ML19350B751: Difference between revisions
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ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD * | ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD * | ||
/u to in the matter of: ) ' | /u to in the matter of: ) ' | ||
) | ) | ||
DUKE POWER COMPANY ) DOCKET NUMBERS | DUKE POWER COMPANY ) DOCKET NUMBERS | ||
). | ). | ||
(William B. McGuire Nuclear Station ) 50-369-OL Units I and 2: - - reope'ned ) 50-370-OL | (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station ) 50-369-OL Units I and 2: - - reope'ned ) 50-370-OL operating license proceeding) ) | ||
operating license proceeding) ) | |||
) | ) | ||
) | ) | ||
INTERVENOR, CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP, HEREBY MAKES APPLICATION FbRSUBPOENAS,PURSUANTTO10CFR52.720,andsays: . | INTERVENOR, CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP, HEREBY MAKES APPLICATION FbRSUBPOENAS,PURSUANTTO10CFR52.720,andsays: . | ||
On February 24, 1981, in the course of tie opening day of hearing C | On February 24, 1981, in the course of tie opening day of hearing C | ||
in this matter, Intervenor gave oral notice that it desired to have subpoenas issued for witnesses necessary for the proper presentation of its case. The Chairman of the Board sitting in said hearing has | in this matter, Intervenor gave oral notice that it desired to have subpoenas issued for witnesses necessary for the proper presentation of its case. The Chairman of the Board sitting in said hearing has required a showing, pursuant to 10 CFR 22 720(a) of the general | ||
required a showing, pursuant to 10 CFR 22 720(a) of the general | |||
' relevance of the testimony sought. | ' relevance of the testimony sought. | ||
l T Intervenor appends hereto a list of proposed witnesses and questions to be asked of them. Further, for those from which one . | l T Intervenor appends hereto a list of proposed witnesses and questions to be asked of them. Further, for those from which one . | ||
Line 56: | Line 45: | ||
questions to be asked are not sufficiently revealing of the testimony l | questions to be asked are not sufficiently revealing of the testimony l | ||
proffered,'a summary of the answers believed likely is attached, in relation'to the Contentions admitted in this hearing. Intervenor l believes that the testimony of the five academic psychologists, Messers Cook, Palmer, Kello, Brockway and Long, is relevant to Contentions 1 and 2 concerning the ootential for hydrogen generation, in that . | proffered,'a summary of the answers believed likely is attached, in relation'to the Contentions admitted in this hearing. Intervenor l believes that the testimony of the five academic psychologists, Messers Cook, Palmer, Kello, Brockway and Long, is relevant to Contentions 1 and 2 concerning the ootential for hydrogen generation, in that . | ||
l | l 81032306 $ ._ _. _ . | ||
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J | J | ||
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7 .- . | 7 .- . | ||
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i elements of the Job content of reactor operators, of all grades, are likely to lead to poor performance under accident conditions. This testimony will be in direct contradiction, we believe, to the testimony i | |||
i | given by the Appilcant's panel on operator training and work. Further, this testimony will be relevant'to Contention 3 relating to emergency planning in that it make,s Applicant's reluctance to do proper planning understandable. | ||
The testimony of Louis Charles Barbe is relevant to Contentions 1 and 2 in that he can also testify about the human factors involved in reactor operation and to safety factors. He is an engineer and has worked for Westinghouse in the nuclear division. | |||
elements of the Job content of reactor operators, of all grades, are likely to lead to poor performance under accident conditions. This testimony will be in direct contradiction, we believe, to the testimony i | |||
given by the Appilcant's panel on operator training and work. Further, this testimony will be relevant'to Contention 3 relating to emergency | |||
planning in that it make,s Applicant's reluctance to do proper planning understandable. | |||
The testimony of Louis Charles Barbe is relevant to Contentions 1 and 2 in that he can also testify about the human factors involved in reactor operation and to safety factors. He is an engineer and | |||
has worked for Westinghouse in the nuclear division. | |||
Joe Lanford is also an engsteer and is a former Duke Power employee He can testify on issues involved in Contentions P | Joe Lanford is also an engsteer and is a former Duke Power employee He can testify on issues involved in Contentions P | ||
who worked at McGuire. | who worked at McGuire. | ||
Line 88: | Line 61: | ||
1 and 2 with regard to deficiencies in welding techniques on the McGuire containment and Duke's reaction to his reporting these deficiencies. | 1 and 2 with regard to deficiencies in welding techniques on the McGuire containment and Duke's reaction to his reporting these deficiencies. | ||
Doctors Easton and Baker work at Charlotte Memorial Hospital, -, | Doctors Easton and Baker work at Charlotte Memorial Hospital, -, | ||
the prime emergency facIIIty in the area. The former is head of radio-L logy and the'1atter head of the emergency room. They can testify about the ability to care for victims of a radioactive release from McGuire, a matter raised in Contentions 3 and 4. | the prime emergency facIIIty in the area. The former is head of radio-L logy and the'1atter head of the emergency room. They can testify about the ability to care for victims of a radioactive release from McGuire, a matter raised in Contentions 3 and 4. | ||
Intervenor reluctantly applies for a subpoena for Jan Beyea. Dr. | Intervenor reluctantly applies for a subpoena for Jan Beyea. Dr. | ||
Line 94: | Line 66: | ||
Dr. Jan Beyea regarding the.use of potassium iodide in a radiological | Dr. Jan Beyea regarding the.use of potassium iodide in a radiological | ||
. emergency . . ." His testimony will be relevant to Contentions 3 and 4. | . emergency . . ." His testimony will be relevant to Contentions 3 and 4. | ||
b | b | ||
- n. -_ - | - n. -_ - | ||
a' se . | |||
I. ) | |||
a' | |||
e s | e s | ||
l Beyea had indicated a willingness to testify, but has since become reluctant to do so. A pubilcation is attached indicating his area | l Beyea had indicated a willingness to testify, but has since become reluctant to do so. A pubilcation is attached indicating his area i | ||
of expertise, he consequences of a radioactive release on the population. | |||
Intervenor still intends to call Mr. Riley and Dr. Sternglass, and has distributed their testimony. | Intervenor still intends to call Mr. Riley and Dr. Sternglass, and has distributed their testimony. | ||
Beyond the relevance of testimony Intervenor has commented in the course of the hearing on the reasons for subpoenas, lateness of if the request and other factors that amount to excusable neglect, neglect it be. Mr. Barbe came to the attention of Intervenor when he answered an advertisement in Human Factors Magazine. A member of CESG telephoned him after receiving his letter on 2/20/81. Thereafter, Hr. Riley telephoned him on 2/21/81. He was unknown to the Intervenor prior to that time and thus there was no way to notify the parties. | |||
Beyond the relevance of testimony Intervenor has commented in the course of the hearing on the reasons for subpoenas, lateness of if the request and other factors that amount to excusable neglect, neglect it be. Mr. Barbe came to the attention of Intervenor when he answered an advertisement in Human Factors Magazine. A member of CESG telephoned him after receiving his letter on 2/20/81. Thereafter, | |||
Mr. Lanford called Mr. Riley after he read an article on the pending hearing in the Charlotte Observer on 2/22/81. His case is , | Mr. Lanford called Mr. Riley after he read an article on the pending hearing in the Charlotte Observer on 2/22/81. His case is , | ||
s'imilar to that of Mr. Barbe. | s'imilar to that of Mr. Barbe. | ||
Although Intervenor knew it wanted some human factors witnesses, it had none as of January, 1981. Its search accounts for the advertise- | Although Intervenor knew it wanted some human factors witnesses, it had none as of January, 1981. Its search accounts for the advertise- | ||
. ment mentioned above. Conversations with local psychology professors brought forth persons who had knowledge of the area in early February, but CESG's investigator-member had to leave Charlotte on business and was unable to confirm the testimony of thesepeople. Another member gathered the information submitted herewith. The same is true of the two doctors. | |||
. ment mentioned above. Conversations with local psychology professors | |||
brought forth persons who had knowledge of the area in early February, but CESG's investigator-member had to leave Charlotte on business and was unable to confirm the testimony of thesepeople. Another member gathered the information submitted herewith. The same is true of the two doctors. | |||
Based on the importance of the issues involved, the public's , | Based on the importance of the issues involved, the public's , | ||
right to have all points of view adequately presented and the minimal . | right to have all points of view adequately presented and the minimal . | ||
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e | e Impact on the parties ability to present their cases and cross examine, Intervenor requests subpoenas for these witnesses. / Intervenor believes that without subpoenas, they will not attend and testify. | ||
Impact on the parties ability to present their cases and cross examine, Intervenor requests subpoenas for these witnesses. / Intervenor believes that without subpoenas, they will not attend and testify | |||
Dated: 2/26/81. - | Dated: 2/26/81. - | ||
/ | / | ||
ni Shelle/41um, atto y for Intervenor CESG 854 Henley Place | ni Shelle/41um, atto y for Intervenor CESG 854 Henley Place | ||
- Charlotte NC 282C | - Charlotte NC 282C 4 | ||
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Proposed witnesses for whom subpoena is requested | Proposed witnesses for whom subpoena is requested Janes Cook: Prof.of psychology at UNC-Charlotte ? | ||
Janes Cook: Prof.of psychology at UNC-Charlotte ? | |||
Edward L. Palmer: Prof. of psychology at Davidson . | Edward L. Palmer: Prof. of psychology at Davidson . | ||
John Edward Kello: Prof. of psychology at Davidson ,- | John Edward Kello: Prof. of psychology at Davidson ,- | ||
Gar; Thomas Long: Prof, of psychology at UNC-Charlotte John Philip Brockway: Prof. of psychology at Davidson | Gar; Thomas Long: Prof, of psychology at UNC-Charlotte John Philip Brockway: Prof. of psychology at Davidson Chief of Department of Radiology at Charlotte Memorial Dr. Edward Easton: | ||
Chief of Department of Radiology at Charlotte Memorial Dr. Edward Easton: | |||
Hospital ' | Hospital ' | ||
Head of Emergency Treatment Department at Charlotte Dr. John W. Baker: Memorial Hospital I | Head of Emergency Treatment Department at Charlotte Dr. John W. Baker: Memorial Hospital I | ||
former Westinghouse nuclear division engineer | former Westinghouse nuclear division engineer Louis Charles Barbe: | ||
Louis Charles Barbe: | |||
former Duke Power engineer at McGuire Nuclear Station Joe Lanford: | former Duke Power engineer at McGuire Nuclear Station Joe Lanford: | ||
Jan Beyea: scienti'ic advisor of National Audubon Society' | Jan Beyea: scienti'ic advisor of National Audubon Society' e | ||
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j. | j. | ||
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* LEWIS CHARLES BARBE { | * LEWIS CHARLES BARBE { | ||
[.. | [.. | ||
6321 Limerick Lane (612) 941-6319 ( | 6321 Limerick Lane (612) 941-6319 ( | ||
Edina, Mn. 55435 - | Edina, Mn. 55435 - | ||
7 CERTIFICATIONS: | 7 CERTIFICATIONS: | ||
C.S.P. Registration Number 1853 ( A.S.S.E.) | C.S.P. Registration Number 1853 ( A.S.S.E.) | ||
Line 234: | Line 127: | ||
Registration Number 435 Fire Protection Engineering (State of C.S.R.P. California) | Registration Number 435 Fire Protection Engineering (State of C.S.R.P. California) | ||
Registration Number 76-047 f EDUCATION: | Registration Number 76-047 f EDUCATION: | ||
Illinois Institute of Technology, B.S.,1954 (Fire Protection and Safety Engineering) | Illinois Institute of Technology, B.S.,1954 (Fire Protection and Safety Engineering) | ||
University of Iowa (Industrial Hygiene) . | University of Iowa (Industrial Hygiene) . | ||
Line 242: | Line 134: | ||
Factory Insurance Association (Fire) National Safety Council C | Factory Insurance Association (Fire) National Safety Council C | ||
' U.S. Department of Labor (Safety) | ' U.S. Department of Labor (Safety) | ||
: f. EXPERIENCE: ; | : f. EXPERIENCE: ; | ||
Occupational Safety & Heal th Services , Inc. , - | Occupational Safety & Heal th Services , Inc. , - | ||
. Managing Director - Engineering . | . Managing Director - Engineering . | ||
American Hoist & Derrick, Corp. Director - Loss Con | American Hoist & Derrick, Corp. Director - Loss Con l | ||
l Stanray Corporation, Safety Engineer l | |||
Loss Control Services Ltd., Risk Service Engineer SOCIETIES: | |||
Loss Control Services Ltd., Risk Service Engineer | |||
SOCIETIES: | |||
Veterans of Safety International American and Canadian Societies of Safety Engineers National Fire Prevention Association. | Veterans of Safety International American and Canadian Societies of Safety Engineers National Fire Prevention Association. | ||
American Society of Testing Materials American Industrial Hygiene Association National Society of Professional Engineers British Safety Council System Safety Society | American Society of Testing Materials American Industrial Hygiene Association National Society of Professional Engineers British Safety Council System Safety Society | ||
, fF LOUIS CHARLES BARBE b Direct Examination ' ! | |||
, fF | |||
LOUIS CHARLES BARBE b Direct Examination ' ! | |||
Ir Q. | Ir Q. | ||
How would you go about evaluating the safety of a given - | How would you go about evaluating the safety of a given - | ||
Line 275: | Line 152: | ||
Q. | Q. | ||
What document or set of standards would guide the safety - | What document or set of standards would guide the safety - | ||
evaluation? | evaluation? | ||
Q. | Q. | ||
Line 294: | Line 170: | ||
What are the effects on control room personnel of the , | What are the effects on control room personnel of the , | ||
operation of a fire extinguishing system? | operation of a fire extinguishing system? | ||
these personnel Q. What provisions must be made to protectfrom ill eiffects due t | these personnel Q. What provisions must be made to protectfrom ill eiffects due t Q. What is the incidence of 'edhuman mistakesby for equipment in fault relation treetoanalysis? | ||
the safety standards r(s ence that is instructive in regard Q.' Is there any NELIA e. | |||
Q. What is the incidence of 'edhuman mistakesby for equipment in fault relation treetoanalysis? | |||
the safety standards r(s | |||
ence that is instructive in regard Q.' Is there any NELIA e. | |||
to safety matters, bot to human error and equipment failure? | to safety matters, bot to human error and equipment failure? | ||
Q. | Q. | ||
Line 307: | Line 179: | ||
Q. Has the maximum forseeable. loss been determined? | Q. Has the maximum forseeable. loss been determined? | ||
Q. Should it have been? | Q. Should it have been? | ||
= ' | = ' | ||
~, | ~, | ||
_2 t | _2 t | ||
Q. Has there been a control room fire? | Q. Has there been a control room fire? | ||
Q. Describe what happened? | Q. Describe what happened? | ||
Q. What would prevent a similar occurrence in a like event at McGuire? f | Q. What would prevent a similar occurrence in a like event at McGuire? f Q. Could a control room fire contribute to a hydrogen generation event? | ||
Q. Could a control room fire contribute to a hydrogen generation event? | |||
Q. What would .be the consequences of installing ra" pipe in place of 1" pipe in the McGuire spray system? | Q. What would .be the consequences of installing ra" pipe in place of 1" pipe in the McGuire spray system? | ||
Q. What is the fire protection significance of having wiring and ductwork underneath spray heads? | Q. What is the fire protection significance of having wiring and ductwork underneath spray heads? | ||
Q. What do you see as essential qualities in reactor operators? | Q. What do you see as essential qualities in reactor operators? | ||
Q. In senior reactor operators? | Q. In senior reactor operators? | ||
Q. How does this relate to navy training, i.e. nuclear submarine service, as part of a reactor operator's prior experience? | Q. How does this relate to navy training, i.e. nuclear submarine service, as part of a reactor operator's prior experience? | ||
Q. How are you presently employed? | Q. How are you presently employed? | ||
Q. Wnat employment,have you previously had? | Q. Wnat employment,have you previously had? | ||
Q. What is your academic background? | Q. What is your academic background? | ||
Q. Are you a member of any professional societies? | Q. Are you a member of any professional societies? | ||
e S | e S | ||
e i | e i | ||
e | e t | ||
L-. | L-. | ||
~ | ~ | ||
. ~ . - . | . ~ . - . | ||
i Dr. Edward Easton Q. Where are you employed? .' | i Dr. Edward Easton Q. Where are you employed? .' | ||
Q. In what capacity? | Q. In what capacity? | ||
Line 371: | Line 215: | ||
Is Charlotte Memorial Hospital one of the hospitals scheduled to receive patients in the event of radiation exposure resulting from an accident at McGuire nuciear, station? | Is Charlotte Memorial Hospital one of the hospitals scheduled to receive patients in the event of radiation exposure resulting from an accident at McGuire nuciear, station? | ||
Q. How many beds do you have in the emergency ward? | Q. How many beds do you have in the emergency ward? | ||
Q. How many seriously exposed patients could you treat? | |||
Q. What special facilities do you have for treating radiation victims? | Q. What special facilities do you have for treating radiation victims? | ||
Q. Could you adequately treat 100 to 200 radiation patients? | Q. Could you adequately treat 100 to 200 radiation patients? | ||
Line 377: | Line 221: | ||
emergency ward has about 20 beds. Showers are available for decontamination. | emergency ward has about 20 beds. Showers are available for decontamination. | ||
So are chelating agent procedures. A load of 100 to 200 cases would far exceed the physical capabilities of the Memorial emergency ward. | So are chelating agent procedures. A load of 100 to 200 cases would far exceed the physical capabilities of the Memorial emergency ward. | ||
O t | O t | ||
4 e | 4 e | ||
t i : _ . = _ .. . . - | t i : _ . = _ .. . . - | ||
~ | ~ | ||
= - :.== _ = .c = ~ - t_ : x. - _ _ : .- ~ | = - :.== _ = .c = ~ - t_ : x. - _ _ : .- ~ | ||
Questions to Jan Beyea | Questions to Jan Beyea | ||
\. | \. | ||
\ - | \ - | ||
Q. What is your present position? ) s Q. Wh5t is your prior expereince and background? | Q. What is your present position? ) s Q. Wh5t is your prior expereince and background? | ||
Q. In studying possible exposure of a population to radio-iodine, what mitigatory measure would you recommend? Why? | Q. In studying possible exposure of a population to radio-iodine, what mitigatory measure would you recommend? Why? | ||
Q. Have you studied the benefit of increas}ng containment strength? | Q. Have you studied the benefit of increas}ng containment strength? | ||
Q. What are the consequences of containment rupture? | Q. What are the consequences of containment rupture? | ||
Dr. Beyea has studied the health effects of exposure to radio-Iodine. He finds that a population subject to exposure will be most effectively protected by taking potassium iodide before exposure. | Dr. Beyea has studied the health effects of exposure to radio-Iodine. He finds that a population subject to exposure will be most effectively protected by taking potassium iodide before exposure. | ||
4 For the currect generation of containments, the release in | 4 For the currect generation of containments, the release in a severe accident is such as to create the inhabitation of 4000 square miles of land untenable, in that a dose of 10 rem or greater would be delivered to inhabitants over a 30 year period. | ||
a severe accident is such as to create the inhabitation of 4000 square miles of land untenable, in that a dose of 10 rem or greater would be delivered to inhabitants over a 30 year period. | |||
~ | ~ | ||
5 e | 5 e | ||
f e | f e | ||
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Latest revision as of 04:11, 18 February 2020
ML19350B751 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Mcguire, McGuire ![]() |
Issue date: | 02/26/1981 |
From: | Blum S BLUM & SHEELY, CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP |
To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
Shared Package | |
ML19350B747 | List: |
References | |
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8103230622 | |
Download: ML19350B751 (10) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9-
~ SMR c' f 7 '98I > 'T NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS'10N D f Ig Bar.
da.4 ,
5 /
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD *
/u to in the matter of: ) '
)
DUKE POWER COMPANY ) DOCKET NUMBERS
).
(William B. McGuire Nuclear Station ) 50-369-OL Units I and 2: - - reope'ned ) 50-370-OL operating license proceeding) )
)
)
INTERVENOR, CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP, HEREBY MAKES APPLICATION FbRSUBPOENAS,PURSUANTTO10CFR52.720,andsays: .
On February 24, 1981, in the course of tie opening day of hearing C
in this matter, Intervenor gave oral notice that it desired to have subpoenas issued for witnesses necessary for the proper presentation of its case. The Chairman of the Board sitting in said hearing has required a showing, pursuant to 10 CFR 22 720(a) of the general
' relevance of the testimony sought.
l T Intervenor appends hereto a list of proposed witnesses and questions to be asked of them. Further, for those from which one .
'could be obtained, we append a curriculum vita. In so far as the l
questions to be asked are not sufficiently revealing of the testimony l
proffered,'a summary of the answers believed likely is attached, in relation'to the Contentions admitted in this hearing. Intervenor l believes that the testimony of the five academic psychologists, Messers Cook, Palmer, Kello, Brockway and Long, is relevant to Contentions 1 and 2 concerning the ootential for hydrogen generation, in that .
l 81032306 $ ._ _. _ .
J
a- :- --- :- - . - . - - - . . ---
7 .- .
4
. $a
'E ;
i elements of the Job content of reactor operators, of all grades, are likely to lead to poor performance under accident conditions. This testimony will be in direct contradiction, we believe, to the testimony i
given by the Appilcant's panel on operator training and work. Further, this testimony will be relevant'to Contention 3 relating to emergency planning in that it make,s Applicant's reluctance to do proper planning understandable.
The testimony of Louis Charles Barbe is relevant to Contentions 1 and 2 in that he can also testify about the human factors involved in reactor operation and to safety factors. He is an engineer and has worked for Westinghouse in the nuclear division.
Joe Lanford is also an engsteer and is a former Duke Power employee He can testify on issues involved in Contentions P
who worked at McGuire.
~
1 and 2 with regard to deficiencies in welding techniques on the McGuire containment and Duke's reaction to his reporting these deficiencies.
Doctors Easton and Baker work at Charlotte Memorial Hospital, -,
the prime emergency facIIIty in the area. The former is head of radio-L logy and the'1atter head of the emergency room. They can testify about the ability to care for victims of a radioactive release from McGuire, a matter raised in Contentions 3 and 4.
Intervenor reluctantly applies for a subpoena for Jan Beyea. Dr.
Beyea was identified as a potential witness in the cover letter to the testimony of Jesse Riley, dated 2/17/81. "We anticipate having . . .
Dr. Jan Beyea regarding the.use of potassium iodide in a radiological
. emergency . . ." His testimony will be relevant to Contentions 3 and 4.
b
- n. -_ -
a' se .
I. )
e s
l Beyea had indicated a willingness to testify, but has since become reluctant to do so. A pubilcation is attached indicating his area i
of expertise, he consequences of a radioactive release on the population.
Intervenor still intends to call Mr. Riley and Dr. Sternglass, and has distributed their testimony.
Beyond the relevance of testimony Intervenor has commented in the course of the hearing on the reasons for subpoenas, lateness of if the request and other factors that amount to excusable neglect, neglect it be. Mr. Barbe came to the attention of Intervenor when he answered an advertisement in Human Factors Magazine. A member of CESG telephoned him after receiving his letter on 2/20/81. Thereafter, Hr. Riley telephoned him on 2/21/81. He was unknown to the Intervenor prior to that time and thus there was no way to notify the parties.
Mr. Lanford called Mr. Riley after he read an article on the pending hearing in the Charlotte Observer on 2/22/81. His case is ,
s'imilar to that of Mr. Barbe.
Although Intervenor knew it wanted some human factors witnesses, it had none as of January, 1981. Its search accounts for the advertise-
. ment mentioned above. Conversations with local psychology professors brought forth persons who had knowledge of the area in early February, but CESG's investigator-member had to leave Charlotte on business and was unable to confirm the testimony of thesepeople. Another member gathered the information submitted herewith. The same is true of the two doctors.
Based on the importance of the issues involved, the public's ,
right to have all points of view adequately presented and the minimal .
--r-.
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e Impact on the parties ability to present their cases and cross examine, Intervenor requests subpoenas for these witnesses. / Intervenor believes that without subpoenas, they will not attend and testify.
Dated: 2/26/81. -
/
ni Shelle/41um, atto y for Intervenor CESG 854 Henley Place
- Charlotte NC 282C 4
e D
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a __;_ . . __
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. 1 l ,
- 4 s
Proposed witnesses for whom subpoena is requested Janes Cook: Prof.of psychology at UNC-Charlotte ?
Edward L. Palmer: Prof. of psychology at Davidson .
John Edward Kello: Prof. of psychology at Davidson ,-
Gar; Thomas Long: Prof, of psychology at UNC-Charlotte John Philip Brockway: Prof. of psychology at Davidson Chief of Department of Radiology at Charlotte Memorial Dr. Edward Easton:
Hospital '
Head of Emergency Treatment Department at Charlotte Dr. John W. Baker: Memorial Hospital I
former Westinghouse nuclear division engineer Louis Charles Barbe:
former Duke Power engineer at McGuire Nuclear Station Joe Lanford:
Jan Beyea: scienti'ic advisor of National Audubon Society' e
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- LEWIS CHARLES BARBE {
[..
6321 Limerick Lane (612) 941-6319 (
Edina, Mn. 55435 -
7 CERTIFICATIONS:
C.S.P. Registration Number 1853 ( A.S.S.E.)
P.E. Registration Number 717 Safety Engineering (State P.E. of California)
Registration Number 435 Fire Protection Engineering (State of C.S.R.P. California)
Registration Number 76-047 f EDUCATION:
Illinois Institute of Technology, B.S.,1954 (Fire Protection and Safety Engineering)
University of Iowa (Industrial Hygiene) .
Penn State (Basic Principles of Property Control)
American Management Association (Risk Management)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Safety)
Factory Insurance Association (Fire) National Safety Council C
' U.S. Department of Labor (Safety)
- f. EXPERIENCE: ;
Occupational Safety & Heal th Services , Inc. , -
. Managing Director - Engineering .
American Hoist & Derrick, Corp. Director - Loss Con l
l Stanray Corporation, Safety Engineer l
Loss Control Services Ltd., Risk Service Engineer SOCIETIES:
Veterans of Safety International American and Canadian Societies of Safety Engineers National Fire Prevention Association.
American Society of Testing Materials American Industrial Hygiene Association National Society of Professional Engineers British Safety Council System Safety Society
, fF LOUIS CHARLES BARBE b Direct Examination ' !
Ir Q.
How would you go about evaluating the safety of a given -
operation in a nuclear generating plant?
Q.
Who would be qualified to make such a deter inat".on?
Q. How would his credentials be attained?
Q.
What document or set of standards would guide the safety -
evaluation?
Q.
What level of risk 'is assumed in meeting these standards?
Q.
Is fire a hacard in a nuclear plant control room?
Q. Explain why.
Q.
What extinguisher systems are used?
Q.
What position has the NRC taken with regard to extinguisher
- system specification?
Q.
Who would be qualified to make judgnents'in regt<.d to the risk of fire?
Q. In regard to means for fire protection?
Q. How are such. credentials attained?
Q.
What are the effects on control room personnel of the ,
operation of a fire extinguishing system?
these personnel Q. What provisions must be made to protectfrom ill eiffects due t Q. What is the incidence of 'edhuman mistakesby for equipment in fault relation treetoanalysis?
the safety standards r(s ence that is instructive in regard Q.' Is there any NELIA e.
to safety matters, bot to human error and equipment failure?
Q.
Have fau.lt tree analyses been made in regard to the hydrogen generation question at McGuire?
Are redundant safety systems present in regard to various hydrogen generation, ignition, mitigation systems?
Q.
Q. Has the maximum forseeable. loss been determined?
Q. Should it have been?
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Q. Has there been a control room fire?
Q. Describe what happened?
Q. What would prevent a similar occurrence in a like event at McGuire? f Q. Could a control room fire contribute to a hydrogen generation event?
Q. What would .be the consequences of installing ra" pipe in place of 1" pipe in the McGuire spray system?
Q. What is the fire protection significance of having wiring and ductwork underneath spray heads?
Q. What do you see as essential qualities in reactor operators?
Q. In senior reactor operators?
Q. How does this relate to navy training, i.e. nuclear submarine service, as part of a reactor operator's prior experience?
Q. How are you presently employed?
Q. Wnat employment,have you previously had?
Q. What is your academic background?
Q. Are you a member of any professional societies?
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i Dr. Edward Easton Q. Where are you employed? .'
Q. In what capacity?
Have you received any special training in the treatment of radiologic f Q. l exposure cases?
Q. Where and when?
Q. Do any other medical doctors in Charlotte have similar or equivilent training to the best of your knowledge? Would ,you know if there were a doctor so trained?
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Dr. Easton is Chief of the Department of Radiology at Charlotte Memorial Hospital. He has received a course in the treatment of persons exposed to radiation a't Oak Ridge National Laboratory. He is the only physician in Charlotte to have received such training and one of the few in North Carolina.
Dr. John W. Baker Q. Where are you employed?
Q. In what capaci ty?
Q. Have you recived special training in the treatment of radiation exposure cases?
Q.
Is Charlotte Memorial Hospital one of the hospitals scheduled to receive patients in the event of radiation exposure resulting from an accident at McGuire nuciear, station?
Q. How many beds do you have in the emergency ward?
Q. How many seriously exposed patients could you treat?
Q. What special facilities do you have for treating radiation victims?
Q. Could you adequately treat 100 to 200 radiation patients?
Dr. Baker heads the Emergency Treatment Department at Charlotte Memorial Hospital. He has not received special training in handling radiation The cases. Memorial is a key hospital in McGuire emergency planning. %
emergency ward has about 20 beds. Showers are available for decontamination.
So are chelating agent procedures. A load of 100 to 200 cases would far exceed the physical capabilities of the Memorial emergency ward.
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Questions to Jan Beyea
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Q. What is your present position? ) s Q. Wh5t is your prior expereince and background?
Q. In studying possible exposure of a population to radio-iodine, what mitigatory measure would you recommend? Why?
Q. Have you studied the benefit of increas}ng containment strength?
Q. What are the consequences of containment rupture?
Dr. Beyea has studied the health effects of exposure to radio-Iodine. He finds that a population subject to exposure will be most effectively protected by taking potassium iodide before exposure.
4 For the currect generation of containments, the release in a severe accident is such as to create the inhabitation of 4000 square miles of land untenable, in that a dose of 10 rem or greater would be delivered to inhabitants over a 30 year period.
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