05000348/LER-2016-004, Regarding Unapproved Environmental Qualification Material Caused Lnoperability of One Containment Cooling Train

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Regarding Unapproved Environmental Qualification Material Caused Lnoperability of One Containment Cooling Train
ML16354B551
Person / Time
Site: Farley Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 12/19/2016
From: Gayheart C
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NL-16-2595 LER 16-004-00
Download: ML16354B551 (6)


LER-2016-004, Regarding Unapproved Environmental Qualification Material Caused Lnoperability of One Containment Cooling Train
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
3482016004R00 - NRC Website

text

A Southern Nuclear December 19, 2016 Docket Nos.: 50-348 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Cheryl A. Gayheart Vice President-Farley Farley Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 470 Ashford, AL 36312 334.814.4511 tel 334.814.4575 fax cagayhea@ southemco.com NL-16-2595 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2016-004-00 Unapproved Environmental Qualification Material Caused lnoperability of One Containment Cooling Train Ladies and Gentlemen:

This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for Unit 1.

This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions regarding the submittal, please contact Ms. Julie Collier at (334) 814-4639.

Respectively submitted, Ms. C.

yheart Vice President - Farley CAG/JAC Enclosure: Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2016-004-00

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-16-2595 Page2 cc:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. S. E. Kuczynski, Chairman, President & CEO Mr. D. G. Bost, Executive Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer Mr. M.D. Meier, Vice President-Regulatory Affairs Mr. D. R. Madison, Vice President-Fleet Operations Mr. B. J. Adams, Vice President-Engineering Mr. C. R. Pierce, Regulatory Affairs Director Ms. B. L. Taylor, Regulatory Affairs Manager-Farley Mr. K. D. Miller, Operating Experience Coordinator-Farley RTYPE: CFA04.054 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms. C. Haney, Regional Administrator Mr. S. A. Williams, NRR Project Manager-Farley Mr. P. K. Niebaum, Senior Resident Inspector-Farley

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2016-004-00 Unapproved Environmental Qualification Material Caused lnoperability of One Containment Cooling Train

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ~PPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 1013112018 (11-2015)

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor. and a person is no

~ uired to respond to, the information collection.

~*PAGE Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000- I 348 1 OF 3

~*TITLE Unapproved Environmental Qualification Material Caused lnoperability of One Containment Cooling Train

5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED I SEQUENTIAL I REV NO ACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR ACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 10 20 2016 2016 004 -

00 12 19 2016

9. OPERATING MODE
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

D 20.2201

D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 6 D 20.2201 (d)

D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

D 20.2203(a)(1)

D 20.2203(a)(4}

D 50.73(a}(2}(iii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ix}(A)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

D 50.36(c)(1}(i}(A)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

D 50.73(a}(2)(x)

10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

D 73.71 (a)(4)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

D 50.36(c)(2)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

D 73.71 (a)(5) 0 D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv}

D 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

D 73.77(a)(1)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

D 73.77(a)(2)(i)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

~ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(vii}

D 73.77(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i}(C)

D OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in 348 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 2016 004 During Cycle 27 there were four periods during applicable modes when the 1 C Containment Cooler was the selected cooler for B train for a period greater than seven days:

14:19 on 5/4/2015 to 17:17 on 5/26/2015.......... 22 days 9:38 on 5/29/15 to 10:18on 6/22/2015.......... 24 days 1 :28 on 2/24/2016 to 3:37 on 7/13/2016.......... 140 days 0:52 on 8/10/2016 to 23:30 on 10/1/2016.......... 53 days There were no periods of concurrent inoperability for both the A and B trains of Containment Cooling, therefore this condition does not meet the reporting criterion for a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident, and is not reportable for 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v)(D).

The containment cooler system consists of two separate trains, of equal capacity, each capable of meeting the design bases. Each train is of sufficient capacity to supply 100 percent of the post accident heat removal design cooling requirements. Because there were no periods of concurrent inoperability for both the A and B trains of Containment Cooling, this condition did not significantly degrade plant safety, and the safety significance of this event is considered very low.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTION

The immediate corrective actions was the installation of an appropriately EO qualified splice suitable for use inside containment. Also there was additional training conducted subsequent to the installation of the splice for design engineering to strengthen understanding of design inputs. A new expectation to have a corporate environmental qualification specialist review design packages when working with EO component replacements was also implemented.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1) Failed Components:

The component did not fail. Its operability could not be supported for cycle 27 due to the untested configuration for EO purposes.

2) Previous Similar Events:

None

3) Other system affected:

No systems other than those mentioned in this report were affected by this event.

4) Commitment Information: This report does not create any licensing commitments
5)

Energy Industry Identification System Code: [BK]

REV NO.

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