ML19241B293

Complaint & Memo of Particulars Supporting Motion for Preliminary Injunction.Plant Is Immediate Threat to Persons Living within 50 Mile Radius.Supporting Documentation Encl

ML19241B293
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	07/09/1979
From:	Lodge T TOLEDO COALITION FOR SAFE ENERGY
To:
Shared Package
ML19241B291	List: ML19241B290 ML19241B292 ML19241B293
References
RTR-NUREG-0396, RTR-NUREG-396 NUDOCS 7907130521
Download: ML19241B293 (32)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY AND ) DOCKET NO. 50-346 THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING )

COMPANY ) COMPLAINT

) AND DAVIS-EESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, ) MEMORANCUM OF UNIT NO. 1 ) PAETICULARS

)

1. Co=plainant Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy (TCSE) is a nonprofit corporation under the laws of Ohio, and is a coalition of customers of Toledo Edison Co=pany (TEco) with the co==on ai=s of pursuing saf ely-produced, equitably-priced energy, utilizing all legal devices of civil redress and action. Most of the me=bership of TCSE lives within a twenty-five (25) =ile radius of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Statien, Unit No. 1 (Davis-Besse), and stand to suffer 1r-reparable personal injury, da= age and loss in the event of a serious accident at Davis-Besse. 307 (%5A(

2. The Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station is, f =a generic design standpoint, closely related to the Eabcock &

Wilcor nuclear reactor Three Mile Is'_and II, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (TMI). In fact, because of defective design and personnel procedures which gave rise to the serious ac-cident at TMI on March 28, 1979, this Co==ission ordered TEco and its co-licensee of Davis-Besse. Cleveland. Electric Illuminating Co=pany (CEI) to i=ple=ent certain design changes and personnel retraining prior to NRC authorization to re-start Davis-3 esse. This order of the NRC issued May 16, 1979 3 On April 24 1979, TCSE by letter co=plained to Ja=es Keppler of NRC-Chicago of operating deficiencies at; "{ , j so

- Davis-Besse, and of certain discrepancies, inadequacies and deficiencies in r=ergency and evacuation preparations for Davis-Besse, said preparations having been =ade by TECo and the State of Ohio, Disaster Services Agency.

4. This Co==ission notified Co=plainant TCSE on Jane 1, 1979 of its decision to treat the TCSE letter of April 24, 1979 as a " Request for Action Under 10 CFE 81.206." As of this date, the N?C has indicated an intention to process TCSE's Co= plaint.

5 This Co==ission is required by 42 U.S.C. 82232 to recaire licensees of special nuclear material to provide such information as the "Co==ission =ay, by rule or regulation, dee= necessary in order to enable it to find that the.util-ization or production of special nuclear =aterial. . .will pro-vide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public.."

Pursuant to that statute and relevant NEC guidelines, each licensee of a nuclear power plant =ust docu=ent the estab-lish=ent of e=ergency and evacuation procedures to protect public health and safety. .

6. 'Ihere are certain characteristics of the e=ergency plans for Davis-Besse as detailed hereafter in this Co= plaint and Me=orandu= of Particulars, which, taken in some instances individually, as well as severally and collectively, pose a substantial and 1==ediate thraat to the property and ohysical well-being of TCSE =e=bers and to the public at large within a fifty (50) =11e radius of Davis-Besse'.. Said characteristics of e=ergency preparations will continue to pose an i==inent threat until they are revised to reflect NEC guideline =an-dates, suggestive indicators and the rational dictates of,

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coc=on sense.

7. The licensees of Davis-Besse, TECo and CEI, have failed to for=ulate a comprehensive, workable and dependable emergency and evacuation plan, and have thus ignored federal require =ents, with the result of placing residents within 50 miles of the plant in unnecessary danger.

3. Licensees have failed to abide by the specifications and needed actions outlined in their own already-deficient e=ergency and evacuation plan, ignoring federal regulations and suggestions and exposing residents within a 50 mile radius to unnecesrary peril in the event of a nuclear accident.

9. The operational record of Davis-Besse is so poor with respect to performance che.racteristics and safety censures that an effective, co=prehensive and workable e=ergency and evacuation setup is needed to ensure the health and welfare of residents within a 50 mile radius..

10. Complainant TCSE hereby alleges that the tech-nical pleadings herein constitute = ore than sufficient grounds in support of a Prell=inary Injunction or such other restraining order available to the NRC to enjoin oper-ations at Davis-Besse until corrections and modifications have been completed to both the utility and state e=ergency and evacuation plans.

I.

THE PLANNING RADIUS KNOWN AS THE LOW POPULATION ZONE (LPZ) IN THE DAVIS-BESSE EMERGENCY PLAN IS INSUFFICIENT AND INAPPROPRIATE TO GUARANTEE PUB-LIC HEALTH AND SAFETY

11. Complainant hereby re-alleges and incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 10 of this Complaint.

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12. The "ravis-Besse Nuclear Power Station F=ergency Plan" (Utility Plan) designates a circular Low Population Zone (LPZ) having a radius of two (2) miles, using the plant as the centerpoint. " Final Safety Analysis Report of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station," Appendiz 13-D (Utility Plan),

Figure 4-1 at p. 41.. It is this LPZ which has been set forth by Licensees of Eavis-Besse, to which e=ergency and evacuation measures are addressed in the Utility Plan and the 'Dttawa County Radiological E=ergency Plan" (Ottawa County Plan, attached hereto as Appendix I). See generally Utility Plan E!b.2.2.1(a) at p. 19, 5 3.1.4 at p. 24; and County Plan, aa3 01, 5 0151.

Section 100 3 of the Code of Federal Reaulations, at (b) defines " Low Population Zone" as "the area i==ediately sur-rounding the exclusion area which contains residentc, the total nu=ber and density of which are such that there is a reasonable probability that accrocriate protective reasures could be taken in their behalf in the event of a serious

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accident." In light of this standard, Licensees' use of a two-=11e e=ergency planning radius is highly illogical and inappropriate for numerous reasons. For one, the Utility Plan LPZ ignores the very authoritative suggestion that a ten (10) =11e zone be utilized for LPZ purposes. See

" Planning Easis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological E=ergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water huclear Power Plants"(' Planning Basis"),

NUREG-0396, Dece=ber, 1978 (attached hereto as Append 1I II),

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at 16. " Planning Easis" was compiled in late 1978 by a task force consisting of NBC and EPA officials, ranging in rank and prestige as high as the NRC Assistant Director for E=ergency Pr epar ednes s. Of fice of State Programs; the NBC Assistant Director for Engineering and Projects; and the EPA Direc tor, Environmental Analysis Division, Office of Radiation Programs.

Staff engineers, physicists and other technical specialties were also directly involved in the study.

The stated purpose behind " Planning Basis" is to provide a basis for Federal, State and local govern-ment e=ergency preparedness organizations to determine thb appropriate degree of e=eraency response planning efforts in the environs of nuclear power plants.(Id.

at 1)

The study identified two " predominant [Eadiation7 exposure pathways" around a . nuclear plant which require consideration for e=ergency planning purposes. Id. at 9 One is a " plume exposure pathway," defined as that area in wnich there would be a high possibility of "whole body external exposure" and "inhalat$on exposure" fro = an airborne radiation release. Id.

The time for potential exposure within this pathway "could range from hours to days." Id.

" Planning Basis" also identified an " ingestion expo-sure pathway," within which radiation exposure might occur from consu=ption.of contaminated water or foods such,as milk or fresh vegetables. Id. at 10. The time for potential exposure could range in length from hours to conths. Id.

The authors of " Planning Easis" have reco=cended that a ten (10) =11e radius be utilized for the low population zone c

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_6-around a light water reactor such as Davis _Besse. Id. at 16.

The EPZ /e=ergency planning zone 7 reco== ended is of sufficient size to provide dose savings to the pop-ulation in areas where the projected dose fro design basis accidents could be expected to exceed the ap-plicable PAGs / Protective Action Guides, federally-set " trigger" levels of radiation "to assist public health and other governmental authorities in deciding how much of a radiation hazard in the environ =ent constitutes a basis for initiating e=ergency protective actions,"'id. at 3,h7 under unfavorable at=ospheric conditions. Id. at 16.

Co=plainant TCSE asserts that the two (2) =ile LPZ/EPZ radius utili=ed by Licensees for Davis-Eesse is not consonant with the knowledg eable and reasonable reco==endation of 10

=1les which technically astute personnel fro = the NEC suggested in " Planning Easis:"*

.../Y7he Task Force concluded that about a 10 =ile Emergency Planning Zone for the plume exposure path-way was justified to assure that predetermined actions would be planned in those areas where PAGs could be exceeded in the event of a release co= parable to a design basis accident. Id. at I-34 13 10 CFR 5100 3(a), suora paragraph 12, requirec the LPZ around a nuclear facility to be so designed as to assure a "reascnable probability" of taking protective

=easures on behalf of the public in the event of accident.

Co=plainants sub=1t that Lic ensees for Davis-Besse have flatly failed to meet this " reasonable probability" cri-

• It is i=portant to note that the plume and ingestion ex-posure pathways were considered highly nacessary by the NRC/

EPA authors of " Planning Basis" despite the then-perceived extre=ely low probability of a so-called " Class 9" or most disastrous nuclear core =eltdown. The authors of " Planning Basis" concluded that "there is about a 1% chance of emer-gency plans being activated in the U.S. beyond the reco= men .

ded EPZ's within the next few years" (e=phasis in original).

Id. at I-10. This s=ugness arose from the fact that in Nove=ber, 1978, when the Task Force was drafting its study, c.

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terion by using a totally inadequate two =ile radius for pur-poses of evacuation planning.. In fact, 10 CyE S100.11(a) provides an aid to nuclear plant license applicants: "assu=e a fission produce /Jic,7 release from the core, the expected de=onstrable leak rate from the contain=ent and the =eteor-ological conditions pertinent to his site to derive an eIclu-sion area, a low population zone and population c enter dis-tance."

Nowhere in the Utility Plan do Licensees discuss the er-pected de=onstrable leak rate nor meteorological conditions in deriving a two mile radius LPZ. Moreover Tootnote 1 to 10 CFR 8100.ll(a) adds that The fission product release assu=ed for t ese cal-culations should be based upon a major acc ident, hypothesized.for purposes of site analysi.' cr pos-tulated fro considerations of possible a;cidental events, that would result in potential hazards not exceeded by those fro = any accid ent cons! dered cred-ible.. Such accidents have generally be.. aesuned to result in substantial =eltdown of the core with subsequent release of appreciable que.ntities of fission products..

it relied upon the low probabilities of severe core =elt-down and radiation release as calculated in Reactor Safety Study, WASE-1400, otherwise known as the "Fas=ussen Report."

That report was specifically disavowed and repudiated by the Nuclear Regulatory Cc==issioners on January 18, 1979, when the Co==ission stated that "it does not regard as re-liable the Reactor Safety Study's numerical estimate of the overall risk of a reactor accident." l UCS Nucleus 3 (May, 1979). In light of this significant official policy shif t, it is quite likely that =uch more e=phasis needs to be put upon imple=enting the 10-=ile LPZ concept. It beco=es even more crucial in light of the de facto RSS debunking epito-

=1:ed by Three Mile Island, where it 'will be reme=bered tha*. pregnant =others and children were urged to voluntarily evacuate a five =ile radius area around the reactor.

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In consideration of the fact that Davis-Besse is a Eabcock & Wilcox reactor like TMI, with design and personnel procedure problem.g merely underscores the need for Licensees and NRC officials to set about i= mediately to bring e=er-gency and evscuation plans for Davis-Besse into compliance with 8100.11 by expanding the planning radius to 10 miles..

LICEISEES HAVE FAILED TO CCNSIDER MORE THAN ONE FOSSIELE OFFSITE ACCIDHIT SEQUEICE IN SELECTING AN ADEOUATE EVACUATION RADIUS , PLACING NEARBY RESIEENTS CUTSIDE THE PRESaiT RADIUS IN UNNEC-ESSARY DAtiGER

14. . Complainant TCSE hereby incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 13 of this Complaint..

15 The Davic-Besse emergency accident sequence for offsite mobilization of evecuation resources conte = plates only a sequence which would involve evacuation in a cir-cumbscribed 2-c11e radius..

16. " Planning Easis," suora paragraph 13,at 8, concludes that it is not possible to choose only one accident sequence and remain credible in emergency / evacuation planning:- "/Jhe Task Force 7 deter =ined that a single accident for a light water reactor nuclear power plant cannot be identified as a planning basis" (e=phasis added).

17. The Utility Plan contains no mention of either the "plu=e exposure pathway" or the " ingestion exposure pathway" nor does it utilize any such descriptive approach.

This contradicts the " Planning Basis" findings that "a single emergency plan would include elements con =on to assessing or taking protec tive actions for both pathways." Id..at 10.

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_9 LICEiSEES' FROVISIONS FCR OFFSITE TREATMENT OF RADIATICN VICTIMS ARE GBCSSLY INADEQUATE, WHOLLY UNWORKAELE AND DO NOT EEFINITIVELY FROVIDE FOR TRANSPORT AND TREATMENT

18. Complainant TCSE hereby incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 17 of this Complaint..

19 An NRC document, " Standard For=at and content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Flants - L'n'R Edition,"

NUREG-75/094 (" Regulatory cuide a ), advises plant licensees at E1.70.14 to identify and formulate arrangements with two (2) hospitals for treat =ent of radiological accident vic cims and to provide other medical planning linkages in utility emergency plans..

20. Li.:ensees' Utility Plan includes the following contractual or cooperative arrangements for e=erEency =ed-ical services in five (5) docu=ents. See Utility Plan, Appendix 3 at 55. Letter of Agreement froc Drs. Kenneth L.

Akinc. V.W. Wagner and G.V. Crisologo; at 56-8, Letter of Agree =ent with Radiation Management Corporation; at 60, Letter of Agree =ent with Ottawa County Board of Health; at 61 Letter of Agree =ent with Robinson Funeral Home, Inc.;

at 63, Letter of Agreement with Robert Dumminger, Admin-1strator of H.B. Magruder Me=orial Hospital.

21. Taken individually or as a system of e=ergency medical arrangements, these commitments are insufficient and ineffective.

22. The letter from the three doctors, id. at 55. con-tains several inadequacies on 'its face.. The three ev$dently operate in some relationship to Magruder Hospital, according

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to the letterhead, which is Magruder's. According to the ter=s of the agree =ent, only one of the three would be avail-able for emergencies at any given time.. That individual would " respond to an accid ent at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station provided, in our judaement fric7 no other uraent medical duties creclude our availability" (emphasis added). Thus there is no real ausrantae of the availability of even one physician should an accident of any size occur..

23 The Magruder Hospital apparently has facilities to accommodate some 80 radiological victi=s. See Testi=ony of Kathy Westby and Janis White Before the Citizens' Com-

=ission on Nuclear Power in Ohio, May 5, 1979 (attached as Appendix III); Westby and White conducted a study of Davis-Besse evacuation plans for Ohio Public Interest Research Group. At =ost, ther6 is only one doctor to treat 80 cases or more. Given the awful severity of many radiation injur-les, that is a questionable and insufficient arrange =ent..

2 4.. The Radiation Management Corporation letter (RMC), id.

at 56-8 contains many deficiencies. Apart from its reference to coordination and u=piring of drills which have never oc-curred, there are other statements for which evidence is lacking: ,

- RMC agreed to " establish the procedures for coordina-ting the local medical emergency support with the central sup-port facilities in Philadelphia" (the second hospital osten-cibly for which services have been contrac ted for). There is no reference whatsoever in any other part of the Utility Plan , o 7, 1

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to the for=ulation tf any transportation arrange =ents to Philadelphia. This is inconsistent and inercusable.

- even the =edical emergency transportation arrange-

=ents which do appear in the Utility Plan, Robinson Funeral Home at 61, are phantom in nature. The OPIEG study mentioned sucra paragraph 23 abova indicated that Robinson sold its ambulance business to another firm. There has been no revision of the Utility Plan in the form of new or alter-native provisions!.' Given the likely s=all size of a rural a=bulance servic e, it would nonetheless be highly probative whether Robinson or any local successor provider could supply adequate vehicle availability.

- RMC promises to " annually review and take reco==en-dations for updating the =edical emergency plans such reviews and reco==endations specifically covering the adequacy of medical equipment and supplies, the degree of_ training of involved personnel, and the efficacy of existing procedures.."

If RMC has perfor=ed such updating services, they are nowhere evident on the face of the Utility Plan. As mentioned pre-viously, no changes in =edical support procedures have been entered in that portion of the Utility Plan since October, 1975 25 The letter of the Ottawa County Board of nealth, i'd . at 60, is a =odel of ambiguity. The Board states that it has no prepared plan on file cencerning radioactive material, accidental spills or fall-out proc edures. Yet the Board acknowledges that "it would be under the jurisdiction of this ,

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department to take uction it such an accident would happen."

From the date of this correspondence (March 30 1973) it was apparently successfully passed off to the AEC as part of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Eeport!.

Further, the moard states that it "would have available personnel that could evaluate conditions and carry out the nec essary proc edure to conde=n food produc ts.." Precisely what " conditions" would be evaluated is not clarified. There is no description of conitoring equipment, :onitoring frequency, or =ethodology as to how food products would be conde=ned, nor how radioactively contacinsted food would be disposed of..

26. As if these deficiences do not reveal a chaotic and decidedly inept set of e=ergency medical plans, the =ost recent (and presumably =ost applicable) Ottawa County Radio-logical Emergency Plan (County Plan. _sucra in paragraph 12 above)' makes no mention whatsoever of Magruder Hospital, any ambulanc e servic e, or any Danis-Serse area lectors as being cooperating entities in its . Jion of health pro-cedures. This is incomprehensible in 11gnt of tne County Plan's " purpose and scope" statement (53 01), to the effect that "the Ottawa County governmental agencies will act as necessary to insure [ sic 7 public safety and prevent radiation indury to the populace of the area designated as the Low Pcp-ulation Zone 1- the event of a release or potential release of radioactiv s . ;erial from the Davis-Eesse Nuclear Power Station."

It would be incredible to assu=e that a radiological n o[g cu

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_13-consultant firm such as RMC. which is supposedly under con.

tract to coordinate and consult with local hospital and health authorities, would not be in extensive contact with governmental health officials during a major radiological accident at Davis-Besse - yet RMC is not mentioned in the County Plan.*

THE UTILITY ASSIGNS EXCESSIVE TASKS AND RESPONSI6 SILITIES TO THE PLANT SHIFT FOREMAN, WEICH COULD NOT REALISTICALLY BE ADDRESSED DURING AN EMER-GENCY SITUATION

27. Complainant TCSE hereby incorporates and re-alleges the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 26 herein.

28. The Utility Plan, in identifying tasks for the Plant Shift Foreman throughout Section 4.-- of the Utility Plan, assigns excessive and thereby i=possible to perform tasks in the event of e=ergency, creating doubts as to the ability of TE00 of ficials to respond speedily, adequately.

and effectively.

29 A sampling of assignments of the Shift Foreman include:

- taking charge of the plant and supervising all energency procedures;

- announcing the location, type and classification of the emergency to the media;

• In f ac t, OPIRG researchers, suora paragraph 23 above, found that the Magruder Hospital administrator with which EMC is to consult is unaware of HMC's support status or existence. This merely underscores the pri=1tive status of emergency arrangements.

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- supervising *a coordinated evaluation of station con-ditions on a continuing basis:

- supervising an evaluation of radiation levels on a con-tinuing basis;

- notifying Ottawa County Sheriff's Department of the situation and advising them of the areas affected;

- making notations on meteorological conditions;

- notify 11:g officials at the NRC-Chicago Operations Office anc inforcing them of problemt,

- directing evacuation of personnel to a safe onsite assembly area:

- notifying Detroit Edison Co. and Consumers Power Company and apprising the: of the accident and recuesting assistance if needed:

- sounding the evacuation alar =;

- notifying the Oak Harbor Fire Department upon de-termining the need for fire fighting personnel;

- securing ambulance service (which should be especial-ly difficult since it is documented elsewhere, suora paragraph 24 above, that there is no ambulance service under contract, which service would have to be willing to transport conta=-

inated radiological accident victims);

- updating the media through a second accident an-nounce=ent;

- notifying Magruder Hospital and =aking preparations for treatment of accident victi=s;

- determining the cause and extent of the offsite n y g 1 L CJ "1

emergency; *

- notifying the Radiation Management Corporation, ad-vising them of the situation, and requesting their assistance;

- notifying the station superintendent or his desig-nated alternate and requesting assistance of additional offsite personnel;

- notifying the Ohio Disaster Services Agency, advi-sing them as to the details of the incident, and prepara-tions for their assistance;

- work with the Disaster Services Agency to help pre-pare evacuation procedures and relocation centers.

30. . Instead of assigning separate and distinct re-sponsibilities to a team of capable utility officials, the Utility Plan delegates too =uch responsibility to one person's discretion. The sheer time consu=ption of so central a =an-agement setup cannot afford prompt protective action in the event of an emergency. Such overburdening handicaps emergency efforts, makes quick and responsive procedures impossible, and would have the ef f ect of placing the lives of nearby res-idents in unnecessary danger..

31. The management approach adopted by the Utility Plan fails to comply with NEC regulations requiring proper training of personnel and offsite oersons. See 10 CFR Part 50, Appen-dir E(IV)(g) :

_dhe emergency plans shall contain7[~p_7rovisions for training of employees of the licensee wno are assigned specific authority and responsibility in the event of n o '7 l L G-jJ( 'I

an emergency.and of other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiation emergency.

The Utility Plan includes no arrangements for the training and/or indoctrination of all offsite groups and individuals responsible for in cost instances implementing the bulk of emergency protection actions..*

LICENSEES EAVE ? AILED TO COMPLY WITH NEC GUIDANCE CONCERNING THE IDENTI?ICATION OF MILK PROCESSING PLANTS IN THE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZCNE

32. Co=plainant TCSE hereby incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 31 herein.

33 " Planning Basis" sets out a radius of 10 to 50 miles wherein it advises protective actions to minimize subsequent contamination of milk or other food. Id. at 12 and 16 3h. The Utility Plan makes no note whatsoever of the existence of at least one milk plant within the radius of ten (10) =11es of Davis-Besse. The Chatteau Drive-In Dairy,1817 Route 163, Lakeside, Ohio, is a milk processing facility located approximately sir (6) =iles from Davis-Besse, well within the range of even a TMI-type nuclear accident.. Neither this plant nor any other key food proces_

sing facilities are identified or addressed in the Utility Plan.

• 0PIRG, suora paragraph 23 above, quotes the fire chief of the Village of Oak Hafbor, with which Licensees have formal arrange =ents. Utility Plan, suora at 6h, as saying that TECo officials told hl= "we don't have any of that wicked stuff

/Eeaning plutoniug7 here at the plant. Besides, the stuff we c ,,3 do have decays quickly."

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THE LIC5 SEES' FAVE FAILED TO CCNDUCT F1.EEGLCY DRILLS, IN CCNTRADICTION OF NRC GUIDELINES AND THEIR OWN ALLEGED AERANGEMENTS 35 Co=plainant TCSE hereby incorporates 2nd re-alleges the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 3h herein.

36. 10 CFR Part 50, AppendiI E(IV)(I) requires nuclear licensees to establish Provisions for testing, bz ceriodic drills, of radia-tion e=ergency plans to assure that employees of the licensee are familiar with their specific duties, and provisions for participation in the drills by other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiatien emergency. (e=phasis added)

37. As of the date of this Complaint, Licensees have never conducted any drills on or off the Davis-Besse site, with cooperating officials of federal, state and local govern-

=ents, or private parties.

33. Licensees included in the Utility Plan certain Letters of Agreement with private, state, federal and local 2

governmental entities. See generally Utility Plan, Append 1I 3.

39. In no less that five (5) of said Letters of Agreement, specific reference is made to the signatory parties' partici-pation in the formulation, conduct and/or implementation of periodic emergency drills in cooperation with Davis-Besse officials. Those Letters include the Ottawa County Sheriff, id. at 65; village of cak Harbor, id. at 64; Magruder Hos-pital, id. at 63; Robinson Funeral Home, id. at 61; and Radiation Management Corporation, id. at 56-8.

40. Each of the five subject letters in paragraph 39 above was entered into Licensees' Utility Plan as of October,

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1975, nearly four (4) years prior to the date of this Com-plaint, yet there has never been any drill or similar par-ticipatory activity conducted which has involved any of the signatories of said letters or their agents.

41. The study conducted by OPIEG, sucra paragraph 23 above, in the first few :onths of 1979 revealed that con-tact parties in Licensees' Letters of Agreecent wer.e vague or unaware as to their duties, the scope of their cot =itments and/or the range of the potential e=ergency hazard scenarios in the event of a Davis-Besse offsite emergency. Some er-a=ples:

- as =entioned previously, the Oak Harbor fire chief minimized the dangers of radioactivity. Suora paragraph 31, fn.

- as mentioned previously, the Magruder Hospital ad-ministrator was unaware of the backup availability of the University of Pennsylvania Hospital through the Radiation Management Corporation. Suora paragraph 26, fn.

- the Ottawa County Sheriff was not knowledgeable of the potential widespread da= age of a large-scale nuclear accident. He cor=ented upon his department's flood evac-uation experience, quite a different emerg ency action, with

= ore potential response time.

- the Shift Foreman at Davis-Besse, according to the Utility Plan, is to notify offsite emergency groups in the event of "offsite high radiation" and offsite "high [radiatic[7 airbcrne activity" accidents. Id. EE.2.l(a) and S4.2.2.1(a).

By contrast, the =ost recent revision of the County Plan

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indicates (at n5 0111) that Sheriff will be responsible for provideing /Jic7 a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> operation to serve as a notification point of contact by DENPS to receive warning relative to radiological incident.

At a5 0112, the County Plan indicates that " Sheriff will provide notification and warning to all County and State agencies..." The problem is, the technical information about a radiological emergency which would be of certinence to ag ene.ies with varying informational needt, according to function must be filtered through a sheriff's office staff. Information such as radiation levels of a leakage may not be important to a roadblocking sheriff or Civil Defense officials without confir=ation of medical effects fro =, say, the Board of Health or Magruder Hospital.. There is =uch potential for =1sinfor=ation and consecuent loss of time if the Sheriff's office is solely responsible for dis-semination of technical data to agencies with compler roles.

The Ohio risaster Services Agency, author of County Plan, apparently does not clearly grasp the need for a defined and sophisticated informational linkage with the utility.

42. For the NEC to allow this situation to continue unabated places the public in the vicinity of Davis-Besse in im=inent danger from even a relatively s=all offsite radio-active leakage..

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LICENSEES HAVE FAILED TO QUANTIFY ESTIMATED E7ACUATION TIMES AND EXPECTED REQUIRED TIMES TO NOTIFY THE PCP-ULATION IN THE LPZ 43.- Complainant TCSE hereby incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 42 herein.

44 10 CFR Part 50, Appendir E(IV(C) and (D) require Licensees to have in their emergency plans:

C. Means for determining the =agnitude of the release of radioactive materials, including criteria for de-termi'. ling the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies and the Atomic Energy Co=-

mission

• and other Federal agencies, and criteria for determining when protective =sasures should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety and. prevent health and safety and prevent damage to property; D. Procedures for notifying, and agreements reached with local, State, and Federal of ficials and agencies for the early warning of the public and for public evacuation or other protective =easures should such warning, evacuation or other protective measures beco=e necessary or desirable, including identification of the principal officials, by title and agencies...

" Regulatory Guidi 31.70.14, sucra paragraph 19 above, requires esti=ates of evacuation times of residents and transients

" projected as peak values during the life of the plant."

The se=e ref erence also requires utility emergency plans to specify an expected accident time, and the time required to notify the population, with data to back up both.

45 The instant Utility Plan contains no such in-for:ation.. A co=plete and exhaustive postulation of time needs and availability during a radiological accident or accidents of differing magnitudes is quintessential to

• This quotation was excerpted from the 1979 edition of 10 CFR. Eas it really been five years since an NEC official has read this portion of the NEC guidelines? ^

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adequate e=ergency planning.. The consequent need for spec-ification of notificatien procedures for cooperating e=er-gency agencies and the public speaks for itself.

46. " Planning Basis", suora paragraph 12 above, places considerable emphasis upon an understanding of the time fac-tors associated with releases of radiation:

The Reactor Safety Stady indicates, for example, that major releases =ay begin in the range of one-half hour to as =uch as 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> after an initiating event and that the duration of the releases =ay range fro = one-half hour to several days with the rajor portion of the release occurring well within the first day. In addition, significant plume travel times are associated with the =ost adverse =eteorological conditions that might result in large potential exposures far fro = the site. For exa=ple, under poor dispersion conditions associated with low windspeeds, two hours or core

=1ght be required for the plu=e to travel a distance of five =11es. Higher windspeeds would result in shorter travel ti=es but would provide more dispersion.

=aking high exposures at long distances =uch less likely.

If. at 18.

Table 2 at page 20, id., esti=ates that radioactive material could be =ostly released fro = 0 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to 1 day af ter the start of the release fro = plant containment. It is utterly naive, therefore, for public officials such as the Ottawa County Sheriff to assu=e that a radiological e=ergency evac-uation would be possible under the = ore flexible time con-straints of a flooding Lake Erie. And r.s is reinted out in " Planning Easis," "the time available f or action is strongly related t.o the time consu=ed in notification that conditions exist that could cause a =ajor release or that a

=ajor release is occurring. Develoc=ent and periodic testina of procedures for racid notification are encoursaed" (e phasis

-l added). Evidently and unfortunately, this self-evident re- 7 1 "J)

L E, b I lationship has been lost upon Licensees, who have never ~

conducted " periodic testing of procedures for rapid notifi-cation" at all. The wisdo: of the NEC/ EPA professionals in

" Planning Basis" is notably absent from the judgment exer-cised by the NRC in approving a woefully deficient Utility Plan.*

LICENSEES HAVE COMPLETELY OMITTED FROM THE UTILITY PLAN ANY IDENTIFICATION OF EGRESS RCUTES AND THEIR CAPACITY CHARACTERISTICS, AND EAVE SUMMARILY FAILED TO IDENTIFY LPZ RESIDENTS EAVING SPECIAL EVACUATION NEEDS

47. Co=plainant TC3E hereby incorporates and.re-al-leges the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 46 herein.

48. " Regulatory Guide" El.70.14, sucra paragraph 19 above, requires utility emergency plans to specify po.

tential egress routes and their traffic capacity charac-teristics within the boundaries of the LPZ around a nuclear facility.

49. Nowhere in their already-deficient Utility Plan do Licensees include any maps, diagrams, data or =eaningful discussion of escape routes.**

50. Neither Utility Plan nor County Plan, sucra para-graph 12 above, have id entified any resident populations within the inadequately-drawn LPZ which may have special transportation

• Northwest Ohio has twice experienced catastrophically para-lyzing blizzards, in the winters of 1976-77 and 1977-78. What response do Licensees have to the potential of a core melt-down and radiation leakage during conditions of such neteor-ological severity and population i==obility?

• • In light of growing and, for the foreseeable future, per-ranent shortages and uncertainty concerning the availability of.gesoline, Co=plainant TCSE urges that NRC require Licensees to id entify and set aside stockpiles of fuel to be made avail-able to the public freely in the event of evacuation. ,

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needs in the event of evacuation, vils, hospitals, nursing homes, individua'l eldarly or handicapped households, persons without private motor vehicles, etc.

51. The Utility Plan and the County Plan fail to in-clude any data or reference to planning linkages with pro-fessional planning organizations with expertise in trans-portation planning and population density information, all of which is publicly-available. These include at a mini =u=

the Toledo Metropolitan Area Council of Governcents, which includes Ottawa County within its planning jurisdiction and which has been designated by the U.S. Depart =ent of Transport-ation as the regional transportation ;Lanning body; and the Ottawa County Planning Commission, a county agency.

52. Complainants urge that neither the Utility Plan nor the County Plan evidence any satisfactory or reascnable provision for special needs populations, and especially that no effort has reasonably been put forth by Licensees or the State of Chio. Disaster Services Agency, to utilize avail-able resources in developing these and other planning elements. -

LICENSEES HAVE EAD SINCE AT LEAST 1975 To UPDATE, REVISE AND UPGEADE THE STATUS OF DAVIS-BESSE EMERGENCY PLANS 53 Complainant TCSE.hereby incorporates and re-alleges the paragraphs 1 through 52 herein. -

54 10 CFH Part 50, Append 1I E(IV)(3) requires licensees to

=aintain. in utility e=ergency planc:

Provisions for maintaining up to date: 1. The organ-ization for coping with emergencies. 2. the procedures for use in e=ergencies, and 3. the lists of persons with special qualifications for coping with e=ergency con- r ditions;... 1 gs3 f3 bI

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55 Licensees have failed, on the f ac e of their Utility Plan and as detailed elsewhe2e in this Complaint, to either provide comprehensively for tpdating the status of the Util-ity Plan, or to actually update it. Since October, 1975, nine (9) minor.cinsubstantial and inconsequential revisions have been made to the Utility Plan.

56. Licensees have had nearly four (4) years, since the filing of their Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), to revise and prove the viability, workability and eff ec tiveness of their Utility Plan as written, through drills and continuous eva l..ations as required by NEC regulations, sucra paragraph 54 above.. Licensees have curther had the sa=e period of time to coordinate and cooperate with the State of Chio, Disaster Services Agency, to cone up with something more conclusive than the " draft copy" County Plan which the stats government is pawning off as a statement of emergency readiness. Com-plainant TCSE would e=phatically repeat that emergency plans should have been formulated and in place and proven workable EEy0RE Davis-3 esse was ever allowed to start up in the first plac e. Neither Licensees nor the State of Ohio can make any credible argument that nearly four (4) years is not enough time to he vc developed workable and eff ective emergency and evacuation plans.

5.7 No less than eleven (11) other states than Ohio have NRC-endorsed emergency plans. "U.S., States Termed Ill-Prepared For Atomic E=ergencies," The Bl ad e 1 ( A pril 27, 1979) .*

Yet an NRC official indicated that it may take until April, 1980 before Ohio has an approvable emergency plan developed .-

g _, 0

• Attached -hereto as Appendix IV.

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. developed by its Disaster Services Acency. Id.

58. This Co==ission is mandated by its own Suidelines to apply a high standard to its evaluation of utility emer-gency plans. 10 CFR Fart 50 Appendir E(III) says:

The Final Sr.f ety Analysis neport shall contain plans for coping with emergencies. The details of these plans and the details of their implementation need not be included. but the plans submitted must include a description of the elements set out in section IV ta an extent sufficient to demonstrate that the olans provide reasonable assurance that accrocriate measures can and N111 be taken in the event of an emer=encv to orotect public health and safety and orevent demane lo crocerty. (emphasis added)

Ey approving the deplorable excuse for a " Utility Plan" of the present Eicensees, the Nuclear Regulatory Con =ission has perpetrated a considerable abuse of its administrative dis-cretion upon the trust reposed in it by Congress and the public. Licensees have not proven through their treatment and consideration of their own Utility Plan tPat there is

" reasonable assurance" that appropriate emergency procedures exist to =inimize property losses, personal injury and death in the event of any emergency at Davis-Eesse.

LICE?S EES ' PLANT RAS AMCNG THE F00EEST OPERATING HECORDS OF ANY CCMMERCIAL REACTOR IN THE UNITED STATES, AND A CONSEQUEITLY GREATER NEED FCE 4CHKAELE EMERGSiCY AND EVACUATION PLANS

59. Complainant TCSE hereby incorporates and re-alleges the allegations of paragraphs 1 throuEh 58 herein.

60. TECo and CEI have been subjected repeatedly to criticism by the NRC. The Davis-Eesse. plant sported a 1978 capacity factor of 32 5%. virtually the lowest in the commercial nuclear industry, and a consequence in 7

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a f large part of poor operator perfor ance.. On or about April 20, 1979, James G. Keppler of NRC-Chicago rated Davis-Besse operator performance ac a "D" (on an A to F scale, F being worst). " Frequency of Errors By Personnel At Davis-Eesse Is Under NRC Study." The Blade 1 (April 20, 1979) (attached hereto as Appendix V).

Moreover, NRC consternation over the plant's safety features actuation system (SFAS) mountad in su=mer, 1978 such that enforcement responsibility was transferred from NEC Chicago to NRC-Washington. " Nuclear Troubles at Davis-Eesse," The Plain Dealer (April 29, 1979) (attached hereto as AppendiI VI).

The topic of technical troubles at Davis-Basse was also the subject of discussion in the immediate wake of the TMI accident. On April 4, 1979, NRC staff =e=ber D.

Eisenhut told the Co= mission that Davis-Eesse had had "three or four" autocatic feedwater system transients (incidents).

See In the Matter of: Babcock & Wilcox Plants, Closed Meeting of the Nuclear hegulatory Commission, April 4, 1979, trans- '

cript, at 13 The NRC has threatened to fine TECo for lengthy delays in reporting to the Co= mission (2 =onths) the fact that in January, 1979, a 4"-5" section of feedwater pipe froz,e in the plant's emergency core cooling system (ECCS), a last-ditch reactor core cooling mechanism. This incident ren-dered the ECCS useless for more than a day, and ould have figured critically in any operational =ishap during that period. See " Davis-Eesse to restart Wednesday," The Plain c'I

'>l

[,b.

Dealer.1, 7 (April 20, J379) (attached hereto as Apperdix

VII ).

Perhaps =ost dist.urbing, however, has been Licensees' (or at least Toledo Edison Conpany's) bad faith or incoc-petent d?alings with the NEC itself.. By letter dated June 29, 1979. Earold E. Denton, Director of the NRC Cffice of Nuclear Reac:cr Regulation, expressed " concern over th e failure of Toledo Edison Ccapany. . .to bring to the attention of the NEC Staff re=bers evaluating the Co=psny's c ompliance with tne Co=missien's con.'irtatory crder of May 16, 1979, Reportable Occurrence (RO) #79-062...." (Letter attached hereto as Apcend1I VIII) . In that correspondenca. Dr. Lenten pointedly r.sked TEco to explain why a TECr Vi ce-?resid ent was unaware of a May 21 occurrence involving an incperable-auxiliary feedwater suction pressure switch and out-of-tolerance pressure setpoints, id., when NRC personnel met with the utility officials en June 8. The NRC has further inquired as tc why the Levis-3 esse plant superintendent seemed equally unaware of that ccourrence on June 8.

Davis-Desse has a notacir questionable history of proble=s wiM. its core cooling mechanisms. Cn September 2, 1977, while operating at one-quarter power or less, a valve in the reactor core failed, and a pump startad too slowly as a coolant feedwater leak occurred. See The rlein Dealer article, Appendi VI hereir.. That incident was cited by Earold Denton to tais Cocaission when he argued in Mcy of this fear for a shutdown -f Zabcock & k*ilect reactors 'r. toe vake of Three Mile Island. Id . . Finally, corrective operatcr retraining r - 7 b.,n t.. ' '

,I

for Davis-Eesse personnel which centered upon the parallels between that incident and the early stases of the TMI crisis has taken place in the past six weekt at E.:bcock & Wilcor's control room simulator in Virginia. See Memorandum to NEC Cor=1ssioners fro = Harold R. Denton, June 27, 1979 concerning the " Removal of Suspensicn of Operation of Davis Besse [sig7," at 29-33, uhich extensively discusses the tech-nical parallels cf the September 2E, 19?? incident and the TMI incident, and specifies operator retraining measures which have bee' taken.

61. Through February of this year. Eavis-Besse personnel have filed reports of more than 280 " events" at the plant, reflecting countless instances of operator error, technical malfunction, and equip =ent failure.

As of rely $, when~ the NEC gave per=1ssion to TECo to restart the plant, NEC of ficials still appeared cautionary in their approach to the proble=s which have occurred.

Harold Centon co= rented I'd be willin: to let the= start up and deconstrate that tney are on tcp of problcr.s. Eu: the situation -

should be monitored carefully. See "NR, Erpected To OK Start-Up Of Davi -Eesse," The clade 1 (July 6, 1979) (Attached hereto as AppenciI IX ).

Thus pertission to restart the plant should not be inter-preted as a ecspletely clean till cf health for TE0o and its operational performance with Da vis-Eesse.

' ' O f;l s-

THIS COMMISSION IS STATUTORILY AUTHORIZRD ONLY TO CONSIDER THE FU3LIC EEALTH AND SAFETY IN IMFOSING LICENSE CONDITIONS, AND CONSIDERATION OF COMPLAINi-ANT'S REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY SEUTDOWN OF THE PLANT MAY BE UNDERTAKEN ONLY UFON SUCE A 3a. SIS

62. Cor.plainant TCSE hereby incorporates and re-alleges the allegations of paragra~phs 1 through 61 herein.

63 Complainant TCSE has caused to be affixed to this Co: plaint a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, which is hereby incorporated in its entirety by this reference.

64 In said Motion, Complainant TCSE apprises this Commission that it is empowered by 42 U.S.C. 52232 to ensure that nuclear operating licenses contain adequate conditions to " provide adequate pI -taction to the health and saf ety of the public."

65 Complainant TCSE has in this Co= plaint alleged and docu=ented nu=erous failures by Licensees of Davis-Besse to 7.dhere to 42 U.S.C. 92232 and variously-cited NRC guide-lines as set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations.

66. During the extensive shutdown ordered by the NRC of Sabcock & W11cor reactors since TMI. TECo officials have been able to provide electric service to customers through the purchase of power generated elsewhere when customer de=and exceeded output by TECT facilities.

67. This Conmission is nowhere e= powered by statute to consider economic factors in directing a shutdown of a nuclear generating facility.

68. Complainant TCSS has focused direc tly upon vital r i issues of public health and safety in the composition of g L

s

]I this Complaint, and has documented that Davis-Eesse Licensees

have had amele ti=e, while Davis-Besse hos,been licensed and considered operational by the NEC, to fulfill the letter and spirit of statutes, guidelines, and co==on sense as regards providing adequately for the continued health and safety of the public.

69. Licensees would suffer no greater economic har=

than they have already undergone during the NRC-ordered shutdown after TMI.

70. Licensees are protected and held harmless frc=

economic loss by the allowance in the State of Ohio of the costs from purchasing power elsewhere being passed through the " fuel adjustment clause" directly to custo=ers.

71. The interests of the =e=bership of TCSE, an'd ' ' as e of the public within a fifty ('50) =11e radius of Davis uesse will be unnecessarily threatened and co= promised if "Eco is allowed by this Co==ission to continue power generation while emergency preparedness plans have not becn adequately established and/or finalized.by Licensees and pertinent agencies of the State of Ohio.

WHEREF0EE, Co=plainant TCSE prays that this Honorable Co==1ssion:

1. Find that Davis Besse is not presently safe to operate and is an i==ediate threat to the public heal'th, safety, welfare and protection of property interests of those citizens living within a fifty (50) =11e radius of 9

the plant; L

C; ;, i 7 2 Grant a Prell=inary Injunc tion or such other order as =ay have the prac tical eff ect of shutting down

Davis Besse immedihtely pending implementation of the cor-rective measures sought herein, and any other rectifying steps which the NEC sees fit to impose; 3 Order Licensees to conduct full-scale drills which de=onstrate to the public the emergency readiness needed to minimize danger to the health and property of the public; 4 Order posting.of emergency and evacuation infor-

=ation in public places within a fifty (50) mile radius of Davis-Eesse, the expenses of such posting to be borne solely and exclusively by Licensees; and 5 order Licensees to enclose emergency and evacuation instructions in utility billings to their customers at least once (1 time) per year, the first ti=e to be prior to any authorized startup of Lavis-Eesse.

Respectfully sub=itted,

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TEEEY J . LCDGE Counsel'for the Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy Served by me this day via certified U.S. tail upon Bruce Churchill,. Counsel for TECo and CEI.

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}? v. . *J/'l Terry J<.EL,odge -

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AFFIDAVIT STATE OF CHIO, COUNTY OF LUCAS, SS:

Michael Ferner, first being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the Chairperson of the Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy, the Complainant herein, and that the facts stated in the foregoing Co= plaint are true as he verily believes.

Michael Ferner STATE OF CHIO, COUNTY OF LUCAS, SS:

Christopher Kerosky, first being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is a member of the Toledo Coalition for Safe En ergy , the Complainant herein, and that the facts stated in the foregoing Complaint are true as he verily believes.

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' Christopher Kerosky Sworn to before ce and subscribed in my presence by Michael Ferner and Christopher Kerosky this 9th day of July, ,

1979 ,

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Terry J- Lodge, Notary Public State;of Ohio My Cottission Eoes Not Expire h

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