ML19319B498

Memoradum Supporting Proposed Amend to 10CFR73.55(d)(1), Eliminating Physical Searches.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML19319B498
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	08/19/1977
From:	Charnoff G, Silberg J BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO., WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO., WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML19319B495	List: ML19319B496 ML19319B498
References
RULE-RM-73-2 NUDOCS 8001220907
Download: ML19319B498 (11)

Text

_ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ .

.- ~

AuguDt 19, 1977

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of )  :

I

)

l PHYSICAL SEARCHES AT ) Docket No. PRM i b h NUCIEAR POWER REACTORS )

f M ORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF i

PROPOSED RULE MAKING i 1 On February 24, 1977, the Commission published in the Federal i

Register amendments to its regulations setting forth requirements for the physical protection of nuclear power reactors. 42 Fed.

Reg. 10836. Among these requirements is the obligation imposed by 10 CFR 573.55 (d) (1) that at all points of personnel access to the protected area " searches of all individuals be made" and that the " search function for detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices shall be conducted either by a physical search or by use of equipment capable of detecting such devices."

Petitioners Wisconsin Electric Power Company, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, and Saltimore Gas and Electric Ccmpany believe that a requirement for a " pat-down" physical search is unnecessary in view of the other protective measures required, the absence of such a requirement for other (and more sensitive) facilities, and the serious problems which the physical search requirement

imposes. "

On the other hand, pat-down" physical searches should l

be permitted in any case where security personnel are suspicious

, about an individual and signs should be posted that individuals ~

l entering a protected area may Le subject to search.

8001228Y#7

---

y--e w- , -

w r- w wr--- me

p 2

I. ACCESS CONTROLS OTHER THAN PHYSICAL SEARCH REQUIREMENT PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION .

Section 73.55 (d) establishes numerous requirements for the nuclear power plant physical security plan, in addition to the physical search requirement, which provide more than adequate control over access to the protected areas of the plant. These include:

1. Control of all personnel and vehicle access points;

2. Identification of all individuals;

3. Check of authorization for all individuals;

4. Search of all individuals by metal, exple-sives and incendiary detectors, if available.

5. Isolation of individual controlling admission to protected area within bullet-resisting structure;

6. Search of all hand-carried packages:

7. Check ef all deliveries into protected area for identification and authorization;

8. Search of all deliveries into protected area;

9. Search of all vehicles (except in emergency) prior to entry into protected area;

10. Escort of all vehicles (except designated licensee vehicles) in protected area;

11. Restriction of designated licensee vehicles to protected area except for operational, maintenance, repair, security and emergency j

purpcses; 1

I l

i

,' ~,. .

^

' 12. Positive licensee control over all designated licensee vehicles;

13. Numbered picture badge system for all persons authorized access to protected areas without escort;

14. Escort required for individuals not authorized to enter protected area without escort;

15. Individuals requiring escort must register name, date, time, purpose of visit, employment application, citizenship and name of individual being visited;

16. Access to vital areas limited to authorized individuals requiring access:

17. Positive control of personnel and vehicle access to vital areas;

18. Special badges for vital area access;

19. Protection by locks and active intrusion alar =s of unoccupied vital areas;

20. Reactor containment decrs and hatches to be alarmed and locked;

21. Positive access control to reactor containment when frequent access required;

22. Control of keys, locks, ccmbinations and related equipment;

/ 23. Change of key, lock combination or related -

equipment on evidence of its compremise; )

(3 ^

1

24. Change of keys, locks, combinations or related equipment on termination of employee having access thereto.

Wholly apart from the extent and adequacy of these measures, it must also be kept in mind that sabotage of a reactor sufficient to cause significant public harm would be a most ccmplicated act to ccuplete, that light water reactor fuel is not a candidate for strategic material diversion, and that spent fuel is an unlikely target for sabotage.

MTR-7022, Brennan et al., The Threat to Licensed Nuclear Facilities (MITRE Corp. 1975) , pp. 114-118.

The NRC has also proposed that a personnel security program be instituted which would require, inter alia, that cer-tain individuals involved in the operation of licensed nuclear pcwer reactors receive authorization frcm NRC for access to or control of special nuclear material. 42 Fed.

Reg. 14880 (March 17, 1977). As the Commission observes in the statement of consideration acccmpanying the proposed rule, "in the opinion of the Ccemission, experience has shown that (clearance] programs do substantially reduce the risk of such (" insider"] conspiracies." Petitioners support the proposed rule to the extent that it would require the icwer level clearance for licensee employees. Certainly, if such a clearance program is adopted, searches ought not to be required for persons with clearances. This would be consistent with NRC's proposed " Performance Oriented I

Safeguards Requirements", 42 Fed. Reg. 34310 (July 5, 1977) ,

573.46 (d) (4) , which exempts from the search requirement ERDA couriers and licensee employees with NRC or ERDA clearances.

Certainly, any requirements which require searches of cleared personnel are totally unnecessary.

Modifying the rule to explicitly permit physical searches on suspicion and to inform all individuals prior to entering a protected area that they may be searched would also lend further assurance to the security prcgram.

II. OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES WITH RESPONSIBILITY OVER FACILITIES MORE SENSITIVE THAN NUCLEAR PCWER REACTORS DO NOT REQUIRE PHYSICAL SEARCHES AS PART OF THEIR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

Nuclear power reactors are by no means the most sensitive facilities operated or licensed by the Federal Government.

Nuclear weapons storage areas, military nuclear research facilities and many military bases would seem to have a greater need for physical security protection than ccmmercial nuclear reactors. Even the anti-hijacking precautions in effect i for all commercial airlines wculd appear to need measures at least as stric: as those for nuclear pcwer plants. Yet in none of these cases do government regulations require a physical search.

The security requirements for nuclear weapons are governed by Department of Defense Directive No. 5210.41,

" Security Criteria and Standards for Protecting Nuclear Weapons" (September 10, 1976). This directive applies to

all Defense Department components having responsibility for

,-- , - - - ,.4, - ,,,,-,. e .n - Ig-- nnn , w

m ' '

the protection of nuclear weapons. Enclosure 3 to Directive No. 5210.41 sets forth the Criteria and Standards for Protecting

~

Nuclear Weapons. Section F, Entry and Access Control, governs entry into Exclusive Areas (defined as a designated area in which one or more nuclear weapons are located) and Limited Areas (areas surrounding Exclusion Areas) and requires:

1. entry control to assure positive identification, including as a minimum

a. controlled picture badge system;

b. formal entry control resters;

c. visitor escort system, and

d. a duress system (a system whereby the security personnel can be covertly informed of a situation of duress).

2. limitation of entry to authorized personnel, including either personnel security clearance for those authorized entry or surveillance by a designated escort for persons without clearance.

3. provisions for rapid entry during actual response or exercises.

No requirement exists for physical searches, even when nuclear weapons are involved.

The U.S. Army nuclear weapons security procedures similarly do not require physical searches. Army Regulatien AR 50-5 (eff. September 1, 1976) provides for a badge syste.7,

,\

entry control rosters, a visitor control system and a duress system. Unescorted entrance to Limited and Exclusion Areas is restricted to cleared individuals with an escort system for persons without clearances. However, even for uncleared (but escorted) persons having access to nuclear weapons, no physical search is required.

Security regulations in other defense related areas also have no requirement for physical searches. The Energy Research and Development Administration procedures are set forth in ERDA Manual Chapter 2000. Specifically, ERDA Manual Appendix 2401, Physical Protection of Classified Matter and Information, makes no mention of physical searches.

Defense Department regulations used for the security of naval shipyard construction (including naval nuclear construction) req'2 ire no physical searches. See DOD 5220.22-M, " Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information",

and DOD 5220.22-R, " Industrial Security Regulation."

Nonsilitary security programs similarly do not require physical searches. To deter potential hi-jackers, the Federal Aviation Administration in 1972 adopted 14 CFR 5121.538, " Aircraft Security." This regulation requires that each carrier adopt A screening system, acceptable to the Administra-tion, that is designed to prevent or deter the carriage aboard its aircraf t of any explosive or incendiary device or weapon. . . .

To our kncwledge, no carrier has adopted, nor has the FAA required,

~

a screening system which requires physical search.

, - .--.. , - - - - e ., --n,.. -- ,

Thus, our investigation of physical security requ'irements for activities with a sensitivity comparable to, or greater than, nuclear power reactors discloses no examples where physical

~

searches are required III. THE PHYSICAL SEARCH REQUIREMENT CAUSES NEEDLESS PROBLEMS TO LICENSEES REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT IT A number of practical problems have already surfaced in the short time since the Commission-mandated physical search require-ments has been implemented. Other problems can be expected over the next several months.

Some plant personnel and their unions have made kncvn their fecling that a physical search is highly distasteful, personally offensive, and in violation of individual rights. In at least one case of which we are aware, the employee refused to submit to a physical search. As a result, the utility felt obliged to place the employee on leave of absence without pay until such time as another position in the ccmpany could be found where the employee would not be subject to physical search. The employee has retained a lawyer and is investigating the possibility of legal action against the utility. Several unions have protested and at least one has asserted that the new physical search requirement constitutes a change in working conditions requiring i a negotiated settlement.

I l

The problem of women employees and visitors is particu-larly troublesome. Although most utility guard forces may

! include some wcmen, there is no assurance that a woman guard ,

would be at every entrance at any time that a wcman empicyee

3

_9 or vi'sitor might appear. In the absence of a woman guard, the physical search, and the woman's entry, would have to be delayed until a woman guard was obtained. In some instances, this might result in a significant delay in order to have a woman guard report to the plant.

The likelihood of a substantial delay in processing people through the security system is likely with the onset of colder weather and the need for entering personnel to a

remove their coats, jackets and sweaters, so that those items can be searched prior to the physical search of the individual.

Significant delays may be involved in processing large numbers of people, particularly during outages when a significant increase in the number of workers coming on-site can be expected. This added time may result in additional costs to the utility in terms of reduced productivity or requests for additional ccmpensation. Larger guard forces may also be required in an attempt to reduce the delay.

IV. CCNCLUSICN As shown above, the physical search requirement imposed by the Ccmmission is unique. In the perspective of the risks of industrial sabotage sccepted by American society and the precautions taken in connection with those risks, the Commission's physical search requirement appears excessive and unreanonable.

Other government agencies with responsibility over activities of equal or greater sensitivity and susceptability to industrial or other sabotage do not require a physical search as a part of their

, . , - , _ . _ , _ . , , - - - , _ _ , , , . . _ y .-r-m,-

=

security plans. And there is no known parallel to such require-ment in connection with other private activities involving pe.rhaps Other measures required by the Com-larger risks to society.

i mission give adequate asr. ance that a nuclear power reactor is properly protected. Finally, the present requirements are causing and will continue to cause problems to the utilities which must We therefore respectfully request implement those requirements.

that the Commission modify its physical search requirement to read as follows:

The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access inte a protected area. Identi-fication and search of all individuals shall be made and authorization shall be checked at such points. The licensee <nall post signs at such points informing ind'.viduals that they may be subject to physical search prior to entering a protected area. The search function for detection of firearms, explosives and incendiary devices shall be conducted [either by a physical search or] by use of equipment capable of detecting such devices, to the extent such equipment is reasonably available. The licensee may conduct a physical search of an incividual if deemed necessarv or appropriate. The individual responsible for the last access control function (controlling admis-sion to the protected area) shall be isolated within a bullet-resisting structure as described in paragraph (c) (6) of this section to assure their ability to respond or to summon assistance.

Respectfully submi:ted, SEAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE

~

f /'\ ,.

b~ 5

,/

By _- -

, Gerald Charnoff 4

[J,ayE. Silberg 1*00 M Street, N.W.

1ashington, D.C. 20036, (202) 331-4100 Dated: August 19, 1977

- s UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of )

)

PHYSICAL SEARCHES AT ) Docket No. PRM D->

NUCLF.'$R POWER REACTORS )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certiy that copies of the foregoing " Petition for Rule Making" and " Memorandum In Support of Proposed Rule Making" were mailed, first class, postage prepaid, this 19th day of August.- l') 77 , to the following:

Mr. Edson Case Docketing and Service Section Acting Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatcry Office of Nuclear Reactor Commission Regulation Washington, D. C. 20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 General Counsel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

/

\ ,s. 1 \ t,.,

/-

Jayf'g. Silberg -

t

<i  ;

~ ~

w