NL-11-2445, LER 11-S01-00 for Joseph M. Farley, Unit 1 Regarding Loss of Power to Security Systems

LER 11-S01-00 for Joseph M. Farley, Unit 1 Regarding Loss of Power to Security Systems

ML120100171
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	01/09/2012
From:	Lynch T Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
NL-11-2445 LER 11-S01-00
Download: ML120100171 (6)

Text

Thomas A. Lynch Southern Nuclear Vice President* Farley Operating Company. Inc.

Farley Nuclear Plant Post Office Drawer 470 Ashford. Alabama 36312 Tel 334814A511 Fax 334.814.4728 SOUTHERN ' \ .

COMPANY January 9, 2012 Docket Nos.: 50-348 NL-11-2445 50-364 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission AnN: Document Control Desk Washington. D. C. 20555-0001 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Licensee Event Report 2011-S01-00 Loss of Power to Security Systems Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.71 Section (d) and 10 CFR 73 Appendix G Section I(c), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report. This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Doug McKinney at (205) 992-5982.

Sincerely.

1~

T. A. Lynch Vice President - Farley TAlIWDO

Enclosure:

Units 1 and 2 Licensee Event Report 2011-S01-00

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-11-2445 Page 2 cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. S. E. Kuczynski, Chairman, President & CEO Mr. D. G. Bost, Chief Nuclear Officer Ms. P. M. Marino, Vice President - Engineering Mr. B. L. Ivey, Vice President - Regulatory Affairs RTYPE: CFA04.054 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. V. M. McCree, Regional Administrator Mr. R. E. Martin, NRR Project Manager - Farley Mr. E. L. Crowe, Senior Resident Inspector - Farley

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Licensee Event Report 2011-S01-00 Loss of Power to Security Systems Enclosure Units 1 and 2 Licensee Event Report 2011-S01-00

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150*0104 EXPIRES: 10131/2013 (10-2010)

Es1ima1ed burden per response 10 comply w~h 1his manda10ry collec1ion request 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorpora1ed into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIAIPrivacy Sectio~.5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Commission, Washington, DC 20 0001. or by internet e-mail to infoeolleets.resource 0 nrc'Bov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NE B-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Man8Q9ment and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an rnformation collection does no1 display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor. and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 13. PAGE Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000348 1 OF 3

4. TITLE Loss of Power to Security Systems

5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 05000364 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 11 15 2011 2011 - S01 - 00 01 09 2012

9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check al/ that apply) o 20.2201(b) o 20.2203(a)(3)(i) o 5O.73(a)(2)(i)(C) o 5O.73(a)(2)(vii) 1 o 20.2201(d) o 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) o 5O.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) o 5O.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) o 20.2203(a)(1) o 20.2203(a)(4) o 5O.73(a)(2)(ii)(8) o 5O.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) o 20.2203(a)(2)(i) o 5O.36(c)(1 )(i)(A) o 5O.73(a)(2)(iii) o 5O.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL o 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) o 5O.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A) o 5O.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) o 5O.73(a)(2)(x) o 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) o 5O.36(c)(2) o 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) o 73.71 (a)(4) o 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) o 5O.46(a)(3)(ii) o 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) o 73.71 (a)(5) 100 o 20.2203(a)(2)(v) o 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 181 OTHER o 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) o 50.73(a)(2)(i)(8) o 5O.73(a)(2)(v)(D) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME rELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

J.M, Farley Nuclear Plant, W. D. Oldfield - Principal Licensing Engineer 334814-4765

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT MANU- REPORTABLE MANU* REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX B EE IS 8569 N 14, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION o YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) 181 NO DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, I.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewrillen Jines)

On November 15, 2011 at approximately 06:05, with Unit 1 at 100 percent and Unit 2 at 88 percent power, all security equipment lost power including card readers, microwaves, and cameras. The security uninterruptable power supply (UPS) did not operate to keep the security equipment functional. Security compensatory measures were established within approximately ten minutes and remained in effect until the power was restored to all security equipment. There was never any indication of undetected access, evidence of tampering, or on-going security threat. Power was restored to all security equipment through the operation of a UPS manual bypass switch. All loads were systematically restored and successfully tested before compensatory measures were relaxed on November 15, 2011 at 18:00.

A one-hour non emergency report was made on November 15, 2011 at 07:03 in accordance with 10 CFR 73 Appendix G Section I(c) for a failure of a safeguard system that could allow undetected access to the protected area or vital areas. The vendor supported troubleshooting revealed that the security UPS failed due to three faulty microswitches in the blown fuse alarm circuitry. These microswitches were replaced and the system was removed from manual bypass to normal operation on November 18, 2011 at approximately 15:00.

NRC FORM 366 (10*2010)

NRC FORM 366A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) u.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)

CONTINUATION SHEET

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE YEAR SEQUENTIAL IREVISION NUMBER NUMBER Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000348 I 2 of 3 2011 - 801 - 00 NARRATIVE Westinghouse -- Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification Codes are identified in the text as [XX]

Description of Event On November 15, 2011 at approximately 06:05, with Unit 1 at 100 percent and Unit 2 at 88 percent power, all security equipment lost power including card readers, microwaves, and cameras. There was no significant plant equipment out of service that had an impact on this event. The security uninterruptable power supply (UPS) (EE] did not operate to keep the security equipment functional.

Security compensatory measures were established within approximately ten minutes and remained in effect until the power was restored to all security equipment. There was never any indication of undetected access, evidence of tampering, or on-going security threat. Power was restored to all security equipment through the operation of an UPS manual bypass switch. All loads were systematically restored and successfully tested before compensatory measures were relaxed on November 15, 2011 at 18:00.

A one-hour non emergency report was made on November 15, 2011 at 07:03 in accordance with 10 CFR 73 Appendix G Section I(c) for a failure of a safeguard system that could allow undetected access to the protected area or vital areas. The vendor supported troubleshooting revealed that the security UPS failed due to three faulty microswitches in the blown fuse alarm circuitry. The faulty 4 amp at 250 volt microswitches (type MAl and part number 540-9197) were manufactured by Bussmann. These microswitches were replaced and the system was removed from manual bypass to normal operation on November 18, 2011 at approximately 15:00.

Cause of Event The normal alignment of the UPS inverter is "Normal Operation." When the inverter senses an internal fault it automatically switches to static bypass or the alternate power source from a dedicated security diesel. On November 15, 2011, the inverter sensed blown fuses due to three faulty microswitches and attempted to swap to static bypass. However, due to an alarm that came in the previous week (frequency out-of-tolerance) on November 10, 2011 , static bypass to the security diesel was unavailable. Therefore, when the inverter sensed blown fuses and attempted to swap to bypass, the bypass was unavailable and the inverter shutdown, resulting in a total loss of security power.

The Security UPS had only been in operation for approximately four months. The vendor indicated that this was not a common equipment fault with this brand of UPS. Therefore, the equipment faults could not have been prevented. However, the event could have been prevented had it been recognized that an immediate response to the alarm received the previous week on November 10, 2011 was needed. As a result, the causal analysis identified weaknesses in system monitoring and knowledge gaps in system operation as contributing causes.

NRC FORM 366A (W-2010)

NRC FORM 366A (10 -2010)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) u.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I~______~~~~~____ C_O_N~T_IN~U~A~T~IO~N~S_HE_E_T~~~~~__~__~~~~

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE YEAR SEQUENTIAL IREVISION NUMBER NUMBER Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000348 I 3 of 3 2011 - 801 - 00 NARRATIVE Safety Assessment Although security systems experienced a loss of power, compensatory measures were established within approximately ten minutes. These compensatory measures were maintained until security system power was restored, loads reestablished, and systems tested. Additional security force officers from other Southern Nuclear (SNC) plants were brought in as added assurance in establishing compensatory measures in the event power was subsequently lost during troubleshooting and/or power transfer operations. A determination was made that no security threat ever existed . Therefore, no risk to plant equipment or operation was identified. Accordingly, there was no safety significance associated with this event, as there we re no releases of radioactive materials, no personnel injuries, and no undetected or unauthorized entries made into the protected area or other vital areas. There were no safety system functional failures as a result of this event. This event had no adverse effect on the safety and health of the public.

Corrective Action The three faulty microswitches were replaced and the system was removed from manual bypass to normal operation.

Causal analysis was initiated and additional corrective actions were identified. These actions related to the new security UPS involve improving equipment monitoring, enhancing operating procedures. and training on system operation will be tracked to closure in the corrective action program.

Additional Information Similar Events:

None NRC FORM 36M (1 (}'20 I 0)