ML19105B110

08/24/1981 Vepco'S Response to Safety Evaluation Report by Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

ML19105B110
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	08/24/1981
From:	Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML19105B110 (124)

Text

VEPCO SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2

RESPONSE

TO SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMP ANY

SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION FOR VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NO. 50-280/281 NRC Request 11 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 1 INTRODUCTION General Design Criteria 1 and 4 specify that safety-related elec-trical equipment in nuclear facilities must be capable of perform-ing its safety-related function under environmental conditions associated with all normal, abnormal, and accident plant opera-tion. In order to ensure compliance with the criteria, the NRC staff required all licensees of operating reactors to submit a reevaluation of the q~alification of safety-related electrical equipment which may be exposed to a harsh environment."

Vepco Response No comment jw/242A/l Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

NRC Request 11 2 BACKGROUND On February 8, 1979, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) issued to all licensees of operating plants (except those included in the systematic evaluation program (SEP)) IE Bulletin IEB 79-01, "Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment. 11 This bulletin, together with IE Circular 78-08 (issued on May 31, 1978), required the licensees to perform reviews to assess the adequacy of their environmental qualification programs.

Subsequently, Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21 (issued on May 23, 1980) states that the DOR guidelines and portions of NUREG-0588 (which were issued on January 14, 1980, as enclosures 4 and 5 to IEB-79-0lB) form the requirements that licensees must meet re-garding environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment in .order to satisfy those aspects of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC)-4. This order also requires the staff to complete safety evaluation reports (SERs) for all opera-ting plants by February 1, 1981. In addition, this order requires that the licensees have qualified safety-related equipment in-stalled in their plants by June 30, 1982.

Supplements to IEB 79-018 were issued for further clarification and definition of the staff's needs. These supplements were issued on February 29, September 30, and October 24, 1980.

In addition, the staff issued orders dated August 29, 1980 (amended in September, 1980) and October 24, 1980 to all licen-sees. The August order required that the licensees provide a report, by November 1, 1980, documenting the qualification of safety-related electrical equipment. The October order required the establishment of a central file location for the maintenance of all equipment-qualification records. The central file was man-dated to be established by December 1, 1980. The order also re-quired that all safety-related electrical equipment be qualified by June 30, 1982. In response, the licensee submitted information through 1etters dated October 1 and 31; and December 1, 1980. 11 Vepco Response Revision 3 to the I.E.Bulletin 79-018 90 Day Review was submitted on Janu~ry 30, 1981. rt is assumed that this revision was not incorporated into the staff's SER review.

jw/242A/2 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

NRC Request "2.1 Purpose The purpose of this SER is to identify equipment whose qualifica-tion program does not provide sufficient assurance that the equip-ment is capable of performing the design function in hostile en-vironments. The staff position relating to any identified defic-iencies is provided in this report."

Vepco Response No comment jw/242A/3 Surry l and 2 August 24, 1981

NRC Request 11 2.2 Scope The scope of this report is limited to an evaluation of the equip-ment which must function in order to mitigate the consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or a hi9h-energy-line-break (HELB) accident, inside or outside containment, while subjected to the hostile environments associated with these accidents. 11 Vepco Response No comment jw/242A/4 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

NRC Request 11 3 STAFF EVALUATION The staff evaluation of the licensee's response included an onsite inspection of selected Class IE equipment and an examination of the licensee's report for completeness and acceptability. The criteria described in the DOR guidelines and in NUREG-0588, in part, were used as a basis for the staff evaluation of the ade-quacy of the licensee's qualification program.

The NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement performed (1) a pre-liminary evaluation of the licensee's response, documented in technical evaluation reports (TERs) and (2) onsite verification inspections (reports dated May 2, 1980) of selected safety-related electrical equipment. Some components of the inside recirculation spray and the feedwater systems were inspected at both Units l and

2. The inspections at both units verified proper installation of equipment, overall interface integrity, and manufacturers* name-plate data. The manufacturer's name and model number from the ,

nameplate data were compared to information given in the Component Evaluation Work Sheets (CES) of the licensee's report. The site inspections are documented for Units l and 2 in reports IE 50-280/

80-14 and 281/80-15, respectively. Prior to the inspection, the licensee had not determined the model numbers of several compon-ents listed on the CES. Consequently, licensee and inspector model numbers could not be compared. The licensee agreed to pro-vide the model numbers during the present outage of the Surry e steam generator. For this review, the documents referenced above have been factored into the overall staff evaluation. 11 Vepco Response Vepco has completed a field verification program (Special Test 104) to verify manufacturer and model number of all class lE equip-ment listed on the master list. The information obtained by the program is being reviewed. The component evaluation worksheets (CES) have been revised to correct any known discrepancies in the manufacturer or model numbers previously provided. Revision 4 to the I.E.Bulletin 79-018 90 Day Review is included with this sub-mittal and includes the revised CES.

Vepco will complete the Special Test review by June 1982 and main-tain the results in the equipment qualification central file.

jw/242A/5 Surry l and 2 August 24, 1981

NRC Request "3.1 Completeness of Safety-Related Equipment In accordance with IEB 79-0lB, the licensee was directed to (1) establish a list of systems and equipment that are required to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA and an HELB and (2) identify components needed to perform the function of safety-related dis-play information, post-accident sampling and monitoring, and radiation monitoring.

The staff developed a generic master list based upon a review of plant safety analyses and emergency procedures. The instrumenta-tion selected includes parameters to monitor overall plant perform-mance as well as to monitor the performance of the systems on the list. The systems list was established on the basis of the func-tions that must be performed for accident mitigation (without re-gard to location of equipment relative to hostile environments).

The list of safety-related systems provided by the licensee was reviewed against the staff-developed master list.

Based upon information in the licensee's submittal, the equipment location references, and in some cases subsequent conversations with the licensee, the staff has determined and verified that the systems included in the licensee's sub~ittal are those required to achieve or support: (1) emergency reactor shutdown, (2) contain-ment isolation, (3) reactor core cooling, (4) containment heat removal, (5) core residual heat removal, and (6) prevention of significant release of radioactive material to the environment.

The staff therefore concludes that the systems identified by the licensee (listed in Appendix D) are acceptable, with the exception of those items discussed in Section 5 of this report.

Display instrumentation which provides information for the reactor operators to aid them in the safe handling of the plant was not specifically identified by the licensee. A complete list of all display instrumentation mentioned in the LOCA and HELB emergency procedures must be provided. Equipment qualification information in the form of summary sheets should be provided for all compon-ents of the display instrumentation exposed to harsh environ-ments. Instrumentation which is not considered to be safety re-lated but which is mentioned in the emergency procedure should appear on the list. For these instruments, (1) justification should be provided for not considering the instrument safety re-lated and (2) assurance should be provided that its subsequent failure will not mislead the operator or adversely affect the mitigation of the consequences of the accident. The environmental qualification of post-accident sampling and monitoring and radia-tion monitoring equipment is closely related to the review of the TMI Lessons-Learned modifications and will be performed in con-junction with that review.

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The licensee identified 553 items of equipment which were assessed by the staff. Because Units 1 and 2 are nearly identical, the review can be performed as one. Where necessary, differences in the units will be noted for clarity. 11 Vepco Response A list of display instrumentation referenced in the Emergency Pro-cedures is provided in Table 1. The equipment in Table 1 has been divided into three categories.

Category A - Display instrumentation which has been previously included on the master list of the I.E. Bulletin 79-0lB 90 Day Review, Revision 3. The appropriate worksheet page number for each item in this category can be found in Table 1.

Category B - Display instrumentation which is in a harsh environ-ment but not previously listed on the master list of I.E. Bulletin 79-0lB 90 Day Review, Revision 3.

Equipment in this category has been added to the master list of I.E. Bulletin 79-0lB 90 Day Review, Revision 4, as a result of our review of the Emer-gency Procedures. The appropriate worksheet page number for the equipment in this category can be found in Table 1.

The qualification status and proposed corrective action of equipment in Category Bis as follows:

LT-RS251A, B Containment Sump Level This equipment is being replaced as part of the TMI Lessons-Learned modifications. The trans-mitters were included on the master list for the TMI Review Supplement 3 response submitted Febru-ary 1, 1981.

PT-2402 RCS Wide Range Pressure PT-RC2401-l RCS Wide Range Pressure LT-2477, 87, 97 Steam Generator Wide Range Pressure PT-RS256A, B Outside Recirculation Spray Pump Discharge Pressure FT-2961, 62, 63 Cold Leg. SI Flow FT-2945, 46 Low Head Injection Header Flow jw/242A/7 Surry l and 2 August 24, 1981

The sensor, cable and terminations of the indication listed above will be reviewed for qualification.

Those portions of the instrumentation loop that are exposed to a harsh environment will be upgraded with qualified equipment. This will ensure that the oper-ator will not be provided with erroneous indication due to the effects of a harsh environment on this equipment in the event of a LOCA or MSLB.

The majority of the display instrumentation in the Surry control room is supplied directly from protec-tion channels. However, to ensure the integrity of the trip function, an isolation device is provided to supply the indicator so that faults at the indicator will not be reflected into the safety trip portion of the circuit. Therefore, the cables that run from the safety trip circuit to the indicator are not treated as Class lE cables with respect to cable separation.

This approach allows for redundant indicators to be positioned side-by-side for comparison of readings. /.

Qualification of Post Accident Monitoring equipment referenced in the Emergency Procedures is a new re-quirement. Vepco will review the qualification status of this equipment and advise the NRC of the schedule for implementation of any required correc-tive action by June 30, 1982.

Category C - Display instrumentation which is not exposed to a harsh environment. These components will be included on the master list for equipment which is in a mild environment and will be reviewed as such. At present there is no requirement to provide Component Evalua-tion sheets for equipment in a mild environment.

e jw/242A/8 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

e Surry l and 2 August 24, 1981 TABLE l CATEGORY A EXPOSED TO A PREVIOUSLY LISTED MARK NUMBER DESCRIPTION HARSH ENVIRONMENT ON MASTER LIST WORKSHEET COMMENT TE-2413 RCS Temperature X X 191 Element (Wide Range)

TE-2423 RCS Temperature X X 195 Element (Wide Range)

TE-2433 RCS Temperature X X 199 Element (Wide Range)

PT-LM200A Containment Pressure X X 128 (Narrow Range)

PT-LM200B Containment Pressure X X 129 (Narrow Range)

PT-LM200C Containment Pressure X X 130 (Narrow Range)

PT -LM200D Containment Pressure X X 131

( Narrow Range)

LT-2459 Pressurizer Level X X 182 Protection LT-2460 Pressurizer Level X X 183 Protection LT-2461 Pressurizer Level X X 184 Protection LT-2474 Steam Generator Narrow X X 90 Range Protection LT-2484 Steam Generator Narrow X X 93 Range Protection NOTE: Surry Unit Two mark numbers are provided. Table 1 also applies to Surry Unit l equipment.

e Surry l and 2 August 24, 1981 TABLE l CATEGORY A - (Continued}

EXPOSED TO A PREVIOUSLY LISTED MARK NUMBER DESCRIPTION HARSH ENVIRONMENT ON MASTER LIST WORKSHEET COMMENT LT-2494 Steam Generator Narrow X X 96 Range Protection LT-2475 Steam Generator Narrow X X 91 Range Protection LT-2485 Steam Generator Narrow X X 94 Range Protection LT-2495 Steam Generator Narrow X X 97 Range Protection LT-2476 Steam Generator Narrow X X 92 Range Protection LT-2486 Steam Generator Narrow X X 95 Range Protection LT-2496 Steam Generator Narrow X X 98 Range Protection PT-2474 Steam Generator l X X 151 Pressure PT -2475 Steam Generator l X X 152 Pressure PT -2476 Steam Generator l X X 153 Pressure PT-2484 Steam Generator 2 X X 154 Pressure PT-2485 Steam Generator 2 X X 155 Pressure

e Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981 TABLE 1 CATEGORY A - (Continued)

EXPOSED TO A PREVIOUSLY LISTED MARK NUMBER DESCRIPTION HARSH ENVIRON~ENT ON ~ASTER [IST WORKSHEET COMMENT PT-2486 Steam Generator 2 X X 156 Pressure PT -2494 Steam Generator 3 X X 157 Pressure PT -2495 Steam Generator 3 X X 158 Pressure PT-2496 Steam Generator 3 X X 159 Pressure FT-FW200A Aux Steam Generator X X 87 Feed Pump Flow FT-FW200B Aux Steam Generator X X 88 Feed Pump Fl ow FT-FW200C Aux Steam Generator X X 89 Feed Pump Flow

e Surry and 2 August 1:ZI-, 1981 TABLE l CATEGORY B EXPOSED TO A PREVIOUSLY LISTED MARK NUMBER DESCRIPTION HARSH ENVIRONMENT ON MASTER LIST WORKSHEET COMMENT LT-RS251A Containment Sump Level X 10.3-30 TMI Reveiw Supplement 3 LT-RS251B Containment Sump Level X 10.3-31 TMI Reveiw Supplement 3 PT-2402 RCS Wide Range Pressure X 6-273 PT-RC2402-l RCS Wide Range Pressure X 6-274 LT-2477 Steam Generator Wide Range X 6-275 Level LT-2487 Steam Generator Wide Range X 6-276 Level LT-2497 Steam Generator Wide Range X 6-277 Level PT -RS256A Outside Recirculation Spray X 6-?78 Pump Discharge Pressure PT -RS256B Outside Recirculation Spray X 6-279 Pump Discharge Pressure FT-2961 Clod Leg Safety Injection X 6-280 Flow FT-2962 Clod Leq Safety Injection X 6-281 Flow FT-2963 Clod Leg Safety Injection X 6-282 Flow FT-2945 Low Head Injection Header X 6-283 Flow FT-2946 Low Head Injection Header X 6-284 Flow

e Surry ,.nd 2 August 24, 1981 TABLE 1 CATEGORY C EXPOSED TO A PREVIOUSLY LISTED MARK NLMBER DESCRIPTION HARSH ENVIRONMENT ON MASTER LIST WORKSHEET COMMENT LT-CS200A Refueling Water Storage NA Tank Level LT-CS200B Refueling Water Storage NA Tank Level LT-CN200 Consensate Storage Tank Level NA LT-CS200C Consensate Storage Tank Level NA LT-CS200D Consensate Storage Tank Level NA

NRC Request 11 3.2 Service Conditions Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21 requires that the DOR guidelines and the "For Comment" NUREG-0588 are to be used as the criteria for establishing the adequacy of the safety-related elec-trical equipment environmental qualification program. These docu-ments provide the option of establishing a bounding pressure and temperature condition based on plant-specific analysis identified in the licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) or based on generic profiles using the methods identified in these documents.

On this basis, the staff has assumed, unless otherwise noted, that the analysis for developing the environmental envelopes for Surry Units 1 and 2, relative to the temperature, pressure and the con-tainment spray caustics, has been performed in accordance with the requirements stated above. The staff has reviewed the CES to en-sure that the qualification data envelope the specifications es-tablished by the licensee. During this review, the staff assumed that for plants designed and equipped with an automatic contain-ment spray system which satisfies the single-failure criterion, the main-steam-line-break (MSLB) environmental conditions are enveloped by the large-break-LOCA environmental conditions. The staff assumed, and requires the licensee to verify, that the con-tainment spray system is not subjected to a disabling single-component failure and therefore satisfies the requirements of Section 4.2.1 of the DOR guidelines.

Equipment submergence has also been addressed where the possi-bility exists that flooding of equipment may result from HELBs. 11 Vepco Response A description of the containment spray systems at Surry is pro-vided in Section 6.3.1.4 of the Surry FSAR (Reference 1). This system contains redundant 100% capacity trains which are not sub-jected to a disabling single-component failure.

jw/242A/14 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

NRC Request 11 3.3 Temperature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Inside Containment The licensee has provided the results of accident analyses as follows:

Max Temp (OF) Max Press (psig) Hurni dity (%)

LOCA 278 45 100 MSLB not provided not provided not provided The staff has concluded that the minimum temperature profile for equipment qualification purposes should include a margin to account for higher-than-average temperatures in the upper regions of the containment that can exist due to stratification, especially fol-lowing a postulated MSLB. Use of the steam saturation temperature corresponding to the total building pressure (partial pressure of steam plus partial pressure of air) versus time will provide an acceptable margin for either a postulated LOCA or MSLB, whichever is controlling, as to potential adverse environmental effects on equipment.

The licensee's specified temperature (service condition) of 2780F does not satisfy the above requirement. A saturation temperature corresponding to the pressure profile (2920F peak temperature at 45 psig) should be used instead. The licensee should update his equipment summary tables to reflect this change.

If there is any equipment that does not meet the staff position, the licensee must provide either justification that the equipment will perform its intended function under the specified conditions or propose corrective action.

Vepco Response Stratification would only be present for a short time period (since the containment spray system becomes effective within 100 seconds) following a LOCA or MSLB. The spray delivery to the upper regions of the containment would quickly cool the stratified region.

No safety-related electrical equipment is located in the upper third of the containment volume. This precludes any ~quipment from being exposed to a higher-than-average temperature due to stratification in the upper regions of the containment following a LOCA or MSLB.

Even if safety related electrical equipment were located in the upper third of the containment volume, the computer codes and models used to calculate the maximum containment average tempera-ture of 2780F for LOCA contain significant conservatisms such that the calculated temperature is an overprediction of the ex-pected average temperature. These conservatisms include:

jw/242A/15 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

(1) the blowdown model, which maximizes release rates to the con-tainment (2) overprediction of the energy available for release to the containment (3) underprediction of the containment heat sinks and containment volume (4) assuming the most severe containment initial conditions (5) minimizing containment spray heat removal (6) the modeling of the behavior of the break effluent to maxi-mize the containment pressure and temperature.

The combination of all these factors results in calculated con-tainment pressure and temperature transients which are substan-tially greater than expected values. Therefore, there is suffi-cient margin in the calculated temperature to account for strati-fied regions of higher-than-average temperatures for an MSLB.

Stratification of steam in the upper regions of the containment is not expected to occur after a LOCA. The location of the break is below the operating floor in the lower portion of the contain-ment. The high, subcooled liquid blowdown rates will result in a high degree of mixing which will prevent the accumulation of stratified steam.

A sample of the methodology used to determine the inside contain-ment LOCA profiles can be found in the Environmental Zone Descrip-tions for Surry Power Station behind Reference Tab #2.l l A copy of the Environmental Zone Descriptions (EZD) Surry Power Stations Units l and 2 are provided with the SER response.

jw/242A/l 6 Surry l and 2 August 24, 1981

NRC Request "3.4 Temperature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Outside Containment The licensee has provided the temperature, pressure, humidity and applicable environment associated with an HELB outside contain-ment. The following areas outside containment have been addressed:

(1) Auxiliary building (2) Auxiliary building charging pump cubicle The staff has verified that the parameters identified by the li-censee for the HELB are acceptable.

Vepco Response No comment jw/242A/17 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

NRC Request 11 3.5 Submergence The maximum submergence levels have been established and assessed by the licensee. Unless otherwise noted, the staff assumed for this review that the methodology employed by the licensee is in accordance with the appropriate criteria as established by Com-mission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21.

The licensee's value for maximum submergence is at the 21 ft. 11 in. elevation. The licensee identified three safety-related elec-trical components for Unit 1 and three for Unit 2 as having the potential for becoming submerged after a postulated event.

The licensee stated that these components--6 motor-operated valves--will have completed their function before becoming sub-merged. In this regard, the licensee should provide an assessment of the failure modes associated with the submergence of the valves.

The licensee should also provide assurance that the subsequent failure of these components will not adversely affect any other safety functions or mislead an operator. Additionally, the licen-see should discuss operating time, across the spectrum of events, in relation to the time of submergence. If the results of the licensee's assessment are acceptable, then the valves may be exempt from the submergence parameter of qualification.

It is not clear from the information submitted that submergence of safety-related electrical equipment outside of containment was addressed. The licensee should address this area more specifi~

cally in the 90-day response and upgrade the CES as appropriate."

Vepco Response

1. Inside Reactor Containment Building The methodology used to determine the submergence level inside containment is provided for your review in the Environmental Zone Descriptions for Surry Power Station behind Reference Tab #6.

This methodology is in accordance with the requirements of I.E.

Bu 11 et in 79-01 B.

The maximum fluid level in the calculation is elevation -21' 11 11 to which all components were reviewed. The 6 motor operated valves (MOV 1865 A, B, C and MOV 2865 A, B, C) are below the sub-mergence 1eve 1.

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These motor operated valves have been removed from the master list.

The valves serve to isolate the safety injection accumulater tanks during refueling. They are administratively locked open whenever the reactor is critical by locking out the breakers that supply power to the valves. The valves will then remain in their locked open position and available to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA or MSLB. No power is supplied to these motor operated valves dur-ing critical operation; therefore, there can be no adverse effects to the electrical bus which normally supplies power to the valves.

There is no position indication on these valves, thus the operator cannot be mislead due to the submergence of the valves. Since the valves are locked open, the question of operating time across the spectrum of events in relation to submergence need not be address-ed.

2. Outside Reactor Containment Building Submergence outside of containment was not specifically addressed during the I.E. Bulletin 79-0lB 90 Day Review. The effects of piping system breaks outside of containment was analyzed in Appen-dix D of the Surry FSAR. This review takes into account the effects of discharging fluids that may result in failure of equip-ment important to safety.

A detailed review of the effects of flooding on equipment impor-tant to safety is provided in the North Anna FSAR Appendix C, Effects of Piping System Breaks Outside Containment (Reference 2). The Auxiliary Building was the only area affected by the pos-tulated high-energy line breaks with regard to submergence. The maximum water level in the Auxiliary Building is 1 inch above the floor. All equipment important to safety was found to be at least 15 inches above the floor.

A similar review of the effects of flooding was not done for Surry.

We can determine for Surry, however, that no equipment outside of containment important to safety will become submerged due to the postulated pipe breaks because of the similarity in design of the piping systems, the Auxiliary Building layout, and equipment loca-tion for North Anna and Surry.

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Since we have determined that there is no equipment outside con-tainment that would be subjected to submergence due to a LOCA or HELB, the submergence column on the Component Evaluation Sheet has been marked Not Required (NR).

jw/242A/20 Surry 1 and 2 Auqust 24, 1981

NRC Request "3.6 Chemical Spray The licensee 1 s submittal and reference are not clear on the sub-ject of chemical spray solution and concentration. Moreover, there seem to be inconsistencies between the pH of 8.5-11 speci-fied in the reference and the qualification values on the CES in the submittal. Therefore, for the purpose of this review, the effects of chemical spray will be considered unresolved. The staff will review the licensee 1 s response when it is submitted and discuss the resolution in a supplemental report."

Vepco Response The component evaluation sheets have been revised to show consis-tent units for chemical spray concentration. Each component on the master list which is subjected to chemical sprays has been reviewed to ensure that the chemical spray environment in the test report envelops the sp~cified chemical spray environment. The results of the review are indicated on the worksheets included in Revision 4 of the IE Bulletin 79-0lB 90 Day Review. Specific chemical spray deficiencies which were identified in Appendix B have also been reviewed and resolutions to these deficiencies are indicated on the Revision 4 component evaluation worksheets.

Details of the qualification review for chemical spray can be found in the qualification review packages contained in the cen-tral file. -

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NRC Request "3. 7 Aging Section 7 of the DOR Guidelines does not require a qualified life to be established for all safety-related electrical equipment.

However, the following actions are required:

(1) Make a detailed comparison of existing equipment and the materials identified in Appendix C of the DOR Guidelines.

The first supplement to IEB-79-0lB requires licensees to utilize the table in Appendix C and identify any additional materials as the result of their effort.

(2) Establish an ongoing program to review surveillance and main-tenance records to identify potential age-related degrada-tions.

(3) Establish component maintenance and replacement schedules which include considerations of aging characteristics of the installed components.

The licensee stated that all Class lE electrical equipment is assessed for operability at specified time intervals by systematic application of the plant periodic test program. The licensee also stated (1) that a preliminary program was developed by December 1, 1980 to determine whether equipment inoperability was caused by aging, and (2) that the use of the periodic test program, together with a detailed analysis of all Class lE inoperable equipment and other sources of information, should satisfy the aqing requirement and provide assurance that Class lE equipment and components will perform when needed.

For this review, however, the staff requires that the licensee submit supplemental information to verify and identify the deqree of conformance to the above reauirements. The response should include all the equipment identified as required to maintain func-tional operability in harsh environments.

The staff will review the licensee's response when it is submitted and discuss its evaluation in a supplemental report.

Vepco Response Vepco has not fully developed an aging evaluation program to meet the current requirements for addressing aging as outlined in the Safety Evaluation Report and as discussed in the meetings held in Bethesda on July 7-10, 1981. As indicated previously in I.E.

Bulletin 79-018 90 Day Review, Revision 3, a program to assess the failure mechanisms of all class lE electrical equipment has been developed and implemented at Surry.

jw/242A/22 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

The Atomic Industrial Forum is currently drafting a position paper which Vepco feels has merit with regard to addressing the aging concerns. Implementation of this program is contingent, however, on review of the existing preventive maintenance program at the station. Vepco is currently reviewing the draft AIF position paper on aging evaluation methods in conjunction with the existing preventive maintenance program at Surry. An aging evaluation pro-gram which meets the requirements of the SER will be implemented by June 1982.

Below is the program being proposed by the AIF:

3.7.1 Discussion The purpose of qualifying safety-related equipment in a harsh environment is to assure that when the equipment is subjected to severe environmental stresses from a design-basis event, common mode failures will not occur in redundant safety systems. The purpose of including aging as part of the qualification process is to assure that such equipment will perform its safety functions in its "end-of-useful-1 ife" as well as in its "as-new" condition.

Such a demonstration must consider the design, manufacture, test-ing, installation, operation, maintenance, and replacement of the equipment.

However, the evaluation of aging, as practiced in the nuclear power industry, embodies the concept of preconditioning a piece of equipment by putting it in a simulated advanced stage of life.

This practice is extended to determine an expected (i.e., quali-fied) life for that piece of equipment if, following the precondi-tioning, the equipment can be demonstrated to perform its intended function successfully when exposed to a harsh environment.

The aging and qualified-life concept is sound and logical in prin-ciple. In practice, however, industry research and experience has demonstrated that aging is still at the leading edge of technol-ogy; this statement is based on the following:

(1) The most common method to achieve a preconditioning of equip-ment is to use some form of accelerated stressing. This re-quires the identification of the various environmental para-meters (i.e., temperature, pressure, himidity, radiation, vibration, and chemical environment) that cause stress. An appropriate acceleration technique must be established for each type of stress that is identified. The simultaneous simulated acceleration of some or all of these parameters (e.g., radiation, temperature, humidity), as would occur in the plant, is not always practical or feasible. In addition, some of these parameters (e.g., humidity and chemical envir-onment) do not lend themselves to acceleration.

e jw/242A/23 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

(2) When acceleration is practical, the methods used (such as the Arhenius technique and the 10 degree C rule for thermal aging, and an increased dose rate for radiation) are approximate and subject to arbitrary assumptions. Electric Power Research Institute Report NP-1558, 11 A Review of Equipment Aging Theory and Tech no 1ogy, 11 demonstrates th rs fact.

The DOR Guidelines recognize this state-of-the-art limitation, as demonstrated by the staff position in Section 7, 11 Aging, 11 which states:

Implicit in the staff position in Regulatory Guide 1.89 with regard to backfitting IEEE Std. 323-1974 is the staff's con-clusion that the incremental improvement in safety from arbi-trarily requiring that a specific qualified life be demon-strated for all Class lE equipment is not sufficient to jus-tify the expense for plants already constructed and operating.

Section 7 continues that:

This position does not, however, exclude equipment using materials that have been identified as being susceptible to significant degradation due to thermal and radiation aging.

Component maintenance or replacement schedules should include considerations of the specific aging characteristics of the component materials. Ongoing programs should exist at the plant to review surveillance and maintenance records to assure that equipment which is exhibiting age related degrad-ation will be identified and replaced as necessary.

Section 3.7.2 outlines the proposed program. When implemented this program will satisfy the aging requirements in the DOR Guide-lines and the Safety Evaluation Report.

3.7.2 Aging Evaluation Program To address the aging evaluation program in a disciplined man- ner, each safety related Class lE equipment located in potentially harsh environment areas and, identified in the component evaluation worksheet will be reviewed individually and classi-fied into three categories as follows, based on their qualifi-cation methods:

Category A - Equipment tested under LOCA/HELB conditions with preaging included in the test program Category B - Equipment tested under LOCA/HELB conditions with-out preaging in the test program Category C - Equipment not tested under LOCA/HELB conditions jw/242A/24 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

3.7.2.l Category A Category A includes the equipment which was qualified by type tests. These type tests include (l) simulated aging test in-cluding thermal, radiation aging, and mechanical and electrical cycling where applicable, and (2) design-basis-event tests to verify the equipment's functional capability following simu-lated aging. In these cases a qualified-life estimate, based on most limiting of the thermal and radiation aging tests, was established. For this equipment, an Ongoing Aging evaluation and replacement schedule will be factored into an existing sur-veillance program, which includes:

3.7.2.1.1 The performance of routine preventive maintenance in accordance with established procedures based on manufacturers* recommenda-tions and plant operating experience.

3.7.2.1.2 Parts replacements on which the expected qualified-life is con~

tingent. Based on the review of the qualification tests and the results thereof. Vepco has identified the parts replacements such as gaskets and lubricants that are required. The existing preventive maintenance programs for each piece of equipment will be revised to include these.

3.7.2. 1.3 The evaluation of equipment failures to identify any trends that indicate a potential for common mode failure so corrective actions can be initiated. The failure evaluation program will specifically address the following.

A record will be maintained of all failures of safety related Class lE equipment. Periodically failure records will be re-viewed to determine:

(a) Repetitive nature (1) Is the same type failure occurring on the same equip-ment and at some definite intervals?

(2) Is the same type failure occurring at a definite in-terval on similar equipment?

(b) Timing of the failures with respect to any environmental condition changes (c) Other causes indicative of equipment in-service aging degradation.

Vepco currently has an administrative procedure that addresses this requirement. This procedure when fully developed and implemented will provide the additional information required to detect impending age related failure and initiate corrective action.

jw/242A/25 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

3.7.2.1.4 Review of periodic operational test and calibration records to spot any clues for developing age related failure mechanism.

3.7.2.2 Category B Category B includes the equipment for which the qualification has been based on LOCA/HELB tests that are coupled with engin-eering analyses to address aging. The engineering analyses might include (1) a material evaluation to identify weak links and (2) a comparison of test data on qeneric materials, or an extrapolation of conservatisms contained in the LOCA/HELB test-ing. In these cases, the establishment of an estimated quali-fied life or replacement schedule has been based on engineering analyses. For this equipment, Ongoing Aging evaluation will consist of:

3.7.2.2.1 The performance of routine preventive maintenance in accordance with established procedures based on manufacturers' recommenda-tions and plant operating experience.

3.7.2.2.2 Parts replacements on which the expected qualified-life is con-tingent. Based on the review of the qualification tests and the results thereof VEPCO has identified the parts replacements such as gaskets, and lubricants that are required. The exist-ing preventive maintenance programs for each equipment will be revised to include these.

3.7.2.2.3 The evaluation of equipment failures to identify any trends that indicate a potential for common mode failure so corrective actions can be initiated. The failure evaluation program will specifically address the following.

(a) Repetitive nature (1) Is the same type failure occurring on the same equip-ment and at some definite intervals?

(2) Is the same type failure occurring at a definite in-terval on similar equipment?

(b) Timing of the failures with respect to any environmental condition changes (c) Other causes indicative of equipment in-service aging degradation.

Vepco currently has an administrative procedure that addresses this requirement. This procedure when fully developed and implemented will provide the additional information required to detect impending age related failure and initiate corrective action.

3.7.2.2.4 Review of periodic operational test and calibration records to spot any clues for developing age related failure mechanism.

jw/242A/26 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

3.7.2.2.5 An equipment monitoring program to augment engineering analyses for aging.

An example of this monitoring program could be the periodic review of motor-winding temperatures, starting current or running currents to identify any trends that indicate perform-ance degradation. The results of this review would form the basis for initiating corrective action.

3.7.2.3 Category C Category C includes the few pieces of equipment for which qualification has been demonstrated by analysis only. This equipment is exposed to a limited number of harsh environment parameters, which are substantially lower than they would be for Category A or B. An example would be the equipment in the pump rooms, where the only harsh parameter is the radiation that results from recirculating fluid lines or a transient temperature spike from a HELB accident.

3.7.2.3.l The performance of routine preventive maintenance in accordance with established procedures based on manufacturers' recommenda-tions and plant operating experience.

3.7.2.3.2 Parts replacements on which the expected qualified-life is con-tingent. Based on the review of the qualification tests and the results thereof Vepco has identified the parts replacements such as gaskets, and lubricants that are required. The exist-ing preventive maintenance programs for each equipment will be revised to include these.

3.7.2.3.3 The evaluation of equipment failures to identify any trends that indicate a potential for common mode failure so corrective actions can be initiated. The failure evaluation program will specifically address the following.

(a) Repetitive nature (l) Is the same type failure occurring on the same equip-ment and at some definite intervals?

(2) Is the same type failure occurring at a definite in-terval on similar equipment?

(b) Timing of the failures with respect to any environmental condition changes (c) Other causes indicative of equipment in-service aging degradation.

Vepco currently has an administrative procedure that addresses this requirement. This procedure when fully developed and im-plemented will provide the additional information required to detect impending age related failure and initiate corrective action.

jw/242A/27 Surry l and 2 August 24, 1981

3.7.2.3.4 Review of periodic operational test and calibration records to spot any clues for developing age related failure mechanism.

3.7.2.3.5 A specific maintenance test program designed to augment the engineering analysis for the specific area of concerns (e.g.,

replacement of gaskets, 0-rings, etc.).

3.7.3 Conclusion The program outlined above reflects a practical approach to aging evaluation, consistent with the requirements of the DOR Guidelines and the requirements as outlined in the Safety Evaluation Report. Vepco believes that the implementation of this program will provide an extra measure of confidence in safety-related equipment capabilities on a continuing basis.

jw/242A/28 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

NRC Request 11 3.8 Radiation (Inside and Outside Containment)

The licensee has provided values for the radiation levels postu-lated to exist following a LOCA. The application and methodology employed to determine these values were presented to the licensee as part of the NRC staff criteria contained in the DOR Guidelines, in NUREG-0588, and in the guidance provided in IEB-79-0lB, Supple-ment 2. Therefore, for this review, the staff has assumed that, unless otherwise noted, the values provided have been determined in accordance with the prescribed criteria. The staff review determined that the values to which equipment was qualified en-veloped the requirements identified by the licensee.

The radiation values provided by the licensee for inside contain-ment for total integrated dose range from 7.44 x 106 to 3.41 x 109. The radiation service condition provided by the licensee is lower than provided in the DOR Guidelines (4 x 107 rads) for gamma and beta radiation. The licensee is requested to either provide justification for using the lower service condition or use the service condition provided in the DOR guidelines for both gamma and beta radiation. If the former option is chosen, the analysis--including the basis, assumptions, and a sample calcula-tion--should be provided.

A required value outside containment of Rx 106 rads has been used by the licensee to specify limiting radiation levels within the charging pump cubicle. This value appears to consider the radiation levels influenced by the source term methodology assoc-iated with post-LOCA recirculation fluid lines and is therefore acceptable. 11 Vepco Response The calculated total integrated gamma radiation doses inside con-tainment range from 7.4 x 106 to 3.8 x 107 rads, depending on the location of the dose points. They are shown in Table 2. The radiation doses were calculated based on power level of 2546 MW thermal and containment free volume of 1.8 x 106 ft3. The shielding credit of crane wall and operating floor was taken into consideration. A sample calculation is provided in the Environ-mental Zone Descriptions for Surry Power Station behind Reference Tab #3.

jw/242A/29 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

TABLE 2 40-year normal plus LOCA gamma dose inside containment Location Oose (rads) e 1. 47 1 4 11 - Inside crane wall 3.7 X ,o7 el. 47 1 4 11 - Outside crane wa 11 7.4 X ,06 el. 18 1 4 11 - Outside crane wall 7.4 X ,06 el. (-) 3 1 6 11 - Inside crane wall 3.7 X 107 el. (-) 3 1 611 - Outside crane wall 7.4 X ,06 el. (-)27 1 711 - Above sump water 3.5 X ,o7 el. (-)27 1 711 - Submerged in sump water 3.8 X ,o7 jw/242A/30 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

NRC Request 11 4 QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT The following subsections present the staff's assessment, based on the licensee's submittal, of the qualification status of safety-related electrical equipment.

• The staff has separated the safety-related equipment into three categories: (1) equipment requiring immediate corrective action, (2) equipment requiring additional qualification information and/or corrective action, and (3) equipment considered acceptable if the staff's concern identified in Section 3.7 is satisfactorily re-solved.

In its assessment of the licensee's submittal, the NRC staff did not review the methodology employed to determine the values estab-lished by the licensee. However, in reviewing the data sheets, the staff made a determination as to the stated conditions pre-sented by the licensee. Additionally, the staff has not completed its review of supporting documentation referenced by the licensee (for example, test reports). It is expected that when the review of test reports is complete, the environmental qualification data bank established by the staff will provide the means to cross reference each supporting document to the referencing licensee.

If supporting documents are found to be unacceptable, the licensee will be required to take additional corrective actions to either establish qualification or replace the item(s) of concern. This effort will begin in early 1981.

An appendix for each subsection of this report provides a list of equipment for which additional information and/or corrective action is required. Where appropriate, a reference is provided in the appendices to identify deficiencies .. It should be noted, as in the Commission Memorandum and Order, that the deficiencies identified do not necessarily mean that equipment is unqualified.

However, they are cause for concern and may require further case-by-case evaluation."

Vepco Response No comment

- jw/242A/31 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

NRC Request 11

4. 1 Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrective Action Appendix A identifies equipment (if any) in this category. The licensee was asked to review the facility's safety-related elec-trical equipment. The licensee's review of this equipment has not identified any equipment requiring immediate corrective action; therefore, no licensee event reports (LERs) were submitted. In addition, in this review, the staff has not identified any safety-related electrical equipment which is not able to perform its in-tended safety function during the time in which it must operate."

Vepco Response No comment jw/242A/32 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

NRC Request 11 4.2 Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action Appendix B identifies equipment in this category, including a tabulation of deficiencies. The deficiencies are noted by a letter relating to the legend (identified below), indicating that the information provided is not sufficient for the qualification parameter or condition.

Legend R - radiation T - temperature QT - qualification time RT - required time P - pressure H - humidity CS - chemical spray A - material-aging evaluation; replacement schedule; ongoing equipment surveillance S - submergence M - margin I - HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM - qualification method RPN - equipment relocation or replacement; adequate schedule not provided EXN - exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - separate-effects qualificption justification inadequate QI - qualification information being developed RPS - equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided As noted in Section 4, these deficiencies do not necessarily mean that the equipment is unqualified. However, the deficiencies are cause for concern and require further case-by-case evaluation.

The staff has determined that an acceptable basis to exempt equip-ment from qualification, in whole or part, can be established pro-vided the following can be established and verified by the licen-see:

(1) Equipment does not perform essential safety functions in the harsh environment, and equipment failure in the harsh envir-onment will not impact safety-related functions or mislead an operator.

(2a) Equipment performs its function before its exposure to the harsh environment, and the adequacy for the time margin pro-vided is adequately justified, and (2b) Subsequent failure of the equipment as a result of the harsh environment does not degrade other safety functions or mis-lead the operator.

jw/242A/33 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

(3) The safety-related function can be accomplished by some other designated equipment that has been adequately qualified and satisfies the single-failure criterion.

(4) Equipment will not be subjected to a harsh environment as a result of the postulated accident.

The licensee is, therefore, required to supplement the information presented by providing resolutions to the deficiencies identified; these resolutions should include a description of the corrective action, schedules for its completion (as applicable), and so forth.

The staff will review the licensee's response, when it is sub-mitted, and discuss the resolution in a supplemental report.

It should be noted that in cases where testing is being conducted, a condition may arise which results in a determination by the licensee that the equipment does not satisfy the qualification test requirements. For that equipment, the licensee will be required to provide the proposed corrective action, on a timely basis, to ensure that qualification can be established by June 30, 1982 o II Vepco Response The equipment listed in Appendix B has been re-evaluated with regard to the deficiencies identified for each component. In most cases re-evaluation of the available qualification documentation provided assurance that the equipment is qualified for the para-meters listed as deficiencies. The Component Evaluation Sheets (CES) have been updated with the required additional information.

The summary information presented on the CES in Revision 4 of I.E.

Bulletin 79-0lB 90 Day Review (provided with this SER response) should provide enough information to resolve the deficiencies of Appendix B for equipment that has been determined through our review to be qualified.

The present status of each component listed in ,Appendix B is indi-cated in the resolution column of Table 3. Each component has been placed into one of the following four categories:

(1) COMPONENTS DELETED FROM THE MASTER LIST (2) COMPONENTS REQUIRING REPLACEMENT OR MODIFICATION (3) COMPONENTS DETERMINED TO BE QUALIFIED (4) COMPONENTS DETERMINED TO BE QUALIFIED EXCEPT FOR AGING The criteria used to resolve the deficiencies and categorize the equipment listed in Appendix Bare presented below:

jw/242A/34 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

(1) COMPONENTS DELETED FROM THE MASTER LIST Components which have been deleted from the master list are listed in the conclusion of the I.E. Bulletin 79-0lB 90 Day Review Revision 4 (Section 7.3). Justification for deleting this equipment is provided there.

(2) COMPONENTS REQUIRING REPLACEMENT OR MODIFICATION Components which are being replaced with qualified equipment or are being modified to upgrade their qualification status are listed in the conclusion of the 79-0lB 90 Day Review Revision 4. (Section 7.1 and 7.2.) Justification for con-tinued operation and the schedules for proposed corrective action are provided in these sections.

(3) COMPONENTS DETERMINED TO BE QUALIFIED Further review of the available qualification documentation has provided sufficient justification to substantiate quali-fication. Summary information is provided on the CES to resolve the deficiencies for each component. The criteria used for re-evaluation of each parameter are as follows:

R - Radiation The qualification references were reviewed to ensure that the proper service radiation level was indicated on the CES. The radiation level in the test report was checked to see that it encompassed the specification level. The test method was reviewed for adequacy. Any deficiencies with regard to this parameter were identified on the CES along with the proposed resolution.

In each equipment review effects of Beta dose were addressed to assure that either total radiation test dose includes the gamma equivalent of the same, or that the shielding effects inherent in the construction of the equipment (i.e., jacket thickness, casings thickness) were sufficient to reduce the total Beta dose to the sensitive internals are less than 10%

after total required gamma dose.

T - Temperature The qualification references were reviewed to ensure that the proper service temperature was indicated on the CES. The temperature level in the test report was checked to see that it encompassed the specification level. The test method was reviewed for adequacy. Any deficiencies with regard to this parameter were identified on the CES along with the proposed resolution.

jw/242A/35 Surry l and 2 August 24, 1981

QT - Qualification Time The qualification references were reviewed to ensure that the correct qualification time was indicated on the CES. The qualification time was checked to see that it encompassed the required time. The test method was reviewed for adequacy.

RT - Required Time The operating time(s) indicated on the CES are based on two references. The 120-day operating time is based on Westing-house letter #NS-SS-79287 (Reference #3) dated November 28, 1979 which provided the operating times for equipment sup-plied by Westinghouse. The 60 second operating time for con-tainment isolation valves is based on Section 6.2.4.2 of the North Anna FSAR (Reference #4). This reference is applicable in this case because the same design criteria for containment isolation valves at North Anna was used for Surry.

P - Pressure The qualification references were reviewed to ensure that the proper service pressure was indicated on the CES. The pres-sure in the test report was checked to see that it encom-passed the specification level. The test method was reviewed for adequacy. Any deficiencies with regard to this parameter were identified on the CES along with the proposed resolution.

H - Humidity The aualification references were reviewed to ensure that the proper service humidity was indicated on the CES. The per-cent humidity in the test report was checked to see that it encompassed the specification level. The test method was reviewed for adequacy. Any deficiencies with regard to this parameter were identified on the CES along with the proposed resolution.

CS - Chemical Spray The qualification references were reviewed to ensure that the proper chemical spray concentration was indicated on the CES, The chemical spray valves in the test report were checked to see that they encompassed the specification level. The test method was reviewed for adequacy. Any deficiencies with regard to this parameter were identified on the CES along with the proposed resolution.

Chemical spray effects were addressed in the review and evaluation of the qualification of each equipment by estab-lishing an overall envelope of parametric (i.e., concentra-tion, rate of spray flow, duration, and other environmental conditions occurring simultaneously) conditions. During the review, effects of any deviation in the tests of these condi-jw/242A/36 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

tions from those required were addressed. Any resulting de-ficiencies and the resolutions thereof are indicated on the component evaluation worksheets.

A - Aging The test documentation was reviewed with regard to aging. If there was sufficient qualification data to substantiate a qualified life for the equipment, the equivalent preaged life was indicated on the CES.

S - Submergence No equipment in Appendix B was determined by the NRC to have a deficiency with regard to submergence.

M - Margin Each of the parameters for which margin is a concern were reviewed to ensure sufficient margin was included for the test parameter.

I.~ HELB EVALUATION outside containment not complete No items in Appendix B were determined by the NRC to be deficient from the standpoint of HELB mitigation.

QM - Qualification Method The qualification method used has been evaluated against each of the critical parameters (operating time, temperature, pressure, relative humidity, chemical spray, radiation and aging) to determine the adequacy of the oualification infor-mation provided. The qualification method is indicated on the CES.

RPN - Replacement schedule not provided Replacement schedules for equipment being replaced or modi-fied can be found in the conclusion of the 79-018 90 Day Review Revision 4.

EXN - Exempted equipment justification inadequate See Category 1 SEN - Separate - effects qualification inadequate No components in Appendix B were determined by the NRC to have this deficiency.

jw/242A/37 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

QI - Qualification information being developed During the continuing re-evaluation process, qualification information (identified in the 90 day submittal as "being developed") has been assembled and reviewed. Disposition thereof is reflected in Appendix B, CES, and the conclusion section.

RPS - Equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided.

The equipment relocation or replacement schedule is prtivided in the conclusion section of the I.E. Bulletin 79-0lB 90 Day Review Revision 4.

(4) EQUIPMENT WHICH HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO BE QUALIFIED EXCEPT FOR AGING This equipment was reviewed using the same criteria as listed in Category 3. There was insufficient test documentation to predict a qualified life for components in this category.

Therefore, we will develop an aging evaluation program by June 1982 for these components. For the details of this pro-gram see Section 3.7 of the SER response.

Additional supporting data for the conclusion reached on the qualifica-tion of all components on the master list are available in the equipment qualification central file. It is our understanding that the NRC has not requested or required all test documentation or details of the test docu-mentation review process be supplied to the NRC at this time.

jw/242A/38 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

TABLE 3

• SURRY roIBR STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 SAFEI'Y EVALUATIO::J REFDRT (SER)

APPENDIX B i- e

VEPCO SURRY UNIT APPENDIX B TO NRC-SER AUGUST 24, 1981 LEGEND DESIGNATION FOR DEFICIENCY R - Radiation T - Temperature QT - Qualification time RT - Required time P - Pressure H - Humidity CS - Chemical spray A - Material aging evaluation, replacement schedule, ongoing equipment surveillance S - Submergence M - Margin I - HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM - Qualification method RPN - Equipment relocation or replacement, adequate schedule not provided EXN - Exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - Separate effects qualification justification inadequate QI - Qualification information being developed RPS - Equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided RESOLUTION OF DEFICIENCY

1. Components deleted from the master list

2. Components requiring replacement or modification

3. Components determine to be qualified

4. Components determined to be qualified except for aging OK,

e e SURRY-1 APPENDIX B

• • • !1!11111 ******11111111111111*~****11**** **11**11111111******* **************** *****11111111**11**1111 II *11111111 111111111111*1111111111111111****11**~* II COMMENTS STA NUM KEYi/ EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF 111111

• • "* llllll****lllllllllllllllllll*II*****

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ***************** *******1111*1111*1111*

• 1111111111 *11111111*11*****1111111111******* II 001 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SV-102A R,QT,A 2 6-1 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 002 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1275A QT,A 3 6-2 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 003 0548 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE UNKNOWN MOV-12756 QT,A 3 6-3 004 0548 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1275C QT,A 3 6-4 005 0500 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1373 R,T,QT,P,H,A,QT 3 6-5 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 006 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1381 QT,A 3 6-6 007 0351 PUMP MOTOR WESTINGHOUSE 1-CH-P-1A R,T,QT,P,H,A,RPN 3 6-7 REF QDR-5437-43-01 008 0351 PUMP MOTOR WESTINGHOUSE 1-CH-P-1B R,T,QT,P,H,A,RPN 3 6-8 REF QDR-5437-43-01 009 0351 PUMP MOTOR WESTINGHOUSE 1-CH-P-1C R, T,QT, P ,H,A*, RPN 3 6-9 010 0600 FLOW CONTROL VALVE FCV-1122 R,QT,A 6-10 011 0121 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISHER-GOVENOR FT-1122 RQT,A,RPN 6-11 012 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-1311 R,T,QT,P,H,A,CS, 1 6-12 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 RPN 013 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-11156 QT,A 2 6-13 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 014 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1115C QT,P,A,QI 3 6-14 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 015 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1115D QT,P,A,QI 2 6-15 QDR-5437-MOV-1~01 016 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1115E QT,P,A,QI 3 6-16 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 017 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1289A QT,A 3 6-17 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 018 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-12896 QT,A 3 6-18 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 019 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-1204 R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-19 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 020 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-1200A R,T,QT,P,H,A,CS 3 6-20 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 Sl B -

e e SURRY-1 APPENDIX B 111111 11111111 ************************ **************** **************** **************** II 1'*111111 llllllllllllllllllllll*IIIIIIIRIIIIIIRIIIIII I NUM KEYi/ EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA

!Ult **** RIIIIIIWIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIRIIIIRIIIIWWIIII* **************** 11111111111111********* IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIWW II IHW*II ************************ II 021 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-1200B R,T,QT,P,H,A,CS 3 6-21 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 022 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-1200C R,T,QP,P,H,A,CS 3 6-22 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 023 0711 480V MOTOR CONTROL CUTLER-HAMMER 1-H1-2 SOUTH R,QT,A,QI 6-23 024 0711 480V MOTOR CONTROL CUTLER-HAMMER 1-H1-2 NORTH R;QT,A,QI 6-24 CENTER 025 0711 480V MOTOR CONTROL CUTLER-HAMMER 1-J1-2 WEST R,QT,A,QI 6-25 CENTER 026 0711 480V MOTOR CONTROL CUTLER-HAMMER 1-J1-2 EAST R,QT,A,QI 6-26 CENTER 027 1012 POWER PENETRATION CONAX SPEC. NO. 21/ CS,A 3 6-27 REF QDR-5437-49-01 CONAX TYPE IC 028 1012 POWER PENETRATION CONAX SPEC. NO. 21/ CS,A 3 6-28 CS & A DEFICIENCES CONAX TYPE ID 029 1012 POWER PENETRATION CONAX SPEC. NO. 21/ CS,A 3 6-29 REF QDR-5437-49-01 CONAX TYPE !IA 030 1012 POWER PENETRATION CONAX SPEC. NO. 21/ CS,A 3 6-30 REF QDR-5437-49-01 CONAX TYPE IIB 031 1012 POWER PENETRATION CONAX SPEC. NO. 21/ CS,A 3 6-31 REF QDR-5437-49-01 CONAX TYPE !IC 032 0813 600V CONTROL GABLE CERRO WIRE AND SPEC. NO. NAS- CS,A 3 6-32 QDR 5437-MOV-2-021 CABLE CO. 120 033 0813 600V CONTROL CABLE CERRO WIRE AND SPEC. NO. NAS- QT,CS,A 3 6-33 REQDRD5437-MOV-2-02 CABLE CO. 3187 034 0806 300V INSTRUMENT CABLE BOSTON INSULATED SPEC. NO. 128 CS,A 3 6-3'1 WIRE AND CABLE 035 0813 300V INSTRUMENT CABLE CERRO WIRE AND SPEC. NO. NAS- QT,CS,A 3 6-35 REQDRQ5437-MOV-2-02 CABLE CO. 430 S1 B - 2

e e SURRY-1 APPENDIX B llllll llllllll llllllllllllllllll!lllllllllllllllllllllRllWll l!Rllllllllll!lllllllllllllllll !lftll!lllllllllll!l!lllllWWll **************** * ***** lllHMllllllllll!IRllllllRW*lllllMlll

• NUM KEYi/ EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA

• • • **** ************************ **************** **************** llllllllllllllllll!lllllllllllll

• llllllllll llllRllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll 036 0813 300V INSTRUMENT CABLE RAYCHEM CORP. SPEC. NO; NAS- QT,CS,A,QI 3 6-36 REQDRQ5437-MOV-2-02 3190 037 0837 1000V CONTROL CABLE CERRO WIRE AND SPEC. NO. NUS- R,T,QT,P,CS,A,QI 3 6-37 CABLE CO. 325 038 0813 1000V CONTROL CABLE CERRO WIRE AND SPEC. NO. NUS- R,T,QT,P,CS,A,QI 3 6-38 QDR 5437-MOV-2-021 CABLE CO. 381C 039 0813 1000V CONTROL CABLE CERRO WIRE AND SPEC. NO. NUS- R,T,QT,P,CS,A,QI 3 6-39 QDR 5437-MOV-2-021 CABLE CO. 381E 040 0824 1000V CONTROL CABLE GE WIRE AND SPEC. NO. NUS- QT,CS,A,QI 1 6-40 CABLE 381 041 0814 1000V CONTROL CABLE CONTINENTAL WIRE SPEC. NO. NUS- QT,CS,A,QI 3 6-42 QDR.5437-MOV-2-02-02 AND CABLE 420 042 0813 1000V CONTROL CABLE CERRO SPEC. NO. NUS- R,T,QT,P,CS,A,QI 3 6-42A . QDR 5437-MOV-2-021 362 043 0836 1000V CONTROL CABLE OKONITE SPEC. NO. NUS- R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A, 3 6-42B REF QDR-5437-57A-01 381B QI 044 1002 INSTRUMENT PENETRATION AMPHENOL SPEC. NO. 111/ R,T,QT,P,CS,A,QI 4 6-43 REF QDR-5437-59-01 AMPHENOL TYPE IA 0115 1002 INSTRUMENT PENETRATION AMPHENOL SPEC. NO. 111/ R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A, 4 6-1111 REF QDR-51137-59-01 AMPHENOL TYPE IB QI 046 1002 POWER PENETRATION AMPHENOL SPEC. NO. 111/ R~T,QT,P,H,CS,A, 4 6-115 REF QDR-51137-59-01 AMPHENOL TYPE IC QI 047 1002 TRIAXIAL PENETRATION AMPHENOL SPEC. NO. 41/ *R, T,QT, P,H,CS,A, 4 6-46 REF QDR-51137-59-01 AMPHENOL TYPE QI III 048 0602 THERMOCOUPLES AMPHENOL SPEC. NO. 111/ R,T,QT,P,H,CS, 4 6-117 REF QDR-51137-MOV-2-01 AMPHENOL TYPE IV AQI Sl B - 3

e e SURRY-1 APPENDIX B e

llllll llllllll lllllfllllllllllllllllllllllll!l!lllllllllllllll

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ******lllllllllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll * ***** ************************ II NUM KEYi/ EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA

• • • llllllll ***********llfllllllllllllllllllllll **************** llllHllllllllllllllllllllllllll **************** * ***** ************************

• 049 0829 600V POWER CABLE KAISER ALUMINUM SPEC. NO. NUS- QT,CS,A,QM,QI 6-48 AND CHEMICAL 225 SALES 050 0829 600V POWER CABLE KAISER ALUMINUM SPEC. NO. NUS- QT,CS,A,QM,QI 6-49 AND CHEMICAL 365A SALES 051 0836 600V POWER CABLE OKONITE SPEC. NO. NUS- QT,CS,A,QM,QI 3 6-50 365B 052 0836 600V POWER CABLE OKONITE SPEC. NO, NUS- QT, CS;A ,QM, QI 3 6-51 REF QDR-5437-56-01 365C 053 0836 TRIPLEX NOS. 2, 210, 410 OKONITE SPEC. NO. NUS- QT,CS,A,QM,QI 3 6-53 REF QDR-5437-56-01 AWG, 250 MCM, 350, 500 374 REF QDR-5437-56-01 AND 750 MCM 054 0815 600V POWER CABLE COLLYER INSU- SPEC. NO. NUS- QT,CS,A,QM,QI 3 6-54 REF QDR-5437-56-02 LATED WIRE CO. 365E 055 0814 600V INSTRUMENT CABLE CONTINENTAL WIRE SPEC. NO. NUS- R,QT,P,H,CS,A,QI 3 6-58 AND CABLE 341 056 0814 600V INSTRUMENT CABLE CONTINENTAL WIRE SPEC. NO. NUS- R,QT,P,H,CS,A,QI 3 6-59 AND CABLE 411 057 0814 600V INSTRUMENT CABLE CONTINENTAL WIRE SPEC. NO. NUS- R,QT,P,H,CS,A,QI 3 6-59A AND CABLE 341A 058 0814 HIGH TEMPERATURE CABLE CONTINENTAL WIRE SPEC. NO. NUS- QT,CS,A,QM,QI 3 6-60 AND CABLE 326 059 0815 5000V POWER CABLE COLLYER SPEC. NO. NUS- R,T,QT,P,H,A,QI 3 6-60A REF QDR-5437-62A-01 364 060 0836 5000V POWER CABLE OKONITE SPEC. NO. NUS- R,T,QT,P,H,A,QI 3 6-60B REF QDR-5437-62C-01 364A 061 0829 5000V POWER CABLE KAISER SPEC. NO. NUS- R, T, QT , .P, H, A, QI 6-60C 217 S1 B - 4

e e SURRY-1 APPENDIX B

• • • *lllll ************************ **************** **************** **************** * ***** ****************ff*******

• NUM KEYi/ EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA 062 0300 PUMP MOTOR 1-cc..:P-2A R,T,QT,P,H,A,RPN 2 6-61 063 0325 PUMP MOTOR GE 1-CC-P-2B R,T,QT,P,H,A,RPN 2 6-62 064 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CC-105A R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-63 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 065 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CC-105B R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-64 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 066 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CC-105C R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-65 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 067 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CC-107 R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-66 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 068 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CC-109A . R,QT ,A,RPN 2 6-67 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 069 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CC-109B R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-68 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 070 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CC-110A QT,A,RPN 2 6-69 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 071 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CC-110B R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-70 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 072 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CC-110C R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-71 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 073 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-CS-101A QT,A 3 6-72 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 074 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-CS-101B QT,A 3 6-73 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 075 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE . MOV-CS-101C .QT,A 3 6-74 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 076 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-CS-101D QT,A 3 6-75 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 077 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-CS-102A QT,A 3 6-76 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 078 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-CS-102B QT,A 3 6-77 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 079 0300 PUMP MOTOR 1-CV-P-1A R,QT, 6-78 080 0300 PUMP MOTOR 1-CV-.P-1B R,QT,A 6-79 081 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CV-150A R,QT,Q,RPN 2 6-80 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 082 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CV-150B R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-81 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 S1 B - 5

NUM KEYi/

e llffllllllllll*IIWllll*lllllllWIWl*M EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER SURRY-1 APPENDIX B DEFICIENCY II !lll!IIW RES REF II 1111111 COMMENTS STA II 083 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CV-150C R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-82 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 084 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CV-150D R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-83 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 085 0122 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER FT-FW-lOOA R,QT,RT,CS,A,RPN 2 6-84 086 0122 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER FT-FW.:_lOOB R,QT,RT,CS,A,RPN 2 6-85 087 0122 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER FT-FW-lOOC R,QT,RT,CS,A,RPN 2 6-86 088 0138 LEVEL TRANSMITTER ROSEMOUNT LT-1474 QT,A,RPN 2 6-87 089 0107 LEVEL TRANSMITTER BARTON LT-1475 P,CS,A,RPN 2 6-88 090 0107 LEVEL TRAN5MITTER BARTON LT-1476 P,CS,A,RPN 2 6-89 091

• 0107 LEVEL TRANSMITTER BARTON LT-1484 P,CS,A,RPN 2 6-90 092 0107 LEVEL TRANSMITTER BARTON LT-1485 P,CS,A,RPN 2 6-91 093 0107 LEVEL TRANSMITTER BARTON LT-1486 P,CS,A,RPN 2 6-92 094 0107 LEVEL TRANSMITTER BARTON LT-1494 P,CS,A,RPN 2 6-93 095 0107 LEVEL TRANSMITTER BARTON LT-1495 P,CS,A,RPN 2 6-94 096 0107 LEVEL TRANSMITTER BARTON LT-1496 P,CS,A,RPN 2 6-95 097 0500 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-FW-151A R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A, 2 6-96 QDR-5437-MOV-1-02 QI 098 0500 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-FW...:151B R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-97 QDR-5437-MOV-1-02 QI 099 0500 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-FW-151C R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-98 QDR-5437-MOV-1-02 QI 100 0500 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-FW-151D R,T,QT,P,H.CS,A, 2 6-99 QDR-5437-MOV-1-02 QI 101 0500 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-FW-151E R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A, 2 6-100 QDR-5437-MOV-1-02 QI Sl B - 6

e e SURRY-1 APPENDIX B

• • • **** lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllR **************** II llllllllll RllllllllMllllftllllllllllllllllllllllWWllll II NUM KEYi/ EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA RIil!

• • • • ************************ **************** llllllftllllRllHllllllllllllll ****************

• llllllllll llllllllWllllllllllllllllllllllllllllMllllllll II 102 0500 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-FW-15 lF R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A, 2 6-101 QDR-5437-MOV-1-02 QI 103 0300 AUX. FEED PUMP MOTOR 1-FW-P-3A T,QT,P,H,A 3 6-101A QUal by Backup

• 104 0300 AUX. FEED PUMP MOTOR 1-FW-P-3B T,QT,P,H,A 3 6-lOlB QUal by Backup 105 1600 HYDROGEN RECOMBINER WEST 1-GW-HC-2A R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A, 3 6-102 QI 106 1600 HYDROGEN RECOMBINER WEST 1-GW-HC-2B T,QT,P,H,CS,A,QI 3 6-103 107 1600 HYDROGEN ANALYZER BENDIX 1-GW-H2A-103 R,QT,A,RPS 2 6-104 MANUFACTURER IS BENDIX CORPORATION 108 1500 POWER PANEL POWER SUPPLY R,QT,A,QI 1 6-105 1-GW-HC-2A 109 1500 POWER PANEL POWER SUPPLY R,QT,A,QI 1 6-106 1-GW-HC-2B 110 0303 FAN MOTOR ALLIS CHALMERS 2-VS-F-8A R,T,QT,P,H,A,RPN 1 6-107 REF QDR-5437-79-01 111 0303 FAN MOTOR ALLIS CHALMERS 2-VS-F-8B R,T,QT,P,H,A,RPN 1 6-108 REF QDR-5437-79-01 112 1200 DAMPER RCS INC. DAMPER 3A(2) R,T,QT,H,A,RPN 1 6-109 MANUFACTURER IS BUFFALO 113 1208 DAMPER RCS INC. DAMPER 3B(2) R,T,QT,H,A,RPN 1

• 6-110 MANUFACTURER IS BUFFALO 114 0325 PUMP MOTOR G.E. 1-RS-P-lA R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 3 6-111 REF. QDR-5437-34-01 115 0325 PUMP MOTOR G.E. 1-RS-P-lB R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 3 6-112 REF. QDR-5437-34-01 116 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-IA-100 R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-113 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 117 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-IA-101A R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-114 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 118 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-IA-101B R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-115 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 119 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-LM-100A QT,A,RPN 2 6-116 S1 B - 7

e e SURRY-1 APPENDIX B ll*ll **** ************************ **************** **************** **************** ll llllllllll *****11******11***********

• NUM KEYi/ EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA

• • • **** ************************ ********II******** **************** **************** * ***** ************************

• 120 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-LM-100B QT,A,RPN 2 6-117 121 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-LM-100C QT,A,RPN 2 6-118 122 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-LM-100D QT,A,RPN 2 6-119 123 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-LM-100A R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-120 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 124 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-LM-100B R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-121 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 125 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-LM-100C R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-122 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 126 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-LM-100D R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-123 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 127 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-LM-100E R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-124 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 128 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-LM-100F R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-125 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 129 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-LM-100G R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-126 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 130 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-LM-100H R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-127 REF'QDR-5437-SOV-01 131 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO . SOV-LM-101A R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-128 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 132 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-LM-101B R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-129 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 133 0122 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER FT-1474 R,QT,RT,CS,A,RPN 2 6-130 134 0122 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER FT-1475 R,QT,RT,CS,A,RPN 2 6-1'31 135 0122 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER FT-1484 R,QT,RT,CS,A,RPN 2 6-132 136 0122 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER FT-1485 R,QT,RT,CS,A,RPN 2 6-133 137 0122 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER FT-1494 R,QT,RT,CS,A,RPN 2 6-134 138 0122 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER FT-1495 R,QT,RT,CS,A,RPN 2 6-135 139 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-1464 QT,A,RPN 2 6-136 140 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-1466 QT,A,RPN 2 6-137 S1 B - 8

e e SURRY-1 APPENDIX B 1111!1 111111!1 llll!lllllll!IIIHll!lll!IIIIIIIIIW!lllllllll!I llllllllll!IIIMIIM!lllllllllll 1111111111111111!1111111!1111111 11111111111111111111111111111111 II lllUIIII llllllllllllllllllll!IHIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII II NUM KEYi/ EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA 11111 11111111 IIIIIIIIIIIIMllllllllllllffWllllftllllllllllll Wllllllll!lllll!lllllllllllllll IIIIHlllllllllllllfllllRll!III 111111111111111111111111!1111111 II 1111111111 11111111111111!111111111111111111111111111111111 II 141 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-1468 QT,A,RPN 2 6-138 142 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-1474 QT,A,RPN 2 6-139 143 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-1475 QT,A,RPN 2 6-140 144 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-1476 QT,A,RPN 2 6-141 145 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER *FISCHER & PORTER PT-1484 QT,A,RPN 2 6-142 146 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-1485 QT,A,RPN 2 6-143 147 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-1486 QT,A,RPN 2 6-144 148 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-1494 QT,A,RPN 2 6-145 149 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-1495 QT,A,RPN 2 6-146 150 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-1496 QT,A,RPN 2 6-147 151 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-MS-101AA R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-148 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 152 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-MS-101AB R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-149 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 153 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-MS-1 01BA R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-150 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 154 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-MS-101BB R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-151 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 155 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-MS-101CA R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-152 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 156 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-MS-101CB R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-153 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 157 0401 SOLENOID VALVE" ASCO SOV-MS-109 R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-154 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 158 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-MS-110 R,QT,A 2 6-155 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 159 0325 PUMP MOTOR G.E. 1-RS-P-2A R,QT,A,QI 3 6-156 REF. QDR-5437-42-01 160 0325 PUMP MOTOR G.E. 1-RS-P-2B R,QT,A,QI 3 6-157 REF. QDR-5437-42-01 161 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-RS-155A QT,A,QI_ 3 6-158 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 .

S1 B - 9

e e SURRY-1 APPENDIX B NUM KEYi/ EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • IIIIWWMMllillWIIWIIWWW **************** * ***** ************************

• 162 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-RS-155B QT,A,QI 3 6-159 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 163 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-RS-156A QT,A 3 6-160 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 164 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-RS-1568 QT,A 3 6-161 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 165 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-DA-100A R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A, 3 6-162 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 166 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-DA-1008 R,_QT, A, RPN 2 6-163 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 167 0401 SOLENOID VALVE

• ASCO SOV-DG-108A R,T,QT,P,H,CS,P, 2 6-164 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 RPN 168 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-DG-108B R,QT,A 2 6-165 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 169 0401 SOLENOID VALV.E ASCO SOV-VG-109A R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-166 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 170 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-VG-109B R,QT,A 2 6-167 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 171 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-RM-1008 R,QT,A 2 6-168 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 172 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-RM-100C R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-169 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 RPS 173 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-RM-100A R,T,QT,P,H,A 2 6-170 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 174 0107 LEVEL TRANSMITTER BARTON LT-1459 P,CS,A,RPN 2 6-171 175 0107 LEVEL TRANSMITTER BARTON LT-1460 P,CS,A,RPN 2 6-172 176 0107 LEVEL TRANSMITTER BARTON LT-1461 P,CS,A,RPN 2 6-173 177 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-1455 R,QT,RT,CS,A,RPN 2 6-174 178 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-1456 R,QT,RT,CS,A,RPN 2 6-175 179 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-1457 R,QT,RT,CS,A,RPN 2 6-176 180 0600 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT TE-1410 T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-177 181 0600 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT TE-1412B T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-178 S1 B - 10

e e SURRY- 1 APPENDIX B NUM KEY/I EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF . COMMENTS STA

• • • llllllll 182 0600 T.EMPERATURE ELEMENT TE-1412D T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-179 183 0600 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT TE-1413 T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-180 184 0600 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT TE-1420 T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-181 NRC-TYPCO-SHOULD BE TE-1420 185 0600 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT TE-1422B T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-182 186 0600 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT TE-1422D T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-183 187 0600 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT TE-1423 T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-184 188 0600 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT TE-1430 T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-185 189 0600 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT TE-1432B T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-186 190 0600 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT TE-1432D T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-187 191 0600 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT TE-14.33 T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-188 192 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-1519A QT,A 2 6-189 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 193 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO MOV-1535 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A, 2 6-196 QI 194 0500 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1536 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A, 2 6-197 QDR-5437-MOV-1-02 QI 195 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-1455C-1 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 3 6-190 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 196 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-1455C-2 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 3 6-191 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 197 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-1455C-3 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-192 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 198 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VAVLE ASCO SOV-1456-1 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 3 6-193 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 199 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-1456-2 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 3 6-194 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 200 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-1456-3 F,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-195 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 201 0351 PUMP MOTOR WESTINGHOUSE 1-SI-P-1A R,QT,A,RPN 3 6-198 S1 B - 11

e e SURRY-1 APPENDIX 8 llftll

• • • • ************************ **************** **************** **************** ll lllUllH

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .ll NUM KEY/I EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA

• • • **** *****'****************** llllllllllllllllHllllRllllHll **************** **************** ll ftlllllllf ************************

• 202 0351 PUMP MOTOR WESTINGHOUSE 1-SI-P-18 R,QT,A,RPN 3 6-199 203 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1842 QT,A 3 6-200 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 204 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1860A QT,A,QI 3 6-201 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 205 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-18608 QT,A,QI 3 6-202 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 206 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1862A QT,A,QI 3 6-203 QDR-5437-MOV-1-011 207 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-18628 QT,A,QI 3 6-204 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 208 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1863A QT,A,QI 2 6-205 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 209 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-18638 QT,A,QI 2 6-206 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 210 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1865A QT,P,CS,A,QI 6-207 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 211 0500 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-18658 QT,P,CS,A,QI 6-208 QDR-5437-MOV-1-02 212 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1865C QT,P,CS,A,QI 6-209 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 213 0500 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1867A R,QT,A,QI 3 6-210 QDR-5437-MOV-1-1 214 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-18678 QT,A 3 6-211 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 215 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1867C QT,A 3 6-212 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 216 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1867D QT,A 3 6-213 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 217 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1869A QT,A 3 6-214 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 218 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1890A QT,A,QI 2 6-215 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 219 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-18908 QT,A,QI 2 6-216 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 220 -0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1890C QT,A,QI 2 6-217 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 221 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SI-100 R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-218 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 222 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SI-101A QT,A 3 6-219 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 S1 8 - 12

NUM llltll llllllll KEYi/

llllllft

• • • • llllllllllllllllllllllllllftftllllllllll EQUIPMENT

• • • • • • • • • • • llllllllllllllllllllllllll

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ***********II**** ****************

MANUFACTURER llllllllllllllllllllllllRllllll COMPONENT NUMBER llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll SURRY~ 1 APPENDIX B DEFICIENCY llllllllllllllllllllftllllllllll RES REF

• 1111111111 COMMENTS llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll STA ll 223 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SI-101B R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-220 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 224 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SI-102A1 R,QT,A 1 6-221 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 225 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SI-102A2 R,T,QT,P,H,A 6-222 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 226 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SI-102B1 R,QT,A 1 6-223 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 227 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SI-102B2 R,T,QT,P,H,A 6-224 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 228 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-1884A R,QT,A 2 6-225 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 229 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-1884B R,QT,A 2 6-226 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 230 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO S0V-1884C R,QT,A 2 6-227 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 231 0500 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1864A R,QT,A,QI 2 6-228 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 232 0500 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1864B R,QT,A,QI 2 6-229 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 233 0500 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQOE MOV-1869B R,QT,A,QI 3 6-230 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 234 0500 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1885A R,QT,A,QI 3 6-230A QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 235 0500 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1885B R,QT,A,QI 3 6-230B QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 236 0500 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-1885C R,QT,A,QI 3 6-230C QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 237 0500 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE

• LIMITORQUE MOV-1885D R,QT,A,QI 3 6-230D QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 238 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-100Ji1 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-231 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 239 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-100B1 R,QT,A 2 6-232 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 240 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-101A1 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-233 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 241 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-10181 R,QT,A 2 6-234 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 242 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-102A1 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-235 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 243 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-102B1 R,QT,A 2 6-236 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 S1 B - 13

NUM KEYi/

llllllll llllllll llllllllllllllllHlllllllllllllllllllllllllllll EQUIPMENT llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll

• • • • • • • • • llllllllllllll MANUFACTURER ftllRllllHllllllllllllllllllll llllllllllllMllllllllllllllllll COMPONENT NUMBER e

SURRY-1 APPENDIX 8 llllllWllllllllllllllllllllllll DEFICIENCY

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • w11*n************

RES REF II !lllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll COMMENTS llftllRllllllllllllllllRllllllllll!lllftll!lll STA 244 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-103 R,QT,A 2 6-237 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 245 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-104A R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-238 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 RPN 246 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-1048 R,QT,A 2 6-239 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 247 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-106A R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A, 2 6-240 REF. QDR-5437-SOV-01 RPN 248 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-1068 R,QT,A 2 6-241 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 249 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-SW-104A QT,A 3 6-242 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 250 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-SW-1048 QT,A 3 6-243 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01

\

251 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-SW-104C QT,A 3 6-244 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 252 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-SW-104D QT,A 3 6-245 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 253 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-SW-105A QT,A 3 6-246 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 254 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-SW-1058 QT,A 3 6-247 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 255 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-SW-105C QT,A 3 6-248 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 256 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-SW-105D QT,A 3 6-249 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 257 0300 PUMP MOTOR 1-SW-P-5A R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-250 258 0300 PUMP MOTOR 1-SW-P-58 R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-251 259 0300 PUMP MOTOR 1-SW-P-5C R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-252 260 0300 PUMP MOTOR 1-SW-P-5D R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-253 261 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-BD-100A R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A, 3 6-254 . REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 RPN 262 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-BD-1008 R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-255 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 263 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-BD-100C R,T,QT,P,CS,A, 3 6-256 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 RPN 264 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-BD-100D R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-257 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 265 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-BD-100E R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A, 3 6-258 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 RPN 266 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-BD-100F R,"QT ,A,RPN 2 6-259 REF QDR-5437-SOV-01 S1 B - 14

VEPCO SURRY UNIT 2 APPENDIX B TO NRC-SER AUGUST 24, 1981 LEGEND DESIGNATION FOR DEFICIENCY R - Radiation T - Temperature QT - Qualification time RT - Required time P - Pressure H - Humidity CS - Chemical spray A - Material aging evaluation, replacement schedule, ongoing equipment surveillance S - Submergence M - Margin I - HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM - Qualification method RPN - Equipment relocation or replacement, adequate schedule not provided EXN - Exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - Separate effects qualification justification inadequate QI - Qualification information being developed RPS - Equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided RESOLUTION OF DEFICIENCY

1. Components deleted from the master list

2. Components requiring replacement or modification

3. Components determine to be qualified

4. Components determined to be qualified except for aging OK,

SURRY-2 APPENDIX B llllll NUM llllllll lllllllllllllllllRlllllllllllllllWIIII KEYi/ EQUIPMENT

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • **************** ****************

• lllll!U ************************

• MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA ll!lll **** ************************ **************** **************** **************** * **""* llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllWlllllll II 267 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SV-202A R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-1 REF GDR-5437-SOV-02 268 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2275A QT,A 3 6-2 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

269 0548 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2275B R,T,QT,P,H,A,QI 3 6-3 REF QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 270 0548 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2275C R,T,QT,P,H,A,QI 3 6-4 REF QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 271 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2373A QT,A 3 6-5 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

272 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2381 QT,A 3 6-6 QDR-5437-MOV-1-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

273 0351 PUMP MOTOR WESTINGHOUSE 2-CH-P-1A R,T,QT,P,H,A,RPN 3 6-7 274 0351 PUMP MOTOR WESTINGHOUSE 2-CH-P-1B R,T,QT,P,H,A,RPN 3 6-8 275 0351 PUMP MOTOR WESTINGHOUSE 2-CH-P-1C R,T,QT,P,H,A,RPN 3 6-9 276 2521 FLOW CONTROL VALVE FISHER-GOVE NOR FCV-2122 R,QT,A 6-10 277 0121 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISHER-GOVENOR FT-2122 R,QT,A 6-11 278 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-2311 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A, 6-12 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 RPN S2 B 1

e e SURRY-2 APPENDIX B llllK K*lll

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • **************** **************** * ***** ************************ STA

• NUM KEYi/ ************************

EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF 111111 COMMENTS

• • • • \*******1111 *1**1*11****1*** ****1********111

• lllfilllllll******11111***11 I

279 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-21158 QT,P,A 2 6-13 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

280 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2115C QT,P,A,QI 3 6-14 QDR 5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

281 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2115D QT,P,A 2 6-15 QDR 5437-MOV-2-01 282 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2115E QT,P,A,QI 3 6-16 QDR 5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP, WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

283 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2289A QT,A 3 6-17 QDR 5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

284 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-22898 QT,A 3 6-18 QDR 5437-MOV-2-01

• BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE 285 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-2204 R,QT,A 3 6-19 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 286 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-2200A R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 3 6-20 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 287 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-22008 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 3 6-21 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 288 0711 480V MOTOR CONTROL CUTLER-HAMMER 2H1-2 SOUTH R,QT,A,QI 6-23 CENTER 289 0711 480V MOTOR CONTROL CUTLER-HAMMER 2H1-2 NORTH R,QT,A,QI 6-24 CENTER 290 0711 480V MOTOR CONTROL CUTLER-HAMMER 2J1-2 WEST R,QT,A,QI 6-25 CENTER 291 0711 480V MOTOR CONTROL CUTLER-HAMMER* 2J1-2 EAST R,QT,A,QI 6-26 CENTER 292 1012 POWER PENETRATION CONAX SPEC. NO, 21/ CS,A 3 6-27 .REF QDR-5437-117-01 CONAX TYPE lC S2 B - 2

e e e SURRY-2 APPENDIX B NUM llllll!I KEY/I llllllllllllllllll!lllllft!lllllll*llll*llll*

EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA llllll llllllll llllllllllllllll"!l!lff!l*llllllllllllll!III **************** **************** lllll*llllllftlllllRlll!lll !I !IIUIIR ft!lllll!llllllllllll!lllllllllllllllll!IIII II 293 1012 POWER PENETRATION CONAX SPEC. NO. 21/ CS,A 3 6-28 REF QDR-5437-117-01 CONAX TYPE 1D 294 1012 POWER PENETRATION CONAX SPEC. NO. 21/ CS,A 3 6-29 REF QDR-5437-117-01 CONAX TYPE IIA 295 1012 POWER PENETRATION CONAX SPEC. NO. 21/ CS,A 3 6-30 REF QDR-5437-117-01 CONAX TYPE IIB 296 1012 POWER PENETRATION CONAX SPEC. NO. 21/ CS,A 3 6-31 REF QDR-5437-117-01 CONAX TYPE UC 297 0813 600V CONTROL CABLE CERRO WIRE AND SPEC. NO. 120 CS,A 3 6-32 QDR 5437-MOV-2-0201 CABLE CO.

298 0813 600V CONTROL CABLE CERRO WIRE AND SPEC. NO. NAS- QT,CS,A 3 6-33 REQDRQ5437-MOV-2-021 CABLE CO. 3187 299 0806 300V INSTRUMENT CABLE BOSTON INSU- SPEC. NO. 128 CS,A 6-34 LATED WIRE AND CABLE 300 0813 300V INSTRUMENT CABLE CERRO WIRE AND SPEC. NO. 430 QT,CS,A 3 6-35 REQDRQ5437-MOV-2-021 CABLE CO.

301 0837 300V INSTRUMENT CABLE RAYCHEM CORP SPEC. NO. NUS- Q,T,CS,A,QI 3 6-36 QDR-5437-54-01 3190 302 0813 1000V CONTROL CABLE CERRO WIRE AND SPEC. NO. NUS- R,T,QT,P,CS,A,QI 3 6-37 CABLE CO. 32.5 303 0813 1000V CONTROL CABLE CERRO WIRE AND SPEC. NO. NUS- R,T,QT,P,CS,A,QI 3 6-38 QDR.5437-MOV-2-02-02 CABLE CO. 381C 304 0813 1000V CONTROL CABLE CERRO WIRE AND SPEC. NO. NUS- R,T,QT,P,CS,A,QI 3 6-39 QDR.5437-MOV-2-02-02 CABLE CO. 381E 305 0824 1000V CONTROL CABLE GE WIRE AND SPEC. NO. NUS- QT,CS,A,QI 6-40 CABLE 381 306 0814 1000V CONTROL CABLE CONTINENTAL WIRE SPEC. NO. NUS- QT,CS,A,QI 3 6-42 AND CABLE 420 307 0813 1000V CONTROL CABLE CERRO SPEC. NO. NUS- R,T,QT,P,CS,A 3 6-42A QDR.5437-MOV-2-02-02 362 32 B - 3

e e SURRY-2 APPENDIX B

!HIii 11111111 111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 11111111111111111111111111111111 11111111111111111111111111111111 IIIIIIHIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII II 1111111111 1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 II NUM KEY/I EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA 1111ft 11111111 111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 111111111111111111111111111111 11111111111111111111111111111111 11111111111111111111111111111111 II 1111111111 111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 II 308 0836 1000V CONTROL CABLE OKONITE SPEC. NO. NUS- R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A, 3 6-112B REF QDR-51137-125A-01 381B QI 309 1002 INSTRUMENT PENETRATION AMPHENOL SPEC. 111/ R,T,QT,P,CS,A,QI 4 6-113 REF QDR-51137-127-01 AMPHENOL TYPE IA 310 1002 INSTRUMENT PENETRATION AMPHENOL SPEC. 111/ R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A, 4 6-1111 REF QDR-51137-127-01 AMPHENOL TYPE 1B QI 311 1002 POWER PENETRATION AMPHENOL SPEC. 111/ R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A, 4 6-115 REF QDR-51137-127-01 ,,-

AMPHENOL TYPE 1C QI 312 1002 TRIAXIAL PENETRATION AMPHENOL SPEC. 111/ R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A; 4 6-116 REF QDR-51137-127-01 AMPHENOL TYPE QI III 313 0602 THERMOCOUPLES AMPHENOL SPEC. 111/ R,T,QT,RT,P,H,CS 4 6-117 QDR 51137-MOV-2-0201 AMPHENOL TYPE IV A,QI 3111 0829 600V POWER CABLE KAISER ALUMINUM SPEC. NO. NUS- QT,CS,A,QM,QI 1 6-118 AND CHEMICllL 225 SALES 315 0829 600V POWER CABLE KAISER ALUMINUM SPEC. NO. NUS- QT,CS,A,QM,QI 1 6-119 AND CHEMICAL 365A SALES 316 0836 600V POWER CABLE OKONITE SPEC. NO. NUS- QT,CS,A,QM,QI 3 6-50 REF QDR-51137-1211-01 365B 317 0836 600V POWER CABLE OKONITE SPEC. NO. NUS- QT,CS,A,QM,QI 3 6-51 REF QDR-51137-1211-01 365C 318 0836 TRIPLEX NOS. 2, 210, 410 OKONITE SPEC. NO, NUS- QT,CS,A,QM 3 6-53 REF QDR-51137-1211-01 AWG, 250MCM, 350, 500 AND 3711 700MCM 319 0815 600V POWER CABLE COLLYER INSU- SPEC. NO. NUS- QT,CS,A,QM,QI 3 6-511 REF QDR-51137-1211-02 LATED WIRE CO. 365E 320 08111 *600V INSTRUMENT CABLE CONTINENTAL WIRE SPEC. NO. NUS- R,QT,P,H,CS,A,QI 3 6-5~

AND CABLE 3111 S2 B - 4

e e SURRY-2 APPENDIX B llllll NUM llllllll KEY/I EQUIPMENT ftllllllllllllllllllllRlllll llllllMllllllllllllllllllllllll ll MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA

• • • **** llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • **************** lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll 321 0814 600V INSTRUMENT CABLE CONTINENTAL WIRE SPEC, NO. NUS- R,QT,P,H,CS,A,QI 3 6-59 AND CABLE 411 322 *0814 600V INSTRUMENT CABLE CONTINENTAL WIRE NUS-341A R,QT,P,H,CS,A,QI 3 6-59A AND CABLE 323 0814 HIGH TEMPERATURE CABLE CONTINENTAL WIRE NUS-326 QT,CS,A,QM,QI 3 6-60 AND CABLE 324 0815 5000V POWER CABLE COLLYER NUS-364 R,T,QT,P,H,A,QI 3 6-60A REF QDR-5437-143-01 325 0836 5000V POWER CABLE OKONITE NUS-364A R,T,QT,P,H,A,QI 3 6-60B REF QDR-5437-133-01 326 0829 5000V POWER CABLE KAISER NUS-217 R,T,QT,P,H,A,QI 1 6-60C 327 0325 PUMP MOTOR GE 2-CC-P-2A R,T,QT,P,H,A,RPN 2 6-61 328 0325 PUMP MOTOR GE 2-CC-P-2B R,T,QT,P,H,A,RPN 2 6-62 329 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CC-205A R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-63 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 330 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CC-205B R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-64 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 331 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CC-205C R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-65 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 332 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CC-207 R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-66 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 333 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CC-209A R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-67 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 334 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CC-209B QT,A 2 6-68 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 335 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CC-210A QT,A,RPN 2 6-69 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 336 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CC-210B R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-70 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 337 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CC-210C R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-71 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 338 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-CS-201A QT,A 3 6-72 QDR 5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE S2 B - 5

e e SURRY-2 APPENDIX B llllll **** *******************11111111* llllllllllllllllllllllllWllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll II llllllllll IIIIIIIIWIIWlllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll II NUM KEYi/ EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA l!llll !1111111 llllllllllllllllWllllllllllllllllllllllllllllft ****ll**llllRl!llllllllll llllllllllllllMllllllllllllWII ********llllftllllllllll II

• • • • II IIIIIIWllWllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll*** II 339 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-CS-201B QT,A 3 6-73 QDR 5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE 340 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-CS-201C QT,A 3 6-74 QDR 5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE 341 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-CS-201D QT,A 3 6-75 QDR 5437-MOV-2-01 342 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-CS-202A QT,A 3 6-76 QDR 5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE 343 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-CS-202B QT,A 3 6-77 QDR 5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE 344 0300 PUMP MOTOR 2-CV-P-1A R,QT,A 6-78 345 0300 PUMP MOTOR 2-CV-P-18 R,QT,A 6-79 346 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CV-250A R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-80 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 347 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CV-250B R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-81 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 348 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CV-250C R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-82 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 349 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-CV-250D R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-83 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 350 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-PG-107A QT,RT,A 3 6-84 QDR 5437-MOV-2-01 351 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-PG-107B QT,RT,A 3 6-85 QDR 5437-MOV-2-01 352 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-PG-107C QT,RT,A 3 6-86 QDR 5437-MOV-2-01 353 0122 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER FT-FW-200A R,T,QT,P,CS,A, 2 6-87 REPLACE RPN 354 0122 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER FT-FW-200B *R, T, QT, P, CS, A, 2 6-88 REPLACE RPN S2 B - 6

NUM lUll KEYfl

!l!l!l!l!lllllllllllllllllllllll!lll!lllllW!lll EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY e

SURRY-2 APPENDIX B llllllllllllllllllllllll!lllllll

• llllllllll RES REF II 11!11111!1 M!lllllllMllllllllllftllllllllR!lllll!lftllll COMMENTS llll!IRWllllllllllllllllllllllllll!lllllll!lll STA 355 0122 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER FT-FW-200C R,T,QT,P,CS,A, 2 6-89 REPLACE 356 0138 LEVEL TRANSMITTER ROSEMOUNT LT-2474 QT,A,RPN 2 6-90 REPLACE 357 0138 LEVEL TRANSMITTER ROSEMOUNT LT-2475 QT,A,RPN 2 6-91 358 0138 LEVEL TRANSMITTER ROSEMOUNT LT-2476 QT,A,RPN 2 6-92 359 0138 LEVEL TRANSMITTER ROSEMOUNT LT-2484 QT,A,RPN 2 6-93 REPLACE 360 0138 LEVEL TRANSMITTER ROSEMOUNT LT-2485 QT,A,RPN 2 6-94 361 0138 LEVEL TRANSMITTER ROSEMOUNT LT-2486 QT;A,RPN 2 6-95 362 0138 LEVEL TRANSMITTER ROSEMOUNT LT-2494 QT,A,RPN 2 6-96 363 0138 LEVEL TRANSMITTER ROSEMOUNT LT-2495 QT,A,RPN 2 6-97 364 0138 LEVEL TRANSMITTER ROSEMOUNT LT-2496 QT,A,RPN 2 6-98 365 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-FW-251A QT,P,CS,A,QI 2 6-99 QDR 5437-MOV-2-02 366 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-FW-251B QT,P,CS,A,QI 2 6-100 QDR 5437-MOV-2-02 367 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-FW-251C QT,P,CS,A,QI 2 6-101 QDR 5437-MOV-2-02 368 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-FW-251D QT,P,CS,A,QI 2 6-102 QDR 5437-MOV-2-02 369 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-FW-251E QT,P,CS,A,QI 2 6-103 QDR 5437-MOV-2-02 370 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-FW-251F QT,P,CS,A,QI 2 6-104 QDR 5437-MOV-2-02 371 0300 AUX. FEED PUMP MOTOR 2-FW-P-3A T-QT,P,H,A 3 6-104A Back-Up Rev 372 0300 AUX. FEED PUMP MOTOR 2-FW-P-3B T,QT,P,H,A 3 6-104B Back-Up Rev 373 1651 HYDROGEN RECOMBINER WESTINGHOUSE 2-GW-HC-2A R,T,QT,P,A,QI 3 6-105 374 1651 HYDROGEN RECOMBINER WESTINGHOUSE 2-GW-HC-2B T,QT,P,A,QI 3 6-106 375 1633 HYDROGEN ANALYZER BENDIX 2-GW-H2A-203 R,QT,A,RPS 2 6-107 MANUFACTURER IS BENDIX S2 B - 7

e e SURRY-2 APPENDIX B

• • • **** WllWllWW**llWWUllllllWWWllllWWWW llllllHllllWllllllllllllllll **************** lllllllHlllllllllllllll II

• • • • • ************************ I NUM KEY/I EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA

• • • lllllll ************************ HlllllllllllllllllllllWllWll **************** **************** II llllllllll ************************ II 376 1541 POWER PANEL WESTINGHOUSE POWER SUPPLY/ R,QT,A,QI 6-108 2-GW-HC-2A 377 1551 POWER PANEL WESTINGHOUSE POWER SUPPLY/ R,QT,A,QI 6-109 2-GW-HC-28 378 0303 FAN MOTOR ALLIS CHALMERS 1-VS-F-8A R,T,QT,P,H,A,RPN 1 6-110 REF QDR-5437..:.18-01 379 0303 FAN MOTOR ALLIS CHALMERS 1-VS-F-88 R,T,QT,P,H,A,RPN 1 6-111 REF QDR-5437-18-01 380 1200 DAMPER RCS INC. DAMPER 3A(2) R,T,QT,P,H,A,RPN 1 6-112 MANUFACTURER IS BUFFALO 381 1200 DAMPER RCS INC. DAMPER 38(2) R,T,QT,P,H,A,RPN 1 6-113 MANUFACTURER IS BUFFALO 3821 651 CHILLER WESTINGHOUSE 1-VS-E-4A T,QT,H,A 6-114 383 1651 CHILLER WESTINGHOUSE 1-VS-E-48 T,QT,H,A 6-115 384 1651 CHILLER WESTINGHOUSE 1-VS-E-4C T,QT,H,A 6-116 385 0325 PUMP MOTOR GE 1-VS-P-1A T,QT,H,A 6-117 386 0325 PUMP MOTOR GE 1-VS-P-18 T,QT,H,A 6-118 387 0325 PUMP MOTOR GE 1-VS-P-1C T,QT,H,A 6-119 388 0303 PUMP MOTOR ALLIS CHALMERS 1-VS-P-2A T,QT,H,A 6-120 389 0303 PUMP MOTOR ALLIS CHALMERS 1-VS-P-28 T,QT,H,A 6-121 390 0303 PUMP MOTOR ALLIS CHALMERS 1..:.vs-P-2c T,QT,H,A 6-122 391 0325 PUMP MOTOR GE 2-RS-P-1A CS,A 3 6-123 REF. QDR-5437-96-01 392 0325 PUMP MOTOR GE 2-RS-P-18 CS,A 3 6-124 REF. QDR-5437-96-01 393 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-IA-200 R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-125 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 394 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-IA-201A QT,A 2 6-126 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 395 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-IA-201B QT,A,RPN 2 6-127 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 S2 B - 8

e e SURRY-2 APPENDIX B

• • • llllllll ************************ *"************** **************** lllllllllllllllllllll!Wlllllill

• ***** llllllllftlllllllllllllllllllllillllllHWHllll NUM KEYi/ EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA 11111 **** ************************ **************** **************** **************** ll ****" **********"**"**********

• 396 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-LM-200A QT,A,RPN 2 6-128 REPLACE 397 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-LM-200B QT,A,RPN 2 6-129 REPLACE 398 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-LM-200C QT,A,RPN 2 6-130 REPLACE 399 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-LM-200D QT,A,RPN 2 6-131 REPLACE 400 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-LM-200A R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-132 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 401 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-LM-200B R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-133 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 402 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-LM-200C R,QT,A,RPN 2* 6-134 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 403 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-LM-200D R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-135 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 404 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-LM-200E R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-136 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 405 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-LM-200F R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-137 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 406 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-LM-200G R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-138 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 407 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-LM-200H R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-139 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 408 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-LM-201A R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-140 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 409 01101 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-LM-2018 R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-141 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 410 0122 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER FT-2474 R,T,QT,P,CS,A, 2 6-142 RPN 411 0122 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER FT-2475 R,T,QT,P,CS,A, 2 6-143 RPN 412 0122 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER FT-2484 R,T,QT,P,CS,A, 2 6-144 RPN 413 0122 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER FT-2485 R,T,QT,P,CS,A, 2 6-145 RPN 414 0122 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER FT-2494 R,T,QT,P,CS,A, 2 6-146 RPN S2 B - 9

NUM llllll KEYi/

llllllll llllllllAllllllARA.AllAAllA*llllWllW EQUIPMENT llllftllllllRWllftllllllllllWllllRRRllllW MANUFACTURER

• • • • • • • llllllllllllllllll COMPONENT NUMBER e

SURRY-2 APPENDIX B llllllW*llWWllllllllllllllll DEFICIENCY ll lllll!Rll RES REF ll!lllllll llllllllllllRllllllllWllRllllllllll*llllllll COMMENTS llllllWllllllllfflllllllllllWllWWllllllllll STA ll 415 0122 FLOW TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER FT-2495 R,T,QT,P,CS,A 2 6-147 RPN 416 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-2464 QT,A,RPN 2 6-148 417 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-2466 QT,A,RPN 2 6-149 418 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER F.ISCHER & PORTER PT-2468 QT,A,RPN 2 6-150 419 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-2474 QT,A,RPN 2 6-151 REPLACE 420 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-2475 QT,A,RPN 2 6-152 REPLACE 421 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-2476 QT,A,RPN 2 6-153 REPLACE 422 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-2484 QT,A,RPN 2 6-154 REPLACE 423 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-2485 QT ,A,RPN 2 6-155 REPLACE 424 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-2486 QT,A,RPN 2 6-156 REPLACE 425 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITER FISCHER & PORTER PT-2494 QT,A,RPN 2 6-157 426 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-2495 QT,A,RPN 2 6-158 REPLACE 427 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-2496 QT,A,RPN 2 6-159 REPLACE 428 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-MS-201AA R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-160 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 429 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-MS-201AB R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-161 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 430 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-MS-201BA R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-162 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 431 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-MS-201BB R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-163 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 432 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-MS-201CA QT,A 2 6-164 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 433 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-MS-201CB R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-165 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 434 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-MS-209 R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-166 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 S2 B - 10

e e SURRY-2 APPENDIX B 111111 11111111 1111111111111111111111111111,11 111111111111111111*11*11** ,1111*1111*111111111111111111 1111111111111111111111111111!1111111111111*1111 II 11111111111111111*111111!!1111111****** * **111111 NUM KEYi/ EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA 11111 11111111 11*1111*1111111111111111n11111111111111111111 11111111111111111111111111111111 1111111111111111111111111111111 1111111111111111111111111111111 II 111111*11 111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 II 435 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-MS-210 R,QT,A 2 6-166A REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 436 0325 PUMP MOTOR GE 2-RS-P-2A R,QT,A,QI 3 6-167 REF. QDR-5437-104-01 437 0325 PUMP MOTOR GE 2-RS-P-2B R,QT,A,QI 3 6-168 REF. QDR-5437-104-01 438 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-RS-255A QT,A 3 6-169 QDR 5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

439 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-RS-255B QT,A 3 6-170 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

440 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIM I TORQUE MOV-RS-256A QT,A 3 6-1.71 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

441 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-RS-256B QT,A 3 6.-172 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

442 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-DA-200A QT,A 2 6-173 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 443 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-DA-200B R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-174 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 444 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-DG-208A R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A, 2 6-175 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 RPN 445 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-DG-208B R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-176 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 446 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-VG-209A QT,CS,A 2 6-177 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 447 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-VG-20913 R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-178 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 448 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-RM-200B R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-179 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 449 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-RM-200C QT,A 2 6-180 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 450 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-RM-200A R,T,QT,P,H,A 2 6-181 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 S2 B - 11

e e e SURRY-2 APPENDIX B llllll 11111111 WIIIIIIIIIIIIIIMIIIIDllllllllllllWIIIIIIIIII IIRllllllllllllllllllWIIIIIIII llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll ftllllllllllllllllllllllMIIIIII II 1111111111 llllllMllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllftWII II NUM KEYi/ EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA 111111 lllUII lllllllllllllllllllllUllllllllllllllllllllllll llllllllllWllllllllllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll IIIIIIIIWllftlllllllllllllllll II 1111!11111 llllllRllllllllllMllllllllllllllllllllllllllll II 451 0107 LEVEL TRANSMITTER BARTON LT-2459 CS,A,RPN 2 6-182 Rf:PLACE 452 0107 LEVEL TRANSMITTER BARTON LT-2460 CS,A,RPN 2 6-183 REPLACE 453 0107 LEVEL TRANSMITTER BARTON LT-2461 CS,A,RPN 2 6-184 REPLACE 454 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-2455 R,T,QT,P,CS,A,M, 2 6-185 RPN 455 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-2456 R,T,QT,P,CS,A,M, 2 6-186 RPN 456 0122 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FISCHER & PORTER PT-2457 R,T,QT,P,CS,A,M, 2 6-187 RPN 457 0638 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT ROSEMOUNT TE-2410 T,QT,P,CS,A 2 6-188 458 0638 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT ROSEMOUNT TE-2412B T,QT,P,CS,A 2 6-189 459 0638 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT ROSEMOUNT TE-2414D T,QT,P,CS,A 2 6-190 460 0638 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT ROSEMOUNT TE-2413 T,QT,P,CS,A 2 6-191 REPLACE 461 0638 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT ROSEMOUNT TE-2420 T,QT,P,CS,A 2 6-192 462 0638 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT ROSEMOUNT TE-2422B T,QT,P,CS,A 2 6-193 463 0638 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT ROSEMOUNT TE-2422D T,QT,P,CS,A 2 6-194 464 0638 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT ROSEMOUNT TE-21123 T,QT,P,CS,A 2 6-195 REPLACE 465 0638 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT ROSEMOUNT TE-2430 T,QT,P,CS,A 2 6-196 466 0638 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT ROSEMOUNT TE-2432B T,QT,P,CS,A 2 6-197 467 0638 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT ROSEMOUNT TE-2432D T,QT.,P,CS,A 2 6-198 468 0638 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT ROSEMOUNT TE-2433 T,QT,P,CS,A 2 6-199 REPLACE 469 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-2519A QT,A 2 6-200 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 S2 B - 12

111111 NUM KEYi/

1111111 1111!111 llllll!l!l!lllllll!IIIW~llll!l!lllllllll!l!l!I EQUIPMENT

• • • • • • • • 11111111n11111111111111111111 11111111************

MANUFACTURER llllllllllllllllffWIIIIW!I ll!lftll!lllll!lftll!l!l!lftllll COMPONENT NUMBER llllll!l!lllllllllft!IIIIIIIIII SURRY-2 APPENDIX B 1111!1111111!111111111111111!1!1 DEFICIENCY

!11111111111111111111111!1111111 II 1111111111 RES REF II 11111111!1 llllllllllllllllll!l!l!l!lllllll!IIIIIIIIIIW COMMENTS

!lllllllll!lll!llllll!lllll!IIIIIIIIIIIIW!III STA II 470 0500 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2535 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-200A QDR-5437-MOV-2-02 471 0500 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2536 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-200B QDR-5437-MOV-2-02 472 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-2455C-1 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-200C REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 473 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-2455C-2 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-200D REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 474 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-2455C-3 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-200E REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 475 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-2456-1 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-200F REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 476 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-2456-2 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-200G 477 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-2456-3 R,T,QT,P,H,CS,A 2 6-200H REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 478 0351 PUMP MOTOR WESTINGHOUSE 2-SI-P-1A R,QT,A,RPN 3 6-201 REF QDR-5437~105-01 479 0351 PUMP MOTOR WESTINGHOUSE 2-S.I-P-1B R,QT,A,RPN 3 6-202 REF QDR-5437-105-01 480 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2842 QT,A 3 6-203 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

481 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2860A QT,A 3 6-204 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

482 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2860B QT,A 3 6-205 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

483 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2862A QT,A,QI 3 6-206 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

484 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2862B QT,A,QI 3 6-207 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

485 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2863A QT,A 2 6-208 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 S2 B - 13

e e SURRY-2 APPENDIX B 111111 11111111 111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 IIIIIIIIHIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII 1111111111111111111111111111M IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIHIIIIIIIIHII I lllllllll IIIIIIIIIIMIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII II NUM KEY# EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA IIIIM 1111111 111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll 1111111111111111111111111111111 lllllllllllllllllllllllllllll

• 1111111111 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 II 486 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-28638 QT,A 2 6-209 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 487 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2867A QT,A 3 6-213 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

488 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2867B QT,A 3 6-214 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 489 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2867C QT,A 3 6-215 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 490 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2867D QT,A 3 6-216 QDR~5437-MOV-2-01 491 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2869A' QT,A 3 6-217 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 492 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2890A QT,A 2 6-218 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 493 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-28908 QT,A 2 6-219 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 1194 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2890C QT,A 2 6-220 QDR-5'137-MOV-2-01 495 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SI-200 R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-221 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 496 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SI-201A QT,CS,A,M 2 6-222 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 497 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SI-2018 R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-223 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 498 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SI-202A1 R,QT,A 6-224 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 499 01101 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE SOV-SI-202A2 R,T,QT,P,H,A 6-225 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 500 01101 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SI-202B1 R,QT,A 6-226 REF QDR-51137-SOV-02 501 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-SI-20282 R,T,QT,P,H,A 6-227 REF QDR-51137-SOV-02 502 01101 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO S0V-2881IA R,QT,A,RPN 3 6-228 REF QDR-51137-SOV-02 503 01101 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-28848 R,QT,A,RPN 3 6-229 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 504 01101 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-2884C QT,A 2 6-230 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 505 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2864A QT,A,QI 2 6-231 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

S2 B - 14

e e SURRY-2 APPENDIX B 111111 1111111 IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIHllllllllllllllllHIIIIIIWH IIIIHIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIHIIIIII HIIIIIIHIIIIHIIIIIIIIIIIIWII IIIIHHIIIIIIHIIIIIIIIIIIIIII II *llllllll HllllHHllllllllHIIIIIIIIHIIHHllllllllllll II NUM KEYi/ EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT NUMBER DEFICIENCY RES REF COMMENTS STA llllll llllllll llllllllllllllllftllllftllllllllllllllffftllllll **************** RIIHllftllllHHllllftBHHlllllftllllllllft

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • IIIIIIIIIIHllllftllHllllllllff II

• • • • • II 506 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2864B QT,A,QI 2 6-232 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

507 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2869B QT,A 3 6-232A QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE, 508 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2885A QT,A 3 6-232B QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 509 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2885B QT,A 3 6-232C QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 510 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2885C QT,A 3 6-232D QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

511 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-2885D QT,A 3 6-232E QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE, 512 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-200A1 QT,CS,A,M 2 6-233 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 513 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-200B1 R,QT,A 2 6-234 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 514 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-201A1 QT,CS,A,M 2 6-235 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 515 0401 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-201B 1 R,QT,A 2 6-236 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 516 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-202A1 QT,CS,A,M 2 6-237 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 517 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-202B1 R,QT,A 2 6-238 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 518 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SS.,-203 R,QT,A 2 6-239 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 519 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-204A QT,CS,A,M 2 6-240 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 520 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-204B R,QT,A 2 6-241 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 521 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-206A QT,CS,A,M 2 6-242 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 522 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-SS-206B R,QT,A 2 6-243 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 S2 B - 15

NUM 1111

• • " KEYi/

1!11 1111 lllllllllllllllll!IURlllllllllRI EQUIPMENT llllllllllllllftllllllll*llllllllll MANUFACTURER llllllllllllllllllllllftlllll lllllllllllllllllllllllllll COMPONENT NUMBER lllllllllllllllllllllll e

SURRY-2 APPENDIX B lllllllllllllllllllllll DEFICIENCY llllllMIRllllllllllll I lllllllll RES REF

• ***1*

• • • • • • • • • • 1****111111111**

• COMMENTS lllllllllllftlllllllllllllllllllllllll STA I

e 523 0325 PUMP MOTOR GE 2-SW-P-10A T,QT,P,H,A 6-244 524 0349 PUMP MOTOR u.s. ELECTRIC 2-SW-P-10B T,QT,P,H,CS,A 6-245 525 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-SW-204A QT,A 3 6-246 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

526 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-SW-204B QT,A 3 6-247 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

527 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-SW-204C QT,A 3 6-248 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP. WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

528 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-SW-204D QT,A 3 6-249 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 BASED ON SURRY 1 INSP, WILL BE VERIFIED DURING OUTAGE.

529 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-SW-205A QT,A 3 6-250 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 530 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-SW-205B QT,A 3 6-251 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 531 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-SW-205C QT,A 3 6-252 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 532 0531 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV_;SW-205D QT,A 3 6-253 QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 533 0548 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-SW-107B T,QT,P,H. ,A 1 6-254 REF QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 534 0548 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-SW-107C T,QT,P,H,A 1 6-255 REF QDR-5437-MOV-2-01 535 0325 PUMP MOTOR GE 2-SW-P-5A R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-256 Duplicated from Unit 2.

536 0325 PUMP MOTOR GE 2-SW-P-5B R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-257 537 0325 PUMP MOTOR GE 2-SW-P-5C R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-258 538 0325 PUMP MOTOR GE 2-SW-P-5D R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-259 539 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-BD-200A QT,CS,A,M 2 6-260 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 S2 B - 16

lll!ll NUM IUllll KEY/I llllllll e

llllllll************"*******

EQUIPMENT

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • COMPONENT MANUFACTURER SURRY-2 APPENDIX 8 NUMBER DEFICIENCY

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • n******* **************** **************** lllllllllll!Rllllllllllllllllll ll llllllll*

RES REF II 1111111111 COMMENTS STA 540 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-BD-2008 QT,A 2 6-261 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 541 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-BD-200C QT,CS,A,M 2 6-262 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 542 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-BD-200D R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-263 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 543 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-BD-200E QT,CS,A,M 2 6-264 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 544 0401 SOLENOID VALVE ASCO SOV-BD-200F R,QT,A,RPN 2 6-265 REF QDR-5437-SOV-02 32 B 17

NRC Request 11 4.3 Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable Based on the staff review of the licensee's submittal, the staff identified the equipment in Appendix C as (1) acceptable on the basis that the qualification program adequately enveloped the specific environmental plant parameters, or (2) conditionally acceptable subject to the satisfactory resolution of the staff concern identified in Section 3.7.

For the equipment identified as conditionally acceptable, the staff determined that the licensee did not clearly:.

(1) state that an equipment material evaluation was conducted to ensure that no known materials susceptible to degradation because of aging have been used; (2) establish an ongoing program to review the plant surveillance and maintenance records in order to identify equipment de-gradation which may be age related; and/or (3) propose a maintenance program and replacement schedule for equipment identified in item 1 or equipment that is qualified for less than the life of the plant.

The licensee is, therefore, required to supplement the information presented for equipment in this category before full acceptance of this equipment can be established. The staff will review the licensee's response when it is submitted and discuss the resolu-tion in a supplemental report."

Vepco Response The aging program for equipment identified in Appendix C is des-cribed in Section 3.7 above.

jw/242A/39 Surry l and 2 August 24, 1981

NRC Request 11 5 DEFERRED REQUIREMENTS IEB 79-0lB, Supplement 3 has relaxed the time constraints for the submission of the information associated with cold shutdown equip-ment and TMI lessons-learned modifications. The staff has re-quired that this information be provided by February 1, 1981. The staff will provide a supplemental safety evaluation addressing these concerns. 11 Vepco Response No comment jw/242A/40 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

NRC Request 11 6 CONCLUSIONS The staff has determined that the licensee's listing of safety-related systems and associated electrical equipment whose ability to function in a harsh environment following an accident is re-quired to mitigate a LOCA or HELB is complete and acceptable, except as noted in Section 3 of this report. The staff has also determined that the environmental service conditions to be met by the electrical equipment in the harsh accident environment are appropriate, except as noted in Section 3 of this report. Out-standing information identified in Section 3 should be provided within 90 days of receipt of this SER.

The staff has reviewed the qualification of safety-related elec-trical equipment to the extent defined by this SER and has found no outstanding items which would require immediate corrective action to ensure the safety of plant operation. However, the staff has determined that many items of safety-related electrical equipment identified by the licensee for this review do not have adequate documentation to ensure that they are capable of with-standing the harsh environmental service conditions. This review was based on a comparison of the qualification values with the specified environmental values required by the design, which were provided in the licensee's summary sheets.

Subsection 4.2 identified deficiencies that must be resolved to establish the qualification of the equipment; the staff requires that the information lacking in this category be provided within 90 days of receipt of this SER. Within this period, the licensee should either provide documentation of the missing qualification information which demonstrates that such equipment meets the DOR guidelines or NUREG-0588 or commit to a corrective action (requali-fication, replacement, relocation, and so forth) consistent with the requirements to establish qualification by June 30, 1982. If the latter option is chosen, the licensee must provide justifica-tion for operation until such corrective action is complete.

Subsection 4.3 identified acceptance and conditional acceptance based on noted deficiencies. Where additional information is required, the licensee should respond within 90 days of receipt of this SER by providing assurance that these concerns will be satis-factorily resolved by June 30, 1982.

The staff issued to the licensee Sections 3 and 4 of this report and requested, under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f), that the licensee review the deficiencies enumerated and the ramifications thereof to determine whether safe operation of the facility would be impacted in consideration of the deficiencies. The licensee has completed a preliminary review of the identified deficiencies and has determined that, after due consideration of the deficien-cies and their ramifications, continued safe operation would not be adversely affected.

jw/242A/41 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

Based on these considerations, the staff concludes that conform-ance with the above requirements and satisfactory completion of the corrective actions by June 30, 1982 will ensure compliance with the Commission Memorandum and Order of May 23, 1980. The staff further concludes that there is reasonable assurance of con-tinued safe operation of this facility pending completion of these corrective actions. This conclusion is based on the following:

(1) that there are no outstanding items which would require immediate corrective action to assure safety of plant opera-tion (2) some of the items found deficient have been or are being replaced or relocated, thus improving the facility*s capabil-ity to function following a LOCA or HELB (3) the harsh environmental conditions for which this equipment must be qualified result from low-probability events; events which might reasonably be anticipated during this very limit-ed period would lead to less demanding service conditions for this equipment. 11 Vepco Response Summary information which demonstrates that the equipment listed on the master list meets the DOR guidelines or NUREG-0588 is pro-vided in Revision 4 of the IE Bulletin 79-0lB 90 Day Review. The corrective actions for those items which are considered by Vepco to have insufficient documentation are included in the conclusion of the above report. Also provided in the conclusion is the justifi- cation for continued operation until the corrective action is complete.

jw/242A/42 Surry 1 and 2 August 24, 1981

e SAFETY EVALUATION RESPONSE SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2

References:

1. Surry FSAR, Section 6.3.1.4

2. North Anna FSAR, Appendix C, Section C.5.4.6.3

3. Westinghouse letter number NS-SS-79287 dated November 28, 1979

4. North Anna FSAR, Section 6.2.4.2

6.3.1- 16 4-15-70 e The recirculation spray water'flows through recirculation-spray coolers where it is cooled by service water flowing under gravity at 6,000 gpm, as discussed in Section 9.9. Since the recirculation spray water pressure in the coolers is greater than the service water, only outleakage can occur, and dilution of the borated water by service water in the containment is not possible. This ensures that the necessary cold shutdown margin by boron is maintained.

The service water from each cooler is monitored by means of radiation monitors to enable the defective subsystem to be shut down if outleakage occurs.

Section 7.4.2 describes the monitoring devices and techniques used.

Two nozzle sizes are used in the Containment Spray Subsystem and three nozzle sizes are used in the Recirculation Spray Subsystem. The arrangement and sizes of the spray nozzles produce an average particle size of approximately 1250 microns. The nozzle arrangement was designed so that some of the nozzles cover a vertical annulus measuring 15 feet horizontally on either side of the spray headers and the remainder of the nozzles cover the containment volume outside of the annulus.

The entire Spray System is constructed of corrosion-resistant materials, primarily stainless steel. However, other materials are used where suitable, such as brass for the spray nozzles. The system design pressure is 150 psig.

6.3.1.4 Evaluation The Spray System consists of two completely separate, 100 percent capacity Containment Spray Subsystems and four completely separate 50 percent capacity Recirculation Spray Subsystems. The elimination of interconnecting valving e

. ,.\,.

6. 3. 1-1 7 12-1-69 e in the subsystems provides redundancy and improves system reliability. The use of a separate spray header connected to the discharge of each pump results in a fixed flow rate and allows for optimized selection of spray nozzle sizes.

This arrangement gives the optimum combination of small spray particles for maximum heat transfer and larger particles for better coverage toward the center and sides of the containment. In addition, this arrangement also ensures that a failure of a component in any one subsystem does not affect the opera-tional capability of the other subsystems.

The methods of preventing the plugging of spray nozzles in the two systems vary.

For each Containment Spray Subsystem, the materials of construction, as well as the pump suction filter, prevent nozzle plugging. A method of nozzle test-ing is provided in the refueling water storage tank to ensure that no particu-lates which could plug the containment spray nozzles collect in the tank.

Despite this precaution and regardless of strainer perforation size, some type of particles could conceivably pass lengthwise through the strainer and cause clogging of a spray nozzle. However, since the strainer perforations are smaller than the smallest spray nozzle size, such an occurrence is considered to be highly improbable.

The screen assembly in the containment sump is arranged so that no single failure results in the clogging of all suction points to the Recirculation Spray Subsystems, as discussed in Section 6.3.1.3. A first stage screen failure, coupled with the plugging or failure of the second stage, i.e., suction point cylindrical screens, must occur for any one of the suction points to be lost.

Sufficient area is provided to ensure that system operation during accident e

6.3.1-18 12-1-~9 e conditionR is not impaired and entrance flow velocities are low enough to prevent entrainment of most small particles. System overdesign allows for some plugging or loss of function, in addition to the foregoing.

A 25 percent margin in the number of spray nozzles on the recirculation spray headers has been provided. However, plugging of 25 percent of the spray nozzles would result in only a 10 to 15 percent reduction in flow. Since the redundant capacity of the Recirculation Spray Subsystems increases from 100 percent after a loss-of-coolant incident to 400 to 1,000 percent one day after an incident, plugging which could only occur on a long-term basis would have no significant effect on the capability of the subsystems.

Initially the heat exchangers of the Recirculation Spray Subsystems are clean e and dry, with maximum heat transfer capability. For long-term operation, on the order of weeks or months, there may he some fouling of the tubes on the service water side, with resultant loss in heat transfer capability. This loss of heat transfer capability is more than offset by the decrease in heat load due to decreasing decay heat production. One day after a LOCA, the decrease in the residual heat production rate is such that each subsystem has sufficient heat removal capacity to hold the containment at subatmospheric 0

pressure. With a maximum service water temperature of 95 F, the Recircula-tion Spray Subsystem design is conservative. There is a minimum 100 percent reserve capacity in recirculation spray at the onset of an accident. Within one day after the LOCA, the reserve capacity exceeds 400 percent.

The recirculation spray heat exchangers are designed to Section III of the e ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, and have welded construction at all points

6.3.1-19 12-1-69 e where there could be a potential for leakage of radioactive recirculation spray water into the service water. The maximum pressure differential which can occur between the service water and the recirculation spray water is 100 psi; under those conditions, leakage flow from the Recirculation Spray Subsystem is into the Service Water System. The service water is monitored for leakage by radia-tion monitors to detect leakage (See Section 11.3.3) from the defective sub-system. If leakage above that allowable is detected, the defective subsystem is shut downby manual operation of remote motor operated valves which isolate the recirculation spray cooler. As a result of the above pressure difference, inleakage of nonborated water into the containment, causing dilution of the borated water in the containment, is not possible.

Recirculation through the outside recirculation spray pumps presents a possi-e bility of leakage through valve packings and from leaks in the suction and discharge piping of the pump. Valve designs are selected to reduce this potential leakage to a negligible amount. Leaks in the suction and discharge piping are controlled as follows:

1. Large leaks in the discharge piping of the recirculation spray pumps are detected by variations in the recirculation spray pump discharge pressure readings in the Main Control Room. A decreased pressure reading indicates a pipe break which causes an alarm to sound, and the operator in the Main Control Room then remote-manually isolates the pump indicated by the alarm.

2. Large leaks in the suction piping in the valve pit are detected by liquid level measuring devices. The valve pit is provided with a

6.3.1-20 12-1-69 baffle, dividing the pit into two sections. Thus, leakage from one set e of recirculation spray lines is detected by the increased liquid level on the affected side of the baffle. Upon detection, the operator in the Main Control Room remote-manually isolates the leaking subsystem leaving one recirculation spray loop operable. In the case of small leaks, specific detection of a leak is not possible; however, the ventilation air from the structure (See Figure 6.3.1-4) enclosin~ the piping outside the containment is discharged to the atmosphere through the ventilation vent, and is automatically diverted through charcoal filters on a high high containment pressure signal.

The containment spray pumps start and pick up full load in less than 15 sec after receiving the safeguards initiation signal. This fast start-up is accomplished by using solid wheel, single-stage steam turbines which have been used successfully for many years in_industry. These turbines are not subject to damage by slugs of water in the steam or by temperature transients; however, the steam supply lines to these turbines are continually charged with steam in order to keep them warm, thereby preventing slugs of water from forming on turbine start-up. Steam traps are provided in the lines to ensure that any condensate formed as a result of warming steam flow is removed. If for any reason the steam turbines fail to operate, the pumps are driven by electric motors. The steam supply piping, as shown on Figure 10.3.2-1, is arranged so that no single pipe failure could result in the loss of steam to both turbines.

At 100 percent of station load, each steam generator contains about 81,000 lb of water and 6,700 lb of steam, saturated at about 510 F. Each steam generator has adequate steam capacity to drive both containment spray pumps for at least

6.3.1-21 12-1-69 e 40 min. For the case of minimum safeguards, sufficient steam capacity is available to drive one containment spray pump, 100 percent capacity, for at least 80 min.

The recirculation spray pumps are capable of meeting NPSH requirements under LOCA conditions. Analyses have shown that the water on the containment floor is subcooled with respect to containment temperature. The water in the sumps provides a net static head, after allowance is made for the suction piping losses, of about 3.5 ft to 7.5 ft. A minimum of 21 ft of head is available when the minimum containment air partial pressure (9.0 psia) is added to the static head. The deep well pumps installed, both inside and outside, require between 12 and 15 ft of NPSH. Since there is about 24.5 to 28.5 ft of NPSH available in the design, adequate NPSH is available to ensure satisfactory operation of the recirculation spray pumps.

A periodic inspection will be made of all potential points of leakage.

Table 6.3.1-2 sunnnarizes the potential leakage from the recirculation spray sub-system. Leakage nf pumped fluid from the recirculation srray pumps cannot occur, due to the manner in which the pump shaft is sealed. Two mechanical seals are arranged in tandem, with a seal fluid between them. The seal fluid is supplied from a reservoir arranged in such a mann~r that the pressure of the seal fluid is sli~htly above (about 1 psi) the pumped fluid pressure at the inboard side of the inboard seal at all times. With this arrangement, assuming the inboard seal fails, seal fluid leaks through the failed seal while the other seal remains available to prevent escape of pumped fluid to the atmosphere. A level alarm on the reservoir provides indication of a seal failure.

A failure made analysis for the components of the Spray Systems is included in Table 6.3.1-1.

6.3.1-2i 12-1-69 e TAB LE 6 . 3. 1-1 CONSEQUENCE OF COMPONENT MALFUNCTIONS Comments and Components Malfunction Consequences

1. Containment Pump casing ruptures The casing is designed for 450°F Spray Pumps temperature; standard test pres-sure is 250 psig and maximum test pressure is 375 psig.

These conditions exceed those which could occur during any operating conditions.

The casings are made from cast iron (ASTM A351-CF8); this metal has corrosion-erosion resistance and produces sound castings. The pumps conform to Class I design. Pumps are missile protected and may be inspected at any time.

Rupture by missiles is not con-sidered credible. Rupture of the pump casing is therefore not considered credible.

2. Containment Pump fails to The containment spray system Spray Pmnps start has 2 parallel 100 percent capacity pumps. Sufficient capacity is provided by one pump in case of failure of the other pump.

3. Containment Pump driven motor Turbine portion of dual drive Spray Pumps fails to start or operates pump electric power is not available

4. Containment Pump turbine Motor portion of dual drive Spray Pump driver fails to operates pump start

5. Containment Valve fails to Redundant parallel valves are Spray Pump open provided. Redundant valve Discharge carries the flow.

Valve e

6.3.1-23 12-1-69 e TABLE 6.J.1-1 (Cont'd)

Connents and Components Malfunction Consequences

6. Containment Rupture of valve body Valve body is designed for 150 lb.

Spray Pump The castings are made from Discharge stainless steel; this material Valve has corrosion-erosion resistance and produces sound castings, The valves are designed to be missile protected.

Rupture of valve body is not considered credible.

7. Containment Weight loaded valve Valve is checked periodically Spray Pumps in pump discharge during normal operation.

line sticks closed In addition, parallel 100 percent capacity containment spray sub-system is operable.

8. Containment Pipe rupture Piping is designed for 100° F Spray Piping temperature and ~75 psig pres-sure. These conditions exceed those which could occur during operation. The piping is fab-ricated of Type 304 stainless steel; this metal has corrosion-erosion resistance. Piping is designed for Class I and is missile protected. Pipe rupture is not considered credible.

9. Recirculation Pump fails to start Four 50 percent capacity recir-Spray Pump culation spray pumps are provided altogether.

10. Recirculation Tube or shell rupture Four 50 percent capacity recir-Spray Cooler culation spray coolers are pro-vided altogether. The recircu-lation spray coolers are designed to the ASME Code Section III C and Class I. Rupture is con-sidered unlikely, However, in the event of a rupture, motor operated valves are provided to isolate the cooler and prevent further leakage. Another 50 percent capacity recirculation subsystem is used .

6.3.1-24 4-15-70 e TABLE 6.3.1-1 (Cont'd)

Comments and Components Malfunction Consequences

11. Outside Recircu- Rupture of pump casing The casing is fabricated lation Spray of ASTM-A452 Type 304 Pump stainless steel; this metal is very corrosion resistant. The casings are missile protected and set in concrete.

Rupture of the pump casing is not considered credible.

12. Recirculation Rupture of piping Piping is fabricated of Spray Piping Type 304 stainless steel and designed to Class I.

Piping is also missile protected. Rupture of piping is not considered credible. However, in case of pipe rupture for pipe lines to and from outside recirculation spray pumps, isolation

.valves are provided.

13. Motor Operated Loss of power to one Redundant valves are pro-Valves valve due to failure vided, electric power to of electric bus valves is supplied from separate buses

14. Automatic Failure of one train Redundant train will actuate electric and redundant equipment control instru-mentation trains to actuate con-sequence limiting safe-guards equip-ment

6.3.1-25 4-15-70 TABLE 6.3.1-1 (Cont'd)

Comments and Components Malfunction Consequences

15. Spray Nozzles Spray nozzles plugged Filters are provided in the suction of the con-tainment spray pumps.

Three layers of screening are provided in the suc-tion of recirculation spray pumps. The filters and the screen mesh are small enough to prevent any material which could plug the spray nozzles from passing through.

Sufficient margin is provided to accommodate plugging of 25 percent of the nozzles.

e

TABLE 2 e RECIRCULATION SUBSYSTEM LEAKAGE*

Leakage to No. Uncollected Vent and of Type of Leakage Control and Unit Leakage, Drain System, Item Units Leakage Rate used in the Analysis cc per hr cc per hr Recirculation 2 No leakage of spray water due to tandem 0 0 spray p~s seal arrangement Flanges: Assuffl@d at 10 drops per min per flange

a. Pump 4 120 0

b. Valves - 4 115 0 bonnet to body (larger than 2 in.)

Valves - St** 4 Backseated, double packing with leakoff - 0 4 leakoffs 1 cc per hr per in. stem diameter Miscellaneous 2 Flanged body, packed stem - 1 drop per min 6 0 small valves Total 241 4

• Based on two subsystems in operation under DBA conditions.

.... c,.

N, I W c,. I

\0 N O'

'11 'J1' r.5-21 3-14~75

a. The addition of temperature sensors in various parts of the AB as previously described, and

h. The use of existinr, instrumentation and valvinr. to detect and isolate the break.

Flooding within the auxiliary buildinr. has been investigated with the approach to demonstrate that essential equipment is not endanP-ered bv water from any postulated pipe break.

A system of floor drains within the Auxiliary Buildinp will direct the water flow from a break to ~he Auxiliary Buildinr, sump, which is located within the floor of the 244 ft-6 in. elevation. *Highwater level within the sump will initiate an alarm in the control room. For breaks that exceed the 900 gal capacity of the sump, the water will run out onto the 244 ft-6 in. level. The large floor area of the Auxiliary Building at this elevation requires approximately 8,800 gal of water to attain a water level of 1 in. above the floor. The minimum height above floor level of 34 equipment which is essential to safety was found to be 15 in. Therefore, the water required to reach this height would be approximately 132,000 gal.

The sump alarm, combined with visual inspection, will excute detection and isolation of the water source in adequate time to assure safety, considering the large amount of water required to cause dama~e.

\ .. . *.' ..,, ' .... _.

c.s.4.7 Structural Analy!is The overall structural stability of the Auxiliary Buildinp, is not impaired by any potential pipe breaks.

AMEND 24

.: ~, _*,) NS-SS- 79287

(

_./

Nuclear Technology Division e Fron1

\'/:N Sa.fety Standards 249-4856 021~  : November 28, 1979 s~tJ!::r;1 Qualification of Electrical Equipment for Near Term OL Plants

w. c. Gangloff, 5 To M. A. Siano, 5

R. s. Ho\'1ard, 5 J. L. Vota, 5 M. H. Judkis, 5 cc: D. H. Rawl ins, 4 R. J. Sero, 4 G, Butter\'mrth, 4 As a result cif a meeting with t~e five {Salem 2, North Anna 2, McGuire l, Sequoyah 1, Diablo Canyon) near. term OL plants on October 31, 1979 commitments were made to provide information on Westinghouse supplied electrical equipment inside containment. The information required along v1ith a sample transmittal letter is attached. Please transmit Attachment A and the appropriate valve, e table (Attachment B) to your customer. As indicated herein, an additional trans-mittal on valves operators will be required prior to December 11, 1979.

Since the enclosed information is vital to the near term OL plants, it is essential that you get an advanced copy of this infonnation to your customer after project manager approval.

• If you have any questions, please contact the undersigned.

~~*-~~/

C. E. Faust, III Safety Standards

-JJM/keg Attachment(s)

D e

Discard Date:

_.,.. /

Westinghouse Water Reactor PWR Syf.lems D:vision e Electric Corporation Divisicns Box 355 Pittsburgh Pm1s)'iv"a.1iJ ) 5230 Qualification of Westinghouse Supplied Electric Equipment Inside Containment

Dear Sir:

In response to your request at the October 31, 1979 meeting with Westinghouse, information is provided to further support your operating license review and the qualification of Westinghouse supplied electrical equipment inside contain-ment. The enclosed infonnation- h~s been segregated into t\-10 attachments as foll OWS:

Attachment A - The informatipn in this Attachment identifies Westinghouse supplied electrical equipment (excluding valve operators) inside containment.

This information is presented in the tabular format identified in draft

• NUREG-0588. This information is generic and, as such, must be reviewed by e your staff to identify which equipment is applicable to your plant. Additionally, portions of the information required by draft NUREG-0588 is plant specific and must be completed by your staff.

Attachment B - This Attachment identifies valves and their electircal operators lo~ated inside containment required to mitigate the consequences of a postulated accident. The valves listed represent those valves inside containment in Westinghouse supplied systems. However, all the va lv-es and/or the va 1ve operators may not have been supplied by Westinghouse. Currently, the qualification docu-mentation for the valve operators identified in this Attachment is being reviewed.

This effort will be completed by December 11, 1979 and a table in the format

~f draft NUREG-0588 will be provided.

In regard to valve operators, .there have been a number of NRC I&E Bulletins and Circulars over the past several years which may have necessitated field modifi-cations to valve operators. Based on these NRC instructions and other circum-stances it is recommended that *you verify the information in Attachment B based upon as-installed conditions.

e.

The pa~t-accident radiation dose used in the calculation of the narrow range RTO qy:l Hied life sent to you in a previous letter (

e ) dated (

was tuo large. The calculations of attachment Care a corrected.version of thos~ transmitted previously. [The revised cal cul a ti on does not affect

)

the qualified life.] (The sentence in br.ackets should be deleted for McGuire and Sequoyah.)

If you have any questions on the enclosed information, please contact Mr.

G. B~tterworth~ (412-373-4761) or Mr. C. Faust,III, (412-373-4176).

PROJECT MANAGER

/keg e.

/JA.of ~, Errr~ r C l.."7.SS e -LU WESTINGfKJUSE SUPP~AFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPME IDE CONTAINMENT

z. I

. I ei Abnonnal or Accident Environment Qualified Environment Model lnte- lnte-Number Peak grated Peak grated Accuracy Accuracy Qualfff-or Iden- Tempera- Dose Tempera- Dose Operabil- Require- Demon- cation EJI.J ip- tifica- ture Radia- ture Chemistry Radi a- ity Re- Operabfl- ments strated Reference

-~'":~ Manuf ac- tion Pressure Chemistry tion Pressure Condition tion quire- fty Dem- (% of (% of and fu11ct ion* Lac at ion turer Number Humidity Condition Type Humidity Type ments onstrated Span) Span) Method Pres sur- Ba.rton 753 (Lot LOCA 1.14 wt. LOCA 4 months 4 months +10% <5% for NS-TMA-iz~r- 1 280°F %Boric 5xl07 Post-DBE i>ost-DBE for 5 min. 1950 P~es S'Jre 78 psia Acid and GAMMA <5 min. Max. Anderson Tr~.,s- 100% RH 0.17 wt. SLB '5" min. Error to Stolz ri~~er Fig. 3-1  % NAOH f;J3x to 4 mo. 5 min. tlS-TMA-SLB dissolved 10 _:25% to 4 mo. 2120 380°F in water GAMMA 17% Anaerson 75 psig to Stolz 100% RH (Test)

Fig. 3-19 thru 3-22 Barton 763 (Lot 380°F 1.14 wt. Sxl07 4 months 4 months +10% for (1) (1)

2) 75 psig  % Boric GAMMA Post-DBE Post-DBE <5 min.

100% RH Acid and '5" min.

0.17 wt. to 4 mo.

% NAOH ,:25%

dissolved in water Foxboro Ell GM >300 1.5% 2.fi X 30 min. 40 hr. +10% for Max. WCAP-8541 (MCI\) °F sec noric 10 Post-DOE Post-DBE ;5 min. Error (lest)

(4-20 ma) App. B Acid by GAMMA 0 to 5

>60 weight+ min. -7'/.

psig N40H to >5 min.

100% RH adjust -9%

the pH to 9.25-10 Foxboro Ell GM >318 None 2.p 30 min.

25 hr. +10% for Max. WCAP-8541 (MCA)

(10-50

°F see 10 Post-DBE Post-DBE ;s min. Ei:-ror (Test)

App. A GAMMA -14%

ma) >90 psig 100% RH

,\

-* f.1~del tlumber Peak WESTINGHOU.PLIED SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL Abnonnal or Accident Environment E

Inte-grated ENT INSIDE CONTAINMENT Qualified Environment Peak Inte-grated Accuracy Accuracy e

Qualifi-or Iden- Tempera- Dose Tempera- Dose Operabil- Require- Demon- cation

~*J'IJ ~p- . tifi ca- ture Radia- ture Chemistry Radia- lty Re- Operabil- ments strated Reference

--= . t Manufac- tioh Pressure Chemistry tion Pressure Condition tion quire- ity Dem- (% of (% of and f *:.,c~ ion loc1t. i an turer Number Humidity Condition Type Humidity Type ments onstrated Span) Span) Method

'~=, s*r- Barton 764 >320 1.14 wt. 1.9 X 4 months 4 months +10% 0 to 5 NS-CE-

~!~~ ( Proto- Of 75  % Boric 10 Post-DBE Post-DBE _ao for min. 1384

-:*, c. l type) psig Acid and GAMMA <5 min. <3% Eicheldlnger

... '"'S .. 100% RH 0.17 wt. 5 min

• to Stolz

-: ~ ':.::"" see Fig-  % NAOH to 4 mo. (Test) ure dissolve -19%

in water Barton 764 (lot LOCA 1.14 wt. LOCA 4 months 4 months +10% o to 5 NS-TMA-

1) 280°F  % Boric 5x107 Post-DBE Post-DBE ..ao for min. 1950 78 rsia Acid and GAMMA <5 min. <5% Anrf~rson 100% RH 0.17 wt. SLB Max. to Stolz Fig. 3-1  % NAOH r.T3 X Error NS-TMA-SLB dissolve 105 5 min. 2120 38QOf in water GAMMA to 4 mo. Anderson 75 psig 17% to Stolz 100% RH (Test)

Fig. 3-19 thru 3-22 BartM 764 (lot 3B00F 1.14 wt. 5xl07 4 mo11ths 4 months +10% (1) (1)

2) 75 psig  % Boric GAMMA Post-DBE Post-DBE -ao for 100% RH Acid and <5 min.

0.17 wt.  ;- min,

% NAOH to 4 mo.

dissolve +25%

in water

- Model Number Peak WESTINGHOUSE SU~D SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL Abnonnal or Accident Environment EQU.IPM Inte-grated Peak INSIDE CONTAINMENT Qualified Environment Inte-grated Accuracy Accuracy e

Qualifi-

• \

or I den- Tempera- Dose Tempera- Dose Operabil- Require- Demon- cation Ea,,..: i p- tifi ca- ture Radia- ture Chemistry Radia- ity Re- Operabil- ments strated Reference

-e~t Mariuf ac- tion Pressure Chemistry tion Pressure Condition tion quire- ity Dem- (% of (% of and f*J.,ct ion Location turer Number Hurni dity Condit ion Type Humidity Type mer.ts onstrated Span) Span) Method qcs R:,,.Je Wi~'c! Barton 763 (Proto-

>320 Of 75 1.14 wt.

% Boric 1.9 10 X 4 months Post-DBE 4 months Post-DBE

_10% <+10% NS-CE-1384 n,..1=Ssure type) psig Acid and GAMMA Eiche 1di nger 100% RH 0.17 wt. to Stolz see Fig-  % NAOH (Test) ure dissolved in water Barton 763 (Lot LOCA 1.14 wt. LOCA 4 months 4 months :_10% <+10% NS-TMA-

1) 280°F  % Boric 5xl07 Post-DBE Post-DBE 1950 78 psi a Acid and GAMMA Anderson 100% RH. 0.17 wt. SLB to Stolz Fig. 3-1  % NAOH CT3 x NS-TMA-SLB dissolved 105 Anderson J850F in water GAMMA to Stolz 75 psig (Test) 100% RH Fig. 3-19 thru 3-22 Barton 763 (Lot 380°F 1.14 wt. 5xl07 4 months 4 months :_10% (1) (1)

2) 75 psig  % Boric GAMMA Post-DBE Post-DBE 100% RH Acid and 0.17 wt.

% NAOH dissolved in water Veritrak 59 PM l30°F None None N/A N/A, 0.5% <0. 5% Instruct ion Atmos- Manual pheric (Test)

N/A (2)

- Model WESTINGHOUSE SU~ SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL Abnormal or Accident Env iro1111ent EQUIPM Inte-NSIDE CONTAINMENT Qualified Environment Inte-e Number Peak grated Peak grated Accuracy Accuracy Qual1f1-or Iden- Tempera- Dose Tempera- Dose Operabil- Require- Demon- cation Ecuio~ tifica- ture Radia- ture Chemistry Radia- 1ty Re:. Operabil- ments strated Reference

'"'!':"t Manufac- tion Pressure Chemistry tion Pressure Condition tion qujre- 1ty Dem- (% of (% of and f_:,~tio~ Location turer Number Humidity Condition Type Humidity Type ments ons trated Span) Sp~n) Method s:~?..~ *Barton 764 (Lot LOCA 1.14 wt. LOCA 4 months 4 months ~10% O to 5 NS-TMA-G-.:"-e"'~~i:ir 1) 280°F  % Boric 5xl0 7 Post-DBE Post-DBE min. 1950 L~ve1 78 psia Acid and GAr-'MA ~5 min. <~1, And~rson Tr-~~s- 100% RH 0.17 wt. SLB Max. to Stolz

!'r.;:ter Fig. 3-1  % NAOH f;J3 X Error (Test)

Ui3rrow SLB dissolved 10 5 min.

R~.,g~) 380°F in water GAMMA to 4 mo.

75 psig 17%

100% RH Fig. 3-19 thru 3-22 Barton 764 (Lot 380°F 1.14 wt. 5x107 4 rronths 4 months ~10% (li (1)

2) 75 psig  % Boric GAMMA Post-DBE Post-DBE 100% RH Acid and ~5 min.

0.17 wt.

% NAOH dissolved in water

e WESTINGHOUSE SUP~ SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPM NS!DE CONTAI_NMENT . e f Abnonnal or Accident Environment Qua 1ified Environment Model Inte- Inte-Number Peak grated Peak grated Accuracy Accuracy Qua l ifi-or I den- Tempera- Dose Tempera- Dose Operabi 1- Require- Demon- cation

°'.1'J J* tifica- ture Radia- ture Chemistry Radia- ity Re- Operab 11- men ts strated Reference

...'2 ... : ~anufac- tion Pressure Chemistry tion Pressure Condition tion quire- ity Dem- (% of (% of and

&:*ri::tio., Loe a t1 on turer Nwnber Humidity Condition Type Humidity Type ments onstrated Span) Span) 1"ethod

~~~ ~- Fischer 1082496 >350 1.14 wt. 4x104 Initiate Failed at +10% Max. WCAP-9157

=1,:,v and ~F see  % Boric GAf*f'1A SI on 6 min. until Error Rev. -0

. . ~-s- Porter Fig. 5-2 Acid-and steaml ine contain- -2.1% (Test)

-; ~ ~~r to 6-4 0.17 wt. break ment +1.9%

66 psig % NAOH pressure 100% RH di sso 1ved initiates in H20 SI Barton 764 (Lot 380°F 1.14 wt. 5xl07 4 months 4 months -10% (1) (1)

2) 75 psig  % Boric GAMMA Post-DBE Post-DBE +m for 100% RH Acid and ~5 min.

0.17 wt.

% NAOH dissolved in water Veri trak 590P l3QOF None None N/A N/A 0.5% <0.5% Instruct ion Atmos- M~nual pheric pest)

N/A 12)

~

e WESTINGHOUSE S~D SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIP INSIDE CONTAINMENT e Abnonnal or Accident Environment Qua 1if1ed Env 1ronrnent Model Inte- lnte-Nu:,ber Peak grated Peak grated Accuracy Accuracy Qualifi-or Iden- Tempera- Dose Tem;,era- Dose Operabil- Require- Demon- cation E:! 1j io- tifi ca- ture Radia- ture Chemistry Radia- ity Re- Operabil- ments strated Reference

-~-t Manuf ac- tion Pressure Chemistry tion Pressure Condition tion quire- ity Dem- (% of (% of and f:_.*ri~~i'Jl1 Loe at ion turer Number Hurni dity Condition Type Humidity Type merts onstrated Span) Span) Method Q:S Rose- 176KF >320 1.146 wt. lxl08 30 sec. 40 yr. .!_.2% .!_.2% WCAP-9157

~::iera- rrount ~F see  % Boric GAMMA rost-SLB Life (Test) bre Fig. 5-3 Acid and over 30

,:~rrcw and 6.3 0.17 wt. sec.

~ ~r:Je 66 psig  % NAOH Post-SLB

~T9S 100,: RH dissolved in H20 Sostman l1834B-1 >320 1.146 wt. lxl08 30 sec. 40 yr. .!_.2% .!_.2% WCAP-9157

~F see  % Boric GAMMA Pos t-SLB Life (Test)

Fig. 5-3 Acid and over 30 and 6.3. 0.17 wt. sec.

66 psig  % NAOH Post-SLB 100% RH dis~olved in H20 e:s Rose- 176KS >320 1.146 wt. lxl08 2 weeks 12 yr. .!_.2% .!_.2% WCAP-9157 T~... ~e,..a- mount ~F see  % Boric GAMMA Post-SLB Life (by comparl-t 1.Jr'? Fig. 5-3 Acid and 2 weeks son)

~~ j~ and 6-3 0.17 wt. Post-SLB

, ~.,'J'e 66 psig  % NAOH

~";[':; 100% RH dissolved in H20 Sostman l1901B >320 1.146 wt. 1x108 . 2 weeks 12 yr. .!_.2% .!_.2% WCAP-9157

~F see  % Boric GAMMA Post-SLB Life (by compari-Fiq. 5-3 Acid and 2 weeks son) and 6-3 0.17 wt. Post-SLB 66 psig  % NAOfl 100% RH dissolved in H20 E'(-.:~re }i!GTD WL-23686 3QQOf N/A (5) 8 hr. at 16 hr. at N/A Detector WTest

'lt?*J tr'Jr: Atmos- 175DF 300°F Fune- T/69

~~~ectors pheric t ion a1

( Pm,*er N/ A_

o.~rge)

e WESTINGHOUSE S~D SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIP INSIDE CONTAINMENT e Abnormal or Accident Environment Qua 1 ified Environment Model Inte- Inte-Number Peak grated Peak grated Accuracy Accuracy Quallfi-or Iden- Tempera- Dose Tempera- Dose Operab il- Require- Demon- cation Ea*J io- tifica- ture Radia- ture Chemistry Radia- ity Re- Operabil- 11ents strated Reference

..,-: .,t Manufac- tion Pressure Chemistry tion Pressure Condition tion quire- ity Dem- (% of (% of and f*.!r:c:~cn Location turer Number Humidity Condition Type Humidity Type ments* onstrated Span) Span) Method Ele:tric w A 380°F 2500 ppm 2xl08 <l yr. 1 yr. N/A N/A WCAP-7820

~._. ~:"::Jc::n Sturte- 77 psia Boron as GAMMA Post-DBE Post-DBE and Supp.

~~:*:ir.: vant 100% RH Boric Acid 1-4

~ '-~.j see Supp. with NAOH WCAP-7709-L 2 Sect. to give a and s,;pp.

3.4.3 pH of 10 1-4 (Test)

1~ctric w B 302°F 2500 ppm 2xl08 <1 yr. 1 yr. N/A. N/A WCAP-7820 u_.,~ ... ('~e,n Sturte- (4) Boron as GAM~ Post-DBE Post-DBE and Supp.

~~ ':')I"'!- v~nt 69 ps ia Boric 2xl0 1-7

~  ; . . . ~r 100% RH Acid with BETA WCAP-7709-L N110H to and Supp.

give a pH 1-7 (Test) of 10

MlTES:

(1) The tests have been completed and the report is being developed for e submittal to the NRC.

(2) The test is a calibration preformed on each instrument by the manufacturer per the instruction manual.

(3) The recombiners are qualified to 420°F per the !'RC acceptance letter dated 6/22/78.

(4) Oe i gned to 5 X 10 11 n/cm 2s rnerma 1~ 5 X 10 11 n/cm2s fast and 5 5

10 R/Hr garrrna up to 2 x 10 n/cm and/or 0.7 x 10 R.

X e

e

e iJescription Syste.J!! Valve No.

NJRTH A~~TEGORY I VALVES Location Function ~

Valve Operator Manufacturer Model No.

or ID No.

Pressurizer SY RCS 551 ABC IRC AM/RCPB Relief N/A Letdown LCV eves +LCV-460A IRC RCPB/AM AOV Letdown LCV eves +LCV-4608 IRC RCPB/AM AOV Letdown eves +200 ABC IRC CIS AOV Ex Letdown eves 201 IRC RCPB AOV LS NAMCO D-2400X s ASCO LB-831654

!~1l RCP Seal Ret eves +380 IRC CIS MOV I

ACC. TO GAS SYST. SIS HCV-936 IRC CIS AOV LS NAMCO D-2400X '.

s ASCO LB-832654 l

I ACC. TO TEST LINE SIS 842 IRC CIS AOV LS NAMCO D-2400X s ASCO LB-832654

+ Information on operator not available at Westinghouse. Please check as-installed records.

IRC - inside reactor containment AM - accident mitigation

• RCPB - reactor coolant pressure boundary CIS - containment isolation AOV air operated valve LS* - limit switch S - solenoid

ATTACHMENT C e

Radiation Dose Calculations for RTD's The object of the following calculations is to estimate the plant specific in-service life that, when taken in conjunction with assuming the RTD's operate for 100 days in a post-LOCA environment, yields a total dose equal to 1 x 108 Rads as employed by Westinghouse for the testing reported in WCAP-9157.

External Environment WCAP-8587, Figure 6-4, indicates a containment atmosphere dose of 1 x 108 Rads for 100 days post-LOCA. This value .is based on a TIO calculation for a 4100 MW reactor and a containment volume of 1.1 x 6 3 " * .

10 ft. The Westinghouse calculated dose can be approximately scaled for your*plant appliC'ation by the formulae:

e 8 1.1 X 106 D = 1.0 X 10 V

Rads Inserting a value of 2900 MW (P) and 2.4 x 106 (V) as applicable to your plant yields a post-LOCA 100 day integrated dose of 3.2 x 107

• Rads for the RTD external connection. Since the narrow range RTD is only required for a short time after the event this calculation only applies to the .wide range measurement. The external dose for the narrow range is on the order of 106 Rads and is insignificant compared to the test conditiono The remaining dose available to cover in-service effects is the difference between the totai dose employed in the Westinghouse test reported in WCAP-9157 (i.e., 1 x 108 Rads) and the above calculated post-LOCA dose (i.e., 3.2 x 107 Rads), which is 6.8 x 107 Rads. The

...(

e. dose rate during normal operation appropriate to the external connection

is taken as 165 R/hr (Table 6-2, WCAP-8587). Thus*, assuming an 80 per-e cent load factor, the time required to attain this remaining dose is:

7 Wide Range 6.8 X 10 = 59 years 165x24x365x0.8 Narrow Range 1.0 X 108 = 86 years 165x24x365x0.8 The Westinghouse calculated dose post-LOCA employed for this calculation is conservative with r~spect to those recommended by the Staff in Appen-dix Din NUREG-0588.

Internal Environment WCAP-8587, Figure 6-8, indicates a RCS internal pipe dose of 1.8 x 10 7 Rads for 100 days post-LOCA. Without considering any reduction in this value by scaling for your plant, the remaining dose available to cover in-service radiation effects on the RTD is 8.2 x .10 7 Rads. The dose rate during normal operation for wide range RTD's installed directly in the reactor coolant system is conservatively taken as 820 R/hr as defined for the RCL pipe center.in Table 6-2, WC~P-8587: For the bypass line, narrow range RTD's, the dose rate is conservatively taken as 165 R/hr as defined for the RCL outside surface. Thus, assuming an 80 per-cent load factor the time rE!quired for the internal part of the RTD to attain the remaining dose is:

Narrow Range 8.2 .x 107 = 70.9 years 165x24x365x0.8 Wide Range 8.2 X 107 = 14.3 years 820x24x365x0.8 e

Surmnary

-e Using Westinghouse dose estimates from WCAP-8587 scaled for your plant, the shortest demonstrated life for the wide range RTD is 14.3 years and greater than 40 years for the narrow range RTD.

e e

NlF 6.2-111 11-3-78 requirements for quality Class Bas required by Regulatory Position C.l and e !able 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.26.

The component cooling lines to the residual heat removal heat exchangers are designed and built to ANSI-B31.7-1969 Class III which corresponds to the 65 requirements of quality Class C of Regulatory Guide 1.26.

All of the sealed systems used as isolation barriers in lieu of isolaticn valves meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.:9 for Class I seismic equipment.

6.2.4.2 System Design Table 6.2-34 provides information concerning every penetration that is in 165 service, as to the type of valves that are provided; their positions under various conditions; the fluids they contain, and the systems they connect. In addition, each containment is provided with spare piping penetrations. These serve no function but are available should design modifications require 65 additional penetrations. The spare penetrations are welded closed to prevent leak.age.

All Stone & Webster procured remotely operated valves associated with piping penetrations through the containment are listed in Table 6.2-62. The auto-trip valves listed are spring-opposed diaphrag:n or piston-operated which fail closed upon loss of air or electrical power. 65 Westinghouse procured remotely operated valves associated with piping penetrations are listed in Table 6.2-63. The valves listed as using air for mo~ive force fail closed upon loss of air.

e

NlF 6.2-112 11-3-78 e All motor-operated valves listed in the tables fail in an "as is" condition upon loss of electrical power. Motor-operated valves used for containment isolation are powered from the onsite emergency power system,*and in addition, are equipped with a hand wheel which allows manual operation of the valves in the case of a power failure.

!he status of the valves during normal, shutdown, and accident conditions is given in Table 6.2-34.

All containment isolation valves purchased by Stone & Webster are factory tested and inspected. A written specification defines the specific require~ents for valve procurement, which include the following:

1. Welding and ND! Procedure Qualification

2. Welder and ND! Operator Qualifications e 65

3. Hill Test Reports

4. Dye Penetrant Test Cas required)

5. Magnetic Particle Test Cas required)

6. Radiography Cas required)

7. Body Hydrostatic Test

8. Seat and Valve Steam Leakage Test

9. Performance Test

10. Dimensional Check

11. Cleaning

12. Preparation for Shipment

13. Seismic Qualification The auto-trip containment isolation valves, with the exception of the main steam isolation valves which are discussed in response to Comment 10.2, are

NlF 6.2-113 11-3-78 e air-operated, globe or butterfly valves. The piston or diaphragm operators are spring opposed, so that the valve fails closed upon loss of instrument air or loss of power to the solenoid pilot, or trips closed upon receipt of a safety signal. Factory tests of these valves include tests to ensure proper stroke action and operation of accessories.

The use of "Limitorque" operators has been specified for all motor-operated containment isolation valves. The specific requirements for motor-operated valves include a seismic analysis of the valve and operator as a combined unit. With the exception of the main steam isolation valves, which are required to close within 5 seconds, all containment isolation valves must be capable of closing within 60 seconds after receipt of a containment isolation Phase A signal.

The basis for the 60-second limit is that no fuel cladding is expected to melt e or fail until after 60 seconds following a loss-of-coolant accident CLOCA).

65 Thus, fission prociuct release from the core, to the containment atmosphere, or to other portions of the RCS could not occur until at least one minute after the event.

!his is verified for PWR's by the FLECH! experimental results<JJ> which indicate peak temperatures occur 60 seconds or more after the start of reflooding C30 seconds more after the accident) for low reflooding rates like those that might lead to clad melting.

All containment isolation valves purchased by Stone & Webster satisfy the bases described below.

The bases for the selection of containment isolation valves and valve operators purchased by Westinghouse are primarily systems requirements. For

~lF 6.2-114 ll-3-i8 those lines that penetrate the contain.~ent and are in part of a system that is e not necessary following a LOCA and whose inadvertent closure is not detrimental to plant operation or equipment integrity, Westinghouse systems criteria specify the use of "fail-closed" valves vith air operators. This is based upon the fact that the energy needed for closure of this type of valve/operator is stored in a spring. The failure of the solenoid valve, electric pover, pneumatic device or the loss cf air pressure does net prevent the valve from moving to the desired position. This design ensures a high degree of reliability of the valve function. For those lines that penetrate the ccntair.ment and are a part cf a system that is required following a LOCA, or in which an inadvertent valve closure vculd jeopardize safe plant operation or component integrity, Westinghouse criteria specify the use of valves vith motor-type operators, assigned to "fail as-is." For these types of valves, 65 the failure of the motor operator on loss cf electrical pover to the operator e does not affect the valve movement and ensures that the valve remains in its desired position. This design ensures a high degree of reliability of the valve function. Finally, Westinghouse criteria specify the use cf check valves as the inside isolation valve vhere applicable. Since the only motive force necessary to provide closure of this valve is a pressure difference, this design ensures a high degree of reliability in the valve function.

In addition to these design requirements, all the valves are subjected to functional tests and shell hydrostatic tests prior to installation. These design and testing requirements are specified vithin the equipment specifications. This combination of design and testing is carefully monitored by Westinghouse quality control personnel throughout the procurement process.

In the procurement process, the vendor's capability to produce a quality product to the requirements of the specification is carefully evaluated and is

NlF 6.2-115 11-3-78 e one of the major considerations in awarding a contract.

vendor's quality control program are established Requirements for by the Westinghous~.

Additionally, Westinghouse has approved rights on each vendor's quality control system and on the inspection program for each type of valve.

All containment isolation valves provided by Westinghouse which are not normally in the closed position are capable of closure within 10 seconds.

This time for fast-acting valves of the Engineered Safety Features is based upon the accident analyses requirements.

All lines passing through the containment penetrations enter into the 65 auxiliary building pipe tunnel, safeguards area, or main steam valve house.

All of the external isolation valves for these pipes are located in one of the above areas. The temperature of the auxiliary building pipe tunnel and safeguards area is maintained at a minimum of 50 F, which precludes the freezing of the valves and piping in these areas. The main steam valve house is also maintained at a temperature greater than freezing, as described in the Response to Comment 9.67.

These areas are all within Seismic Class 1 structures and are provided with tornado missile protection as indicated in Table 3.2.1-1.

Figure 6.2-99 shows schematic representations of typical containment isolation 165 valve arrangements. Although the station is designed to the General Design Criteria published in 1966, most isolation arrangements conform to Criteria 55, 56, or 57 of Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Fever Plants" to 10CFR50 published in 1971. A discussion of these criteria 65 can be found in Section 3.1.

e

NlF 6.2-116 11-3-7 8 General Design Criteria 55, 56, and 57 had not been promulgated when four e penetrations, which use check valves outside the containment as isolation valves, were designed. As explained in 6.2.4.2.b, and Table 6.2-34, these penetrations constitute exceptions taken to G.D.C. 55, 56, and 57. !his 65 situation occurs only where there is a sealed Seismic Class I system inside the containment serving as a second isolation barrier. These penetrations are considered to meet the requirements of General Design Criterion 53 (July 10, 1967) in effect at the time of design. Table 6.2-34 also indicates the isolation criterion to which the penetration conforms, or references one of the following sections which describe isolation arrangements which differ from those listed in the criteria:

1. Reactor containment leakage monitoring lines to open taps and containment vacuum pump suction lines.

The leakage monitoring lines to the open taps have one manual, administratively controlled valve followed by two automatic trip valves in series outside the containment. !here are four of these lines utilizing four penetrations. The two automatic valves in each line shut on receipt of a Containment Isolation Phase A Signal.

The containment vacuum pump suction lines have two normally closed automatic trip valves in series. The Containment Atmosphere Cleanup System takes its suction from these lines downstream of the two automatic trip valves. These valves receive a Containment Isolation Phase A Signal to close.

Nlf 6.2-117 11-3-i 8 e !he arrangements of two trip valves in series outside the containment is necessary to provide accessibility to the valves in order to ensure operation of these sytems following an accident.

2. Component cooling water supply to the Residual Heat Removal System CRHRS), the excess letdown heat exchanger and the containment air recirculation cooling coils; feedwater lines and chemical feed lines.

The penetrations for these lines have two barriers between fluid inside the reactor coolant pressure boundary or between the containment atmosphere and the atmosphere outside the containment.

These two barriers are the various heat exchangers served by the lines and the check valves outside the containment. These check valves shut under a differential pressure when the higher pressure is on the containment side of the check valve. The piping inside the containment from the penetration to the component is run so that it is protected from potential missiles generated as a result of an accident.

Each feedwater line has the following connections between the isolation valve outside the containment and the steam generator inside the containment. !he isolation arrangement for each of these connections is described:

a. three-inch auxiliary feed line, located outside the containment, with a check valve.

b. The chemical feed line connects to the main feedwater line inside the containment. In addition to the check valve in the

NlF 6.2-118 11-3-78 e chemical feed line, there is a normally open manual isolation valve on each side of the containment in this line.

3. Main steam line Each 32-inch main steam line is isolated by an automatically tripped, normally open swing-check valve installed in the direction to prevent flow out of the containment. Flow into the containment is prevented by a motor-operated nonreturn valve installed adjacent to the trip valve. These valves are located outside the contail"'.ment with a sealed system inside; this arrangement conforms to General Design Criterion 57. The following lines join each main steam line between the steam generator inside the containment and the isolation valve outside the containment with the exception of the flow element loop 65 which is completely within the containment. The isolation arrangement for each of these lines is described:

65

a. Four 3/4-inch pressure instrument lines outside the containment, each with two manually-operated isolation valves.

b. A 4-inch steam line outside. the containment to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, isolated by one manually-operated valve.

c. A 32-inch connection outside the containment to the safety and relief valves. This line leads to five parallel safety valves and one automatically controlled power relief valve. There is a manually operated isolation valve in the line to the power relief valve, and the safety valves can be manually gagged shut.

NlF 6.2-119 11-3-73 e d. A 3-inch decay heat contains a check valve.

relief line outside the contain~enc A:ter the junction of the three ciecay heat relief lines from the three main steam lines, there is a remote, manually controlled isolation valve.

e. A 1-inch sample line outside the containment containing two normally closed isolation valves.

f. A 3-inch warmup bypass line around the main steam trip valve contains an automatic trip valve :or isolation.

4. Residual heat removal sample lines These 3/8-inch lines contain a re~ote manually-operated isolation valve inside t~e concainment and an automatic trip valve outside the containment. These isolacion valves are normally shut d~ring station oreraticr. and nor~ally c?eneci only when t~e ?eactcr is shu~ de"~ and at reduced pressure and temperature. During power operacion, the RHRS is isolated :rom the RCS by motor-operated valves.

Sa:ety injection discharge lines to the RCS

!he Safety Injection System (SIS) is operated following a LOCA to jss keep the reactor core covered with water (Section 6.3). The valves affecting contain.~ent isolation in the boron injection path to che RCS cold legs are therefore designed to open upon receipt o: a Safety Injection Actuation Signal. All other valves (except in the low head safety injection CLHS!) header to the RCS cold legs) are normally closed and opened as necessary by the central room cperacor after an accident has occurred.

NlF 6.2-120 3-7-80 Ihe high head safety injection line to the Reactor Coolant System e cold legs (boron injection line) is provided with two normally closed, remotely controlled motor-operated isolation valves in parallel outside the containment and one check valve inside the containment. A separate post-accident high head recirculation header feeding the cold leg injection branch lines is provided with one normally closed, remotely controlled motor-operated isolation valve outside the containment and one check valve inside the containment.

In addition, there is a 1-inch line connecting to the boron injection line between the penetration and the isolation valve outside the containment bypassing the boron injection tank. Ihis line is supplied with a normally locked closed manually-operated isolation valve.

Ihe high head safety injection lines to the RCS hot legs are each provided with one normally closed, remotely controlled motor-operated valve outside the containment and one check valve in each header inside the containment.

Ihe LHSI lines consist of three headers outside the containment supplied by both low head safety injection pumps. One LHSI header to 681 the RCS cold legs is provided with two parallel normally open, remotely controlled motor-operated isolation valve outside the containment and one check valve in each branch line to the cold legs inside the containment. Iwo LHSI headers to the RCS hot legs are provided each with one normally closed remotely controlled motor-operated isolation valve outside the containment and one check valve in each header inside the containment.

NlF 6 * .Z-119 11-3-7 8

d. A 3-inch decay heat relief line outside the containment e contains a check valve. After the junction of the three decay heat relief lines from the three main steam lines, there is a remote, manually controlled isolation valve.

e. A 1-inch sample line outside the containment containing two normally closed isolation valves.

f, A 3-inch warmup bypass line around the main steam trip valve contains an automatic trip valve for isolation.

4. Residual heat removal sample lines These 3/8-inch lines contain a remote manually-operated isolation valve inside the containment and an automatic trip valve outside the containment. These isolation valves are normally shut during station operation and normally opened only when the reactor is shut down and at reduced pressure and temperature. During power operation, the RH~S is isolated from the RCS by motor-operated valves.

5. Safety injection discharge lines to the RCS The Safety Injection System CSIS) is operated following a LOCA to

• jss keep the reactor core covered with water (Section 6.3). The valves affecting containment isolation in the boron injection path to the RCS cold legs are therefore designed to open upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Signal. All other valves (except in the low head safety injection CLHSI) header to the RCS cold legs) are normally closed and opened as necessary by the control room operator after an accident has occurred.

NlF 6.Z-1~0 11-3-7 8 The high head safety injection line to the Reactor Coolant System e cold legs Cboron injection line) is provided with two normally closed, remotely controlled motor-operated isolation valves in parallel outside the containment and one check valve inside the containment. A separate post-accident high head recirculation header feeding the cold leg injection branch lines is provided with one normally closed, remotely controlled motor-operated isolation valve outside the containment and one check valve inside the containment.

In addition, there is a 1-inch line connecting to the boron injection line between the penetration and the isolation valve outside the containment bypassing the boron injection tank. !his line is supplied with a normally locked closed manually-operated isolation valve.

The high head safety injection lines to the RCS hot legs are each provided with one normally closed, remotely controlled motor-operated valve outside the containment and one check valve in each header inside the contai:l!!lent.

The LHSI lines consist of three headers outside the containment supplied by both low head safety injection pumps. One LHSI heacier to the RCS cold legs is provided with one normally open, remotely controlled motor-operated isolation valve outside the containment and one check valve in each branch line to the cold legs inside the containment. Two LHSI headers to the RCS hot legs are provided each with one normally closed remotely controlled motor-operated isolation valve outside the containment and one check valve in each header inside the contain.~ent.

NlF 6,2-121 11-3-'i 8 I ,

These containment isolation arrangements conform with the single failure criteria specified in Section 6.2.4.1 and also allow the SIS to perform its design function.

6. Reactor coolant pump seal water supply These lines are each provided with a check valve and a normally open manual isolation valve inside the containment and normally open manual isolation valve outside the containment. In addition, there is an additional check valve inside the contai~_rr.ent which is not missile protected.

The two isolation barriers are the check valve inside the containment and the closed portion of the Chemical and Volume Control System on the discharge side of the charging pumps. The piping from the check valve inside the containment to the manual isolation valve outside the containment is designed to Class I of.ANSI B31.7, and the piping from the manual valve to the charging pump discharge is desig~eci to Class II of ANSI B31.7.

Water is pumped through these lines, through the reactor coolant pump seals and into the RCS during normal operat-ion and safety injection.

Thus these lines remain open after receipt of a safety injection signal and the flow contributes to the SIS flow to the RCS while protecting the reactor coolant pump seals.

NlF 6.2-121 11-3-78 e These containment isolation arrangements conform with the single failure criteria specified in Section 6.2.4.1 and also allow the SIS to perform its design function.

6. Reactor coolant pump seal water supply These lines are each provided with a check valve and a normally open manual isolation valve inside the containment and normally open manual isolation valve outside the containment. In addition, there is an additional check valve inside the containment which is not missile protected.

The two isolation barriers are the check v~lve inside the containment and the closed portion of the Chemical and Volune Control System on the discharge side of the charging pumps. The piping from the check valve inside the containment to the manual isolation valve outside the containment is designed to Class I of ANSI B31.7, and the piping from the manual valve to the charging pump discharge is desig~eci to Class II of ANSI B31.7.

Water is pumped through these lines, through the reactor coolant pump seals and into the RCS during normal operation and safety injection.

Thus these lines remain open after receipt of a safety injection signal and the flow contributes to the SIS flow to the RCS while protecting the reactor coolant pump seals.

NlF 6. :-122 11-3-78 651 e 7. Quench lines spray, recirculation spray, and casing cooling pump discharge 65t The Containment Depressurization System operates after an accident to depressurize the containment. The valves in the lines from the quench spray and outside recirculation spray pumps *re thetefore designed to be opened upon receipt of a contain.~ent depressurization Chigh-high contain.~ent pressure) signal if they are not already open.

The quench spray pump discharge lines are provided with a check valve inside the contain~ent and one normally closed, remotely controlled 41 motor-operated valve outside the containment. This motor-operated valve opens upon receipt of a contain.~ent depressurization (high-high

• containment pressure) signal. The tvo isolation barriers are provided for these penetrations by the check valve and the motor-operated valve.

The outside recirculation spray pump discharge lines are provided vith a check valve inside the containment and a normally open, remotely controlled motor-operated valve outside the containment.

The two isolation barriers are provided by the check valve inside the containment and the closed system outside the containment. This closed system includes the recirculation spray pumps and their casings. The system piping conforms to Class II of ANSI B31.7, the recirculation spray pumps conform to Class II of the Nuclear Pump and 65 Valve Code, and the recirculation spray pump casings conform to AS~.E Section III B.

r NlF 6.2-123 ll-3-i8 e The casing cooling pump discharge lines terminate at the suction to the outside recirculation spray pumps. These lines are provided vith a check valve, one normally open remotely controlled motor-operated valve, and one normally closed remotely controlled motor-operated 65 valve outside the containment. The isolation barriers are the check valve, tvo motor-operated valves, and closed outside recirculation spray pump suction piping as discussed in Section 6.2.4,2.

8. Lev head safety injection pump and outside recirculation spray pump suction lines Special consideration given to the lov head and recirculation spray pump inlet lines vhich take suction from sumps inside the contain~ent results in a conservative design and use of highly reliable e components in a single valve arrangement vhich is enclosed in a 65 special valve pit. The major portion of the piping is buried in the reinforced concrete base mat, and only a short length of piping exists between the mat and the isolation valve. The single valve is 65 equipped vith a highly reliable remote operator. If a failure occurs in this suction line, the valve pit becomes flooded. This provides a vater seal between the containment and the outside atmosphere vhich prevents leakage into or out of the containment. The design of this portion of the installation is compatible vith letters from the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards < 1 2, 11 >. Provisions for 165 detecting leaks in these suction lines are described in Sections 6.2.2, and 6.3.

NlF 6.2-124 11-3-78

- The isolation valve at the suction of the outside recirculation spray pumps is a normally open, reootely controlled, motor-operated The isolation valve for each LHSI valve.

pump suction penetration is a normally closed, remotely controlled, motor-operated valve.

9. Fuei transfer tube

~, A 20-inch OD fuel transfer tube in the fuel transfer penetration between the refueling canal inside the containment and the spent fuel pit is fitted with a blind flange inside the containment and a normally closed gate valve in the transfer canal outside the containment to prevent leakage through the transfer tube during accident conditions.

10. Dead weight pressure calibrator The line to the pressurizer dead veight pressure calibrator is provided vith two normally closed, administratively controlled, manual isolatio~

valves outside the containment. This line is not normally used during station operation.

Branch lines intersecting betveen isolation barriers consist of leakage monitoring connections that are provided vith normally closed valves and caps.

Leakage monitoring connections are designed to the same criteria as their respective main lines.

65 The reactor coolant letdovn line has a branch vith a normally closed relief valve (Figures 9.3.4-3, 6), A temperature element is provided to monitor leakage dovnstream of the relief valve, and the relief valve set pressure exceeds the test pressure of the containment. Therefore, no isolation barrier is required.

NlF 6.2-125 3-7-80 e Yhen internal closed loop systems represent isolation, the containment penetrations, the piping a barrier inside for the containment containment, and the piping up to and including the isolation valves outside the containment are designed in accordance with Seismic Class l criteria.

!he definition of Seismic Class 1 criteria is in Section 3.2.l. Table 3.2.1-1 lists the seismic criteria for structures, systems, and components.

Ihe containment isolation system valves are protected from the effects of pipe whip by separation, physical barrier, and by the application of pipe whip restraints.

Design basis breaks are postulated in the high energy piping in accordance with Section 3.6 and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.46 as explained in the response to 65 Comment 3.19. For the main steam and feedwater lines, whip restraints are

~ designed which eliminate any possibility of damage to an isolation valve from pipe whip. Additional restraints or barriers are supplied, as required, to prevent damage to the isolation valves and related piping from a break in any other high energy line.

!he following containment penetrations are identified as open to the containment with a check valve inside and a single valve outside subject to active failure:

1. Quench spray

2. Outside recirculation spray discharge 68

NlF 6.2-126 3-7-80 Note, however, that there is no penetration with a check valve inside and a single valve outside subject to single active failure which is connected to nonseismic Class I piping or components.

Leakage into the containment for those containment penetrations identified above is prevented as described below.

Ihe suction lines to the outside recirculation spray pumps are sealed against inleakage by a head of water in the containment sump.

Ihe Outside Recirculation Spray System is a closed loop outside the containment and is Seismic Class I throughout so that although it is open to 65 the containment on the inside, failure of an isolation valve does not result

. in inleakage to the containment.

Additional automatic valves are provided for the air ejector vent, instrument air return line, and the contain~ent radiation monitoring return line. Ihese valves appear in Iable 6. 2-34 which lists all .containment isolation valves .

. Ihe check yalves used in the Quench and Recirculation Spray Systems are of the same design. Ihey are soft seated swing check valves. Closing force is provided by external weights of lever arms located on both sides of the valves. Ihe weights are initially set at the factory to hold the discs closed with. 2*psi differential pressure in the normal flow direction. Once open, reseating is expected to occur at about 0.5 psi.

Ihe opening and reseating pressures are adjusted by moving the external weight a-long the weight arm. Opening .and reseating pressures are not independently adjustable.