ML20094J289
| ML20094J289 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse, Perry  |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1992 |
| From: | Fones R, Schechter M, Urban J JUSTICE, DEPT. OF |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#192-12682 91-644-01-A, 91-644-1-A, A, NUDOCS 9203120298 | |
| Download: ML20094J289 (21) | |
Text
u y/ 2672-t t e l il l' usc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '92 MAR 10 P1 :57 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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1 A10MIC_SAEETX_AN D_.h LC EN S 1RG_fDA RR >
ts v In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-440-A
) $0-346-A OHIO EDISON COMPANY )
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )
Unit 1, Facility Operating ) (Suspension of License No. NPF-58)) ) Antitrust Conditions)
)
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC )
ILLUMINATING COMPANY )
THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY )
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, ) ASLPB No. 91-644-01-A Unit 1, Facility Operating )
License No. NPF-58) )
(Davis-Desse Nuclear Power )
Station, Unit 1, Facility )
Operating License No. NPF-3) )
RESPONSE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 10.lPf L LCANT ' S_ MOIL 0H_ EORlUMMARLDI S EOS1110N IRIROD11CIl0B Bef ore the Atomic Saf ety and u censing Board (" Licensing Board") is a motion by Applicants in this matter for summary disposition of a stipulated legal issue, which issue conprises the sole matter before the Licensing Board in the first stage of this bifurcated hearing. The " bedrock" legal issue is whether the Commission, some eight years after a presently unchallenged finding that the grant of nuclear licenses to Applicants would create or maintain a condition inconsistent with the antitrust laws unless appropriately conditioned, 9203120298 920309 PDR ADOCK 05000346 - h$DE M PDR
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is without authority as a matter of law under Section 105 of the Atomic Energy Act to retain the antitrust license conditions contained in an operating license if it finds that the actual cost of electricity from the licensed nuclear power plant is higher than the cost of electricity from alternative sources, all as appropriately measured and compared?
The Department of Justice (" Department") utges that the Licensing Board answer this issue in the negative, and thus conclude that the Commission does possess the jurisdiction and legal authority to retain the relevant license conditions.
Applicants' attempt to pose as a matter of legal authority 01 jurisdiction, a question of remedy subject to the Commission's broad discretion should be rejected.
A. llistern rf_the_Ploceeding Applicant Ohio Edison ("OE") is an investor owned electric
- utility lccated in Ohio and is a part owner of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 (' Perry") . Applicants Cleveland Electtic Illuminating Company ("CEI") and Toledo Edison ("TE") are wholly owned subsidiaries of Centerior Energy Corporation, a public utility holding company, and part owners of Perry and of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1
(" Davis-Besse").1/ The licenses for these nuclear plants 1/ Two other investor-owned utilities, Duquesne Light Company and Pennsylvania Power Company, are part-owners of the Perry plant and were parties to the original proceedings.
7 contain antitrust conditions that were attached by an Atomic Safety and Licensing Boatd after an extensive antitrust hearing in which it was found that a grant of the licenses would
" create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws," unless the licenses were appropriately conditioned.2/
None of the Applicants presently contest the appropriateness of the initial imposition of the license conditions.
On September 18, 1987, OE filed an application to suspend the antitrust license conditions and on May 2, 1988, CEI and TE also requested suspension of the conditions. In their petitions Applicants contended that unless ownership of the licensed nuclear plants provides a significant economic advantage of access to lower-cost power, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
("NRC" or " Commission") is without authority to retain the anti-trust conditions attached to the nuclear plant licenses. The NRC requested the opinion of the Department of Justice on the legal issue raised by the Applicants. In a letter of June 13, 1990, the Department advised the NRC that changes in the costs 2/ Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LpB-77-1, 5 N.R.C. 133 (1977), aff'd as modified, ALAB-560, 10 N.R.C. 265 (1979) (" Toledo Edison Co."). The Commission declined to review the Appeal Board Decision. Two of the Applicants, pennsylvania power Company and Duquesne Light filed petitions for review in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. On September 26, 1980. the petitioners submitted to the Third Circuit a stipulation to dismiss. The Third Circuit dismissed the appeal on October 8, 1980.
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o-I of operating a nuclear plant do not negate, as a matter of law, !
a finding that the construction and operation of that plant creates or maintains a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws. Consequently, the Department recommended that the NRC dismiss Applicants' petitions.3/ The NRC Staff concurred with the Department and denied Applicants' petitions.4/ Applicants then requested this hearing on their Petitions.
In an Order issued after a pre-hearing conference, the Licensing Board granted the parties' request and ordered a bifurcated hearing. The first part of the hearing will resolve the " bedrock" legal issue, stipulated by the parties, and, only if the ' bedrock" issue is answered in the affirmative will an evidentiary hearing be held to determine the factual contentions raised by Applicants. The Department reaffirms the legal conclusion stated in its June 13, 1990 advice letter, and thus recommends against any further proceedings in this matter.
3/ Letter from Mark C. Schechter to Thomas E. Murley, (June 13,.1990).
I A/ Letter from T. Murley to M. Lyster, CEI, and D. Shelton, TE (April 24, 1991) (transmitting NRC Staff Evaluation of l Applications for License Amendments to Suspend the Antitrust I
License Conditions) and Notice of Denial of Applications.for Amendments to Facility Operating licenses and Opportunity for Hearing (April 24, 1991) ("NRC Staff Denial").
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B. SummaIy_nL1hLDe na Ltmen tis _A Lg ume nt Applicants _ urge the mistaken legal proposition that if, after an imposition by the NRC of license: conditions to prevent l
the creation or maintenance of a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws, the electricity produced by the licensed nuclear plant becomes more costly to produce than power from l other. sources, the NRC is automatically divested of legal authority to retain the antittust license conditions.1/
Neither the explicit language of the Atomic Energy Act,f/ its legislative history nor the decisions of the Commission support the conclusion that the NRC must find that electricity from a 1/ Applicants do not argue t hat they no longer have market power, as found in the proceedings before the NRC. Toledo Edison Co., 10 NRC at 278. Nor do they argue:that they cannot .
exercise that market-power. Prehearing Conference-Transcript, '
Septembet-19, 1991, at 155.
E/_ Section 105 of-the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended in 1970,-(42 U.S.C. S2135) authorizes-the Commission to conduct prelicensing antitrust; review of applications to construct-and operate nuclear power plants. Specifically, the Commission is -
authorized to "inake a finding as to whether the activities underEthe license would create or maintain a situation zinconsistent with the antitrust laws'as specified in subsection-105(a)." 42 U.S.C. S2135.(c)(5). .The antitrust laws listed in-
- S_105(a) inclu6e the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the ,
Federal Trade Commission Act.
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- nuclear plant will be-low cost.as a condition precedent-for finding that-a situation inconsistent with the antitrust-laws ,
will'be created or maintained. Rather, Congress intended that the Commission have broad authority to remedy any anticompeti-tive situation that it concludes would arise from the operation of.a nuclear plant.2/ Neither the statutory language, its legislative history nor precedent support the view that Congress !
intended automatically to divest the Commission of the legal authority to retain lawfully-imposed antitrust licensing condi-tions if, with the passage of time, the licensed plcnt did not produce low-cost power. Administrative agencies, like courts, 3
do not' lose their legal authority because of changed conditions subsequent to the issuance of remedial orders. Instead, they retain a broad discretion with respect to enforcing or changing such orders. In the absence of clear evidence of a special 2/ If Congress had intended a " low-cost" limitation on the NRC's. antitrust = jurisdiction it could, and would, have put that '
limitation in the legislation itself. If Congress-was concerned that the NRC-would interpret its j urisdiction ..nore it broadly than Congress intended it could have put a limiting explantion in the Joint Committee Report, as it did to insure that--the reach of the Commission's antitrust authority did--not extend to those who furnish supplies or materials to build
-nuclear plants.-
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legislative intent to deny the Commission the discretion normally accorded administrative agencies, Applicants' legal theory must be~ rejected.
ABGUMENT I. The Atomic Energy Act Does Not Require a Finding That the Power From a Nuclear Unit Will be Low Cost as a Condition Precedent to a Finding of a Situation Inconsistent With the Antilnuttlaws - - - . .-
"A basic tenet of statutory construction is that the express language of a statute is the primary source of its meaning."8/
Section 105c does not require the Commission to find that the power from a licensed nuclear-plant will be low-cost before making a finding that "the activities under the license will create or maintain a situation-inconsistent with the antitrust laws." More importantly for this board, the statute does not "
impose on the Commission a continuing obligation to find that the licensed facility produces " low cost" power as a juris-dictional requirement for retaining _ license conditions. The only limitation on NRC-antitrust authority contained in the
-8/ Alabama-Power Company v.-Nuclear Regulatory Commission,-692 N F.2d 1362, 1373L(11th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983) (" Alabama Power")
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statute is_that the " situation inconsistent"2/ must be created or maintained by the activities under the license, at the time the antitrust condicisns are imposed.10/
.- l In contrast to the absence of limiting language in Section 105c,-Congress limited the jurisdiction of the NRC where it wished to do so. Two issues that received a great deal of attention.during the hearings on the.1970 Atomic Energy Act 2/ The Commission-is not required to find a violation of the antitrust laws, but only a " situation inconsistent" with those laws.
10/ -This required relationship or " nexus" has been the-source of much litigation before the NRC, but is not at issue here.
The Commission has consistently taken a broad view of-nexus, holding that the NRC it. not limited to examining the operations
- of the nuclear plant in isolation from the other activities of
- the licensee. Toledo Edison Company, 10 NRC at 385, citing Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating' Station, Unit No. 1),'ALAB-279c 1 NRC-559, 572-73 (1975). In the only review by the Court of Appeals of a Commission decision imposing antitrust license conditions, the Court rejected Alabama.
~ power's argument that the words~"under'the license" prohibit the NRC from looking beyond the antitrust implications of the activities-of a license applicant other:than those directly
- arising from the activity to be licensed. (Alabama Power at 1367) Instead, the Court held that the Commission could look-both " forward" and "back" to "see if an anticompetitive climate existsLand to.see11f-the applicant has acted.in an--
anticompetitive manner." -(Alabama Power at 1367-68)
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3 Amendments 11/ were whether license applications filed prior to enactment of the 1970 amendments would be tubject to the newly L
instituted antitrust review requirements 12/ and whether there l l
should be a second antitrust review at the operating license j stage.13/ Congress responded to these issues by including ;
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specific provisions in the legislation.14/ There is no such 3 statutory language limiting the NRC's antitrust authority to
" low cost" situations,-undoubtedly because Congress did not I intend such a limit on that authority.
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- 11. The Legislative History Strongly Supports the Conclusion that Congress Intended Section 105 of the Atomic Energy Act .i to Give the Commission Broad Antitrust Authority and !
Remedial Discretion, Unlimited by Applicants' proffered '
Condition fracc.denLoLlow Cost Despite the clear language of the Act, Applicants ask this Licensing-Board to read into the Act a condition precedent for ,
11/ prior to the-1970 Amendments, the NRC (then the' Atomic ;
Energy Commission or AEC) was required to find that a nuclear ;
facility was sufficiently developed to be of practical value before conducting an antitrust review. Joint Committee Report at 34. The 1970-Amendments elimir.ated this requirement.
12/ This issue is discussed in numerous places'in the hearings, e g , pp. 40, 92, 99, 321, 421, 430, 472 and 582.
13/ This issue is discussed in~ numerous places-in the !
Hearings, e g , pp. 323, 348, 355, 384, 391, 198, 481 and 583, 14/ Section In5(c)(3) specifically limits the antitrust review of a license asolication filed prior to December 19, 1970 and section 105(c)*M) states that there is an antitrust review at the operating 17ense-stage only where there have been changed
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the continuing exercise of NRC antitrust jurisdiction--that the powet frem the licensed nuclear units be less costly than power from other units. Applicants seek support for their argument in t.he legislative history of the Act. A fair reading of the legislative history, however, provides little support for the Applicants' position. Instead, it is cleat that Congress did not wish to limit the Commission's broad antitrust authority and remedial discretion in the way Applicants urge.
A. The Joint Committee Report Contains No Limitation on the Commissions Antitrust Authority and Remedial-DiscIction. ._ ___
The antitrust-language in the Atomic Energy Act was adopted from the original language of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. It was reenacted in 1970 only af ter extenttive hearings in which the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (" Joint-Committee") carefully examined the likely offeet of the retention of that language on Commission antitrust reviews under the new Section 105c. The Joint Committee issued a Report that explained its deliberations and its interpretation of the. legislation.15/
li/ Identical reports were issued in the House and Senate:
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, S. Rep. No. 91-1247 and ll.R.
Rep. No. 91-1470, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970) (" Joint Committee Report").
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The Joint Committee Report contains no language that conditions either the Commission's initial or continuing jurisdiction on a finding that a licensed nuclear plant will produce or is producing low cost power. Instead, after noting that it rejected the " extreme" tecommendations of having no antitrust review or having a review that would go beyond the
" provisions and established policies of the antitrust laws,"
the committee continuedt it in intended that, in offect, the Commission will cenelude-whether, in its judgrr.ent, it is reasonably probable that the activities under the license would, when the license is issued or thereafter, be inconsistutd with any 9f the antitrust laws or the policius clearly underlying these laws.16/
The only intended limitation on the NRC's jurisdiction was that its antitrust examination be limited to " activities under the license" and that it not go beyond the boundaries of the antitrust laws and the policies underlying thosel laws. The committee did not limit Commission antitrust authority or remedial discretion to situations where a nuclear unit is 16/ Joint Committee Report at-14, C
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ptoducing low cost electticity.l?/ The antittunt provisions of the Atomic Energy Ait reflect a Congressional cor.cern that atomic enetgy, develcped wit h gover nment money, not be used to create or maintain a private monopoly.10/
D. Congress Could llot Reasonably Assume that the L' censed Nucleat Units Neuld Alwitys. l'Ioduce. Low _ Cost Electricity Even though Section 10L(c) contains no limiting language, Applicants contend that Congress must have meant to limit the NRC's jurisdiction to situations where a nuclear unit would produce lo cost electricity. This contention is based on a 11 / Where the Joint Committee intended that the NRC's antitrust jurisdiction be limited it included language in its report explaining that limitation. For example, during the hearings, a debate arose whether the activities of suppliets of materials to build nuclear units would be within the ambit of the NRC's antitrust jurisdiction. The Joint Committee responded to this issue by directly stating that supplien relationships were not to be examined by the NRC:
The standard pertains to the activities of the license applicant. *lhe activities of others, such as designers, fabricators, manufacturers, or suppliers of materials or services, who, under some kind of direct or indirect contractual relationship may be furnishing equipment, materials or services for the licensed facility would not constitute " activities under the license" unless the license applicant is culpably involved in activities of others that fall within the ambit of the standard. (Jcint Committe Report at 31)
No such limiting explanation exists with respect to the scope of the Commission's examination of the activities of a license applicant or i t. s remedial discretion after license conditions ate lawfully imposed.
10/ Hearings at p. 546.
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i purported knowledge about nuclear power costs gained by Congress
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in the course of congressional hearings. While legislative hearings, unlike statutory language and committee reports, are usually accorded little, i f any, weight in discerning Congress' l intent, the hearings relied on by Applicants do not evince the type of concensus they claim. Although 'lovernment witnesses l
i expressed confidence that the power from the nuclear units would !
be low cost, indu6try witnesses were far less certain. A Report i
prepared for the Joint-Committee by philip Sporn, then retired l president of American Electric power Company, explains: ;
i During the past-two years there has taken place a remarkable and onimous retrogression in the economics of.our nuclear power technology. The '
light-water-moderated reactor, which two years ago offered potentials for nuclear power generation competitive with fossil fuel at 22d to 24.8d por !
million Stu, has today lost position where it is competitive at 28d to 29.5d per million Stu fossil fuel. cost.
This in turn makes it difficult to accept without .
something more than a grain of salt the statement of the Atomic Energy Commission "the outlook for-the_ .
future for nuclear power continues to be very promising
~(because) of the continuing economic competitiveness of nuclear power in spite of increasing costs as prices for both nuclear and fossil plants increase "
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A atings at 300 (footnote omitted).19/
Philip Sporn was not the only indust r y wi t. ness who was concerned about rising costs of nuclear units relative to fossil fuel units. Hattison Ward, Chairman of the Board of Commenwealth Edison Company responded to a question concerning whether there should be prelicensing review of fossil fuel planta as follows:
The economies of scale are somewhat (but not uniquely) greater for nuclear plants, and nuclear fuel is cheaper than alternative fuels in many areas. On the other hand, the required investment per kilowatt of capacity is higher-no small consideration in times of high money costs, lead times are much longer and siting problems may be more complex. Hearings at 391.
William R. Gould, Senior Vice President of California Edison, also discounted the assumption that nuclear power plants would displace other generation technologies:
It has also been asserted that so-called giant corporate utilities are engaged in a drive to monopolize and completely control nuclear power. This -
1R/ Mr. Sporn continues to discuss this phenomenon for 10 more pages. Included in his Report is a statement of the effects that developments have had on the nuclear industry:
It has caused cancellation of one or two previously announced projects, delay in scheduling of other units committed for; it has brought about interposition of fossil fuel units to be completed ahead of what might have been scheduled atomic units, and in some cases it has brought '
about plain decisions to go fossil when, if things had gone differently, atomic units would have been ordered.
Hearings at 300-301.
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dtive has also boun toferred to as a "nucleat gold rush." .
We emphatically disagree with t hese assertions.
In the first place, nuclear plants generally are not economic bonanzas. t
-For our system, nuclear plants do not have a cost advantage on a mills per kilowatt-hcur basis over fossil fuel units. Our company is now committed to ,
build only nuclear units for major generation reso'rces in the California south coastal basis-not because of an economic advantage-but because air pollution control considerations dictate that after 1975, under existing air pollution control regulations, large fossil-fueled generating units may not be built in this coastal basin. Hearings at 436. l Finally, in a-dialogue with George H.R. Taylor,~ Secretary of the AFL-CIO Staff. Committee on Atomic Energy and Natural ,
- Resources,-Senator pastore expressed-his opinion that without
" built-in" subsidies nuclear power would not be competitive.ZQ/
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Based on the information before it, Congress correctly !
could have concluded that the power generated by nuclear units i would not necessarily be lower cost than that generated by ;
fossil-units. Certainly.those hearings do not provido an adequate basis to conclude that Congress intended to limit the ,
i jurisdiction of the NRC to impose and maintain antitrust .
license conditions to how-cost nuclear-plants.
h 20/ Hearings at 551.
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.f III. Commission precedent Does ! Jot Require a Finding that the Electricity produced by a Licensed !Juclear Unit lie Low Cost As a Condition precedent to a Finding of a Situation !
Inconsistent _ ~ _ _ _ _ _
The IJRC has never interpreted the Atomic Energy Act to ?
include a finding that the electricity from a licensed unit !
must be low cost as a condition piecendt.at to a finding of a '
situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws.21/ 11olther can such a condition precedent reasonably be inferred from i
language in prior Commission decisions that discussed access to nuclear facilities. !
t In some licensing proceedings the anticipated cost benofit from a; nuclear unit was a factor in the Commission's offirmative ;
findings under Section 105c. However, cost was never the only 21/ Applicants point to several Advice Letters issued by the Department of Justice and assert that.even the Department viewed the cost issue-as the " sine qua non of Section 105(c)."
Applicants' Motion at 64. The Department held no such view.
The Advice Letters show only that in some cases the Department viewed unit-cost and_ access as a concern in its antitrust review. The letters do not,-however, support an assertion that ,
-the Department-believed the cost of a unit was an essential !
element to a finding of a situation inconsistent with the l antitrust laws. The Advice Letter on the Davis-Desse unit was the first of three Advice Letters concerning units owned by '
these. Applicants: The second and third' letters raised numerous competitive _ concerns beyond unit cost and access.
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factor in any Commission decision and never a condition j I
precedent to an affirmative finding.22/ ;
i IV. The Existence of Other Agencies With Antitrust l Jurisdiction Does liot Justify Suspending the !
Antiltus L141rense_ConditionL . --
Applicants argue that because the Department of Justice, as j i
well as other agencies, has antitrust unforcement authority, the j license conditions should be suspended. Applicants assert t. hat I because of this overlapping jurisdiction the electric systems l i
that are affected by the antitrust relief contained in theso ;
conditions will not be left " unprotected".al/ liut Congress
.t 22/ If the increased-cost of-nuclear power has lessoned Applicants' competitive ability, their incentive to hcndicap :
their rivals may now be even greater than it was originolly. ,
- Applicants, who may still have market power in high voltage ;
transmission, regardless of the cost of nuclear power, may have ;
an increased incentive to prevent their wholesale customers from using Applicants'-high voltage transmission lines to purchase power from more competitive suppliers. Given that Applicants were f ound by. the 14HC to have engaged in anticompetitive activities when their costs were " low", it would be logically inconsistent to believo.that those !
activities, .if not. constrained by the antitrust conditions, .!
would diminish with increases in Applicants' costs of generating power.- t 22/ Applicants' Motion at p. 30.
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I was not content to leave such matters to the courts. Instead, it explossly chose to maku the Commission "the first line of l
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. defense" against anticompetitive practices in the nuclear '
olectiic power industry. Gu l LE t a tus_V t.111ty...Co ._v .-.Fede t a l l'owetCommission, 411 U.S. 747, at 764 (1973). That another l l
agency or the f eder al courts snay be able to remedy any anticom- -
petitive behavior by the Applicanto does not negate the llRC's l
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clear authority to fashion ita own rollef. The conditionn were lawfully imposed, and the filtC continues to possess the
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jurisdiction to maintain them.
1 COHCLUSI0li j -~ 5 Applicant's assertion that the tiltC is without jurisdiction to retain antitrust-licenso conditions if i t finds that the
- electricity from a nuclear unit is not " low-cost" i s without -
ruerit. The plain language of the Atomic Energy Act does not i
require such a_ condition procedent, and the legislative history _
does not support an alternative interpretation of the Act. t i
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- e Foi theno reasonn the Depattment of Justico urgen that the Licensing Board tesolve the bedtock legal issue in the negative, and thus conclude that the Conuninsion does possens t he legal authosity to retain the license conditions here at issue.
Itespectfully submitted, (d' /-
James F. 11111 h,,/0..j [ ,.
Assistant Attorney General M[a t K C /,6chechter8$l27[.___ ;
Antitrust Division Chiet J. Mark Gidley __ , 1% ~ ~ " -
Acting Deputy Assititant koger M. Fones Attorney General Assistant Chief Antitrust Division N-fthL$$ $Eb! x __ _
, tot H. Urban Attorney Transportation, Energy, and Agriculturo Section Antitrust Division Department of Justico 555 4th St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 307-6349 March 9, 1992
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'92 tW1 10 P 1 :57 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
.a t u J J cat ip '
hi)( n[ t 06 4. '<i u $ U i '
i 1 hereby cestify that on this 9th day of March, 1 H W 'b a
copy of the fotogoing Notice of Appearance was served upon each l
of the following by (irst-class mail:
Respectfully submitted, 4Lt/N "_._
Janet R. Urban i
Marshall E. Miller, Chaltman Gerald Charnoff, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Doord Deborah Charnoff, Esq.
1920 South Creek Boulevard Margaret S. Spencer, Esq.-- I Spruce Creek Fly-In Shaw, pittman, potts &
Daytona Beach, FL 32124 Trowbridge, P.C.
2300 N Street, N.W.
Charles Bechhoefer Washington, D.C. 20037
- Administrative Judge e Atomic Safety and Licensing Board . David R. Straus, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Spiegel & McDiarmid Washington, D.C. 20555 1350 New York Avenue, N.W.
Suite 1100 G. Paul:Bollwerk III: Washington, D.C. 20005 Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board D. Hiard MacGuineas, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Volpe, Doske and Lyons Washington, D.C. 20555 918 16th SLteet, N.W.
Suite 602 Office of the Secretary (7) Washington, D.C. 20006 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Washington, D.C. 20555 Reuben Goldberg Attn: Docketing and Service Channing D.-Strother, Jr.
Section' Goldberg, Fieldman & Letham, p.C.
1100 Fitteenth St., N.W.
Sherwiri E. Turk, Esq. Washington, D.C. 20005 Office of the General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
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June W. Heiner, Esq.,
_ Chief Assistant Director of Law City llall, Room 106 601 Lakeside Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44114 John Bentine, Esq.
Chester, Hoffman, Willcox & Saxbe 17 S. liigh Street Columbus, Ohio 43215 Philip N. Overholt Office of Nuclear Plant Performance Office of Nuclear Enotgy U.S. Department of Energy,11E-44 Washington, D.C. 20585 James P.-Murphy, Esq.
Squirn, Sanders & Dempsey 1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C.- 20044 Office.of Commission Appellate Adjudication-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Washington, D.C. 20355 Kenneth L. Hegemana, P,E. ~
President American Municipal Power-Ohio, Inc.
601 Dempsey Road, P.O. Box 549 Westerville, Ohio- 43081 Anthony J Alexander, Esq.
Vice President and General Counsel Ohio Edison Company
-76 South Main Street-Akron, Ohio 44305 11 -
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