ML18106A647: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
(5 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown)
Line 3: Line 3:
| issue date = 06/04/1998
| issue date = 06/04/1998
| title = LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr
| title = LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr
| author name = BAKKEN A C, THOMAS B J
| author name = Bakken A, Thomas B
| author affiliation = PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO. OF NEW JERSEY
| author affiliation = PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO. OF NEW JERSEY
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 16: Line 16:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:-CPS A Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit JUN 04 1998 LR-N980269 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 272/98-011-00 SALEM GENERATING STATION -UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 Gentlemen:
{{#Wiki_filter:CPS ~-
This Licensee Event Report entitled "Improper Isolation of the Single Cell Battery Charger from the 125 VDC Battery" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 1 OCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
      ~:              ~G        -
Attachment BJT c Distribution LER File 3.7 . r 9806120031 980604 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR The prnYer is in yuur Jund:;. Sincerely, I-p .(;, 11.c. 8.*i-...pz:
A Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit JUN 04 1998 LR-N980269 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 272/98-011-00 SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 Gentlemen:
A C. Bakken Ill. General Manager -Salem Operations  
This Licensee Event Report entitled "Improper Isolation of the Single Cell Battery Charger from the 125 VDC Battery" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
' \ " .. ' ; -*** 95-2168 REV. 6/94 NRCFORM 366 U.S. NUCt.: REGULATORY COMMISSION APP VED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (4-95) EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.
Sincerely, I- p    ~            .(;, 11.c. 8.*i-...pz:
FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION (See reverse for required number of AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555--0001, AND TO digits/characters for each block) THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150--0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503. FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3) SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 1 OF4 TITLE (4) Improper Isolation of the Single Cell Battery Charger from the 125 voe Battery EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) I FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL I REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER SALEM UNIT 2 05000311 05 05 98 98 011 00 06 04 98 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER ----HOPE CREEK 05000354 --* .NG 1 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11) MODE(9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) x 50. 73(a)(2)(i)  
A C. Bakken Ill.
: 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)
General Manager -
POWER 100 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i)  
Salem Operations Attachment                                                                                              \
: 50. 73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
BJT                                                                                          ~  "' ~..
LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)  
                                                                                                      ~
: 50. 73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 -20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)
c      Distribution LER . File r
OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1)  
3.7 9806120031 980604 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S                        PDR The prnYer is in yuur Jund:;.
: 50. 73(a)(2)(v)
95-2168 REV. 6/94
Abstract below or in C Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2)  
 
: 50. 73(a)(2)(vii)
NRCFORM 366                             U.S. NUCt.:       REGULATORY COMMISSION                       APP     VED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (4-95)                                                                                                             EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) Brian J. Thomas, Licensing Engineer 609-339-2022 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE I CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS TONPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR IYES XINO SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). DATE (15) ABSTRACT (Limitto 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten Imes) (16) On May 5, 1998, the activity to charge cell 47 of the 1 A 125 VOC battery using the single cell battery charger was identified as having been accomplished without proper evaluation for the isolation of the battery charger from the Class-1 E 125 VOC battery. Without properly analyzing the impact of connecting the single cell charger to the operable 125VOC and providing the necessary electrical Isolation to ensure no impact to the battery, the use of the single cell charger rendered the battery inoperable.
REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                              LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.               FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR (See reverse for required number of                                  REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555--0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150--0104), OFFICE OF digits/characters for each block)                                MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
No Technical Specification Action Statements (TSAS) were entered while the single cell battery charger was connected to the 1A 125 voe battery. Although a specific review of past occurrences has not been performed, discussion with cognizant station personnel has indicated that the single cell battery charger has been used in the past on other battery banks at both Salem Units 1 and 2, and at Hope Creek without proper isolation.
FACILITY NAME (1)                                                                           DOCKET NUMBER (2)                                   PAGE (3)
The cause of occurrence for Salem is attributed to an inadequate 1 OCFR50.59 applicability review during past revisions of the maintenance procedure for single cell battery charging.
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1                                                             05000272                                           1 OF4 TITLE (4)
The cause of the Hope Creek event is attributed to a deficient procedure and inadequate review of the separation requirements during initial plant startup. This event is being reported in accordance with 1 O CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
Improper Isolation of the Single Cell Battery Charger from the 125                                     voe Battery EVENT DATE (5)                 LER NUMBER (6)                   REPORT DATE (7)                       OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
* NRC FORM 366 (4-95)   
FACILITY NAME                             DOCKET NUMBER MONTH     DAY     YEAR     YEAR       SEQUENTIAL     I REVISION MONTH     DAY     YEAR NUMBER         NUMBER I                                                                SALEM UNIT 2                           05000311 05       05     98       98     --    011     --      00       06     04       98 FACILITY NAME HOPE CREEK DOCKET NUMBER 05000354
*,('
    - -*     .NG       1     THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION . FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse  
MODE(9)                     20.2201(b)                       20.2203(a)(2)(v)               x   50. 73(a)(2)(i)                       50. 73(a)(2)(viii)
-Pressurized Water Reactor General Electric -BWR/4 125 VDC Batteries  
POWER         100         20.2203(a)(1)                     20.2203(a)(3)(i)                   50. 73(a)(2)(ii)                     50.73(a)(2)(x)
{EJ/-}* LER NUMBER (6) YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION 2 NUMBER NUMBER 98 -011 -00 PAGE (3) OF 4 *Energy Industry Identification System (EllS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC}.
LEVEL (10)                   20.2203(a)(2)(i)                   20.2203(a)(3)(ii)                 50. 73(a)(2)(iii)                     73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)                 20.2203(a)(4)                     50.73(a)(2)(iv)                       OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)                 50.36(c)(1)                       50. 73(a)(2)(v)                 Spec~in    Abstract below or in     C Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)                 50.36(c)(2)                       50. 73(a)(2)(vii)
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE At the time of discovery, Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 were in Mode 1 and Hope Creek was in Op Con 1. DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On May 5, 1998, the activity to charge cell 47 of the 1 A 125 VDC battery using the single cell charger was identified as having been accomplished without proper evaluation for the isolation of the battery charger from the Class-1 E 125 VDC battery. The single cell charger was installed in accordance with maintenance procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q).
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
The power source for the single *cell charger was a non Class-1 E power source. The procedure contained a caution concerning channel separation and that the purpose of the fuses provided in the single cell charger were to maintain channel separation.
NAME                                                                                             TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
However, the fuses were not specifically analyzed for protection of the class-1 E battery. Without properly analyzing the impact of connecting the single cell charger to the operable 125VDC and providing the necessary electrical isolation to ensure no impact to the battery, the use of the single cell charger rendered the battery inoperable.*
Brian J. Thomas, Licensing Engineer                                                             609-339-2022 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
No Technical Specification Action Statements (TSAS) were entered while the single cell battery charger was connected to the 1 A 125 VDC battery. TS 3.8.2.3 action f stated to, "restore the battery to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following*
CAUSE       SYSTEM       COMPONENT       MANUFACTURER       REPORTABLE             CAUSE       SYSTEM     COMPONENT     MANUFACTURER         REPORTABLE TONPRDS                                                                             TONPRDS IYES SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
30 hours." The single cell charger was connected to the 1 A 125 VDC battery for greater than 2 hours. Discussion with cognizant station personnel has indicated that the single cell battery charger has been used in the past on other battery banks at both Salem Units 1 and 2. A review of the procedure for single cell battery charging at Hope Creek was performed.
(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
This review determined that proper isolation was not being provided when connecting the single cell charger to the Hope Creek Class-1 E batteries.
I XINO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
MONTH          DAY        YEAR ABSTRACT (Limitto 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten Imes) (16)
On May 5, 1998, the activity to charge cell 47 of the 1A 125 VOC battery using the single cell battery charger was identified as having been accomplished without proper evaluation for the isolation of the battery charger from the Class-1 E 125 VOC battery. Without properly analyzing the impact of connecting the single cell charger to the operable 125VOC and providing the necessary electrical Isolation to ensure no impact to the battery, the use of the single cell charger rendered the battery inoperable. No Technical Specification Action Statements (TSAS) were entered while the single cell battery charger was connected to the 1A 125                           voe     battery. Although a specific review of past occurrences has not been performed, discussion with cognizant station personnel has indicated that the single cell battery charger has been used in the past on other battery banks at both Salem Units 1 and 2, and at Hope Creek without proper isolation.
The cause of occurrence for Salem is attributed to an inadequate 10CFR50.59 applicability review during past revisions of the maintenance procedure for single cell battery charging. The cause of the Hope Creek event is attributed to a deficient procedure and inadequate review of the separation requirements during initial plant startup.
This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
* NRC FORM 366   (4-95)
 
  *,(' r.==========:=:~===-========-======================~=::===il NRC FORM 366A                                                                           U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)
~'                          FACILITY NAME (1)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION       .
DOCKET NUMBER (2)     LER NUMBER (6)              PAGE (3)
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1                                         05000272     YEAR I  SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION NUMBER 2  OF    4 98 -      011    -    00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor General Electric - BWR/4 125 VDC Batteries {EJ/-}*
        *Energy Industry Identification System (EllS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC}.
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE At the time of discovery, Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 were in Mode 1 and Hope Creek was in Op Con 1.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On May 5, 1998, the activity to charge cell 47 of the 1A 125 VDC battery using the single cell b~ttery charger was identified as having been accomplished without proper evaluation for the isolation of the battery charger from the Class-1 E 125 VDC battery. The single cell charger was installed in accordance with maintenance procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q). The power source for the single
      *cell charger was a non Class-1 E power source. The procedure contained a caution concerning channel separation and that the purpose of the fuses provided in the single cell charger were to maintain channel separation. However, the fuses were not specifically analyzed for protection of the class-1 E battery. Without properly analyzing the impact of connecting the single cell charger to the operable 125VDC and providing the necessary electrical isolation to ensure no impact to the battery, the use of the single cell charger rendered the battery inoperable.* No Technical Specification Action Statements (TSAS) were entered while the single cell battery charger was connected to the 1A 125 VDC battery. TS 3.8.2.3 action f stated to, "restore the battery to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following*
30 hours." The single cell charger was connected to the 1A 125 VDC battery for greater than 2 hours.
Discussion with cognizant station personnel has indicated that the single cell battery charger has been used in the past on other battery banks at both Salem Units 1 and 2. A review of the procedure for single cell battery charging at Hope Creek was performed. This review determined that proper isolation was not being provided when connecting the single cell charger to the Hope Creek Class-1E batteries.
Based on the above, this event is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any condition prohibited by the plant's. Technical Specifications.
Based on the above, this event is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any condition prohibited by the plant's. Technical Specifications.
NRC FORM 366A (4*95)
NRC FORM 366A (4*95)
,f, NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION 3 OF 4 NUMBER "NUMBER 98 -011 -00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of occurrence for Salem is attributed to an inadequate 1 OCFR50.59 applicability review during past revisions of the maintenance procedure for single cell battery charging.
 
Although the isolation requirements in the original Salem single cell charging procedure may not have been adequate, 1 OCFR50.59 applicability reviews for changes to the isolation requirements during past procedure revisions did not adequately assess the sepa_ration requirements for installing a non class-1 E battery charger to an operable class-1 E battery. The cause of the Hope Creek event is attributed to a deficient procedure and inadequate review of the separation requirements during initial plant startup. Although the above event was attributed to an inadequate 1 OCFR50.59 review, improvements have been made to the 1 OCFR50.59 program since the above 1 OCFR50.59 reviews were performed.
,f, r.======'.'~~==========
Some of the improvements included the establishment of formal training and requalification requirements for 1 OCFR50.59 preparers, peer reviewers, and approvers.
NRC FORM 366A                                                                         U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)
However, as outlined in the corrective actions, additional enhancements will be made to the 1 OCFR50.59 program to specifically address the issue identified in this LER. PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2, and Hope Creek for the prior two years did not identify any similar occurrences associated with inadequate 1 OCFR50.59 applicability reviews. However, LER 272/97-013-00 was issued concerning an instance of having measuring and test equipment (M& TE) connected to operable plant equipment.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
This LER identified the test equipment remained connected to the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) while the EOG was declared operable however the test equipment was not evaluated for remaining connected to an operable EOG. This event was attributed to personnel error for intentionally leaving the test equipment in place when declaring the EDG operable contrary to the procedure requirement that directed removal of the test equipment.
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)                           DOCKET NUMBER (2)     LER NUMBER (6)               PAGE (3)
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS The possibility of a charger failure occurring that would damage a battery cell when the non class-1 E battery charger is connected to the class-1 E battery is minimal. Although the single cell battery charger is non-safety related, the single cell charger is provided with similar features (i.e., current limit) as the installed safety related battery chargers and should limit a fault from affecting the battery. There have been no reported c_ases of a single cell battery charger adversely impacting battery cell voltage during Salem or Hope Creek Station's use of the single cell battery charger. Therefore, there was no impact to the health and safety of the public. NRC FORM 366A (4-95)
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1                                       05000272     YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION "NUMBER 3   OF     4 98 -     011     -     00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
----------
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of occurrence for Salem is attributed to an inadequate 10CFR50.59 applicability review during past revisions of the maintenance procedure for single cell battery charging. Although the isolation requirements in the original Salem single cell charging procedure may not have been adequate, 10CFR50.59 applicability reviews for changes to the isolation requirements during past procedure revisions did not adequately assess the sepa_ration requirements for installing a non class-1E battery charger to an operable class-1 E battery. The cause of the Hope Creek event is attributed to a deficient procedure and inadequate review of the separation requirements during initial plant startup.
--.... \ (4-95) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION 4 NUMBER NUMBER 98 -011 -00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PAGE (3) OF 4 1. Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(0) was placed on administrative hold to prevent use of the procedure in the field until satisfactory resolution of the proper isolation of the single cell battery charger from Class -1 E battery. 2. A review of maintenance procedures is being performed to determine if other procedures allow temporary equipment to be installed on operable systems. If maintenance procedures exist that connect temporary equipment to operable systems, a review will be performed to determine if the effect of the temporary equipment on system operation has been properly evaluated.
Although the above event was attributed to an inadequate 10CFR50.59 review, improvements have been made to the 10CFR50.59 program since the above 10CFR50.59 reviews were performed.
This review will be completed by August 7, 1998. 3. The "1 OCFR50.59 Program Guidance" procedure, NC.NA-AS.ZZ-0059, will be revised to include examples concerning the connection of temporary equipment to operable systems when_ performing 1 OCFR50.59 reviews. The procedure will be revised by August 31, 1998. 4 .. Procedure HC.MD-GP.ZZ-0014(0) was revised to delete the provisions for charging a single battery cell while the battery is in service. 5. This issue will be included in the next two year cycle of 1 OCFR50.59 refresher training starting in July 1998. NRC FORM 366A (4-95)}}
Some of the improvements included the establishment of formal training and requalification requirements for 10CFR50.59 preparers, peer reviewers, and approvers. However, as outlined in the corrective actions, additional enhancements will be made to the 10CFR50.59 program to specifically address the issue identified in this LER.
PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2, and Hope Creek for the prior two years did not identify any similar occurrences associated with inadequate 10CFR50.59 applicability reviews. However, LER 272/97-013-00 was issued concerning an instance of having measuring and test equipment (M&TE) connected to operable plant equipment. This LER identified the test equipment remained connected to the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) while the EOG was declared operable however the test equipment was not evaluated for remaining connected to an operable EOG. This event was attributed to personnel error for intentionally leaving the test equipment in place when declaring the EDG operable contrary to the procedure requirement that directed removal of the test equipment.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS The possibility of a charger failure occurring that would damage a battery cell when the non class-1 E battery charger is connected to the class-1 E battery is minimal. Although the single cell battery charger is non-safety related, the single cell charger is provided with similar features (i.e., current limit) as the installed safety related battery chargers and should limit a fault from affecting the battery. There have been no reported c_ases of a single cell battery charger adversely impacting battery cell voltage during Salem or Hope Creek Station's use of the single cell battery charger.
Therefore, there was no impact to the health and safety of the public.
NRC FORM 366A (4-95)
 
. \
J*~N=R=C=F?OR~M=3=6=6A================~==========================~u~~.s=.N=-u~c~L?EA~R=R~E~G~U~LA~T~O~R~Y~C?OM~M~l?SS~l?O:==i!N (4-95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)                           DOCKET NUMBER (2)     LER NUMBER (6)             PAGE (3)
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1                                       05000272       YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION NUMBER 4  OF    4 98 -     011     -     00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
: 1. Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(0) was placed on administrative hold to prevent use of the procedure in the field until satisfactory resolution of the proper isolation of the single cell battery charger from th~ Class -1 E battery.
: 2. A review of maintenance procedures is being performed to determine if other procedures allow temporary equipment to be installed on operable systems. If maintenance procedures exist that connect temporary equipment to operable systems, a review will be performed to determine if the effect of the temporary equipment on system operation has been properly evaluated. This review will be completed by August 7, 1998.
: 3. The "1 OCFR50.59 Program Guidance" procedure, NC.NA-AS.ZZ-0059, will be revised to include examples concerning the connection of temporary equipment to operable systems when_
performing 10CFR50.59 reviews. The procedure will be revised by August 31, 1998.
4 .. Procedure HC.MD-GP.ZZ-0014(0) was revised to delete the provisions for charging a single battery cell while the battery is in service.
: 5. This issue will be included in the next two year cycle of 10CFR50.59 refresher training starting in July 1998.
NRC FORM 366A (4-95)}}

Latest revision as of 09:30, 23 February 2020

LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr
ML18106A647
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 06/04/1998
From: Bakken A, Bernard Thomas
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-98-011, LER-98-11, LR-N980269, NUDOCS 9806120031
Download: ML18106A647 (5)


Text

CPS ~-

~: ~G -

A Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit JUN 04 1998 LR-N980269 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 272/98-011-00 SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 Gentlemen:

This Licensee Event Report entitled "Improper Isolation of the Single Cell Battery Charger from the 125 VDC Battery" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Sincerely, I- p ~ .(;, 11.c. 8.*i-...pz:

A C. Bakken Ill.

General Manager -

Salem Operations Attachment \

BJT ~ "' ~..

~

c Distribution LER . File r

3.7 9806120031 980604 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR The prnYer is in yuur Jund:;.

95-2168 REV. 6/94

NRCFORM 366 U.S. NUCt.: REGULATORY COMMISSION APP VED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (4-95) EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR (See reverse for required number of REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555--0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150--0104), OFFICE OF digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 1 OF4 TITLE (4)

Improper Isolation of the Single Cell Battery Charger from the 125 voe Battery EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL I REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER I SALEM UNIT 2 05000311 05 05 98 98 -- 011 -- 00 06 04 98 FACILITY NAME HOPE CREEK DOCKET NUMBER 05000354

- -* .NG 1 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

MODE(9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) x 50. 73(a)(2)(i) 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER 100 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50. 73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50. 73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50. 73(a)(2)(v) Spec~in Abstract below or in C Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50. 73(a)(2)(vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Brian J. Thomas, Licensing Engineer 609-339-2022 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS TONPRDS IYES SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

I XINO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limitto 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten Imes) (16)

On May 5, 1998, the activity to charge cell 47 of the 1A 125 VOC battery using the single cell battery charger was identified as having been accomplished without proper evaluation for the isolation of the battery charger from the Class-1 E 125 VOC battery. Without properly analyzing the impact of connecting the single cell charger to the operable 125VOC and providing the necessary electrical Isolation to ensure no impact to the battery, the use of the single cell charger rendered the battery inoperable. No Technical Specification Action Statements (TSAS) were entered while the single cell battery charger was connected to the 1A 125 voe battery. Although a specific review of past occurrences has not been performed, discussion with cognizant station personnel has indicated that the single cell battery charger has been used in the past on other battery banks at both Salem Units 1 and 2, and at Hope Creek without proper isolation.

The cause of occurrence for Salem is attributed to an inadequate 10CFR50.59 applicability review during past revisions of the maintenance procedure for single cell battery charging. The cause of the Hope Creek event is attributed to a deficient procedure and inadequate review of the separation requirements during initial plant startup.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

  • NRC FORM 366 (4-95)
  • ,(' r.==========:=:~===-========-======================~=::===il NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)

~' FACILITY NAME (1)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION .

DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION NUMBER 2 OF 4 98 - 011 - 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor General Electric - BWR/4 125 VDC Batteries {EJ/-}*

  • Energy Industry Identification System (EllS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC}.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE At the time of discovery, Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 were in Mode 1 and Hope Creek was in Op Con 1.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On May 5, 1998, the activity to charge cell 47 of the 1A 125 VDC battery using the single cell b~ttery charger was identified as having been accomplished without proper evaluation for the isolation of the battery charger from the Class-1 E 125 VDC battery. The single cell charger was installed in accordance with maintenance procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q). The power source for the single

  • cell charger was a non Class-1 E power source. The procedure contained a caution concerning channel separation and that the purpose of the fuses provided in the single cell charger were to maintain channel separation. However, the fuses were not specifically analyzed for protection of the class-1 E battery. Without properly analyzing the impact of connecting the single cell charger to the operable 125VDC and providing the necessary electrical isolation to ensure no impact to the battery, the use of the single cell charger rendered the battery inoperable.* No Technical Specification Action Statements (TSAS) were entered while the single cell battery charger was connected to the 1A 125 VDC battery. TS 3.8.2.3 action f stated to, "restore the battery to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following*

30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />." The single cell charger was connected to the 1A 125 VDC battery for greater than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Discussion with cognizant station personnel has indicated that the single cell battery charger has been used in the past on other battery banks at both Salem Units 1 and 2. A review of the procedure for single cell battery charging at Hope Creek was performed. This review determined that proper isolation was not being provided when connecting the single cell charger to the Hope Creek Class-1E batteries.

Based on the above, this event is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any condition prohibited by the plant's. Technical Specifications.

NRC FORM 366A (4*95)

,f, r.======'.'~~==========

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION "NUMBER 3 OF 4 98 - 011 - 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of occurrence for Salem is attributed to an inadequate 10CFR50.59 applicability review during past revisions of the maintenance procedure for single cell battery charging. Although the isolation requirements in the original Salem single cell charging procedure may not have been adequate, 10CFR50.59 applicability reviews for changes to the isolation requirements during past procedure revisions did not adequately assess the sepa_ration requirements for installing a non class-1E battery charger to an operable class-1 E battery. The cause of the Hope Creek event is attributed to a deficient procedure and inadequate review of the separation requirements during initial plant startup.

Although the above event was attributed to an inadequate 10CFR50.59 review, improvements have been made to the 10CFR50.59 program since the above 10CFR50.59 reviews were performed.

Some of the improvements included the establishment of formal training and requalification requirements for 10CFR50.59 preparers, peer reviewers, and approvers. However, as outlined in the corrective actions, additional enhancements will be made to the 10CFR50.59 program to specifically address the issue identified in this LER.

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2, and Hope Creek for the prior two years did not identify any similar occurrences associated with inadequate 10CFR50.59 applicability reviews. However, LER 272/97-013-00 was issued concerning an instance of having measuring and test equipment (M&TE) connected to operable plant equipment. This LER identified the test equipment remained connected to the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) while the EOG was declared operable however the test equipment was not evaluated for remaining connected to an operable EOG. This event was attributed to personnel error for intentionally leaving the test equipment in place when declaring the EDG operable contrary to the procedure requirement that directed removal of the test equipment.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS The possibility of a charger failure occurring that would damage a battery cell when the non class-1 E battery charger is connected to the class-1 E battery is minimal. Although the single cell battery charger is non-safety related, the single cell charger is provided with similar features (i.e., current limit) as the installed safety related battery chargers and should limit a fault from affecting the battery. There have been no reported c_ases of a single cell battery charger adversely impacting battery cell voltage during Salem or Hope Creek Station's use of the single cell battery charger.

Therefore, there was no impact to the health and safety of the public.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

. \

J*~N=R=C=F?OR~M=3=6=6A================~==========================~u~~.s=.N=-u~c~L?EA~R=R~E~G~U~LA~T~O~R~Y~C?OM~M~l?SS~l?O:==i!N (4-95)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION NUMBER 4 OF 4 98 - 011 - 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(0) was placed on administrative hold to prevent use of the procedure in the field until satisfactory resolution of the proper isolation of the single cell battery charger from th~ Class -1 E battery.
2. A review of maintenance procedures is being performed to determine if other procedures allow temporary equipment to be installed on operable systems. If maintenance procedures exist that connect temporary equipment to operable systems, a review will be performed to determine if the effect of the temporary equipment on system operation has been properly evaluated. This review will be completed by August 7, 1998.
3. The "1 OCFR50.59 Program Guidance" procedure, NC.NA-AS.ZZ-0059, will be revised to include examples concerning the connection of temporary equipment to operable systems when_

performing 10CFR50.59 reviews. The procedure will be revised by August 31, 1998.

4 .. Procedure HC.MD-GP.ZZ-0014(0) was revised to delete the provisions for charging a single battery cell while the battery is in service.

5. This issue will be included in the next two year cycle of 10CFR50.59 refresher training starting in July 1998.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)