ML19345G902

Response in Opposition to Carolina Environ Study Group 810402 Motion Questioning Util 810324 Request for OL for 35% Power level.TMI-type Accident Is Not Credible.Proposed Order & Certificate of Svc Encl

ML19345G902
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	04/17/1981
From:	Mcgarry J DEBEVOISE & LIBERMAN, DUKE POWER CO.
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
NUDOCS 8104220695
Download: ML19345G902 (27)

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• UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ( c/ 7* -

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION \g h BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD - ' - '

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Before Administrative Judges: / /g

& VA Robert M. Lazo, Esquire, Chairman ij Emmeth A. Luebke, Ph.D. -

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\# C Richard F. Cole, Ph.D.

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9 9 5-In the Matter of ) Ik

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DUKE POWER COMPANY. ) Docket Nos. 50

) 50-370 (William B. McGuire Nuclear )

Station, Units 1 and 2) )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING APPLICANT'S MOTION FOR LICENSE AUTHORIZING OPERATIONS UP TO AND INCLUDING 35% RATED POWER OPERATIONS At the close of the evidentary hearings in this pro-ceeding, Duke Power Company (" Applicant") orally moved for authorization to ascend to a 35% power level. Tr. 5240.

The Atemic Safety and Licensing Board (" Licensing Board")

requested that such motion be in writing. Tr. 5242-3.

l Accordingly, on March 24, 1981, Applicant, pursuant to 10 CFR 550.57(c), filed a Motion For License Authorizing i

Operations Up To and Including 35% Rated Pcwer Operations.

On April 2, 1981, Intervenor, Carolina Environmental Study Group ("CESG"), responded, questioning the scope and content of Applicant's Motion. On April 8, 1981, the Nuclear Regu- q gg]

latory Commission Staff (" Staff") responded to Applicant's 5 Motion stating that it " raises no objection." In its C[

l l

8194220695

Response, the Staff sought leave to respond to CESG's reply. On April 13, 1981, the Licensing Board granted the Staff's request; the Board afforded Applicant a like oppor-tunity to respond. On April 17, 1981, pursuant to the Board's Order of April 13, 1981, both Applicant and Staff filed responses to CESG's reply urging the Board to grant Applicant's 35% Rated Power Operations Motion.

In the TMI Restart proceeding the Commission issued two decisions regarding the proper scope and focus of litigation of matters involving hydrogen generation. Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit No.

1), CLI-80-16, 11 NRC 674 (1980) and Order of September 26, 1980 (Docket No. 50-289)(Restart)). The hydrogen generation issue placed in controversy in this proceeding 1/ parallels 1/

~ As quoted below, CESG's contention in this regard is the precise contention raised as Sholly Contention 11 in the TMI Restart Proceeding (Docket No. 50-289 (Restart)).

Contention 1: The licensee has not demonstrated that, in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident j at McGuire:

1. substantial quantities of hydrogen (in excess of the design basis of 10 CFR }50.44) will not be generated; and

2. that, in the event of such generation, the hydro-gen will not combust; and

3. that, in the event of such generation and com-I bustion, the containment has the ability to with-

! stand pressure below or above the containment de-l sign pressure, thereby preventing releases of off-I site radiation in excess of Part 100 guideline values.

_ -. . -.- ..-- . . - - - - -- _ = - - _ - - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _

-

3-the issue raised in the TMI Restart proceeding. Thus, the two commission decisions in that proceeding, discussed below, are applicable here.

In the first decision, the issue of hydrogen generation was brought before the Commission in the form of two csrtified questions:

1. Whether the provisions of 10 CFR 50.44 should be waived or exceptions made thereto in this proceeding where a prima facia showing has been made under 10 CFR 2.758 that hydrogen gas generation during the TMI-2 accident was well in excess of the amount required under 10 CFR 50.44 as a design basis for the post-accident combustion gas control system for TMI-1. .

2. Whether post-accident hydrogen gas control should be an issue in this proceeding where post-accident hydrogen gas control was perceived to be a serious prob-lem and was in fact a problem during the TMI-2 accident.

[Three Mile Island, supra, 11 NRC at 674-5.]

In its ruling regarding the certified questions, the Commission declined to waive or except the hydrogen generation provisions embodied in 10 CFR $50.44. Id. However, the Commission stated that litigation of the hydrogen generation issue was acceptable in individual licensing proceedings under 10 CFR Part 100 (Id.

11 NRC at 675) subject to the following restrictions:

The Commission believes that, quite apart from 10 CFR 50.44, hydrogen gas control could proper-ly be litigated in this proceeding under 10 CFR Part 100. Under Part 100, hydrogen control mea-aures beyond those required by 10 CFR 50.44 would be required if it is determined that there is a credible loss-of-coolant accident scenario entail-ing hydrogen generation, hydrogen combustion, con-tainment breach or leaking, and offsite radiation  ;

doses in excess of Part 100 guideline values.

[ emphasis supplied) Id. 11 NRC at 675].

8

. - , e - - - ,,,--- n. , - . , . . , , - - , , - ~ , , . . - - , -

In the second Co'mmission decision, Commissioners Gilinsky and Bradford in their dissent to the Commission's September 26, 198C order denying reconsideration of CLI-80-16 make clear where the burden of establishing such a credible accident lies:

Moreover, Chairman Ahearne and Commissioner Hendrie are, in effect, saying that even after experience

. has amply demonstrated the inadequacy of safety regu-lations covering the internal components of the reactor the burden is still on a challenger to lay out a specific accident sequence to the Commission which leads to containment failure and public radiation exposures in excess of those permitted by Part 100.

[TMI (Restart), supra, Order, dissenting opinion, slip op. at p. 2 (September 26, 1980).]

Based on the above Commission decisions, it is clear that the required scope of accident analysis in this proceeding is limited to those accident scenarios involving hydrcgen produc-tion resulting in offsite doses in axcess of 10 CFR Part 100 limits which CESG has demonstrated are " credible". 2/

At the outset of the hearing, Applicant stated that in view of the occurrence of the TMI accident, it would not stand on formality and require CESG to first establish the credibility of a TMI accident. Tr. 2816. Rather, Applicant 2/ The Commission noted that it is planning a broad rulemak-ing proceeding regarding degraded core conditions in-cluding measures to deal with hydrogen generation in the event of such degraded core conditions. Id. . NRC at 675. The degraded core rulemaking effort will c-sider, inter alia, accidents outside the current design basis accident envelope (i.e., incredible accidents) including core melt / slump accidents. See 45 Fed. Rec.

65474 (October 2, 1980).

stated that it would present evidence to show such an accident was not credible at McGuire. Id. Aside from a TMI accident, placed in evidence by the Applicant, an examination of the evidence clearly reveals that CESG has failed to establish any credible accident scenario. 3/

Thus, pursuant to the Commission decisions in the TMI Restart proceeding,.the only issue in controversy and -

subject to resolution in this proceeding is whether a TMI

-3/ CESG's case consisted of the direct testimony of five psychologists (Tr. 3624-39, 3835-44, 3845-51, 3852-59, 3977-87), direct testimony of a former Duke Power Com-pany employee (Tr. 3824-33), a report by Sandia National Laboratory (Intervenor Exhibits 40, 40A), a table from a risk analysis performed for Sequoyah (Intervenor Exhibit 61), and a page from the Encyclopedia Britannica (Intervenor Exhibit 60). The testimony of the five psychologists did not relate to a specific accident sequence but rather focused on various psychological phenomena related to worker performance (Tr. 3624-39, 3835-59, 3977-87); the former Duke Power Company employee did not raise an accident sequence but rather generally suggested the presence of an alleged defective weld in the liner plate of the containment vessel. (Tr.

3827-33); the Sandia report does not serve as support for a particular accident, but rather questions the wisdem of requiring igniters in the upper plenum of the ice condenser (Intervenor Exhibit 40 at pp. 1-2: see also Tr. 4082, 4087, 4101, 4112); the Sequoyah risk analysis material is a one page table that simply lists the probability associated with various Sequoyah-related postulated accidents, which are not directly applicable to McGuire (Tr. 4464), and which cannot be viewed as establishing the credibility of an accident; the Encyclopedia Britannica raises no accident scenario, rather it relates to the melting temperature of solder (Tr. 3823). Further, inasmuch as neither Applicant nor Staff raised any accident except TMI as being credible, Intervenor's cross-examination cannot be the foundation

for the demonstration of a credible accident.

, . _ - . - - - - , - , - - - , -r -

accident resulting in excessive hydrogen generation leading to offsite doses in excess of part 100 limits is credible at the McGuire facility.

With regard to a TMI accident, Applicant testified that at 35% power operations such could not occur at McGuire. Tr. 3046-51 and 3083. Specifically, Applicant analyzed a loss-of-feedwater event at McGuire with loss of auxiliary feedwater (a TMI event). This analysis demon-strated that the power operated relief valve, which was the location of the loss-of-coolant in the TMI accident, had not opened for a period well in excess of the time within which feedwater was restored in the TMI accident, and thus hydrogen in excess of regulatory limits would not be gener-ated. 4/ Tr. 3046-7, 3051. This situation results from (1) the reduced volume of steam that would be generated at 35%

pc.-er in a TMI accident at McGuire, and (2) the increased

, size of the Westinghouse steam generators (as compared to the smaller Babcock and Wilcox steam generators present at

-4/ The pertinent sequence of events which occurred at TMI resulting in a hydrogen generation accident are (1) a loss of feedwater transient resulting in high reactor coolant system pressure which was relieved by the power operated relief valve, (2) failure of the relief valve i to close resulting in a continued loss-of-coolant, (3) premature operator interference with the emergency core cooling system resulting in inadequate cooling of the reactor core and excessive core temperatures, and (4) production of hydrogen from the reaction of approxi-mately 45% of the =irconium clad and steam in the pre-sence of the excessively high temperatures. Tr. 2870-3, 3086-89, 3374, 4469-70 and Staff Testimony Regarding An Analysis of Hydrogen Control Measures following Tr. 4353 at pp. 2-3.

t

TMI (Tr. 3103-4)) which generators provide a heat sink of such volume that injection of auxiliary feedwater is unnecessary for periods well in excess of the time auxiliary feedwater 7

was supplied in the TMI accident. Tr. 3083; see also Tr.

3051. 5/

The record fails to disclose any contrary evidence.

Indeed, CESG does not challenge the authenticity of Appli-

~

cant's testimony in this regard. See CESG's Reply to Applicant's Motion at p. 3. Rather, CESG raises three concerns regarding (1) the possibility of loss of power coupled with a TMI accident; (2) the possibility of fail-ure to reinitiate auxiliary feedwater in 4000 seconds, and (3) the possibility of steam generators at McGuire boiling dry during the scenario. 6/ 7/ In that during the TMI 5/ For a further discussion of the steam generators at McGuire versus those at TMI, see Applicant responses to Board examination at Tr. 3086-9. See also Intervenor's recross-examination of Applicant at 3096-8.

-6/ CESG also asserts that Contentions 3 and 4 remain in controversy and thus "an initial decision as to these matters must issue before the contested activity can be authorized." Contentions 3 and 4 relate to emergency planning and are premised upon the generation and com-bustion of excessive amounts of hydrogen resulting in containment breach and offsite doses in excess of 10 CFR Part 100. Inasmuch as we find today that excessive hydrogen (in excess of 10 CFR $50.44 limits) will not be generated with regard to the matter in controversy (the TMI accident) at 35% power operation, Contentions 3 and 4 do not come into play, and thus, it is not necessary to reach these matters in this decision.

-7/ The Board notes that CESG's three concerns are not based on the record and thus cannot be viewed as evidence.

i

accident there was no loss of power, and auxiliary feedwater was established within approximately 480 seconds (Tr. 3051),

CESG's first two concerns are well beyond the scope of the TMI accident. In addition, CESG has failed to present any evidence which would establish the credibility of loss of power or sustained failure of the auxiliary feedwater system during a TMI event. With regard to CESG's third concern regarding McGuire steam generators boiling dry, Applicant testified, as noted above, that McGuire steam generators were significantly larger and of a different design than those at TMI. Tr. 3103-4. Applicant testified that at full power operations it would take approximately 10 times longer for the McGuire steam generators to boil dry. Tr. 3098, 3104. Further, Applicant testified that at 35% power, assum-ing auxiliary feedwater was not restored for 10 minutes (approximately 2 minutes longer than the time within which auxiliary feedwater was restored in the TMI accident) the steam generator level would have only dropped to approxi-mately 75% of its original value, and thus, at this power level McGuire steam generators would not have boiled dry prior to reinitiation of feedwater or initiation of auxil-iary feedwater. Tr. 3050.

The Board finds that the matters raised in opposition to Applicant's Motion do not weigh against issuance of the requested license for 35% power operations. Specifically,

the Board finds that at 35% rated power operations, a TMI accident resulting in excessive hydrogen generation leading to offsite doses in excess of Part 100 limits at the McGuire facility is not credible.

In addition to the above, the Licensing Board is cogni-zant of the. Commission's guidance in TMI (Restart), supra, 11 NRC at 676, wherein it was stated that a " critical issue" in determining the likelihood of an accident entailing the generation of hydrogen in excessive quantities "would be the likelihood of an operator interferring with ECCS operation."

Accordingly, the Board notes that Applicant testified that even assuming a TMI accident did occur at McGuire, due to post-TMI changes in training, personnel, equipment and pro-cedures, premature termination of the ECCS by McGuire oper-ators is so remote that it would not occur. Testimony of K.S. Canady, L.A. Reed and H.B. Barron regarding McGuire Operation Relating to Hydrogen Generation following Tr. 2864

("Canady Panel I"), Tr. 2993-4. See also Applicant's Pro-posed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Form of a Supplemental Initial Decision at pp. 11-24 (" Applicant's Proposed Findings"); 8/ NRC Staff Proposed Findings of Fact 8/ The Board has examined the proposed findings of Applicant and Staf f regarding the issue of operator inference with ECCS operation. The Board finds the two documents to be similar in this regard. The Board concurs with these proposed findings and will include the substance of them in its Supplemental Initial Decision Regarding 100%

Power Operation.

10 -

and Conclusions of Law In The Reopened Licensing Board Proceeding Regarding Hydrogen Generation In The Form Of A Supplemental Initial Decision at pp. 15-26 ("NRC Proposed Findings"). Applicant noted that its testimony regarding such operator actions was not limited to the precise TMI accident conditions, but included a range of loss of coolant i

accidents. Testimony of Canady Panel I at p. 8. Further, t

I j the evidence reflects that at 100% power operation, even i

assuming premature termination of ECCS operation during a TMI-type accident at McGuire, it is incredible to assume that McGuire operators would not reinitiate ECCS operation well prior to hydrogen generation in excess of the limits set forth in 10 CFR 50.44. Testimony of K.S. Canady, L.A.

Reed, R.A. Muench, and H.B. Barron Regarding McGuire Nuclear Station Operation Relating to ECCS Termination following Tr.

3045 at pp. 2-3 ("Canady Panel II"), Applicant Exhibit 5A at Table 2. See also Applicant's Proposed Findings at pp.

19-20. 9/ Further, Applicant testified that at 35% power, the time for reinitiation of ECCS operation prior to hydro-I gen generation in excess of 10 CFR $50.44 limits would be l

"substantially" increased. Testimony of Canady Panel II at

p. 2. See also, Applicant's Proposed Findings at pp. 10 20. 10/

1 9/ See n.8 supra.

10/ See n.8 supra.

I l

I i

l l

Thus, in view of the above, the Licensing Bor.rd finds that, even assuming a TMI-type accident resulting in a loss .

of reactor coolant, there is reasonable assurance that at 35%

power operations the McGuire operators will not prematurely terminate ECCS operations for sustained periods of time necessary to result in generation of hydrogen in excessive quantities.

The Board notes that during the course of this pro-ceeding in addition to the above noted testimony regarding premature operator termination of ECCS, inquiry was made into a range of accident sequences. This inquiry was not directed to determining the credibility of an accident; rather it was concerned with assessing the adequacy of the hydrogen mitigation system proposed by Applicant. Inasmuch as it has been determined that at 35% power operation excessive h:rdrogen (i.e. , in excess of 10 CFR $50.44 limits) will not be generated, this mitigation system will not be called upon if a TMI-type accident occurred at McGuire at such a power level. Accordingly, findings concerning the mitigation system need not be made at this time. This is not to say that the Board will not address the mitigation system in its 100% power decision.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER Pursuant to 10 CFR $50.57(c) the above shall constitute the Board's findings on the matters specified in 10 CFR

{50.57(a) as to which there is a controversy. On the basis

of such findings the Board concludes that with respect to the activities herein authorized (1) that the facility will operate in conformity with the application as amended, the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; (2) that there is reasonable assurance that the activities authorized herein can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public; (3) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter 1; (4) and that issuance of the requested license will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Wherefore, it is ordered that Applicant's Motion For License Authorizing Operations Up To And Including 354 Rated Power Operations is granted. It is further ordered that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, is authorized, upon making findings on all other matters specified in 10 CFR 50.57(a), to issue to Applicant, an operating license for McGuire Unit 1 for operations up to and including 35%

rated power operations.

The instant Memorandum and Order authorizes licensing action; accordingly, the Board hereby advises the parties of the applicability of Appendix B to 10 CFR part 2. Such Appendix provides that a stay of the instant decision may be sought pursuant 10 CFR $2.788. Such stay request is to be filed with the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board

within 10 days after service of this decision. 11/

In addition to requests for stay, exceptions to this decision may be filed within 10 days after the service of this decision. A brief in support of the exceptions should be filed within 30 days thereafter (40 days in the case of the Staff). . Within 30 days after the service of the brief of appellant (40 day, in the case of the Staff), any other, party may file a brief in support of, or in opposition to, the exceptions.

. FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Robert M. Lazo, Chairman Administrative Judge Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke, Member Administrative Judge Dr. Richard F. Cole, Member Administrative Judge Issued at Washington, D.C.

this day of April, 1981.

-~11/ The Board notes that Applicant has sought waiver, exception and/or exemption from the provisions of i

Appendix B, 10 CFR Part 2. In addition the Commission has published a proposed amendment to Appendix B. 46 Fed. Rec. 20215 (April 3, 1981). In the event Appendix B is modified in whole or in part, either in response to l Applicant's petition or the rulemaking, this ordering clause should be viewed as accordingly amended.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA h .

OM, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND / I;::; LICEN In the Matter of )

)

DUKE POWER COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-369

) 50-37 (William B. McGuire Nuclear ) @i  !/

Station, Units 1 and 2) e

) h APPLICANT'S RESPONSE TO CESG'S REPLY TO APPLIC<

MOTION FOR LICENSE AUTHORIZING OPERATIONS [8E n pgBF ec y Hl UP TO 35% RATED POWER OPERATIONS k9 u.s. %*p* (

At the close of the evidentary hearings in this p g

3, g y

.[1 ceeding, Duke Power Company (" Applicant") orally moved for authorization to ascend to a 35% power level. Tr. 5240.

The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (" Licensing Board")

requested that such motion be in writing. Tr. 5242-3.

Accordingly, on March 24, 1981, Applicant, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.57(c), filed a Motion For License Authorizing Operations Up To and Including 35% Rated Power Operations.

On April 2, 1981, Intervenor, Carolina Environmental Study Group ("CESG"), responded, questioning the scope and content of Applicant's Motion. On April 8, 1981, the Nuclear Regu-l latory Commission Staff (" Staff") responded to Applicant's Motion stating that it " raises no objection." In its Response, the Staff sought leave to respond to CESG's reply. On April 13, 1981, the Licensing Board granted the pso3 Staff's request; the Board afforded Applicant a like s oll i

l l

_2-opportunity to respond. On April 17, 1981, pursuant to the Board's order of April 13, 1981, both Applicant and Staff filed responses to CESG's reply urging the Bcard to grant Applicant's 35% Rated Power Operations Motion.

In the TMI Restart proceeding the Commission issued two decisions regarding the proper scope and focus of litigation of matters involving hydrogen generation. Metropolitan Edison Ccmpany (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit No.

1), CLI-80-16, 11 NRC 674 (1980) and Order of September 26, 1980 (Docket No. 50-289 (Restart)). The hydrogen generation issue placed in controversy in this proceeding 1/ parallels the issue raised in the TMI Restart proceeding. Thus, the two Commission decisions in that proceeding, discussed belcw, are applicable here.

~1/ As quoted below, CESG 's contention in this regard is the precise contention raised as Shelly Contention 11 in the TMI Restart Proceeding (Docket No. 50-289 (Restart)).

Contention 1: The licensee has not demonstrated that, in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident at McGuire:

1. substantial quantities of hydrogen (in excess of the design basis of 10 CFR $50.44) will not be generated; and

2. that, in the event of such generation, the hydro-gen will not combust; and

3. that, in the event of such generation and com-bustion, the containment has the ability to with-stand pressure below or above the containment de-sign pressure, thereby preventing releases of off-site radiation in excess of Part 100 guideline values.

In the first decision, the issue of hydrogen generation was brought before the Commission in the form of two certified questions:

1. Whether the provisions of 10 CFR 50.44 should be waived or exceptions made thereto in this proceeding where a prima facie showing has been made under 10 CFR 2.758 that hydrogen gas generation during the TMI-2 accident was well in excess of the amount required under 10 CFR 50.44 as a design. basis for the post-accident combustion gas control system for TMI-1.

2 Whether post-accident hydrogen gas control should be an issue in this proceeding where post-accident hydrogen gas control was perceived to be a serious prob-lem and was in fact a problem during the TMI-2 accident.

[Three Mile Island, supra, 11 NRC at 674-5 3 In its ruling regarding the certified questions, the ccmmission declined to waive or except the hydrogen generation provisions embodied in 10 CFR 50.44. Id. However, the Commission stated that litigation of the hydrogen generation issue was acceptable in individual licensing proceedings under 10 CFR Part 100 (Id.

11 NRC at 675) subject to the following restrictions:

The Commission believes that, quite apart from 10 CFR 50.44, hydrogen gas control could proper-ly be litigated in this proceeding under 10 CFR Part 100. Under Part 100, hydrogen control mea-sures beyond those required by 10 CFR 50.44 would be required if it is determined that there is a credible loss-of-coolant accident scenario entail-ing hydrogen generation, hydrogen combustion, con-tainment breach or leaking, and offsite radiation doses in excess of Part 100 guideline values.

[(emphasis supplied) Id. 11 NRC at 675.]

In the second Commission decision, Commissioners Gilinsky and Bradford in their dissent to the Commission's September 26,*1980 Order denying reconsideration of CLI-80-16 make

clear where the burden of establishing such a credible accident lies:

Moreover, Chairman Ahearne and Commissioner Hendrie are, in effect, saying that even after experience has amply demonstrated the inadequacy of safety regu-lations covering the internal components of the reactor the burden is still on a challenger to lay out a specific accident sequence to dhe Commission which leads to containment failure and public radiation exposures in excess of those permitted by Part 100.

[TMI (Restart), supra, Order, dissenting opinion, slip op. at p. 2 (September 26, 1980).]

Based on the above Commission decisicas, it is clear that the required scope of accident analysis in this proceeding is limited to those accident scenarios involving hydrogen produc-tion resulting in offsite doses in excess of 10 CFR Part 100 limits which CESG has demonstrated are " credible". 2/ The NRC Staff concurs in this position. Tr. 2829-32.

At the outset of the hearing, Applicant stated that in view of the occurrence of the TMI accidont, it would not stand on formality and require CESG to first establish the credibility of a TMI accident. Tr. 2816. Rather, Applicant stated that it would present evidence to show such an 1

l accident was not credible at McGuire. Id. Aside from

-2/ The Commission noted that it is planning a broad rulemak-ing proceeding regarding degraded core conditions in-cluding measures to deal with hydrogen generation in the event of such degraded core conditions. Id. 11 NRC at 675. The degraded core rulemaking effort will con-sider, inter alia, accidents outside the current design basis accident envelope (i.e., incredible accidents) including core melt / slump accidents. See 45 Fed. Reg. 65474 (October 2, 1980).

l l

~. . . ._ _ _ _ _ _ _

a TMI accident, placed in evidence by the Applicant, an examination of the evidence clearly reveals that CESG has failed to establish any credible accident scenario. 3/

Thus, pursuant to the Commission decisions in the TMI Restart proce0 ding, the only issue in controversy and subject to resolution in this proceeding is whether a TMI accident resulting in excessive hydrogen generation leading to offsite doses in excess of Part 100 limits is credible at the McGuire facility.

~3/ CESG's case consisted of the direct testimony of five psychologists (Tr. 3624-39, 3835-44, 3845-51, 3852-59, 3977-87), direct testimony of a former Duke Power Companv employee (Tr. 3824-33), a report by Sandia National Laboratory (Intervenor Exhibits 40, 40A), a table from a 'isk analysis performed for Sequoyah (Inter-venor Exhibit 61), and a page from the Encyclopedia Britannica (Intervenor Exhibit 60). The testimony of the five psychologists did not relate to a specific accident sequence but rather focused on various psycho-logical phenomena related to worker performance (Tr.

3624-39, 3835-59, 3977-87); the former employee did not raise an accident sequence but rather generally cuggest-ed the presence of an alleged defective weld in the liner plate of the containment vessel. (Tr. 3827-33);

the Sandia report does not serve as support for a particular accident, but rather questions the wisdom of requiring igniters in the upper plenum of the ice con-denser (Intervenor Exhibit 40 at pp. 1-2; see also Tr.

4082, 4087, 4101, 4112); the Sequoyah risk analysis material is a one page table that simply lists the probability associated with various Sequoyah-related postulated accidents, which are not directly applicable to McGuire (Tr. 4464), and which cannot be viewed as establishing the credibility of an accident; the Encyclopedia Britannica raises no accident scenario, rather it relates to the melting temperature of solder (Tr. 3823). Further, inasmuch as neither Applicant nor Staff raised any accident except TMI as being credible, Intervenor's cross-examination cannot be the foundation for the demonstration of a credible accident.

With regard to a TMI accident, Applicant testified that at 35% power operations such could not occur at' McGuire. Tr. 3046-51 and 3083. Specifically, Applicant analyzed a loss-of-feedwater event at McGuire with loss of auxiliary feedwater (a TMI event). This analysis demon-strated that the power operated relief valve, which was the location of the loss-of-coolant in the TMI accident, had not opened for a period well in excess of the time within which feedwater was restored in the TMI accident. Tr.

3046-7, 3051. 4/ This situation results from (1) the reduced volume of steam that would be generated at 35% power in a TMI accident at McGuire, and (2) the increased size of the Westinghouse Steam generators (as compared to the smaller Babcock and Wilcox steam generators present at TMI (Tr. 3103-4)) which generators provide a heat sink of such volume that injection of auxiliary feedwater is unnecessary

-4/ The pertinent sequence of events which occurred at TMI resulting in a hydrogen generation accident are (1) a loss of feedwater transient resulting in high reactor coolant system pressure which was relieved by the power operated relief valve, (2) failure of the relief valve to close resulting in a continued loss-of-coolant, (3) premature operator interference with the emergency core cooling system resulting in inadequate cooling of the reactor core and excessive core temperatures, and (4) production of hydrogen from the reaction of approxi-mately 45% of the zirconium clad and steam in the pre-sence of the excessively high temperatures. Tr. 2870-3, 3086-89, 3374, 4469-70 and Staff Testimony Regarding An Analysis f Hydrogen Control Measures following Tr. 4353 at pp. 2-3.

1 I

for periods well in excess of the time auxiliary feedwater was supplied in the TMI accident. Tr. 3083; see also Tr.

3051. 5/

The record fails to disclose any contrary evidence.

Indeed, CESG does not challenge the authenticity of Appli-cant's testimony in this regard. See CESG's Reply to Applicant's Motion at p. 3. Rather, CESG raises three concerns regarding (1) the possibility of loss of power coupled with a TMI accident; (2) the possibility of fail-ure to reinitiate auxiliary feedwater in 4000 seconds; and (3) the possibility of steam generators at McGuire boiling dry during the scenario. 6/ 7/ In that during the TMI accident there was no loss of power, and auxiliary feedwater 5/ For a further discussion of the steam generators at McGuire versus those at TMI, see Applicant responses to Board examination at Tr. 3086-9. See also Intervenor's recross-examination of Applicant at 3096-8.

~6/ CESG also asserts that Contentions 3 and 4 remain in controversy and thus "an initial decision as to these matters must issue before the contested activity can be authorized." Contentions 3 and 4 relate to emergency planning and are premised upon the generation and com-bustion of excessive amounts of hydrogen resulting in containment breach and offsita doses in excess of 10 CFR

! Part 100. Inasmuch as we find today that excessive hydrogen (in excess of 10 CFR $50.44 limits) will not be generated with regard to the matter in controversy (a TMI accident) at 35% power operation, Contentions 3 and 4 do not come into play, and thus, it is not necessary to reach these matters in this decision.

7/ , Applicant would note that CESG 's three concerns are not t based on the record and thus cannot be viewed as evidence.

i

was established within approximately 480 seconds (Tr. 3051),

CESG's first two concerns are well beyond the scope of a TMI accident. In addition, CESG has failed to present any evidence which would establish the credibility of loss of power or sustained failure of the auxiliary feedwater system during a TMI event. With regard to CESG's third concern regarding McGuire steam generators boiling dry, Applicant testified, as noted above, that McGuire steam generators are significantly larger and of a different design than those at TMI. Tr. 3103-4. Applicant testified that at full power operations it would take approximately 10 times longer for the McGuire steam generators to boil dry. Tr. 3098, 3104. Further, Applicant testified that at 35% power, assum-ing auxiliary feedwater was not restored for 10 minutes (approximately 2 minutes longer than the time within which auxiliary feedwater was restored in the TMI accident), the steam generator level would have only dropped to approxi-mately 75% of its original value, and thus, at this power 1

level McGuire steam generators would not have boiled dry prior to reinitiation of feedwater or initiation of auxil-iary feedwater. Tr. 3050.

On the basis of the above, Applicant submits that the i 1

matters raised in opposition to Applicant's Metion do not weigh against issuance of the requested license for 35%

9 i power operations. Specifically, at 35% rated power operations, a TMI accident resulting in excessive hydrogen generation leading to offsite doses in excess of Part 100 limits at the McGuire facility is not credible.

In addition to the above, Applicant is cognizant of the Commission's guidance in TMI (Restart), supra, 11 NRC at 676, wherein it was stated that a " critical issue" in deter-mining the likelihood of an accident entailing the genera-tion of hydrogen in excessive quantities "would be the likelihood of an operator interferring with ECCS operation."

Applicant testified that even assuming a TMI accident did occur at McGuire, due to post-TMI changes in training, personnel, equipment and procedures, premature termination of the ECCS by McGuire operators was so remote that it would not occur. Testimony of K.S. Canady, L.A. Reed and H.B.

Barron regarding McGuire Operation Relating to Hydrogen Generation following Tr. 2864 ("Canady Panel I"), Tr.

2993-4. See also Applicant's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Form of a Supplemental Initial Decision at pp. 11-24 (" Applicant's Proposed Findings").

Applicant noted that its testimony regarding such operator actions was not limited to the precise TMI accident condi-tions, but included a range of loss of coolant accidents.

a Testimony of Canady Panel I at p. 8. Further, the evidence i reflects that at 100% power operation, even assuming prema-ture termination of ECCS operation during a TMI-type acci-dent at McGuire, it is incredible to assume that McGuire operators would not reinitiate ECCS operation well prior to hydrogen generation in excess of the limits set forth in 10 CFR $50.44. Testimony of K.S. Canady, L.A. Reed, R.A.

Muench, and H.B. Barron Regarding McGuire Nuclear Station Operation Relating to ECCS Termination following Tr. 3045 at pp. 2-3 ("Canady Panel II"), Applicant Exhibit SA at Table

2. See also Applicant's Proposed Findings at pp. 19-20.

Further, Applicant testified that at 35% power, the time for reinitiation of ECCS operation prior to hydrogen generation in excess of 10 CFR $50.44 limits would be "substantially" increased. Testimony of Canady Panel II at p. 2. See also, Applicant's Proposed Findings at pp. 19-20.

Thus, Applicant submits that even assuming a TMI-type accident resulting in a loss of reactor coolant there is reasonable assurance that it 35%* power operations the l McGuire operators will not prematurely terminate ECCS oper-l ations for sustained periods of time necessary to result in generation of hydrogen in excessive quantities.

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Applicant notes that during the course of this pro-ceeding in addition to the above noted testimony regarding premature operator termination of ECCS, inquiry was made into a range of accident sequences. This inquiry was not directed to determining the credibility of an accident; rather it was concerned with assessing the adequacy of the hydrogen mitigation system proposed by Applicant. Inasmuch as it has been demonstrated that at 35% power operation excessive hydrogen (i.e., in excess of 10 CFR $50.44 limits) will not be generated, this mitigation system will not be i called upon if a TMI-type accident occurred at McGuire at such a power level. Accordingly, findings concerning the mitigation system need not be made at this time. This is not to say that the Board will not address the mitigation system in its 100% power decision. 8/

On the basis of the above, Applicant respectfully requests that its Motion For License Authorizing Operations Up To And Including 35% Rated Power Operations be granted.

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-8/ Applicant notes that the McGuire facility and in parti-cular the installed hydrogen mitigation system is similar to Tennessee Valley Authority's Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.

Tr. 3403; Staff Exhibit I at p. I-4. The Staff and Commission have found that the hydrogen mitigation system installed at Sequoyah provides, with reasonable assurance, protection against breach of containment in the event that a substantial quantity of hydrogen is generated.

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N , i To assist the Board, Applicant, pursuant to 10 CFR $2.730(b),

has prepared a proposed order and attaches it hereto. 9/

Respectfully submitted,

,J.

N' &&

Michael Mc.Garry,,III DEBEVOISE & LIBERMAN 1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 857-9800 Of Counsel:

William L. Porter Associate General Counsel DUKE POWER CO.iPANY April 17, 198.

4

-9/ Applicant would note that as of this date, additional licensing is still necessary on May 15, 1981. The timely grant of a 35% license will provide Applicant with approximately 4-6 weeks additional testing and inspection work; a full power license will be necessary in mid to late June 1981. Given the fact that the immediate effectiveness rule has been suspended (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix B), Board action well before these dates is necessary, so as to provide sufficient time for Commission review.

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