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{{#Wiki_filter:NRC FORM 195 I2-70)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC D'ISTRIBUTION FDR Pa T 50 DOCKET MATERIAL DOCKET NUMBER 50-335 FILE NUMBER INCIDENT REPORT I N.C.Moseley F ioM: Flordia Power 8I Light Co.Miami, Floddia A.D.Schmidt DATE OF DOCUMENT 4-2-76 DATE RECEIVED 4-15-76 OI.ETTE R OORIGINAL@COPY DESCRIPTION ONOTORIZED SUNCLASSIFIED Ltr.trans th'e following.......
{{#Wiki_filter:NRC FORM 195                                           U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKET NUMBER I2-70)                                                                                              50-335 FILE NUMBER NRC D'ISTRIBUTION FDR Pa T 50 DOCKET MATERIAL                               INCIDENT REPORT I
PROP INPUT FORM NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED" 30 ENCLOSURE Reportable Occurrence k'6-1 Licensee Event Report on 3-3-76 Concerning the water level in the refueliyj cavity being below the top of the fuel transfer tube.......
F ioM: Flordia Power 8I Light Co.         DATE OF DOCUMENT N.C. Moseley                                                                        4-2-76 Miami, Floddia A.D. Schmidt                       DATE RECEIVED 4-15-76 OI.ETTE R                 ONOTORIZED         PROP                   INPUT FORM         NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED OORIGINAL              SUNCLASSIFIED                                                          "
~" (30 Cys.ReceivedI'No Original)ACKNOW/LEDGED DO NOT REMOVE PLANT NAME~St Luci e III]NOTE: XF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS XNVOLVED SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J COLLINS SAFETY BRANCH CHIEF.: W 3 CYS FOR ACTION LXC.ASST: W/CYS ACRS CYS FOR ACTION/INFORMATION Ziemann DiaaS ENT TO LA ENVIRO INTERNAL 0 R I BUTION IST NRC PDR 6cE 2 SCjIROEDER/IPPOLITO NOVAK CHECK.R IIES&N E TEDESCO MACCA BARR SHAO VOLLMER BUNG KRE E OL N LPDR'XC NSXC 1 cep EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION CONTROL NUMBER 3821 NRC FORM 10d (2-70I II I II 1~s~1'L~1~I N Aprj.l 2, 1976 PRN-LI-76-68 P.O.BOX 3100 MIAMI, FLOIIIOA 33101 ALIIS, I3~grill@FLORIDA POWER 5 LIGHT COMPANY p gHk'll g>sXS>II,>>~a~34egufatO~
    @COPY                                                                                            30 DESCRIPTION                                                    ENCLOSURE Reportable Occurrence k'6-1 Licensee Event Ltr. trans        th'e following.......                        Report on 3-3-76 Concerning the water level in the refueliyj cavity being below the top of the fuel transfer tube.......
y~~c&E Mr.Norman C.Moseley, Director, Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission 230 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 818 Atlanta,"Georgia 30303  
                                                            ~
(30 Cys. ReceivedI'No   Original)
ACKNOW/LEDGED DO NOT REMOVE PLANT NAME ~           St Luci e III ]                         NOTE:     XF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS XNVOLVED SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J     COLLINS SAFETY                             FOR ACTION/INFORMATION                ENVIRO BRANCH CHIEF.:                         Ziemann W 3 CYS FOR ACTION LXC. ASST:                             DiaaS W/ CYS ACRS         CYS               ENT TO LA INTERNAL 0 IST R I BUTION NRC PDR 6cE   2 SCjIROEDER/IPPOLITO NOVAK CHECK
      .R IIES         &N E TEDESCO MACCA BARR SHAO VOLLMER BUNG KRE E             OL   N EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION                                      CONTROL NUMBER LPDR'XC 1 cep NSXC                                                                                              3821 NRC FORM 10d (2-70I
 
II I II 1
1
    ~ s ~     'L
                ~ 1~
I N
 
P.O. BOX 3100 MIAMI, FLOIIIOA 33101
                                                          ~                             grill@
FLORIDA POWER 5 LIGHT COMPANY gHk       '
p ll Aprj.l 2,  1976                                g>sXS >
PRN-LI-76-68                                                  34egufatO~            ALIIS,  I3 II,>> ~a~
y~~ c&E Mr. Norman C. Moseley,     Director, Region     II Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 230 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 818 Atlanta,"Georgia 30303                                   '5(S8,'~I~glA


==Dear Mr Moseley:==
==Dear Mr Moseley:==
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-76-1 ST LUCIE UNIT 1 DATE OF OCCURRENCE:
gaS  CO~~ ~(A REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-76-1 ST LUCIE UNIT 1 DATE OF OCCURRENCE:   MARCH 3, 1976 BREACH OF   CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY The attached   Licensee Event Report is being submitted in ac-cordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30-day notification of the subject: occurrence.
MARCH 3, 1976 BREACH OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY'5(S8,'~I~glA gaS CO~~~(A The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted in ac-cordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30-day notification of the subject: occurrence.
Very truly yours,
Very truly yours, ,~g.gd~~A.D.Schmidt Vice President Power, Resources MRS/jn Attachment cc: Jack R.Newman, Esctuire Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30)Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3)I LPIN<G BUILD FLORIDA 3 rP A'7 Jl'~C CONTROL BLOCK: 1 UCENSEE NAME[pg~]F L S L S 1 7 89 14 15 LICENSEE EVENT 6 REPORT (P E PAINT ALL REQUIRED INFDAIVIATION)
  , ~g.gd~
LCENSE EVENT TYPE TYPE 4 1 1 1 1~03 25 26 30 31 32 REPORT REPORT CATEGORY.TYPE SOURCE[001]coN'T~~L L 7 8 57 58 59 60 EVENT OESCRIPTION Qo 2 During initial core OOCICET NUMBER EVENT OATE REPORT OATE 0 5 0 0 3 3 5 0 3 0 3 7 6 0 4 0 2 7 6 61 68 69 74 75 80 loading, the water level in the refueling cavity was 7 8 9~~'80[Jpg~]found to be approximately 2 inches below the top of the fuel transfer 7 89 tube.This was in conflict with the intent of Technical Specification 7 8 9 Qp5 3.9.4 which requires that, during refueling operations, there be no 7 89;*fgg~]direct access from containment to the outside atmosphere which is 80 80 80 COMPONENT s*MANUFACTURER N 47 7 8 9 PRME SYSTEM CAUSE COMPONENT COOE COOE COMPONENT COOS SUPPLER VQtATION Qpjp~FC~F Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z 9 9 9 7 8 9 10 11 12 17 43 44 48 CAUSE OESCRIPTION
~ A. D. Schmidt Vice President Power, Resources MRS/jn Attachment cc:   Jack R. Newman, Esctuire Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement               (30)
[op/The exact cause of the occurrence has not been determined.
Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3)
However, 80 7 8,9 Qos the water lost from the refueling cavity was traced to tanks in the 80 80 7 89 FA CIVVY STATUS 36 POWER s~oo o 7 8 9 10'2 13 FORM OF ACTIVffY COATENT...RELEASEO OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTNITY$12 Z-~Z.NA 7 8 9 10'11 PERSONNFL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE-OESCRIPTION
I   LPIN<G   BUILD FLORIDA
~s~oo o~z 7 8 9 11'2 13 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER OESCILPTION
 
~4 Loaoo J 7 8 9, 11 12 METHOD OF OISCOVERY OISCOVERY OESCRIPTION o erator OTHER STATUS NA a'0 44 45 46 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 80 44 45 NA 80 NA 80 PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 7 8 9 80 Qs o]E ui ment and Chemical Drain System and further investigation identified 7 8 9 LOSS OR OAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE OESCRIPTION t116 Z 7 89 10 PUBLICITY 7 8 9 NA NA NA 80 80~80 AOOITIONAL FACTORS Q1 g See a e two for continuation of Event and Cause descriptions.
3 rP A'7 Jl'~
7 8 9 7 89 M.A.Schopoman PHONE 305/552-3779 80 QPO CSI i CCT V'eportable Occurrence 335-76-1 Licensee Event Report Page Two Event Descri tion (continued) incapable of automatic isolation.
C
The immediate corrective action was to suspend core loading'nd restore the water level in the refueling cavity.Additional:
 
corrective action was to establish more frequent surveillance of the water level in the refueling cavity.This was the first occurrence of this type (335-76-1)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK:                                                                   (P      E  PAINT ALL REQUIRED INFDAIVIATION) 1                         6 UCENSEE                                                                                     LCENSE                EVENT NAME                                                                                         TYPE                TYPE
.Cause Descri tion (continued) two probable causes of the water transfer.First, the refueling cavity water level may have been lowered during, electrical checkout of the refueling canal sump pump motor.The sump pump was being tested concurrent with core loading and too much water may have been pumped from the refueling cavity to the Equipment and Chemical Drain System.Followup action was to place a clearance tag on the sump pump which prohibited use of the pump unless authorized by the Nuclear Plant Supervisor.
[pg~] F             L   S     L     S   1                                                                 4     1   1   1   1     ~03
Second, an'ncorrect valve lineup may have caused a'gradual decrease in water level.However, since it was necessary to change the position of certain valves in order to restore the refueling cavity water level,.it was not possible to verify that a valve lineup error had caused the'occurrence.
                    ~
Followup action after restoring water level was to confirm that all valve lineups which could affect refueling cavity water level were correct for the operating condition then in effect.k}}
7 89                                      14      15                                              25     26                     30   31     32 REPORT     REPORT                                                                                        REPORT OATE CATEGORY         .TYPE     SOURCE               OOCICET NUMBER                         EVENT OATE L          0   5   0       0     3   3   5       0   3     0   3     7   6       0   4     0   2   7   6
[001] coN'T                          ~L 7    8            57      58        59        60      61                                 68   69                         74   75                       80 EVENT OESCRIPTION Qo  2      During initial core loading, the water level in the refueling cavity was 7 8 9                                                                                     '                                                                   80
[Jpg~]
found           to     be   approximately ~
2   inches
                                                                          ~
below       the   top     of   the     fuel     transfer 7 89                                                                                                                                                           80 tube. This was in conflict with the intent of Technical Specification 7 8 9                                                                                                                                                           80 Qp5       3. 9. 4   which         requires           that,     during       refueling         operations,             there     be no 7 89;*                                                                                                                                                           80 fgg~]     direct access from containment to the outside atmosphere which is 7     8 9                                                                     PRME 80 a'0 SYSTEM         CAUSE                                             COMPONENT             COMPONENT s
* COOE           COOE                 COMPONENT COOS               SUPPLER             MANUFACTURER            VQtATION Qpjp     ~FC               ~F               Z   Z     Z   Z   Z   Z             Z             Z   9   9   9               N 7     8 9 10                   11       12                           17         43         44                 47          48 CAUSE OESCRIPTION
[op/       The exact cause                         of the occurrence has not been determined. However, 7 8,9                                                                                                                                                           80 Qos         the       water           lost       from     the   refueling           cavity       was   traced         to   tanks     in     the 7 8 9                                                                                                                                                            80 Qs  o] E ui ment and Chemical Drain System and further investigation identified 7     89                                                                                                                                                         80
                                        '2 FA CIVVY                                                                 METHOD OF STATUS               36 POWER                 OTHER STATUS            OISCOVERY                        OISCOVERY OESCRIPTION s               ~oo         o               NA                                                                    o  erator 7     8         9               10                   13                         44      45      46 FORM OF ACTIVffY           COATENT
        ...RELEASEO           OF RELEASE               AMOUNT OF ACTNITY                                               LOCATION OF RELEASE NA
$8 7
12 9
Z       -
                                  ~Z 10 '11
                                                  .          NA 44      45                                                                  80 PERSONNFL EXPOSURES NUMBER               TYPE     -
OESCRIPTION
~s ~oo                   o
                                '2~z                                   NA 80 7     8 9                 11               13 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER               OESCILPTION
~4 Loaoo J                                                               NA 80 7     8 9     ,           11     12 PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES NA 7     8 9                                                                                                                                                         80 LOSS OR OAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE           OESCRIPTION t116       Z                                                           NA 7     89             10                                                                                                                                         80 PUBLICITY NA 7     8 9                                                                                                                                                       ~ 80 AOOITIONAL FACTORS Q1 g       See         a e two             for continuation of Event                           and Cause         descriptions.
7     8 9 7     89                                                                                                                                                         80 M. A. Schopoman                                                         PHONE 305/552-3779 QPO CSI i CCT
 
Occurrence 335-76-1 V'eportable Licensee Event Report Page Two Event Descri             tion (continued) incapable of automatic isolation. The immediate corrective action was to suspend core loading'nd restore the water level in the refueling cavity. Additional: corrective action was to establish more frequent surveillance of the water level in the refueling cavity. This was the first occurrence of this type (335-76-1) .
Cause Descri tion (continued) two probable causes             of the water transfer. First, the refueling cavity water level may have been lowered during, electrical checkout of the refueling canal sump pump motor. The sump pump was being tested concurrent with core loading and too much water may have been pumped from the refueling cavity to the Equipment and Chemical Drain System.                 Followup action was to place a clearance tag on the sump pump which prohibited use of the pump unless authorized by the Nuclear Plant Supervisor. Second, an
'ncorrect valve lineup may have caused a 'gradual decrease in water level. However, since position  of          certain  valves  in it was necessary to change the order to restore the refueling cavity water           level, .it was not   possible the'occurrence.
to verify that a valve Followup action after lineup error             had caused restoring   water           level was to confirm that all valve lineups which could             affect refueling   cavity water level were correct for the operating             condition   then in effect.
k}}

Latest revision as of 03:31, 3 February 2020

LER 1976-001-00 for St. Lucie Unit 1, a Breach of Containment Integrity
ML18110A676
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/02/1976
From: Schmidt A
Florida Power & Light Co
To: Moseley N
NRC/IE, NRC/RGN-II
References
PRN-LI-76-68 LER 1976-001-00
Download: ML18110A676 (6)


Text

NRC FORM 195 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKET NUMBER I2-70) 50-335 FILE NUMBER NRC D'ISTRIBUTION FDR Pa T 50 DOCKET MATERIAL INCIDENT REPORT I

F ioM: Flordia Power 8I Light Co. DATE OF DOCUMENT N.C. Moseley 4-2-76 Miami, Floddia A.D. Schmidt DATE RECEIVED 4-15-76 OI.ETTE R ONOTORIZED PROP INPUT FORM NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED OORIGINAL SUNCLASSIFIED "

@COPY 30 DESCRIPTION ENCLOSURE Reportable Occurrence k'6-1 Licensee Event Ltr. trans th'e following....... Report on 3-3-76 Concerning the water level in the refueliyj cavity being below the top of the fuel transfer tube.......

~

(30 Cys. ReceivedI'No Original)

ACKNOW/LEDGED DO NOT REMOVE PLANT NAME ~ St Luci e III ] NOTE: XF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS XNVOLVED SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J COLLINS SAFETY FOR ACTION/INFORMATION ENVIRO BRANCH CHIEF.: Ziemann W 3 CYS FOR ACTION LXC. ASST: DiaaS W/ CYS ACRS CYS ENT TO LA INTERNAL 0 IST R I BUTION NRC PDR 6cE 2 SCjIROEDER/IPPOLITO NOVAK CHECK

.R IIES &N E TEDESCO MACCA BARR SHAO VOLLMER BUNG KRE E OL N EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION CONTROL NUMBER LPDR'XC 1 cep NSXC 3821 NRC FORM 10d (2-70I

II I II 1

1

~ s ~ 'L

~ 1~

I N

P.O. BOX 3100 MIAMI, FLOIIIOA 33101

~ grill@

FLORIDA POWER 5 LIGHT COMPANY gHk '

p ll Aprj.l 2, 1976 g>sXS >

PRN-LI-76-68 34egufatO~ ALIIS, I3 II,>> ~a~

y~~ c&E Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director, Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 230 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 818 Atlanta,"Georgia 30303 '5(S8,'~I~glA

Dear Mr Moseley:

gaS CO~~ ~(A REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-76-1 ST LUCIE UNIT 1 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: MARCH 3, 1976 BREACH OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted in ac-cordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30-day notification of the subject: occurrence.

Very truly yours,

, ~g.gd~

~ A. D. Schmidt Vice President Power, Resources MRS/jn Attachment cc: Jack R. Newman, Esctuire Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3)

I LPIN<G BUILD FLORIDA

3 rP A'7 Jl'~

C

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: (P E PAINT ALL REQUIRED INFDAIVIATION) 1 6 UCENSEE LCENSE EVENT NAME TYPE TYPE

[pg~] F L S L S 1 4 1 1 1 1 ~03

~

7 89 14 15 25 26 30 31 32 REPORT REPORT REPORT OATE CATEGORY .TYPE SOURCE OOCICET NUMBER EVENT OATE L 0 5 0 0 3 3 5 0 3 0 3 7 6 0 4 0 2 7 6

[001] coN'T ~L 7 8 57 58 59 60 61 68 69 74 75 80 EVENT OESCRIPTION Qo 2 During initial core loading, the water level in the refueling cavity was 7 8 9 ' 80

[Jpg~]

found to be approximately ~

2 inches

~

below the top of the fuel transfer 7 89 80 tube. This was in conflict with the intent of Technical Specification 7 8 9 80 Qp5 3. 9. 4 which requires that, during refueling operations, there be no 7 89;* 80 fgg~] direct access from containment to the outside atmosphere which is 7 8 9 PRME 80 a'0 SYSTEM CAUSE COMPONENT COMPONENT s

  • COOE COOE COMPONENT COOS SUPPLER MANUFACTURER VQtATION Qpjp ~FC ~F Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z 9 9 9 N 7 8 9 10 11 12 17 43 44 47 48 CAUSE OESCRIPTION

[op/ The exact cause of the occurrence has not been determined. However, 7 8,9 80 Qos the water lost from the refueling cavity was traced to tanks in the 7 8 9 80 Qs o] E ui ment and Chemical Drain System and further investigation identified 7 89 80

'2 FA CIVVY METHOD OF STATUS 36 POWER OTHER STATUS OISCOVERY OISCOVERY OESCRIPTION s ~oo o NA o erator 7 8 9 10 13 44 45 46 FORM OF ACTIVffY COATENT

...RELEASEO OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTNITY LOCATION OF RELEASE NA

$8 7

12 9

Z -

~Z 10 '11

. NA 44 45 80 PERSONNFL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE -

OESCRIPTION

~s ~oo o

'2~z NA 80 7 8 9 11 13 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER OESCILPTION

~4 Loaoo J NA 80 7 8 9 , 11 12 PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES NA 7 8 9 80 LOSS OR OAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE OESCRIPTION t116 Z NA 7 89 10 80 PUBLICITY NA 7 8 9 ~ 80 AOOITIONAL FACTORS Q1 g See a e two for continuation of Event and Cause descriptions.

7 8 9 7 89 80 M. A. Schopoman PHONE 305/552-3779 QPO CSI i CCT

Occurrence 335-76-1 V'eportable Licensee Event Report Page Two Event Descri tion (continued) incapable of automatic isolation. The immediate corrective action was to suspend core loading'nd restore the water level in the refueling cavity. Additional: corrective action was to establish more frequent surveillance of the water level in the refueling cavity. This was the first occurrence of this type (335-76-1) .

Cause Descri tion (continued) two probable causes of the water transfer. First, the refueling cavity water level may have been lowered during, electrical checkout of the refueling canal sump pump motor. The sump pump was being tested concurrent with core loading and too much water may have been pumped from the refueling cavity to the Equipment and Chemical Drain System. Followup action was to place a clearance tag on the sump pump which prohibited use of the pump unless authorized by the Nuclear Plant Supervisor. Second, an

'ncorrect valve lineup may have caused a 'gradual decrease in water level. However, since position of certain valves in it was necessary to change the order to restore the refueling cavity water level, .it was not possible the'occurrence.

to verify that a valve Followup action after lineup error had caused restoring water level was to confirm that all valve lineups which could affect refueling cavity water level were correct for the operating condition then in effect.

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