Information Notice 1986-30, Design Limitations of Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Systems: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-30 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-30
                                  UNITED STATES


COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


OFFICE OF INSPECTION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT


===AND ENFORCEMENT===
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 April 29, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-30:  DESIGN LIMITATIONS OF GASEOUS EFFLUENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 April 29, 1986 IE INFORMATION


NOTICE NO. 86-30: DESIGN LIMITATIONS
MONITORING SYSTEMS
 
OF GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING
 
SYSTEMS


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:
:
All nuclear power reactor facilities
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license or a con- struction permit.
 
holding an operating
 
license or a con-struction
 
permit.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
: This notice is provided to alert licensees
:
This notice is provided to alert licensees to two design limitations noted in


to two design limitations
the use of Eberline's SPING-4 (system particulate iodine and noble gas) gaseous


noted in the use of Eberline's
effluent monitoring systems. The first deals with the limitations of the


SPING-4 (system particulate
detection capability of the SPING-4 monitoring system. Some licensees are


iodine and noble gas) gaseous effluent monitoring
incorrectly relying on the SPING-4 to meet all of the post-accident require- ments of NUREG-0737. The second deals with noble gas adsorption that could


systems. The first deals with the limitations
interfere with routine operational low-level monitoring.


of the detection
It is expected that recipients will review this information for applicability


capability
to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude problems


of the SPING-4 monitoring
related to these limitations at their facilities. However, suggestions con- tained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specif- ic action or written response is required.


system. Some licensees
==Description of Circumstances==
 
:
are incorrectly
The Eberline SPING-4 is designed to monitor radioactive noble gasses, particu- lates and iodines in plant gaseous effluents. By using three overlapping
 
relying on the SPING-4 to meet all of the post-accident
 
require-ments of NUREG-0737.
 
The second deals with noble gas adsorption
 
that could interfere
 
with routine operational
 
low-level
 
monitoring.
 
It is expected that recipients
 
will review this information
 
for applicability
 
to their facilities
 
and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude problems related to these limitations
 
at their facilities.
 
However, suggestions
 
con-tained in this notice do not constitute
 
NRC requirements;
therefore, no specif-ic action or written response is required.Description
 
of Circumstances:
The Eberline SPING-4 is designed to monitor radioactive
 
noble gasses, particu-lates and iodines in plant gaseous effluents.
 
===By using three overlapping===
channels, the noble gas (NG) monitor has a detection
 
capability
 
of 10-7 to 105 pCi/cc (Xe-133 equivalent).
 
The low-range
 
channel employs a beta scintillation
 
detector.
 
The mid- and high-range
 
channels of the NG monitor use energy-compensated
 
GM tube detectors.
 
Conformance
 
to NUREG-0737 II.F.1: Item II.F.1.1 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification
 
of TMI Action Plan Requirements," issued November 1980, requires licensees
 
to have the capability
 
to detect and measure concentrations
 
of NG fission products in plant effluents (up to lo5 pCi/cc for undiluted
 
containment
 
exhaust) during and following
 
an accident.Recent NRC regional inspections
 
of NUREG-0737 implementation
 
indicate that 8604280122 IN 86-30 April 29, 1986 some licensees
 
have installed
 
SPING-4 monitors and mistakenly
 
consider them adequate to meet all of the requirements
 
of Item II.F.1.1.
 
Although the SPING-4 does have an upper detection
 
capability
 
of 105 pCi/cc, its associated
 
microcomputer
 
is vulnerable
 
to radiation
 
damage from a total integrated
 
dose greater than 1000 rads. Therefore, it is unlikely the SPING-4 would survive the course of an accident.
 
Eberline has indicated
 
that the SPING-4 was designed primarily
 
as a normal-range
 
monitor with extended capabilities
 
for brief excursions
 
to concentrations
 
greater than 102 pCi/cc. Full-range
 
moni-toring consistent
 
with Item II.F.1.1 can be achieved by using the SPING-4 in conjunction
 
with an accident monitor (with a remote microprocessor)
such as Eberline's
 
model AXM-1. The accident monitor comes on line when excessively
 
high activity levels are sensed while the SPING-4 isolates itself and goes into a purge cycle.Noble Gas Adsorption:
Eberline has noted noble gas adsorption
 
with the plastic scintillator
 
while performing
 
a SPING-4 calibration.
 
This calibration
 
compared the SPING-4 output with a GeLi detection
 
system output, as the concentration


of a reference
channels, the noble gas (NG) monitor has a detection capability of 10-7 to 105 pCi/cc (Xe-133 equivalent). The low-range channel employs a beta scintillation


gas (Xe-127) was decreased.
detector. The mid- and high-range channels of the NG monitor use energy- compensated GM tube detectors.


The concentration
Conformance to NUREG-0737 II.F.1:
Item II.F.1.1 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,"
issued November 1980, requires licensees to have the capability to detect and


of Xe-127 (initially
measure concentrations of NG fission products in plant effluents (up to


at 210 pCi/cc)in the closed test loop was decreased
lo5 pCi/cc for undiluted containment exhaust) during and following an accident.


by vent and dilution operations.
Recent NRC regional inspections of NUREG-0737 implementation indicate that


Cali-bration was interrupted
8604280122


after 2 days to correct problems with the GeLi system.The system was allowed to stand idle for 10 days with 0.3 pCi/cc Xe-127 concen-tration. When the calibration
IN 86-30
                                                              April 29, 1986 some licensees have installed SPING-4 monitors and mistakenly consider them


resumed, the response of the beta scintillator
adequate to meet all of the requirements of Item II.F.1.1. Although the


did not decrease in the expected proportions.
SPING-4 does have an upper detection capability of 105 pCi/cc, its associated


An investigation
microcomputer is vulnerable to radiation damage from a total integrated dose


indicated
greater than 1000 rads. Therefore, it is unlikely the SPING-4 would survive


that both the inner and outer mylar sheets that cover the plastic scintillator
the course of an accident. Eberline has indicated that the SPING-4 was


had adsorbed Xe-127 gas.Although the levels of activity used in this calibration
designed primarily as a normal-range monitor with extended capabilities for


were much higher than those normally encountered, the noble gas adsorption
brief excursions to concentrations greater than 102 pCi/cc. Full-range moni- toring consistent with Item II.F.1.1 can be achieved by using the SPING-4 in


noted on the low range of the detection
conjunction with an accident monitor (with a remote microprocessor) such as


system could indicate a generic operational
Eberline's model AXM-1. The accident monitor comes on line when excessively


concern. The high background
high activity levels are sensed while the SPING-4 isolates itself and goes into


resulting
a purge cycle.


from the adsorbed gas could cause overestimations
Noble Gas Adsorption:
Eberline has noted noble gas adsorption with the plastic scintillator while


in any effluent release calculations
performing a SPING-4 calibration. This calibration compared the SPING-4 output


that are based on the monitor output. This is particularly
with a GeLi detection system output, as the concentration of a reference gas


true if low-level
(Xe-127) was decreased. The concentration of Xe-127 (initially at 210 pCi/cc)
in the closed test loop was decreased by vent and dilution operations. Cali- bration was interrupted after 2 days to correct problems with the GeLi system.


monitoring
The system was allowed to stand idle for 10 days with 0.3 pCi/cc Xe-127 concen- tration. When the calibration resumed, the response of the beta scintillator


is resumed following
did not decrease in the expected proportions. An investigation indicated that


either a large activity excursion
both the inner and outer mylar sheets that cover the plastic scintillator had


(3 or 4 orders of magnitude
adsorbed Xe-127 gas.


above normal) or an extended moderate increase (1 order of magnitude
Although the levels of activity used in this calibration were much higher than


for a week or more). Following
those normally encountered, the noble gas adsorption noted on the low range of


such releases the monitor should be purged and a new background
the detection system could indicate a generic operational concern. The high


taken. It should be noted that this gas adsorption
background resulting from the adsorbed gas could cause overestimations in any


phenomenon
effluent release calculations that are based on the monitor output. This is


is probably not unique to SPING-4 monitoring
particularly true if low-level monitoring is resumed following either a large


systems. Other manufacturers
activity excursion (3 or 4 orders of magnitude above normal) or an extended


of plastic scintillation
moderate increase (1 order of magnitude for a week or more). Following such


detectors
releases the monitor should be purged and a new background taken. It should be


use similar construction
noted that this gas adsorption phenomenon is probably not unique to SPING-4 monitoring systems. Other manufacturers of plastic scintillation detectors use


techniques.
similar construction techniques. Any effluent monitor that employs a plastic


Any effluent monitor that employs a plastic scintillation
scintillation detector may experience the same difficulties.


detector may experience
IN 86-30
                                                            April 29, 1986 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.


the same difficulties.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional


IN 86-30 April 29, 1986 No specific action or written response is required by this information
Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.


notice.If you have any questions
ward L. Jordan Director


about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator
i  Division of Emergency Preparednes


of the appropriate
and Engineering Response


regional office or this office.ward L. Jordan Director i Division of Emergency
Office of Inspection and Enforcement


Preparednes
===Technical Contact:===


and Engineering
===Roger L. Pedersen, IE===
                    (301)492-9425 James E. Wigginton, IE


Response Office of Inspection
(301)492-4967 Attachment:


and Enforcement
===List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices===


Technical
Attachment 1 IN 86-30
                                                            April 29, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED


Contact: Roger L. Pedersen, IE (301)492-9425 James E. Wigginton, IE (301)492-4967 Attachment:
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
List of Recently Issued IE Information


Notices
Information                                    Date of


Attachment
Notice No.      Subject                        Issue  Issued to


1 IN 86-30 April 29, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION
86-29           Effects of Changing Valve      4/25/86 All power reactor


NOTICES Information
Motor-Operator Switch                  facilities holding


Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 86-29 86-28 86-27 Effects of Changing Valve Motor-Operator
Settings                              an OL or a CP


Switch Settings Unauthorized
86-28          Unauthorized Transfer and      4/28/86 All licensees author- Loss of Control of Indus-              ized to possess and


Transfer and Loss of Control of Indus-trial Nuclear Gauges Access Control at Nuclear Facilities
trial Nuclear Gauges                   use industrial nuclear


Potential
gauges.


Problems In Generators
86-27          Access Control at Nuclear      4/21/86 All power reactor


Manufactured
Facilities                            facilities holding


By Electrical
an OL or CP, research


===Products Incorporated===
and nonpower reactor
Traceability


And Material Control Of Material And Equipment, Particularly
facilities, and fuel


Fasteners 4/25/86 4/28/86 4/21/86 4/17/86 4/11/86 86-26 86-25 All power reactor facilities
fabrication & pro- cessing facilities


holding an OL or a CP All licensees
86-26          Potential Problems In          4/17/86 All power reactor


author-ized to possess and use industrial
Generators Manufactured By            facilities holding


nuclear gauges.All power reactor facilities
Electrical Products                    an OL or CP


holding an OL or CP, research and nonpower reactor facilities, and fuel fabrication
Incorporated


& pro-cessing facilities
86-25          Traceability And Material      4/11/86 All power reactor


All power reactor facilities
Control Of Material And                facilities holding


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
Equipment, Particularly                an OL or CP


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
Fasteners


holding an OL or CP; research and test reactor facilities;
86-24          Respirator Users Notice:      4/11/86 All power reactor
fuel cycle licensees


and Priority 1 material licensees All power reactor facilities
Increased Inspection Frequency        facilities holding


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
For Certain Self-Contained            an OL or CP; research


holding an OL or CP and research and test reactors 86-24 Respirator
Breathing Apparatus Air                and test reactor


Users Notice: 4/11/86 Increased
Cylinders                              facilities; fuel


Inspection
cycle licensees and


Frequency For Certain Self-Contained
Priority 1 material


Breathing
licensees


Apparatus
86-23          Excessive Skin Exposures Due  4/9/86  All power reactor


Air Cylinders 86-23 Excessive
To Contamination With Hot              facilities holding


Skin Exposures
Particles                              an OL or CP


Due To Contamination
86-22          Underresponse Of Radition      3/31/86 All power reactor


With Hot Particles Underresponse
Survey Instrument To High              facilities holding


Of Radition Survey Instrument
Radiation Fields                      an OL or CP and


To High Radiation
research and test


Fields 4/9/86 3/31/86 86-22 OL = Operating
reactors


License PIr r,.^-,4>.
OL = Operating License


n,.}}
PIr  r,.^-,4>.    n,.}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 03:04, 24 November 2019

Design Limitations of Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Systems
ML031220651
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill
Issue date: 04/29/1986
From: Jordan E
NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-86-030, NUDOCS 8604280122
Download: ML031220651 (4)
v • d • e


SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-30

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 April 29, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-30: DESIGN LIMITATIONS OF GASEOUS EFFLUENT

MONITORING SYSTEMS

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license or a con- struction permit.

Purpose

This notice is provided to alert licensees to two design limitations noted in

the use of Eberline's SPING-4 (system particulate iodine and noble gas) gaseous

effluent monitoring systems. The first deals with the limitations of the

detection capability of the SPING-4 monitoring system. Some licensees are

incorrectly relying on the SPING-4 to meet all of the post-accident require- ments of NUREG-0737. The second deals with noble gas adsorption that could

interfere with routine operational low-level monitoring.

It is expected that recipients will review this information for applicability

to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude problems

related to these limitations at their facilities. However, suggestions con- tained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specif- ic action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

The Eberline SPING-4 is designed to monitor radioactive noble gasses, particu- lates and iodines in plant gaseous effluents. By using three overlapping

channels, the noble gas (NG) monitor has a detection capability of 10-7 to 105 pCi/cc (Xe-133 equivalent). The low-range channel employs a beta scintillation

detector. The mid- and high-range channels of the NG monitor use energy- compensated GM tube detectors.

Conformance to NUREG-0737 II.F.1:

Item II.F.1.1 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,"

issued November 1980, requires licensees to have the capability to detect and

measure concentrations of NG fission products in plant effluents (up to

lo5 pCi/cc for undiluted containment exhaust) during and following an accident.

Recent NRC regional inspections of NUREG-0737 implementation indicate that

8604280122

IN 86-30

April 29, 1986 some licensees have installed SPING-4 monitors and mistakenly consider them

adequate to meet all of the requirements of Item II.F.1.1. Although the

SPING-4 does have an upper detection capability of 105 pCi/cc, its associated

microcomputer is vulnerable to radiation damage from a total integrated dose

greater than 1000 rads. Therefore, it is unlikely the SPING-4 would survive

the course of an accident. Eberline has indicated that the SPING-4 was

designed primarily as a normal-range monitor with extended capabilities for

brief excursions to concentrations greater than 102 pCi/cc. Full-range moni- toring consistent with Item II.F.1.1 can be achieved by using the SPING-4 in

conjunction with an accident monitor (with a remote microprocessor) such as

Eberline's model AXM-1. The accident monitor comes on line when excessively

high activity levels are sensed while the SPING-4 isolates itself and goes into

a purge cycle.

Noble Gas Adsorption:

Eberline has noted noble gas adsorption with the plastic scintillator while

performing a SPING-4 calibration. This calibration compared the SPING-4 output

with a GeLi detection system output, as the concentration of a reference gas

(Xe-127) was decreased. The concentration of Xe-127 (initially at 210 pCi/cc)

in the closed test loop was decreased by vent and dilution operations. Cali- bration was interrupted after 2 days to correct problems with the GeLi system.

The system was allowed to stand idle for 10 days with 0.3 pCi/cc Xe-127 concen- tration. When the calibration resumed, the response of the beta scintillator

did not decrease in the expected proportions. An investigation indicated that

both the inner and outer mylar sheets that cover the plastic scintillator had

adsorbed Xe-127 gas.

Although the levels of activity used in this calibration were much higher than

those normally encountered, the noble gas adsorption noted on the low range of

the detection system could indicate a generic operational concern. The high

background resulting from the adsorbed gas could cause overestimations in any

effluent release calculations that are based on the monitor output. This is

particularly true if low-level monitoring is resumed following either a large

activity excursion (3 or 4 orders of magnitude above normal) or an extended

moderate increase (1 order of magnitude for a week or more). Following such

releases the monitor should be purged and a new background taken. It should be

noted that this gas adsorption phenomenon is probably not unique to SPING-4 monitoring systems. Other manufacturers of plastic scintillation detectors use

similar construction techniques. Any effluent monitor that employs a plastic

scintillation detector may experience the same difficulties.

IN 86-30

April 29, 1986 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional

Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.

ward L. Jordan Director

i Division of Emergency Preparednes

and Engineering Response

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Technical Contact:

Roger L. Pedersen, IE

(301)492-9425 James E. Wigginton, IE

(301)492-4967 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

Attachment 1 IN 86-30

April 29, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to

86-29 Effects of Changing Valve 4/25/86 All power reactor

Motor-Operator Switch facilities holding

Settings an OL or a CP

86-28 Unauthorized Transfer and 4/28/86 All licensees author- Loss of Control of Indus- ized to possess and

trial Nuclear Gauges use industrial nuclear

gauges.

86-27 Access Control at Nuclear 4/21/86 All power reactor

Facilities facilities holding

an OL or CP, research

and nonpower reactor

facilities, and fuel

fabrication & pro- cessing facilities

86-26 Potential Problems In 4/17/86 All power reactor

Generators Manufactured By facilities holding

Electrical Products an OL or CP

Incorporated

86-25 Traceability And Material 4/11/86 All power reactor

Control Of Material And facilities holding

Equipment, Particularly an OL or CP

Fasteners

86-24 Respirator Users Notice: 4/11/86 All power reactor

Increased Inspection Frequency facilities holding

For Certain Self-Contained an OL or CP; research

Breathing Apparatus Air and test reactor

Cylinders facilities; fuel

cycle licensees and

Priority 1 material

licensees

86-23 Excessive Skin Exposures Due 4/9/86 All power reactor

To Contamination With Hot facilities holding

Particles an OL or CP

86-22 Underresponse Of Radition 3/31/86 All power reactor

Survey Instrument To High facilities holding

Radiation Fields an OL or CP and

research and test

reactors

OL = Operating License

PIr r,.^-,4>. n,.


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