relay sticks when CEA withdrawn 4 RCS002 M (ALL) RCS Leak of 100 GPM 5 RCS002 M (ALL) RCS Leak increases to 200 GPM 6 Panel Override C (CRO) SIAS B Block Failure SIAS B Block II Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario: See Section D.5.d) I Actual Attributes I -- I -- I -- 11

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 11 6
2. Malfunctions after EOP entrv (1-2) 11 ~

2

3. Abnormal events (2-4) 11 4
4. Major transients (1-2) 11 2
5. EOPs enteredlrequiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 1 1
6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 11 a
7. Critical tasks (2-3) 1 1 2

Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 2 SCENARIO OVERVIEW DROPPED CEA/RCS LEAK Initial Conditions: 100% Rated Thermal Power, MOL, 12 AFW pump 00s for repair of overspeed trip device linkage (6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> into 18 hour2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> maintenance window).

Scenario starts with Pressurizer level transmitter X instrument failinmg low. After identification of instrument failure channel Y level controller will be placed in service and PZR heater cutout selected to Y only (vice WY). Common tap analysis should be consulted and other instruments checked to ensure no instrument line leak.

CEA 37 in Group 5 will drop completely causing multiple alarms. CRS will implement AOP-lB, with CRO lowering turbine load to restore Tcold to program. CRS will also notify OWC of CEA drop to ensure E&C response. When crew attempts to realign the CEA the outward motion relay will stick causing the CEA to continue withdrawing even after inholdout switch is released. CEDS will be placed in off stopping CEA motion. When crew realizes they cannot realign the CEA a power reduction to 70% power should be ordered.

During the power reduction IAW OP-3 an RCS leak will begin in excess of 1 charging pump.

AOP-2A will be implemented which will eventually lead to a reactor trip.

After the trip the leak will increase in size to 200 gpm. EOP-5 will be entered after completing EOP-0. The crew will begin a cooldown and depressurization to minimize leakage, during this step the crew will be unable to block SIAS B.

The scenario ends when the crew has throttled safety injection flow to prevent overfilling the pressurizer. CRS will declare EAL H.A.5.1.2.

INSTRUCTOR SCENARIO INFORMATION

1. Reset to IC-24
2. Perform switch check.
3. Place simulator in CONTINUE, advance charts and clear alarm display.
4. Place simulator in FREEZE.
5. Enter Trigger
a. T1: CEDS IdHoldOut switch moved
6. Enter Malfunctions
a. PZRLevel X Transmitter Fails Low.

RCS026-01 (Low) on Fl

b. CEA37Drop CEDS012-37 on F2

Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Page 3 of 1 0

c. CEDS Raise Relay sticks when CEA withdrawn CEDSOO3 on T1
d. RCS leak of 100 gpm RCS002 lOOgpm on F3
e. 12 AFW Pump Failure AFW001-02 at Time Zero
7. Enter Panel Overrides
a. SIAS B Block Failure SIAS B Block keyswitch to normal at Time Zero
8. Enter Remote Functions / Administrative
a. Place yellow tag on 12 AFW Pump trip pushbutton.
9. Set simulator time to real time, then place simulator in CONTINUE.
10. Give crew briefing.
a. Present plant conditions: 100%load at MOL 10,885 MWDMTU
b. Power history: 100% for 12 months C. Equipment out of service: 12 AFW Pump 00s (repairing overspeed trip linkage 6 hrs into 18 hr window)
d. Abnormal conditions: None
e. Surveillances due: None
f. Instructions for shift: Maintain 100% power
11. Allow crew 3-5 minutes to acclimate themselves with their positions.
12. Instructions for the Booth Operator.
a. Activate Fl PZR Level X transmitter fails low when cued by the lead evaluator.
b. Activate F2 CEA 37 drop when cued by lead evaluator.
c. Remove CEDSO12-37 After CEA fully inserted.
d. Activate F3 100 gpm RCS leak when cued by lead evaluator.
e. Modify RCS002 Raise RCS leak rate to 200 gpm when reactor trips.
f. Block SIAS B Use panel override to give ESFAS door alarm then block SIAS B, 1 minute after requested of PWS.

Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Page 4 of 1 0 RESPONSES TO CREW REQUEST If a request and response is not listed, delay response until reviewed with the examiner. If one request is dependent upon completion of another, then subsequent actions should not be responded to until the appropriate time delay has been observed. Responses to routine requests, which have no effect the scenario, do not require examiner clearance.

REQUEST RESPONSE

1. TBO check IC43 PZR level indication Acknowledge request. After 2 minutes report 216 inches.
2. OWC contact I&C to investigate PZR Level Acknowledge request.

transmitter failure 3 NFM for Fxyt & Frt Report Fxyt is 1.023 and Frt 1.58,2 days ago 4 Chemistry sample both S/G's for activity Acknowledge request IAW CP-436 5 PWS block SIAS B locally at ESFAS cabinet Acknowledge request, After 1 minute give ESFAS door alarm then block SIAS B using panel override for block WS Critical Tasks

1. Place CEDS panel to off prior to high power pretrip alarm
2. Commence cooldown of RCS prior to subcooling lowering below 30".

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page 5 of 10 Event

Description:

PZR Level X Transmitter Failure (Evaluator Cue)

Time - Position Applicants Actions or Behavior I I I

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Group 5 CEA Drop (Evaluator Cue)

RO Places CEDS to off RO Informs CRS that CEA motion stops CRS Refers to TS 3.1.4 CRS Enters LCO 3.1.4.A CRS/CRO Calculates time to realign CEA is 30 minutes CRS Directs power reduction to 70%

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Power Reduction to 70% (Realignment Time Expiration)

~ ~~

Time

-~~ Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DQ Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 8

-- of 10 Event

Description:

RCS Leak / AOPQA (After Power Lowered By 5%)

RO Secure L/D (Shut I-CVC-515 & 516)

CRO Check for S/G tube leak (determines no tube leakage)

RO Detrmine if leak is on charging header CRO Determine leak is in containment CRO Starts all CACs with max flow CRS Determines leak not isolated, directs Rx trip

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 9

-- of 1 0 Event

Description:

EOP-0 (After Reactor Trip)

Time p Position Applicants Actions or Behavior P

~

Report CE not met due to containment pressure & temp trends (may call met CRO Perform Rad Levels External to Containment (Met)

CRS Perform EOP-0 brief CRS Implements EOP-5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 5

Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 10of 1 0 Event

Description:

EOP-5 (After EOP-0)

RO Depressurize RCS to maintain subcooling CRO Throttle HPST Flow CRS Determines EAL H.A.5.1.2

~

  • Shading indicates a Critical Task

ndix D Scenario Outline - -

Form ES D I Scenario No.: 3 Page __

1 o f x Facility: Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 2008 Examiners: Operators:

Turnover: Unit 1 is at 100%power, MOL equilibrium conditions. 13 HPSI pump tagged out for repair of excessive vibration during last STP 0-7B (3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> into 36 hour4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> maintenance window) IAS LCO 3.5.2.A.

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1.

2.

Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d)

Total malfunctions (5-8)

Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)

Actual Attributes I

t t

I 5

1

-- I

3. Abnormal events (2-4) I t 3
4. Major transients (1-2) I t 1
5. EOPs enteredhequiringsubstantive actions (1-2) I t 1
6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) I t 0
7. Critical tasks (2-3) I t 3

Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Page 2 of 1 1 SCENARIO OVERVIEW RCP SEALSRUBE LEAK Initial Conditions: 100% Rated Thermal Power, MOL, Eqilibrium conditions. 13 HPSI pump tagged out for repair of excessive vibration during last STP 0-7B (3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> into 36 hour4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> maintenance window) IAS LCO 3.5.2.A.

Scenario starts with 12A RCP 1" stage seal failure. The crew ensures only a single seal failed and notifies engineering.

Channel B RPS matrix power supply will fail causing multiple alarms at 1C05. After ensuring RPS is not calling for a trip the crew should enter LCO's 3.3.3.A & 3.3.3.B. The CRS should call OWC to get I&C working on repairs to the power supply problem.

After all LCO's determined calls made 12A RCP 3d stage seal will also fail. This second seal failure will require an expeditious shutdown IAW Alarm Manual.

During the shutdown turbine valve CV-3 fails as is and turbine control becomes more difficult. The crew should recognize valve failure and implement AOP-7E.

After crew stabilizes the plant a CIS B spurious actuation occurs which causes a loss of component cooling water to the RCP's. The crew will be unable to reset the CIS B and a reactor trip will be ordered.

After verifying Reactivity control in EOP-0 the RCP's should be secured. After completing EOP-0 a transition to EOP-2 should occur.

After a few steps are completed in EQP-2 a tube leak develops in 12 S/G causing the crew to transition to EQP-6.

The scenario will end when the 12 S/G is isolated IAW EQP-6. CRS will declare EAL H.A.5.1.2 INSTRUCTOR SCENARIO INFORMATION

1. Reset to IC-24
2. Perform switch check.

- 3. Place simulator in CONTINUE, advance charts and clear alarm display

- 4. Place simulator in FlIEEZE.

- 5. EnterTrigger

a. None
6. Enter Malfunctions
a. 12A RCP Lower Seal Failure RCSOl1-03 on F1
b. Channel B RPS Matrix Power Supply Failure RPS007-02 on F2

Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Page -&of 1 1 C. 12A RCP 3rdStage Seal Failure RCSO13-03 on F3

d. Spurious CIS B Actuation ESFA009 on F4
e. 11 S/G Tube Leak (2 Tubes)

MS002-01 at F5

f. CV-3 Fails AS-IS TG005 at Time Zero
7. Enter Panel Overrides
a. None
8. Enter Remote Functions / Administrative

- a. Place yellow tag on 13 HPSI Pump WS in PTL.

b. Place red dot on H20 13 HPSI PP BKR L/UIMPR
9. Set simulator time to real time, then place simulator in CONTINUE.
10. Give crew briefing.
a. Present plant conditions: 100%load at MOL 10,885 MWDMTU
b. Power history: 100% for 9 months C. Equipment out of service: 13 HPSI Pump 0 0 s (repairing excessive vibration during STP-0-7, 3 hrs into 36 hr window)
d. Abnormal conditions: None
e. Surveillances due: None
f. Instructions for shift: Maintain 100%power
11. Allow crew 3-5 minutes to acclimate themselves with their positions.
12. Instructions for the Booth Operator.
a. Activate Fl 12A RCP Lower Seal Failure when cued by the lead evaluator.
b. Activate F2 Channel B RPS Matrix Power Supply Failure when cued by lead evaluator.
c. Activate F3 12A RCP 3rdStage Seal Failure when cued by lead evaluator.
d. Activate F4 Spurious CIS B Actuation when cued by lead.
e. Activate F5 11 S/G Tube Leak (2 Tubes) when cued by lead

Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Page 4 of RESPONSES TO CREW REQUEST If a request and response is not listed, delay response until reviewed with the examiner. If one request is dependent upon completion of another, then subsequent actions should not be responded to until the appropriate time delay has been observed. Responses to routine requests, which have no effect the scenario, do not require examiner clearance.

REQUEST RESPONSE

1. OWC contact Engineering about 12 A RCP Acknowledge request.

lower seal failure

2. OWC contact I&C to investigate loss of RPS Acknowledge request.

matrix power supply 3 OWC contact Engineering about 12 A RCP Acknowledge request upper seal failure

4. TBO/PPO check CV-3 Acknowledge request, after 5 minutes report nothing unusual except it appears more open then other 3 CVs
5. OWC contact Engineering about CV-3 failing Acknowledge request as-is
6. PWS attempt reset of CIS B locally at ESFAS Acknowledge request, After 2 minute give cabinet ESFAS door alarm then clear alarm after another 2 minutes. Call CR and report unable to reset CIS B locally Critical Tasks
1. Recognize need for expeditious shutdown within 5 minutes of 2ndseal failure
2. Secures all RCPs within 3 minutes of reaching RCP temperature limits.
3. Isolate 11 S/G prior to S/G filling solid and MSSVs open.

Dendix D Required Operator Actions Form FS- -

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Acknowledges 1C06 & computer alarms.

RO Evaluates 12A RCP, determines lower seal failure CRO Evaluate Alarm Manual CRS Directs RO to monitor other RCP seals CRS Notifies Engineering of seal failure I I I I w

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 6

-- of 11 Event

Description:

Channel B RPS Matrix Power Supply Failure (Evaluators Cue)

Time - Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 7-- of --J-Event

Description:

12A RCP 3rdStage Failure (Evaluator's Cue)

- Time

- - Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Acknowledges 1C06 & computer alarms.

RO Evaluates 12A RCP, determines a upper seal failure CRO Evaluate Alarm Manual CRS Recognize need for expeditious shutdown to protect against RCS leak from RCP s

. . v nf ?* s a l i a l w e CRS Directs an expeditious shutdown CRS Notifies Engineering of 2ndseal failure

  • Shading indicates critical task

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DQ

~

Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 8of >

Event

Description:

Expeditious S/D with CV-3 fails As-Is (When Down Power Commenced)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Place all PZR Heaters to On RO Lowers PZR Press controllers to -2200#

RO Borate from RWT IAW OP-3 CRO Lower turbine load using load set I

CRO Recognizes CV-3 failing as-is CRS Implements AOP-7E CRS Directs RO/CRO to stabilize plant CRS Notify Main Turbine Engineer

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 9

-- of 11 Event

Description:

Spurious CIS B (Evaluators Cue)

RO/CRO Announce CIS alarm CRS Direct RO to monitor primary CRO Evaluate CIS, determines spurious CRO Attempts to reset CIS unsuccessfully at both l C l 0 & ESFAS CRS Holds short brief, then orders Reactor Trip

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DP Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 1 0of &

Event

Description:

EOP-0 (After Reactor Trip)

- Time

- - Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Directs EOP-0 CRO Performs Core & RCS Heat Removal (Not Met due to no operating RCPs)

CRO Performs Containment Environment (Met)

CRO Perform Rad Levels External to Containment (Met)

CRS Perform EOP-0 brief CRS Using EOP-0 flowchart determines EOP-2 is correct EOP CRS Implements EOP-2

~

I

  • Shading indicates critical task

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DQ Event

Description:

S/G Tube Leak (EOP-6) (Evaluator's Cue after steps assigned in EOP-2)

RO Depressurize RCS to -25' Subcooling CRS Determines EAL H.A.5.1.2 I I

  • Shading indicates critical task

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario No.: 4 Page __

1 of 10 Facility: Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 4 Op-Test No.: 2008 Examiners: Operators:

Turnover: Unit 1 is at 100% power, BOL, Equilibrium Conditions. 12 AFW pump tagged out for repair of overspeed trip device linkage (6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> into 18 hour2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> maintenance window).

Event Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes -- _- -_

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) I 1 5

~

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) I 1 2
3. Abnormal events (2-4) 1 1 2
4. Major transients (1-2) I 1 1
5. EOPs enteredlrequiring substantive actions (1-2) I 1 1
6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) I 1 0
7. Critical tasks (2-3) I 1 3

Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Page 2 of 1 0 SCENARIO OVERVIEW NI POWER SUMMERLOSS OF ALL FEED Initial Condition is steady state at 100% power with 12 AFW pump tagged out for repair of overspeed trip device linkage (6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> into 18 hour2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> maintenance window).

After crew takes the watch a NI channel A power summer amp fails causing multiple alarms.

Once crew identifies failed power summer amp NO-1-200 should be referenced and LCOs 3.3.1.A & 3.3.1.D should be entered. CRO will bypass channel A trip units 1,2,7,8,10.

A failure of the 12 S/G Main FRV controller will cause the FRV to fail to the D/P controller in manual. AOP-3G should be implemented. After verifying a good setpoint signal the CRO will commence auto operation with the Main Feed Bypass valve.

Once feedwater is in auto a loss of offsite power will occur concurrent with a fault on the 11 4KV bus. This will cause a loss of all A train components. During EOP-0 the CRO will need to start 12 CC pp to prevent a RCS leak from the RCP seals. During the wrap up brief for EOP-0 the 11 AFW pump will trip causing a loss of all feedwater. CRS should implement EOP-3.

During EOP-3 the crew will cool down the primary using available S/G inventory and commence once through core cooling when S/G level reaches -350. CRS should direct tying MCC 114 to MCC 104 to maximize PORV flow.

Scenario ends when crew has determined OTCC will be successful IAW EOP Attachments.

CRS will declare Alert based on either A.A.7.1.2 or H.A.5.1.2 INSTRUCTOR SCENARIO INFORMATION

1. Reset to IC-24
2. Perform switch check.
3. Place simulator in CONTINUE, advance charts and clear alarm display.
4. Place simulator in FREEZE.
5. Enter Trigger
a. None
6. Enter Malfunctions
a. Channel A NI Power Summer Failure NIOOll-01 on F1
b. 12 FRV Controller Failure FWO18-02onF2

Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Page 3-- of 10 C. Loss of Offsite Power SWYD002 on F3

d. 11 4KV bus fault 4KVOO1-01 on F4
e. 11 AFW Pump Failure AFWOO1-01 on F5
f. 12 AFW Pump Failure AFWOO1-02 at Time Zero

- 7. Enter Panel Overrides

a. None
8. Enter Remote Functions / Administrative
a. Place yellow tag on 12 AFW Pump trip pushbutton.
9. Set simulator time to real time, then place simulator in CONTINUE.

- 10. Give crew briefing.

a. Present plant conditions: 100% load at BOL 2545 h4WDMTU
b. Power history: 100% for 2 months C. Equipment out of service: 12 AFW Pump 00s (repairing overspeed trip linkage 6 hrs into 18 hr window)
d. Abnormal conditions: None
e. Surveillances due: None
f. Instructions for shift: Maintain 100%power
11. Allow crew 3-5 minutes to acclimate themselves with their positions.
12. Instructions for the Booth Operator.
a. Activate F1 Channel A NI Power Summer Failure when cued by the lead evaluator.
b. Activate F2 12 FRV Controller Failure when cued by lead evaluator.

C. Activate F3 & F4 Loss of Offsite Power & 11 4KV bus fault at same time when cued by lead evaluator.

d. Activate F5 11 AFW Pump Failure when cued by lead evaluator

Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Page 4-- of a RESPONSES TO CREW REQUEST If a request and response is not listed, delay response until reviewed with the examiner. If one request is dependent upon completion of another, then subsequent actions should not be responded to until the appropriate time delay has been observed. Responses to routine requests, which have no effect the scenario, do not require examiner clearance.

REQUEST RESPONSE

1. OWC contact IM for assistance for NI Power Acknowledge Request Summer
2. OWC contact Engineering & IM for FRV Acknowledge Request Controller Failure 3 PWS tie 1Y09 to lYlO with lYlO supplying Acknowledge Request, after 4 minutes tie lYO9 IAW local plaque to lYlO 4 TBO shift13 charging pump to 14 480V Bus Acknowledge Request, after 1 minute shift power supply 5 ABOEPO check SWGR Ventilation in Acknowledge Request, after 2 minutes report service SWGR Ventilation in service
6. ABO/PPO operate ADV's locally with chain Acknowledge Request, after 2 minutes open operator ADV's to requested position.
7. OWC/TBO check 11 AFW pp Acknowledge Request, after 2 minutes report 11 AEW pp appears seized.
8. U2 CRO align 23 AFW pp to supply U-1 Acknowledge Request, after 2 minutes report cross-connect valve will not open, OWC informed
9. OWC expedite return of 12 AFW pp to Acknowledge Request service
10. ABO/PPO/PWS tie MCC-114 to MCC-104 Acknowledge Request, after 5 minutes tie MCC's using Remote Function Critical Tasks
1. Commence boration as alternate action fox inability to assess CEA position within 5 minutes of trip.
2. Starts 12 Component Cooling Pump prior to exceeding RCP temperature limits. (thrust bearing 195", CBO 200").
3. Commence OTCC within 5 minutes of both S/G's c-350"or Tcold rising 5"uncontrollably (must be commenced prior to CET temperature reaching 560°F.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page __ of -

Event

Description:

Channel A NI Power Summer Failure (Evaluators Cue)

Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO 1cos w CRO Verifies FWS not calling for a trip CRO/RO Recognize power summer failure on channel A CRS Reference NO-1-200 matrix for T.S. applicability CRO Bypass T/U 1,2,7,8,10 on Channel A CRS Enter LCOs 3.3.1.A & 3.3.1.D RO Evaluate Alarm Manual for compensatory actions

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Page __ of __

Event

Description:

12 FRV Controller Failure (Evaluators Cue)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page __ of -

Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power & 11 4KV bus fault, EOP-0 (Evaluator's Cue)

CRS Implement EOP-0 RO Commence boration as alternate action for inability to assess CEA position within 5 min of trip I Reports Reactivity Control (Met)

I I RO CRO I

Performs Turbine Trip (Met)

CRO Starts 12 Component Cooling Pump prior to reaching RCP temperature limits (thrust bearing 195", CBO 200')

CRO Performs Containment Environment (Met). (May call Not Met unable to assess)

CRO Secures Blowdown due to not able to assess Rad Levels CRO Reports Rad Levels External to Containment (Not Met)

CRS Contact PWS to tie 1Y09 to 1Y10 IAW local plaque

  • Shading indicates Critical Task

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page -of -

Event

Description:

Loss of 11 AFW Pump (Evaluators Cue, z 3 minutes after pump started)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2008 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Page -of __

Event

Description:

EOP-3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRO Commence rapid cooldown to 465°F CRO Block SGIS CRS Contact maintenance for AFW pps & 1A DG(if not done during EOP-0)

RO Prepares for Once Through Core Cooling (Starts HPSI, charging pumps, etc)

CRO Prevent dryout of SIGs CRS Direct tying MCCll4 to MCC 104 CRS Direct initiation of SIAS A6 & B6 CRS EAL A.A.7.1.2 or H.A.5.1.2 t

1 I

  • Shading indicates Critical Task
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